Individuation by Matter in Averroes’ Metaphysics

187INDIVIDUATION BY MATTER IN AVERROES’ METAPHYSICS

MATTEO DI GIOVANNI

Individuation by Matter in Averroes’ Metaphysics*

THE BASIC QUESTION␣ : IN SEARCH OF AVERROES’ PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

Presumably not many philosophical issues are so central to theAristotelian metaphysics as is the issue of individuation. Beginning withthe ontology outlined in the Categories, being an individual counts as adistinctive mark of substances, which in turn are the mainstay of the wholeworld of nature. Aristotle both states this explicitly in Cat., 5 (where heclaims that anything called ‘substance’ means something particular, a todeti) and argues for it indirectly, when he opposes the kind of being properto a substance to the kind of being belonging to a universal ␣ : the former, hesays, exists by itself, whereas the latter only exists on account of thesubjects it is predicated of1 .

In the light of the hylomorphic analysis set forth in the Physics, however,the very topic of individuation results in a major challenge for the interpretersof Aristotle. For even the individual being of substances, as well as theirexistential being, ultimately appears to be reducible either to form or tomatter as to its principal source and explanatory principle. In this regard, awide variety of doctrines has been worked out over the centuries and amongthem the inquiry by Averroes (Ibn Rushd) no doubt represents a contributionboth philosophically stimulating and doctrinally articulate. ␣ «␣ El pensamientode Ibn Rushd acerca de la individuación es bastante complejo, pues lo planteacon una amplitud inusitada␣ » has been properly noticed2 . As a matter of fact,Averroes’ theory of individuation still proves quite challenging even to theexperts and today’s readers␣ : whereas E. Renan maintains that ␣ « ␣ pour Averroèsle principe d’individuation est la forme, pour saint Thomas c’est la matière␣ »,A. Bäck considers that ␣ « ␣ Aquinas is also influenced by Averroes and the mostprominent similarity is his insistence that matter is the principle of

* I wish to thank warmly Peter Adamson for revising my English as well as for his valuableremarks. I am, of course, solely responsible for any mistake.

1 See ARISTOTELIS Categoriae, 5, 3b10 and 2b16-17.2 See A. GARCÍA MARQUÉS, La individuación de las substancias materiales en Averroes y Santo

Tomas, ␣ «␣ Sapientia␣ », 35, 1980, pp. 601-613, esp. p. 602.

188 MATTEO DI GIOVANNI

individuation␣ »3 . In like manner, alongside the Medieval and RenaissanceAristotelian tradition, Averroes came to be credited with a strict theory ofindividuation by form, even though his celebrated doctrine on interminatedimensions laid the foundations for Aquinas’s view on dimensive matter asthe principium individuationis4 .

In what follows, a concise account of Averroes’ theory of individuation willbe provided. No discussion will be devoted to the foregoing opposinginterpretations, despite their insight and the wide range of the Averroeanmaterial on which they draw. Rather, such diverging texts and ideas will betentatively put in a consistent picture, where opposing readings and particularperspectives should combine in the dynamic unity Averroes’ thought actuallyseems to reveal.

A special focus will be on Metaphysics, Z, 13 and the related sections ofAverroes’ Long Commentary, where the nature of universals is closely discussedand the issue of individuation is consequently raised (§. 2). The inquiry in Z,13 also gives some insights into the nature of substance, because it makesconstant reference to the particular vs. individual status either of substances(in Aristotle) or of substantial forms considered as primary substances (inAverroes’ understanding)␣ ; an examination of Averroes’ own notion ofsubstance, therefore, will be a necessary preliminary (§. 1). What will finallyemerge from the present analysis is the Averroean version of a standardtheory of individuation where, on the one hand, emphasis is put on theindividuality of material forms as a distinctive mark of Aristotle’s ontology vs.Plato’s doctrine. On the other hand, the individuality of material forms istraced back to their being material (or enmattered) rather than to their being

3 See E. RENAN, Averroès et l’averroïsme. Essai historique, deuxième edition, Michel LèvyFrères, Libraires-Éditeurs, Paris 1861, p. 241␣ ; A. BÄCK, ␣ «␣ The Islamic Background␣ : Avicenna (b.980␣ ␣ ; d. 1037) and Averroes (b. 1126␣ ␣ ; d. 1198)␣ », in J. J. E. GRACIA ed., Individuation inScholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650, State Universityof New York Press, Albany, NY 1994, pp. 38-67, esp. p. 60. For further readings on individuationin Averroes’ metaphysics, see also M.-D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, Le “De ente et essentia” de SaintThomas, J. Vrin, Paris 1948, pp. 67-70, J. LOMBA, El principio de individuación en Averroes,␣ « ␣ Revista de Filosofía␣ », 12, 1963, pp. 299-324.

4 See FRANCISCI SUAREZ Opera Omnia. Editio Nova a CAROLO BERTON innumeris veterumeditionum mendis expurgata, adnotationibusque in ultimum tomum relegatis illustrata, Apud L.Vivès Bibliopolam Editorem, Paris 1866, vol. XXV, p. 175. English translation in F. SUAREZ, OnIndividuation. Metaphysical Disputation V␣ : Individual Unity and Its Principle. Translated fromthe Latin with Introduction, Notes, Glossary and Bibliography by J. J. E. GRACIA, MarquetteUniversity Press, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 1982, p. 105. For a detailed study on Averroes as a sourceof Thomas Aquinas’s theory of individuation, see J. OWENS, Thomas Aquinas␣ : dimensive quantityas individuating principle, ␣ «␣ Medieval Studies␣ », 50, 1988, pp. 279-310␣ ; see also S. DONATI, Ladottrina delle dimensioni indeterminate in Egidio Romano, ␣ «␣ Medioevo␣ », 14, 1988, pp. 149-234.


forms␣ : forms in themselves have nothing particular, but they are individuatedby matter as the actual source and the explanatory principle of theindividuation of material substances5 .

1. PRELIMINARY REMARKS␣ : AVERROES’ MODERATE INCOMPATIBILISM

The locus classicus for the debate on the status of forms is Met., Z, 13.Aristotle here starts a close examination of the question of whether universalscan be substance and arrives at the clear-cut words of chapter 16␣ : ␣ « ␣ It is nowclear that nothing at all that is predicated universally is a substance and thatno substance whatever is composed of substances␣ »6 . Such a conclusion isfully consistent with the partial results that have already emerged from theinquiry␣ : no universal is substance, as is said in Z, 13, and the very idea of auniversal-substance, i.e. of a Platonic Form, is self-contradictory. For substanceis separate and separateness is incompatible with universality on severalgrounds. First, because what is separate cannot be ubiquitous (pollach' /),whereas the universal is found at the same time in all those instances whichshare in it (Z, 16). Secondly, because no separate substance could simultaneouslyexhibit opposing attributes, whereas universals do receive opposing differentiae(Z, 14). Thirdly, for a conclusive reason␣ : since separateness can nevercombine with universality, everything separate must be non-universal and, assuch, also indefinable (Z, 15). Nothing unexpected in the premise␣ : startingfrom Z, 3, being separate (cwristovn) is always coupled with being particular(tovde ti). But the effect is disruptive␣ : for nothing indefinable can really be asubstance, one distinctive feature of which is indeed to be something primarilyknowable and primarily definable7 .

Towards the end of Book Zeta, thus, it comes to light that some of theworking hypotheses put forward at the beginning of Z, 3 must in fact bereconsidered. A list of four claimants to the title of substance has been presentedthere, i.e. subject, essence, genus and universal. But the inquiry starting with Z,13 eliminates from this list either one candidate, i.e. the universal, or, accordingto an alternative interpretation, both the genus and the universal8 . Be that as it

5 No issue about the individuation of separate substances will be addressed here. This topic,of some interest, might be the object of further research.

6 ARIST., Metaphysica, Z, 13, 1041a3-5. Here and below the English translations of Met., Zetaare quoted from ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics Book Z and H. Translated with a Commentary by D.BOSTOCK, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994.

