Identity and Meaning in Architecture by Alan Shear

Abstract

Recent trends in the philosophy of architecture show a need

for a robust method in which to clarify those principles that

constitute a building’s identity. Current theories

of architectural identification offer, as factors that can

contribute to architectural identity, the history of production,

the architect’s intention, and the building’s practical function.

In this paper, I will show how alone these factors are

insufficient to establish identity. Philosopher Nelson Goodman,

who has written specifically on architecture, proposes a series

of definitions that help establish architectural identity, but

they are only a beginning. My task here is to present my own

analysis of Goodman’s theory of architecture, review the history

of the commentary on his theory of architecture including

criticisms, and finally, assess their strengths and weakness. I

will review Goodman’s theory of architecture in the context of

worldmaking (in “When is Art?” in Ways of Worldmaking), and then,

how architecture relates to his theory of representation,

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exemplification and expression (in Languages of Art). Finally,

applying these to his theory of architecture (in “How Buildings

Mean” in Reconceptions in Philosophy, and in “Art in Theory” in Of Mind

and Other Matters). Later, I will discuss the strengths and

weaknesses of Goodman interpreters, such as, Paul Ricoeur. After

assessing the adequacy of the various critiques, I will propose

my own understanding of Goodman’s theory, and in its application

to Michel Foucault’s theory of vision as cognition and

understanding, will demonstrate how this understanding would work

in practice.

The Problem of Identity

The task before us here, the investigation of identity in

architecture, has previously been undertaken by philosophers of

art who have been seeking an aesthetic description of how a

building is a work of art. Philosopher Nelson Goodman identifies

a building as an artwork when it “signifies, means, refers,

symbolizes in some way” (R 33). It is the particular way a

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building signifies means, refers, and symbolizes that identifies

it an art work. On the other hand, there are others, whom we

might call functionalists, seeking to identify a building with

its purpose as intended by its architect, or as represented

solely through its structure. This investigation will begin

neither by comparing architecture with other art forms, or with

the relationship of its form to its function. Following Goodman

in How Buildings Mean, my path to discovery of a building’s

identity is found in the symbol systems. In How Buildings Mean,

Goodman states that naming, predication, narration, description,

exposition, portrayal, and pictorial representations are kinds of

denotation, but because buildings are neither texts nor pictures,

they only metaphorically describe or depict.1 More important

than investigating ‘how a building can be a work of art’ when it

does these things, is the fact that a building can do any of

these things. These terms and their definitions provide a way of

seeing qua understanding that is based upon the recognition that

what is perceived is perceived as part of a symbol system.

1 Goodman, Reconceptions in Philosophy, hereafter, R, 34.

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In Languages of Art, Goodman provides a theory of symbolism

that establishes consistent and practical identity criteria by

positing three interrelated aspects of representation:

denotation, exemplification, and expression. A representation can

be a generalized or specific image, a token or a type, and even

if it’s meaning is overt or hidden, all representations

participate in their symbol system. Both representation and

denotation posit relational meaning, but while representation and

expression are referential modes of symbolization, only

expression is self-reflexive. These distinctions are necessary in

order to avoid the simple but incorrect formula: ‘what denotes

also represents when there is resemblance.’ What is important to

remember when considering building identity is that labels are

independent of resemblance; a building will completely resemble

itself while representing something else. Goodman’s example of a

building that looks like what is sold from it (hotdog-shaped

building selling hotdogs) is a rare kind of resemblance. “An

architectural work may of course both literally exemplify some

properties and express others” (R 41). Denotation is central to

representation, but is not the same as resemblance. Parts of a

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building can represent, for example, when they display sculpture

or mosaics, but representation, as well as, exemplification and

expression, are to be understood as varieties of symbolization

and reference. Signifies means, refers, symbolizes in some way.

Denotation is the heart of representation and is independent of

resemblance of which it is neither a sufficient nor a necessary

condition.2 Denotation is a relationship of applying-to or

standing-for like the relationship between a label such as ‘Louis

Sullivan’ or ‘architect of building X’ and what it labels.

A building may or may not represent anything, and if it

doesn’t it still may literally exemplify or metaphorically

express when the meaning comes “from symbol to certain labels

that apply to it or to properties possessed by it” (R 36).

Certain architectural styles in the 20th century built structures

specifically to literally exemplify, that is, to make visible its

formal elements, to refer to structural characteristics, to show

these in order to express their meaning.3 Buildings can

metaphorically refer to properties (labels) that it does not 2 Goodman, Languages of Art, hereafter, LA, 5.3 Goodman, R 38.

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literally possess or “may express feelings it does not feel,

ideas it cannot think or state, activities it cannot perform” (R

40). “Reference by a building to properties possessed either

literally or metaphorically is exemplification, but

exemplification of metaphorically possessed properties is what we

more commonly call ‘expression’” (R 40). Goodman is clear that

what a work of architecture means cannot be identified with the

thoughts it inspires, the feelings it arouses, or with the

history of its origins including those of the identity of the

architect and his building designs.4 Causes and effects of a

building are not reference. Meaning, understood in this way, is

not identity. Importantly, Goodman distinguishes meaning from the

history of the building, because it’s meaning, “may have nothing

to do with its architecture” (R 43). If some of what a building

means is not its identity then to what meanings can we turn that

might constitute identity? Buildings do have meanings and so

there is the need to discover how to interpret those meanings

that indicate identity from those which don’t. Combining

Goodman’s philosophy of the languages of art and the ways of

4 R 43.

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worldmaking allows for establishing criteria for determining the

identity of a building.

In Ways of Worldmaking, Goodman follows Ernst Cassirer in

positing that there are many world-versions.5 Goodman shows how

worlds are built through the conceptualization of the properties

and structure of the stuff the world is made of. The plurality of

the visions or versions are irreducible, and that each version

builds on another that is already made. Envisioning a worldview

qua version is a form of knowledge, and as will be made clear,

knowledge understood in this way is a structure not an authority.

