Identifying and Conceptualizing Transnational State Responsibility for Past Historical Injustices

I. Introduction

Since the end of World War II, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, an unprecedented phenomenon has

arisen in international politics to redress past historical injustices which took place between previously

hostile countries. The key concept of transnational state responsibility for past historical injustices

(TSRPHI) is that any country should take proper responsibility for its past historical injustices towards

citizens in other states, including during the modern colonial period, the two World Wars and the Cold

Transnational state responsibility for past historical injustices (TSRPHI) is an emerging field in international

human rights. For a systematic and scientific examination of TSRPHI, this paper attempts to create a dataset with the

level of TSRPHI. To identify its population, I develop what conceptually constitutes TSRPHI by providing an

operational definition and a detailed description of the process applied to obtain historical information within the

dataset. In the second part, the level of TSRPHI is conceptualized with the level of transnational reparations in a

target country. Ultimately, the level of TSRPHI is operationalized with historical cases of responsibility-taking in

which the refusal or issuance of an apology, or payment of financial compensation by a perpetrator state is explicitly

directed towards the government or victim groups of another state. In the final section, this article then presents an

empirical description of some basic patterns that are to be found in the dataset.

Key words: Transnational state responsibility, past historical injustices, reparations claims, state apology,international human rights

Identifying and Conceptualizing Transnational StateResponsibility for Past Historical Injustices

Lee, Jin MyoungHankook University of Foreign Studies

* Received October 5, 2012, Reviewed October 9, 2012, Accepted December 30, 2012

32 Korean Political Science Review Vol. 46 No. 6

War. The concept of TSRPHI is extended beyond the traditional one of sovereignty. That is, the current

international human rights regimes are largely confined to the positivistic state-centered approach1) of

international law, which is applied to the relationship between states and persons within territories,

ignoring the relationship between one state and citizens of other states (Gibney and Roxstrom 2001,

917).

According to the conventional view, one state does not have to take transnational responsibility for its

past wrongdoings over citizens in other states since individual victims of other states are not allowed to

be a subject of rights to claim the state take proper transnational responsibility. In practice, however, the

concept of TSRPHI is an emerging field in international human rights. Even though it could be

internationally recognized in both the principle of universal international human rights and international

customary laws, it is an evolving field, and one not yet fully entrenched in international laws (Howard-

Hassmann 2004, 825).

In the arena of international conflict, the concept of TSRPHI represents the resolution of historical

disputes by “providing a mechanism for negotiating rivalries and recognizing identities rather than

ignore them”(Barkan 2000, 321). Ultimately, it mainly pursues to break the cycle of revenge and hatred

between former enemies by encouraging reconciliation between them. Reconciliation is defined as

bringing again into friendly relations. Reconciliation between previously hostile countries may be

affected more by other factors than simply acknowledging the truth about past wrongs (Hayner 2001, 6).

However, there are several important measures for true reconciliation such as “a clear end to the threat of

further violence, official recognition of past wrongs, reparations program for those injured, and

addressing structural inequalities and basic material needs”(Hayner 2001, 163-5). Accordingly, in

successful cases, this new form of negotiation between previously hostile countries leads perpetrators to

admit responsibility for historical injustices, thereby opening a potential road for cooperative relations.

Given ethical consideration about power politics, it is totally unprecedented that both perpetrators and

their victims can produce “a communicative history, which is re-written and shared by both”(Torpey

2003, 6).

As illustrated above, despite the theoretical significance of TSRPHI, we have no empirical foundation

in this field that could lead to scientific inquiry. For example, one of the critical research questions in this

field is “why do some countries willingly take responsibility for their past injustices, whereas others do

not?”While there is an appreciable number of studies that attempt to answer this question, there is no

such study supported by hard evidence. It is true that transnational reparations as a particular form of

TSRPHI within international politics are theory rich, yet the arguments are largely constructed upon

speculation rather than hard evidence.

1) Its main assumption is that the state is legitimate and defensible, but individuals and private groups are not.

Identifying and Conceptualizing Transnational State Responsibility for Past Historical Injustices 33

The more serious problem with existing literature may be a methodological one. What has been

missing in existing research is systematic analysis, calling into question the applicability of the results.

Accordingly, some important questions within the TSRPHI puzzle lie dormant due to the lack of

available data. Previous studies have been heavily reliant on case studies about World War II actions,

colonial atrocities, and indigenous movements (Torpey 2003; Gibney and Roxstrom 2001; Barkan 2000;

Brooks 1999). There are a few comparative studies (Howard-Hassmann 2004; Laremont 2001; Negash

2002), but no quantitative analysis. Accordingly, empirically-based knowledge on this issue is far from

complete. Hence these studies are useful in describing TSRPHI, but do not suggest empirically tested

theories applicable over time and region. This is understandable, of course, since the TSRPHI issue is an

emerging one in the field of international human rights.

Consequently, to provide a systematic and scientific examination of TSRPHI, this paper attempts to

create one original data set, with one variable, of most TSRPHI cases from 1945 to 2000. I attempt to

identify a substantial number of TSRPHI cases, which manifest as 22 dyads of TSRPHI. For this

research, I first develop what conceptually constitutes TSRPHI by providing an operational definition

and a detailed description of the process applied to obtain historical information within the data set. A

well-defined population of cases would be the most reasonable place to start to ensure generalization on

the concept of TSRPHI. Second, I attempt to conceptualize the level of TSRPHI with the level of

transnational reparations in a perpetrator country. Ultimately, knowledge about the refusal, acceptance,

and evolution of transnational reparations could be interpreted as some of the conditions that make

transnational state responsibility more likely. I assign the value of the transnational reparations level in a

target (perpetrator) country, using four categories consisting of refusal, partial apology, full apology, and

apology with financial compensation, to each year under analysis in the 22 dyads of TSRPHI cases.

Finally, I present an empirical description of some basic patterns that are to be found in the data set.

II. Identifying Transnational State Responsibility for

Past Historical Injustices

Case selection criteria here begin with defining the concept of past historical injustice, based upon a

synthesis of the studies referred to above. What historical events are identified with historical injustices?

Second, if the concept of historical injustice is clearly defined, it is not so difficult to identify

transnational state responsibility cases with those for which reparations claims are being politicized by

victim groups (or countries). My special focus is placed on transnational state responsibility─an issue

that emerges between previously hostile countries─to ensure consistency in the level of analysis.


Furthermore, I am specifically interested in state responsibilities arising from human injustices, as shown

in case selection criteria put forward by Roy Brooks (1999). Finally, I take into account technical issues

such as defining the proper addressee and target of responsibility claims and data accessibility.

One distinction in defining the concept of human injustices seems to lie in the fact that the term has

been conceptualized in order to capture recent political and social phenomena to redress past atrocities

for which there was no defining term, particularly before 1945. Accordingly, the concept of historical

injustice differs according to how and in what respect one views these recent political and social

phenomena. Obviously, the main point is to distinguish clear attributes and characteristics of historical

injustices, compared to overall historical inhumanities or historical incidents.

1. Conceptual Criteria of Transnational State Responsibility for PastHistorical Injustices

First, among numerous historical inhumanities, historical injustices are identified as those that have

ended while their consequences continue to impact on the survivors. Therefore, on-going political

conflicts between countries are not included in historical injustices. Thus, I am dealing with historical

incidents that occurred in the past and have at this point ended. These two characteristics easily

distinguish this concept from historical inhumanities or historical events overall. In particular, it is

assumed that the continuation of victims’suffering as the consequence of perpetrators’wrong doings is

a crucial motivation that moved perpetrators or their descendants to recognize their commission of gross

atrocities, taking proper responsibility for them. With regards the perpetrators, Barkan contends that “the

public tends to suspend a belief in cultural pluralism and ethical relativism and to view the past as a

foreign, disdained culture on the basis of local, provisional, and superior moral presentism. The public

may willingly embrace certain cultural legacies, but choose only the very appetizing dishes. However,

there are no instances in which suffering will not animate sympathy or in which destruction will not be

denounced”(2000, xxxi).

Yet, the serious problem is an empirical one; sufferings vary in severity, and obtaining an empirical

reference for the continuation of victims’sufferings as the consequence of perpetrators’wrong doings is

not straightforward. The severity of historical atrocities can be mild or extreme. We could, of course,

visualize or quantify sufferings using the numbers of victims. Yet, the number of victims may not be a

convincing criterion to discriminate one case of historical injustice from another. Furthermore, it might

be impossible to compare different types of suffering─from forced labor to war to mass-killings or

sexual slavery─so as to discriminate one case from another.