7 See ARIST., Met., Z, 1, 1028a28-b 2 and Z, 4, 1030a17-27.8 Thus AVERROIS Tafs±r m∞ ba√d a¥-¥ab±√a. Texte arabe inédit établi par M. BOUYGES S. J., 3

vols., Imprimerie Catholique, Beyrouth 1938-48, vol. II, p. 768, ll. 13-p. 769, l. 3 and p. 1027, ll.4-6 (= c. 7/c and c.2/d, on Met., Z, 3, 1028b34-35 and H, 1, 1042a20-22␣ ; cf. ID., In Metaphysicorumlibros XIIII, Venetiis 1562, vol. VIII, f. 157vK-L and f. 210rD).


may, Z, 13 has unquestionably given a fundamental contribution to theundertaking of Zeta to the extent that it has finally established what ‘substance’is (not). And this is precisely why, for Aristotle, Z, 13 completes its task here.Its target has been satisfactorily achieved.

The reader is left with something more than a curiosity, however␣ ; and it nowconcerns Aristotle’s forms, rather than Plato’s. For it has been seemingly clear toa long interpretative tradition that the strong criticism addressed by Aristotle inZ, 13 against Plato’s conception of transcendental Forms, or (which is the same)against any conception of universals as substances, actually betrays somethingof the way Aristotle himself looks at substantial forms. When Aristotle arguesthat no universal is a substance, what he really appears to imply is that nosubstantial form can be something universal. For doubtlessly one major tenet ofMet., Zeta is that substance is form or that it is, at least, primarily form.

Precisely on such grounds many have drawn the following conclusionconcerning the status of the Aristotelian forms␣ : since for Aristotle (1) nouniversal is substance and since (2) the form is the (primary) substance, itfollows that (3) no form is universal. As is evident, such reasoning basicallyreproduces the schema of a standard Celarent syllogism and it therefore turnson the syntactic function of a middle term such as ‘substance’. Thus, it is onthe one hand the main argument against those who want to credit Aristotlewith a theory of universal forms␣ ; on the other hand, however, it may begranted as a fully consistent reasoning only on the condition that its middleterm, ‘substance’, keeps the same meaning in both the major and the minorpremise, i.e. both (i) where the universal is denied to be a ‘substance’ and (ii)where ‘substance’ is predicated of form. This is actually the main point ofdispute, which divides the interpreters of Aristotle into the opposing partiesof supporters and opponents of the universality of forms.

For his part, Averroes is well aware of the basic ambivalence which affectsthe notion of substance as it is actually focused in the different works byAristotle. While Cat., 5 directly equates the primary substance with a concreteparticular such as a man or a horse, Met., Zeta clearly reserves this same labelto the substantial forms alone9 . In the face of such evidence, Averroes couldmove in two opposite directions, either admitting an inner inconsistency inAristotle’s texts or explaining it away as a deceptive illusion. To state it inmodern terms, he could side either with a compatibilist or with anincompatibilist account of Aristotle’s theory of substance.

Emblematically embraced in recent times by M. Frede and G. Patzig10 ,incompatibilism is a way of approaching Aristotle’s ontology marked by two

9 See ARIST., Cat., 5, 2a11-16 and Met., Z, 7, 1032b1-2␣ ; Z, 11, 1037a5, 1037a28, 1037b1-4.10 M. FREDE, G. PATZIG, Aristoteles, ‘Metaphysik Z’. Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar, 2

vols., Verlag C. H. Beck, München 1988, vol. I, pp. 36-42.


main features␣ : (i) it assumes that a univocal notion of substance is at work inthe Categories as well as in Met. Zeta and that this is the notion of substanceas an ultimate subject of predication (i.e. that which everything is said of,while it itself is not said of anything else)␣ ; (ii) it takes such a univocal notionof substance as being applied in two different ways (to the concrete particularand the substantial form) on account of an inner development in Aristotle’sthought. The opposite view is endorsed by medieval and contemporaryversions of compatibilism, beginning with Aquinas’s commentary onAristotle’s Metaphysics up to some most recent studies on the Aristotelianontology11 . According to this view, (i) no actual doctrinal gap is foundbetween the Categories and Met., Zeta and (ii) what is said in these differentworks must be correspondingly understood in two different ways␣ ; for theconcrete particular is said to be ‘substance’ in Cat., 5 according to a differentintuition than the one at work in Met., Zeta. Indeed, in Cat., 5 ‘substance’means an ultimate subject of predication, whereas in Met., Zeta it rathermeans the inner principle of that ultimate subject or the ontological causewhy the substances themselves, taken in the former sense, come to be thesubstances they are.

Once compared with these opposing approaches, the account given byAverroes turns out to be a third, middle way, which could be consequentlylabelled a kind of spurious or moderate incompatibilism. Like incompatibilism,(i) it regards the many occurrences of ‘substance’ as univocally meaning oneand the same philosophical notion both when applied to the concrete particularand when applied to the form. Like compatibilism, on the other hand, (ii) itdoes not find in Met., Zeta any substantive departure from the basic ontologyalready outlined in Cat., 5. As regards the first point, it is indeed acknowledgedthat being a substance basically means throughout the different contexts ofthe Aristotelian works nothing other than being the first item (prwvton) in thewhole range of being. And a pivotal principle often quoted by Averroes fromMet., a, 1 states that whatever comes first in a given genus is also the causewhy the other things are found in the same genus12 . As a consequence,‘substance’ turns out to mean nothing other than the cause of being precisely

11 See S. THOMAE DE AQUINO In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Lib. VII,lec. 2, ed. R. SPIAZZI, Marietti, Taurini-Romae 1964, nn. 1275, 1293. For an in-depth discussion ofAquinas’s position and of the debate concerning compatibilism vs. incompatibilism, see G. GALLUZZO,Aquinas’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Zeta, forthcoming. For a contemporaryversion of compatibilism, where the differing notions of substance are conceived of as the answersto different (population vs. definitional) questions, see C. WITT, Substance and Essence in Aristotle.An Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1989, pp. 6-38.

12 On the priority of substance as a kind of being, see ARIST., Met., Z, 1, 1028a19-b2. For thestated link between priority and causality, see ARIST., Met., a, 1, 993b23-31. As regards Averroes


because it is meant to be nothing other than the first member of it13 . Thisapplies first of all to the concrete particulars␣ : for they can really count assubstances (i.e. as the first members of being) to the extent that they count asthe cause of anything else (i.e. of universals and accidents). But the sameholds in the case of substantial forms␣ ; for the form is the cause of the(concrete) substance itself, to the point that ␣ «␣ the concrete substance is theway it is just by virtue of its form␣ »14 . The form, thus, is the first member inthe whole range of substances␣ : it is actually the first substance, which Met.,Zeta constantly calls the primary ousia. Averroes puts it in the clearest terms␣ :␣ « ␣ Aristotle said that form is the primary substance precisely because it is thecause of the ostensible substance and the ostensible substances come to besuch by virtue of form␣ »15 .

One might wonder about the fortunes of the concrete particulars at thispoint, which in the Categories were indeed ranked as primary ousiai insteadof substantial forms. Is there not sufficient evidence of a substantive departurefrom the outdated, dismissed ontology of the Categories towards a new andreformed perspective like that at work in Met., Zeta␣ ? Averroes denies this␣ : ifthe opposing statements found in Cat., 5 and Met., Zeta appear to be mutuallyexclusive, such statements are not to be thereby referred to the divergingstages of any purported philosophical development on Aristotle’s part. Rather,they belong to the different levels or rhetorical registers rooted, as it were, inthe philosophical discourse developed by Aristotle. The concrete particularsand their substantial forms both count as fully fledged substances␣ : both arefully fledged causes for something else in the order of being. But, whilst thesubstantial form also proves to be a primary cause on the basis of the strictontological analysis developed in Met., Zeta, the concrete particular dealtwith in Cat., 5 only appears to be primary from some broader phenomenologicalperspective. Hence, whilst the form really is the first substance, since it truly

himself, he assumes this principle in the following terms␣ : ␣ «␣ What makes the essence of theconcrete (substance) known is more worthy of being called substance than the concrete itself,as it would be repugnant and absurd that the principles and the elements of substance were notthemselves substances. That which is the cause of a given attribute, indeed, has more properlythat attribute of which it is the cause␣ » (AVERROES, Compendio de Metafísica. Texto arabe contraducción y notas de C. QUIRÓS RODRÍGUEZ, Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, Madrid 1919, I 26,pp. 15-16 of the Arabic text␣ ; the translation is mine).

