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JOVANA JEZDIMIROVIĆ RANITO S I N C E TH E E N D O F 1 98 0 S , W HE N R E E M E R G EN C E O F I NC I D E N T S B ET W E E N AL BA N I AN A N D S E R B I AN P O P UL A TI ON I N K O SO VO B E C A M E A N O R D IN AR Y EV E NT , Q U E S TI O N O F K O SO VO B E C AM E A V ALU AB L E P O LI TI C AL TO OL I N S ERB I A N P OLI TIC S . I N T H E 19 9 0 S , MY T HIC A L SY MB OLI S M OF K O SO V O H A S B EE N U S E D A N D A B U S ED BY T H E PO LI TI C AL ELI T E T O R AI S E N A TI O N ALI S M TH A T S E R V E D T O SU P P O R T A UT O C R A TI C R E GI M E A T T H E TI M E. AF T E R T HE FALL OF T H E A U T O C R A TIC R E GI M E OF MIL O S EV IC , MY T HOL OG I C AL U SE O F HI S TO RY M A I N T AI N ED , BY I NV O KI NG S Y MB OLI S M OF K O SO V O B A TTL E, T HO U GH TH E N A R R A TIO N M O D E B E CAM E G EN E R ALLY MO R E P R A G MA T I C. T H E A I M OF T HIS C H A P T E R I S T O D E MON S T R A T E TH A T E V EN T H O UG H T HE D I S C O UR SE A P P R O A CH T O T H E K O S O VO P RO BL E M B E CA M E M OR E M A T T E R - OF -F ACT AND D E C R E A S E D T H E L EV E L O F VI OL E N CE I N I T , IT S E R V E S TH E S A M E P U R P O S E S I T D I D T W O D E C AD E S A G O: T O R AI S E NAT I ON ALI S M, F R A M E EXT E R N AL E NE M Y A N D DIS T R A C T TH E M A S S E S F RO M A N I MO SI TY TH A T GL A R IN G E CO N O MI C , P OLI TI CAL AND S O CI AL P RO BL E M S T HA T T H E S T AT E F A C E S .

INTRODUCTION

The End of Cold War brought some changes to the European geography, especially over the 1990s with the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia. These processes have led to a formation of new countries and a creation of new nation-states that sought to find their own national identities. The

common denominators of the process were a use of their own language, religion and remembering their historical roots before the phase where they formed a union with other nations.

In that sense, case of Serbia has been more radical in a certain manner, once the rebirth of national identity occurred in a period of political instability and internal conflict in the

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southern province, Kosovo. The need that other nations felt to determine their national identity and shape it to fit in the modern context182 was in Serbia’s case pronounced even more by the political discourses that were oriented in the increasing a critical mass that would support the nationalistic ideas of the political elite in the country.

The presence of the nationalistic connotation in discourse is not an exception in Serbia’s case; the importance of the national identity in the European political elite discourses, despite strong participation in the European Union (EU) institutions, is evident and omnipresent. The classic example of Gordon Brown´s insistence of ‘Britishness’183 or the appearance of neo-racism in Austria in the beginning of 1990s184 assists in identification of some of them. It is not this sort of references that cause concern, rather ones associated with a rise of the national identity that leads to nationalism, spread not solely over the Eastern Europe and Balkan (with the disintegration of the USSR and Yugoslavia) in past years, but where it had the most extreme connotations. As Berger put it ‘we can establish a map of narrative scar tissue across Europe, where national histories and national identities clashed with often deadly con-sequences’.185 Regarding that map, it has been explored, in the elite political discourse analysis and study of nationalism,

and covers largely Russia186 and post-soviet space187 and in smaller scale considers Kosovo problem. Both Albanian and Serbian discourse have been analyzed, one from the sight of irredentism of Albanian ethnonationalists188 and another from the assessment of the ‘war on terror’ narrative.189 By being an active issue, it represents an open space for the discussion and different lines of inquiry.

The consistency of any narrative in the construction of national identity derives from the policy of invoking history and incitement to remember some moments in history that are sacred for the nation, for different reasons, as a celebration of the victories over enemies, liberation from enemy or conquering new territories. These aspects are fairly well covered in the literature,190 and concern are the consequences of the fusion of the history and national identity, mainly translated in the escalation of the hate discourse 191 and identification of the ‘other’ as an enemy.192

To initiate a discussion of how myths influence a general understanding of history, it is necessary to define history and its origins. Early in the past, history of one nation was presented in a narrative form, used by historiographers, who presented their vision of facts (and myths) and therefore, it was difficult to refer to history as an objective matter at that time. The level of involvement of myths through the historical periods

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changed, during the medieval period its addition has been even seen as a welcome. However, from Enlightening period onward, historical writing has been forced on more professional and institutionalized form in order to diminish accusations for incur-poration of the mythical elements and more accurate representation of the past events.193

The myth and history can be crossed on many different levels, as Stefan Berger summarized, from historical myths of origin, over mythologies of the religion to spatial mythologies dealing with borders and borderlands.194 The combination of these interpretations is commonly used for the construction of the national identity, and it was a common practice in Europe over the period of the construction of the nation states in 18th and 19th century. This ‘mythistory’ may become a very dangerous weapon in the arms of those who pretend to use it for mobilization for aggression or oppression.

