IN THE PEACE OPERATIONS 1990’S,WHAT ARE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS?

6/1/2015IN THE PEACE OPERATIONS 1990’S, WHAT ARE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS?DIS 3053 PEACEKEEPING OPERATION GROUP 9Col. (R) Abdul Latif Bin Harun

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IN THE PEACE OPERATIONS 1990’S, WHAT ARE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS?

ContentNo.

Title Page

1. Introduction to 1990’s Peacekeeping Operation

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2. What Are Basic Condition For Success?2.1 Adequate Financial &Logistic Support2.2 Effective UN Commandat HQ & in the Field2.3 Readiness of MemberStates Contribute theMilitary and CivillianPersonnel2.4 The Continuing Supportof the Security Council2.5 A Clear & PracticalMandate

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3. Conclusion 17

4. References 18

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1. Introduction

In 1993, after the cold war the Peace Operations had

undergo transformation. Firstly, quantitative transformation

whereby the UN conducted more peace operations, and then

normative transformation with the belief Peace Operations

should be broaden and lastly is the qualitative transformation

as a complex Peace Operations more regular basis.

By 1995, the catastrophes of Somalia, Angola, Bosnia,

and Rwanda prompted many states to re-evaluate the value of

peace operations and their contribution. The member states

expressed preference for working thru regional organizational

or alliances for example the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization. And so, the Security Council became reluctant to

create new missions.

FAILURES AND RETREAT

During the failure of Peace Operations in the 1990’s, the

main reasons for the failure was the insufficiency of

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resources made by member states. Then, because of the

ambitious mandates handed down by the Security Council.

Besides that, the environments where peace and ceasefire

agreements were often precarious. Lastly is the awful dilemma

that figured out as to soldier that was to do with limited

resources.

Rwanda Case: Failure by the UN

One of the main reason of the failure was the inadequacy

of the mandate whereby the scope of UNAMIR’s mandate was

unsuited to the situation in Rwanda and lack contingencies and

fall-back positions other than the lack of will on the part of

member states and the UN failures to inform the security

council about the situation in Rwanda before the genocide.

Other than that, the reason of the failure was the

implementation of the mandate where the mandate was

implemented cautiously, focussing on preserving the appearance

of neutrality under traditional peacekeeping mandate that was

unsuited to the context. Then, the UN headquarters and the

Security Council should be alerted to the inadequacy of this

approach.

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Plus, the confusion over rule of engagement because

UNAMIR never received a response to request for guidance about

the rules of engagement, resulting in a critical lack of

clarity regarding which rules were in force. After that,

because of the inadequate resources and logistics such UNAMIR

have a limited military transport and medical supplies.

Besides, the failure to protect because UNAMIR failed to

protect political leaders, civilians and national staffs even

where had been promised so. Lastly, it is because of the

organizational problems whereas poor personal relations and

unclear lines of communication and authority within UNAMIR and

between the second generation, UN staff and the Security

Council hindered the transfer of information.

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2. What Are Basic Condition For Success?

2.1 Adequate Financial and Logistic Support

The important of this condition to support the mandate from

Security Council for that particular PKO. The mandate were

such as humanitarian assistance, reconstruction, economic

recovery and mine action. Brahimi Report, the analysis from

the failure of PKO in 1990s suggested that ‘The Panel also

recommends that the Secretary-General be given authority, with

the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and

Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) to commit up to $50 million well

in advance of the adoption of a Security Council resolution

establishing a new operation once it becomes clear that an

operation is likely to be established.’1 Inadequate financial

and logistic support affect the result for that PKO. It can be

seen from this case study:

1 Executive Summary, Report of the Panel on United Nation Operation, p 5.

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I. United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo

(MONUC)

