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R,EAFFTRMING OTTOMAN SOVEREIGI{TYIN YEMEN 1825 - 1840

Caesar E. Farah

This study deals with the manner in which the Britishproceeded to acquire a permanent foothold in southwest Ara-bia following their failure to make Mocha in the Tihamatheir base. In it we shall attempt to show how Muhammad.Ali, the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, became the unwittinginstrument of British policy while ostensibly on a mission inbehalf of his sovereign the sultan to suppress revolts andtribal defiances that invited foreign intervention.

British attempts since 17?0 to establish a firm base inthis strategic corner of Arabia were abetted by the endlessrivalries of the indigenous tribes and the lack of firm Otto-man control over the poiitical scene in Yemen. Exptoitingsuch turmoil, Britain through the India Goverment firstwrested a treaty agreement from the Imam of Sanaa per-mitting them a foothold in Mocha; and when unable to se-cure their position there, extracted a similar agreement fromthe sultan of Lahaj enabling them to consolidate a position onthe isthmus of Aden. Both agreements were of dubiouslegality, at least as viewed from the Ottoman stance.

* Recourse was to Joseph von lfammer-Purgstall,s Geschichte der os-manichen Reiches (10 vols. Budapest, 182?-95), V, 302 and VI, 3?6;and so acknowledged in F. O. BBI/2147, pp. 19-20.

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At first the British sought to justify their presence bycasting aspersion on Ottoman legal claims to sovereignty. Butresearchers in the archives of the Foreign Office could onlycome up with data supporting Ottoman de jure possessionof the Yemen.l The sovereign rights of the Ottomans wereacquired by conquest in 1539 during the saltanate of Sulei-man the Magnificent, reinforced by Sinan Pasha (grand ad-miral of the Ottoman navy) in 1569.

Upon withdrawing from south Arabia, Sinan entrustedadministration of the lowlands (Tihama) from the port ofMocha to the port of Hodeida to the Imam of Sanaa, who inturn appointed the $erif of Abu Aris overseer. Sinan him-self chose this ancient center of Islamic learning theadministrative headquarters of the Tihama.

According to their own accounts, the Ottomans did notattempt to establish direct rule in Yemen on account of thegreat distances separating it from Istanbul, the capital. Thevali of Hejaz acted as the liasion person with the SublimePorte. Owing to such benelovent neglect, the qerifs of AbuAris succeeded with time in exercising near independent ruleover the lowlands, in full defiance of the Imam's adminis-trative prerogatives.

Not only the Imam, but often the chieftains of neighbo-ring Asir refused to accept the authority of the qerifs. Dispu-tes, rivalries and bloody feuds ensued. Turmoil and confu-sion dominated the history of this regionz. When matters gotcritical, the Imam could only refer them to Istanbul for re-solution.

The Ottomans had tolerated th establishment of tradingfactories in Mocha in the latter part of the eighteenth cen-tury provided the maritime powers of Europe confined their

:'!.ffi'ffi{fiffiI See Cevdet, <Events of 1234i1818-19,> pp. 17-18.2 Recueil de Firmans, No. 49?. (Collection of Saban 1243/1828).

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activities to the port region. But the British found it neces-sary to strike up close relations with neighboring chieftainsand the Imam of Sanaa which only served to awaken suspi-cion in Ottoman circles, particularly when the British ar-gued the need to intervene on grounds of being harassed byunfriendly local officials and chieftains.

To remove such pretexts, the Sublime Porte authorizedMuhammad Ali to pacify the region. The viceroy was al-rady engaged on a mission to suppress Wahhabi defiance ofOttoman rule in Nejd. They had a strong following amongthe chiefs of Asir, a land immediately neighboring on Ye-men. The Asiris in turn were ailied to Ha'mmud, serif of AbuAris. All were Wahhabis or sympathizers. Muhammad Alihad cause to move his military operations south. He also hadthe sultan's ordersl.

$erif Hammud of Abu Aris had allied himself with theWahhabis in return for their acknowledging his rule overthe Tihama. With reinforcements from Egypt under thecommand of Mirmiran Halil Pasa, Mirmiran Arna'ut Pasa,officer in command in Jidda, moved to avenge the defeat ofhis underling, Jum'a APa (mutasallim at Quna!) by Hammudand his allies. Meanwhile Hammud had died and was succe-eded by his young son Ahmad, who teaming up with Hasanibn Halid of the Saud clan, set out to recapture Dir'iya fromthe viceroy's toops. They were met by Halil Pasa who hadset out from Mecca in Safar of. t234 (December 1B1B) and atMahayil were defeated and scattered. In pursuing them theEgyptian forces marched onto Abu Aris. Ahmad surrenderedand was exiled.

The Egyptian expedition set out to rebuild the fortressesof the Tihama (at Abu Aris, Giran, Hodeida, Luhayya, Za-bid, and Bayt al-Faqih). Atl the areas previously admini-

I As'ad Jabir, nYemen>, 353.

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stered by the gerifs were restored to the Imam's jurisdiction.

The Imam, in return, promised to deliver coffee supplies tothe imperial kitchens, as in past practices.

