Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry

28
Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry Kosuke Shimizu Working Paper Series No. 24 Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies Ryukoku University

Transcript of Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry

Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry

Kosuke Shimizu

Working Paper Series No. 24

Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development StudiesRyukoku University

Mission of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies

Poverty and other issues associated with development are commonly found in many Asian and African countries. These problems are interwoven with ethnic, religious and political issues, and often lead to incessant conflicts with violence. In order to find an appropriate framework for the conflict resolution, we need to develop a perspective which will fully take into account the wisdom of relevant disciplines such as economics, politics and international relations, as well as that fostered in area studies. Building on the following expertise and networks that have been accumulated in Ryukoku University in the past, the Centre organises research projects to tackle with new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. It aims to disseminate the results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement in public discourse. 1. Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies 2. Expertise of Participatory Research / Inter-civic Relation Studies 3. Expertise in Southwest Asian and African Studies 4. New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan 5. Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes

Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies Ryukoku University

Human Security, Universality, and National Interest:

A Critical Inquiry

Kosuke Shimizu

Working Paper Series No.24

2007

Ⓒ2007 Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies Ryukoku University 1-5 Yokotani, Seta, Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, JAPAN All rights reserved ISBN 978-4-903625-25-6 The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies. The publication of this working paper series is supported by the Academic Frontier Centre (AFC) research project "In Search of Societal Mechanisms and Institutions for Conflict Resolution: Perspectives of Asian and African Studies and Beyond" (2005-2009), funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Ryukoku University.

Human Security, Universality, and National Interest: A Critical Inquiry∗

Kosuke Shimizu∗∗

Introduction Is human security in progress? Or is it in retreat? In 1994, the concept of human security shot through the international relations discourse like a comet. This concept emerged in the international scene for the first time in the Human Development Report (HDR) published by United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Since then, it has been frequently mentioned in various texts as the antithesis to realism which exclusively advocates the rule by legitimate violence. Thus IR scholars have often arranged it into liberalist discourse by arguing that human security has comparatively similar disposition to the political liberals in a sense that it focuses on individuals and civil society organisations rather than nation states. To be sure, the concept of human security can be evaluated as a radical departure from the traditional security discourse which has been exclusively based on nation-states and their inter-state relations. Shifting the focus from states to individuals had profound influence on the theory of international relations in a sense that it added a new dimension to the term “security”. However, it is often said that as far as the report of UNDP is concerned, it is far from a concrete proposal. It is worth mentioning here as well that shifting the concern from states to individuals has already been frequently witnessed in the history of political philosophy when the traditional European political theories encountered the emergence of political liberalism. And this theory, based on humanism, has been criticized by many political scholars and philosophers who observed the power of the generalization and the exclusivist tendency embedded in it. It will become clear that there is, in the discourses of human security, the necessity of receiving a critical verification insomuch as it is characterised with the similarities to liberalism. If the human security discourse is based on the liberal principle of autonomous individuals, while the indispensable point who the “human being” is remains ambiguous, the concept of human security is rather dangerous.

∗ A paper presented at the Third International Workshop of the Afrasian Centre for Peace and Develop-ment Studies, Ryukoku University. Work in progress. Please do not cite without permission of the author. ∗∗ Associate Professor of International Relations, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University