13 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 752, ll. 5-14 (= c. 3/h, on Met., Z, 1, 1028a29-30␣ ; cf. In Met.cit., f. 154rE-F)␣ ; ib., vol. II, p. 753, ll. 9-12 (= c. 4/a, on Met., Z, 1, 1028a30-31␣ ; cf. In Met. cit.,f. 154vI-K) and p. 758, ll. 8-10 (c. 5/a␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 155vM).

14 AVERROES, Compendio cit., II 60, p. 68 of the Arabic text.15 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 761, ll. 16-17 (= c. 5/k, on Met., Z, 1, 1028b6␣ ; cf. In Met. cit.,

f. 156rF)␣ ; ib., vol. II, p. 770, ll. 12-14 (= c. 7/k, on Met., Z, 3, 1029a7␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 158 rA-B).


is the first, non-reducible cause of being, the concrete particular only claimsto be first, insofar as it is what at first appears to be a substance␣ ; it is said tobe a primary substance because it is what people primarily identify as asubstance relying on a mere pretheoretical insight16 .

Multivocity, thus, resolves into univocity. Substance means cause and themore it is cause, the more it is substance. Such is indeed the concreteparticular, though its causal efficacy remains on a lower rank than thecausality enjoyed by substantial forms. Therefore, the concrete particular istermed primarily ‘substance’ only with respect to such prima facie, non-scientific beliefs as those which people primarily hold. Substantial forms, bycontrast, are the causes of being at the highest, most effective level␣ : they arewhat really makes even the concrete substances both being and the substancesthey are. As such, they finally represent the cause of causes or the ␣ « ␣ primarycause of all beings␣ »17 ␣ ; they are what a thorough scientific inquiry into thewhole world of nature shows to be a primary substance18 .

Some remarks are in order, naturally. First, the picture given above seemsto meet a basic intuition about the subject criterion outlined in the Categories,

16 This aspect of Averroes’ account has been pointed out by L. BAULOYE, À propos du“fondamental” et de “l’essentiel” dans le commentaire d’Averroès sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote,␣ « ␣ Revue de Philosophie Ancienne␣ », 2, 1995, pp. 225-238. As a matter of fact, it anticipates areading of Aristotle’s statements concerning the primacy of the concrete substance which hasrecently been put forward by G. REALE, Guida alla lettura della Metafisica di Aristotele, Laterza,Roma-Bari 1997, pp. 141-144. An alternative, seemingly minor line of thought can be found inAVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 827, ll. 2-3 (= c. 20/m, on Met., Z, 6, 1031a31-b3␣ ; cf. In Met. cit.,f. 169vL). Here the concrete particulars are considered to count as ‘primary’ substances becausethey exist ‘primarily’, i.e. in their own right.

17 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 759, ll. 3-4 (= c. 5/b, on Met., Z, 1, 1028b2-4␣ ; cf. In Met. cit.,f. 156rA). See also ib., vol. III, p. 1553, ll. 4-9 (= c. 28/f, on Met., L, 5, 1071a34-35␣ ; cf. In Met. cit.,f. 312vK). Note that in the latter passage I take the Arabic quµw∞ (ultimate) to be referred to √ilal(causes), not to al-mawø≤d∞t (the existents) as is suggested by the English translation in C.GENEQUAND, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentaryon Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book L∞m, E. J. Brill, Leiden 1986, p. 133. I agree with the Latintranslation, as well as with the French translation in AVERROÈS, Grand Commentaire de laMétaphysique d’Aristote (Tafs±r m∞ ba√d a¥-¥ab±√a), Livre L∞m-Lambda. Traduction et Notes parA. MARTIN, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1984, p. 184.

18 Being all ‘primary’ with respect to the composite substances, moreover, the formsthemselves are portrayed by Averroes as being mutually arranged, in their turn, according tosome order of priority and posteriority. Thus, the proximate forms of the particular sensiblesubstances are said to be ‘primary’ insofar as they are the closest to the sensible world␣ ; while,in the very same passage, the separate self-subsistent forms are called ‘primary’ insofar as theyare found on the top of the rank of all forms and of their causal relations. Cf. e.g. AVERROES, Tafs±rcit., vol. II, p. 779, ll. 10-12 (= c. 9/d, on Met., Z, 3, 1029a33-34␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 159vL) and ib.,vol. II, p. 780, ll. 15-17 (= c. 9/g␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 160rB).


according to which being a subject of predication ultimately means being acause of the existence of the things predicated. Corresponding to the twofoldfocus which is found in the Categories, at the same time logical and ontological,predicative facts are intended to mirror, or imply, further substantiveontological relations␣ ; for any ultimate subject of predication is in fact that ofwhich everything is predicated insofar as it is what gives everything its ownbeing and existence (␣ « ␣ if the primary substances did not exist, it would beimpossible for any of the other things to exist␣ » 19 ). Conversely, no ultimatesubject can be predicated of anything, insofar as nothing at all is found onwhich it can possibly rely for its being and existence. Clearly, the subject ofpredication outlined in the Categories finally resolves into a cause of existence,though one possessing a peculiar feature␣ : for this subject of predication is anon-caused cause␣ ; it is self-subsistent or, as Aristotle would say, it is somethingseparate in being.

Secondly, what we called Averroes’ moderate incompatibilism appears tomake no room for any distinction between a monoargumental and abiargumental meaning of substance as this is usually understood20 . Such adistinction holds in fact from a linguistic point of view insofar as, even in thepractice of Averroes’ own language, one and the same term, i.e. ‘substance’,actually fits different syntaxes according to different linguistic contexts. Itfits a biargumental use or a genitive syntax (as in ‘to be the substance of’) onlywhen referred to the form, but not when referred to the concrete particular␣ ;only when it is causally linked with one and the same object (peculiaritycondition)21 ␣ ; only when the object itself with which it is causally linked is asubstance in its turn. According to Averroes, however, such a linguisticdistinction has no conceptual parallel, inasmuch as the different syntaxes of‘substance’ do not mirror any different concepts of it (substance as subject vs.substance as cause) but merely express two different workings of the verysame concept. Substance means cause, for Averroes, which appears in its turnto be a functional predicate to the extent that it denotes the function of beingcause. It can consequently work either as a first-order or as a second-orderpredicate␣ : in the former case, the explanatory function will range over theobjects that populate the mental and extramental world, such as accidentsand universals␣ ; in the latter case, it will rather apply to the function itself. In

19 ARIST., Cat., 1, 2b5-6. English translation in Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione.Translated with Notes by J. L. ACKRILL, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1963, p. 6.

20 Being expressly rejected by their own account of Aristotle’s theory of substance, such adistinction is outlined by FREDE, PATZIG, Aristoteles, ‘Metaphysik Z’ cit., vol. II, pp. 11-15.

21 By ‘peculiarity condition’ a basic requirement is meant that occurs in Z, 13, 1038 b10, andstates that the substance of something must be peculiar (i [dion) to it.


the former case, it will be satisfied by the concrete particulars, which areindeed the causes of being for both accidents and universals␣ ; in the lattercase, the explanatory function will instead be satisfied by substantial forms,i.e. the ultimate causes by virtue of which the concrete particulars are causesin their turn. Finally, in the former case the causal function of concreteparticulars will be expressed linguistically by the monoargumental use of theterm ‘substance’␣ ; whereas, in the latter, this is rather expressed by thebiargumental one.