The imperial government had serious reservations con-cerning the efficacy of the imams of Sanaa. Their rapacityand cruel handling of tribes had alienated them from thelowlanders and accounted for much of the turmoil and law-lessness characterizing tribal relations in the two precedingcenturies. The tribes specifically singled out for criticismwere, in many rspect, the most powerful: Dhu Muhammad,Husayn, Hasid, Bail, and Yam.? All fought for dominion overthe northern regions of Yemen. Ottoman observers felt theyhad to be dealt with in a strict manner. Inhabitants of thecoastal cities were equally interested in their being chastised.The merchants had suffered from their marauding, and thepopulace from their raids. All assisted in financing the re-building of fortifications to keep them out. Often these werethe very tribes who took orders from the Imam of Sanaa.l

British merchants, operating predominantly out of In-dian ports, had urged their governrnent to take steps neces-sary for securing their operations at Mocha. Attempts to doso through treaty relations with the Imam bore little fruitsince it was the serif of Abu Aris they had to circumventand he did not take kindly to such measures. In the expedi-tion of Muhammad Ali they expected reprieve. The Britishhad opposed an earlier one, but were not disposed to do thesame in 1825 particularly when ordered by the SublimePorte.l

Doubtful about their efforts to secure an operation atMocha, particularly following a sharp dispute with the Imam

Dispatch of Henry Salt to the Foreign Office. Alexandria June 18,

1825. F. O. 7Bl135.See map for geographical distribution of major tribes.

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of Sanaa in 1828, the British began to cast about for an al-ternative cite. Aden proved particularly attractive for thenext location of a Factory. Commanding an exploratory na-val expedition in behalf of the India government, CaptainHuichinson was authorized to <enter into a Convention withthe Sovereign of Aden, arranging the terms on which theBritish Residency should be recived at that place in the eventit is necessary to remove it from the dominions of the Imaumof Sennaa (sic).nl

The British were particularly anxious to secure Adenfor their Factory following rumors that Muhammad AIi plan-ned to occupy the isthmus, Its strategic importance was dis-covered in 1829 when coal was transported to Aden fromMocha in order to provision the first steamer (<Hugh Lind-sayu), which was on its way to Suez from India.?

Muhammad Ali did not seriously entertain a militarypresence in Yemen until 1833 following a rebellion in Hejaz.Pianned or not, the rebellion provided Muhammad Ali withthe pretext to march his troops into Yemen. It began in Ju-ne of 1832 when a Circassian slave by the name of Muham-mad A[a, alias fiirkge Bilmez (Knows no Turkish), hithertoconsidered a loyal follower of the viceroy, revolted with hisAlbanian followers in Mecca for not having received pay overseveral months. All two thousand (horse and foot) marchedto Jidda, where they seized the treasury, confiscated equip-ment and supplies, and with warships they had comman-deered set saii for the Thima in December of that year. Therebels quickly occupied the coastal cities of Mocha and Ho-deida, and the land in between. They were joined ofdiscontented Arab tribes of the bordering region.s When querri-

3

Campbell's No. 21 of April 17, 1338 and18, 1838, both cited in F.O. 88112L47.For background see Macro, 5?-58.

See Campbell's No. 10 of April 16, lB33

India Board's letter of July

to Palmerston. F.O. 781227.

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ed by British observers, Bilmez alleged that he rebelled becausehe felt Muhammad Ali would soon be deposed by the sultan,and now he had an opportunity to prove his loyalty andusefulness to the Ottoman government. He anticipated forreward, governorship of the Hejaz.

Bilmez concluded an agreement with Ali ibn Muhtar, anAsiri chief, offering to share with him the revenue of theregion in return for his support. The revenue was ,not col-lected owing to the absence of an official administrator.The Circassian, however, had incurred greater expenses thananticipated, so he defaulted on his agreement with Ali.

The possibitity of a prior understanding between theviceroy, his subordinate Bilmez and the British concerningoperations in Yemen is seen in reports from Consul Gene-rai Chapbeli. According to these, Muhammad Ali suggested toCampbell early in 1833 that he might send an expeditionto Yemen in order to chastise Bilmez and rescue Sanaa fromanarchy. If the rebellion of Bilmez were staged, then a perfectpretext for immediate involvement would be ready made.The facility with which Bilmez moved from Mecca to Jiddato Yemen can only lend credence to this notion.

Campbell's wiliingness to cooperate with the viceroy wasfurther abetted by news from Yemen that in the midst of theturmoil British commerce was suffering. It was reported that(nearly all the coffee of Mocha was carried off in ships ofthe United States to the manifest detriment of our (English)commerce.>

But turning control over to Muhammad Ali was not with-out its risks; for while British commerce would be facilita-ted by the viceroy now controlling both sides of the Red Sea,as Moresby reported to Campbell and the latter to palmers-ton, still the British might be acquiescing to a formidableterritorial concentration in the hands of a powerful vali whobight not always be friendly to British interests. It was

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presumed that once fully in his control, Muhammad Aliwould annex its administration to the Hijaz where his nephewKuguk Ibrahim governed as vali. Ibrahim had been investedwith that office by the sultan's government as a reward forhis suppressing the

'Vfahhabis.

Palmerston yielded to Campbell's arguments that cont-rol of bouth sides of the Red Sea by the viceroy would onlyfacilitate the shipping of the India Government. He respon-ded by blessing the viceroy's expedition to Yemen.l To quietthe anxieties of the Sublime Porte, Campbell recommendedthat Palmerston's government reassure the Ottoman that theBritish considered Yemen ,an integral part of Ottoman pos-sessions, and administratively an appenage of the vilayet ofHejaz.2

Meanwhile, reports from Captain Moresby, who com-manded the India Government's surveying ship <Benares>,indicated that the forces of Bilmez were concentrated in Moc-ha, where they meant to await the Viceroy's troops. Moresby'sletter of June 26, 1833 from Jidda painted o bleak picture:the Imam had died and with him the last semblance of or-der; Surat ships were being detained by Bilmez at Mocha;commerce was deplorable, and its revival could be assuredonly with Muhammad Ai taking possession of Yemen. Eventhen it would not be an easy task, for the viceroy would haveto contend not only with the ravages of rebels, but also withan interior of Yemen torn by civil wars precipitated by thefeuding brothers of the deceased Imam, none of whom enjoy-ed much force, power or strong backing.

