International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Policies: Implications to the Philippine Economic...

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International Monetary Fund Structural Adjustment Policies: Implications to the Philippine Economic Development

Ferdinand T. AbocejoCenter for Research and Development

Cebu Normal University

ABSTRACT

This study investigated the implications of International Monetary Fund (IMF)Structural Adjustment Policies (SAP) on the Philippine economic development landscape.The author employed a critical analysis approach to evaluate and analyze secondarydata from government statistics, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, World Bank, IMF andarticles from online refereed journals. Analysis were focused on IMF prescribed SAP loanconditionalities pertaining to liberalization, export-oriented economic efficiency,privatization of estate owned assets, reducing government expenditures, andstreamlining the bureaucracy. Findings revealed that trade liberalization implementedthrough stripping off restrictions of more than 900 items and reduction in nominaltariff protection fell short from the onset of global recession. Apparently, aggregateexports contracted instead of expanding while imports disproportionately increasedwhen importers took advantage of the liberalized regime. In effect, severe erosionoccurred for Philippines’ industries which were left unable to compete in the openmarket. Government revenues, generated from the SAP driven privatization policy wereredirected for debt servicing rather than being invested on productive programs andprojects for economic development. The privatization policy even created localmonopolies in the country’s capital market. Reduction in government expenditures,through tightening of government budget, cuts in government subsidies and freezingthe filling up of government vacant positions, failed to propel poverty alleviationsefforts and reinforce the much needed resources for basic health, education and socialservices delivery programs. In conclusion, the adherence by the Philippines to IMF loanconditionalities did not considerably benefit the country as manifested by the country’ssluggish economic development. The Philippines should never go back to the IMF loanportfolio and whenever possible, put a stop to external borrowings. It should findalternative financial resources to propel growth and development away from externalborrowings.

Keywords: Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs), International Monetary Fund (IMF), economic growth and development, loan conditionalities

I.0 Introduction

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For several decades, the Philippines had been fixated withthe loan requirements of both IMF (or the Fund) and World Bank(WB or the Bank). The country, since the 1960s until the early2000, had been largely borrowing from these two InternationalFinancial Institutions (IFIs) in the form of stabilization loans,export financing facility (EFF), sectoral and project loans,standby arrangements and structural adjustment program (SAP)loans. Under SAPs, the increased role of the market is viewed tobenefit both the poor and the rich countries in a fairliberalization network between trading partners. Objectively,free market economic development, which put emphasis on thegreater role of the private sector, was envisioned as the primarystimulus for sustainable growth and development of the Philippineeconomic landscape (Bello, 2005).

For decades until the present, the Philippines heavilyrelies on external borrowings to bring about it’s much desiredeconomic progress. This policy option has been espoused by pastand present administrations, since the time of Ferdinand Marcosuntil the current leadership of Philippine President BenignoAquino II, with the end view of lifting up the sluggish economicperformance of the country in comparison with its neighboringcountries. However, all through the decades of loan dependentgovernment financing, the Philippines has not substantiallyachieved it’s long term targets of tangible economic growth anddevelopment.

Operationally, IMF loans (in the same way as WB loans) comewith policy conditionalities and performance target for theborrowing country – for this paper, the Philippines. Some of IMFprescribed SAP loans for the country include conditionalities onliberalization, export-oriented economic efficiency,privatization of estate owned assets, reducing governmentexpenditures particularly in view of burgeoning annual budgetdeficits, bureaucratic streamlining, taxation reforms andimposition of new taxes, currency devaluation and increasingdomestic interest rates.

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This paper endeavoured to put forward a critical analysis ofthe IMF’s SAP conditionalities on the Philippine economicdevelopment. It attempted to examine how SAP conditionalities ofthe IMF casted shadows on the directions of the country’seconomic policies. This article argues that while thePhilippines has considerably embarked on these free-marketinspired approaches to economic growth, evidences on favorableoutcomes are seen far from reality relative to the country’ssluggish economic development. Seemingly, the faithful adherenceto loan IMF conditionalities did not benefit the borrowingcountry – the Philippines – since the results were more favorableand advantageous to the IMF whose loan policies are influenced bythe big player countries of the Fund.

