International Lending Institutions, the State, and Indigenous Movements in the Latin America of the...
Transcript of International Lending Institutions, the State, and Indigenous Movements in the Latin America of the...
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International Lending Institutions, the State, and Indigenous Movements in the
Latin America of the 1990s1
Gerardo Castillo2
The paper explores the emergence of indigenous movements in Latin America in the
decade of 1990s in the context of land-titling policies promoted by the World Bank. The
cases of Ecuador and Bolivia are examined.
Key words: indigenous movements, Latin America, World Bank, land-titling, Ecuador,
Bolivia.
1. Introduction
Since 1990s, Latin America is experiencing crucial changes and challenges. After the
collapse of the national modernization project of the import substitution model in the late
1970s, Latin American governments have implemented structural adjustment programs,
liberalize their economies and reduced state role under the tutelage of international
lending institutions (namely, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). In
addition, new social movements –within which the indigenous rights movement is a
major actor—are struggling for a more inclusive political role (Findji); and, the fragile
democracies of the sub-continent are searching for a new social contract where
multiculturalism and decentralization are central components. In many cases, the
components are being expressed in constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2000).
This paper explores some of the implications of these processes within light of the land
reforms that involve indigenous groups, states and international lending institutions. To
be sure, land has been the central locus of social struggles in Latin America since colonial
times, when indigenous groups were organized around a system of labor, land and
products expropriation. The beginning of the XX century witnessed a second wave of
dispossession and external aggression with the strengthening of the hacienda system and
1 Paper based on the research conducted under the supervision of Karl Offen, Department of Geography at
The University of Oklahoma, December 2002. 2 Director, Societas Consultora. E-mail: [email protected]
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the introduction of capitalism forms among peasant communities.3 This situation led to
thousands of landless and impoverished peasants in the highlands to massive social
mobilizations. Many populist and nationalist governments answered with a mixed policy
of military repression and land distribution reforms. However, the new context presents at
least three main differences. First, the geography and nature of the reforms have moved
from land distribution in the highlands to territory demarcation in the lowlands. Second,
struggles for land are also taking place over symbolic resources claimed through the
reinvigoration of ethnic identities4 and over modes of self-governance.5 Third, the
proposed reforms in the 1990s are being legitimized by discourses of democratic
decentralization, export integration to international markets, and natural conservation
instead of ideals of social justice.
Through the exploration of two projects in Bolivia and Ecuador, I examine the scope and
limits of the World Bank’s land reform proposals. It is argued that demarcation, titling
and securing ownership of land projects and reforms promoted by the World Bank since
1990 should be read as both shaping and reflecting indigenous political mobilization, but
also advancing neo-liberal agenda. This assertion implies a “win-win” scenario where: a)
indigenous and peasant groups obtain land rights, cultural (for not to say ethnic) and
political recognition, and the prospect of economic benefits (i.e. infrastructure,
development projects and, more importantly, some degree of participation of the profits
from natural resources exploitation); b) the state is able to attract foreign investments,
reduce its welfare role, recover internal legitimacy among growing disappointment with
the liberalization policies, and obtain external credibility; and, c) international lending
institutions set a political order of liberal democracy and multiculturalism (Hale), and
3 See, for instance, Mallon’s book for a recount of peasant struggles against capitalist incursions in the
central highlands of Peru. 4 See Gros for an analysis of indigenous identity Colombia, and Fisher for Pan-Mayan resistance and
construction in Guatemala. 5 Without doubt, Colombia is the country that has advanced most significantly in financial and political
decentralization and, also, in restituting territorial autonomy to indigenous and black communities. For
territorial decentralization in the Amazonia see the compilation of Vieco et al., specially the articles of
Clemente Forero and Juan José Vieco. For territorial decentralization and identity among black
communities in Colombia see Wade’s article and the interview with the Organización de Comunidades
Negras de Buenaventura. The paper prepared by Offen (2002, Indigenous…) provides a general overview
of decentralization and indigenous autonomy in Latin America.
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secure sustainable economic exploitation of natural resources through the stabilization of
property regimes in untitled regions.
2. State-Society Relationship: A New Social Contract in Latin American Countries
Current literature in Latin America (Jelin 1996; Reis) has delineated the dramatic changes
that Latin American economic and political regimes have experienced over the last
decades. These changes have meant the reduction of the state role in the economy,
privatization of national assets and services, liberalization of internal markets, and budget
cuts in agreement with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and, in less
extend, the Inter-American Development Bank6. But, and maybe more importantly in the
long term, they have also included a political reconfiguration of the state-society
relationship7.
In an unintended confluence, both Neo-liberal and New Left discourses and practices
have abandoned their emphasis on the state as the omnipresent actor in the political
arena. Neo-liberal agenda, on the one hand, with its accent on accountability, delivery
efficiency, capacity building, social responsibility, and good governance, regards
organized civil society and private corporations as privileged actors in the race for
economic development and liberal democratic consolidation at expenses of the state8.
The New Left turn, on the other hand, has incorporated participatory democracy as its
central concept in the political reconfiguration of the 1990s. Elsewhere, Evelina Dagnino
has indicated that in the Latin American leftist discourse the centrality of the state has
been replaced by the idea of democracy. After the defeat of the armed strategy, the arena
of political struggle was no longer the capture of the state. Democracy became the
6 Eduardo Lora presents an excellent comparative summary of the performance of macro-economic reforms
in Latin America. 7 For a summarized revision of the changes in the state-society relationship, see the introduction prepared
by Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar. 8 Many of these terms defines a discursive universe which dilutes broader political and economic constrains
to an individualistic will. For example, an approach that considers the social capital of the community or
the social responsibility of the firm as the main factors of development, privileges local scales at the
expense of the state as political regulator and economic distributor.
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unifying concept for fight against authoritarian states in all the fronts: from political and
human freedom to better economic conditions, to women rights, and to ethnic and
linguistic identities. As Dagnino puts correctly, the way to think and make politics in
Latin America is moving “from the kingdom of ideology and the state to apogee of
hegemony and civil society” (35).
Latin American academics, trying to understand the changing panorama of the 1980s,
moved from a statist view of politics9 to an emphasis in an autonomous civil society. This
reconceptualization was the result of major changes in social theory but also of the
specific Latin America context convulsed by increasing social movements. Thus, new
actors and new movements --not possible to encapsulate in the rigid correspondence of
class interests-- put in agenda the recently rediscovered concept of civil society. In Latin
America, civil society was less a reflection about hegemony than the practical imperative
facing the debacle of the modern social contract: the state was not only unable to deliver
minimum welfare but also lacked the legitimacy in the use of violence. Resistance against
authoritarian states took shape through the organization of civil society. This original
feature fostered a view that radically opposed civil society and the state. Moreover, from
this point was short the step to the mythification of civil society "…as a virtuous pole
against an evil state." (Dagnino, 41).
However, the "…intellectual enthusiasm generated by the new forms of collective
expression in the 1980s is now a thing of the past." (Jelin 1998, 405). The political
democratization --inaugurated by the transition governments in the early 1980s-- did not
automatically produce a strengthened civil society, a culture of citizenship, and a sense of
social responsibility. In Latin American countries, the extreme poverty and violence
9 As pointed by Dagnino:
Under the heavy influence of Marxist structuralism, the state was conceived as a condensation of
power relations and the specific locus of domination in the society. As the privileged focus of
attention in the analysis of politics and political transformation, the state was considered to be the
only decisive arena of power relations and, therefore, the only relevant site and target of political
struggle, in what came to be known as a ‘statist’ view of politics. Latin American political culture
came to reinforce such a view, since a conception of a strong and interventionist state, since as
historically linked to the building of the nation and as the primary agent of social transformation,
has been central to all versions of populism, nationalist, and developmentalist projects, whether
conservative or leftist. (Dagnino, 36).