- 1 -

When scrutinising such an ambitious proposal, it seems that there are at least two related but distinctive ways of critical assessment. One is to focus on the point, if the idea is, as its adherents often advocate, coherent and consistent, and, probably, whether the assumptions and the "common sense" embedded in the idea are relevant. The second is, setting aside the theoretical validity and coherence of the idea, to criticise the compromises, changes, and gaps from what the theory assumes probably emanated from the process of putting it into practice. Originally these two are entangled with, and difficult to distinguish one from, the other, yet I try to do so because this distinction will be useful in order to promote our understanding. This paper is an attempt to investigate the problem of liberalism which has transferred its embedded assumptions and givens to the human security discourse, and the meanings it entails for the security of East Asia. The central concern here is to clarify some unquestioned premises implanted in human security, and to provide some critical comments regarding them. But the most important point concerns who is speaking and who dominates and controls the discourse. 1. Outlining Human Security Before jumping into a detailed critique of human security, it seems useful to introduce its background and contents. Human security was taken up in the HDR published by the UNDP, and appeared on the international scene for the first time in 1994. It was argued that human security is the new generation of security discourse. It emerged as a response to such issues as ethnic and religious conflicts, immigration, refugees, and terrorism, all emanating from the post-Cold War international political scene where an approach of looking at only state-state relations was no longer regarded as relevant or comprehensive. In this age, people’s safety can no longer protected by the traditional understanding of security, and therefore a new approach to it was an immediate need. According to this understanding, human security was the answer. Others argue that the term “human security” itself contains political meaning which will be revealed when we focus upon its historical background. In supporting the Basic Human Needs approach to development, Johan Galtung, for example, contends “the state hit back with humanitarian intervention and human security, making the governments and the military the indispensable sine qua non for the sine qua non of

- 2 -

security.1” In this reading of human security, it can be said that it was introduced to the discourse of international relations by nation-states in order to recapture the lost power of governance over economic and social lives in the age of globalisation. In other words, human security is understood as a political answer, or backlash, to the globalisation process which has been dominated by the symbolic logic of economics rather than state sovereignty. The contents contained in the UNDP report encouraged the conversion of the meaning of security from a concept centring on nation-states to one centring exclusively on human beings. Four fundamental features are raised, namely: universality, inter-dependence, preferring early prevention to intervention at a later phase, and human-centred. That human security is universal has a number of meanings. For example, issues like unemployment, drug abuse, crime, pollution, or the violation of human rights, are all threats to people irrespective of place. Such threats are actual and increasing. Adherents to the concept contend that surely there are differences in degree according to the places they occur, yet these threats are nevertheless common to all2. Interdependence means that issues related to instability of individuals in which human security adherents get interested, such as famine, pollution, drug-trafficking terrorism, and social problems are not confined to one individual country3. This explanation is based on the recognition that threats to people are related to one another and constitute a huge network which has been wrapping the earth. Thirdly, the concept of human security, which prioritises prevention rather than intervention, signifies the pragmatic orientation mainly concerned with reducing the cost by adopting measures before a problem grows too large. The UNDP report exemplifies the HIV/AIDs situation in Africa and argues that the money spent on HIV/AIDs in the 1980s was about 240 billion dollars and that if a few billion dollars had been spent on primary health and family planning education, the present problem could have been prevented4.

1 Johan Galtung (2004), “Human Needs, Humanitarian Intervention, Human Security and The War in Iraq”, a paper presented at the International Symposium" Political Violence and Human Security in the Post-9.11 World", Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Dec. 2004. 2 UNDP (1994), Human Development Report, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p.22. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid, pp.22-23.

- 3 -

Lastly, that human security is human-centred means that it is concerned with the life of people. Thus, it is stated that the freedom of choice, access to markets, the equality of social opportunity, and so forth are given exclusive importance5. Following the path of the UNDP, the Commission on Human Security where Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata served as the chairpersons, released the last report in May, 2003. This committee was formed in response to the request made by the UN General Secretary at the Millennium Summit in September, 2000, and established to address two exclusive issues; "the freedom from fear" and "the freedom from lack". It was mainly financed, as I will explain in more detail later on, by the Japanese government with the pragmatic political implication of fulfilling their long ambition to become a permanent member of the Security Council. The two main concepts of freedom from fear and freedom from lack mentioned at the beginning of the Commission’s report were followed by some concrete targets including; deepening the understanding of the general public about the importance of "human security" by promoting their participation and support; developing the concept of human security into a concrete means for policy planning and implementation in each country; and to provide some concrete programmes in order to cope with some extensive and serious threats against human security6. In this report, the portion which discussed the relationship between human security and national security needs detailed investigation. There, it was said that human security helps national security for the following reasons. First, it focuses on individual society rather than the state, and therefore, the factors which have not necessarily been considered a direct threat to national security are now included in the security discourse as threats to people's safety. Second, not just states but various actors are involved in protecting peace. And third, it aims to transcend protection and move towards empowerment of individuals. The comprehensive nature of the concept of human security leads policy makers to focus on lives and societies across state borders in contrast to traditional national security which has exclusively focused upon the protection of territorial borders. Moreover, unlike the conventional security concept, responsibility for safety in the human security discourse is not exclusively placed on states because it is said that