It is a kind of cognition, an epistemic regime, and each regime

is its own authority. “My interest here is rather with the

processes involved in building a world out of others…I want to

illustrate and comment on some of the processes that go into

worldmaking” (WW 7). Each ordering schema is a world-version,

rather than a version of the world; the latter implying that

there is some objective world over and above the versions, an

5 Goodman contrasts his approach from that of Cassirer’s whose search is “a cross-cultural study of the development of myth, religion, language, art, and science,” while Goodman’s approach is, “an analytic study of the types and functions symbols and symbol systems” (WW 5).

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idea rejected by Goodman. Each world is equally legitimate and

each (including Goodman’s) may be right or wrong. Right, in that,

it fits with the current experience with symbols and that it

provides guidelines for the use of the terms defining symbol and

representation, but not ‘right’ as true. Goodman resists the

Siren’s call of reductionists by refraining from condensing the

different versions into a single materialist or physicalist

world-in-itself. Reductions are partial, fragmentary, and vague,

he thinks, and besides, no one reduction would satisfy everyone.

No doubt, each would demand that the reduction be conducted in

such a manner that the end result would prove their most favored

antecedent. This applies also (or most of all) to the reductions

demanded by those who privilege mathematics, science or

technology. The evidence offered by these quantitative

disciplines as inevitable is, according to Goodman, negligible,

thus denying their attempts to posit their particular symbol

systems as the undeniable necessary proof warranting reduction.

Each worldmaking organization refers are symbol systems.

Symbol systems are referring systems, and as a referring system

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are epistemological constructs integral to, “our perceiving,

understanding, (and) constructing the worlds of our experience:

the different sciences and the different arts equally contribute

to the enterprise of understanding the world” (Giovannelli).6 We

make worlds by construing symbolic systems. Each symbol system is

capable of making and remaking, organizing and reorganizing the

world. The process is, in general, a linguistic analysis of the

words used to order things into kinds. Worlds may or may not

differ according to entities, emphasis, construction, proximity,

spatiality, temporality, periodicity, circumstances, objectives,

patterns, and derivation. What is important, for Goodman, is that

none of these ordering structures is found in the world, but

rather, they are “built into the world” (WW 15). Even so, in How

Buildings Mean, Goodman critiques three interpretative systems that

seek to establish how a building means.7 First, the absolutist

rejects the worldmaking premise for how could there not be a

single meaning that identifies a building. Second, the relativist

states that on the worldmaking view there is then no one correct

6 Giovannelli, Alessandro, Goodman's Aesthetics, Standard Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goodman-aesthetics, 2005.7 R 44ff.

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interpretation for there is no standard of rightness that would

apply throughout all the referring symbol systems, that is,

worldviews. Goodman faults the relativist claim that a building

will mean whatever an interpreter says it does and so the

building does not have any meaning in itself for all

interpretations are external to it. Third, the deconstructionist

accepts the worldmaking view in order to label all

interpretations as storytelling. By doing so they are released

from the futility of searching for that one right interpretation

with the unfortunate result that, like the relativist, every

interpretation could be said to be right. On this view,

attempting to achieve an understanding of the meaning of a

building apart from the extraneous interpretations is a futile

exercise.

Rejecting the absolutist view outright, Goodman suggests

passing through radical relativism and resolute deconstructionism

to an interpretive position of constructive relativism. A

relativism that is constructive sees some construals as wrong;

and taking the deconstructivist methodology, reconstructs an

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interpretation of building meaning that admits its

provisionality. Goodman’s search for how well a building works as

an art work hinges on definitions of rightness, that is, how the

exemplified formal architectural components correspond to one

another and to the whole, or how it expresses, denotes or refers.

There are no general rules for determining meaning, but Goodman

does offer suggestions regarding kinds of meanings. Buildings

have meaning. A work of architecture that we physically enter

affects all our senses and all our cognitive activities such that

they transform, alter, inform, and reorganize our experience,

that is, remake our world how we “see, feel, perceive, conceive,

comprehend” (R 48).

The question need not bother us if there is only one right interpretation of any text; for then the work can be identified indifferently with the text or with the right interpretation – there is just the one text, the one right interpretation, the one work. That a text has a single rightinterpretation that is determined by and is entirely in accord with the author’s intentions has been, and perhaps still is, like absolute realism, the most popular view. But like absolute realism, is untenable. (R 55)

The absolutist world is lost and with it, “All notions of

pure givenness and unconditional necessity and of a single

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correct perspective and system of categories are lost as well” (R

49). Even so, there is in Goodman no reduction to relativism or a

rejection of being able to state that an interpretation is false.

Conflicting statements are each true in their respective

worldviews. There can be a variety of these systems; each

constructed according to its own values, representations and

symbols. Correct statements come from a corresponding worldview,

that is, a representational system where that statement is indeed

correct. “The mistake comes in thinking of such systems as

devices for representing an antecedent reality. Rather, by

determining the categories in terms of which its realm is to be

described, a representation system determines the sorts of things

its world consists of” (R 51). The experience of the formal

elements is an interpretation; interpretation is an act and an

event.8 Each event is distinct and so is each interpretation.

As was stated above, this study will not compare buildings

to other art works in the hope of finding an aesthetic definition

of a building. Nevertheless, the analogical application of

8 Vandevelde 36, 43, 44.

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language theory to art works, specifically architecture, has a

number of strengths. I proceed by applying one concession - a

building is analogous to a literary work for both are single

entities subject to various interpretations. In his essay on

Interpretation and Identity, Goodman developed a methodology of

interpretation from literary works, which I will apply to

architecture. “Our question is whether the availability of

multiple right interpretations of a single text in a single world

gives rise to multiple works associated with that text” (R 54,

italics original). Like Goodman, my task here is to investigate the

nature of interpretation within a worldmaking milieu. Goodman

rejects the absolutist claim that there is one correct

interpretation of a building’s meaning that is founded upon the

identity of the architect and his intention. Among the several

reasons given that counter absolutist claims, I am interested in

investigating the premise of architect intentionality. This

seemingly plausible standard of identity founded upon architect

intention founders when there are buildings for whom no architect

is identifiable.9 Also, buildings may have meanings that the

9 This standard does not apply as easily to the many anonymous buildings for which intention, architect, and meaning that are constantly encountered

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architect never intended, and even could never have imagined. As

the absolutist argument for identity fades by denying that there

is one right interpretation because there is one building that

stands as the physical embodiment of the architect’s intention,

for the relativist, this absence of an architect’s intention in

an extent building leads them to deny that there is any right or

wrong interpretation.