Another empirical problem is how to obtain an observable measurement of the continuation of


victims’sufferings as the consequence of perpetrators’wrong doings? Obviously, determining whether

or not there is a clear continuation of the victims’sufferings as the consequence of perpetrators’wrong

doings requires a huge labor-intensive investigation of historical sources which would be a mission

impossible.

A more serious problem would be the controversial views on victims’sufferings in certain cases. A

good example is Howard-Hassmann’s research (1978) on the consequence of Western colonialism on

the development of African countries. Ultimately, she found that the development of Ghana resulted

from the interest of British capital such as the establishment of infrastructure and the expansion of cash-

crop production, calling into question the political vindication of African reparations claims. As a result,

defining the concept of historical injustice alone cannot be the exclusive and exhaustive criterion for case

selection.

The second criterion for case selection is the existence of political and social demands made by

victims to redress the historical atrocities. I employ this criterion as the empirical reference for the

continuation of victims’sufferings as the consequence of perpetrators’wrong doings. Even though

there are numerous historical injustices, the victims of which continue to suffer the consequence of the

original injustice, unless victims, by mobilizing political and moral leverage to lay blame at the

perpetrators’door, aim to have perpetrator countries take proper responsibility for those injustices,

perpetrators rarely do take responsibility, are thereby are not considered as TSRPHI cases. This criterion

matches that of reparations claims cases outlined by John Torpey (2001), who classifies reparations

claims cases emerging since 1945 into three sources and two types. Obviously, his underlying criterion

for case selection is the presence of reparations claims. Without the observable reparations claims for

historical injustices, those cases are not identified with reparations claims.

The third criterion centers on my special focus of transnational responsibility, that is, responsibility

claims directed to another state, precisely another government. Transnational redress refers to

compensation given to victims in one state from the government of another state deemed to share

responsibility for the human rights violations committed by its citizens, or by those acting under

government order or under the cover of state acceptance. Gibney and Roxstrom (2001) and Negash

(2002) focus on transnational state responsibility. To address the transnational responsibility issue,

Gibney and Roxstrom focus on Guatemalan reparations claims to the U.S. for its military involvement in

the Guatemalan Civil War, while Negash analyzes several cases: Jewish reparations claims to Germany

for the Holocaust, South Korean to Japan for military sexual slavery perpetrated by Japan, U.S. remorse

for Rwandan genocide, and U.S. apologies to China for the U.S. bombing of a Chinese embassy. One of

the reasons why their main arguments are compelling is that their studies were conducted with consistent

levels of analysis, focusing on transnational state responsibility. It is as if interstate conflicts are not


comparable to civil wars due to the difference in their levels of analysis.2)

The fourth criterion is the focus on transnational state responsibility arising from human injustices

suggested by Brooks (1999). Brooks considers human injustices to be all kinds of violation and

oppression of human rights or fundamental freedoms recognized in important international human rights

instruments. My attention is on “gross and systematic violations of human rights such as violations of

the right to life, slavery, torture, genocide, and disappearances”(Baehr 2001, 20-31). According to

Torpey (2003), these gross and systematic violations of human rights would be state-sponsored mass

killing, torture, and sexual exploitation.

One controversial facet of human injustices is war crimes. In principle, I exclude war crimes codified

in the Geneva Convention because those war crimes are assumed to be resolved in international treaties.3)

Yet, the exclusion of war crimes recognized in the Geneva Convention is not a clear-cut criterion. While

most war crimes are not included in my data set, several are, such as Singaporean reparations claims to

Japan for the Soock-Ching Massacre in 1942, Chinese to Japan for the Nanking Massacre (1937-38),

Dutch to Japan for military sexual slavery, and Vietnamese to the U.S. for use of Agent Orange. Among

these four cases, the Nanking Massacre is one reparations claim case well covered in existing literature.

What is the defining difference between the Nanking Massacre which is categorized as a reparations

claim case and other cases which are not categorized as such in existing literature? There is no clear

answer to this question in existing literature. While Brooks acknowledges that “to the extent that any of

the acts specified in the detailed definition above are committed during times of war, they would be

subject to civil redress, provided that the chosen courts accept jurisdiction over the claim”(Brooks 1999,

7), this exception may not convince in that Brooks also includes the 1968 Mai Lai Massacre in Vietnam

and Indian oppression of the Kashmir people (1992 to present) as cases of reparations claims arising

from human injustices, even though they might be categorized as war crimes in conventional wisdom,

but are not treated as war crimes in practice.

Another crucial criterion is the existence of reparations claims. Thus, if political demands are observed

in TSRPHI cases, war crimes are taken into consideration in my case selection. According to the Geneva

Convention, colonial wars are not treated as wars. Therefore, I include three reparations claims arising

2) Accordingly, reparations claims against churches and private firms are excluded from my research. For example, reparationsclaims arising from the exploitation of forced and slave labor by German companies during the Nazi period and Japanesecompanies during World War II are not included because those reparations claims are largely directed at German andJapanese companies. In addition, reparations claims relevant to the aftermath of transition to democracy in Latin America,Eastern Europe, and South Africa in recent years are not included in my case selection because the level of analysis of thosecases are societal as part of domestic politics in a country. Finally, reparations claims raised against international monetaryagencies as the cause of Third World poverty and environmental destruction are not included in my case selection becausethose international organizations are not states.

3) Such problems are solved in the international treaties which define the crimes, and leave resolution up to states that haveratified them.


from colonial war: Algerian war of independence against France, Indonesian war of independence

against Netherlands, and Boer resistance against the U.K. All three cases are named war, but in reality

are not defined and treated as interstate war because they are cases of colonial war. Even though the

addressee countries have demanded perpetrators take proper responsibility for their crimes against

humanity during those (colonial) wars, target countries have refused to acknowledge that those wars

were conflicts between two states, regarding them instead as internal problems. Based on this criterion, I

have excluded some cases involving Nazi collaboration because Nazi collaborators are not direct parties

of historical atrocities. An example is French responsibility for the deportation of 76,000 Jews of French

nationality to concentration camps during the Nazi period. In 1992, Jacques Chirac apologized for

France’s responsibility for the deportation.4)

Fifth, when there is considerable difficulty in determining who might be the proper addressee and who

the target of responsibility claims, I exclude those cases. For instance, African reparations claims to

Western countries are still struggling with the problem of determining the proper beneficiaries and

targets of those claims. This problem is closely related to the question of what past historical injustices

should be redressed: the ravages to the continent caused by slavery or the damage caused by European

colonialism?5) Data inaccessibility has been taken into account in my case selection. A good example of

data inaccessibility relates to the 1998 Russian apology for the Katyn Massacre (1935-45) to Poland. In

March 1940, Soviet authorities murdered about 22,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forest. In 1998, the

Russian government acknowledged Soviet responsibility for the massacre. Yet a great deal of data,

particularly from the Cold War period, is inaccessible. In addition, Israeli reparations claims to East

Germany for the Holocaust are not included in my data set due to data inaccessibility. After long

refusing to accept responsibility for Nazi crimes, in 1990 the East German parliament announced both an

apology and reparations for the Holocaust. Yet again, a great deal of data, particularly from the Cold War

period, is inaccessible in this case, thereby excluding it from my case selection.

In sum, based on the combination of all these criteria, I identified 22 dyads of TSRPHI cases, as

shown in Table 1. The first column of the table reveals responsibility claims emerging from three

sources: World War II and its aftermath, colonialism and its aftermath,6) and the Cold War and its

4) Paul Taylor, “France Finally Admits Role in Aiding Nazi Death Machine.”Chicago Sun-Times, July 17, 1995 at 20<http://www.suntimes.com> (access date: May 24, 2011).

5) If African reparations claims are aimed at slavery, “the role of North Africans, Middle Easterner, and Sub Saharan Africansthemselves in the slave trade threatened to muddy the historical waters”(Torpey 2001, 353). If African reparations are soughtfor the damage caused by European colonialism, the presence of the damage itself has been a controversial issue, as shown inHoward-Hassmann (1978). Should the indigenes of both North and South America, Australia, and New Zealand beembraced? It is quite intractable to determine the legitimate beneficiaries of reparations. In sum, African reparations claims toWestern countries for slavery and ravages to the African continent are not included in my data set due to the significantproblem in determining the proper beneficiaries and the proper targets of reparations claims.