5 Ibid, p.23. 6 Commission of Human Security (2003), Human Security Now, available at http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/finalreport/index.html, p.153.

- 4 -

various actors should be involved in the process of the realisation of human security in order to address a variety of threats which nation-states are unable to recognise or address. In this sense, human security attaches much importance to the participation of individuals and NGOs7. Focusing on the participation of individuals and civil society groups implies that human security is formulated with liberalist assumptions of the rational individual. In fact, the report says in the beginning, "human security starts from the recognition that people are the most active participants in determining their well-being". This is a typical liberal premise that no one knows a person or a society more than he/she/it does him/her/itself. Therefore human security takes a position in order to support people making efforts for their own lives8 that I will discuss in detail later as self-determination. What are the concrete goals of human security then? Human security is divided into seven security domains according to the UNDP report. They are: the economy, food, health, the environment, the individual, the community, and political security 9 . Economic security means a stable basic income10; food security refers to a state where access to necessary minimum food is secured for all the people11. With the security of health, maintenance of a suitable medical system to cope with infection and illness becomes the central concern, which is of course connected with the level of income12. As for an environmental security, it is articulated in relation to the contamination of water or land13. Individual security focuses on crime, domestic violence, drug abuse, and suicide14. Abolition of discrimination based on race, religion and family is required for the security of community, and political security is connected with such concepts as democracy and human rights15. The concrete programme for implementation of human security which is supposed to address the issues above is mainly divided into two domains, namely: "human development" and "peace building", and these two roughly correspond to international political economy and international politics respectively.

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, p.4. 9 UNDP (1994), op.cit., pp.24-25. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., p.27. 12 Ibid, p.28. 13 Ibid, p.28-29. 14 Ibid, p.30-31. 15 Ibid, p.32-33.

- 5 -

Human Development

In the report of the "Commission on Human Security", human security is, as already mentioned, narrated with such expressions as "freedom from lack", and "freedom from fear." It is thought that the former corresponds with human development and empowerment and the latter with protection and security. For realising these concepts of freedom, the Commission on Human Security provides a concrete programme: for resolving poverty, by making sure that the benefit of economic development reaches even the most disadvantaged people; creating economic stability on the basis of labour for every one; balancing resource allocation in order for individual empowerment; and ensuring adequate government intervention in times of economic financial crisis. These proposals roughly correspond to the domains of security mentioned before (i.e., the economy, food, health and the environment). It is characteristic here that the relief of people in weak positions becomes a primary concern of the report. This concern is related to the word "protection" which is repeatedly employed in the report. In order to take care of people, the report claims it necessary to respect such universalised concepts as fundamental human rights and freedom, which is the first step in creating "human security". Then the necessity of internationally concerted efforts to develop national and international norms, institutions, and processes is emphasised. In doing so, they must be systematic, comprehensive, and preventive. It also emphasises the importance of people’s participation in decision-making processes and implementation of policies16. All the policies recommended in the report are based upon democratic participation considering "empowerment" of people as a pre-requisite. According to the report, this portion represents the point which distinguishes human security from traditional concepts of national security, humanitarian activities and development policies. It is also said in the report that empowerment should perform the main role, in contrast with protection, in the process of establishing human security17.