The slim boundaries between history, myth and fiction have been a light motive of the writings of Hayden White195 and Michel de Certeau196 who worked on the approach of how historiography is intertwined with rhetorical and literary strategies. The study of the national identity through the rhetorical analysis is relatively recent, its exploration being intensified only in the last decade. A rhetorical approach centering on the

construction of the national identity surged as a study for the political realities that have been created by the discourses of the elites capable to transform the construction of public space. As Michael Bruner defined, a range of the effects extends from the communities where national identity ‘foster the recognition of rights and duties in virtue of shared membership in a vibrant public sphere’ to where it foster ‘patterns of identification based on a suppression of important political realities through constrictions on critical citizenship’.197

The role of the strategic forgetfulness is equally important in the process of formation of political memory of one nation as is the remembering selective facts.198 The process of intentional amnesia and focus on the specific aspects and moments in history is a tool that is often used by politicians in the formation of the specific public memory. This tool Nietzsche199 defined as a monumental approach to history, used as ‘an incentive to action’, as a tool of imitation of past actions, and the one that represents a ‘danger of being somewhat distorted, or being reinterpreted according to aesthetic criteria and so brought closer to a fiction’.200

In case of Serbia, the rise of the use of history as a political tool, regarding the problems of Kosovo, is evident from the end of the 1980s. With the insistence on the

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differences of the people and ethnics who until then lived together, Serbia, as well as other ex-Yugoslav republics, invested during the 1990s in the creation of its own national identities. In case of Serbia, the identity quest steered to the medieval Serbian state, as it ultimately always did, in that time (late 1980s and beginning of 1990s) straightened by the fact that new conflicts between Serbian and non-Serbian population (mainly Albanian) were present in Kosovo and thus, allusion to famous Kosovo battle from 1389, spread easily through the population. The other component of identification of Serbianhood is related to the religious inheritance built at Kosovo, and so, being part of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC) became symbol often (mis) used by the political elite to make nationalistic pro-paganda that served their interests.

Rather often one can come across reference of the Kosovo myth in literature, and the topic has been quite fairly explored.201 However, for clarification on what are historical facts that have been misused by the political elite, there is necessity of two remarks to quickly identify some crucial points that will be later on addressed in discourse. The Medieval Serbian state (in the 12th and 13th century) was raised in the Kosovo area and it represented its politico-economical center where the cities of Prizren, Pristina and Pec started to develop.

Historically, it was recognized as a place where from the Serbian state start its growth, the place where the first cultural properties of the nation were built. Our first remark goes for the fact that Serbian people left since that time cultural facilities, namely monasteries and churches, which have been since then under the property of the SPC and have gathered population around them. The (ab) use of this specific fact in the mythological sense lies on the premise that if there are cultural facilities that have gathered Serbian population through the centuries, than is acceptable to insinuate that that ground is holy and sacred for Serbia, referring to religious connotation of monasteries and churches on the ground.

Second remark explains the pain associated with defeat and loss of Kosovo territory in the famous battle on Kosovo page on 28 June 1389202 which marked in the Serbian history transfer from the freedom to slavery, and the establishment of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. The (mis) use that is reiterated in Serbian political discourse is directed to the loss of the ground and being under the servitude of the occupier, another symbol repeatedly used in contemporary narrative. Behind the pain of that symbolism is grounded resistance from the enemy and pride that have been hurt in the Kosovo battle in 1389.

Regarding a use of the mythological interpretation of history, on the Serbian

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political scene is possible to identify two leading and opposing trends regarding Kosovo. The first path is of rising nationalism through the rhetoric, invoking national identity issues and connecting historical and religious dimension to political discourses. Approached in this form, the call on action often is not limited to the diplomatic resolution of the problems, and has no hesitation in claiming a possibility on inclusion of violent means of dispute to achieve desired goals. The second path is more liberal and democratic, presenting more moderate use of history and less apparent nationalism, by leaving history in the background and searching for the solutions (on discourse level) by diplomatic means, recalling the power of law and institutions. Nevertheless, a major part of Serbian political elite is located somewhere in between, with the shift in their discourse through the time and leaning occasionally on the SPC and its symbolism to fortify their political position.

The aim of chapter is to identify these discourses in seven main political parties and their representatives through the period from 1989 to 2012: Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), Serbian Renovation Movement (SPO), Serbian Radical Party (SRS), Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), Democratic Party (DS) and Liberal Democratic Movement (LDP).

In this analysis are considered a different type of discourses that have been delivered by a political elite through the years, namely commemorative speeches (political discourses delivered on considered historical dates of remembrance and related to some ‘magic numbers’), press statements, inter-views and public debates. By including diverse sources of rhetoric, our goal is to reach the most realistic vision of the narrative behind the discourses.

To accomplish it, the structure of this chapter includes an introduction to the political discourse analysis and components of national identity political discourse, followed by analysis of the Serbian political elite discourse related to Kosovo itself. Finally, some final observation marks will be withdrawn from the appreciated discourse analysis in question.

POLITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND SPECIFICITIES OF FOCUS ON NATIONAL

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION

The power of the language in the politics is undeniable, and it's rooted in the history dating from Aristotle and Plato, to modern analysts such Habermas, Foucault or Bourdieu, crossing different disciplines and approaches from rhetorical studies, over

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postmodernist practitioners, critical linguistics analysts to critical discourse analysis and political linguists. The roots of its meaning have been identified still by Aristotle, when he distinguished a man from animals by naming it as a political animal that holds a unique capacity to speak (versus emit voice). The speech is designed to help with definition of harmful from advantageous, and just from unjust, right from wrong.203 Even though Aristotle does not connect directly politics with speech, Praxis demonstrated that there is no political activity without use of the language, both oral and written.

Modern approaches are split by linguistic and discourse grounded analysis, both focusing on empirical evidences that have been long time ignored and neglected by political science for being ‘a kind so obvious’.204 With the development of specific tools by these disciplines during the 20th century, a discourse analysis and a linguistic approach to politics won more attention and followers. There are two main perspectives in observing political discourse, first from the institutional point of view and second from the point of view of everyday politics. Here focus falls on institutional view, concentrating on the political elite as a main actor in this process. That comprehends analysis of the different forms of speeches, oral and written,

from the both governmental officials and the opposition representatives.

Special attention is given to the transmission of the message from the politicians to the public sphere, where the message that they are transmitting is ‘unwrapped’ and interpreted by public where it is addressed. An interpretation of the messages rests on several factors with capacity to manipulate significance and raise emotions within public, such as geographical origin, local culture, history, gender and political orientation, among many others.205

The framework that is embraced here is Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), in the widest sense. It emphases the everyday communication based on institutional, media or political environments and encompasses both oral and written discourse as a part of social practice.206 The main emphasis is the nexus of language/discourse/speech and social structure. Its function is discovering the modes in which social structures are being endangered by discourse patterns and handling it as problematic should they imply certain effects in society, such as empowering the powerless, giving voice to the voiceless, exposing power abuse, and mobilizing people to remedy social wrongs.207 Through the discourses, social actors constitute knowledge, social roles and situations and construct a relationship between different social groups.

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Still, discursive acts are in no sense one way street: as much as institutional and social context influence them, they shape and affect social and political reality as well. In other words, discourse constitutes social practice and it is, at the same time, constituted by it.

The purpose and function of the discourses in multi-folded, they can be used for a) formation, creation and building of certain social conditions (as for construction of national identities); b) justifying and supporting of the status quo; c) perpetuating and restore the status quo and d) transformation and destruction of the status quo. Regarding these functions, it is possible to identify four macro strategies in discourse analysis: constructive, perpetuating, trans-formational and destructive208. These stra-tegies, in the context of the use of history for the construction of national identities, can be observed in the following contexts: Firstly, by use of historical facts and myths with a goal to construct a discourse that will defend escalation of nationalism and protection of their nation and state; Secondly, justifying the politics that would protect nationalistic discourse and support maintenance of the politics that would sustain the status quo in order to preserve dominant politics; Thirdly, perpetuating this sort of discourse to maintain the support of the population and continuation of the status quo, and lastly, the trans-

formation of the mainstream discourse with an aim to destruct the status quo and invert nationalistic discourse. In our research it is possible to identify all four functions in the narrative that will be examined further ahead.

For better comprehension of the relationship concerning discourse analysis and national identity construction we resort to the framework developed by Ruth Wodak.209 She lays her approach on three main pre-sumptions. Firstly, national identities are discursively produced and reproduced and therefore understood as a social practice. Secondly, based on the Pierre Bourdieu´s concept of habitus, she defines national identity as an embedded complex of common but diverse notions of perception, emotions or attitudes that are internalized through socialization.210 In this specific case it refers to the Serbianhood, common history, territory and shared cultural (and religious) values. Finally, she reminds us that there is no such a thing as one national identity; rather we are faced with different identities that are discursively constructed regarding context and audience to which they are addressed.211

The misuse of history in national identity construction has as main aim a creation of compliant and controlled citizens, commonly used by state leaders and the ones in positions of authority. Pursuing the path that demonize the Other (as it occurs in traditional

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nationalism), can lead to a formation of totalitarian and fundamentalist state, contrasting to possibility of democratic commodification of the Other.212 The expected effect of such instrument is a creation of mass unity that would be supported on the manipulation of history. If that would be achieved, other strategies that could promote public debate and provide a reflexive basis to find and justify diverse political action would be set in the second plan. That particular goal could be accomplished with a transformation of the meaning of hero-patriot, turning it into what Bruner213 called critical-citizen subject ‘whose political actions are based on a reflexive understanding of the marginalization that accompany their necessarily limited and prejudiced subject positions’.