Meanwhile, Ali, the disgruntled Asiri chief, gathered uphis fighting men and laid siege to Bilmez at Mocha after

1 Palmerston's No.2 Campbell's No. 63

781228.

15 to Campbell, September 2, 1833. f'.O. 78/550.to Palmerston. Alexandria. October 2?. 1833. F.O.

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seizing the entire area surrounding the port town. Muham-mad Ali's navy recaptured or destroyed vessels comman-deered by Bilmez. Losses and defections had reduced the re-bel's force to between twelve and fifteen hundred men, mostof whom were stationed either at Mocha or at Aden. Theviceroy was most eager to dislodge them from the fortressat Aden, lest the rebel convert the town into a piraticalstronghold preying on Egyptian shipping in the Red Sea to

reinforce the siege of Mocha, Muhammad Ali ordered a re-giment of infantry (3200 men), a cavalry unit (400 men), andan artillery of 200 with six field pieces and two mortarsdispatched from Alexandria. Champbell urged the comman-ding officer of the expedition to take all necessary steps toinsure the safety of British subjects at Mocha.l The viceroy'snephew Ahmad, who also served as minister of war, left forYemen with an additional 2400 regular and 1200 irregularcavalry (chiefly Anatolian) with 400 artillery men. Fourhundred and fifty camels transported their bagage by land,while the troops left by sea, <all in good order.>2

Alerted by the alliance between Asiri Wahhabis and Bil-mez, the viceroy selected one of the twelve Asiri chiefsdetained in Egypt foliowing the suppression of the Wahhabiuprising, bestowed upon him a pelisse of honor, and dispat-ched him along side Ahmad to Yemen.. Muhammad Aii co-unted on the Asiri Sayh Muhammad al-Dasin, to draw supportaway from Bilmez. He allocated over a thousand purses innine-piaster gold pieces (total of 60,000 Austrian dollars) topurchase the support of Asiris, promising not to punish thosewho ailied themselves with Bilmez should thev abandon hisside.3

Campbell's No. 66 to Palmerston, Cairo,78/228.Campbell's No. ?0 to Palmerston, Cairo,78t228.Ibid.

November 1?, 1833. F.O.

December 15, 1833. F. O.

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The inhabitants of the Tihama were jubilant at the sightof the Egyptian expedition. For nearly two years the Asirishad visited upon them a variety of suffering and privation.Merchants were plundered, and the possessions of all carriedaway by land and sea. No one was abie to ward off the ra-pacity of the marauding Asiris. Rich and poor alike seram-bled to get out. Foreign merchants were not spared either byBilmez or by his deputy Abd al-Rahman who served as (mu-hafizn (governer),of Bab ai-Sahil (at Bab al-Mandib).

While the marauding of the Asiris had co'mmenced whenBilmez was in charge, it oniy intensified after he decidedto flee following negotiations with the Asiri chieftain Lahiqibn Ahmad Zaydani whereby in exchange for two thousandriyals,l he agreed to hand over to him Mocha. Bilmez alsoarranged with one of his trusted deputies to open the gatesof the town after Bilmez was safely on board a British ves-sel heading for Bombay, a scheme he had hatched with An-glo Indian.2

Whiie the fate of Bilmez3 after reaching Bombay isshrouded in mystery, that of the Egyptian expedition is not.It did not fare as well as inticipated during the whole of1834. The Bombay government reflected its concerns by dis-patching Captain Haines to Socotra in October of that yearto investigate the purchase of that island to serve as a pos-sible alternate coaling station. He was also asked to scout theHadramaut coast and map it.

Exasperated by the turmoil and his inability to controlit, the Imam of Sanaa reportedly offered to deliver up his

Two hundred according to <Miraat iil-Yemen,> 72.<Yemen>, 356,It was alleged that from Bombay he went to Baghdad, then backto Egypt where he was allegedy seized and executed (Ibid.); butvery much alive in 1858, having been assigned to Bagdad. Play-fair, 141 (note).

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country to the Egyptians but his subjects would not supportthis decision.l Elsewhere the war went on without a celearindication of the outcome. The key centers of Luhayya andHodeida were heavily garrisoned, according to British olfi'cers monitoring the war,z and Egyptian forces decided roawait the reinforcements dispatched by Muhammad Ali.

It was not the Yemenis that posed a military problenrfo the Egyptian, as both high and lowlanders were willingto accept reasonable terms; rather it was the Asiris and theirallies among Yemenis who put up the fiercest resistance. Ina letter from a French medical officer accompanying AhmadPasa to Clot Bey of November 10, 1834 we learn that theexpedition suffered severe attrition in terms of provisions,camels, horses owing to insufficient provisioning. Local sup'plies proved both expensive and hard to acquire. Morale felldrastically, particularly when the fierce Asiris outwitted iheEgyptians several times in key battles. They captured tirecapital of Asir, but the surrounding country remained in thehands of defiant Sayh A'id ibn Muy'i the recognized chiefof the land. Three lowland provinces were captured, but notthe key cities of Abu Aris, Saba, Bisr or Benicher. Reportsreaching the viceroy clearly indicated that more men, ma-terial and money would be needed.'j

The viceroy was too deeply commited to abandon the ex-pedition and leave Yemen to the Asiris and their Wahhabisupporters. With Abd al-Rahman, his muhafrz, killed by theAsiris, the last official connection to Cairo was broken. Theviceroy resolved nevertheless to continue the fight. Mirmi-

Testimony in a letter from Rose of September 29 to Campbell.Captain Rose who commanded the sloop of war nCooteo off Mocha.Dispatch ol November 10, 1834 from o frenchman accompanying Ab-mad Pasa to Clot Bey, head of the medical establishment in Egypt.These and other letters mentioned above were cited in Campbell'sreports to London. See his No. 2 to Palmer"ston. Cairo, January 6,1835. F. O. 781257.