6) Some scholars contend that many affluent past colonial powers possess extensive duties of rectificatory justice to some of the


aftermath. The first two are the same as those covered in existing literature.7) I propose the third, a new

source of transnational state responsibility claims: the Cold War and its aftermath. This source contains

three cases of transnational state responsibility claims, all of which have the common denominator of

having been atrocities that took place during ideological confrontation. TSRPHI cases themselves are

listed in the second column.

<Table 1> Dyads of TSRPHI

Each TSRPHI case specified has both a proper target and proper addressee country in terms of

reparations claims. For identification purposes I employ the list of states in the international system

maintained by the Correlates of War Project.8) The target country of responsibility claims is that which

committed past historical injustices. The addressee country is that which attempts to demand proper

responsibility be taken for past historical injustices it has suffered. In some cases, there are multiple

world’s poorest peoples because it is nowadays commonplace to maintain that the domination they suffered at the hands ofthe colonizing power was unjust (Butt 2012, 228).

7) One controversial case identified in Table 1 is Armenian Genocide, which is not represented in all three possible sources.Tentatively, I categorize this case under colonialism and its aftermath.

8) Correlates of War Project. 2005. “State System Membership List, v2004.1.”Online at <http://correlatesofwar.org> (accessdate: December 31, 2011).


dyads of target and addressee. The Armenian genocide, for example, has two dyads. First, Armenian

people were under the Soviet Union until 1989. Thus, in this case, the addressee country is the Soviet

Union. Following Armenian independence in 1990, the addressee country is coded as Armenia. The

Holocaust case involves two dyads: Israel─Germany and Israel─Austria. The Military Sexual Slavery

by Japan case involves seven dyads: Japan with the Philippines, China, South and North Korea, Taiwan,

Indonesia, and the Netherlands. Among the 22 dyads that emerge from the identification process

predicated on the criteria of TSRPHI, some are already exposed in existing literature. I do not comment

on these cases in detail. Many other cases were newly identified in this paper.

2. Defining the Start and End Dates of Cases

When does a TSRPHI case between the two previously hostile states begin and end? Taking one-year

data slices over the particular period in question, between 1945 and 2000, the coding criteria for the start

and end date of the TSRPHI cases, provides us with the number of observations, as shown in the last two

columns of Table 1. However, identifying start and end dates is quite challenging because it has not been

attempted in previous studies. Furthermore, it requires a labor-intensive investigation of historical

resources and a great deal of interpretation that might render replication difficult. Yet, even though there

are definite limits on how well the question can be answered at this point, I try to propose certain

reasonable coding criteria for the start and end date in the belief that payoff for the analysis will be

substantial.

Coding rules for the start and end date are as follows: first, the TSRPHI case begins in the first year

that individuals, groups, or organizations without the authority, or official representatives in an addressee

country make observable investigation regarding historical injustices committed by a target country.

Once responsibility claims are made in an addressee country, the case is considered ongoing unless there

is a clear-cut record of terminating it. In some cases, those claims are delivered by the government of an

addressee country; in most cases, they are made by the civil society of an addressee country. In sum, the

start date is determined by when an addressee country begins fact-finding for details of past historical

injustices.9)

Second, even though there is no observable data for responsibility claims in an addressee country, if a

target country voluntarily makes reparations─such as an apology or financial compensation─or

provides convincing evidence of its own wrongdoings, the start date is assumed to be10) years before the

9) Responsibility claims are direct voices of victims and their families. At the initial stage, even though the truth of historicalinjustices is quite obscure to the majority of people in an addressee or a target country owing to the passage of time, thebottom line is that those injustices must be truthful at least to victims, their families and some witnesses. Accordingly, thedirect voices of living victims are the starting point.

10) While Holocaust denial is legally banned in Germany, it became an issue of free speech.


date of payment of the reparations, or the voluntary disclosure of the convincing evidence. This is

because I assume explanatory events such as reparations claims or at least circumstantial predictors

which could lead a target country to take voluntary action on its own past wrongs must occur first. For

instance, in 1995, the Dutch government voluntarily released a UN document that indicated that Dutch

troops committed war crimes in the Indonesian Independence War, 1945 to 1949. These new findings

led to the emergence of a responsibility claims issue in Indonesia and the Netherlands (Houben 1997,

58-63). Accordingly (and as shown in Table 1), the start date for Indonesian reparations claims to the

Netherlands for the so called Police Action is coded as 1985, 10 years before the issuance of the

convincing evidence of 1995.

Finally, the termination of responsibility claims is taken as when both a target and an addressee

country reach a formal agreement with significant follow-up implementations. In the case that both a

target and an addressee country reach a formal agreement (including an apology resolution by

legislators) on some part of the responsibility claims, and unless during the 10 years following the formal

agreement the target country accepts another, higher level of transnational responsibility than that

addressed in the formal agreement, the case of TSRPHI is assumed to have terminated 10 years after the

formal agreement. Note that as the sample period concludes with the year 2000, this is taken as the so-

called “end date”for those cases that continued beyond that date. With these criteria, most cases are

considered not terminated and are ongoing, the two exceptions being Jewish reparations claims to

Germany in 1979 and Singaporean reparations claims to Japan in 1976, as shown in Table 1. [J2]In the

case of Singaporean reparations claim to Japan, in 1966, Japan and Singapore reached an agreement that

Japan would pay $50 million to Singapore. Japan, however, has not issued an official apology.

Therefore, 10 years after 1966, this case is coded as terminated in 1976.

In reality, determining the end date is not so straightforward. If the two states in question reach an

explicit agreement on the issue of TSRPHI and finalize all the implementations of the agreement, the

end date is easily determined. Yet, there may be a long implementation process for the agreement,

without a specified end date. In the process of implementation, there may be some additional requests,

which lead to other agreements. Responsibility claims may also disappear into the background for

substantial periods of time, which sometimes signals the ultimate end. Yet, at other times an issue of

responsibility claims may appear to cool off, along with considerable agreement between the two

countries in question, and then reemerge after a long period of dormancy. Such unpredictable or

unquantifiable situations are very similar to those faced when trying to determine the ending of enduring

rivalries, which is determined by the absence of militarized conflict or a recognizable official settlement

or agreement between rivalries. Yet, with cases of TSRPHI determining a consistent end date of interest

is even more difficult than determining that of an enduring rivalry. As well as official representatives of


the two states in question, the former requires having to take into account another set of actors, victim

groups in the addressee country.

For example, the West German and Israeli governments reached a formal agreement in 1952 for the

Holocaust. The Jewish reparations claims case was coded as terminated in 1979 since the Israeli

government, the Claims Conference, and the Federal Government agreed to finalize the last payment to

the Jews. Yet, since 1979, there had been a long process of internalizing legal, political, and moral

responsibility for the Holocaust in Germany. For instance, in 1985 the Bundestag started to adopt the

automatic prosecution of people who deny the Nazi Holocaust. Finally, in 1994, the Bundestag

unanimously approved a measure that would make it a crime to deny the Holocaust. By this law,

publicly denying, endorsing, or playing down the Holocaust faces a maximum penalty of five years in

jail and no less than the imposition of a fine10 (Deutsche Welle, December 23, 2005). In 1998,

Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder invited Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to make the first state visit to

Berlin by an Israeli Prime Minister, as a gesture of reconciliation. In 1999, the German parliament

approved the building of the National Holocaust Memorial, which cost $35.7 million, and first opened to

the public in 2005. This institutional reform can be considered a highly critical measure, but it is beyond

the scope of my research. Therefore, the end date for Jewish reparations claims for the Holocaust is

coded as 1979, as shown in Table 1.

One controversial case is Jewish reparations claims to Austria. In 1952, the Israeli government

announced that it would not demand from Austria state responsibility for the Holocaust. Thus, the claims

were presented in the name of Jewish organizations alone. In 1961, Jewish organizations and the

Austrian government reached an agreement over the issue. So, the case would be terminated in 1961.

Yet many victims raised another question over Austrian reparations. In particular, in the 1970s, the

World Organizations of Victims of Nazism and the World Organization of Austrian Emigrants actively

made additional claims against Austria. As a result, the Austrian parliament proposed additional

compensation in 1988, community rehabilitation in 1990, issued an apology in 1994, and established

another compensation fund in 1995 to Nazi Victims. Finally, in 1998, the Israeli government urged the

Austrian government to establish a committee, together with representatives of the Israeli government

and the Austrian Jewish community, and either return property to survivors or offer them compensation.