Alongside history, there are other important elements of national identity construction, being one of them culturally constructed and socially shared memory, which is redefined, reshaped and re-interpreted in accordance with facts of present.214 Another important element in the process of shaping of shared identity is a religion. The intensity and the modes of its use are changeable and dependent of the confrontation with different contexts, and political use can be merged with other elements such as history and language in a

mode to intensify the message, or its exclusion can lower the tone certain discourse has.215

The range of the forms in which discourse can be employed is extensive. Even though commemorative discourses have been recognized as a tool of election used for con-struction of the national identities (consi-dering people’s past, present and future), the aim here is to demonstrate that the historical references and recalling the message from commemorative discourse are enhanced by other type of addresses, on everyday basis. Therefore are covered different aspects re-garding discourses directed to internal con-sume and specially observed the historical and mythical connotation brought up as a strategy, namely to raise a national identity issues and downsizing an importance of the other state interests, such as economy, social politics or crime and corruption control. It will de-monstrate the change in the message deli-vered through the period examined (1987-2012) in the service of the political interest of the representative in question.

(AB)USE OF HISTORICAL MYTHOLOGY IN THE SERBIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

In the 1990s, problem of Kosovo have been used and abused by the political elite to

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raise nationalism that served to support autocratic regime at the time. After the fall of the Milosevic regime, invoking history in the political discourse on the Serbian political scene maintains the same importance as it did in 1990s, though discourse generally appears to be more pragmatic.

In the rising the national identity founded partly on Kosovo myth by the Serbian political elite in 1980s, the call on historical right and religious importance of the region was crucial. The purpose of invoking history in the political discourse, especially in the end of 1980s216 and end of 1990s,217 was nurturing the nationalistic narratives in the population. These narratives were constructed with support by invoking the historical importance of Kosovo for Serbianhood and right on the land, with evoking cultural roots of the nation that once in history were raised on that ground (often recognized by the words of ‘heart of Serbia’) as well as with the commitment of the SPC´s intervention in public life with the rein-forcement of an identification of belonging to the Orthodox Church as one of the crucial elements of Serbianhood. As Marko Zivkovic put it well, one of the most important un-derlines of the Kosovo narrative is the one that ‘links bones, graveyards, and split blood, with soil, borders and territory’.218

As political discourse is a two-way channel, beside its influence on the general population, it does get influenced as well by it. Therefore, in some moment over the first decade of this century, when population identifies other priorities for Serbia, beside the question of Kosovo, that are limiting their lives, such as corruption, poverty, and better economic standard219 it is possible to identify its influence on the shift in political discourse through the period examined.220

Our examination focuses on four main points. It will consider the relationship and engagement of the seven major acting political parties and their leaders with the following topics: 1) their (ab) use of mythical history in the discourse toward the problem in Kosovo; 2) the narrative in public discourse regarding the proposed means to address problem resolution; 3) the representation of the other and related historical allegories; and last, but not least 4) the relationship with the SPC (and its utilization for the political purposes).

As some of the points identified can raise doubts, clarification of the elements included and their place in the investigation follows. Firstly, the point of constructing nationalistic narrative, with a focus on a means by which issue should be resolved. As it will be demonstrated ahead, some political parties tried to support their political strategies alluding on the symbolism of Kosovo battle

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and the modus operandi used in medieval time, violence. Thus, there are two main categories identified in this analysis referring to different adherences to nationalistic narrative: the more violent (invoking all means available to defense of the homeland, including armed conflict) or more peaceful (centered on dialogue, negotiations and cooperation).

The second point is concerning the issue that Kosovo through the history was understood in analogy ‘them against us’, by them being different nations (as for example Ottoman Kingdom or German Nazi's regime). Following that analogy, the great majority of Serbian political elite saw, in one moment or another (some of them continuously), a problem of Kosovo in these terms and used that in their discourse for construction of their nationalistic narrative. The evaluation that will be applied for that aspect is cooperation versus animosity.

The last point is about the presence of and a relationship with the SPC in the discourse. Beside the cultural influence that should be naturally expected from the church as an institution in this matter (related to the monasteries and churches in the province), it has been documented that the role of the Church has been increasing in Serbian political discourse, especially as a socialist government has been removed in 2000.221 Certain parties have been (ab) using the SPC (in a similar

mode as mythology and history) for the wider support of the population, reinforcing believing that important part of Serbianhood belongs to the SPC.

Before we focus on the discourse analysis itself, it is crucial to situate several important moments in context for the more complete perception of the context in which discourses surge. In the 1980s, the Kosovo province began to face occasional disturbances on a political level, with some conflicts raised between Albanian and Serb population. At the end of 1980s, these episodes became more frequent and the discontentment of Albanians after an abolition of certain rights they had in the province (for example schooling in their own language), the manifestations turned violent. First political (ab) use of the mythical history of the province, and probably until this day the most marking one was in the 1989, that occurred in the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the Kosovo battle.222 The 1990s have been marked on the Serbian political scene by disintegration of the SFRY and the war in Bosnia and Croatia, and only from 1997 the Kosovo problems re-surged in discourse, with an intensification of the conflicts between populations. The topic has been very hot until 2000, when the political scene in Serbia was dominated by a battle for breaking down the socialist regime. The Kosovo relapsed as a hot topic in 2003-4 and

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continued active in political discourses ever since. Yet, the marking year was 2008 when the Albanian population of Kosovo made a unilateral declaration of independence, and caused the new wave of mythological narrative among the political elite. At last, 2012 has caused a new impulse in a resolution of the crisis, with the election of new president a new government, and, as it appears to be more dynamic and result-orientated than before, some nationalistic narrative had come back and others got intensified.