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ran Amin Beg headed land reinforcements, and Qapudan Ha-frz more sea units as they were dispatched south to relieveexhausted units. He placed his nephew Kuguk Ibrahim incharge of the entire expedition, which was now expanded byanother 2400 men arriving via Suez and Jidda and financedby an extra forty thousand Austrian dollars. The money sentalong earlier to buy the loyalty of Asiris appeared to havelittle impact; indeed, the Asiris sent along, al-Dasin, wassuspected of secretly working with the rebels.l

Operations in the Tihama brought some results. MahmudBeg and a detachment of troops assisted by a bedouin forceled by Husayn ibn Haydar captured the fort commanding thewater supply to Hodeida on January 15, 1835 thus cuttingoff the city from its water. Four days later the governor,Mahmud ibn Mufassa, surrendered to the Egyptians at theurging of the local merchants in order to prevent the cityfrom being subjected to looting. Mocha itself was placed un-der the command of Husayn as a reward for his cooperati-on with the Egyptians; but with the approach of MahmudBeg, and uncertain of his status vis-a-vis the Egyptian com-mander, he decided to flee the city on January 24. Left un-attended, Mocha was temporarilyn held by the captain of anEgyptian vessel and a handful of men who quickly securedthe customs house's gate and battery and hoisted the Egyp-tian flag.2

But while Egyptian troops met with success in the Tiha-ma, they did not fare so well in the highlands. Indeed, theysuffered a number of serious reverses. The Asiris led bywhat was termed in Cairo <Rijal Almau (men of [the tribe]by that name), held once as hostages by the viceroy, known

1 lbiat.2 For additional details see a letter from Commander Denton of the

India Government's Brig of War <Euphrates> to Col. Campbellfrom Mocha, January 30, 1835. Incl. No. 2 in Campbell's dispatchto the Duke of Wellington from Cairo, February 16, 1885. F.O. 78/257.

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for unflinching fierceness in battle, lured Kuguk Ibrahim intotheir mountain fastness on pretexts of fleeing his advanceand inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians.

Once again Muhammad Ali sent reinforcements, another2400 (a regiment) commanded by a former minister of war,Khurshid Pasa. He was convinced that his nephew had shownlittle skill or acumen in handling the Asiris. The campaignproved costly both in men and materi6l. The Rijal Alma andtheir fighters had inflicted heavy losses on the Egyptians,Both Kuguk Ibrahim and the serif of Mecca who had ac-companied him on the expedition were among those whofled for their lives. Many Egyptian fugitives wandered aboutaimlessly in the desert and perished. A. strong column ofAsiris marched on to the fort at al-Husa, builty by theEgyptians at a sma1l port for receiving provisions, and cap-tured it with its depot. Unaware of its capture, Egyptianvessels sailed unsuspectingly into the port and were captured,their crews and passengers massacred.l

The campaign was fast becoming a drain on the vice-roy's treasury.z Another 100,000 dollars were sent in thecompany of an escort of fifty cavalry to Suez. The cotton hesoid for it at Alexandrie was with the understanding hewould be paid in either Spanish Daubloons or Austrian dol-lars, the currency in use in Yemen.3

Fresh troops under more competent co'mmand finallyturned the tide of war against Asiris and their Yemeni alliesin the course of 1837. Not only were the port cities of Moc-ha, Luhayya, and Hodeida all recaptured, but the interior

I See extract of a letterfrom an agent in Jiddah to Campbell of 21Safar 125U18 June 1835. Incl. in No. 24, Campbell to Palmerston,from Alexandria, July 24, 1835. F.O. 78/228.

2 See Campbell's No. 24.3 Campbell's No. 9 to the Duke of Wellington. Cairo, April 18, 1835.

F. O. ?8/228.

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centers like Taiz and l{ajziya as well. Stability returned mo-rnentarily to both the Tihama and highlands, for which theinhabitants were both relieved and greatful to MuhammadAli.1

However, no sooner did the sultan's government breathea sigh of relief over the pacification of Yemen at last thanit learned that the British were about to capitalize on thesituation to implant themselves at Aden in keeping withplans in the offing for some time. The news did not sit wellwith Muhammad Ali who had hoped to offset his huge cam-paign expenditures by tapping the customs resources of Ye-men port cities, ineluding Aden's. Moreover, he viewed Aden'slocation as important for the defense of south Arabia and forsecuring his hold on it. The Hejaz was already a financialburden to the sultan's, and his government as well. Its re-venues never provided even for its basic administrative ex-peru;es.

The India Government had resolved on making Aden itsoutpost to replace Mocha, which port already had proven it-self both unstable and untenable. Besides, Aden appeared farmore suitables as a commercial and supply point.

Aden was ruled at this time by the sultan of neighboringLahaj, who had managed to maintain a postrue of indepen-dence vis-a-vis the Imam of Sanaa. Captain Haines of the In-dia Marines already had detailed in his exploratory reportsthe advantages of Aden over other cites. James McKenzie ofthe Bengal Lancers had reported to the Foreign Office inLondon that Muhammad Ali was planning to occupy Aden af-ter he suppressed the Asiris. He urged the British authorizethe occupation of the isthmus before the viceroy could. Heregarded Aden a necessary port for establishing a Britishcommercial presence in this corner of Arabia, While the In-

I qYemen). 358.