Goodman believes that architecture, of all the arts, “makes

us aware that interpretation cannot be so easily distinguished

from the work” (R 45). There is meaning in architecture and so

all construals cannot be stripped away. Understanding the

different accounts within the symbol systems simply understands

that they are each true descriptions in different worlds,

descriptions of different things. Goodman states that these

different accounts, “increases the importance of distinguishing

between right and wrong versions” (R 52). Not every

interpretation is correct, and there are interpretations that may

through out our lives, but rather those unique and distinctive buildings with whom we live, that we experience, and which have some notable meaning. Even though we have not yet discovered what this meaning might be and how it is found.

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be substantiated as possessing more rightness than another. Each

system is active in its description of the world. Whether that

system is mathematical, scientific, religious, or whatever the

world is made, it is an artifact, and so, it is subject to

interpretation. The identity of a building is, for Goodman, the

history of its construction, but this history includes more than

the merely construction activities. How, and for what purpose a

building was constructed provides some information as to the

meaning of the building. History can contribute to the

formulation of identity, but history itself is an interpretation,

and so, is subject to the same criteria of rightness.

Interpretation of a building would include all its various symbol

systems, their contemporary meaning, and their current meaning.

Goodman notes that, “nothing is gained by assigning conflicting

interpretations to different worlds as we assign conflicting

versions of different world. For the question how correct but

conflicting interpretations can concern a single text is no less

problematic than the question how they can concern a single work”

(R 56).

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In concluding this section on representational identity, I

note that Goodman’s philosophical works seek to overcome what has

developed in Modernity that the arts are epistemologically

distinct and less accurate than the sciences. Both art and

science are epistemological systems that stand in an equal

relation to worldmaking. His philosophy seeks rather to

investigate the worlds we experience through their appropriate

symbol systems in order to deconstruct their hold on our

cognitive faculties. To accomplish this Goodman posits a symbol

system that is to be understood a class of symbols within a

correlated field of reference. In addition, the relations among

the symbols can be indirect and do at times relate to one another

along an extensive web of reference. In any event, it is the

comparison of the versions that is fruitful not their

condensation. What is philosophically interesting for Goodman is

not the positing of a neutral version lying beneath these other

versions, but rather his interest is in the, “overall

organization embracing them” (WW 5). The epistemological

activities of ordering are the ways of worldmaking. Worldmaking

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is the result of what is literally or metaphorically exemplified

or expressed, whether spoken or shown.

Goodman’s philosophy of symbols is a form of discourse on

what is cognized, but it is also a description of the process of

cognition itself. Cognitive processes that lead to a rightness

criteria include the technical tools that analyze the referential

functions of symbols. Goodman’s aesthetics describe how,

“emotions function cognitively,” where the, “work of art is

apprehended through the feelings as well as through the senses”

(LA 248). Sensory and emotive experiences are related in complex

ways to the properties of objects. In addition, emotions function

in combination with cognition as complementary means of knowing.

There are no clear separations among what one might label a

perception or a conception, and a feeling. Each and all of these

intermingle and interact resisting distinctions that would

divide, for example, the emotive and non-emotive aspects of an

aesthetic experience. In asserting that emotion is a form of

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cognition, Goodman states that any distinction of thought from

emotion is merely linguistic.10

Historical Identity

For Goodman, architectural identity cannot be separated from

its history of production. While this statement is important, and

has been employed on several occasions in this paper, it should

be noted that this conclusion is based upon Goodman’s need to

distinguish between a painting and an exact copy of it in a

culture of mechanical reproduction, and a forgery from the

original. The authentic painting of two visually

indistinguishable art works can only be determined by referring

to its provenance. Lagueux asserts that for “Goodman, the very

notion of a painting's authenticity involved in this question

presumes that the painting's own identity cannot be determined

without reference to the historical conditions of its production”

(Lagueux 20). Goodman suggests the term autographic to describe

works of art where not even the ‘most exact duplication of it

10 As we take leave of this discussion, it should be noted that their importance will be integral to the conclusion of the paper that suggests a solution to the problem of architectural identity can be found in developing atheory of polyscopic cognition.

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does not thereby count as genuine,” and allographic to describe

works of art whose distinct instances, like a building or a

musical performance, are each considered to be equally

authentic.11 Multiple houses built from the same plan with

similar materials are not forgeries. Each is an instance of the

plan just as prints from an etching are authentic instances of

the artist’s original plate. As was said above, architectural

identity here derives both from a description of the history of

production to the instance of the end product, from plan to

building. This is not the case with painting, but even if the

building plans are stolen or that the end product is falsely

attributed to a particular architect, the building is not a

forgery. It appears that for Goodman the architectural notational

system is the distinguishing characteristic between autographic

and allographic. The specific requirement that Goodman proposes

necessary between the notational system of architectural plan

(drawing, etc.) is that the drawing transcend the individual and

should be understood in such a way so as to produce the building,

in other words, that the end product conform to the plan.12 “But

11 LA 113.12 LA 120.

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architecture seems to differ from music in that testing for

compliance of a building with the specifications requires not

that these be pronounced, or transcribed into sound, but that

their application be understood” (LA 120). Architecture assumes

and presupposes a language of what is expressed and what is

expressible in the building. In the narrative description of a

building and what it represents is found a relationship present

in all language between predicate and its object. Understanding

this narrative relationship of the “characteristics of

representation as a special kind of denotation” is, for Goodman,

a “grave misconception” that makes resemblance a feature that

distinguishes representation from denotation.