FROM MILOSEVIC TO DACIC: DID ANYTHING CHANGE?

The political discourse of SPS has not been

consistent; it has been changed several times. However, one clear observation can be extracted: its radicalization has been de-creasing through the time. From the end of 1980s, when the most radical affirmations were held, there is a decrease over 1990s until the disruption and the shift of the strategy and discourse through the first decade of the 21st century, and most clearly in the last years. The distinction between the periods can be observed through several strategies over the time: firstly by venturing onto constructive

strategy, followed by perpetuating the status quo, until the change that occurred with a fall of the Milosevic regime and meant destruction of the status quo and inversion of nationalistic discourse.

Regarding the first aspect of this analysis, the (ab)use of mythological history and symbolism in the political discourse, the SPS have changed its strategy through the time. As stated before, radicalization of the discourse was related especially for the 1980s, when Slobodan Milosevic in 1989 escalated the nationalistic tone of address and built more nationalistic narrative. From calling Serbs to stay on Kosovo for their ancestors and do not disgrace them on a meeting on Kosovo Polje,223 to underlining of historical role of Kosovo for foundation of Serbia, its culture and memories on meeting in Belgrade in November 1988224 until the famous speech he held on Gazimestan on commemoration of 600th anniversary of Kosovo battle (1989) where he relates Kosovo battle with emotions of heroism, pride and army that even in loss kept undefeated.225 Slobodan Milosevic on that occasion declared that ‘is difficult today to separate the legend from the history of this battle, but (now) this is no longer important’.226 The discourse invoking mythical Kosovo girl227 from 1389 occurred again in 1999,228 and references to Kosovo as a sacred land appear until the fall of the Milosevic

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regime.229 Slobodan Milosevic himself held very few direct discourses invoking the historical importance and (re) construction of Kosovo myth, the central role in its dissemination during 1980s and 1990s fell on the journalists, academics and the SPC representatives.230 In the period after Milosevic, we can still trace references of Kosovo as ‘the birthplace of Serbia’,231 but the clearest cut with mythological references was with the invitation of the Ivica Dacic in 2011 to finish with fairytale about Kosovo232 although there are references of the change before.233

The second aspect of analysis discusses a construction of a nationalist narrative, focusing the question of means to be employed in the resolution. Regarding this point, SPS has been inconsistent as well, from calling on all available means and violence as a duty to protect nation to the diplomatic efforts and dialogue. The constructive strategy support adoption of all means and tools, and its escalation can be followed from late 1980s when Milosevic implies that battles can be armed as well234 to 1999 where are supported all means, including armed conflict, in protection of homeland.235 Continuation of that narrative can be followed in the first decade of the 21st century with Dacic,236 until the very end of it, when he recognizes a necessity to look at the Kosovo problem with more pragmatic and peaceful perspective.237

The analogy ‘them against us’ is not escaping the trend of evolution. The unique constant in the discourse is ‘us’, referring to Serbia, Serbian people and particularly SPS itself. In opposition, ‘them’ has been changed and enemies and partners have been altered through the time. In the beginning, they represented the Albanian population,238 later it was expanded to ‘Western forces’, namely the USA and NATO.239 Curiosity is the change in the discourse of Milosevic at the end of the war in 1999, where he exceptionally recognized Western forces as allies that would help in the preservation of the territorial integrity of Serbia.240 Nevertheless, this change was punctual and the strategy of animosity toward West continued through the most part of the first decade of the new century.241 Lately, the political strategy that was fed by nationalistic narrative, included analogy them against us is left behind and substituted by very pragmatic strategy.242

The last topic examined is related to the position of the SPC in the SPS political discourse and their relationship. During the 1990s, there was no direct relationship or cooperation with the SPC, rather there are traces of accusatory tone by SPS directed to the SPC for ‘dividing people’ in relation to national politics, by supporting the opposition in general243 and backing up (of some members of the SPC) in the election

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campaign.244 As a party with communist orientation, it is not surprising the absence of the SPC in the political discourse of SPS. In the 2010 and 2011 Ivica Dacic, as a Minister of Internal Affairs, had more straight cooperation with the SPC,245 though not related to Kosovo problems and his collaboration gave him right to White Angel medal.246 The relationship between the SPC and SPS in the last year has been divided between the support247 and in firm attitude toward its attempts to influence state politics.248

EVOLUTION OF THE SPO NARRATIVE

The SPO, led by Vuk Draskovic, has been

one of few political parties that can be followed through the whole period examined here. The party was a member of the opposition through the 1990s (with the exception of several months in 1999 when Draskovic was a deputy Prime Minister of Yugoslavia), and since 2000 has been participating both in government and as an opposition. Their political discourse has certain stability, employing constructive strategy and maintaining the status quo, until 2010 when was detected a shift, marked by leaving the back-up in the mythical and

religious symbolism behind and employing transformational and destructive strategy.