Empowerment is important because people develop their potential as individuals and as communities. Strengthening peoples' abilities to act on their own behalf is also instrumental to human security. People empowered can demand respect for their dignity when it is violated. They can create new opportunities for work and address many problems locally. And they can mobilize for the security of others,

16 Commission on Human Security (2003), op.cit., p.11. 17 Ibid, p.11.

- 6 -

say, by publicizing food shortages early, preventing famines or protesting human rights violations by states18.

In this way, the concept of freedom from lack plays a central role in the human security discourse. In the following pages of the report, empowerment is continually emphasised with special attention, and education and information are assigned the main roles in its materialisation. Peace Building In contrast to the discourse of human development in human security, peace building overlaps with the traditional interpretation of security, which has been exclusively connected with the domain of international politics. Unlike the concept of human development, which focuses mainly on the prevention of conflict, peace building’s main concern is more directly linked with conflict resolution. However, these two are not distinguishable in precise terms. For example, the process of peace building, (and therefore conflict settlement,) inevitably involves concern with prevention of a re-emergence of the conflict. Thus, conflict prevention and conflict resolution are interdependent. Here, freedom from fear serves as the main focus, and an individual, a community, and political security become the main focus among the seven domains raised by the UNDP which I introduced earlier in this paper. As a threat over the safety on an individual level, drug abuse, the rapid increase in crime, traffic accidents, and violence in the workplace are singled out. What deserves special attention is the point that these threats are often turned on women and children19. Concerning threats of the community level, discrimination against women, and discrimination against ethnic minorities are the main focuses. Violence due to tradition and convention, such as female circumcision as seen in Africa, exemplifies the former case. In the case of the latter, disputes between races which have broken out in Sri Lanka, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda are illustrative as examples20. Political security is closely connected with the human rights question. The Commission report argues:

18 Ibid, p.11. 19 UNDP (1994), op.cit., pp.30-31. 20 Ibid, p.31-32.

- 7 -

To achieve peace and stability in today's interdependent world, preventing and mitigating the impact of internal violent conflicts are not sufficient. Also important are upholding human rights, pursuing inclusive and equitable development and respecting human dignity and diversity. Equally decisive is to develop the capability of individuals and communities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf21.

Although important developments were seen in the form of a greater shift to democracy in the 1980s, political oppression has still been witnessed in many countries. Political imprisonment and torture have been frequently reported. Among the countries where the army is mobilized against its own nationals, while a large amount of defence expenditure is made, the budget outlaid for education and welfare has significantly decreased22. 2. Human Security in East Asia What meaning does the concept of human security convey to the concrete context of world affairs in East Asia? The Japanese government has shown its concern with this concept from an early stage. Murayama Tomiichi, Prime Minister at the time, made a speech in October 1995 at the 50th anniversary general meeting of the U.N. foundation. He emphasized the importance of human security in order to tackle such issues as poverty, refugees, and regional disputes which the entire humanity is facing at present. Then, when the then Prime Minister, Keizo Obuchi, visited Singapore in 1999, in addition to financial support, human security was set as a pillar for its cooperative policy with other Asian countries where an economic crisis brought massive damage. Japan aimed at practicing human security policy in such directions as military affairs, politics, and development support in the speeches made by Murayama and Obuchi. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defence Agency were regarded as an axis in terms of military affairs and political support, and JICA as the core with respect to development support. Collaboration work with JICA and CIDA is also repeatedly emphasised in the peace building processes23.

21 Commission on Human Security (2003), op.cit., p.5. 22 UNDP (1994), op.cit., p.33. 23 Fumihiko Yoshida (2004), Ningen no Anzenhosho Senryaku: Heiwa to Kaihatsu no Paradaimu Shifuto wo Mezashite, Tokyo: Iwanami, pp.140-141.