This is been played out in Democratic Republic of Congo

where MONUC strength of 17,000 is below the recommend

strength of about 24,000 because of lack of funds.2 The

mission is yet to achieve its mandate within allocated

time frame, it had to depend on EU standby force (EUFOR

RD Congo) deployed to neighbouring Gabon during the

recently held election in case of any violence.3 Therefore

the UNSC needs to make deliberate efforts to adequately

fund UN PKOs around world. This will ensure the

availability of troops, equipment and logistics at the

required levels, thus such missions could be successful.4

II. PKO in Africa by Maj Gen Philip V Sibanda, Force

Commander (FC) of Africa

2 Unil Ram, the History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from Retrenchment to Resurgence: 1997 to 2006 (UNITARPOCI, 2007).3 Tom Woodhouse and Tamara Duffey, Peacekeeping and International Conflict Resolution. (NewYork: UNITARPOCI, 2000)4 Solomon Agada, The Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: Case Study of Somalia, (Peace Operation Training Institute, 2008), p 75.

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Maj Gen Philip V Sibanda who commanded a peacekeeping

mission in Africa explained the mission’s situation when

he took over thus:

I took over as the FC … on 1 October 1995. At that time,

about 3,500 peacekeepers, military and police observes

out of the 7,000 approved…had arrived in the country. One

of the questions I asked my predecessor, a Nigerian Maj

Gen was why the number of peacekeepers was so small

considering the size of Angola…. The answer I got was

that although the mission had requested close to 15,000

troops, the UNSC had declined to authorise this figure….

This situation was made worse by the provision of only a

few fixed wing and rotary aircraft….This inadequate

provision of resource both in terms of men and equipment,

had far reaching consequences for the successful

accomplishment of mandated tasks of the mission.5

These facts on the mission was also stated in an earlier

report dated 25 November 1992 to the UNSC, where the UNSG

stated that the failure of the peace process in that country

was due to the incomplete fulfilment of the key provisions of 5 Frank Adu-Amanfor, Understanding the UN Systems and Second Generation Peacekeeping, (Accra: AdwinsaPublication, 1997).

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the peace accords. This included the ineffective

demobilization and storage of weapons, the delay in creating

the new armed forces. Others were delay in setting up a

neutral police force and the failure to re-establish central

administrations in many parts of the country due to inadequate

manpower and logistics.6This research strongly believes that if

the outlined remedies are applied in UN PKOs in world it could

lead to success of such missions. Thus a lasting peace could

be attained in most conflict situations in world.

2.2 Effective of UN command at HQ and in the field

The effectiveness of United Nation command at

Headquarters and in the field is very important because to

make sure the information between HQ and field command precise

and correct in order to avoid miscommunications. This is

really a matter and serious thing that UN HQ should look

forward. The failure of their mission because of the unclear

mandate that been drawn by Security Council. Take Rwanda as

example, the failure of the mission is the failure as the

whole UN. Lack of commitment by the member of the mission

which is UNAMIR is a major problem that occurred during the

6 Solomon Agada, The Challenges of United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa: Case Study of Somalia, (Peace Operation Training Institute, 2008), p 34.

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Rwanda mission. This is happening because the communication

and political will from Security Council to UNAMIR is very

poor. The relation link between UNAMIR and United Nation

Secretary General also was not in good condition. Supposedly,

UNAMIR was not control under Secretary General as commander in

chief, and yet General Dallaire as force commander has not

received fully authority to control the UNAMIR7. Due to lack of

authority problem, Belgium and France withdrew from the

mission, hence this cause lack of focal allegiance between the

members. The number of peacekeeper which is not in approximate

range has become the biggest issues for them to handle this

mission8.

The enhancement of headquarter capacity to plan and

support peace operation is also needed. According to Brahimi

Report, the Headquarters support for peacekeeping be treated

as a core activity of the United Nation. As many as possible

resources are also required and this should be funded through

regular budget of the Organization. DPKO and other offices

that plan and support peacekeeping is currently primarily

7 Mathias Kabunduguru, Peacekeeping and the UN: Lessons from Rwanda, Asia Pacific Press, 1999, p 6.8 Ibid.

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funded by the Support Account, which is renewed each year and

funds only temporarily post9.

The report also emphasizes the new headquarters capacity

for the information management and strategic analysis. This is

for the need to support the Secretary General and the member

in term of information-gathering and analysis entity. Without

such capacity, the Secretariat will remain a reactive

institution and this will make it unable to get ahead of daily

event10.