Goodman concedes that the current state of the architectural

notational system is not the same kind of system as that of

musical notation and neither is it as exact. There are the

correct notes to be played as they are written in the score even

if there is some variation in the kind of instruments that play

it. A builder, on the other hand, can substitute materials and is

often not expected to be more precise than within a 1/32 inch

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deviation. And even if it is realistic to concede that a musical

performance with mistakes is still the work of the composer there

comes problems in deciding at what point the number of mistakes

degrades the piece so much that it does not even qualify as a

rendition of the composition. Art work identity, especially in

architecture, would benefit from the acceptance of gradations of

authenticity and from greater specificity of designation. This

openness, when applied to building identity, would allow for

greater flexibility when considering the degrees and methods of

architectural restoration; for example, in reconsidering a

currently unpopular restoration technique, anastylosis, and

reconstruction using original elements. The outright rejection of

anastylosis is based on a too strong argument regarding

historical building identity and an arbitrary degree of

dissimilarity. The new parts have to look very different from the

old parts so as to not foist a forgery on the public. The common

restorative practice is a compromise that makes it clear which

make sure the restored parts remain visibly, even dramatically,

distinct. With the acceptance of this suggested revised

understanding of a realistic relativity of historical identity,

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the restoration debate could admit to the discussion using

original structural parts in non-original placement, or blending

the repairs invisibly with the rest of the building.

The ideal object of what the art work was in the mind of the

artists and what she finally created as her intended fulfillment

of the idea. That there is a single, ideal, originary object is

the result of the illusion of Platonism. Those who would seek the

ideal object so as to identify an art work labor fruitlessly for

there is no ideal in space and time. Supposedly, there is a

moment when all the pertinent research is completed and the art

work is finally identified as being X. This process already

assumes a method that can discern what is important and pertinent

before even getting to the conclusion. It disregards, by

definition, information judged to be superfluous, and that genre

of information is historical events that impinge on the identity.

This method determines that there is one identity, an original

event when, in our study, a building that is completed, and so

judges what is pertinent, the construction process, and what is

not, what come after that. The conclusion is, the real art work

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can only be X and nothing that happens to it can change its ideal

identity. If it becomes another thing through age or some other

agent of change then it is a different thing. To restore a

building to its identity as being X, it has to be identified as

X, so that any conservationist will know what to do.13 Michel

Foucault suggests a methodology of archaeology and genealogy to

define the historic conditions and an investigation into the

elements that compose the history, including the history of its

production. The method is to think ‘backwards’ from the event of

the building to the rules, regularities and practices that

occasion their appearance. Interpretation of the various world-

making symbol systems of a building is a form of genealogy from

which one could more clearly discover its identity.

Goodman’s philosophy of symbols is a form of discourse on

what is cognized, but it is also a description of the process of

cognition itself. Cognitive processes that lead to a rightness

criteria include the technical tools that analyze the referential

functions of symbols. Goodman’s aesthetics describe how,

13 Gennette 21

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“emotions function cognitively,” where the, “work of art is

apprehended through the feelings as well as through the senses”

(LA 248). Sensory and emotive experiences are related in complex

ways to the properties of objects. In addition, emotions function

in combination with cognition as complementary means of knowing.

There are no clear separations among what one might label a

perception or a conception, and a feeling. Goodman states that

each and all intermingle and interact resisting distinctions that

would divide, for example, the emotive and non-emotive aspects of

an aesthetic experience. In asserting that emotion is a form of

cognition, Goodman makes any distinction of thought from emotion

as merely linguistic. History is in the service of life-as-art,

where the past is a means of strength in the present by defining

human identity within the created social space of the building.

The built environment is not to be understood only as the means

of determining personal, individual autonomy, but as the public

space with social dimensions that define the human experience.

The built environment serves the public. Social practice precedes

individual consciousness and it is in the experience and

interpretation of our experience within built space that defines

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our social being. Essential to our social being is language for

human being is being in language. In this sense, architecture is

art, culture and historical text. As such, it is part of the

horizon in which we live and through which our worldview is

shaped. How we experience a building is informed by what we

understand a building’s function to be, because buildings have

intentions.14 The building that is experienced, confirms and

establishes a relationship among individual and community and in

this way, it constitutes a certain way of being in the world. The

building identifies human being as much as human being is

identified in our shared built environment. As we build we are

constructed, and it is in this sense that Gadamer speaks of the

fusion of horizons where there exists a mutual self-understanding

between us and the aesthetic object, which is here, the building.

As we live with buildings, there is a dialogue, a process that in

its reciprocity co-determines both the identity of human being

and the building. The building creates a certain kind of person.

It projects an anthropology that constitutes the person.15 A

building exists within a tradition and even as it seeks to

14 Arheim 117.15 Dufrenne 1973, liii

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innovate and break with tradition the building itself, as an

event requires both participation and interpretation.

Functional Identity

Function is a value of utility that assumes human need so

that the form of the building can fulfill it. Functionalism is an

aspect of intention in architecture when a building is a public,

cultural, and historical structure. For example, when the formal

elements of the building facilitate the most efficient movement

of building’s participants or that the structure of the building

facilitates social gathering or open views so as to see some

important ritual activity. Here, the architectural value is

founded upon the fulfillment of its function. It is in this

worldview that the function of the building assumes a number of

metaphorical perspectives. The functionalist architecture

metaphor interprets the interrelation of human social, economic,

political, and religious purposes within biological and

evolutionary schema. According to this metaphorical

understanding, function is related to the active purpose of the

organism to achieve its continued survival and fulfillment of its

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procreative instincts. Winters notes that, architectural

functionality is a biological metaphor that applies the

efficiencies of mechanical or technical processes to buildings.

On this biological evolutionary view, when something is

functional, it seeks to fulfill essential physical needs. The

building's functionality represents both the fulfillment of human

physical necessity, and so also, represents metaphysically the

nature of a human being. Echoing Descartes and the early moderns,

bodies are biological mechanisms, and so, the building is a

mimetic expression of that world-view. The building is designed

in such a way so as to solve physically a particular mechanical

problem. Oddly enough, the opposite can also be expressed: the

building mechanically solves a particular limitation of human

physical nature. The criterion of judgment is efficiency, and the

value of the building is in its adherence to the combination of

the metaphors of biological and technological functionality.