Accordingly, this case is not terminated in my data set.

Based on these criteria, I identify the start and end year under analysis in each dyad, as shown in the

fourth and fifth columns in Table 1. The number of observations in each dyad under investigation is the

total years from the start to the end year under analysis. For instance, South Korean reparations claims to

Japan were raised around 1988 even though the issue of military sexual slavery perpetrated by Japan

took place during the 1934-45 period. Hence, the start year of reparations claims under analysis is 1989.


The end date of the claims is coded as 2000 even though the claims are not yet terminated. Accordingly,

the number of observations in this dyad is 13, from 1988 to 2000. The total number of observations in

my data set is 382. The data in a given year under analysis were collected from 1945 to 2000 because it

is assumed that the concept of TSRPHI emerged after 1945 (i.e. during World War II).

In sum, the start and end dates in my data set depend on when the claims on TSRPHI start and end.

Based on three criteria for the start and end dates, my data set generates 382 observations. In the

following section, I discuss further how I measure TSRPHI.

III. Operationalization of Transnational State Responsibility for Past Historical Injustices

Obviously, the most challenging part in operationalization is the data collection process along with the

coding rules. It requires extensive, labor-intensive investigation and a great deal of interpretation of

historical sources, originating in books, journal articles and newspapers. In particular, historical sources

for the most obscure cases, newly identified in my paper, were obtained from using LexisNexis

Academic,11) which provides full-text articles and reports from major U.S. and World Publications, Major

World Publications (non-English), News Wire Services, and TV and Radio Broadcast Transcripts. The

LexisNexis Academic search engine covers as far back as 1975. Hence, historical sources before 1975

covers books and academic journals. In addition, I utilized the website of Political Apologies and

Reparations,12) provided by Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann, Canada Research Chair in International

Human Rights at the Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada.

I measure TSRPHI with transnational reparations, which refer to the compensation given to victims in

one state by the government of another state deemed to share transnational responsibility for past

historical injustices committed by the citizens of that state or by those acting under government order or

under cover of state acceptance. In reality, defining transnational reparations is not easy because it would

be different to reparations claims cases, depending on how satisfied an addressee country is and what the

reparations claims are. In principle, it requires various and comprehensive remedies in the form of an

appropriate combination of political, social and economic approaches. According to the U.N., remedies

for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law include the victim’s right of access to

justice, of reparation for harm suffered, and of access to the factual information concerning the

violations. In particular, the U.N. defines reparations in terms of a variety of the following forms of

11) <http://academic.lexisnexis.com> (access date: October 31, 2011).12) <http://political-apologies.wlu.ca/> (access date: September 31, 2012).


redress: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition (Bassiouni

2000, 8-12). Satisfaction includes apology and judicial or administrative sanctions against persons

responsible for the violations. Likewise, Priscilla Hayner suggests a variety of types of redress, such as

“restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition”(Hayner 2001,

171). Reparations is the general term for these various types of redress. “Restitution aims to reestablish

to the extent possible the situation that existed before the violation took place; compensation relates to

any economically assessable damage resulting from the violations; rehabilitation includes legal, medical,

psychological and other care; while satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition relate to measures to

acknowledge the violations and prevent their recurrence in the future”(Hayner 2001, 171). Hayner

argues that a mix of these types of redress is appropriate. Brooks (2003, 107-8) notes that there are

myriad forms of redress, mostly emphasizing reparations as atonement for the commission of an

injustice, and settlements, which do not require atonement.

To catch testable implications for transnational reparations, I focus on both apology and financial

compensation among the various and comprehensive remedies. The level of transnational reparations in

a target country can vary significantly in magnitude, reflecting differences between each type and level

of action. To assist in understanding this, I propose three subcategories, partial apology, full apology, and

apology with financial compensation, as shown in Table 2. In any given year under analysis, I assign

every reparation claim made by an addressee country one of the following scores depending on the

highest level of reparations in a target country that takes place. No responsibility is coded as 0 if a target

government refuses issuing an official apology or paying agreed compensation to victim groups. Partial

apology is coded as 1 if high officials, the president or prime minister in a target country issue an official

apology. Full apology is coded as 2 if a target country passes the apology resolution in legislature.

Apology with financial compensation, which is assumed to be the highest of the categories, is coded as 3

if a target government pays compensation to an addressee country in an agreement. These four

categories of transnational reparations were created taking several considerations in hand in defining the

concepts of both apology and financial compensation. As a general rule, the categories and the coding

are based on the idea that each category should represent logically exhaustive and mutually exclusive

target state behavior in a given year under analysis.

First, the categories and the coding rules in Table 2 capture the conceptual definition and its inherent

problem of defining apologies and financial compensation. Conceptually, apologies and financial

compensation are defined inseparably. According to Barkan (2000), reparations are financial atonement

for the commission of an injustice. Hence, reparations require accompanying statements of apology

because “reparations refers to some form of material recompense for that which cannot be returned, such

as human life, a flourishing culture and economy, and identity”(Barkan 2000, xix). Apology refers to


official acceptance of the commission of an injustice and recognition of its effects. According to Mark

Gibney and Erik Roxstrom (2001), one of the important attributes of an apology is financial

compensation. Without appropriate financial compensation as amendment, apology is not sufficient. As

the result of this inseparable conceptual definition of apologies and financial compensation, I assume

that the category of Apology with financial compensation, which could be used interchangeably with

financial compensation with an apology, is the highest of the transnational reparations levels, as shown

in the Table 2.

Second, a serious empirical problem arises in defining inseparably the concepts of apology and

financial compensation because in reality there are many cases which do not fit this conceptual

definition, calling into question the validity of their conceptual formation like conceptual stretching. That

is, in some reparations claims cases, a target country may issue an apology to victim groups without

accompanying financial compensation, or it may pay compensation without an accompanying statement

of apology in a given year under analysis. Accordingly, there is strong reason to capture these two types

of empirical cases in the transnational responsibility level in a given year under analysis. Therefore, I

have created two categories, partial and full apology, to capture these two types of empirical cases as

lower levels of transnational responsibility in a target country in a given year under analysis, as shown in

Table 2. Yet, to understand the exact reason for categorizing partial and full apology, I subsequently

discuss another dimension of defining the concepts of apology and financial compensation.

<Table 2> Coding Rules of the Level of TSRPHI in a Target Country


Finally, another empirical problem in defining the concept of an apology and financial compensation

is that an apology or compensation varies considerably in magnitude, reflecting the difference in its type.

For instance, there is a considerable distinction between an apology issued by high officials of state and

an apology resolution passed by the national parliament. Yet most researchers in this field do not

distinguish state apologies from those issued by high officials of state. Probably, conceptually the

apology resolution, which is approved in the legislature, carries the weight of two branches of the

government and thereby carries much wider legitimacy. The apology resolution would be a perfect

formal apology since it facilitates fulfilling proper responsibilities, including giving legal, moral, and

monetary compensation to the victims, and institutional reform.

Yet, apologies issued by high officials of state are in reality quite limited in their consequences. At

worst, these apologies do not carry any significant meaning other than the personal remorse of high

officials of state. As a result, we need to capture this considerable distinction between an apology made

by high officials and an apology resolution using different categories, namely partial and full apology.

In the same context, financial compensation varies considerably in magnitude, reflecting the difference

in its types. It may be paid in the form of both individual compensation for victim groups and

rehabilitation for the community because in reality most victims have already passed on. Such

compensations are defined as full ones, an attribute of full apology in Table 2. There are also cases in

which compensation is paid individually to a few surviving victims, without community rehabilitation,

or as simply community rehabilitation to an addressee country without individual compensation.

A related question at this juncture is “do we need to distinguish individual compensation from

community rehabilitation?”Yes. Given the inherent nature of the transnational state responsibility cases

arising from human injustices being studied here, survivors are few since most victims died in battles,

concentration camps, or over the passage of time. As a result, for a target country, in reality, individual

compensation for a few victims appears to be simply basic duty, and not such a big burden financially.