Thirdly, it should be clear at this point that the only two features we couldconsider as really essential to the Averroean notion of substance are (1) itscausal value together with (2) its functioning either as a first-order or as asecond-order predicate. In first-order contexts the function of cause is satisfiedby the concrete particulars focused on in the Categories, which are said to besubstances in a monoargumental (i.e. unqualified) sense and turn out to beprimary from a merely phenomenological perspective. In second-ordercontexts, the causal function is rather satisfied by substantial forms dealtwith in Met., Zeta, which are said to be substances in a biargumental (i.e.genitival) sense and prove to be primary on account of a deeply-rootedontological analysis. Finally, and particularly relevant to our present concern,there are no other properties, beyond these, which appear to be likewiseessential to the notion of substance as conceived of by Averroes. Separateness,in particular, does not qualify. According to Averroes, as suggested above,separateness or self-subsistence in fact turns out to be like a supervenientproperty, being only concomitant with the core function of substance onaccount of the differing domains where this function comes to be applied. Inthe threefold ontology set out in the Categories, which recognises concreteparticulars, accidents and universals, the concrete particulars are bothsubstances and separate. The three basic items are indeed such as to make thecausality function, which is proper to substance, in some way non-symmetrical␣ : the concrete particulars are the causes of being for bothaccidents and universals, but the converse is not the case. So the concreteparticulars can be properly substances, to the extent that they are causes␣ ; andthey are properly separate, inasmuch as they result in non-caused (self-subsistent) causes. By contrast, the lower-level analysis which is at work inMet., Zeta reduces the concrete particular to its inner constituents, i.e. matterand form␣ ; and the threefold ontology, which consequently changes (i.e.compound, matter and form), shapes a new frame of reference where thefunction of substance gets transformed accordingly22 . The causality function

22 It is disputed whether accidents and universals are ruled out from the new ontology ofMet., Zeta. Some passages appear to imply this (see Z, 4, 1030a23-27 and Z, 10, 1035b27-30). Theissue, however, has no relevance to our present concern.


comes to be a symmetrical relation␣ : just as form somehow causes both theparticular compound (to exist as a fully-fledged substance) and its matter(to exist as an actual being), in like manner the matter somehow causes theform (to concretely subsist as an actualised principle). Thus, the substantialform will be a primary substance inasmuch as it is a primary cause␣ ; but itwill not also be a separate substance, as it subsists only thanks to itssustaining matter23 .

Precisely the supervenient nature of separateness is what is seeminglyalluded to in the very beginning of Averroes’ Long Commentary on Met., Z, 13␣ :␣ «␣ The difference between the present inquiry (i.e. inquiry into the substantialityof universals) and the inquiry into (the substantiality of) forms is that the onewhich credits universals with being substances must also credit them withbeing separate␣ »24 . On the one hand, the notion of substance does not implyseparateness by itself. On the other hand, the various domains where such anotion actually works come to imply separateness only in the case of universalsand not in the case of forms. Contrary to forms, indeed, universals will be self-subsistent, if they are to work as the substances of something else. For formsbelong to the threefold ontology of Met., Zeta (compound, matter and form)where indeed they can be, at the same time as well as in different senses, bothcausing subjects (with respect to compounds and matter) and objects caused(by matter). But universals enter the threefold ontology of the Categories(concrete particulars, accidents and universals), where nothing could work asa cause of existence for universals, once the universals were assumed to be thesubstance of the concrete particulars␣ : neither the concrete particulars, sincethey are supposed to rely on universals as on their substances and causes ofbeing␣ ; nor the accidental properties, since their existence, in turn, will dependon the concrete particulars. If universals were assumed to be the substance ofthe concrete particulars, hence, they would be not merely a cause, but theunique existential cause of anything else␣ ; they would hence be separatesubstances, not essentially (i.e. insofar as they are substances) but nonethelessnecessarily (i.e. insofar as they are part of a given ontological framework).

To conclude, Averroes’ doctrine on substance may be sketched out in fivemajor statements. (i) Substance is a univocal notion (incompatibilism), as itunivocally refers to some kind of explanatory function according to which

23 The present remarks apply, of course, only to the case of material forms. For they concernthe nature of separateness in its relation to the ontologies of material substances, such as thoseoutlined in Cat., 5 and Met., Zeta. A different account must be given concerning the case ofimmaterial forms. It is not my purpose, however, to develop it here.

24 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 962, ll. 10-12 (= c. 45/a, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b6-8␣ ; not in theLatin).


some items in the world are the cause of the being of the others. (ii) Theconcrete substance is that which causes accidents and universals to beexistent, while the substantial form is in turn what causes the concretesubstances themselves to be substances (i.e. to be causes of existence)␣ ; thesubstantial form proves, hence, to be the eminent, or the primary, cause ofbeing. (iii) Being a primary cause, form is properly called the ‘primarysubstance’, while the concrete particulars focused on in the Categories aretermed ‘primary substances’ only with reference to a phenomenological pointof view, rather than to some purported stage of Aristotle’s developing thought(where Averroes’ incompatibilism touches compatibilism, thus getting closer,as it were, to what I called a moderate version of incompatibilism). (iv)Although both are substances, the substantial form is better defined as a‘substance of’ insofar as it makes the particular compound to be a substancein its own right␣ ; by contrast, the particular compound is better defined as a‘substance’ tout court, insofar as it makes anything else to be existent toutcourt. (v) Finally, the property of separateness is not implied by substance assuch␣ ; it is rather a function of differing ontological frameworks and it maysupervene both on a substance in the monoargumental sense (like thecompound, which is separate in being) and on a substance in the biargumentalsense (were the universal the substance of concrete particulars, indeed, itwould exist separately).

2. AVERROES’ ACCOUNT OF INDIVIDUATION BY MATTER

Once Averroes’ notion of substance has been inspected in detail, we aredoubtlessly in a better position to broach the original question of whether,according to Averroes, the arguments given in Met., Z, 13 can tell us somethingabout the particular or universal status of the Aristotelian forms. In otherwords, whether the move of Z, 13, i.e. denying universality to substance, isitself sufficient to deny universality to the substantial form, given that formis the primary substance. For such a question to be answered affirmatively,it must be granted that the substantial forms are individual, that is non-universal␣ ; and for such a conclusion to follow, the notion of substanceattached to forms must coincide with the notion of substance opposed touniversality according to Z, 13.

As already argued, Averroes considers that universals would be substancesin a somewhat different sense than substantial forms. As he himself claims inthe passage already quoted from the commentary on Z, 13, contrary to formsuniversals would be self-subsistent (separate) substances to the extent that,whereas forms exist by relying on their matter, universals would depend,insofar as they are substances, neither on the concrete particulars nor on


their inhering accidents. But separateness is of lesser importance, as it is acontingent property which may in no way regard or affect the core notion ofsubstance. What instead must have appeared highly relevant in the eyes ofAverroes is the fact that Z, 13 denies that universals are substances inprecisely the same sense as substantial forms, namely as the (biargumental)substances of everything else. Such is the teaching of Ζ, 13␣ : being universaldoes not agree with being the inner cause of a substance, which, on thecontrary, every form is supposed to be.

In the prologue of chapter 13, indeed, Aristotle expressed himself rathervaguely␣ : ␣ «␣ It seems impossible for any of the things predicated universally tobe a substance␣ » (1038b8-9)␣ ; and yet Averroes sees here an allusion to theprecise kind of biargumental substantiality which is proper to form. Hecomments correspondingly␣ : ␣ «␣ what Aristotle means is␣ : we believe it impossiblethat anything called universal may be the substance of something else␣ »25 .Admittedly, even in the eyes of Averroes some of the arguments in Z, 13 arerather directed against separateness as a property which would possiblyconcern only universals, once they were assumed to be substances26 . In hisopinion, however, the main aim of the Z, 13 inquiry is precisely to show thatnothing universal could be what the Aristotelian forms are, namely an innerprinciple of substances and a cause for their substantiality itself (i.e. a substanceof substances). As a matter of fact, Aristotle often claims (as paraphrased byAverroes) that no universal could even be a ‘part’ of the composite substances,which evidently implies, at least in the language of Averroes’ Long Commentaryon Met., Z, 1, that it could never be their explanatory principle27 .

25 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 962, ll. 14-15 (= c. 45/b, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b8-9␣ ; cf. In Met.cit., f. 197vB). Cf. ib., vol. II, p. 962, ll. 10-13 (= c. 45/a, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b6-8␣ ; not in the Latin).

26 Such is the case, for Averroes, with the second and the sixth argument listed by Ross,corresponding to ARIST., Met., Z, 13, 1038b15-16 and 30-34. The former establishes thatuniversals do not satisfy the subject criterion, which means that they do not exist by virtue ofthemselves. The latter only recapitulates the achieved conclusions, but is rather misunderstoodin the Arabic text␣ ; according to Averroes, it would argue that no universal is a separatesubstance, for separate substances are opposed to relatives and each universal is counted amongrelatives (allusion to ARIST., Met., D, 15, 1021a26-b3). For Averroes’ reconstruction of the secondargument, see AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, pp. 964, l. 12-965, l. 4 (= c. 46/a, on Met., Z, 13,1038b15-16␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 198rA). For his reconstruction of the sixth argument, see ib., vol.II, pp. 968 l. 11-969, l. 8 (= c. 48/b-c, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b30-34␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 198vB).