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dia Government opposed a lasting Egyptian presence in theTihama, it was prepared to take steps to deprive him ofAden's control. Besides, it did not want the viceroy thatclose to Bombay. The strategic location of Aden, halfway bet-ween Suez and Bombay, was not lost on the India Govern-ment, nor was the excellent port facility it could provide Bri-tish shipping. With the advent of steam transportation, itwas an ideal coaling station as well.l

To justify the acquisition of Aden, London through theIndia Government labored to reduce the legitimate claimsof the Imam of Sanaa and by extension, of the Ottoman go-vernment. They had recourse to books on geography, andPalmerston instructed Campbell to tell the viceroy that ru-mors reaching London allude to his design on Aden, not tomention those (upon Muscat and Bagdad.> His dispatch oftroops towards Aden <would seem to indicate intentions onhis part to extend his authority towards the Persian Gulfand the pashaiick of Bagdad.>2 Concern was intensified byMuhammad Ali's successful campaigns in Nejd and Yemenwhere, in spite of heavy cost in men, money and materialhe succeeded in suppressing the Wahhabis and Asiris.s

In preparing the grounds for the take over of Aden be-fore the Egyptians could occupy it, Rear Admiral Sir C. Mal-colm Kirk, Superintendent of the Indian Navy, alleged tothe Government of Bombay that <both the Arabian and Abys-sinian coasts of the Gulf of Aden were becoming very un-safe, from the depredations committed on trading vessels.>Furthermore, he reported that the <Sultan of Aden had shownhimself to be little better than a common marauder. per-

Campbell's781342.See his No.1837; citedCampbell's

No. l5 to Palmerston. Alxandria, March 27, 1838. F,O,

5 to Campbell of August 4, also No. 25 of December 8,in F.O. BBL/2L47, p. 3.No. 38 to Palmerston of July 72, L837. F.O. ?8/320.

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mitting the plunder of ships driven on the coast, and, in so'meeases, sharing in the profits of these outrages.>l

A more specific pretext was provided by an incident in-volving the <Doria Dowlutr, a Madras vessel belonging toan Indian family that was wrecked in a storm in Januaryof 1837 off Aden. It was aileged that the sultan had not pre-vented it from being looted. The Bombay government askedthe India Government's approval to use this incident to de-mand satisfaction from the sultan of Aden. It was followedwith a proposal to the Court of Directors in London thatthey be granted permission to take possession of the port ofAden in compensation for <the insults offered by its Ruierto the British flag.rg

Captain Haines was directed to proceed to Aden for thepurpose of accomplishing this objectives. After obtainingsaticfaction in the from of compensation for the loss sustainedby the wrecked <Doria Dowlut>, he next proceeded to <ne-gotiate> the transfer of Aden from the sultan's to the IndiaGovernment's control. He demanded both the port of Adenand the adjacent promontory, offering in exchange a meagerannual payment of 8,700 Austrian dollars.

Subsequent developments affirm the suspicions of scho-lars that the negotiations were conducted under the gunsof his naval force and that the sultan, hardly abie to under-stand the instrument presented to him for signing wasclearly intimidated. For no sooner had he signed the instrumentof transfer than his own infuriated sons plotted to seize Ha-ines before he could carry the instrument back to Bombay.According to reports reaching Admiral Kirk, Haines appa-

Cited in F.O. BBI/214?, p, 4.Bombay Government to the Court of Directors, Septembre 26, 1837.Cited in F.O. 881/2147, p. 4.

3 Bombay Government to the Superintendent of the Indian Navy,November 25, 1837. F.O. 88112147.

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rently wanted to keep the negotiations secret, just betweenhimself and the sultan, but uhe like a silly man trusted thewhole to six merchants who soon dispensed it throughout thetown.>1

Word reached Kuguk Ibrahim that the British were sur-reptitiously maneuvering to acquire Aden by whatever me-ans. He inquired only to get word back from Haines that hehimself now controlled Aden by virtue of an instrument oftransfer from the sultan. Haines also sent word to Ibrahimnot to interfere.z

Disturbed by this development, Muhammad AIi demand-ed clarification from Campbell and was told that the Bom-bay government considered Aden an independent power andcould treat with its sultan if it wished. Exasperated by thewhole Yemen affair, the viceroy was ready to whitdraw,and he so informed Campbeii. He made it clear that hewould not allow Aden to lapse into foreign hands unless itcan be shown that the fmam Sanaa did not exercise right-ful jurisdiction over it. Contrary to what was reported bythe agents of the Bombay government, Muhammad AIi didnot acquiesce in the transfer of Aden.3 He would permit theBritish to have a coaling station there, but not ruling rights;and this only after he had subjugated the rest of the countrysurrounding Aden.

Political No. 1. Report on the transfer of Aden to Rear AdmiralSir C. Malcolm Kirk, dated January 20, 1838. Incl. in Secret dis-patch from the India Board to the Governor General of Indiain Council and to the Governor/Council at Bombay, dated May 30,1838. F.O. 781349; see other incls. on Haines' negotiotions with thesultan and terms of the alleged transfer.See letter of February 3, 1838 and another of the 6th to lbrahrm.Copies inclosed in Secret, from the India Board to the GovernorGeneral of India in Council, dated May 30, 1838. F. O. ?8/349.Artin Beg to Bogus Beg of 25 Z 1253122 March 1838. Incl. in No.15, Campbell to Palmerston of March 27, 1838. F.O. ?8/342.