For example, it is known that 80 to 90 percent of the estimated 200,000 sex slaves created by Japan died

or were murdered in battles from 1934 to 1945. Since the issue of military sexual slavery by Japan was

exposed to the public in 1990s, no more than 300 survivors have been officially identified in South

Korea. Here, the crucial purpose of South Korean reparations claims to Japan is not for individual

compensation for just 300 survivors, even though such individual compensation would be a minimum

claim. In fact, the South Korean parliament already approved a law for creation of a victim fund in 1995.

Obviously, the more important and comprehensive purpose of responsibility claims would be the

manifestation of community rehabilitation for the dead victims, and their bereaved and descendants,

including the survivors. Again, reparations are financial amendment for the commission of injustices

such as murder, torture, and identity, which cannot be restored. As a result, individual compensation is


captured here as an attribute of the category partial apology and community rehabilitation, which is

defined as full compensation, an attribute of the category full apology.

In sum, the categories in Table 2 represent the combination of the above considerations. Partial

apology which could be used interchangeably with partial compensation, has two attributes, either partial

apology or individual compensations. Full apology, which could be used interchangeably with full

compensation, also has two attributes, either full apology or community rehabilitation.

Followings are some examples of how these coding rules are applied to the real cases. Partial apology

is defined as an apology issued by high officials of a target state, which mainly depends on verbal

indications of accepting its past wrong doings. Since apologies are usually expressed in diplomatic

language,13) they are often difficult to interpret. In general, words like “apologies,”“sadness,”

“remorse,”or “regret”and “sorrow”may not be uniformly defined and could often be used

interchangeably. Yet, in this field, an apology is the explicit statement of apology, distinguished from

words like sadness, remorse, or regret.

For example, in 1999, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed sadness to all the victims of the

Anglo-Boer war. In the same year, Queen Elizabeth also expressed sadness over the loss of life and

suffering in the Boer War. Yet, those two verbal statements of sympathy to victims fell short of a display

of apology. So, Britain’s action over the periods under analysis is not coded as partial apology.

Likewise, in 1998, German President Roman Herzog expressed that he deeply deplored the manner in

which the German colonial forces had reacted during the 1904-1907 war in German Southwest Africa.

Yet, there is no clear statement of apology. Accordingly, his statement is not coded as apology.

A slightly more controversial case is 1997 Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto’s apology to

Dutch victims of Japan’s wartime aggression at a war memorial in The Hague. Japan is coded as partial

apology from 1997 to 2000 for the Netherlands reparations. Yet, a controversial issue in this case is that

Prime Minister Hashimoto referred to the Japanese apology for its wartime acts, made in August 1995.

Yet, since 1995 Japanese former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama’s apology to Asian victims made

no direct reference to the Netherlands, 1995 and 1996 are not coded as partial apology.

High officials of state may deliver apologies as well. In 1993, the Japanese government issued an

apology, acknowledging that the Japanese army forcibly held Korean women in sexual servitude for its

soldiers during World War II. The apology was issued in a statement read by Chief Cabinet Secretary

Yohei Kono. Accordingly, 1993 to 2000 is coded as partial apology.

In addition to verbal statements of apology made in public announcements, apologies are also

13) Political apologies have some characteristics as follows: they are highly mediatory events and quite controversial symbolicacts, which could result in further conflict if not seen as sincere. They must also accept responsibility which is otherwiseperceived as insincere (Harris, Grainger, and Mullany 2006). Here, the most important part of political apologies is takingresponsibility for past injustices (Thompson 2012).


delivered in written letters to the victims or by kneeling down at a public memorial. For instance, former

West German Chancellor Willy Brandt fell on his knees and bowed his head in silent tribute at a

memorial to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising in 1970. Falling on his knees seems an apology with

most dramatic and utmost sincerity. Gibney and Roxstrom pinpoint the essence of this apologetic action,

noting that “the most noteworthy, and certainly the most memorable, state apology was West German

Chancellor Willy Brandt’s unscripted genuflection at the Warsaw Ghetto”(Gibney and Roxstrom 2001,

928).

As I defined in brief, another attribute of partial apology is partial compensation to an addressee

country in the form of ether individual compensation or community rehabilitation. A good example is

the 1961 Austrian parliament decision to adopt a law to give $6.5 million compensation to victims of

Nazi persecution for reasons of religion or race. In 1961, Jewish organizations signed a declaration in

which they undertook not to present any additional claims against Austria. They announced that the

Jewish reparations claims were concluded. Yet, many victims raised a question regarding the Austrian

reparations. In particular, in the 1970s, the World Organizations of Victims of Nazism and the World

Organization of Austrian Emigrants were active in making additional claims against Austria. “The

World Organization of Austrian Emigrants contended that many mistakes were made in the matter of

compensation from Austria, and that claimants from Austria are the only group of victims of Nazism in

Europe who did not receive due compensation either for their suffering or for the vast property seized

from them”(Sagi 1980, 211). In 1988, the Austrian parliament approved compensation to Nazi victims.

The payments varied from $208 to $416, depending on whether the recipient was persecuted by the

Nazis, forced to leave the country, or served in the resistance movement. In 1990, reparations for

community rehabilitation were adopted. Accordingly, 1948 to 1989 is coded as partial apology.

Full apology is easily interpreted since it is a product of institutional processes of acceptance of

perpetrators’past wrong doings. A good example is the 1998 German apology resolution adopted in the

Bundestag for involvement in the Guernica bombing.

As stated previously, another attribute of full apology is full compensation, which is defined as

community rehabilitation. A well-known example is the 1952 Luxemburg Agreement signed by

Adenauer and Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett. It included two corollary protocols. Protocol 1 is

the legislative program on Individual Compensation and Protocol 2 is the global payment to the Claims

Conference. The West German government eventually agreed to pay 3 billion DM directly to the state of

Israel as collective reparations and another 450 million DM to the Claims Conference to be held in trust

for individual, stateless Jews. Accordingly, Germany is coded as full apology from 1952 to 1969, one

year before 1970 when German Chancellor Willy Brandt issued an apology for the Holocaust.

Another example of full apology is the 1990 Austrian government’s decision to pay about $25 million


over the ensuing five years in the form of community rehabilitation to Jewish victims of the Nazis. The

funds went to support retirement homes and other social welfare institutions in Israel, the U.S., Austria,

and other countries. Accordingly, Austria is coded as full apology from 1990 to 1993, one year before

1994 when Austrian president Thomas Klestil apologized for his country’s role in the Holocaust and

acknowledged Austria’s responsibility for the atrocities.

The other example of full apology is the 1966 Japanese reparations to Singapore for the Soock-Ching

Massacre. The compensation package included payment of $25 million in grants and a similar amount in

special loans. This compensation is quite controversial in that in fact, these two types of payment in

grants and special loans are kind of quasi-reparations. At first, the Japanese government denied

Singaporean requests for reparations, noticing that the 1951 San Francisco Treaty settled the issue of

reparation with Britain, the colonizing power of Singapore. Yet, the Singaporean government

successfully convinced Japan that the British colonial government hardly represented Singaporean

sentiments. As a result, 1966 to 1975 is coded as full apology.

A less controversial case is the 1999 U.S. reparations to Guatemala. In 1999, the U.S. acknowledged

that the U.S. government supported those responsible for human rights abuses committed by

Guatemalan armed forces in a 36-year civil war. The U.S. contributed $1.5 million for the work of the

Guatemalan truth commission and provided $25 million to support education and other human

development sectors.14) Accordingly, the year 1999 to 2000 is coded as full apology.

Apology with financial compensation is the highest of the categories. Again, proper compensation

requires an accompanying statement of apology. Likewise, without appropriate financial compensation

as amendment, apology on its own is insufficient. A state over the period under analysis is coded as

apology with financial compensation if it issues both an apology and pays compensation regardless of

the level of apology and financial compensation, full or partial.

A good example is the British apology and compensation for the Maori War. In 1995, the Queen

expressed her profound regret and apologies for the loss of lives arising from British invasion and at the

devastation of property and social life (Sharp 1997, 451). She admitted that Britain violated the terms of

the Waitangi Treaty in 1840 between Queen Victoria’s representative and tribal chiefs. In addition to the

issuance of apology, she also promised to make amends for these acknowledged injustices by paying

compensation. The Queen gave a royal asset to the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Bill, which

returned 38,000 acres of confiscated Maori land, including the land on which the University of Waikato,

the court and high courts stand, and paid ?26 million ($112 million) in compensation. Accordingly, 1995

to 2000 is coded as apology with financial compensation.