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excluded minorities from the political community. This social and economic crisis has
led to a serious disappointment with traditional liberal democratic forms and to growing
social mobilization.
Since the 1990s, thus, the fragile democracies of the sub-continent are searching for a
new social contract where multiculturalism and decentralization are central components
and become expressed in constitutional reforms (Van Cott 2000). In fact, many Latin
American countries have reformed or are currently reforming their Constitutions in order
to explicitly declare a pluri-cultural and pluri-ethnic nation10. This is a major shift from
an authoritarian, national-populist and developmentalist ideal to a (formal) democratic,
decentralized, and neo-liberal model, which applies a “positive discrimination” in favor
of indigenous respect and autonomy (Gros). Decentralization has been also favored by
the democratic transition that relaxed thigh controls over regions and social movements
(Rojas). In addition, structural reforms have also played a significant role. The
elimination of trade barriers, monopolies, fixed exchange rates, and price controls over
basic consumer goods, has mainly hurt the industrial urban centers and has provided an
stimulus to more dispersed mining, oil, forest and agricultural activities, especially if are
destined to external markets. In turn, these extractive activities are pushing frontier lands
(Fox).
3. World Bank Development Objectives and Strategies
The World Bank11 deals with long-term development reforms. In effect, after a brief
period where its main interest was the post-war European economic reconstruction, the
Bank responded to the claims of Lest Developed Countries (LCDs) enlarging and re-
10 For a revision of the success or failure of introducing pro-indigenous constitutional reforms in Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela, see Van Cott (2001). 11 The World Bank Group is formed by four agencies. The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) makes loans at commercial rates to middle-income developing countries. The
International Development Association (IDA-1960) provides soft loans to the poorest governments. The
International Finance Corporation (IFC-1956) assists economic development in poor countries through
investing private projects, supporting private capital markets and encouraging local and foreign capitals.
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA-1988) promotes the flow of direct foreign to Less
Developed Countries through the lessening of non-commercial investment barriers.
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orientating its loans. Influenced by development theories of the time, the Bank promoted
the industrialization of LDCs financing infrastructure (namely, transport, energy and
communications). The modernization project –which considers the lack of infrastructure
and initial capitals as the only barriers for economic growth-- failed in the early 1970s
and was replaced for an emphasis on "basic needs", growth with redistribution, and
investments in the rural sector. Since 1980 the Bank has moved away from a poverty
alleviation approach and became more involved in structural changes and promoting the
private sector development. Moving from sector programs focused in industrial and
economic growth, the Bank became more concerned with poverty reduction policies and
structural adjustments12 in a close relationship with the IMF (Mosley et al.).13
By the early 1990s two central elements were added to the Bank’s agenda: environment
and indigenous people. Although the inclusion of these issues on the Bank’s policies are
partly the result environmental NGOs and indigenous movement pressure around the
world, it is also true that they have evolved from internal processes. This is especially the
case for the link between biodiversity and indigenous people, which has evolved from a
reflection on poverty and land degradation. Effectively, in the last years there is an
increasing concern about the relationship between economic performance and
environment among academic researches and policy makers14. As Helm has noted, the
environment “has assumed a status as the economic problem of the 1990s, as did oil in
1970s and inflation in the 1980s” (Helm, ix. Italics in the original). Equally, in current
development discussion there is a concern in poverty, environment and development
(Markanya 1999). Although not without differences, this development literature suggests
12 Structural adjustments are generally designed by the IMF and constitute the macro economic framework
where the WB development strategy operates. These measures include privatization of state companies and
services; liberalization of foreign trade through tariff reductions and non-tariff barriers and; price
liberalization and deregulation. The short-term effects of the privatization process are raising
unemployment and the deterioration of living standards but could stop government losses. Likewise, direct
food supplies to target groups replace the elimination of subsidies on basic products (Kahler). 13 The mediation of the World Bank and IMF would not only foster private foreign capital inflows but the
agreement of better conditions for both the receiving country and the trans-national corporations. Thus,
many Latin American countries with mining traditions have liberalized their economy and reformed their
legal framework under the World Bank support (World Bank 1995, Characteristics…). Now, the investor is
assured of total transferability of titles and of long term fiscal and foreign exchange terms and in return
makes an enforceable commitment to carry out a specified and verifiable investment program, besides to
pay high but clear taxes over the net incomes and dividends. 14 See, for instance, López or World Bank (2000).
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that an increase in poverty within the community results in increased degradation.
Conversely, a reduction in poverty will reduce environmental degradation (de Janvry and
García). In a similar line Stern, Common, and Barbier conclude that increases in
economic development have a complex effect on the environment, but in the long-term
should help reduce poverty and improve the environment15.
Among this debate, the World Bank has re-oriented its policies from industrial growth to
conservation and sustainable economic development. Thus, altogether with the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Environmental
Programme (UNEP), the World Bank is one the Implementing Agencies16 of the Global
Environment Facility Program (GEF)17.
Result of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, the GEF is a mechanism for providing funds to
achieve global environmental benefits in four focal areas: Climate change; Biological
diversity; International waters; and Ozone layer depletion. Activities concerning land
degradation, desertification and deforestation are also eligible for funding as they relate
to the four focal areas. The GEF serves as the financial mechanism for the Conservation
of Biological Diversity, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and as the
interim financial mechanism for the implementation of the Persistent Organic Pollutants
program. (World Bank 2002, Global…). As one of the three implementing agencies of
the GEF, the World Bank:
15 Nevertheless, there are more critical positions stating that social and political historical processes –
namely, colonial experience (Watts) or structural adjustments programs— have resulted in increments of
poverty and environmental degradation in a large number of developing countries. For instance, Veening
and Groenendijk for the Guianas and Bowles et al. for Latin America, argue that logging and timber
extraction are indirectly subsidized by host states in terms of infrastructure (namely, ports and roads),
exoneration of taxes and royalties, and non-payment of social and environmental externalities. Thus, Latin
American tropical forest is starting to replace Asian timber extraction where production dropped
dramatically. 16 The World Bank's primary role is in ensuring the development and management of investment projects.
The United Nations Development Programme's main concern is in ensuring the development and
management of capacity building programs and technical assistance projects. The United Nations
Environment Programme's first task is to catalyze the development of scientific and technical analysis and
to advance environmental management in GEF-financed activities. 17 The GEF consists of an Assembly of all participating countries, and Council, Secretariat, a Scientific and
Technical Advisory Panel, and three Implementing Agencies – UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank.
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[…] assists its member countries conserve and sustainably use their biological
diversity, reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, manage shared water
bodies and reduce their emissions of ozone-depleting substances by accessing
GEF resources to cover the incremental costs of additional actions on these global
issues. (World Bank 2002, Global…).
Nowadays, in addition, any project financed by the World Bank requires an
Environmental Assessment, which is one of its ten environmental and social safeguard
policies used in the Bank to examine the potential environmental risks and benefits
associated with the its lending operations.18 The Bank classifies the proposed project into
one of four categories, depending on the type, location, sensitivity, and scale of the
project and the nature and magnitude of its potential environmental impacts: A, B, C, D
and F. In practical terms only the first three are used, where A refers to projects likely to
have significant adverse environmental impacts, and C those with minimal or no adverse
environmental impacts. The cases presented below are ranked B. These impacts are site-
specific; few if any of them are irreversible; and in most cases mitigatory measures can
be designed readily. (World Bank 1999, Environmental…).