II. Literature Review

The Philippines had its first loan from the IMF in 1962(Orbeta, 1996) then its first structural adjustment (SAP) loan ofUS$200 million in 1980 (Simbulan, 2002) to help the governmentmeet its budgetary requirements, at the same time to accelerateeconomic growth and development. In the early 1980s, thePhilippines’ structural adjustment programs were focused on tradeliberalization by way of stripping off restrictions of more than900 items and significant reduction in nominal tariff protection(Bello, 2006). Since then, the Philippines had never been out ofthe debt roster of the IMF until 2006 when the Philippinegovernment pre-paid its remaining obligations to the Fund andexited a post-program monitoring agreement (an arrangement forcountries whose borrowings scheme has expired but still owesmoney from the Fund).

The condition which came with the loan was the removal offoreign exchange controls which resulted to abrupt Philippinepeso devaluation vis-à-vis the US dollar. In the years thatfollowed until early 2000, the country availed 24 IMF loansamounting to more than US$3.0 billion and about special drawingrights (SDR)of 3.1 billion (Bello, 2006). Each of these loanswere contained under the standard “stabilization program” of theIMF bearing tight monetary and fiscal policy measures. One

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specific IMF loan in the amount of US1.4 billion granted to thePhilippines under stand-by arrangement for the period 1998-2000had 110 conditionalities dubbed as “structural reform measures”(Lim & Montes, 2001).

One of IMF conditionalities on SAP loans during the 1985-1988 period (availed towards the end of Marcos’ dictatorshipuntil the Aquino government) required rational governmentspending and efficient utilization of government resources(Orbeta, 1996). Moreover, there was a weak, if not negative,contribution of actual employment and output levels in somesectors which were projected to favorably respond to the importliberalization program (Lim &Montes, 2001). In essence, thiscontradicted the original vision behind the creation of the IFMis “the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employmentand real income” (Kapur and Naim, 2005). It has been criticizedthat IMF policies lack transparency (Elu, 2000). There were alsoevidences of weak responses in some sectors which were viewed tobenefit from the reforms like those sectors which registeredinvestment declines (compared with the period beforeliberalization), and even those sectors having naturalcomparative advantage in the Philippine context (Chung, 2006). Itstipulated the reduction in government expenditures throughtightening of expenditure control. Its effects had been on thePhilippines’ fiscal policy measures like freezing of wages,tightening of government budget, cuts in government subsidies andfreezing the filling up government vacant positions (Bello,2005). This reduction in government budgets translated toexpenditures cuts in various economic and social services(Simbulan, 2002).

In like manner “re-engineering the bureaucracy” has been akey structural adjustment policy implemented by the government tostreamline the size of the government through merging, abolitionof redundant positions, devolutions of functions to localgovernment units (LGUs) and privatization of some governmentbranches/functions (Lim& Montes, 2001). The downside affects werethe retrenchment and displacement of some government employeesadversely affecting the education and health sectors whose

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limited field personnel had been trimmed down thwarting furtherinsufficient services delivery especially in the far flung ruralareas of the country (Simbulan, 2002). The implementation ofthis policy resulted to downsizing (to some extent) of governmentpersonnel and had reduced expenditures on wages and a number ofoperating expenses in some government branches (Fletcher, 2005).

From the savings rate perspective, low savings rate hasintensified the Philippine’s dependence on foreign capitalinflows, in part relieved by remittances from overseas Filipinoworkers (OFWs) and primarily met through external borrowings(Chung, 2006). Essentially however, whenever foreign capitalinflows drop, the incumbent government is left with no choice butto subscribe to IMF-recommended structural policies to secureadditional loans to cover for balance of payments (BoP)difficulties (Bello, 2005). With the onset of the Asianfinancial crisis in 1997, the run-up in short term debts andportfolio investments made the Philippines a powerless prey tothe crisis, draining the economy with dollar reserve afterexperiencing the crisis-led recession (Chung, 2006). Forinstance, structural adjustments implemented after the 1983crisis appeared to have been not sufficient in addressingstructural problems like the inevitable trade and current accountdeficits, low domestic savings rate and very weak tax collectionefforts (Orbeta, 1996).