14) Gibney indicates that “these amounts are nothing close to the hundreds of millions of dollars spent by the United States inthe course of committing these now-acknowledged wrongs”(Gibney and Roxstrom 2001, 931).


Another example is Austrian President Keistil’s 1994 apology, which was issued after full

compensation in 1990, as stated previously. In addition to his apology for the Austrian role in the

Holocaust, he pledged to make money available for Jews forced to deport during the war. Hence, the

years 1994 to 2000 are coded as apology with financial compensation.

In 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt issued an apology for the Holocaust by falling on his

knees and bowing his head in silent tribute at a memorial to victims of the Warsaw Ghetto. This apology

was issued after the 1952 German reparations to the Jews for the Holocaust. In 1979, the Jewish

reparations claims case was terminated since the Israeli government, the Claims Conference, and the

Federal Government finally agreed to finalize the last payment to the Jews. Accordingly, 1970 to 1979 is

coded as apology with compensation.

Finally, a target country is coded as no responsibility when there is no observable and explicit

statement of apology or payment of compensation in a target country. For example, since 1923, the

Turkish government has refused to recognize the Armenian genocide, contending that the number of

Armenians killed in what it calls a civil war has?been greatly exaggerated. Accordingly, Turkey over the

years 1965 to 2000 under analysis is coded as no responsibility.

In sum, the level of transnational reparations is coded using a 4-point scale, ranging 0 to 3. No

responsibility is coded as 0 if a target country refuses to admit its past injustices and if there is no

observable and explicit statement of apology or payment of reparations in a target country even though a

target country acknowledges its past injustices. Partial apology is coded as 1 if high officials of a target

country issue an apology or if a target country pays compensation in the form of individual

compensation for victim groups. Full apology is coded as 2 if a target country passes the apology

resolution in legislature or if a target country pays full compensation in the form of community

rehabilitation to an addressee country. Apology with financial compensation is coded as 3 if a target

country pays compensation, partial or full, with an accompanying statement of apology, partial or full.

IV. Patterns of Transnational State Responsibility for

Past Historical Injustices

1. Descriptive Statistics

Explaining the procedures applied to construct the TSRPHI data set, I examine some of the empirical

patterns found in the data. More specifically, I present the descriptive statistics, frequency, and level of

TSRPHI over time with the average of nine target countries. Table 3 displays the observed number of


TSRPHI under each transnational reparations level, ranging from 0 to 3. It indicates that 237 of 382

observations in total (62.04%) fall under no responsibility. In contrast, 145 of 382 observations (37.96%)

results in a certain level of TSRPHI. Among them, the majority of cases fall in the lowest level of

responsibility, as shown by 85 in partial apology. The highest level, apology with compensation, includes

42 cases, as shown in the fifth row in Table 3. The full apology category has only 18 observations

(4.71%).

<Table 3> Tabulation of the Level of TSRPHI

A related question is whether the type of TSRPHI level is defined as nominal or ordinal. The value of

the TSRPHI level was assigned from 0 to 3, with the assumption that the higher value represents the

higher level of responsibility. Therefore, on the one hand, conceptually these categories could be seen to

represent an ordinal scale. However, an empirical problem arises. The TSRPHI level of interest deals

with the product of negotiations between an addressee and a target country. One of the important

characteristics of the negotiation between the two countries in question is that any result could emerge

without necessarily displaying a step by step process from 0 to 3, while some other cases do take a step

by step process. Furthermore some cases skip some of the steps to the highest level of responsibility

while others remain stuck on a certain level.

For instance, as shown in Table 2, the Holocaust case relevant to Austria shows a step by step process

in the target country accepting its responsibility. In 1956, the Austrian parliament approved a relief fund

for the victims, which is coded as 1. Then the Austrian government gradually expanded the payment of

compensation for the victims in 1959, 1961, 1962 and 1988, respectively. In 1990, the Austrian

government compensation is assessed as full because of the payment to all institutions and individuals in

both domestic and other countries, which is hence coded as 2. In 1994, Austrian President Thomas

Klestil apologized for his country’s role in the Holocaust. Accordingly, in 1994 the Austrian case

reached the highest level, apology with financial compensation.

In contrast, in the case of the Israeli reparations claims, Germany issued an apology in the Bundestag

in 1951, which is coded as 1, and then dramatically reached an agreement with Israel in 1956, which is

coded as 3, skipping level 2. In the case of the Sook-Ching Massacre, Japan agreed on the financial


compensation with Singapore, which is coded as 2, bypassing step 1, just as the U.K. did in the Maoris

War case. In another case, the U.S. reached agreement with Guatemala in 1999 on an apology with

financial compensation, which is coded as 3, skipping levels 1 and 2. So, on the other hand, the

categories representing perpetrator government’s taking responsibility could not be treated as an ordinal-

level value.

How can one solve the inconsistency between the conceptual and empirical definition on the type of

TSRPHI level? In this case, it is evident that a balanced definition of the type of variable ensures

unbiased and efficient results. When the TSRPHI level is explained as a dependent variable and “if a

dependent variable is ordinal and a model for nominal variables is used, there is a loss of efficiency since

information is being ignored. On the other hand, when a method for ordinal variables is applied to a

nominal dependent variable, the resulting estimates are biased or even nonsensical. If there is any

question about the ordinality of the dependent variable, the potential loss of efficiency in using models

for nominal outcomes is outweighed by avoiding potential bias”(Long 1997, 149). The answer seems

quite straightforward: one can apply the data with categorical variables to both ordinal logistic regression

analysis and multinomial logistic regression analysis. Then, one can choose a statistical method which

best answers the research question. What matters is which model works better for the research question.

2. Years to Reach Each Level of TSRPHI

How long does it take to reach each level of TSRPHI? The answer is illustrated in Table 4 which was

generated with the data set. The year when each incident took place is given in the third column. The

four categorical outcomes of TSRPHI, 0 to 3, appear in the fourth column, each of which consists of the

year when the outcome is observed in the period under analysis. The number in parentheses is the year

representing how long it takes to reach each level of responsibility.

As shown in the fifth column of Table 4, to reach level 1, partial apology, takes 41.9 years on average

with a variance from 6 years in the case of German reparations for the Holocaust to 52 in the case of

German reparations for the Guernica Bombing. The seven cases of military sexual slavery by Japan are

stuck on level 1, taking 50 years to 1995 from 1945. As indicated in the sixth column, it takes 63.7 years

on average to reach level 2, formal apology, with a variance from 24 years in the case of Japanese

reparations to Singapore to 122 years in the case of the U.K. reparations to New Zealand. As displayed

in the seventh column, to reach level 3, an apology with financial compensation, it takes 50.6 years on

average with a variance from 9 years in the case of the U.S. reparations to Guatemala to 124 in the case

of U.K. reparations to New Zealand. Finally as of 2000, as shown in the fourth column, eight cases are

stuck on no progress which is coded as 0. Most cases are sourced from colonialism and its aftermath:


Namibian reparations claims to Germany for the Herero Massacre, South African to the U.K. for the

Maori War, Chinese to Japan for the Nanking Massacre, Indonesian to the Netherlands for Police

Action, Armenian to Turkey for Armenian genocide and Algerian to France for the Algerian War, except

for Congolese to Belgium for Lumumba’s Assassination and Vietnamese to the U.S. for Agent Orange

derived from the Cold War.

<Table 4> Years Taken to Reach Each Level of TSRPHI

In sum, it is disclosed that it takes a number of years to reach each level of TSRPHI. Why? In reality,

in many cases, transnational redress for past injustices is a hard and time-consuming process. Obstacles

to the redress in favor of concealing past injustices and averting the issue in both perpetrators and victims

continually arise. Furthermore, for the last half century, most addressee countries had good reason to put

behind them the experience of war, occupation, and colonialism, since nation building and economic

development were urgent. As a result, authoritarianism was prevalent and developmental dictatorship

was easily justified, sacrificing civil and political rights of the people. For example, the major obstacles

in seeking reparations for military sexual slavery by Japan can be explained by aspects of international

law, economic factors, and regime type. In the legal aspect, the basic logic of Japan’s refusal to make

reparations is that “according to a conventional theory in international law, an individual cannot be a


subject of rights or duties in international law, as international law regulates, in principle, the relations

between states”(Ito 1999, 135). In addition, “Japan’s economic clout and the fear of blighting economic

relations have been strong disincentives for the governments of its former colonial subjects to press the

issue of their women’s rights”(Hicks 1995, 236). Even though a group of Taiwanese comfort women

tried to file a lawsuit against the Japanese government, “the Taiwanese government has little incentive to

take up the issue (of comfort women) with the Japanese, since the two governments are economically

interdependent”(Hicks 1995, 241). In the case of the Philippines, according to Hicks, in the request of

the Philippine women’s organization in 1992, the Philippine government displayed a significantly

evasive response to the issue, announcing “that there had been no sex slaves in the Philippines, and that

there was no need to seek an apology and compensation from Japan”(Hicks 1995, 242). “The

government, fearful perhaps of Japanese displeasure, failed to make any demands of Japan on behalf of

the Filipinas”(Hicks 1995, 243). In the case of Indonesia, the Indonesian authorities had no intention to

raise the issue of comfort women, by regarding all claims on Japan as settled by the 1958 reparations

agreement, just as the South Korean government showed under the authoritarian regimes.