27 Universal is denied to be a part of the sensible substances in AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II,p. 963, l. 1 (= c. 45/c, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b10-11␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 197vB)␣ ; ib., vol. II, p. 965,ll. 7-9 (= c. 46/b, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b18-21␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 198rA)␣ ; ib., vol. II, p. 966, ll. 11-13 (= c. 47/a, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b23-25␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 198rA)␣ ; ib., vol. II, p. 971, ll. 5-8 (=c. 49/a, on Met., Z, 13, 1039a3-4␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 199rB). To be a part of substances amountsto being their explanatory principle, i.e. their substance ib., vol. II, p. 751, ll. 15-16 (= c. 3/e, onMet., Z, 1, 1028a27␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 154rB).


A few examples of the way Averroes interprets the arguments of Z, 13 willgive sufficient evidence that, in his opinion, universals are denied that kindof biargumental substantiality which is proper to forms. At 1038b16-23 (thethird argument listed by Ross) it is proved that, insofar as the universalshave definitions, they will always result from prior universals␣ ; so that, onthe assumption that the universals are substances, an infinite regress ofsubstances will follow. In any event, the argument continues, it would makeno difference if the universals were not always definable. For, on the onehand, certain things (i.e. essences) will nonetheless keep having universalsas their own substances and, on the other hand, it has been shown thatuniversals are the substance of nothing28 .

The argument is difficult to follow and the Greek hard to translate␣ ; as aresult, the Arabic version proves here to be rather distorted. The universalsare subject to definition, so Averroes reads in his text, but it will make nodifference whether they are actually defined or not. For certain things (i.e. thesensible substances) will nonetheless keep their own substances regardless oftheir being actually defined. Averroes considers the foregoing as ademonstration that universals cannot be a ‘part’ of the sensible substances,i.e. they cannot be their biargumental substance. For the sensible substances,Averroes comments, do in fact maintain their own substances quiteindependently of their acquiring any actual definitions and, along withdefinitions, any defining universals␣ : just ␣ «␣ as the visible things, if not actuallyseen, are not thereby any less visible than when they are actually seen␣ » 29 .

According to Averroes, this furthermore points to the fact that universalscannot be the biargumental substances of the sensible things. Rather, they willbe like mere accidents with respect to sensible substances, because they comeinto being when abstracted and being abstracted is accidental to them. SoAverroes takes over a doctrine of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who indeed portrayeduniversals as accidental properties, though in a slightly different way30 . At the

28 I follow the reconstruction by W. D. ROSS, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 2 vols., Clarendon Press,Oxford 1997 (first ed. 1924), vol. II, pp. 208-211.

29 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., p. 965, ll. 5-16 (= c. 46/b-c, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b18-23␣ ; cf. In Met.cit., f. 198rA-B).

30 Alexander conceived of universals as of accidental properties, considering that their beingpredicated of many subjects (which amounts to their being universals) is something dependenton such ‘accidental’ circumstances as the concrete existence of many similar items of which theycan, indeed, be predicated. On this issue see A. DE LIBERA, L’art des généralités. Théories del’abstraction, Aubier, Paris 1999, pp. 25-157 and M. M. TWEEDALE, Alexander of Aphrodisias’ Viewson Universals, ␣ « ␣ Phronesis␣ », 19, 1984, pp. 279-303. On Alexander’s doctrine of universals in itsconnection with Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s doctrines of essence, see G. PINI, Absoluta considerationaturae ␣ : Tommaso d’Aquino e la dottrina avicenniana dell’essenza , ␣ « ␣ Documenti e studi sullatradizione filosofica medievale ␣ », 15, 2004, pp. 387-438.


same time, and more importantly, he thus thinks to provide the bestexposition of Aristotle himself. Not, of course, of the Greek Aristotle, whoindeed states that ␣ « ␣ the same thing (i.e. the same difficulty of 1038b10-14)will happen (sumbhvsetai) again␣ » (1038b22)␣ ; but of the Arabic Aristotle, whoclaims, just at these very lines, that the same (universal) will occur to thesensible substances as a ‘sumbebhkov" ␣ ’ (ar. ␣ : saya√ri∑u) or as an accidentalproperty (ar. ␣ : ∫∞l, palaeographical mistake for π∞µµ, lat. proprium, here torender the gr. ␣ : i [dion)31 .

Leaving aside any further consideration of the Greek-Arabic translation andits decisive influence on the work of its Arab interpreter, it is clear now that whatis at issue in Averroes’ reading of the sixth Z, 13 argument is precisely that kindof biargumental substantiality which is proper to form. So is it for the fifthargument (1038b29-30), which moreover provides us with a clear Averroeanapplication (though unhappy, in fact) of such a standard commentary techniqueas interpreting Aristotelem ex Aristotele. Aristotle is arguing that, if universalswere substances, the universal present in Socrates would be the substance oftwo things, Socrates himself and its related species, thus contravening therequired peculiarity condition. Here the Arabic does not differ from the Greekvery much, but the exegesis by Averroes detaches somewhat from the text. Heseems to recall a similar argument in Met., B, 6, 1003a9-12 (on the related aporiaof whether the principles are particular or universal) and to interpret accordinglythe argument at issue. As a consequence, the point is reversed␣ : to take auniversal as the substance of Socrates would no longer imply that one object,the universal, is the substance of two, the species and Socrates, but rather thattwo different things, i.e. the essence and the universal, are the substance of one,Socrates. Whence an insurmountable difficulty arises, in the eyes of Averroes␣ :␣ «␣ how could two substances ever constitute one substantial whole␣ ?␣ » 32 .

Apart from such exegetical details, here as above (as in almost all thearguments in Z, 13) what is basically proved, in Averroes’ opinion, is thethesis that the substance of compounds can by no means be somethinguniversal. And the substance of compounds is exactly their form. Form itself,then, will be not universal␣ : ␣ « ␣ This whole inquiry is necessary in order to makeit clear that the forms of individual substances are substances and that noother substances belong to the individual being, except for the particularmatter and form it is composed of␣ » 33 . Averroes proves to be straightforwardly

31 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 964, ll. 6-10 (= t. 46/b-c, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b16-23␣ ; cf. InMet. cit., f. 198rA).

32 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 968, ll. 6-10 (= t. 48/a, on Met., Z, 13, 1038b29-30␣ ; cf. InMet. cit., f. 198vB).

33 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 960, ll. 6-8 (= t. 44/a␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 197rB).


consistent in his interpretation of Z, 13. The Z, 13 arguments are perceived asbeing intended to show that no biargumental substance can be somethinguniversal. They are thus understood as implying that the substantial form,which indeed is a biargumental substance, cannot be something universal.This holds at least for the form ‘the individual is composed of’, that is for theform considered as an actual constituent of the outside world␣ ; things maychange, as is perhaps understood, when the form is regarded as a concept ofthe mind, abstracted by the intellect and existing in the soul. Be that as it may,however, we can now conclude on good grounds that Averroes turns out to bea plain supporter of individual forms. Insofar as they are actual principles ofthe outside world, substantial forms exist only as individuals.

One could find countless statements in Averroes where the individualnature of substantial forms is stressed as a fundamental point of departurefrom the mistake of Plato. Notwithstanding this, the full significance of suchAverroean claims and of the whole of Averroes’ doctrine cannot be properlyevaluated until one further question is answered concerning the sense inwhich forms are called individuals. One major achievement of recentAristotelian scholarship, indeed, has been bringing to light how the very sametenet, i.e. the individuality of forms, can be understood in two differentways34 . Individuality can either count as an intrinsic property of forms (onewhich forms enjoy in their own right) or as an extrinsic property (which formstake on from the parcel of matter they happen to join). In the former case,forms will be individual per se ␣ ; in the latter, they will rather be madeindividual by matter. In the former case, individuality is a kind of primitive,non-analysable property␣ ; in the latter, it is traceable back to matter. In theformer case, finally, forms originally exist as multiple in number␣ ; in thelatter, forms are only one in themselves, while being multiplied by virtue ofmatter into many repeating tokens of a single shared type. Forms thusindividualised will even resolve into per se universals, as one could indeedexplain by appealing to analogy. Though differing from proper universals(genera and species) as actual beings differ from mental concepts, theindividualised forms resemble universals in one relevant respect at least␣ : justas one substantial form relates to many pieces of matter by beingsimultaneously present in them, so each universal relates to many logicalsubjects being simultaneously predicated of them.