The success of the building fulfilling its functionality is

found, first, in how the problem is formulated, and then in how

that problem is functionally solved. On the one hand, it is a

technical solution to a particular problem. On the other hand, it

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is an ethical, social, economic, and political concern where each

can be solved through the technical efficiency. Foucault sees

architecture as a kind of techne, a technique using elements of

the sciences like, for example, physics; it is a practical

rationality governed by a conscious goal and is “rigorously

indivisible” from the history of ideas and thought.16 Arnheim

thinks that architecture assumes and presupposes a language of

what is expressed and what is expressible in the building. How we

experience a building is informed by what we understand a

building’s function to be, because buildings have intentions.17

In this way, functionalism is a historically determined form of

cognition that informs our understanding of a building. The

evolutionary metaphor can be expanded to include the technical,

that is, architectural structural solution that can solve other,

non-essential, human needs and activities. On this

interpretation, functionalism can serve social, economic,

political, religious purposes, even when function is understood

from its biological and evolutionary metaphors.

16 Foucault, 1980, 253.17 Arheim 1977, 117.

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The function of a building informs our understanding of

building identity and for some philosophers the relationship of

form to function serves as the critical criteria of aesthetic

judgment. Goodman states that the modernist philosophy of

architecture, which states that, ‘form follows function ‘fails to

take into account that ‘function, is itself a symbol.

Functionalism is concerned with interpreting buildings according

to the intended activities for which it was designed and are to

take place within it. Nevertheless, a building can facilitate so

many other activities that the original intentionality and

functionality of architect and even the building itself fade so

that they can be regarded as merely one element among many. The

function of a building informs our understanding of building

identity and can also serve as critical criteria of aesthetic

judgment. Goodman thinks that the relationship between a

building’s aesthetic elements and its functional design are

highly complex, ranging from “interdependence to mutual

reinforcement to outright contention” (R 32). Symbolic

functioning is not always aesthetic and how and what a building

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may mean may have little or nothing to do with its architectural

form.

In conclusion, architecture is a visual art and so must be

assessed according to its visual elements even if the building is

strictly a functional construction. Even strictly functional

elements or purposes are visual even if they are not aesthetic.

Winters states that architecture cannot be deciphered like a text

for it does not represent, express, or imitate.18 Language is the

structural counter-part of architecture.19 Functionalism can be a

criterion of appreciation as when the relationship of form to

function is a part of our judgment of its beauty. Form is the

unity of the sensuous and meaning. There are other functional

purposes and so the expression and fulfillment, that is, the form

of the function becomes a central aesthetic concern. The

aesthetic is part of the expressed form of a building and the

criterion is how well it achieves its purpose of fulfilling the

human activities that are to take place within. The function is a

visual element that shows the participant how to act, that is,

18 Winters 11.19 Winters 64.

30

how to move within it so as to increase the efficiency of their

activities. Within this paradigm are the assumptions of

technological minimalism that reduces or eliminates what is

considered inessential movement. Only those movements that

directly fulfill the purpose of an action are necessary. Here the

ancient ontology of substance and accident are assumed for

efficiency is reified as the activity of stripping away

unessential movements in order to accomplish the goal.

Biographical Identity

Identifying a building as that of such-and-such an architect

is both philosophically uninteresting, and conflates

identification with identity. Granting that such a designation

provides some information it is insufficient in addressing the

more interesting philosophical question of identity; an argument

that smoothes over the questions of personal identity and its

relationship to artifacts. The argument proceeds something like

this: the architect, like the author, has an intentional,

31

psychological and historical relationship to his object.20

Evidence of biographical identity draws upon the architect’s

building plans and drawings that lie behind the building. It is

equally as plausible to say that the building contributes to the

identity of the architect rather than the other way around. Here,

we encounter the standard metaphors of biography as spatial as

when an architect’s intentions are described as ‘lying behind the

building.’ Similarly, the idea of the building lies in the

imagination as an ideal thought object that the architect

translates into a drawing and then into a structure. The assumed

relationship here is that the building is intentionally the

architect’s work, and so also, it is the artistic expression of

the autonomous, individualized architect. Included in this

understanding of a building are the words of the architect that

describe what the building is supposed to mean and how it is

structure reflects a specific narrative event. Documentary proof

is privileged as evidence of intentionality, and the preferred

interpretation is that the document requires thinking back from

it to the architect and the idea in his head as he wrote. Another

20 Ricoeur, 1991, 107.

32

part of this reflecting back from document to architect is a

mental reenactment, that is, a form of intuition of the original

thought of the architect. This method of discovery of the

identity of the architect is supposed to restore or establish the

identity of the building’s intention by referring to what lies

behind.21

Identifying architect-with-building can only be made when an

individual architect and building are so labeled, but positing

that the building is a representation of an architect’s intention

does not provide the philosophical understanding of building

identity that is being sought in this paper. Another limitation

of his mode of identification is that it is applicable mostly for

more contemporary buildings and is irrelevant for most pre-modern

structures for whom there is no single architect, and less so,

for some buildings which take generations to build. The further

back in time the less accurate this mode is. Still, the problem

remains that this mode of identification has not yet been

sufficiently proven to provide understanding of what the building

21 Tanke 385.

33

means. That the architect may be invisible, that is, unknown, but

their construction is not, then relies other forms of identity

such as historical or functional. The architect as creator is

identified by the properties of their construction. Attributions

of architect-identity would be arbitrary for there is no method

that can classify which formal elements of a building relate to

an individual and which do not.