- 8 -

Now why has the Japanese government suddenly taken up human security in the 90s? To answer this question, we need to analyse history, especially in relation to Japan’s “national pride” and its desire for phallus. Japan lost its phallus in both the Second World War and the Gulf War. It not only lost its phallus but also its former colonies as honey-moon partners24 . Just as the U.S. saw pre-Revolutionary Cuba as the iconic feminine, Japan’s masculine perception was directed towards the former colonies with feminine identity. This produced a masculine identity of the Japanese “man”, but it was castrated at the end of WWII. In the Gulf War, Japan was re-castrated by the international and national media which placed Japan on the list of “losers” 25 . The concept of human security appeared in the political debate of Japan against this backdrop. This of course means that Japan’s support for human security should be regarded as an attempt to regain the phallic state of Japanese “men”. But this is not an attempt for mere reproduction of the masculine image of Japanese; it is based on a more sophisticated strategy which colours Japanese men as liberal, tolerant and peace-loving fatherhood figures. However, this new figure of fatherhood does not depart from the traditional father image in the sense that it was aimed at retaining the power over its families and a right to use violence to protect them. It is also supposed to provide the norms and values for the “good life” which is directly related to govermentality in Foucualt’s term26. This tolerant figure of fatherhood was generated out of an opportunistic but strategic concern to use (or abuse) the conjuncture of the prevailing desire among Japanese “men” for the phallic status in the international scene and the fact that Japan has Article 9 in its Constitution (even if it was drafted by the Occupation Army after WWII). Hiroyuki Tosa argues;

It has been regularly witnessed that there are some moves in which human security gets subordinated to national security by substituting some contents of the former. Japan’s diplomacy which aims to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council is a typical case27.

24 Kosuke Shimizu (2006), “Discourse of Leadership: three phallus centrists”, Working Paper Series No.10, Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development Studies. I borrowed such metaphors as “phallus” and “honey-moon” from Cynthia Weber (1999), Faking it: US hegemonoy in the “post-phallic” era, University of Minnesota Press. 25 Kosuke Shimizu (2006), ibid. 26 Michel Foucault (1991), “Governmentality”, in Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon and Peter Miller eds., The Foucault Effect; Studies in Govermentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault, Chicago: University Chicago Press. 27 Hiroyuki Tosa (2003), Anzenhosyo to iu Gyakusetu, Tokyo: Seidosha, p.112.

- 9 -

It is a feature of Japan’s approach to human security that the international contribution in relation to development support, rather than military affairs or political correspondence, is more emphasised in comparison to Canada which is concerned more with peace building. The backdrop of this is [1] constitutional constraints of dispatching the Self Defence Force (SDF) to multinational military and peace-keeping operations, [2] Japan has not made much effort for multilateral diplomacy like Canada, and there is a preset limit in terms of its diplomatic power, [3] Japan, which takes the UN-centred principle, presumes that it is important to get involved in peace building processes through specialized agencies of the UN, and [4] it sees itself as stronger in economic than political terms, and believes that it is more capable of conducting bigger economic assistance projects than Canada28. Probably, the characteristic policy of the Japanese government regarding human security is the financial contribution to the Human Security Fund. The Japanese government offered substantial money to create a fund in the United Nations. When, then Prime Minister, Obuchi visited Vietnam in December 1998, he expressed the idea that a Human Security Fund should be created in the United Nations. The donation track record by 2001 is 18,900 million yen, and is supposed to be supporting the project for protecting people’s lives and dignity through international organisations. Additionally, the Japanese government prepared an ODA scheme specifically for NGO activities separate from the fund for human security through the UN. Through this, 15 billion yen from the government’s budget is paid as expenditure for grass roots activities. In concrete terms, they include; basic educational support for improvement in community development, support for refugees and their return after conflict, maternal-and-child-health support for refugees, and support for measures against infection of the AIDS virus 29. Human Security as National Strategy Some of the official reasons why the Japanese government supports human security deserve close attention. The general view of Japanese officials assumes that the concept of human security conveys universal values. On this basis, the Japanese government contends that it should contribute to "international society" in the form of protecting human lives and dignities. It is also argued that the principles of human security share some similarities with Japan’s Constitution. Takasu, for example, argues that human 28 Ibid, p.141. 29 Ibid, p.142.