Meanwhile, about 50 per cent of government budget had been

allocated to debt servicing through the 1980s representing about7-10 percent of the Philippines’ annual GDP (Bello, 2005). Thiswas also confirmed by Simbulan (2002) when she noted that (asmandated by SAPs doctrine) substantial losses in financialresources have accompanied recessionary effects of much reducedgovernment spending and the continued peso devaluation. Thegovernment’s privatization policy trust (as one of IMF SAP-prescribed policies) is contained in the Philippine Medium-TermDevelopment Plans (MTPDP) since the presidency of Corazon Aquino,Fidel Ramos and Joseph Estrada and Gloria Arroyo (Bello, 2005).

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Particularly the Ramos regime opened public assets andgovernmental functions to foreign investors offering a wide-rangeof agencies to be privatized including those sectors mandated todeliver social services like electricity and water. For thefirst time in 1995 since many years, the Ramos government wasable to realize budget savings from sales of public assets(Flecther, 2005). A deeper analysis further revealed thatprivatization has led to the creation of local monopolies in thecountry’s capital market. This claim is supported by the paper ofLim and Montes (2001) when they affirmed the transfer of controlfrom government ownership to few elite-rich-business magnets whopurchased (in partnership with foreign investors) governmentassets.

In general, the IMF prescribed privatization policy had beencarried out but the outcome it was intended to bring the countryback on its economic growth track did not materialized (Simbulan,2002). The previous Philippine President Gloria Arroyo reported,in her state of the nation address - SONA on 25 July 2005, thatthe Philippine economy is back on track. All she asked from theFilipino people, especially from the country’s political leadersand the opposition group, is to work together for economicdevelopment of the country (Arroyo, 2005).

III. Research Methodology

Secondary data mining technique was employed in this studyutilizing government statistical and economic reports. Economicindicators on gross domestic product (GDP), total external debtstocks and GDP growth rates were sourced from the World Bankstatistical database, Central Bank of the Philippines (BangkoSentral ng Pilipinas [BSP]) and from the Department of Budget andManagement (DBM). Articles from peer reviewed journals obtainedfrom ProQuest database were also utilized to supplement thecritical analysis. Graphs were generated and presented tounderline salient trends and patterns for the longitudinaldescriptive comparative analysis and in the discussion of studyfindings.

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

World Bank

In Million US Dollars

YearFig. 1. Philippines’ External Loan from WB, IMF and ADB,

1990-2011Data source: Central Bank of the

Philippines (Bangko Sentral ng

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IV. Results and Discussion

For many years, the Philippines availed substantial loansfrom the IMF, the World Bank (WB), Asian Development Bank (ADB)and major International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Theseborrowings were intended to primarily fuel the country’s economicdevelopment. In the past years, before the turn of the century,the WB used to be the biggest creditor, followed by the ADB andthe IMF (Figure 1).However, loans granted bythe WB to the Philippinesmanifested a generaldowntrend from 1995 to2010 when started to pickup towards 2011. ThePhilippines obtained itsfirst SAP loan in 1980amounting to US$200million with SAPconditionalitiesprescribed by the lendinginstitution which was theIMF. Such loan was ontrade liberalizationarticulating substantial reduction in tariff protection of morethan 900 tradable items. However, liberalization mechanismefforts failed to consider the onset of global recession in thatperiod, thus aggregate exports contracted instead of expandingwhile imports disproportionately increased as importers tookadvantage of the liberalized regime causing severe erosion on thecountry’s industries which were left unable to compete in theopen market.

In 2006, the Philippines paid in full its obligation to theIMF thereby graduated from the status of being a borrower tolender for the Fund in the years that followed (Figure 1).Nonetheless, the Philippines remains a borrower country from theWB and the ADB until the present. Operationally, the graduationof the Philippines from the IMF debt roster (Figure 1) was offset

In million US dollars

010000000200000003000000040000000500000006000000070000000

YearFig. 2. Philippine External Debt Stocks, Total (DOD,

current US$) 1980-2013

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by the huge increase in loans availed from the ADB keeping thecountry’s aggregate external debt stocks on the rise (Figure 2).This is brought about by the steep upsurge of loans granted bythe ADB from US$3.6 billion in 2006 to almost US$6 billion in2009. This only manifests diversion of loan financier from theIFM to ADB, a monetary management policy which the governmenttook just to clear the country’s image as a heavy debtor from theIMF. This is also one of the reasons why the government externaldebt stocks remain very high even after graduation from the IFMdebt roster (Figure 2).