9 Brahimi Report, Report of the Panel on United Nation Peace Operation, p 5.10 Ibid, p 3.

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2.3 Readiness of Member States Contribute the Military And

Civilian Personnel

Through the day of the establishment of United Nations

until today, more than 70 peace operations done, by the

assisting and contributing of the member states in terms of

military and civilian personnel in order to assist the

conflicted nation to seek for independence and regain their

government and sovereignty. To achieve the objectives of

having success in the operations whether peacekeeping, peace

building and whatsoever, there must a condition to be

fulfilled.

The basic condition in each of operation is the readiness

of the member states in contributing their military and

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civilian personnel. This includes from the early process,

which is before the deployment of troops, or to be specified,

before the selecting of the good candidates. These are

including the preparation before the deployment of members of

troops, which cover all the logistics, financial, training,

communication skills, command skills and so forth.

Malaysia is a good example in terms of preparation of the

mission troops. Before the selection of the troops, there will

be a research on the needs of missions and calculate for the

implication before it is proceed to the cabinet for decision

making. Next, after the cabinet makes confirmation on

deploying troops for the missions, there will be a selection

of the members. Usually, it will give the priority to the most

prestige units and the best of the best members. This is to

ensure the one who will be getting the opportunity committed

to his task’s requirements and needs.

According to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato’ Seri

Najib bin Tun Razak, he stressed that the implication will be

calculated on the four-fold as listed below:

I. Economy and fund

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II. The development of Malaysian Armed Force

III. International relation

IV. Social and politic

If a member state does not fulfill any of those criteria,

the chances of fail the mission is greatly high. For example,

the United Nation Assistance Mission in Rwanda, the armed

forces face the difficulties during the mission.11 This is due

to the lack of the basic condition of the mission requirement.

11 Patrick J.O’ Halloran, Humanitarian Intervention and The Genocide in Rwanda, London: The Research Institution for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995.

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2.4 A Clear and Practical Mandate

Every United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed

on the basis of mandates from the United Nations Security

Council. Basically, a clear and precise mandate leads to

success of any peacekeeping operations. Depending on their

mandate, peacekeeping operations may be required to:

I. Deploy to prevent the outbreak of conflict or the

spill-over of conflict across borders.

II. Stabilize conflict situations after a ceasefire, to

create an environment for the parties to reach a

lasting peace agreement.

III. Assist in implementing comprehensive peace

agreements.

IV. Lead states or territories through a transition to

stable a government, based on democratic principles,

good governance and economic development.

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During 1990s, many peacekeeping operation met failure cause of

unclear and unpractical mandate that were given by UN Security

Council. The operation were:

I. United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) at Croatia in

1993

The choice in Croatia in between continuing a

mission that is clearly unable to fulfil its original

mandate in full or withdrawing and risking a renewed war

that would probably result in appeals for UNFROFOR to

return to restore peace. Given such a choice soldiering

on in hope seems preferable to withdrawing in abdication.

(Boutros-Ghali:

1994)12

II. United Nation Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in

1993.

12 Micheal Pugh, the UN, Peace and Force, (2013, Routledge), p 89.

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Marked the beginning of the demise of UNOSOM II, the

operation were conducted by the US soldiers and not the

UN Peacekeepers.13

III. UNIVAM III in 1995 ( Angola )

The mandate given by Security Council were too broad and

ambitious for peacekeeper which were to monitor

ceasefire, verify withdrawal of combatants, cantoning,

disarming and etc. Lacked of capability of peacekeeper to

build up a state and mandate tasks failed in 1997.14

“I think it was a mistake in the early 1990s to assume

that civil wars and collapsed states could be dealt with

by the peacekeeping model. Peacekeeping was designed to

deal with conflicts and power vacuums between states and

was not suitable for the far more complex task of dealing

with civil wars. So far, however, the UN’s member’s

governments have been unwilling to build new instruments

more suited to this task.”