- 10 -

security contains socio-political values which are also embedded in the Japanese Constitution, that is, a human-centred perception of world affairs 30 . However, it becomes clear that they are not necessarily the main purpose, if the recent foreign policy of the Japanese government is investigated in detail. One of the important foreign policies which the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces on its website is the reform of the U.N.. Although reform of the U.N. means the reform inside the United Nations to some, the reform of the U.N. in understanding of Japanese government means exclusively that Japan should become a permanent member of the Security Council. A pamphlet which the Japanese government published in 2005 entitled "Reform of the UN Security Council: Why Japan should become a permanent member" consists of 8 pages. In this pamphlet, it is explained that Japan is a peace-loving state, offering a large amount of funding to the United Nations, and a large portion of its budget to ODA. Following the substantive financial contribution to the UN, "Japan's Efforts for Human Security", written as the second reason, is stated. That is, (1) Japan has been promoting diplomacy which concentrates on "human security", (2) it has paid its attention to every individual’s safety on the basis of the principle of human security, and (3) it has advocated the establishment of a "Commission on Human Security" in the United Nations as part of that, and has supported the activity31. Human security is clearly a part of the international strategy of Japan however, and it seems to have used the concept of human security as a lever in conjunction with its constitution which denies violent disputes to capture any position in the symbolic international sphere. That is, human security is a concept which provides a complementary meaning to national strategy. This self-centred concern of the nation state was already clear from the outset of the concept, and human security has, in fact, always been connected to national security. 30 Yukio Takasu (2006), “Ningenno Anzenhoshono Shitennitatta Kokuren Kaikaku”, a paper presented at Public Forum for UN Reform organised by Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mita Tokyo, “II. Statement of the 2005 Summit”. 31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan (2005), Reform of the UN Security Council: Why Japan should become a permanent member, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/ policy/un/reform/pamph0503.pdf. The Commission on Human Security was launched in January, 2001 as I already mentioned, deliberated upon such fields as conflict resolution, development, economic stability, health, and education, and submitted the closeout report to Secretary-General Kofi Annan in May, 2003. Furthermore, in order to make the view of human security reflect on the activity of the U.N. institutions concerned, the "human security fund" was installed in the United Nations by Japanese government’s initiative in 1999, and about 29 billion yen is subscribed by the end of the 2004 fiscal year.

- 11 -

Sadako Ogata, on the Commission on Human Security, took up this point and has described it as follows:

In many respects, human security requires including the excluded. It focuses on the widest possible range of people having enough confidence in their future - enough confidence that they can actually think about the next day, the next week, and the next year. Protecting and empowering people are thus about creating genuine possibilities for people to live in safety and dignity. Seen from this angle, human security reinforces state security but does not replace it32.

Moreover, in the text of the Commission on Human Security we can also find the following purport:

Human security and state security are mutually reinforcing and dependent on each other. Without human security, state security cannot be attained and vice versa. Human security requires strong and stable institutions. Whereas state security is focused, human security is broad33.

These statements from the Commission coincide with Takasu’s argument, which presumably reflects the MOFA’s view, a “nation-state’s role of defence, maintenance of social order, and promoting a nationals’ welfare will not be reduced at all even if we place importance on human security”34. This is the moment in which the hidden aim of Japan, and nation-states in general, in supporting human security. Although the Japanese government, and to some extent the Commission, allow the emergence of discourse of the human-centred security approach, and thus the introduction of new agents such as NGOs and CSOs into the security discourse, they do so only to the extent to which the political economic structure of the international society remains untouched. 3. The “Human Security” Abroad, “National Security” at Home This Janus-faced support of human security provided by the Japanese government becomes clear when we focus on the gap between current foreign policy in Japan and the problems of American military bases in Okinawa. As stated previously, the Japanese government contends that human security is one of the important pillars of its

32 Commission on Hunan Security (2003), op.cit., p.5. 33 Ibid, p.6 34 Takasu (2006), op.cit., “V. Roles of Government and Civil Society”.