Regarding the use of mythology and history in its political narrative, SPO has been inconsistent, passing through all four strategies identified before (constructive, perpetuating, transformational and de-structive). This was the most apparent through the 1990s where simultaneously is possible to find a narrative that explains historical belonging of Serbs in Kosovo, Kosovo being tightly connected to Ser-bianhood and representing the birthplace of Serbian state, religion, culture and national myth249 and recognition that it is inhabited with Albanian population, as a recognition of reality.250 Disruption with a myth and history in political discourse occurred in 2010, as through the first decade of this century the perpetuation of the conjunction of myth and reality subsists.251 In 2010 with the declaration that ‘it is of great importance to separate present from historical convictions’, began the narrative that softened the mythical discourse of the SPO.252 Although historical and spiritual references continue to appear in the discourse, they gained a more pragmatic vision.253

On the aspect of the means proposed to resolve the problem, the SPO had been consistent in the defense of the peaceful tools in its political discourse. They assumed that

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Kosovo problem should be resolved through negotiations, debates and meetings.254

Regarding the analogy ‘them against us’ there is continuous effort for withdraw from the narrative. Even in the time when Draskovic was in Milosevic government in 1999, he insisted on ‘cooperation with the rest of the World’.255 This position was clearly supported by the statement that Kosovo should not be defended with the ‘story that the World hates us’.256

Finally, the relationship with the SPC, the religion and its place in the SPO discourse followed constructive strategy and was consistent until 2010, when the SPO disputed the place of the religion in the politics. Since the 1990, the narrative of the SPO was strongly supported on the importance of the Orthodoxy for the Serbianhood, connection of the Orthodoxy and the SPC to Kosovo problem, tradition of Saint Sava and sanctities257. Close relationship with the SPC, religion and its values was prominent until 2010, when SPO created the new program with LDP, named ‘Preokret’, where they condemned the SPC for intrusion in political life.258

CONSISTENCY OF THE SRS

The action of this party can be followed

through the entire period considered, firstly as part of the government in 1990s and since then as an opposition (with a short exception of 2007). Their narrative has been continuous and follows the line of constructive strategy, embracing the nationalistic discourse and the maintenance of the status quo.

Regarding our first aspect, mythol-ogical use of history and symbolism grounded on it, the SRS rooted their political discourse in it. For them, Kosovo has historical-mythical connotations and that was used continuously in political discourse over the time, mainly by consistent and continuous calling onto Serbian ‘Kosovo pledge’ and ‘sacred ground’.259

(Ab)use of the mythological and his-torical narrative in the political discourse, led to legitimizing all means available to resolve Kosovo problem. SRS has been calling on the armed combat, often mentioning river of bloods260 and combat until the last breath.261 They defend that conflict resolution should consider employment of the physical force, implying sending military troops.262

In consideration of the narrative ‘them against us’, it is deeply rooted in the SRS political discourse from early on. From the sharp nationalistic tone toward Kosovo Albanians, detected from early on,263 to the declaration of animosity toward the USA and

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EU,264 references often used for international actors are ‘occupiers’265 and their involvement is considered aggression.266 Lately, in narrative referring to the NATO, EU and USA, these are designated as occupying forces aiming to tear the country apart.267

The relationship of SRS with the religion and the SPC is curious. There are several occasions where representatives of the SRS were practicing rather a sharp intonation in their political discourse regarding public opinions expressed by representatives of the SPC during 1990s268. However, from 2000 onward, there is an approximation of SRS to the SPC and even defense of the narrative that utilizes religious symbolism in political discourse269 and support higher level of involvement of the Church in the political sphere.270

TRANSFORMING STRATEGY OF THE SNS

The Serbian Progressive Party (SNS),

established in 2008 on the roots of the forces of the SRS which has separated with idea to distance from the nationalistic ideology led by Vojislav Seselj through the 1990s and first half of 2000s, was founded by Tomislav Nikolic, at this moment president of Serbia, and currently

led by Aleksandar Vucic. After few years of existence, it is possible to observe the cut with the previous program (SRS) and the consistence in their narrative, with un-ambiguous trend to establish pragmatic and rational narrative, excluding the topic of the SPC, where subsists the emotional and patriotic connotation in the relationship.