Certainly, it is the case that an architect’s buildings

possess features that are described analogously as ‘signature

elements’ such as the linearity of Frank Lloyd Wright. Here is an

instance where the definition of building identity is one of

mimetic correspondence for the building is said to represent

those formal characteristics employed by the architect in such as

way so as to be thematic of his style. Specific combinations of

formal elements in the building are said to represent the

identity of the architect. It is this association of certain

formal elements combined in a certain way that identify the

architect. This argument for identity is affirming the consequent

when those formal elements can be recognized without reference to

34

an architect even if it is accurate to describe the formal

combination as signature of a particular architect. Knowing which

architect built that structure adds little to the identity of the

building beyond explaining how the unique combination of certain

formal elements is indicative of that architect. As was said

above, the unique combination of formal elements has more value

in identifying a painting and distinguishing it from other

similar paintings or in efforts to ascertain forgery than it does

in architecture. Biography provides some sufficient information,

but it is not necessary in determining building identity. Echoing

Goodman, Ricoeur is instructive here regarding over-valuing

biographical identity as the necessary condition of building

identity when he suggests that no one version is exhaustive yet

“the world may be more than each version without being apart from

it. It is the very experience of making that yields that of

discovering. And discovering is to confront the opacity of the

world” (Ricoeur 178). Biographical identity is still subject to

interpretation for the life of an architect, his plans and

buildings are, like any historical document, subject to

interpretation.

35

Foucault redeems the shallowness of the architect as

originator of the building by placing him in the larger context

of various overlapping worldviews that converge in the building.

This back and forth interpretive process begins with the building

and traces backwards to the rules and practices that occasion

their appearance, and forward again to the building and how it

instantiates the architect’s intention. The imaginary discovery

of the architect’s intention is grounded in Foucault’s logic of

the archaeological process as a method of historical analysis

that uncovers deeper levels of knowledge embodied in the built

structure as a public, cultural product, and historical event.

For Foucault, intention could be ‘unconscious’ when it is part of

a larger cultural milieu of power/knowledge, or as Thomas Kuhn

put it, a historical, epistemological paradigm.

In addition to Goodman’s rejection of absolute realism, he

also faults the assumption that even if the author’s, or in our

case, the architect’s, intention can be discovered, knowing these

intentions of a work doesn’t “determine correctness of

36

interpretation; for the significance of a work often diverges

from, and may transcend or fall short of, what the author had in

mind” (R 55). Another problem with attributing an individual

architect’s intention as being realized in his building falters

when there are no extant plans. If plans are like texts that are

considered to be an expression of the architect’s intention it is

still the case that buildings differ from one another in their

relationship to the architect and that plans themselves differ

from one another and to their relationship to the building. Plans

are not a guide to determining the identity of the building.22 If

plans can be found and if they can be attributed to an individual

architect and if there is enough left of the building to make

some degree of attribution between them, then some degree of

identity can be established. Nevertheless, the architect’s

identity is one element in determining the building’s identity

rather than its sole or even primary criterion. “Understanding a

work may be quite different from understanding what the author

intended by it” (R 55). Buildings do not always retain the

intention of the architect and come to mean differently and even

22 A more detailed discussion of architectural plans can be found under Notational Identity.

37

to function in ways never envisioned by the architect and perhaps

in ways contrary to the building’s intention, for example, the

Parisian museum, Musee D’Orsay, originally a train station.

But for distinguishing allographic from autographic works, all that counts is whether or not identity of the work – quite apart from any particular question of author or opus –is independent of history of production. […] Of course, for any work, autographic or allographic, determination of authorship, opus, period, and so on, are aspects of history of production. What distinguishes an allographic work is that identification of an object or event as an instance of the work depends not at all upon how or when or by whom thatobject or event was produced. (MM, 140)

The tangential idea of forgery will occupy us only briefly.

Goodman and others have a concern regarding the meaning of a

forgery as it directly relates to identity and authenticity.

Authenticity is an aspect of identity. It is determined by the

history of production of the work (provenance). So, even though

in architecture the history of the production is important to

establish authenticity, it is still impossible to forge a

building. An architectural work cannot be forgery; rather, it is

an instance of a work.23 Every building is authentic, as is a

23 This is at odds with the notion of authenticity, which is important in determining what kind of restorative technologies to pursue for a building in

38

musical performance of a Mozart symphony or theatrical

performance of an Ibsen play. “Any building that conforms to the

plans and specifications, any performance of the text in

accordance with the stage directions, is as original an instance

of the work as any other. But architecture seems to differ from

music in that testing for compliance of a building with the

specification requires not that these be pronounced, or

transcribed into to sound, but that their application be

understood” (LA 120). Each performance is an instance of the art

work. One could forge a manuscript, but the performance is a

realized instance of the work. In this instance architecture is

more like a performance than a unique object created by an

identified artist. Certainly, the building can be mislabeled as

being the idea of a particular architect when it is not. On the

other hand, even as a building is unique as an object and

according to its production, it is not analogous to a painting,

sculpture, or written work of literature all of which can be

forged. Proof of authenticity of these art forms is based upon

the history of their production and the identity of the artist.

the architectural conservation debate. Restorative activities are founded uponwhat is and isn’t authentic to the building.

39

The need for provenential identification is vital in those art

forms where value is founded upon the artist creating a unique

object. Arguing forgery or debating authorship may determine

value, but such insecurities do not change the status of the art

work as something that exists, as is the case with buildings.

By stating there are no buildings that are forgeries, it may

be conceded that the building’s architect could be attributed

wrongly, but the building itself, like a musical performance,

cannot be a forgery. Identification is not identity. Musical

scores and performances of those scores “may vary in correctness

and quality and even in ‘authenticity’ of a more esoteric kind;

but all correct performances are equally genuine instances of the

work” (LA 113). Scores may be identical and they can identify the

same particular musical composition but the score is not the same

work as the different performances of the work. “Architectural

plans, like musical scores, may sometimes define works as broader

than we usually take them. For the architect’s specifications of

materials and construction (whether written out separately or

part of the plans) can no more be considered integral parts of a

40

score than can the composer’s verbal specifications of tempo” (LA

219). Even more detailed ‘plans-plus-specifications’ Goodman

labels as more like a script than a musical score. Lack of

specificity in architectural plans is that which Goodman

identifies as the reason it lacks the full force of a notational

system. But the lack of rigor is not sufficient to make the

building less of an instance of the work of the architect.