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After having encouraged Muhammad Ali to undertake theexpedition to Yemen, Campbell on instruction from his go-vernment was now urging to withdrawl. The viceroy had ful-filled the role envisioned for him: pacify the country in or-der tcr facilitate the establishment of a secure station. Ar-guments used centered on the inadvisability of further an-tagonizing the tribes on grounds this could only lead to theultimate defeat of Egyptian arms. Moreover, it was alreadytoo costly an undertaking and could only bring poverty toEgypt in the long run. Campbell even had the audacity tourge the viceroy to induce the people of Yemen's interiorto bring freely their goods to the ports of Yemen and to selltheir produce to and purchase merchandise from Europeanmerchants as they might require, and on no account to con-script them or levy taxer on them. To him stability aroundthe Red Sea courtesy of Egyptian arms would increase com-mercial traffic for British India with south Arabia.2

Ibrahim had already anticipated British strategy towardsAden and warned his uncle, the viceroy, that through theIndia government Britain planned to control Aden for com-mercial as well as strategic reasons. This control, he argued,would divert trade activity away from Mocha, hitherto theprincipal port to the interior. It also meant a loss of import-ant customs revenue, which Muhammad Ali had counted onin order to offset the perennial negative balance of revenueof the Hejaz.s The viceroy was equally upset by the Britishaddressing the faqih of Aden by the title <sultan>, when inreality the authority signified by the title was vested legallyby the Ottomans in the Imam of Sanaaa.

Proceeding according to plans, the British government

I Campbell to Palmerston, No. 13 of March 20, 1838. F.O. ?8/342.2 rbid.3 See Annex A.4 Artin to Bogus of March 22, 1838. IncI. in Campbell's No. 1b. F.O.

78/342.

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endorsed the proposed appointmenty by the Court of Direct-ors of the East India Co. of packet agents to the ports ofSuez, Jiddah, Cosseir, and Mocha in anticipation of ex-panded trade. Campbell instructed these agents to provideprovisional consular assistance to any British subject or ves-sel visiting these ports.l

Captain Haines returned to Aden, this time to serve asthe first political agent there. He was issued clear instruct-ions to assert his presence, by force if the <sultan> shouldnot ratify the agreement. He was also informed to avoiddiscussing commerce at this time with the neighboring Arabtribes so as not to excite the jealous feelings of the vice-roy of Egypt, or possibly lead to embarassing connectionsand obligations wit them.z

Angered by these developments, Muhammad AIi put itbluntly to Campbell that by virtue of a firman in his pos-session for ten years, the sultan's government had authori-zed him to take possession of Aden and the rest of Yemen.The French consul general in Egypt had fanned the anxietiesof the viceroy by alleging that the British intended to takeAden for the purpose of capturing the coffee trade of Ye-men and opening up Arabia for British manufacture. With

British capture of Aden, the French argued, they wouldeventually capture Egypt as well.

The British, on the other hand, were no less suspiciousof Egyptian moti.res in Yemen. They in turn believed thatby conquering the country Muhammad Ali intended to mo-nopolize that same coffee trade and use Yemen as an out-let for Egyptian manufacture. The Political Department ofthe Foreign Office was not convinced that Ibrahim would

See instructions to Haines from the India Board of December 12,1838. Cited in F.O. BBll2L47.Campbell's No. 21 to Palmerston of April B, 1838. F.O. 78/373.

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succeed in subjugating <Sheikh Sherzebe (Sar'ab) territory,a rich coffee country called Houshereea (Hujariya), an areaconveniently situated for trade with the port (Aden).rl Theywere convinced that the sayh in reference desired to enterinto a treaty for trade and commerce with the British. Themajor tribes of the area, Dhu Muhammad and Dhu Husaynwere strong numerically and controlled critical passes toAden. British agents had been cultivating both.

These factors had contributed to British intentions toshift their center from Mocha to Aden. Moreover, Aden wascloser to Sanaa by two days' journey. Even if the Egyptianscaptured Sanaa, London still maintained that the British couldhave better relations with the inhabitants of the interior. be-cause <the British name stands very high for good faith andjustice.>

The British, however, were not relying on their goodname alone to halt Egyptian advances in Yemen. Strategycalled for continued friendly negotiations to halt the advan-ce of Egyptians and open up the area to friendly and freeintercourse. The aim was to prevent Muhammad Ali fromcapturing Taiz, which would give him control over the wholecountry, whereby <the entire commerce will be monopolizedby Egypt and our India trade will be ruined.> Haines hadstated to his superiors that be was able to enter into treatiesof friendship and peace with <nearly all the neighbouringstates, and the roads from Aden into the interior are nowopen for supplies and commerce.og

It was all the more imperative now to apply pressureon Muhammad Ali to withdraw from Yemen. As Palmerstonput it earlier in a dispatch to Campbell, <Her Majesty's Go-

Political Department to Campbell. Incl. in lbitl.Dispatch from S. B. Haines, Political Agent at Aden of February2B, 1839. Incl. in Campbell's No. 2l to Palmerston. F.O. ?8i373.

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2

vernment were not aware that the occupation of that countryby his (Muhammad Ali's) troops, promoted any interest ofGreat Britain.>l From Aden Hanies sent a letter to Ibrahiminforming him officially that Aden is to be treated as ofJanuary 19, 1839 a British dependency and requesting that hestay awayz The India government was anxious for this tohappen in order to insure what it termed <a fair competitionwith Mocha in commercial intercourse with the interior ofYemen.> Otherwise, <the cession of Aden would be of littlevalue to the British in a commercial point of view.rg

. With Muhammad Ali taking the position that his expedi-tion to Yemen was with the Ottoman sirltan's blessing, Lon-don instructed Ambassador Ponsonby at Istanbul to inquirefrom the Sublime Porte whether <the conquests which Me-hemet Ali had made in Arabia and on the shores of the Per-sian Gulf had been made i.n accordance with the wishes ofthe Sultan, and in pursuance of any authority or instructionsgiven by the Sultan to Mehemet A1i.>4 Suspecting the vice-roy's aims in the Gulf, Paimerston informed Campbell totell Muhammad Ali that in view of the rumors concerninghis designs on Baghdad, <the British Government could notpermit him to establish his naval and military power on theshores of the Persian Gulf, and that, if he should perseverein such project, he must expect that a British force woulddispossess him from any naval stations, at which he mightattempt to place himself, on the Persian Guif.rs