In short, individuality is said in many ways␣ : either as a property primarilybelonging to per se individual forms or as a property primarily belonging to

34 On this issue and for an overall account of Aquinas’s doctrine of individuation, see G.GALLUZZO, Met. Z 13 in the Contemporary Debate and in Aquinas’s Interpretation, ␣ «␣ Documenti estudi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale␣ », 14, 2003, pp. 159-226, esp. pp.162-163.


parcels of matter and extending to per se universal forms only derivatively.Against this background, Averroes would side with the latter position. As isthe case for one outstanding strand in the Latin tradition of MedievalAristotelianism, for Averroes, too, matter turns out to be the actual principleof individuation and the ultimate reason why the substantial forms becomenumerically many and individually distinguished35 .

This is, after all, the teaching one can learn from a number of Aristoteliantexts to which Averroes, on his part, gives an accurate paraphrase. In Met. Z,10, for example, Aristotle explains that the geometrical segments can count asa part of the circle only as far as the enmattered circle is concerned␣ : for (gavr),Aristotle goes on, one and the same word (circle) can refer both to the pure,immaterial notion and to its corresponding individual figure (1035a31-b3). Acausal link between matter and individuality is here vaguely implied. This isfully disclosed by Averroes␣ : the same term, so he notes, equally applies bothto the circle simpliciter and to that circle which is somehow individualisedprecisely because it exists in the bronze (li-kawnih∞ f± nu∫∞s)36 . Even cleareris another passage from Z, 8, where the concrete substances, such as Calliasand Socrates, are said to differ in matter and agree in form␣ : for matters aredifferent, while forms are indivisible (1034a5-8). Averroes presses the point␣ :the many things produced by one single producer, he now expands, are mademultiple precisely by virtue of that matter on which the producer acts. Sothat, generally speaking, they only get many because their producer is actingupon matter, while the thing produced and the producer are one and the samein form (al-√illa f± ta√addud al-mutakawwin∞t √an al-mukawwin al-w∞∫idta√addud al-√an∞µir)37 .

As is clear, Averroes found in the texts of Aristotle direct evidence thatmatter, rather than form, is the individual and individuating principle in thesensible substances. Even more pieces of evidence could be found in the ArabicMetaphysics, where the thesis of individuation by matter is implied in a numberof further passages, according to which the form is one, unique, and commonlyshared by all the items of the same kind. It has already been stated why the

35 Note that forms are universal per se to the extent that ‘universal’ means ‘common’ andrefers to the forms’ ontological property of being replicated in several instances. But formscannot be called universal per se, clearly, if ‘universal’ is taken to mean ‘abstract’ and is referredto the forms’ epistemic property of being predicated of particular subjects. In the latter sense,the intervention of the human intellect is required and so the Avicennian principle obtains thatformal constituents (essences) are ‘universal’ not in themselves but only in the mind.

36 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 902, ll. 6-13 (= c. 34/o, on Met., Z, 10, 1035a34-b3␣ ; cf. InMet. cit., f. 185rD).

37 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 870, ll. 10-12 (= c. 28/o, on Met., Z, 8, 1034a5-8␣ ; cf. In Met.cit., f. 178vA).


oneness of form implies its being something universal␣ : because, if forms arenot many in number, which means they are not individual, they must beuniversal. Furthermore, if only one form is to be shared by many things, therelation of it to its related instances is necessarily a one-to-many relation, thatis the relation which occurs between a universal and its particular instances.

Now, the uniqueness of form is a recurrent topic in several places ofAristotle’s Metaphysics, as is the case in the passage quoted above from Met.,Z, 8. But it is in the Arabic version that the issue somehow overflows, owingto some relevant linguistic differences in the rendering of two pivotal notionsof Aristotle’s ontology, such as the notion of ‘species’ and the notion of ‘form’.From a theoretical point of view, species basically differs from form to theextent that the former is a concept of the mind, whereas the latter is an actualconstituent of the outside world. This distinction has no linguistic parallel,however, as the Greek of Aristotle expresses both concepts by an identicalterm, eidos. To discriminate, then, is the remit of interpreters and so it wasfor the first translators from Greek into Arabic. Contrary to the Greekphilosophical lexicon, indeed, the Arabic language uses one term as theequivalent of species (naw√) and another term as the equivalent of form(µ≤ra) ␣ : a factual circumstance which meant that the Arab interpreter wasconstantly faced with choosing the appropriate word for each context.

Fairly predictably, confusion is commonplace and the Arabic termcorresponding to ‘form’ often takes the place of that understood for ‘species’.Thus, what is said in the Greek of a mere mental concept comes to apply in theArabic to nothing less than a substantial constituent of the natural world. Thisis what occurs in a well-known discussion of Met., D, 6, where three logicallevels of unity are distinguished by Aristotle from the case of numerical unity␣ :among them, Aristotle tells us, there are unity in species, in genus, andanalogical unity38 . As is often the case, the Arabic translation provides here itspeculiar account␣ ; so it is the unity in form that is now under discussion, not theunity in species. What is one in definition is said to be one not only in species(which is indeed the epistemic counterpart of definition) but even in form39 .

38 See ARIST., Met., D, 6, 1016b32-1017a3.39 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. II, p. 544, ll. 11-14 (= t. 12/n-p␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 114vA-B). Note

that the Latin text has totalitas instead of the Arabic kalima, ‘formula’, where the Arabic textstates that what is one according to the form is one according to the formula (kalima)␣ : ␣ « ␣ Illaquae sunt unum secundum formam sunt illa quorum totalitas est unum␣ ». Many other passages,of course, attest such a shift from the Greek term for species to the Arabic term for form. Seee.g. Met., B, 4, 999b27-31 (on the aporia of whether the principles are one only specifically or alsonumerically), together with the corresponding Arabic translation in AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. I,pp. 243, l. 15-244, l. 6 (= t. 14/a-b␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 52vB-53rA). Cf. also Met. I, 1, 1052a29-34(on the senses of ‘indivisible’), together with AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. III, pp. 1236, l. 9-1237,l. 1 (= t. 1/l-n␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 249vB).


Averroes’ understanding relies entirely on the Arabic text␣ ; he comments thattwo men, like Zayd and √Amr, are one with respect to their form, while they aremany on account of their matter40 . Which amounts, clearly enough, to astraightforward doctrine␣ : form is per se universal (it is common to many),while its matter is the source of numerical distinction.

This conclusion is drawn explicitly by Averroes in a number of texts, wherehe finally comes to set out his own philosophical views. Here the teachings ofhis ‘Arabic’ Master (whether paralleled or not by the original Greek) areendorsed and worked out by Averroes no longer as the great commentatorwidely known in the Latin tradition, but as a philosopher himself, endowedwith original doctrines and philosophical insights. This is the case, first, withontology, a crucial domain where the claims of Aristotle often provokeAverroes well beyond the text commented on. See e.g. Met., Z, 10, 1035b21-22␣ : Aristotle confines himself to a fairly innocent remark, when he says thatthe compound, rather than a mere form, can divide into material parts. Incommenting on this passage, Averroes sets forth the essentials onindividuation␣ : everything, he says, divides into its material parts ␣ «␣ as thespecies divides into its individuals␣ »␣ ; which amounts to saying, he nowexpands, ␣ « ␣ just by reason of matter␣ » (min qibali √an∞sirih∞)41 . A furtherremark in the same vein slips into Averroes’ Long Commentary on Met., Z, 11,where Aristotle contends that the geometrical segments are not a part of theform of the circle, but of the intelligible matter which belongs to the individualfigures (1037a4-6). Once more, Averroes presses the link between matter andindividuality, leaving us with a concise commitment to the thesis ofindividuation by matter␣ : he ventures that even the natural beings, as well asthe objects of mathematics, get their being individuals from their being foundin matter (kilayhim∞ innam∞ ta∂aππaµat li-kawnih∞ f± √unµur)42

The idea that individuation comes from matter moulds the ontologyoutlined by Averroes within the framework of his exegesis of Aristotle, but notin mere dependence on it. Doubtless, this is a view Averroes autonomouslyendorses in close connection with some of his own most celebrated doctrinesand even comes to be, from time to time, the actual pillar on which these proveto rest. In what follows, I shall take into consideration three such doctrines,traditionally counted among the most distinctive of Averroes’ philosophy, and

40 See AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., II, p. 549, ll. 1-4, ll. 15-18 (= c. 12/p-t, on Met., D, 6, 1016b33-36␣ ;cf. In Met. cit., f. 115rE-F).