The Bank’s concerns on environmental issues are clearly expressed in its forestry
policies. The World Bank financed its first forest operations in 1949 with the purchasing
of timber equipment. The Bank’s approach evolved from a focus on industrial operations
to social forestry and agroforestry to an emphasis on conservation. Prior to the
publication of its 1978 Forestry Sector Policy, the Bank:
[…] had supported forestry primarily by investing in log extraction operations,
pulp and paper mills, and technical assistance for species trials; and by
strengthening forestry institutions. Forest-related lending was ad hoc and lacked
overall appraisal of the potential of forest to contribute to economic development
or environmental protection. In addition, […] the 1978 policy paper reflected
growing awareness of the ecological functions of forest and their contributions to
18 The Bank's environmental assessment policy and procedures are described in Operational Policy/Bank
Procedures 4.01 (World Bank 1999, Environmental…).
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agricultural productivity and enhanced rural incomes. (World Bank 2002, A
revised forest…, 23).
During the 1980s, rising international concerns about the escalating rate of tropical
deforestation and its implications for biodiversity loss, global warming, and
environmental degradation triggered a revision of Bank’s policy. The Forest Policy paper
prepared in 1991 recognized poverty reduction, policy reforms to contain deforestation,
and resource expansion as main issues. At the same time, the policy paper emphasized
preserving intact forest areas and concluded a Bank commitment not to finance
commercial logging in primary moist tropical forest under any circumstances. The broad
goals of the 1991 strategy were to prevent or significantly reduce deforestation and to
stimulate plantations and additional forest resource creation. (World Bank 2002, A
revised…, 23).
After a consultative process with governments, major NGOs and private sector, the Bank
have designed a new Bank Forests Sector Strategy and Operational Policy by 2002. Its
forest diagnosis and strategy developed for Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)19
cover three main issues: a) poverty reduction, b) integration of forest in economic
development, and, c) protection of global and local values. (World Bank 2002, A revised
forest…, 53-54).
The poverty reduction aim considers that some 40 million indigenous people –the
majority of them poor—are concentrated in forest areas in the LAC region. The bank’s
strategy is, with governments:
to develop the policy, institutional and legal bases to protect indigenous peoples’
rights and access to forest; empower poor and marginalized people; develop
tenure security; and integrate agroforestry and secondary forest restoration
19 The Latin America and the Caribbean regions contain the largest remaining areas of tropical moist
rainforest, and the dependence of local and poor communities on forest of all types is high. A major joint
paper by the World Bank and Amazon in Brazil indicates that in 83 percent of the Amazon forest, the use
of land for agriculture yields low returns and has limited potential. Therefore, from the national economic
point of view, sustainable management of forest is a much preferable use of the Amazon (Schneider et al.
2002).
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activities involving the poor in rural development programs. (World Bank 2002, A
revised forest…, 54. Italics added).
The objective of integrating forest in economic development considers that an increased
emphasis will be given to integrate forest management into cross-sectoral frame;
governance and illegal operations issues; developing awareness of the link between broad
economic reforms in trade and fiscal areas to forest outcomes; and catalytic investments
in sustainable forest management. Finally, to protect global and local values the focus
will be Bank involvement in GEF and other grant-based support to Protected Areas;
building markets for ecosystem services; and evaluating cross-sectoral impacts on forest
areas. (World Bank 2002, A revised forest…, 54).
The way to deal with this complex interrelation of attacking poverty, stabilizing land
regimes, and securing biodiversity is summarized in this Bank statement about the
Colombian Chocó:
The main thrust of the Bank's assistance to Colombia from the mid 1980s has
been to help establish a policy environment supportive of growth led by the
private sector. The [mapping and titling project] progressed to set the groundwork
for investment through institutional strengthening with [land demarcation and]
titling as a vital [component]. (Ng'weno 2000, 14, quoted from Offen 2002,
Indigenous…).
Following this line, and in a paper presented to the Association of American
Geographers, Offen argues that:
[…] the Bank's modified position is consistent with its efforts to strengthen
property rights, to regularize and integrate a system of protected areas to enhance
the institutional capacities governing these areas, to foment foreign direct
investment, and to attract appropriate technologies to biodiverse areas. (2002,
Indigenous…).
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This approach goes altogether with vision of a decentralized management20 and a
proactive indigenous support. As Marquette has stated:
[…] the Bank has moved from a reactive approach of protecting indigenous
groups from project impacts to a more proactive approach supporting indigenous
land rights, investment in indigenous communities, and the informed participation
of indigenous communities in conservation and development activities (10).
4. Indigenous Right Movements
As previously stated, the last decades have witnessed the emergence of social movements
that emphasizes the strengthening of civil society, formal democracy, and citizenship.
The indigenous rights movement has became a major actor among these struggles for
more inclusive political roles. An enduring and well-organized alliance between pro-
human rights NGOs and indigenous associations has been able to raise ethnic and
indigenous concerns to the agenda of global institutions such as the United Nations21, the
ILO22, or the World Bank23.
20 For the Bank, decentralized environmental management has two interrelated forms. First, it:
[…] occurs under the broader political process of decentralization, which aims to give more power
to citizens in public decision-making. Second, it is part of an economic and administrative process
that aims to gain efficiency by transferring responsibilities from central levels of the public
administration to local levels. (Margulis, 273. Italics added). 21 Thus, in a early document, the United Nations Sub-commission on the Prevention on Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities states that indigenous communities, peoples and nations:
[…] are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies
that developed on their territories, considered themselves distinct from other sectors of the
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form a present non-dominant
sector of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their
ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples,
in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems (United
Nations, 379). 22 In 1989, the International Labor Organization, approved the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention,
1989, which applies:
[…] to tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions
distinguish them from other sections of the national community and peoples in independent
countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent. It requires ratifying States to
recognize the responsibility of Government to develop with the participation of the peoples
concerned, coordinated and systematic action to protect the rights of these peoples and to
guarantee respect for their integrity (ILO). 23 Although the Bank issued its first directive concerning indigenous peoples in 1982 under the title Tribal
People and in Bank-financed Projects (Davis) it was not until 1993 that a more organic strategic was
designed. Effectively, that year the Bank launched its Indigenous Peoples Development Initiative and,
gradually, indigenous development is becoming part of its portfolio (Nieuwkoop and Uquillas).
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Peasant and indigenous peoples in Latin America have experienced long-standing
struggles against dominant conditions since early Colonial times. Along the XX century,
peasant peoples from the highlands have been involved in agrarian reforms with the land
as the central focus of the fight (i.e. 1917 in Mexico, 1953 in Bolivia, 1964 in Ecuador, or
1970 in Peru).
Since the 1980s, however, with the destructuration of political struggles through class
(unions) and political parties, women and indigenous movements are the most important
and original forms of resistance nowadays (Gros). In fact, indigenous peoples of the
lowlands are who are suffering the impact of an accelerated process of colonization and
farming (i.e. Mayan Indians of the Lacandón jungle in Chiapas, Nash; Collier and
Quaratiello) oil and mineral exploitation (i.e. the Petroecuador expansion in the Aguarico
region, Little; or the fight against garimpeiros in Brazilian Amazon, Schmink and Wood)
and development projects (i.e. the Kayapó’s long battle against the Xingu dam project,
Seva Fo). Despite these aggressive intrusions of capitalism forms, indigenous identity
movements have proved great resilience and adaptation capacity, guided by a new
generation of leaders trained in NGOs or Catholic groups (Gros).