Without waiting for confirmation from Istanbul, Pal-'merston instructed Campbell in September of 1839 to informMuhammad Ali that the British Government officially re-

I No. 15 of May 12, 1838 to Col. Campbell. Cited in F.O. 881/214?.2 See copy dated February 25. Incl. in No. 21.3 India Board of September 4, 1839. Cited in F.O. 881/214?, p. 11.4 No. 64 to Lord Ponsoby of May 11, 1839. Cited in lbtd.5 No. 10 of May 11, 1839. Ibial., 11-12.

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quests that he withdraw his troops from Yemen. In a proto-

col concluded between Great Britain, Austria, Russia andPrussia (to from the Quadruple Alliance), the Ottoman go-vernment was supported in their request that Muhammad Aliwithdraw from Syria. Quite clearly the viceroy of Egypt, ha-ving fulfilled his unwitting role on behaif of Great Britain,now had to be confined to Egypt.

To underscore his determination to keep Muhammad Aliaway from the area surrounding Aden in the first instanceand induce him to leave Yemen in the second, Palmerstonnotified the India Board not to be restrained in their dealingwith the tribal chiefs in the interior of Yemen if they sawfit. In his stated view, quite emphatically put, the viceroyohas no right whatever over the countries governed by thoserulers.rr

This rather blunt declaration reflected a hardening posi-tion in London. The British government had cause for alarm.In the course of 1838 the viceroy's armies finally succeededin subduing rebellion against Ottoman authority every'uvhere,from the Hawran in southern Syria to Asir and the Tiha-rna in south Arabia. His forces had reached the Gulf earlyin 1839 with Khurshid and Ahmad now in control of al-Hasaand Qatif. Kuguk Ibrahim had pacified and was in controlof Asir and Yemen. The Wahhabis of Nejd were totallyneutralized for the moment. Muhammad A)i, moreover, en-joyed strong sympathy in Baghdad, and it was feared thathe might next move onto that territory and reduce the portcity of Basra at the head of the GuIf as wel1.2 And to tophis triumphs, the viceroy's briiiiant commander and son Ib-rahim Pasa succeeded on June 24, 1839 in totaliy destroyingthe Ottoman forces sent against him in a battle near thelittle town of Nizip.

I Letter of September2 Admiral Maitland to

r3. F.O. ?8/388.the Admiralty, April 7, 1839. Admiralty 1/219.

_ 1 3 9 _

Seen from the point of view of Britain, which countrygenuinely suspected France's motives in urging the viceroyon, all these moves, particularly towards south Arabia andthe GuIf were deemed untimeiy and unwise since they ap-peared to impact negatively their own interests and influencein this part of the world. They came at a time when the Rus-sians were drawing closer to the Persian court and the shah'srepresentative was in Cairo work out closer relations bet-ween Persia and Egypt. The British were attempting to pre-vent the shah from capturing Herat, a strategic gateway tothe Indian subcontinent, while they themselves were oc-cupying the island of Karak in the Gulf. At the same timeAdmiral MaiUand was ordered to prevent the occupation ofBahrein by the Egyptian forces. Through Campbell the In-dia government wanted instructions sent by the viceroy toKhurshid to stay away from Bahrein.l

In view of the mounting confrontational policy of Pal-merston vis-a-vis Muhammad Ali, Campbell's dream of anAnglo-Egyptian alliance to stabilize this significant part ofthe Ottoman empire and keep away Britain's rivals was nowrapidly being shattered. Palmerston feared and mistrustedMuhammad Ali and preferred to have the weak ineffectualsultan as a substitute working ally. In the name of reassert-ing Ottoman authority in Syria and Arabia, Palmerston wasdetermined to confine the viceroy's armies to Egypt proper.He would permit him to undertake administrative improve-ments in the name of the sultan's government, but no more.The remarkable aspect of Palmerston's audacity is that itworked in the long run to the manifest remorsefulness ofthe Sublime Porte, many of whose ministers saw salvationonly in Muhammad Ali being in control ',r'here they could notexercise effective authoritv.

France was in symptahy with the viceroy's plight but the

1 Foreign Office to Campbell, June 15, 1839. F.O. 781342.

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king was not prepared to go to war against the QuadrupleAlliance on his behalf. Palmerston did not trust the Frencheither, and he much preferred that Britain take the leader-ship in imposing restraints on the viceroy of Egypt.

Although Campbell had communicated Palmerston'swishes to Muhammad A1i, he himself was very unhappy overthe rapidiy deteriorating relations between London and Cai-ro. He had labored hard and long to promote ties in thehope of reducing France's ties with Egypt and counter thatcountry's influence in Egyptian dominated Syria.l But witl:inmonths Campbell was replaced by Col. Hodges (in Februarl'of 1840) as Consul General in Egypt. Unlike his predecessor,Hodges shared Palmerston's hostilities towards the viceroy.

Without proof or reliable information to support his :on-tentions, Hodges reported to Palmerston that Muhammad Alihad sent a secret mission to the Imam of Sanaa urging hinito drive the British out of Aden. He allegedly promised inreturn restoring Taiz and the whole of Yemen's interior tothe fmam's administrative control. Should he not be preparedto respond, then the viceroy was prepared to administer theland in return for an annual subsidy from the Imam. Hisforces would then take up the task of dislodging the Britishfrom Aden. When confronted with such <intelligence>, theviceroy contemptuously dismissed it as slanderous and untrue.He had no plans to dislodge the British from Aden, but rat-her to deiiver Yemen from the incompetent rule of theImam whose machinations and manifest weaknesses only ser.ved to encourage foreign elements to realize their ambitionsat the expense of Yemen2.