41 See AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., II, p. 909, l. 16-p. 910, l. 2 (= c. 35/i, on Met., Z, 10, 1035b21-22␣ ;cf. In Met. cit. f. 187rC).

42 AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., II, p. 933, ll. 3-4 (= c. 39/p, on Met., Z, 13, 1037a4-6␣ ; cf. In Met. cit.f. 191vK).


I will show how the thesis of individuation by matter effectively shapes themand even works at their root. These are the philosophical theology of Averroes’Tah∞fut al-Tah∞fut (Destructio Destructionis) ␣ ; the cosmology worked out inhis commentary on Met., L ␣ ; and the monopsychist psychology of Averroes’Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima.

2.1 The Philosophical Theology of the Tah∞fut al-Tah∞fut

Recent studies have shown in detail how deeply the whole of Averroes’philosophical undertaking was connected ideologically with the Berber regi-me of the Almohades, under which Averroes lived and worked43 . The Almohaddynasty, as is well-known, portrayed its political action as religiously inspiredby the defence of taw∫±d, i.e. the Islamic dogma of the unity or uniqueness ofGod, from which the Almohades took also their name (al-muwa∫∫id≤n). Theunity of God, of course, is a binding doctrine for any Muslim believer. But theAlmohades pursued a radicalised version of it where the nature of God wasassumed to be thoroughly simple, as well as absolutely free from any kind ofcomposition␣ : even including composition with the divine attributes referred toin the Qur’∞n. The doctrine found some supporters among the Hellenizingphilosophers, who sustained it with the strength of the rational argumentswidely supplied by a long philosophical tradition committed to Neoplatonicviews on the full simplicity of the First Principle. It was rejected, though, bysome more conservative Islamic theologians. In his theological treatise knownas Tah∞fut al-Fal∞sifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) al-Ghaz∞l± hadargued that the philosophers failed in their effort to establish the uniquenessof God on rational grounds. Averroes replies to this in his Tah∞fut al-Tah∞fut(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), where he shows that at least themistaken belief in the existence of more than one God can indeed be excludedby the pure use of demonstrative reason. Here the reasoning pattern (maslak f±taw∫±d) is basically the same as in its many other occurrences and it makesclearly appeal to Averroes’ doctrine of individuation by matter. The argumentbegins by resorting to the Aristotelian distinction of different types of identity␣ :if there were a second Intellect like the First, so Averroes reasons, this wouldnecessarily agree with the First either in species, in genus, or analogically.

43 See e.g. D. URVOY, Ibn Rushd (Averroès), The American University in Cairo Press, Cairo1993, pp. 69-89␣ ; ID., Averroès. Les ambitions d’un intellectuel musulman, Flammarion, Paris1998, esp. pp. 56-60␣ ; M. GEOFFROY, L’Almohadisme théologique d’Averroès (Ibn Ru∂d), ␣ « ␣ Archivesd’Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age␣ », 66, 1999, pp. 9-47␣ ␣ ; ID., Ibn Ru∂d et lathéologie almohadiste. Une version inconnue du kit∞b al-ka∂f √an man∞hiø al-adilla dans deuxmanuscrits d’Instanbul, ␣ « ␣ Medioevo␣ », 26, 2001, pp. 327-356.


Now, it can agree only analogically, Averroes concludes, whereby it is indeedprevented from counting as a second God thoroughly identical with the First.For our present concerns, however, the conclusion is less significant than thepremises, where the remaining kinds of identity, i.e. in species and in genus,are tested and rejected. Identity in species is particularly remarkable␣ : if thetwo Intellects were granted to be one in species, so Averroes argues, they shoulddiffer in number. But this is impossible, for the Intellects are immaterial andnumerical distinction can only stem from matter44 . This is what Averroesmaintains␣ : ␣ «␣ if it is like Zaid and √Amr individually differentiated and specificallyone, then it necessarily possesses hyle and this is impossible␣ »45 .

2.2 The Cosmology of the Long Commentary on Metaphysics, XII, 7

Individuation by matter is also the basic assumption of an original tenet ofAverroes’ cosmology. The whole issue is concisely clarified by W. D. Ross in hisintroduction to Aristotle’s theology. Aristotle assumes the existence of 55separate intelligences moving the celestial bodies as final causes, i.e. as objectsof love and desire, and thus implying a corresponding number of celestial soulswhich move them as efficient causes (for love and desire can only be felt bysouls). In the history of Aristotle’s reception, separate intelligences and celestialsouls have been traditionally distinguished as final vs. efficient causes. Roughlyspeaking, this is the account of al-F∞r∞b± and Avicenna within the Arabictradition, as well as of Thomas Aquinas within the Latin46 .

Contrary to this, Averroes maintains that the celestial souls arestraightforwardly identical with the separate intellects␣ : ␣ «␣ an opponent shouldnot say that the forms by which the celestial bodies are moved (i.e. the celestialsouls) are different from those towards which they are moved (i.e. the separateintellects)␣ » 47 . He reasserts this conviction and rephrases it in several ways. He

44 See AVERROES, Tahafot at-Tahafot. Texte arabe établi par M. BOUYGES S. J., ImprimerieCatholique, Beyrouth 1930 (Bibliotheca Arabica Scholasticorum, Série Arabe, Tome III), pp.292, l. 8-293, l. 10␣ ; p. 379, ll. 1-2. English translation in AVERROES, Tahafut al-Tahafut (TheIncoherence of the Incoherence). Translated from the Arabic with Introduction and Notes by S.VAN DEN BERGH, 2 vols., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987 (“E. J. W. Gibb Memorial”New Series XIX), vol. I, pp. 173-174 and pp. 228-229.

45 See AVERROES, Tahafot cit., pp. 385, l. 11-386, l. 12. Eng. trans. in ID., Tahafut cit., vol. I,pp. 232-233.

46 See W. D. ROSS, Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentaryby W. D. ROSS, 2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1924, vol. I, pp. cxxxv-cxxxvii. See alsoGENEQUAND, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics cit., pp. 33-48.

47 AVERROES, De Substantia Orbis. Critical Edition of the Hebrew Text with English Translationand Commentary by A. HYMAN, The Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge, Massachusettsand Jerusalem 1986 (Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevii, Averrois Hebraicus), p. 70.


even comes to claim that the separate intellects constitute some inner principleof the stars, by which he means␣ : they constitute their soul48 . Once again, thefinal theory emerges from two telling premises. The first is a major doctrineof Averroes, according to which the psychic forms of the spheres must beimmaterial, because the spheres themselves have no matter except in anequivocal sense49 . But also the second premise is deeply-rooted in the basicinsights of Averroes’ philosophy. Since the celestial souls, like the separateintellects, are deprived of any matter, they are not even distinguishable as twodiffering beings. Here as above, individual distinction is evidently implied tobe a function of matter. Here, however, the concept comes to be clarifiedthrough an unusual example␣ : the separate intellects are to the celestial soulswhat the form of the baths is to its concept in the soul␣ ; when one enters thebaths, the outside form is the end of his motion (for it is his actual goal), whilethe concept he has of it is an efficient cause which impels him to motion50 . Butthe form of the baths and the concept of them are identical forms, though theyare differently instantiated in differing parcels of matter␣ : they are one inthemselves and many in number. Multiplicity in number, as a result, does notentail multiplicity of forms, nor does individuation of substances entailindividuality of forms. It rather implies multiplicity of matters becausematter, not form, is the ultimate cause of numerical distinctness. This is whatcomes to light from the case of the baths␣ : ␣ « ␣ if the form of the baths were notin matter, it would move us as efficient cause and as final cause without anymultiplicity resulting from that at all ␣ ». We are able to distinguish betweendifferent substantial forms, like the end and the agent, simply because we candistinguish between different material locations of the very same type. ButAverroes warns here that ␣ « ␣ this is distinct and multiple only in us␣ ». And ourmain difference from the celestial spheres is precisely that of being earthlymaterial bodies and of existing as enmattered substances.