Another important issue here is that the years to reach each level of TSRPHI could disclose the

imperfect consistency between the conceptual and empirical definition of the TSRPHI level, as shown in

the observed number of the TSRPHI level. As illustrated before, the TSRPHI level was constructed

under the implicit assumption that the higher level represents the higher responsibility. Conceptually

partial apology is much more limited in its consequence in reality and narrower in its legitimacy than full

apology. Accordingly it is assumed that it might take a shorter period to reach partial apology than full

apology. This conceptual definition was proven in reality. It takes 41.9 years on average to reach partial

apology while full apology takes 63.7 years. Yet, to reach the highest level, an apology with financial

compensation, takes 50.6 years on average, longer than partial apology, but rather shorter than full

apology. Accordingly, one can again utilize the level of TSRPHI as either an ordinal or nominal scale

along with a statistical method which best answers the research question.

3. The Maximum Level of TSRPHI in Each Case

Figure 1 indicates the maximum level of TSRPHI in each case over the period under analysis.

According to Figure 1, five transnational responsibility cases are quite successful, confirming the highest

level, categorized as apology with financial compensation: Jewish reparations claims to Austria and

Germany for the Holocaust, Guatemalan to the U.S. for military involvement in the Civil War, New

Zealand’s to the U.K. for the Maori War, and Spanish to Germany for the bombing of Guernica.

One case alone reached level 2, categorized as full apology: Singaporean reparations claims to Japan


for the Soock-Ching Massacre. In this case, Japan paid financial compensation to the Singaporeans, yet

refused to issue a formal apology.

Seven TSRPHI cases are stuck on partial apology, coded as 1 in Figure 1: Chinese, Indonesian, N.

Korean, Philippine, S. Korean, Dutch and Taiwanese reparations claims to Japan for perpetrating

military sexual slavery. So far, Japan has issued a personal-level apology rather than a formal one to

those seven victim countries. Finally, as illustrated previously, eight transnational responsibility cases

have made no progress at all.

<Figure 1> Maximum Level of TSRPHI in Each Case

In sum, by examining empirical patterns, I have found that the concept and some principles of

international human rights have been changing significantly. It is irrefutable that most TSRPHI cases are

not fully addressed, as is evident in the number of no responsibility cases (about 62%) shown in Table 3.

Yet, given the number (15.7%) of full apology plus apology with financial compensation cases shown in

the descriptive statistics in Table 3, and five successful cases reaching apology with financial

compensation in Figure 1, some TSRPHI cases might be interpreted as having been considerably

amended. What does this mean theoretically? As stated above, TSRPHI is an emerging concept that is

not yet fully coded in international human rights law. Yet, through the noteworthy political and social

movements to redress past historical injustices, as uncovered in defining the start and end date of

TSRPHI cases, it may be proven in part that the concept of TSRPHI has markedly been challenging the


current state-centered transnational concept of international human rights; thereby it seems that the

traditional concept is beginning to change (Gibney and Roxstrom 2001, 917-18). On the one hand,

global civil society has been utilizing the rhetoric and mechanisms of international human rights in order

to achieve specific goals such as reparations claims for past historical injustices. On the other hand, the

concept has remarkably extended human rights principles to individuals and groups previously excluded

from such considerations and has transformed the very conceptualization of human rights (Torpey 2003,

6). Furthermore, even though political and social efforts to redress past historical injustices do not result

in full apologies or reparations in the short term, those efforts could still have a remarkable impact on the

development of international human rights, international peace, and democracy in the long run in both

addressee and target countries. That is, politicizing the transnational redress issue itself would bring the

importance of international human rights and international peace to the eyes of people in addressee as

well as target countries.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, I have sought to define empirically the concept of TSRPHI. The first step was to identify

a population of TSRPHI. I proposed five key criteria for the concept of TSRPHI: i) past historical

injustices and continuation of the victims’suffering as the consequence of the perpetrators’wrongs; ii)

the existence of reparations claims for the wrong doings; iii) an emphasis on human injustices; iv)

transnational responsibility between countries; and v) a clear definition of proper addressee and target for

reparations claims. Based on the conceptual criteria, I identified 22 dyads of transnational state

responsibility cases relevant to nine target and 20 addressee countries from both the transnational

responsibility pool proposed in existing literature and my extensive investigation of historical sources.

Yet, the sample selection in this paper is not perfect because I cannot yet say that I know a great deal

about how TSRPHI is conceptualized. Furthermore, the sample selection process requires a huge labor-

intensive investigation of historical sources. In addition, some data are inaccessible since this issue is all

about history. Of course, even though there are definite limits on how well I can exercise data collection

at this point, they need to be addressed early on rather than later, in the guidance of existing literature.

One of the principal aims of this paper is to propose the operational definition, a measure of TSRPHI,

which enables us to conduct scientific inquiry such as statistical analysis. TSRPHI is operationalized

with transnational reparations, which is measured with a 4-point scale, ranging 0 to 3: no responsibility,

partial apology, full apology, and apology with financial compensation. No responsibility is coded as 0 if

a target country refuses to admit its past injustices and if there is no observable and explicit statement of


apology or payment of financial compensation even though a target country acknowledges its past

injustices. Partial apology is coded as 1 if high officials of a target country issue an apology or if a target

country pays reparations in the form of individual compensation for victim groups. Full apology is coded

as 2 if a target country passes an apology resolution in legislature or if a target country pays reparations

in the form of community rehabilitation to an addressee country. Apology with financial compensation is

coded as 3 if a target country pays financial compensation, partial or full with an accompanying

statement of apology, partial or full.

Based on the data set, some basic patterns of TSRPHI are disclosed. Among 382 observations in total,

237 fall under no responsibility, 85 under partial apology, 15 under full apology, and 45 under apology

with compensation. It takes a number of years to reach each level of TSRPHI: 41.9 years on average to

reach partial apology, 63.7 years full apology, and 50.6 years apology with compensation. It takes a long

time to reach an agreement between perpetrators and their victims because coming to terms with the past

is “a moral and intellectual grappling with the past behavior that gives cause more for shame than for

pride”(Cairns 2003, 63). In addition, some obstacles to TSRPHI could derive from the lack of

international laws, economic relationships, and regime types. While the majority of cases have yet to be

redressed, some are successfully amended, which provides theoretical significance in the international

human rights regime. In reality TSRPHI is an emerging field and not fully settled in international human

rights laws. Yet, the concept of TSRPHI has markedly been challenging the current state-centered

concept of international human rights, extending human rights principles to individuals and groups

previously excluded from such considerations.

My approach is an original one given the lack of existing ones since the TSRPHI issue is relatively

new in the field of international human rights. As other researchers utilize this data set, they will let us

know of any errors suspected or confirmed, which will be indispensable to this scientific endeavor. I

believe that this data set will provide empirically tested theories on TSRPHI. Therefore, I sincerely hope

that important puzzles in the field of TSRPHI do not remain unsolved due to a lack of available data.


References

Baehr, Peter R. 2001. Human Rights: Universality in Practice. Houndsmills and New York: Palgrave.

Barkan, Elazar. 2000. The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. New York:

W.W. Norton and Company.

Barkan, Elazar. 2003. “Restitution and Amending Historical Injustices in International Morality.”In

John Torpey (ed.), Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices. Lanham, MD:

Rowan and Littlefield, pp. 91-102.

Bassiouni, M. Cherif. 2000. “The Rights to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of

Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”The United Nations,

Commission on Human Rights, 56th Session, E/CN.4/2000/62.18 January.