Meanwhile, data onPhilippine External DebtStocks from 1980-2013revealed a general uptrendof aggregate externalborrowings during thestudy period (Figure 2).From around US$17.4billion in 1980, it surgedto more than US$60.6billion in 2013. The dataindicate that in just overthree decades, theexternal debt stocksincreased more than 300percent in nominal terms. Such burgeoning external debt stockscan imply that the government (of each regime in the period understudy) pursued economic policies which were heavily reliant onforeign borrowings for capitalization. The need to promptly meetbalance of payments (BOPs) obligations has compelled thegovernment to purse intensive external borrowings as policyoption (Figure 2). Apparently, this reflects that the Philippinegovernment monetary policymakers have never been prudent inkeeping external debt low. The trend shows that governance ofthe monetary system had been lackluster during the study period.

Figure 3. Selected Philippine gov't. spending, 1981-2006 (% of Nat'l. Budget)Data sources: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Dep't.

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Structural adjustment program (SAP) loan conditionalitiesfrom 1985 to 1988 stipulated that the government implementrational spending for efficient utilization of availableresources. Operationally, these conditionalities mandated thereduction in government expenditures through strict spendingmeasures. As a result, stringent fiscal policies were effectedlike tightening the government budget, cuts in government

subsidies and amoratorium in fillingup government vacantpositions. Suchreduction ingovernment budgetstranslated tocontraction ofexpenditures invarious economic andsocial services. Thedownsizing ofgovernment personnelreduced expenditureson wages led to theretrenchment and

displacement of some government employees. This put adverseeffect on the delivery of basic services in education and healthwhere field personnel and contractual employees were greatlyreduced aggravating further the insufficient services deliveryespecially in the rural areas. As can be seen in Figure 3,expenditures on health services were very minimal when comparedagainst external debt services. Health expenditures remained lessthan 5 percent of the national budget from 1981-2006. Theeducation sector also suffered as to prioritization getting onlyless than 15 percent of the national budget in the 1980s untilmidway of the 1990s.

The country’s GDP manifested a fluctuating trend of growthfrom 1980 to 2013. Evidently, negative growth occurred in 1984-1985, 1991 and 1998 when the government economic performancedwindled during the height of EDSA uprising. It can be recalled

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

2006

2008

2010

2012

-10.0

-5.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

Fig. 4. Philippine Gross Domestic Product, 1980-2013Data source: World Bank Statistics Database

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that these were the years where the Marcos regime experiencestrong opposition, incinerated by the assassination of BenignoAquino which resulted to the peaceful EDSA revolution.Consequently, the economic productivity of the country contractedand GDP output dropped to -7.3 in 1984 and 1985 (Figure 4). Theelection to presidency by Corazon Aquino in 1986 brought backinvestors’ confidence in the new government which wasinstrumental for the rebound of the country’s economy. GDPOutput accelerated and such growth momentum was sustained until1988 (Figure 4), then succumbed to growth fluctuations in theyears that followed.

Notably the government led by Corazon Aquino, continued toincur external debts from the Fund and other IFI’s. There was asustained rise in external debt stocks (Figure 2) until 2003.This clearly shows that the monetary policies pursued by thesuccessions of the government leadership, from Corazon Aquino, toFidel Ramos, to Joseph Estrada until Gloria Arroyo, heavily relyon external borrowings in bringing the economy forward. Arroyo,in her state of the nation address - SONA on 25 July 2005,claimed that the Philippine economy was back on track. Yet her

critics, both in and outside the government, remain sceptical.The continued Arroyo government’s reliance on IMF and WB loans,upon which government economic policies are strongly influenced,remained one of the controversial issues affecting the country’seconomic development.

percen

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Since late 1980s and through the 1990s, the country’srecovery-recession cycles still persisted and they became worsethan before due to shorter cycle lengths. With the onset of theAsian financial crisis in 1997, the run-up in short term debtsand portfolio investments made the Philippines a powerless preyto the crisis draining the economy with dollar reserve afterexperiencing the crisis-led recession. The period 1984-1993witnessed the Philippines getting 15 structural adjustment andstabilization loans from both IMF and WB. Instead of utilizingthe loans for productive investments, said loans were redirectedto service the government US$26 billion debt at that time, mainlyas interest payments to Japan, USA and European internationalcreditor banks (Figure 3). Analysis of the scenario points outthat there was a shift in the national policy directions to debtrepayment rather than mobilizing the economy back on its growthpath. This was also confirmed by Simbulan (2002) when she notedthat (as mandated by SAPs doctrine) substantial losses infinancial resources have accompanied recessionary effects of muchreduced government spending and the continued peso devaluation.