In this process, as María Teresa Findji states for the case of indigenous authorities in
Colombia, indigenous struggles have evolved from reactive resistance to social
movements with extended national networks which –in some extent-- cross class, gender
and ethnicity24. June Nash, examining the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, argues that the
broad social support and aims reached is part of a dramatic opposition to global economic
processes (i.e. NAFTA) seeking accessing new natural resources areas and new markets.
In structural opposition to these economic and political forces, indigenous movements
would provide alternative modes of globalization, which include acknowledgement of
collective rights, ethnic self-determination, and the creation of global civic society
networks. This influential research approach, however, obscures the fact that the aims of
24 To a similar conclusion arrives Rodolfo Stavenhagen in his summary of the evolution of Mexican
ingenuous movement.
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indigenous movements are not necessarily in structural opposition to those of neo-liberal
institutions but partially share an ideal of formal democracy, multiculturalism and
territorial demarcation (Hale)25.
In a suggestive paper, Christian Gross, argues that indigenous movements in the
“highlands” and the “lowlands” have converged in the same claim of acknowledgment of
its cultural difference and territorial autonomy, although starting from opposite points26.
This indigenous movement would be product of some structural factors: the collapse of
the household peasant production due to demographic pressure that leads to a continuous
land sub-division in the highlands; colonization waves and the disruptive entrance to
global market economies in the lowlands; growing access to formal education and media,
which open the cultural horizon; and the emergence of new indigenous leaders with
political and organizational formation in NGOs and religious organizations.
In this sense, following Gros, indigenous movements would make use of the construction
of the invention of the Indianness (Indianidad) as a discursive and organizational resource
inscribed within globalization processes and power correlations with neo-liberal agencies
and the State. In fact, the internationalization of the indigenous agenda runs parallel and
is backed by the ONG network interested in environmental and sustainable development
issues.
Titling and secure tenure projects are particularly valuable because land becomes the
symbolic and material arena where these different processes are expressed. For instance,
indigenous conceptions of territory and property have frequently clashed with static and
individual Western conceptions of rights. Offen (2002, Ecología…) shows how Miskitu
groups in Nicaragua use space in a complex cycle around the year which allows them to
have access to different resources accordingly the particular ecosystem (fisheries, hunting
25 An additional problem is the sequence from resistance to social mobilization. Analyzing Colonial
rebellions in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, Steve Stern criticizes traditional historiography, which had
regarded indigenous movements as pre-political, merely reactive irruptions unable to articulate other social
groups neither to formulate a national program. Stern suggests that the political nature of indigenous
movements depends on the specific power correlations existing under specific circumstances. 26 While highlands groups would be fighting for national integration, lowlands groups would be struggling
against deleterious market intrusion in its territory.
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areas, forests or slash and burn agriculture). For the case of the Achuar, Descola has
illustrated how Catholic and Protestant missions, military bases, and development state
agencies have altered indigenous concept of territory and redefined its boundaries. This
has been the result of an imposed pax among the different Jívaro families and, more
significantly, the introduction of agriculture, limitation of collecting and hunting, and the
compulsory resettlement around the small landing strips.
Moreover, for indigenous peoples territory does not only refer to economic activities but
also is the ground where the whole social (i.e. marriage, sorcery) and cultural (i.e. sexual
attributes or landscape read through gender associations) relationships are organized and
categorized (Echeverri). In this sense, imposed changes in territorial organization would
led to redefinitions in ethnic identities as the hunter and recollecting Yujup and Nukak of
the Colombian northeast have experienced (Franky and Mahecha).
5. Study Cases
5.1. Bolivia
A landlocked country in the Andes, Bolivia is one the poorest in Latin America. In fact,
accordingly estimates of the World Bank (2002, Bolivia at a glance), in 2001 its GNP per
capita barely reached US$1,000 and 67% of Bolivian population lived below the national
poverty line. With a very weak industrial base, Bolivian economy mainly depends on
minerals (tin, zinc, tungsten) and gas exports and small-scale farming for local
consumption. Bolivia’s area covers 1.1 million km2, of which more than 50% is forests.
Its population of 8.5 million is concentrated in the Altiplano region where La Paz, the
capital, and the most important cities --such as Potosí, Oururo, Chuquisaca, and Tarija --
are located. In the eastern tropical slopes, however, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz’s
economy grows, partly fueled by drug trafficking. Certainly, Bolivia is the world's third-
largest cultivator of coca --after Colombia and Peru-- with an estimated 19,900 hectares
under cultivation in July 2001, especially in the Chaparé’s valley (CIA).
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Because of its dramatically low economic and social indicators, comparable with Sub-
Saharan standards, Bolivia is the only South American country considered within the
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. This initiative allows Bolivia to
reduce its total external debt by one-half and to be eligible to the soft loan program for
poor countries managed by the World Bank's International Development Association
(IDA). Indeed, Bolivia was one of the first countries in Latin America in following IMF
and WB policies of macroeconomic stability and structural adjustments since 1985. In
terms of the World Bank, Bolivia: “is a good example of a country that has achieved
successful stabilization and implemented innovative market reforms, yet made only
limited progress in the fight against poverty.” (World Bank 2002, Bolivia’s Debt…).
It is estimated (CIA) that 30% of Bolivia’s population is of Quechua origins and other
25% of Aymara’s ones. As the case of Ecuador, indigenous presence in politics has
increaser enormously. Proof of this is the second place occupied by Evo Morales, an
indigenous candidate with nationalist discourse, in the last presidential elections.
However, the correlation between rural areas and poverty is strong, with 81.7% of the
rural population living below the national poverty line, almost 20 points more than the
national average in 1999. Moreover, for the same year it is calculated that Quechua,
Aymara or Guarani people perceive between 15% and 57% less income than Spanish
speaking individuals (World Bank 2001, Bolivia: Indigenous…, 3-4).
5.1.1. The National Land Administration Project
Current land distribution issues in Bolivia go back to the Agrarian Reform in 1953 with
the sign of the decree 3464 and the creation of the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria
(INRA). The history of the so-called Law INRA reflects the changes in the country’s
politics and economy. From being the spearhead of the land redistribution in the
highlands and nationalizing project of the leftist and nationalist military government, in
the 1990s, the Law INRA is being redirected to fulfill new demands of property rights
stability and frontier expansion in the lowlands (Flores).
16
Table 1. Land Use in Bolivia (in ha)
Cultivated
Land Fallow Land Forest
Natural
Grasslands Total
Uplands 488,284 322,782 272,644 1,355,810 2,439,520
Valleys 331,830 78,760 1,284,903 571,581 2,267,074
Lowlands 543,019 450,778 8,116,158 9,097,465 18,207,420
TOTAL 1,363,133 852,320 9,673,705 11,024,856 22,914,014
Elaborated from World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 2.
From its creation to 1984, the state has provided land to small farmers without cost
through colonization and expropriation of old haciendas. Although updated statistics are
not available, it seems that land distribution in Bolivia is still very unequal. Thus, at the
end of the 1980s, small properties (80% of the total) owned only 2.5% of the land;
medium-size properties (18.1%) owned 12.1%; and large properties (1.8%) concentrated
85.3% of the land.
Table 2. Differences in Treatment Accordingly Types of Land Property
Medium and Large Property Small property, peasant and indigenous
communities
It could revert to the state in case of abandon Property is indivisible, collective, does not
prescribe and could not be executed
Can be sold and given in mortgage Cannot be given in mortgage
Subject of taxes Exempted of taxes
Bought to the state at market prices Given by the state free or at subsidized prices
Elaborated from Flores, 3-4.