The shift from the SRS narrative toward Kosovo is specially visible if considered the speech held on the Belgrade meeting in February 2008,271 at manifestation against the recognition of the unilateral declaration of the independence of Kosovo, where Nikolic called on the Kosovo covenant and declaring Kosovo ‘heart of Serbia’272 and his later declarations that were in its nature very pragmatic and excluding any mythology and symbolism related to historical understanding of prob-lems.273

Considering the means that should be employed in the resolution of the Kosovo problem, there is consistency, once again as a result of the shift in discourse exercised while in SRS.274 The peaceful means, negotiations and pragmatism are the symbol of the narrative utilized by SNS.275

Another change from SRS narrative is the recognition of the EU and USA as partners276 in opposition to the enemy that used to dominate earlier discourses.277 The importance of the opening to the rest of the

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World is recognized as well as its place in the foreign policy of SNS.278

Last aspect is related to the relationship of SNS with the SPC and religion. Regarding these issues, SNS have been practicing consistent narrative since its foundation. They have embraced the SPC279 and searched for their support since the establishment of the party, but the public expressions of this relationship have been especially evident since the rise of Nikolic at the position of the president in 2012. The culmination of the frequent consultations with religious representatives of the SPC about political problems gave in narrative greater importance to the SPC than to other cultural institutions.280

CONSTRUCTIVE STRATEGY OF THE DSS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO

Even though the foundation of this party

dates in 1992, its independent and stronger influence (out of coalition DEPOS and DOS) was present from the second government after the break of the Milosevic regime (in 2004). The leader of DSS, Vojislav Kostunica, has been in the government until 2008 and from then representing opposition in parliament. The political discourse of DSS has been consistent,

in relation to four points here by examining, following constructive strategy and advocating the maintenance of the status quo.

In relation to mythological use of history, DSS used symbolism related to Kosovo battle consistently, considering Kosovo to be ‘the most expensive Serbian word’, the idea, an emotion, part of the (Serbian) identity.281 The narrative had some short outing of linear misuse of mythological history, namely in the beginning of the 2008 after an inclusion in Kostunica´s narrative of some pragmatism, with an introduction of private property issues.282 It was punctual though, once the dominant narrative continued to follow a path of rooting Kosovo in public discourse as a historical, spiritual foundation of Serbia (Beta, 2012a), naming Kosovo ‘the first name of Serbia’.283

Considering the second aspect, the means employed in the narrative of DSS for the resolution of the problem, they insisted on the peaceful means, led by negotiations while maintaining highly nationalistic connotation in it.284 Despite of the loud nationalistic tone identified in discourses toward resolution of the problem, there was no evidence of the call on the violent means to meet solutions.

If defense of isolation can be considered a violent premise, than DSS, as a strong supporter of it, has been practicing use of violent means. Considering their narrative

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over outside influences in this question, continuous line of the discourses supporting the analogy ‘them against us’ can be followed. They are identified mainly as Kosovo Albanians, the USA, the EU and NATO, and the strategy proposed by DSS is an interruption of the communication with these actors. The animosity toward them is identified in comparison of the Kosovo battle, placing Serbia on one side and the USA on the opposite285, calling a ‘robber (the EU) who plunders your territory’,286 naming them (the EU and the USA) ‘usurpers’ with a goal to force Serbs to ‘slavishly welcome abduction’,287 and comparing entrance in the NATO to hell.288

The last aspect of our inquiry is the relationship and an influence of the religion and the SPC in the construction of a nationalist narrative in the political discourse of DSS. Despite the fact that on its website DSS recognizes that religion should not be used in political purposes,289 in the course of the period analyzed hereby can be identified opposite trend in DSS political discourse. Besides the symbolism of the importance of the SPC for DSS, expressed in often and repetitive visits to religious objects on Kosovo and in meetings with the SPC re-presentatives,290 the political action of DSS, while in government, contributed to intimate involvement of the Church in politics.291 An inclusion of the faith and religious symbolism

in DSS narrative is a commonplace292 that had been reduced (joint with the presence of DSS in the public arena with the shift into opposition) and limited on the declarations on the important religious events.293

TRANSFORMING THE NATIONALISTIC DISCOURSE BY THE DS

Although the Democratic Party have been

founded in 1990, the focal point of our analysis is centered on the time after the fall of the Milosevic regime and the raise of Zoran Djindjic on the place of prime minister, as in a time as the opposition there was no much opportunity to be heard. The coherence is marking point of this analysis, in all four aspects considered, and strategy adopted by the DS has been a transformational through the whole period.

Regarding the question of using mythological explanations of history, the DS coherency is clear. There were no mythical connotations with the goal to invoke nationalistic emotions related to Kosovo battle; rather there is a clear attitude against the strategy focusing on history, emotions and myth.294 Still, there are signs of the use of historical allegories with a sarcastic

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tone.295.Through the time, Tadic made critique to the others that were using myth and history to spread hate and animosity296 and (ab) used it in daily politics to obtain an advantage in the election races.297 That criticism was related to the politics that were held on ‘seeming interests of our ancestors’,298 and he advo-cated pragmatic and rational vision of the Kosovo problem.299

Considering the means to be employed in the resolution of the conflict, the narrative of DS counted on the clear message on cooperation and dialogue with European partners and the International Community in general.300

Regarding other international actors, position of DS performs consistently with recognition of the need to cooperate with International Organizations and states in the resolution of conflict.301 No traces of analogy ‘them against us’ could be found in the discourses observed for this investigation.