Variations in materials and lack of exactitude in architectural

plans do not change the identity of that particular existing

building.24 Given this flexibility, Lagueux’s assertion that

Goodman would reject even a perfect copy, forgery, or

reconstruction for the historical conditions of its production

differ from the original is not completely accurate. “A forgery

of a work of art is an object falsely purporting to have the

history of production requisite for the (or an) original of the

work” (LA 122).

24 This condition of inexactitude is analogous to a musical composition being performed by an ensemble featuring more, less or different instruments than those for which it is scored, in that, the performance would still be labeled as the composition of the composer.

41

My discussion of identity builds upon Ricoeur’s distinction

that substitutes identity-as-idem (being the same) with identity-

as-ipse (oneself as self-same) – with the understanding that the

difference is merely the difference between formal identity and

narrative identity.25 The building is only analogously like a

text, discourse, speech or dialogue; though it does show a

narrative identity by how it expresses meaning to individuals and

communities. Ricoeur sees a disjunction between the meaning of

the building and the intention of the architect or his lived

experience.26 While on its surface, this echoes the romantic

ideal of personal creativity of the architect being separated

from the historical horizon in which he lives, Ricoeur is not a

romantic. In the building is inscribed the intention of the

architect, but the impossibility of a detailed translation of

formal elements into text shows how these objects are separate.

To ‘read’ the architect out of the building’s physical structure

is an interpretive act subject to the same interpretive criteria

discussed above by Goodman. Even for the architect who builds a

25 Ricoeur, 1988, 246. Questions that remain to be clarified in Ricoeur: Is the architect idem and the building ipse or is it the reverse? Or, are both idem or are both ipse?26 Ricoeur, 1991, 121.

42

revolutionary and world-making structure it is still the case

that the building is an event that is present for the people of

that time, and all subsequent times for the building shares its

setting even if it is intended to be innovative. The architect’s

work reflects his own historical milieu even as it draws its

participants from other worldviews while it points to yet

another.

Authenticity or Value Identity

The question regarding identity and value is related to the

notion of authenticity. Authenticity is a world-version value and

even though value is a principle shared among versions it is to

be regarded as nothing more than an ordering schema, and that

each schema is a world-version, rather than a version of the

world. The latter position implies that there is some objective

world, a transcendent version; an idea rejected by Goodman, and

just as each world is equally legitimate each may be right or

wrong. Terms denote - they apply as labels to whatever they name,

43

or describe or represent.27 Like the label of ‘authentic,’ or

‘intrinsic’ refers to or represents a certain kind of value.

Intrinsic is a label representing a value in a symbol system that

includes its own meaning and interpretation. Intrinsic represents

the same kind of symbolic valuing system as that which labels

things as beautiful or ugly.28 The attributes of what can be

given the qualitative label of intrinsic are those things that

are already identified in the symbol system of the worldview as

that which quantitatively possessing those values. The

unavoidable conclusion is that the attribution of intrinsic value

begs the question. “A work of art can express or exemplify

properties intrinsic within its structure which are treated

metaphorically while it can represent something that exists

objectively to which it refers. Many works of art historically

have done both” (Donnell-Kotrozo 361). The identity of some

buildings is that they have intrinsic value and so the discussion

asks, ‘What is it that makes it possess these values?’ Here, the

discussion founders in circularity as the different valuing

systems of the diverse building identifiers describe why the site

27 WW 102ff. and LA 40ff.28 LA 255ff.

44

has the values it does because it has already been identified as

possessing an intrinsic value.

The investigation of architectural identity encounters early

on systems of value that propose criteria for determining

identity. Values are presumed to contribute to identity, and so,

the problem of identity is to be investigated in terms of the

values that are supposed to compose the definition from the

identity of the object in question.29 Intrinsic value is proposed

as that which most essentially defines a building. Attempting to

describe how building identity is derived from a valuation

schema, ethicist Dale Jamieson proposes four definitions of

intrinsic value. First, it is an a priori declaration that it is

often self-evident.30 Such declarations of intrinsic value are

not the same as saying that the valuing source is intrinsic for

the valuing source is distinct from the object of value. In other

words, the source of intrinsic value is not in the building

itself, rather the building represents that objective value

29 The object under discussion here will always be some kind of building even when described variously as ‘site’ or some similar designation; it is a structure that remains extant to some degree.30 Jamieson 68ff.

45

source. Secondly, intrinsic value is identified as a value that

comes from the object. The object itself declares its intrinsic

value without relying on this value being established

independently of the object or the valuer. Thirdly, the

declaration of intrinsic value is a threshold for moral

consideration. Finally, intrinsic value is determined by what it

represents; that is, the object represents a universal value over

and above the object itself and this representation of is of a

shared value. In any of Jamieson’s definitions, the building’s

intrinsic value is the source of its identity.

This final definition bridges the idea of value and

representation as the adjective, ‘intrinsic’ that modifies

‘value’ is a label. And because it is the case that labels say as

much about those who would employ them and to what they are

intended to describe it will be helpful to investigate first how

a label functions. First, the intrinsic label presumes that

values are of different kinds and that they can be identified,

sorted and organized according to properties. The diverse

properties of value are brought together under the ‘intrinsic’

label. Here, a certain kind of order is emphasized in this

46

worldview, so that, the value obtains a qualitative distinction.

Valuing in this way presumes an ordering schema that represents a

specific worldview. It is how value is ordered that is one of the

identifying features to this or any worldview. Intrinsic value is

just one of the orders of value in this kind of worldview.