The law gives full property rights to the medium and large owners but restricts them to
small farmers. The law considers small peasant property as a “vital minimum” and,
although it does not forbid its sale and buying, it establishes that land distribution will be
ensued accordingly communal customs and the plots cannot be used as mortgage. As
result, a market differentiation would be geographically developed: relatively free land
transactions in the east and a constrained land market in the high plateau, Andean valleys
17
and the Chaco region. This would explain the lack of credit and capital investments in the
traditional agriculture of the second area.
These differences would create an artificially low price for the land, which in turn would
led to its inefficient use and, moreover, provide incentives for the occupation of more
land in frontier regions. In brief, critics (Flores) claim that the law prevents the formation
of land and capital markets; curbs the development of traditional agriculture; and lowers
land prices. The law, therefore, generates excessive demand, encourage inefficiency in
traditional areas, trigger destruction of forestland, discourage foreign investment and
produce a cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus.
Facing this problematic, the World Bank --altogether with the Bolivian government, the
IDB and other donors-- has elaborated a comprehensive development framework. Among
other areas, the Bank is especially interested in funding and elaborating action strategies
in biodiversity conservation, rural community development, and land administration. In
fact, land ownership is fundamental for the Bank objectives:
Ownership is central to the implementation of development strategy, and
fundamentally, to the process of societal transformation that lies at the heart of
effective development. (World Bank 1999, Bolivia: Implementing…).
In this line, in 1995 the WB agreed to fund the National Land Administration Project in
Bolivia at a cost of US$27.2 million27. The objectives of project attempt:
to achieve a more efficient and transparent land administration system, clarify the
land tenure situation, identify public land suitable for small farmer settlements
and promote a more sustainable use of the country's land resources.” (World
Bank 2001, Bolivia: National… supplement credit, 3. Italics added).
To reach these objectives, the project would “help the Government to formulate land
administration and policy reforms, obtain accurate land ownership information, carry out
27 The Bank, through the IDA will finance US$20.4 and the Bolivian government will contribute with
US$6.8.
18
land studies, alleviate land conflicts and improve land transaction registration” (World
Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 18).
The project, thus, will:
[…] support the formulation of a sound and coherent land policy and legislation,
carry out land mapping on three million ha to obtain cadastre information and to
regularize the land tenure situation wherever possible, identify 500,000 ha
suitable for small farmer settlement and increase the efficiency and transparency
of the land administration system. (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…,
18. Italics added).28
In addition, the project will also finance: 1) title regularization and land settlement
programs by the Instituto Nacional de Tierras (INTI), when established; and 2) the
introduction of an integrated legal cadastral registry system when the Registro Legal del
Catastro (RLC) is established. (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 18).
Accordingly the Bank, the legal reforms and land institutions strengthening proposed in
the project would “improve the current land administration system thereby facilitating its
transition to a permanent and integrated geographical and legal land system as envisaged
by the Government” (World Bank 2001, Bolivia: National… supplement credit, 3). The
National Land Administration Project contains eight main components:
a) Reform of the legal framework
This component contemplates the revision of land tenure reform legislation, which
includes the INTI law, the RCL law, and the Land law. The INTI law would create the
Instituto Nacional de Tierras as the sole authority to distribute public lands and carry out
the cadastre and land titling regularization. The RCL law would creates the Registro
Legal del Catastro and provide legal status to the cadastre and registry procedures. The
28 In 2001 the bank was discussing the approval of a supplemental credit with the objective of:
[…] strengthen further the efficiency and transparency of the Borrower’s land administration
system, especially with regard to its functioning in the Andean region; to complete land titling in
over 3 million total hectares; and to implement a sustainable national legal cadastral system.”
(World Bank 2001, Bolivia: National… supplement credit, 3. Italics added).
19
Land law would include: the implementation of a new land policy taking into account
“efficiency, equity and sustainable criteria” (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National
Land…, 22); the definition of types of property rights (namely, indigenous peoples,
communal systems, and private properties); the formulation of a new land re-distribution
policy; the removal of existing constrains on private land transactions excepting in
communal lands; the creation of mechanisms for environmental monitoring in settlement
areas; and the definition of the conditions for reversion of previously distributed land.
The component also considers the training of judges and staff of the Órgano
Jurisdiccional Agrario. In addition, a group of high-level consultants or Land Policy
Analysis Unit will be established in order to conduct studies on land matters, formulate
land tenure policy proposals, support and monitor legal and institutional land
administration reforms, and conduct workshops for the dissemination of the analytical
studies.
b) Land management improvement – cadastre
This component seeks to strength the Comisión de Intervención (CI)29 and to assist it
with the clarification and systematization of land tenure situation. The CI would clarify
land tenure situation by identifying overlapping land titles, alleviating land conflicts,
continue land titling for small-holders, organizing land tenure information, and
contributing to territorial planning.
The area for title regularization covers 3.7 million ha, focusing on smallholders in the
lowlands of eastern Bolivia and indigenous and communal lands in both the eastern
lowlands and Andean region30. These activities are part of the Cat-Sat (catastro con
saneamiento) plan, which will be fully executed with the creation of the INTI.
c) Identification of land for settlement
29 The Consejo Nacional de Reforma Agraria (CNRA) and the Instituto Nacional de Colonización (INC)
compose the Comisión de Intervención Nacional (CI). 30 The funds available are not sufficient to cover the full-prioritized area of 6 million ha. The government is
seeking additional donors, including the Nordic Development Found, to complete the cadastre work.
20
The CI would “identify, reserve and assess the suitability of 500,000 ha of public land to
be made available for distributing to small-holders. The land settlement program aims at
directing spontaneous settlers to areas suitable for agriculture and livestock thereby
diverting them from environmentally fragile lands.” (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National
Land…, 25.) The identification process includes environmental analysis to determine
weather: a) soils in prospecting areas are suitable for agriculture; b) areas do not include
unique ecosystems or of biodiversity importance; c) areas do not located within lands
claimed by indigenous people.
d) Strengthening of the property registry
The program seeks to improve the capacity of the Property Registry (Derechos Reales) to
register titles and land transactions in rural areas.
e) Strengthening of the Instituto Nacional de Tierras (INTI)
The INTI will merge the CNRA and the INC and will have a central office with four
divisions: a) geographic information, in charge of the cadastre; b) tenure regularization
and titling, in charge of titling and conflict resolution; c) land settlements; and d)
administration and finance.
An external commission, Comisión Nacional Agraria, will provide assistance for the
formulation of the INTI law. A broad range of stakeholders –including state agencies,
peasant and indigenous organizations, or commercial farmer groups—will be part of the
commission.
f) Title regularization (Cat-Sat)
The objective of this program is to resolve conflicts between landholders and to register
and regularize land titles. The process includes: promotion of Cat-Sat, conflict resolution,
publication of field results, registration in the Property Registry (DDRR) and Registro
Legal de Catastro (RLC), and issuance of Registry Certificates.
21
Financing would be provided to conduct land regularization and titling efforts of
smallholders in the Departments of La Paz and Santa Cruz, and the titling of Tierras
Comunitarias de Origen (TCOs) in La Paz and Potosí Departments. One objective of the
titling activity would be develop, test and validate methodologies for land titling that
would address the range of land tenure arrangements in both the eastern lowlands and the
Andean region (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 26-28).
g) Land settlement program
The program seeks to direct spontaneous settlers to areas suitable for agriculture and
livestock accordingly technical studies. The allocation of public lands will require
Environmental Impact Assessments, cannot be located in areas occupied by indigenous
peoples, and will not exceed a maximum of 50 ha, depending on technological and soil
conditions. Virtually all of the lands eligible for small farmers would be in tropical and
sub-tropical lowlands. (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 28-29, 80)
h) Legal Cadastral Registry
With regard to the National Land Registry, the financing would allow for the completion
of a reliable and accessible national land registry including geographical (i.e. cadastral)
information. The full establishment of an effective and sustainable land registry system
depends on finalizing the technical development and installation of a computerized,
integrated registry containing geo-references for all registered titles, and increasing
access to the departments’ offices and 12 rural, regional offices into the automated
registry system (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 29-30).