Brooks, Roy (ed.). 1999. When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy Over Apologies and Reparations

for Human Injustice. New York: New York University Press.

Brooks, Roy. 2003. “Reflections on Reparations.”In John Torpey (ed.), Politics and the Past: On

Repairing Historical Injustices. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefieldpp. 103-14.

Butt, Daniel. 2012. “Repairing Historical Wrongs and the End of Empire.”Social and Legal Studies 21,

No. 2, pp. 227-42.

Cairns, Alan. 2003. “Coming to Terms with the Past.”In John Torpey (ed.), Politics and the Past: On

Repairing Historical Injustices. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, pp. 63-90.

Gibney, Mark, and Erik Roxstrom. 2001. “The Status of State Apologies.”Human Rights Quarterly 23,

No. 4, pp. 911-39.

Harris, S., K. Grainger and L. Mullany. 2006. “The Pragmatics of Political Apologies.”Discourse &

Society 17, pp. 715-37.

Hayner, Priscilla B. 2001. Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York:

Routledge.

Hicks, George. 1995. The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the

Second World War. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Houben, Vincent J.H. 1997. “A Torn Soul: The Dutch Public Discussion on the Colonial Past in 1995.”

Indonesia 63, pp. 47-66.

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. 1978. Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana. London: Croom

Helm.

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E. 2004. “Getting to Reparations: Japanese Americans and African

Americans.”Social Forces 83, No. 2, pp. 823-40.

Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E., and Anthony P. Lombardo. 2008. “Words Requires Actions: African


Elite Opinion about Apologies from the West.”In Mark Gibney et al. (eds.), The Age of

Apology: Facing Up to the Past. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 216-

28.

Ito, Tetsuo. 1999. “Japan’s Settlement of the Post-World War II Reparations and Claims.”In Roy

Brooks (ed.), When Sorry Isn’t Enough: The Controversy Over Apologies and Reparations for

Human Injustice. New York: New York University Press, pp. 135-45.

Laremont, Ricardo Rene. 2001. “Jewish and Japanese American Reparations: Political Lessons for the

Africana Community.”Journal of Asian American Studies 4, No. 3, pp. 235-50.

Long, J. Scott. 1997. Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables. Thousand

Oaks, CA: Sage.

Negash, Girma. 2002. “Apologia Politico: An Examination of the Tile Politics and Ethics of Public

Remorse in International Affairs.”International Journal of Politics and Ethics 2, No. 2, pp.

119-43.

Sagi, Nana. 1980. German Reparations: A History of the Negotiations. Jerusalem: Magness Press.

Sharp, Andrew. 1997. Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New

Zealand Since the 1970s. New York: Oxford University Press.

Thompson, Janna. 2012. “Is Political Apology a Sorry Affair?”Social & Legal Studies 21, No. 2, pp.

215-25.

Torpey, John. 2001. “Making Whole What Has Been Smashed: Reflections on Reparations.”The

Journal of Modern History 73, No. 2, pp. 333-58.

Torpey, John (ed.). 2003. Politics and the Past: On Repairing Historical Injustices. Lanham, MD:

Rowan and Littlefield.

Torpey, John. 2003. “Introduction: Politics and the Past.”In John Torpey (ed.), Politics and the Past: On

Repairing Historical Injustices. Lanham, MD: Rowan and Littlefield, pp. 1-34.

195

롤즈의 공적이성과 한국민주주의

장동진·권경록

이 의 목적은 종합부동산세 판결(2006헌바112)을 내린 한국 헌법재판관들의 판단의 근거를

롤즈의 공적이성의 관점에서 법관의 내적 신념과 다양한 외부 조건들을 중심으로 평가하는데

있다. 롤즈는 고도의 교육과 훈련을 받은 대법원의 판사들이 가장 높은 수준의 도덕적 중립성

과 심의 능력을 행사할 수 있다고 생각하여 이들을 공적이성의 표본으로 삼았다. 그러나 실제

정치과정에서 공적이성은 롤즈의 기대와는 달리 정의의 두 원칙이라는 큰 틀의 판단의 지침을

제공할 뿐 구체적 사안에 대한 판단의 원천을 제공해주지 못한다. 결국 한 개인의 정치적 판단

의 궁극적인 원천은 그 자신의 신념과 사회경제적 배경에 의존할 수 밖에 없으며 헌법재판관

들의 판단 역시 그들 자신의 도덕적 신념과 사회경제적 배경에서 자유롭지 못한 모습을 보여

준다. 그러나 그럼에도 불구하고 헌법재판관들은 공적이성의 이상을 지침으로 삼아 고민했고

시민들은 공적이성의 이상을 준거로 헌법재판소의 판결을 평가하고 공적담론을 이어갔다고 볼

수 있다. 이는 공적이성이 실제 정치과정에서 개인의 신념과 사회경제적 배경으로부터 자유로

울 수 없지만 여전히 규범적 준거로서‘문명화’기능을 한다는 것을 보여준다.

주제어: 존 롤즈, 공적이성, 한국헌법재판소, 종합부동산세, 문명화의 힘

과거역사적불법행위에대한초국경적책임의개념화

이 진 명

과거 역사적 불법행위에 대한 초국경적 책임은 국제인권 규범에서도 최근에 등장한 분야이

다. 이는 개념적으로 모든 국가는 식민시대, 양차대전, 냉전시대에 타 국가 시민들에게 저지른

중대한 범죄에 대해 법적, 정치적, 도덕적 책임을 져야 한다는 규범적 요구이다. 본 연구는 초

국경적 책임이 어떤 조건하에서 이루어지는가를 체계적·과학적으로 분석하기 위해 초국경적

책임의 수준을 정량화하는 것을 목적으로 한다. 먼저 초국경적 책임의 사례를 확인·수집하기

위해 그것의 조작정의를 제시한다. 또한 역사적 정보 획득을 위해 적용된 구체적 연구과정을

제시함으로써 초국경적 책임의 개념적 구성요소가 무엇인가를 밝힌다. 둘째, 초국경적 책임의

수준은 가해국가의 초국경적 보상수준으로 개념화되었다. 즉 가해국가가 피해국가 또는 피해자


집단에게 국가적 수준에서 사과를 했는지 여부, 재정적으로 보다 광범위한 보상을 지불했는지

여부, 그렇지 않고 여전히 책임을 거부하고 있는지 여부에 따라 조작화 되었다. 마지막으로 데

이터셋에서 발견된 기본적 패턴들을 서술하 다.

주제어: 초국경적 국가 책임, 역사적 불법행위, 보상요구, 국가적 사과, 국제인권

권력공유의 역설

정 재 관

내전을 겪은 국가들을 재건하기 위해서 평화와 민주주의는 본질적으로 불가분의 관계라는

인식이 국제사회에서 널리 받아들여져 왔다. 하지만 내전으로 파괴된 국가들에서 평화와 민주

주의를 동시에 증진시키는 것은 필연적인 긴장을 불러일으킨다. 본 논문은 내전을 겪은 국가들

에서 평화와 민주주의 수립의 관계에 대한 체계적 이해를 바탕으로 내전을 종결시키는 과정에

서 수립된 정치제도의 효과에 대한 연구이다. 특히 내전이 협상을 통해 종결된 경우 평화와 민

주주의 수립 사이의 긴장이 가장 극명하게 나타나는 것에 주목하여, 본 논문은 왜 이런 경우

평화와 민주주의 수립 사이에 딜레마가 발생 할 수 밖에 없는지에 대한 이론적 주장과 권력공

유 제도가 평화와 민주주의 증진에 어떤 향을 미치는 지에 대한 경험적 연구를 수행한다. 권

력공유 제도는 내전의 당사자인 정부군과 반군이 평화 수립과 유지 과정에서 맞닥뜨리는 안보

딜레마와 신뢰 유지의 문제를 해결하는 데 가장 효과적인 해법이라고 제시되어 왔다. 하지만

본 논문은 권력공유 제도가 실제 내전을 겪은 국가들의 평화와 민주주의 수립에 장기적으로

부정적 향을 미치고 제도적 장애물로서 기능한다는 분석 결과를 제시한다.

주제어: 내전, 협상을 통한 종결, 권력 공유, 평화건설, 민주주의 증진

Identifying and Conceptualizing Transnational State Responsibility for Past Historical Injustices

Documents

Transcript of Identifying and Conceptualizing Transnational State Responsibility for Past Historical Injustices