2.3 The Monopsychist Psychology of the Long Commentary on De Anima, III, 4

While the previous theses were ultimately based on the doctrine ofindividuation by matter, the celebrated commentum 5 of Averroes’ Long

48 See AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. III, p. 1604, ll. 3-8 and pp. 1593, l. 12-1594, l. 2 (= c. 37/l, onMet., L, 7, 1072a34-35␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 320rD␣ ; and c. 36/c-d␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 319vH). Eng.trans. in GENEQUAND, Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics cit., pp. 153, 149.

49 On the immateriality of heavens and its metaphysical implications in Averroes, see M.DI GIOVANNI, Averroes on the Species of Celestial Bodies, ␣ « ␣ Miscellanea Mediaevalia ␣ », 33, 2006,pp. 438-464.

50 See AVERROES, Tafs±r cit., vol. III, pp. 1594, l. 3-1595, l. 2 (= c. 36/e␣ ; cf. In Met. cit., f. 318vI-K).


Commentary on De Anima, III is literally dotted with such a conception offorms as individuated by matter. Since it considerably permeates the longargument given here in support of monopsychism, one of Averroes’ mostdistinctive doctrines, it also attests how effectively such a view on the topicof individuation works at the roots of Averroes’ philosophy and somehowrepresents the doctrinal framework of its multifarious development.

Monopsychism is the Averroean version of Aristotle’s psychology, accordingto which a unique intellect exists, both material and active, which is commonlyshared by all human beings. Commentum 5 discusses particularly the crucialrole of phantasmata in accounting for a certain kind of multiplicity whichmust be introduced into the core of the material intellect itself, though oneand unique, on account of the so-called speculative intellect (i.e. the store, soto speak, of the abstracted concepts). On the one hand, the speculativeintellect has to reflect the nature of the material one, just as the effect reflectsits cause␣ ; on the other hand, it has also to admit some intrinsic multiplicityso as to become, as the Latin says, ␣ « ␣ numeratus per numerationemindividuorum hominum␣ ». Two main reasons are given by Averroes for thedemand for plurification in the speculative intellect. Curiously enough, theformer can be well expressed by the very same words of Aquinas’s celebratedcriticism of Averroes’ psychology in his De unitate intellectus ␣ : ␣ « ␣ hic homosingularis intelligit␣ ». In Averroes’ view, every concept which is subsequentlyreceived by the speculative intellect would absurdly come to be thought byevery thinking man at the same time, were the speculative intellectunqualifiedly one and the same for every man51 . This is precisely the reasonwhy, according to Averroes, it must rather be assumed to be somehowdifferentiated, at least on account of the differing phantasmata acquired eachtime by each thinking subject. But there is also a second and more relevantreason why the speculative intellect is to be multiplied. The argument here issomewhat complicated (it reproduces a similar argument in Aristotle’s DeCaelo), but is directly committed to the thesis of individuation by matter. Asany mover produces no more than one motion alone, Averroes assumes, therecannot be more than one single thing to be moved by each single mover␣ :otherwise, there will exist in nature something vacuous and superfluous(ociosum et superfluum). As a consequence, there will be exactly as manymoved things as there are acting movers. Now, the speculative intellect is toeach individual man as any mover is to each moved thing, so that there would

51 AVERROES, Grand Commentaire sur le Traité de l’Ame d’Aristote. Texte latin établi par F.STUART CRAWFORD de l’Université de Boston et publié sous l’égide de l’Académie Médiévale desMassachusetts, Académie Tunisienne des Sciences des Lettres et des Arts “Beït Al-Hikma”,Carthage 1997, In IIIum De anima, t.c. 5, p. 393, ll. 176-186 (= on De An., 429a21-24).␣


absurdly be just one man on the earth, if his speculative intellect were to beunique in every respect and one in an absolute manner. Alternatively, Averroesgoes on, there would be as many intellects as individual men. But here a majordifficulty arises. For numerical multiplicity is not found in the humanintellect, as well as in any immaterial substance. And the reason, once more,is highly significant␣ : matter alone is indeed the explanatory principle and theultimate source of that numerical multiplicity, or individual distinction,which is found in any individuated substantial form␣ : ␣ « ␣ et si hoc esset, tuncmotor corporis celestis esset materialis et numeratus per numerationemcorporum celestium␣ »52 .

Earlier in the argument, Averroes had strongly denied that the intellectcould be made numerically multiple (numeratus) precisely because, if it weremany in number, it would be necessarily linked with matter either as a bodyor as a faculty in the body (␣ « ␣ aut corpus aut virtus in corpore␣ »)53 . Such aninference would itself be sufficient to exclude that, according to Averroes,substantial forms are individual per se. For intellects are substantial formsand they are said to need matter in order to become individual. Yet Averroesgoes further and explains the actual reason why the human intellect cannotbe an enmattered form like the material forms that are found in the world ofnature. In some respects, he grants, the intellect is like matter, but it is not inmatter. Like matter, it receives the universal forms (formas universales) butunlike matter, the intellect receives them in a peculiar manner (alio modoreceptionis) which consists in knowing while receiving and understanding theforms received (cognoscens et comprehendens). This amounts to stating thatthe intellect must receive the universals precisely as universals, i.e. as theproper objects of human thought and scientific understanding. This is alsothe actual reason why the intellect itself cannot be involved in matter␣ :because matter turns forms, which are per se universals, into individualforms␣ ; it individualises while receiving and it could not even receive withoutimmediately turning the universals received into something different fromwhat they are in themselves. Matter receives forms precisely as individuals(␣ « ␣ recipit formas diversas, scilicet individuales et istas␣ »), thus reversing theproper status of universals which forms enjoy of their own nature (␣ «␣ nonsecundum quod sunt forme␣ »). Matter is responsible for individuation. Matter,not form, is the individual core of individual substances and the ultimateprinciple of their being individual.

52 AVERROES, In De Anima cit., In IIIum De anima, t.c. 5, p. 403, ll. 473-494 (= on De An.,429a21-24). ␣

53 AVERROES, In De Anima cit., In IIIum De anima, t.c. 5, p. 402, ll. 432-434 (= on De An.,429a21-24). ␣


3. CONCLUSION

At the very end of our inquiry into Averroes’ views on individuation, a fewmain tenets may be recalled and summarised. The whole issue originatedfrom the matter-form pattern worked out in the Physics and laying thefoundations of Met., Zeta, where the properties of composed substancesemerge as something reducible to their inner constituents. As far asindividuality is concerned, revealing clues about its bearers and originatingprinciple seem to be given in Met., Z, 13, where the substance is denied to bea universal. Averroes sees here an allusion to the substantial form, since heinterprets the ‘substance’ in Z, 13 as a biargumental substance (i.e. as a causeof being for the composite substances), which he thinks to be exactly whatsubstantial forms are. As a result, the main aim of Z, 13 is perceived as beingthat of presenting the forms themselves as non-universal, or individual,principles. This is indeed what Averroes constantly maintains over a largerange of texts, where he stresses the individuality of material forms as afundamental difference from Plato’s deceptive doctrine of universal, self-subsistent Forms.

The material forms, however, owe their concrete existence to the matteritself and, as closer inspection shows, this is even the case for their beingindividual. For they are not individual by virtue of themselves, but by virtueof their matter␣ ; on account of their matter they become individuallydistinguishable and numerically multiplied, while they are in themselves oneidentical nature, universally shared. As a matter of fact, this is the teachingAverroes discloses in commenting on some telling passages of Aristotle’sMetaphysics ␣ ; but it is also an outlook to which he is personally committedwhen he sets out his own basic ontology. This is no doubt an issue he caneasily draw on the Arabic text of the Metaphysics, where the thoroughuniqueness of universal forms gets indeed emphasised␣ ; but it is, nonetheless,what he actually endorses in some of his most distinctive theories, where heaffirms e.g. the demonstrative evidence of the Islamic taw∫±d and the utteridentity between separate intellects and celestial souls in the superior regionsof the natural cosmos. Finally, this is the basic assumption leading him to themonopsychist account of his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima,whereby Averroes will be mostly known in the Latin world and he perceiveshimself as an innovating heir of late antique Aristotelianism.

Individuation by Matter in Averroes’ Metaphysics

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