5.2. Ecuador
As any other country of the Andean region, Ecuador presents sharply economic,
geographical and ethnic differences (World Bank 2002, Ecuador…). Within an area of
283,600 km2, Ecuador's population of 12.6 million is essentially divided among the
coastal and highland regions. Guayaquil, the major port, is also the financial and
commercial center and dominates the coastal area, which economy is thrived by
22
agricultural and fishing exports (namely, bananas and shrimps). The highlands host
Quito, the capital, and the traditional powers linked to small-scale farming and services.
In recent decades, the Amazon region, although sparsely populated have acquired
national importance because its large reserves of oil –by far the main country’s export
commodity—and forest resources, and its geopolitical significance31.
As in the case of Bolivia, Ecuador is affected by extreme poverty conditions. In fact,
accordingly the PNUD, 52,3 percent of the Ecuadorians live in poverty with less than 2
US$ daily. This poverty conditions are particularly harsh among indigenous and afro-
ecuadorian peoples. Thus, in 1994, 83%32 of indigenous living in villages and 81% of
afro-ecuadorians living in predominantly black areas were below the national poverty
line (World Bank 1997, 20).
Also similar to other countries in the region, the WB and other multilateral lending
agencies have a strong involvement in Ecuador’s policies, especially after the key
dollarizing legislation in March 2000. Since the 1980s, rural development projects –with
land titling and economic infrastructure included—were added to the portfolio of
interventions of the WB and IDB. The ongoing Rural Development Project is a project of
this type with some coverage of indigenous communities. In land management, United
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has financed a small land
cadastre pilot, which has not been followed up due to high cost per hectare. The strategy
of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) identified three program
areas of intervention: 1) farm activities for households with sufficient land; 2) non-farm
income generating activities for households with insufficient land based on rural
linkages; and 3) land reform and titling. The IFAD implemented this strategy in the
Upper Basin of the Cañar River Rural Development Project and the Saraguro-Yacuambi
Rural Development Project.
31 The access to the Amazon basin, and thus to the Atlantic, is of enormous importance for the country and
it has been the cause of recurrent army conflicts with Peru. Ecuador’s government has frequently used
indigenous populations, especially Achuar, as a front line army. For a description of some consequences of
these practices see Descola. 32 This is approximately 14% higher than the rural average and 32% higher than the national average
(Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, 6).
23
Still more important for our purposes, are the WB co-financed projects of the
Agricultural Census and Information System, the Chocó – Andean Corridor Project, and
the Ecuador – Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project.
5.2.1. Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project
At a cost of US$50 million33, the development objective of the Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project is:
[…] to improve the quality of life of poor rural indigenous and afro-Ecuadorian
communities by providing improved access to land resources and financing for
investment subprojects, which are planned and in most cases implemented by
local membership organizations and communities in accordance with existing
cultural values, vision of development and capacity for self-management. (World
Bank 1997, 2. Italics added).
To fulfill this objective, the project has designed four main components: a)
Institutionalization of local membership organizations and communities; b) Support to
the regularization of land and water rights; c) Rural investments; and, d) Institutional
strengthening of the Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo de los Pueblos
Indígenas y Negros (CONPLADE-IN).
a) Institutionalization of local membership organizations and communities
The implementation of the first component seeks to enable indigenous and afro-
ecuadorian communities and their organizations “to take the process of development in
their own hands in accordance with their cultural norms.” (World Bank 1997, 2).
Although pro-indigenous legislation has been relatively weak and ambiguous in Ecuador
(World Bank 1997, 46), its indigenous –and to a lesser extent afro-ecuadorian— peoples
33 The implementation period covers from 1998 to 2001 and the projects costs are divided among the IBRD
(50%), IFAD (30%), government (11.7%), beneficiaries (7.6%), and private institutions (0.7%) (World
Bank 1997, 52).
24
are highly organized and in recent years has been a major actor in Ecuadorian politics34.
Their participation in politics has allowed them to achieve positions of representation in
several local and regional governments, in the National Congress and in several
executive-branch agencies (i.e. CONPLADE-IN).
Table 3. Target Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Population by Ethnicity and Region
Region Ethnicity/Location Population
Costa-Sierra/Afro-
Ecuadorian region
Eloy Alfaro 23,256
San Lorenzo 9,067
Esmeraldas 86,653
Chota-Mira 22,793
Amazonia Runa, Sucumbios 8,463
Runa, Napo 25,470
Runa, Pastaza 15,866
Shuar, Upano 19,412
Shuar, Transcutucu 11,011
Shuar, Zamora 3,740
Others (Huao, Siona, Secoya, Cofán) 3,221
Sierra North Runa, Otavalo 63,726
Runa, Cayambe-Quito 51,289
Sierra Center-South Runa, Cotopaxi 72,476
Runa, Tungurahua 62,984
Runa, Chimborazo 148,715
Runa, Bolívar 35,086
Runa, Cañar-Azuay 62,447
Runa, Saraguro 11,936
Costa Costa Seca (Huancavilcas, Manteños, Punaes) 65,997
Others (Cachi, Epera, Tsáchilas, Awa) 9,892
TOTAL 813,500 Elaborated from World Bank 1997, 19.
At community level, it is estimated that 2,325 grassroots organizations have been formed
(communes, centers and cooperatives). These in turn have formed 160 second-tier
organizations –OSGs- (associations, unions, federations) and are frequently affiliated
with provincial, regional and national organizations, culminating in coordinating
organizations such as the Comité del Decenio and the Consejo de Nacionalidades
34 Proof of this, is that a major indigenous mobilization in 2000 to Quito helped to overthrown the
Mahuad’s government, which was trying to implement neo-liberal economic policies in the country.
Moreover, in the last elections, ex-colonel Lucio Gutiérrez has been declared president, mainly because of
the indigenous and peasant support.
25
Indígenas (World Bank 1997). Indigenous and afro-ecuadorian communities are formally
recognized under the Ley de Organización y Régimen Comunal (issued in 1937 and
reinforced with the agrarian reforms of 1964 and 1973), and entered in a register
managed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The project focuses on approximately 815,000
indigenous and afro-ecuadorians settled in rural areas. They represent 6.5 percent of the
country’s population.
Accordingly the project appraisal, the indigenous and afro-ecuadorian population is
concentrated in 48 cantons, which in turn contain 228 rural parroquias (226 indigenous
and 58 afro-ecuadorian), representing 29% of country’s total. However, in almost all the
cases these populations live with mestizo and white people. Therefore, the percentage of
indigenous and black population in these parroquias varies. These groups represent more
than 50 percent in 150 parroquias (111 indigenous and 39 afro-ecuadorian).
The beneficiaries of the project are members of grassroots community organizations,
which in turn have associated themselves with OSGs. In this area, the project works at
three levels: communities, OSGs, and regional or national organizations, including the
Comité del Decenio and the Consejo de Nacionalidades Indígenas. The project regards
the community as the basic form of social organization and cultural reproduction for
Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian peoples legally recognized by the state. At operational
level, however, it privileges the OSG level mainly because it brings grassroots
organizations together and because it has demonstrated the ability to work not only on
political but also economic issues, a problem faced by apex organizations.