Narrative Identity

Identity is both a narrative description and a practical

category that answers the question, ‘What is that?”31 In the

practical category, the question is asked of a building; and so

the question, ‘Who did this?’ regards architects in general, and

those architects of particular buildings. Questions of personal

identity seek a proper name. This study will investigate the

relationship of the ‘who’ to the ‘what’ presuming that buildings

can and do have an identity. And when the point in this inquiry

is reached that answers the ‘who’ of biographical identity, it

will be to the building that the important questions will be

asked. Identity presumes some degree of constancy and so to speak

of a building is to tell the story of its constancy, its presence

31 Ricoeur, 1988, 246.

47

in human experience, and speaking of it in this way gives it a

narrative identity. Self-constancy in narrative constitutes

individual and communal identity, but a building is itself not a

narrative though it possesses elements that make it analogous to

a narrative, in that it has and gives identity. Neither is a

building a text, though it is the subject of narrative and text,

and texts may appear on a building. Buildings are analogous to

texts in the sense that both are complete objects in which the

relationship between building and individual, like text and

reader, is not literally a dialogue, but both are ‘read.’ Ricoeur

proposes substituting “identity understood in the sense of being

the same (idem)” with an “identity understood in the sense of

oneself as self-same [soi-meme] (ipse). The difference between idem

and ipse is nothing more than the difference between a substantial

or formal identity and a narrative identity” (Ricoeur, 1988,

246). For Ricoeur, narrative identity can be applied to a

building as a form of narrative, because, first, the identity of

the building is formulated in a narrative, and second, the

building has existed historically as an event and socially as

part of the lives of people.

48

Identity is a narrative description and understanding how

the narrative describes the building is one of interpretation. As

an object, a building cannot self define, but is the subject of

the languages which I would take in its most broad sense to

include all the modes of expression that humans use to define

ourselves.32 The narrative is a mode of expression and one of the

most constant aspects of identity is the architecture that

expresses and defines the individual and their community.

Narrative identity is a reciprocal relationship between the

cultural object and the individual in their community. “We become

full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves and hence

of defining our identity, through our acquisition of rich human

languages of expression” (Taylor 33). The narrative becomes the

history that identifies and so also, it becomes subject to

interpretation. The building is an expression that identifies and

despite the changes that might occur to the edifice, it remains a

constant element of expression that defines the individual and

community. Dramatic examples of this kind include monumental

32 Taylor 33

49

structures like Beijing’s Forbidden City, Solomon’s Temple in

Jerusalem and Pericles’ Acropolis in Athens.

Now that the preliminary investigation into the varieties of

building definition, there is some value in reminding us of

Goodman’s definition: a “building is a work of art only insofar

as it signifies, means, refers, symbolizes in some way” (R 33);

and, in regards to worldmaking and identity, he says that,

“identity or constancy in a world is identity with respect to

what is with that world as organized” (WW 8). On this view, the

architectural structure qua building is an event that has a

material beginning, it continues as a presence in human

consciousness, and so can be interpreted similarly to an art work

and as a historical event, that is, an object of cognition with

multiple interpretive layers. This history will enable us to

apply Goodman’s theory of representation to the symbol systems

operative in a particular building. “Identification rests upon

organization into entities and kinds” (WW 8). The identity of a

building is, for Goodman, the history of its construction, but

this history includes more than the merely construction

50

activities. But Goodman’s definition of identity includes those

elements that comprise the historical conditions of the

construction of a building, but how are those historical

conditions defined. In this way, identity is determined by and

dependent upon recognition, that is, a cognitive acceptance,

affirmation, agreement or acknowledgment of the elements that

compose the building. On the other hand, identity is ahistorical,

because at different times what constitutes identity has been

defined differently. Buildings, like archaeological sites, are

subject to interpretation, which are attempts to establish

identity. We value what we are, or it is the case that, what we

value establishes our identity. It is in this way that valuing is

a relationship not a conclusion.

Goodman’s world-making symbol systems are founded upon an

understanding of metaphor. Ricoeur echoes Goodman’s meta-theory

when he states that, “metaphor is a transference that affects the

possession of predicates by some specific thing, rather than the

application of these predicates to something” (Ricoeur 1979,

234). Ricoeur agrees that Goodman’s worldmaking stating that the,

51

“enigma of metaphorical discourse is that it invents: what it

creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents” (Ricoeur

1979, 239). Metaphors help constitute aspects of reality, in

other words, a world is necessarily a world under a certain

description, it is a world that is seen from a certain

perspective. Metaphors are a combination of two operations, the

first inverts reference while the second inverts transference.33

For Ricoeur Goodman’s theories of worldmaking work in two ways:

first, language and symbolism remake reality; and, second,

metaphors create perspectives that possess the power of

reorganizing our perception of things. Ricoeur observes that

Goodman takes metaphor, which is part of language, and applies it

to his definition of symbol system.34 It is this broad

application of metaphor that Ricoeur thinks Goodman and Aristotle

agree, metaphor is not one figure of discourse among others, “but

the transference principle common to all of them” (Ricoeur RM

237). In a similar way, Wheelwright says metaphors endowed with

integrative properties are symbols and so he posits that there

are different levels of metaphor according to their degree of 33 Ricoeur 234.34 Ricoeur 238.

52

stability, comprehensiveness, and appeal, etc. Similarly, Black

says metaphor creates the resemblance, rather than finding and

expressing it.35

Ricoeur’s critique of Goodman is generally favorable with

many areas of agreement. There are though several applications of

his premises that Ricoeur finds areas that require further

investigation. First, Ricoeur thinks Goodman definitions of

reference are too general and that his privileging linguistic

analysis slights the broader historical context. Second, on the

one hand his narrow historicism is faulted. On the other hand,

there is insufficient support for how it is that each symbol

system in each worldview is similarly organized within human

cognition. Third, the justification that his categorical system

rightly “shows the condition for the possibility of

meaningfulness in our use of system structures” (Ricoeur 177).

Fourth, Goodman’s concept of understanding as a kind mode of

reference of our world versions. Finally, Goodman metaphorically

applying expressions usually used in the activities of production

35 Ricoeur 237 Note 41and 352.

53

to the realm of knowledge categories. Ricoeur asks what the

relationship of knowing is to making that Goodman combines in a

similar category world-making, work of art, production of meaning?

Architecture is a worldmaking activity that creates a way of

looking, a way of seeing and being seen.

54

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