In observation of the relationship with the SPC and religious influences in the political discourse of DS, is found a consistency as well. Djindjic was the one to place the Church as a central institution that would be involved in the resolution of the problem, with a clear message that DS do not want intimate contacts with the SPC and does not wish that the SPC be (ab) used for the spread of the nationalist narrative.302That approach continued with

recognition by Tadic that importance of the church subsists solely as one of the institutions in Kosovo303 and its role in the preservation of the cultural heritage of Serbian history there.304 Still, there are traces of certain symbolism that Tadic doesn’t verbalize, but demonstrates through the selection of the places and dates for his interviews. Monastery Decani has been often choice for the delivery of the message of peace and pragmatic solution of the problems population of Kosovo faces, and dates had some religious305 or commemorative306 con-notation.307

THE DESTRUCTIVE STRATEGY OF THE LDP

The LDP has been established in 2005 and

led by Cedomir Jovanovic, who belonged previously to democratic forces that removed a Milosevic regime in 2000. Their political discourse and consequently applied strategy is consistent, a rarity among the Serbian political elite, and grounds on the destruction of the myth founded nationalistic discourse, and pursuit its inversion.

Considering the use of mythology and history in political discourse concerning

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Kosovo, this political party has not used typical symbolism found among most of political representatives. They consider Kosovo as a rational, not historical problem that should exclude from political discourse ‘blood and soil’.308 Through the time they repeatedly condemned others at the Serbian political scene that encourage nationalism and evoke the history in discussion about Ko-sovo.309

Considering the means to achieve resolution of Kosovo problem used in the political discourse, the LDP has been insisting on peaceful resolution of the conflict and on conciliation between people of Kosovo.310 There is a consistency through the time in this aspect as well, and no discourses encouraging violent resolution or construction of the nationalist narrative in that sense were de-tected.

Regarding the aspect of including the logic of confrontation of the Serbian po-pulation with others, LDP criticized these politics by calling them conspiracy theories.311 They considered a necessity to leave that analogy, and identification of ‘them’ as Kosovo Albanians, NATO, EU or USA312 so it could be opened a space to deal successfully with Kosovo problem.

At last, the position toward the Church in the political discourse of the LDP and the relationship with it follows the path of

continuity and destruction of the myth demonstrated before. A distance and sepa-ration of the religion from the politics in the discourse of LDP are evident,313 and it has been aggravated in the last year due to more intense involvement of the SPC in the politics. LDP last year accused the SPC for an involvement in politics, calling it ‘mutant of the wrong politics’ and responsible for a ‘destruction of everything that is good in Serbia’,314 because of its nationalistic narra-tive, which turned to be more evident and stronger. Their approach rests on premise that the Church should have its place in the society, but out of politics.315

FINAL REMARKS

The Serbian political elite in the period

between 1987 and 2012 has been very diverging in relation to use, abuse and avoidance of mythological interpretation of historical events in their political discourse. There are some examples of consistency in the narrative, and the shifts that can be observed often followed the trend of the public opinion and strategy that would place them better in the ratings and elections. Nonetheless, it is possible to trace the trend of transformation

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of strategy and downsizing the political (ab) use of historical mythology and symbolism related to Kosovo battle and a change to the more pragmatic vision of the problem and its solution.

The instrumental use of mythology and history had supporting elements in the narrative that overcome simple exploit of symbols of historical place in discourse, namely an identification of ‘the other’ and its use in construction of nationalistic narrative, and the place of the religion and its (ab) use with the same purpose. The historical and mythical symbolism was broadened so it would consider as well the transfer of the means used in history to resolve conflicts in Kosovo to nowadays (narrative supporting the premise of use the last breath for secret land and rivers of bloods), and curiously that narrative still can be traced in political discourse of certain political parties. Though, most of that narrative has been left behind and even condemned by the majority of representatives of political elite hereby analyzed.

The demonization of the Other in the discourse has been much more evident until the fall of the Milosevic regime in 2000. Still, certain political parties continue to use the analogy ‘them against us’ with certain conviction nowadays. Interesting is the observation of the shift in the political

discourse of SPS that is presently condemning narrative that they used to have during the 1990s and in the beginning of this century.

The last aspect observed as relevant was a relationship with the SPC. As one study demonstrated316 by the middle of the first decade of 2000s, Serbian population identifies itself strongly with the SPC. It is notable that the trend of the (ab) use of the political support of the SPC, even symbolically, without clear political discourse, with the visits of the political elite to the religious spaces, increased through the last decade or so. Almost in parallel can be observed the rise of the importance of the Church (namely the SPC) in the Serbian political space, and not limited to the questions related to the cultural patrimony of Kosovo.

Jointly, these elements demonstrated the importance of several facets in the construction of national identity and nationalistic discourse based on it. Our findings demonstrate that the political narrative among Serbian political elite maintain diversity, but that mythological history was not eradicated from the political speech in the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, and tendency demonstrates that certain historical and mythical symbolism will continue to be (ab) used for the political purposes. As for the reason behind, there are numerous, but from

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an analysis carried out here could be extracted some of the possible motivations. It seems that certain political parties could have advantages in propagating nationalisms, by focusing on history, and search for the union of the nation against foreign ‘other’, as a form to change

streamline from dealing with corruption, crime and other socioeconomic problems that the state faces.

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