Four are the main activities proposed in order to reach the project component objective:
1) Technical assistance and support to the functioning of key organizations and
communities (i.e. preparation of Local Development Plans); 2) Revitalization of peoples
at risk such as the Huaroni, Siona-Secoya, Cofán, Chachi, Tsachila, Emberá and Awá
(i.e. formulation of emergency plans covering organization, defense of land, cultural
demands, natural resource management, and basic services); 3) Education and training
(i.e. training using traditional methodologies as well as formal seminars on issues such us
26
land tenure, community management, environment, biodiversity, or ecoturism); and 4)
Rescue and strengthening of cultural patrimony (i.e. promotion of ritual and
archeological sites, traditional festivities, ethnographic materials, living heritage and
traditions, cultural identity debates, or publication of works by indigenous and afro-
ecuadorian authors).
b) Support to the regularization of land and water rights
The project recognizes that Ecuador presents a very unequal distribution of land
ownership. Thus, for instance, in the sierra region farms of 0 to 5 ha constitute 80.2% of
all farms and occupy 14.1% of total area. In contrast, the 1.6% farms over 100 ha own
42.9% of all lands. It is also stated that until its disappearance in 1994, the Instituto
Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (IERAC) has adjudicated approximately
6.7 million ha, although the transference of land from the latifundio to the smallholders
the impact of the state-led land reform has been modest.
Table 4. Land Reform in Ecuador: 1964-1994
Region Agrarian Reform/
Adjudications
Has
Colonization**
Has
Beneficiaries
Amazon 3,508,604* 1,336,758 ?
Sierra 597,155 - 89,693
Costa 297,290 917,250 30,474
Total 4,403,049 2,254,008 Elaborated from World Bank 1997: 25.
* Adjudications to indigenous groups in the Amazon region (53%).
** Titling of lands to settlers in frontier regions (34%).
The project (World Bank 1997, 2, 25-33), however, does not focus on land distribution
but on land titling, especially in the lowlands. It is estimated that some 2,500,000 ha
remain untitled in Ecuador, of which 30% is in areas under the jurisdiction of the Instituto
Ecuatoriano Forestal y de Areas Naturales y Vida Silvestre (INEFAN). Though the long-
term objective cover this area, the project aims to initiate concrete activities through:
First, technical assistance in the preparation of legal reforms on a procedure to adjudicate
lands in forest areas (patrimonio forestal del estado) while ensuring adequate
27
management of natural resources; the preparation of management plans and the definition
of ancestral possession; the writing of a unified management plan for the Instituto
Nacional de Desarrollo Agrario (INDA) and INEFAN; and the including of provisions in
the Ley Forestal y de Areas Naturales Protegias, Vida Silvestre y Biodiversidad, allowing
recognition on land property rights of indigenous and black communities in protected
areas.
Second, land regularization on lands claimed by indigenous and afro-ecuadorian peoples
with rights of ancestral possession; other lands claimed by indigenous and afro-
ecuadorian peoples that required land purchase in selected disputed areas (namely, the
cantones of Ibarra, Cotacachi, Otavalo, Saquisilí, Pujulí, Latacunga, and Guaranda);
lands claimed by indigenous and afro-ecuadorian peoples within areas declared national
forestry patrimonium (patrimonio forestal del estado) and under jurisdiction of INEFAN;
and, lands claimed by indigenous and afro-ecuadorian peoples in protected areas
(patrimonio de áreas naturales). This regularization includes the recognition of
indigenous and black communities legal status, demarcation of land, and the elaboration
of management plans35.
Third, the implementation of diagnostic study and the elaboration of an action plan for
the estimated 2,000 community-owned irrigation systems. This plan includes the
inventory of water sources, conflicts, rights, distribution systems, schemes, implementing
agencies, etc.
c) Rural investments
This component includes infrastructure and financial, technical and managerial assistance
in order to increase access of indigenous communities to services and markets and to
diversify and intensify rural production. (World Bank 1997, 2). The rural investment
logic defines two kinds of interventions: of public/communal nature and
private/individual nature. The first includes investments in productive infrastructure,
social infrastructure, training and technical assistance, environmental and natural
35 Initially, the project focuses in the areas of Esmeraldas, Sucumbíos, Napo, y Pastaza.
28
resources management, and institutional strengthening. The second includes investments
in agriculture and micro-enterprises (i.e. handicraft).
d) Institutional strengthening of the Consejo Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo
de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros (CONPLADE-IN)
The objective of this project component is to secure a shift from the homogenizing ideal
of cultural assimilation and equal citizenship to the recognition of cultural diversity and
the promotion of ethno-development. It would be reached through the strengthening of
CONPLADE-IN, an institution created in 1997 with the direct representation of
indigenous and afro-ecuadorian organizations.
This “dream come true” (World Bank 1997, 47) organization is in charge of generating
state policies benefiting indigenous and black populations, and executing and
coordinating programs and projects. Its main tasks include intercultural development in
Ecuador’s society; legal, political and administrative reform of the state; comprehensive
and sustainable development; and, affirmation of bilingual and intercultural identity and
education.
The activities proposed in this last program involve: a) the improvement of information
systems; b) elaboration of a system of project planning, monitoring and evaluation; c)
formulation of a national plan for indigenous and afro-ecuadorian development; d)
formulation of legal reforms and public policies, including the indigenous peoples law,
new communes law, the law for the recognition of indigenous health systems, the law of
indigenous peoples cultures, and the development of capacity to review current
legislation from an indigenous point of view; and e) the establishment of a decentralized
Project Implementation Unit, with its heart quarters in Quito and implementing offices in
seven regions (World Bank 1997, 47).
29
6. Final Considerations
Through the exploration of two projects in the Andean region, I have examined some
characteristics of land reforms supported by the World Bank. Demarcation, titling and
securing ownership of land projects and reforms promoted by the World Bank since 1990
should be read as both shaping and reflecting indigenous political mobilization but also
advancing neo-liberal agenda. There is a fortuitous convergence between indigenous
struggles of autonomy, state attempts to recover internal and external legitimacy, and the
liberal ideology of self-government and free-market. I like to highlight three issues,
which would require further research. In this line, I like to highlight three issues, which
would require further research.
6.1. Land reforms and state legitimacy
As in the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, nowadays Latin American countries are
facing an urgency of land reforms. However, there are crucial differences between both
periods. In general terms, the agrarian reforms of previous decades were signed by: a) a
heavily ideologically charged discourse of social justice and populism; b) authoritarian
top-down mechanisms leaded by the state and imposed by revolutionary leftist
governments (for instance, the cases of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico or Peru); c)
distribution of land among peasants in the highlands and coastal areas and colonization of
“free” lands in the lowlands; and d) a development framework of self-sufficient and
cheap agrarian production to support industrial growth.
As suggested by the National Land Administration Project and the Indigenous and Afro-
Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project, land reforms do not focus anymore in farming
areas (both in the highlands and the coast) but in the frontier area of the lowlands. This
has two main implications. On the one hand, the state populist discourse of social justice
and wealth redistribution is abandoned for a more appealing and progressive one of
concern with ethnic minorities and environment preservation. On the other hand, inward-
oriented development models are shifted for export-oriented policies of natural resources
(re-primarization of the economy) and attractive foreign capital incentives. To reach this
objective, the titling of indigenous land and a process of financial and political
30
decentralization are some of the mechanisms set in motion. In this sense, “ethno-
development” raises as the new hegemonic discourse that links indigenous claims of
“multiculturalism” with late capitalist needs for accessing untouched natural resources.