1 For Palmerston' instructions see supra,; for Campbell's actionthereon, see his No. 79 to Palmerston. October 6, 1839 and the Incl.F.O. 78/3?5.

2 See Col. Hodges' No. 26 of February 22, 1840, and India Board'sof April 30; cited in F.O. 881/2147, p. 12.

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But the loss of Aden was not to be overlooked by thesons of the sultan of Lahaj who had signed the instrumentof transfer nor by other tribes neighboring Aden. They didnot need the urgings of Muhammad Ali to carry on an arrn-ed struggle against the British in Aden. Repeated attemptswere made in November of 1839, May of 1840, and July of1841 under the leadership of the Abdali sultan. All to noavail. The British would not be dislodged.

Meanwhile Muhammad Ali decided to quit Yemen alto-gether. He was preparing for a major military and navalconfrontation with the forces of the sultan and those of theQuadruple Alliance after the decision was taken to force himout of Syria as well. His nephew, Kuquk Ibrahim, returnedwith the Egyptian expedition from the Tihama after turningover the administration of the lowlands and the port citiesof Mocha and Hodeida to Husayn ibn Ali Haydar, the gerifof Abu Aris. the serif's brother, Abu Talib, took charge ofthe fighting forces of the gerif and responsibilities of defen-ce. Thus ended Muhammad Ali's adventures in south Arabia.He came to restore the land to the rightful authority of theOttoman sultan only to find himself being compelled to with-draw under the pressures of a carefully orchestrated policyof Palmerston, in league with the very same sultan whowanted Muhammad Ali's own authoritv diminished.

In conclusion one has to take note of the fact that whileMuhammad AIi succeeded in the mission which the Ottomansultan ordered him to undertake by imperial decree in 1828,the end result of his twelve-year adventure is of dubious va-lue. To be sure the eountry was momentarily pacified, butthe pacification abetted British not Ottoman aims in this cor-ner of Arabia. The question of Ottoman sovereignty wasconveniently kept alive by the British for another decaCe,until their hold on Aden was cemented. In the end (as weshall see in another study) the reaffirmation of imperiai Ot-toman sovereignty was to be achieved only with the con-version of Yemen into an Ottoman vilavet.

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ANNEX A

CUSTOMS REVENUE FROM CITIES OF YEMEN*

10J 1253 to 20J 1254 2 l J 1254 -2N1255 3R I 1255 - IS1256(Sept. 11, 18?3 - Sept. (Sept. 14, 1838 - Nov. (Apr. 3, 1840 - Nov.

13, 1838) 9, 1839) 10, 1840)

City

Taiz

Aden

Mocha

Zabid

Faqih*

Hodeida

Luhayya

Totcl:

t Above tables taken from Bagbakanltk ArgiviMfihimme - Yemen, 1803, Lef 3.

*r Bayt al-Faqih.

- 1 4 3 -

Para Pias. Purse Paru Pias. Purse Para Pios. Purso- - - - - -

0? 466 2521 34 286 3227 35 061 2709

30 223 0123 00 040 0097 20 411 0045

15 005 1964 18 025 0412 00 000 0000

35 228 0862 l0 362 1062 20 055 0483

25 168 0332 25 228 0291 35 203 0189

12 1?1 2716 30 034 2660 18 380 1475

20 312 1040 38 114 1194 38 284 0564

24 0?6 9561 35 090 9005 398 5476

(Istanbul), Meseil-i

BIBLIOGR,APHICAL REFEN,ENCES

Works used in the preparation of this article, includingthe ones cited in footnotes:

Ali, Abdiilmiimin, <Miraat iil-Yemen>, ms. TY, Istanbul Uni-versity Library.

Btry, George, Arabia Infelix or the Turks in Yemen. London:Macmillan Co., 1915.

Cevdet, Tarih, Vol. XI (1309/1891-92). Istanbul: Osmania, 1309.

Great Britain. Foreign Office. Confidential. Abstract of Cor-respondence and Memorandum respecting the Right of thePorte to the Sovereignty over the Yemen, and other Po-ints connected with that Question. F.O. BBL/2147.

Jabir, As'ad. <Yemen>, ms. TY 4250. Istanbul Universtiy Lib-rary.

Macro, Eric, Bibliography on Yemen and Notes on Mocha.Coral Gables, Fla., University of Miami Press, 1960.

Muhyi b. al-Husayn b. al-Qasrm b. M. b. AIi, Gayat al-amanifi ahbar al-Qatr al-Yamani. Ed. Sa'id Abd al-Fattah Asur& M. Mustafa Ziyada. Cairo: Dar al-Katib al-Arabi, 1968,

Playfair, Capt. R. L., A History of Arabia Felix or Yemen...including an account of the British settlement of Aden.Bombay: Government Printing by Education Society

-- r44 -

Press, Byculla, 1859; reprinted by Documentary Publications,Salisbury, N.C., 1978.

Becueil de Firmans Imp6riaux Ottomans address6s aux Valiset aux Kh6dives d'Egypte 1006II. - lg22 II. (1597 J. -C. - 1904 J. - C.) Cairo: Institut Francais d'Arch6ologieOrientale, 1934"

Turkey. Baqbakanhk Argivi (Istanbul). Mesail-i Miihimme -Yemen, 1803. Also, Yemen Meselesine Dair, Nos. 1795-1805.

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