(Sir Brian Urquhart, former UN Secretary General for

Political Affairs, March 8, 1999)15

13 Mark Bowden, Black Hawk down: A Story of Modern War, (2010, Grove/Atlantic), p 16.14 Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S Interests, (2002, Greenwood Publishing Group), p 36.15 Ibid p. 1

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Failure is to be expected. Failure can be caused by a

variety of factors and one of them is caused by the unclear

mandate. The peacekeepers should be clear about the original

mandate and act according to it to prevent from more failure

in peacekeeping operations.

2.5 The Continuing Support of the Security Council.

Security Council play a very important roles on

peacekeeping operations. One of them is by giving the

continuing support to the members of the peacekeeping

operations. By giving continuing support, it is much easier

for the members to execute the peacekeeping operations and the

task given.

The two basics ways of giving support are by using

military and police forces as the element of the support.

These two may sounds similarly but they have a very different

roles in peacekeeping operations. First, the military. The

general roles on what the military do during the peacekeeping

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operations are monitoring ceasefire, de-mining, protecting

borders, provide security for elections and help to rebuild

infrastructures.16 From all of this roles, monitoring

ceasefire is a very popular or important role. When a country

are under a chaos condition, ceasefire are likely to be choose

to get the hold of the situation. Monitoring ceasefire is to

guard the moment where the arrangements agreed by both sides

for the monitoring of the ceasefire period. For example, on

United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II) on

May 1991 and it is last until February 1995. It was the second

United Nations peacekeeping mission, of a total of four,

deployed to Angola during the course of the Angolan Civil War,

the longest war in modern African history. Specifically, the

mission was established to oversee and maintain the

multilateral ceasefire of 1990 and the subsequent Bicesse

Accords in 1991, which instituted an electoral process for the

first time including the two rival factions of the civil war,

the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the

de facto government of Angola, with control of Luanda and most

of the country since independence in 1975, and the National

16 Lecture notes Peacekeeping Operations in 1990s by Col (R ) Abdul Latif Bin Harun

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Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The

mission consisted of military observers, civilian police,

electoral observers, paramedics and both local and

international staff. The personnel came from 25 countries in

five continents. There was a maximum deployment of over 1100

during the early polling, as well as a minimum strength of

under 200 after June 1993. UNAVEM II suffered a total of 5

fatalities, 3 military and 2 civilian.17

Another important role of the military is to provide

security for elections. During the chaos time, there are no

government to run the country. So, they need a new government

in order to get authority to manage the country and in that

process the elections must take place. It is very hard and

dangerous during the elections process on the chaos time

because they will be an extremist group that want to rule the

country by weapons. So, they will do whatever they got to stop

the elections process and in this situation military are given

tasks to provide security for the elections. For example, the

United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) deployed

from April 1989 to March 1990 in Namibia to monitor the peace 17 UNAVEM II,http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm (accessed 29 MAY 2015)

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process and elections there. Namibia had been occupied by

South Africa since 1915, first under a League of Nations

mandate and later illegally. Since 1966, South African forces

had been combating an insurgency by the People's Liberation

Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of the Namibian-

nationalist South West African People's Organization (SWAPO).

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 435 in 1978, which

set out a plan for elections administered by South Africa but

under UN supervision and control after a ceasefire. However,

only in 1988 were the two parties able to agree to a

ceasefire. As UNTAG began to deploy peacekeepers, military

observers, police, and political workers, hostilities were

briefly renewed on the day the transition process was supposed

to begin. After a new round of negotiations, a second date was

set and the elections process began in earnest. Elections for

the constitutional assembly took place in November 1989. They

were peaceful and declared free and fair; SWAPO won a majority

of the seats. The new constitution was adopted four months

later and it was followed by Namibia's official independence

and the successful conclusion of UNTAG.18

18 "Namibia - UNTAG Facts and Figures". http://www.un.org.

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Second, the police forces. The role of police forces is

visiting police station, monitoring police activities,

investigating alleged human rights, protecting the electoral

process and training new police forces. It is a bit different

from the military roles but it is also important. For example,

investigating alleged human rights. This have happened in

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Set up in 1995, UNMIBH exercised a

wide range of functions related to the law enforcement

activities and police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The

Mission also coordinated other UN activities in the country

relating to humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human

rights, elections and rehabilitation of infrastructure and

economic reconstruction. Following the successful conclusion

of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated on 31 December 2002.