Some critics warn about possible consequences of this emergent pattern. Transnational
firms –regarded as culturally neutral—contact directly indigenous groups and, thus, they
would avoid state or other citizen controls (Zizek). Although the traditional position of
the state is in some extent bypassed by the growing influence of international lending
institutions, transnational firms, global indigenous movements, international NGOs, and
relatively autonomous indigenous groups, the cases presented suggest that the role of
state is still central. While in the Bolivian case, the state has a more traditional role of
designing, directing, implementing and monitoring the reforms, in Ecuador, indigenous
and black populations have a more active participation. However, in both cases legal
reforms are expected, including issues of territorial autonomy36 and multiculturalism and
decentralized administrative frame. The State, therefore, makes a sort of concession and
evolves to a more decentralized apparatus but it is also securing the management and
rational exploitation of natural resources. At the same time, it meets with the new set of
international expectations of nature preservation.
6.2. Poverty and environment relationship
Of course, a crucial issue is the definition of rational exploitation of natural resources.
Talking about global and local values, the World Bank seems to envisage a common and
non-conflictive goal: declaring protected areas and securing the sustainable exploitation
of forest resources is the unquestioned value of conserving forest and biodiversity.
Global values, however, are not undisputed and --for instance-- transnational firms,
environmentalist groups and lending institution have not the same idea of how to protect
natural resources. At the same time, local values do not have to coincide with
36 In the Ecuadorian case, for example, although the proposal recognizes usufruct rights by indigenous
communities in protected areas, it is seems that substantial forest areas would be declared national forest
patrimonium and, thus, under the State’s (i.e. INEFAN) jurisdiction. However, the project will also finance
legal reforms which include provisions in the Ley Forestal y de Areas Naturales Protegidas, Vida Silvestre
y Biodiversidad, “authorizing indigenous and afro-ecuadorian peoples ownership of lands in protected
areas.” (World Bank 1997, 31. Italics added).
31
conservationist practices. There is always the danger to idealize indigenous peoples as
closer to nature and ecologist per se. However, beyond the discursive strategies, many of
the indigenous struggles deal more with the appropriation of benefits from natural
resources exploitation rather than with protection of the resources.
In addition, the projects designed by the World Bank Group refer directly to a gradual,
unavoidable and desired process of land stability, foreign investments and market
integration. In this sense, the environmental logic of the World Bank policy is
straightforward: the distribution of public land among small farmers and clear property
rights will stabilize the use of land resources37 and will open incentives for the reception
of foreign capital flows.
In the case of Ecuador, for instance, one of the main objectives of the project is to
improve secured access to land and water resources for indigenous and afro-ecuadorian
peoples through the definition of collective property rights over lands and the elimination
of market constrains which --accordingly the Bank’s diagnosis-- hamper access of small
farmers to land (World Bank 1997, 26). The project appraisal, nevertheless, fails to make
clear how it would solve supply constrains which imply the existence of a “pattern of
land market segmentation by both class and ethnicity” (World Bank 1997, 26). From the
demand side, it regards population growth and land degradation as the most important
problems. But it is no clear if the project will promote further colonization for landless or
smallholder peasants of the highlands or simply titling of traditional indigenous claims in
the lowlands. Indeed, the project blurs distinctions among different land conditions and
social realities in the coastal, sierra and lowlands regions. Therefore, if the Bank
diagnosis considers that the lack of adequate property rights is the main constrain for
37 Thus, accordingly the project appraisal, the environmental impact of the National Land Administration
Project in Bolivia would be strongly positive for the following reasons. First, early land tenure conflict
resolution would reduce incentives to title owners to deforest land to prove occupancy. Second, private land
under more secure individual property rights would be managed in a more sustainable manner. Thus far,
under the original project financing and due to the INRA law of 1996 and its regulations, INRA now
provides incentives for conservation by: a) allowing for increased size of landholdings due to the defining
of private reserves; and b) does not require land categorized as forest to show “improvements” (i.e.
deforestation) in order for an individual to claim legitimate use. In addition, the titling of TCOs (Tierras
Comunitarias de Origen) in eastern Bolivia is putting limits on the expansion of un-managed, illegal
extraction of forest resources (World Bank 1995, Bolivia: National Land…, 80-83).
32
access to credit, efficient resources management, and conflict resolution, then, the
solution is straightforward. However, this naïf approach downplays the very unequal
basis of the power system in the country. In other words, it legitimizes a de facto situation
and, at the same time, makes these “new” lands available to the market.
Also problematic in the logic that links individual property rights with efficient use of
natural resources is the lack of clarity in the Bank’s policies. As the project diagnoses
acknowledge, indigenous peoples have enormous resistance to the privatization of
communal lands. However, neither in the Bolivian and Ecuadorian cases, specific
provisions to prevent land consolidation have been designed. It would seem that the Bank
regards communal rights as an unpleasant although necessary first step towards full
private property rights. In any case, it could be argued the from the Bank perspective,
collective titles are more attractive to foreign capital than no titles and uncertainty.
6.3. WB, State, NGOs, and Indigenous Organizations relationship: The de-
politicizing “ethno-development”
Press notes released by the Bank celebrate the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian
Peoples Development Project success for being the first time that a project defines its
objectives in terms of "ethno-development." It would be also the first time that Ecuador's
government has borrowed resources to invest in Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian
communities. And in “a coup for the Bank's inclusion efforts, the project marks the first
time beneficiaries have of gone to Washington D.C. to participate in project negotiations”
(World Bank 2002, Ethno-development…).
That the Ecuador’s government has borrowed for first time to invest in indigenous and
black peoples and that beneficiaries have participated in the Bank hearth quarters
negotiations is a sign of more inclusive political times. But it also could be read as the
ability of the state to adopt of a more appealing discourse for accessing development
loans. Whatever the reason, it is indicative of current times the definition of “ethno-
development” as a paradigmatic discourse replacing the modernization project.
33
In fact, the Ecuador Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project is the
first Bank’s investment operation focused exclusively in indigenous peoples and ethnic
minorities (Nieuwkoop and Uquillas, 4) and it is presented as a major success. Curiously
the term “ethno-development” does not appear in first project documents (i.e. the project
appraisal of 1997) but in later ones. Thus, while in the first pieces is highlighted the
notion of “inter-culturalism” –or the need “to build a bridge of communication with
mestizo culture” (World Bank 1997, 21)—the paper written by Nieuwkoop and Uquillas
considers that ethnodevelopment:
[…] builds on the positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies to
promote local employment and growth. Such qualities include these peoples’
strong sense of ethnic identity, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to
mobilize labor, capital, and other resources to achieve shared goals. These
dynamics are recognized as fundamental to the way in which indigenous peoples
define their own processes of development and interactions with other segments
of society (3).
Without trying to overshadow this optimist position, there are two issues to note. First,
the project discourse assumes a smooth relationship among the different actors involved
(settlers from the highlands, indigenous peoples from the lowlands, local elites, mestizo
population, NGO and State agents, entrepreneurs, functionaries from international
agencies, etc.), which blurs the complex power relations existing and the diverse aims
and strategies deployed for each group.
Second. As Hale has noted, normalizing “multiculturalism”, international lending
agencies assume the power to define the limits of appropriate and extremist difference, of
what could be tolerate and what not. In this sense, ethnodevelopment and others, re-
appropriates and reinstalls a long-standing fight for indigenous acknowledgement into a
capitalist logic.
34
A final word. It could be argued that since the early 1990s, land titling and securing
tenure have been identified as key elements in the development strategies elaborated by
international lending institutions. However, what is completely new in these land reforms
is the incorporation of concepts of multiculturalism, decentralization and some degree of
territorial autonomy in the projects. These projects are conceived not only as tools of
economic development but mainly as a political enterprise, which requires the
transformation of the nation-state and the inclusion of indigenous peoples into broader
society. Of course, the scale of these transformations will depend on the specific power
and economic alliances en each Latin American country.
35
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