Supposedly, a SAP-driven policy is envisioned to widen theparticipation of private sector in public services, hence allowbusiness initiatives taking over privatized government functions.During the administration of past President Fidel Ramos, thegovernment opened public assets and governmental functions toforeign investors with several agencies offered for privatizationcovering social services such as electricity and water. Suchpolicy direction emerged to favor the large and influentialcorporations it triggered the creation of local monopolies in thecapital market. Over the short run, the Ramos governmentsucceeded, for the first time over many decades, to post zerobudget deficit primarily because of savings from sales of publicassets.

Ironically, analysis suggests that while privatization hasensured the government with more available funds for foreign debtservicing, the amount of foreign debts continued to increaserather than diminish (Figure 2). In effect, the much neededgovernment revenues, generated from privatization thrust, have

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been redirected for debt servicing (Figure 3) rather than beinginvested on productive use for economic development programs. Adeeper analysis further revealed that privatization has led tothe creation of local monopolies in the country’s capital market.This claim is supported by Lim and Montes (2001) when theyaffirmed the transfer of control from government ownership to fewelite-rich-business magnets who purchased (in partnership withforeign investors) government assets.

Basically, the policy roads pursued by successive Philippinepresidents from Cory Aquino until the Gloria Arroyo governmentwere all SAP-driven. This is understandable because the IMF hadbeen extending huge amounts of loans to the country since theMarcos regime. Seemingly, it is not surprising that the need forIMF continued loan commitments influenced the national governmentleaderships for many decades as manifested by the country’sfaithful adherence to IMF’s prescribed conditionalities.

The key issue of this paper is whether such SAPs wereundertaken through building the country’s capacity to recover andwhether they promote long-term and sustainable economicdevelopment. In the case of the Philippines, succumbing to IMFprescribed SAPs need real transformation of policies and programscoupled with strong political will to bring the economy back onstable and high growth path. Even at present, when thePhilippines no longer gets loan from the IMF, somehow the Fundstill has a say on the government’s policy directions because ofits technical assistance being extended to the country overmonetary stance and international banking and investmentdirections, all in the guise of poverty alleviation over the longterm. In general, the IMF prescribed privatization policy hadbeen carried out but the outcome it was intended to bring thecountry back on its economic growth track did not materialized.

Finally, the author argues that SAP-driven policies did nothave substantial positive implications on the country’s economicperformance. Analysis of secondary data points out that thePhilippines has been over-aggressive in opening up for trade,while implementing privatization and deregulation programs with

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fewer safety nets, which have shift the country’s economiclandscape. This supports the findings of Orbeta (1996) whichrevealed that structural adjustments implemented after the 1983crisis appeared to have been not sufficient in addressingstructural problems like the inevitable trade and current accountdeficits, low domestic savings rate and very weak tax collectionefforts.

V. Conclusion and Recommendations

As a whole, the implications of IMF’s prescribed SAPs on thePhilippine development has been mixed. The adherence of thegovernment to SAP-driven policies and programs have narrowed downthe national government’s budget deficit but has never driven thePhilippines out from higher expenditures than revenues. Inparticular, the SAPs conditionality on reducing governmentexpenditures (while faithfully responding to debt servicing) hasresulted to a decline in the share of national expenditures onsocial services (e.g. education and health services). This madethe poor, who comprises the majority of Philippine population,suffers the disproportionate cost of adjustments when publicspending upon substantial reduction of social services budgetaryallocations.

In conclusion, the IMF’s prescribed structural adjustmentpolicy implementation did not bring favourable developments onthe Philippines’ economic endeavours downplaying the authenticpicture of the country’s economic landscape. The Philippines hasnot gained with its short-term stabilization measures ofgovernment expenditures cutbacks, increased interest rates andcurrency devaluation. The delivery of basic social services hasbeen severely sacrificed especially on health and educationprograms. Another pull factor is the political climate of thecountry where government leaderships do not have the politicalwill to implement real and long term reforms since their prioritygoals are limited to the medium term because of vested politicalinterests.