UNMIBH began its operations under inauspicious conditions. As

a result of the conflict, over 200,000 people had died, 20,000

were missing and 1.2 million were internally displaced. The

country was divided along ethnic lines. The fratricidal war,

in which civilians were the principal target and victims, had

left a legacy of hatred and widespread fear of retribution.19

19 UNMIBH http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/

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The police forces also training new police forces. United

Nations Police develop community policing in refugee or

internally-displaced persons camps, they mentor and in some

cases train national police officers, they provide

specialization in different types of investigations and in a

number of countries they help law enforcement agents to

address transnational crime. Improving efforts to recruit,

select, deploy and rotate highly qualified staff in missions.

Increasing the number of female officers in the UN Police

service. Other than that, the role of United Nations Police

has expanded rapidly over the last decade. Not only has the

United Nations almost tripled the number of police authorized

for deployment (from less than 6,000 to more than 17,500), but

also UN police mandates have become more multi-dimensional. In

the UN missions in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, UN Police were

given an executive mandate to safeguard law and order while

facilitating the launch of a new domestic police service.20 The

UN police mission in Kosovo helped to successfully establish

the Kosovo Police Service, while in Timor-Leste, districts of

the country have been continuously handed over to the National

20Police, www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police (accessed 30 October 2015)

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Police (PNTL), while UN Police return to their more

traditional role of advising and mentoring. The Police

Division is increasingly called upon to help to reform

national police services and to support the UN Department of

Political Affairs in its special political missions.21

3. Conclusion

Between 1988 to 1993 the triple transformation of UN

Peace Operations began, comprising quantitative, normative and

qualitative changes to their role and scope. During this

21 Department of Peacekeeping Operations in cooperation with the Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information

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period, the UN took on more complicated operations than in its

previous 40 years combined.

With such contending views, future peacekeeping missions

ought to be looked into carefully, taking into account the

experience of the past and the suggestion by Brahimi Report on

2000. The problem is who is to initiate these change within

the UN. Despites the failures, where goodwill has prevailed,

the UN has been instrumental in bringing about peace for

example in Mozambique.

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4. References

1) Executive Summary, Report of the Panel on United Nation

Operation.

2) Unil Ram, the History of United Nations Peacekeeping

Operations from Retrenchment to Resurgence: 1997 to 2006

(UNITARPOCI, 2007).

3) Tom Woodhouse and Tamara Duffey, Peacekeeping and

International Conflict Resolution. (New York: UNITARPOCI,

2000)

4) Solomon Agada, The Challenges of United Nations

Peacekeeping in Africa: Case Study of Somalia, (Peace

Operation Training Institute, 2008)

5) Frank Adu-Amanfor, Understanding the UN Systems and

Second Generation Peacekeeping, (Accra: Adwinsa

Publication, 1997).

6) Mathias Kabunduguru, Peacekeeping and the UN: Lessons

from Rwanda, Asia Pacific Press, 1999.

7) Micheal Pugh, The UN, Peace and Force, ( 2013,

Routledge ), Page 89

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8) Mark Bowden, Black Hawk down: A Story of Modern War,

(2010, Grove/Atlantic).

9) Frederick H. Fleitz, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s:

Causes, Solutions, and U.S Interests, (2002, Greenwood

Publishing Group).

10) Lecture notes Peacekeeping Operations in 1990s by

Col (R ) Abdul Latif Bin Harun

11) UNAVEM II,

http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/Unavem2.htm

12) "Namibia - UNTAG Facts and Figures".

http://www.un.org.

13) UNMIBH

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/

14) Police,

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police

15) Department of Peacekeeping Operations in cooperation

with the Peace and Security Section of the Department of

Public Information

16) Patrick J.O’ Halloran, Humanitarian Intervention and

The Genocide in Rwanda, London: The Research Institution

for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1995.

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IN THE PEACE OPERATIONS 1990’S,WHAT ARE BASIC CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS?

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