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From the foregoing discussion, it is imperative that thePhilippines should exercise prudence in its external borrowingprogram, and whenever possible not to incur further loans. Thecountry can find other resources to propel growth and developmentaway from external borrowing. It may continue however to engageand avail of the expertise of IMF on monetary and internationalbanking practices on consultation basis. SAP reforms can bepursued with the end goal of realizing a concrete benefits onpoverty alleviations and without underpinning the much neededresources for basic health, education and social servicesdelivery programs beneficial to the large and vulnerable groupsof the populace.

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VI. Literature Cited

African Forum and Network on Debt and Development [ARODAD]. (2007). Illegitimate Debt & Underdevelopment in the Philippines: A Case Study. Retrieved from http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran_storage/www.afrodad.org/ContentPages/43088398.pdf

Arroyo, G. (2005). State of the nation address (SONA) of president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Second Regular Session of the 13th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines. Manila. Philippines. Retrieved from http://www.gov.ph/sona/ sonatext2005.asp

Bello, W. (2006). Unfinished business: The breton woods twins and southeast asia. Focus on the Global South. Bangkok, Thailand. Retrieved from http://www.focusweb.org/ publications/1997/Unfinished%20Business.htm

Bello, W. (2005). The tragedy of contemporary democracy in the south. Transcend, A Peace and Development Network. Romania. Retrieved from http://www.transcend.org/ t_database/articles.php?ida=574

Central Bank of the Philippines. (2013). Philippines’ externalloan from world bank, international monetary fund andasian development Bank. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Economicand Financial Statistics Databse. Retrieved fromhttp://www.bsp.gov.ph/statistics/efs_ext2.asp#GIR

Chung, D. (2006). Bi-annual country report: Philippines. The World Bank. Washington D.C., USA. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALF YEARLYUPDATE/ Resources/550192-1143237132157/philippines-March06.pdf

Elu, J. (2000). The journey so far: The effect os structural adjustment programme. Western Journal of Black Studies. 24(4):202-215. Retrieved from ProQuest Central.

http://www.transcend.org/%20t_database/articles.php?ida=574

http://www.transcend.org/%20t_database/articles.php?ida=574

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Fletcher, K. (2005). Increasing public sector revenue in the Philippines: Equity and efficiency considerations. IMF Working Paper. Washington, D.C. USA. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0522.pdf

IMF Country Report. (2006). Staff report for the 2005 article IV consultation and post-program monitoring discussions. IMF Country Paper Report March 2006 – Philippines. Washington, D.C.USA. Retrieved from http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/ cr0692.pdf

Kapur, D., & Naim, M. (2005). The IMF and democratic governance.Journal of Democracy. 16(1):89-102. Retrieved from ProQuestCentral Database.

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Lim, J., and Montes, M. (2001). Structural adjustment program after structural adjustment program, but why still no development in the Philippines? MIT Press Journals. Massachusetts, USA. Retrieved from www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/ abs/10.1162/ 153535102320894018

Index Mundi. (2014). External debt stocks, concessional (DOD, current US$). Philippines - External debt stocks. Retrieved from http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/ philippines/external-debt-stocks

Orbeta, A. (1996). Structural adjustment and poverty alleviationin the Philippines. Philippine Institute of Development Studies. Discussion Paper Series No. 96-04. Makati, Philippines. Retrieved from http://www3.pids.gov.ph/ ris/dps/ pidsdps9604.pdf

Simbulan, N. (2002). The impact of budget-related structural adjustment on education and health-care services in the Philippines: A summary report. Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network. SAPRIN Secretariat, Washington, DC, USA. Retrieved form http://www.saprin.org/philippines/research/phi_services_ sum.pdf

World Bank. (2014). Annual gross domestic product (GDP) growthrate, 1980-2013. World Bank National Accounts Data and OECDNational Accounts Data Files. Retrieved fromhttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG

World Bank. (2014). Total country external debts stocks, 1980-2013. World Bank International Debt Statistics. Retrieved fromhttp://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.DOD.DECT. CD

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