- 12 -

foreign policy, has supplied a large amount of ODA funds overseas, and insists that it contributes to conflict prevention worldwide. This is clear from the example of human security being taken up with special emphasis in the pamphlet published by the Japanese government with its overt desire to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. When we look at the national diet, government cabinet members have mentioned human security only in the context of permanent membership of the Security Council. The ex-Foreign Minister Machimura stated at a Parliamentary session in 2005 that:

Japan joined the United Nations from a state of being an old enemy country, so to speak, and returned to the international society, and it is in such fields as human security in which Japan has had a say about disarmament, and appropriate activity has been conducted by Japan at the United Nations in the post-war period. We are also confident of having provided a sufficient record of contribution. As a country with such a record of contribution, as a country which had the leading power in Asia, Japan is the place which will call for a meeting to reform the United Nations or the function of the Security Council. In order to make the Security Council more effective, powerful and functional, Japan should become a permanent member. This means Japan will make the utmost effort to implement human security as well as other policies to contribute to international society35.

Concern about the individual has been completely left behind in the universalised human security theory as signified by Machimura. There are only a state and the United Nations. That would be it. Similarly, ex-Prime Minister Koizumi states:

About the role which our country as a permanent member of the Security Council will play, (we need to remind ourselves that) our country has been contributing to the international society until now in various fields, such as peace settlement and the production of peace, human security, disarmament, and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. By becoming a permanent member of the Security Council, Japan will take advantage of the capability and experience which were cultivated until now, I will take part in decision-making of the Security Council positively, and think it is important to play a much greater role in international peace and the maintenance of safety36.

35 Minuets of the Budgetary Commission, 162nd Session of National Parliament, no. 13. Available at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_kaigiroku.nsf/html/kaigiroku/ 001816220050216013.htm 36 Minuets of the Budgetary Commission, 162th Session of National Parliament, no. 8. Available at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/162/0001/16203180001008a.html

- 13 -

Ex-PM Koizumi does not even try to hide the supposedly concealed intention that human security is a means to enter the U.N. Security Council. That is, human security can only become visible, at least in the context of Japan’s diplomacy, exclusively in the context that human security’s universality matches the concern of Japan’s diplomatic and strategic concerns. The result of this is a disregard for stability of everyday lives within/out of the nation as a result of the generalization of human security. In other words, when the concept of human security is transformed universally, its connection with the concrete security of individuals is terminated because the signifier is disconnected from the signified by the power of national interests. Now human security, a universal concept as a signifier, is connected and subordinated to other abstract terms as national security, and drawn into the language game of diplomatic relations. A typical example of this is Okinawa. It is said that Okinawa has 75% of the U.S. related military facilities in Japan. Recently it has been said that a turning point is approaching when a reorganization of U.S. forces is planned. The territorial meaning for the locals, whose land was in fact taken from Okinawa when it was returned to Japan a few decades ago, is now deprived of again by the reorganisation of the US bases. The meaning of the territory where the locals live and maintain their lives has been disrupted again and again by the symbolic logic of state-state relations on the basis of the US-Japan security alliance, and the reorganisation of US forces. In other words, the local Okinawans have been deprived of the power to decide their own lives, despite the Japanese government’s support for human security which clearly states that people should decide how they live by themselves. When Okinawa was in the process of being returned to Japan, it was stated that the post-War period would not end without Okinawa’s return. However, it was done while the Japanese government connived for the free use of the bases by US forces and the subsequent consolidation of them. Moreover, this propaganda has hidden the violent results on the locals forcibly placed in close and violent relationships between the army and sex37. Needless to say, violence towards the women in Okinawa continues even now38. In this reorganization of U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, the word "reduction of burden" became a catchphrase and explanation has been provided as if the local burden would

37 Okinawa Times, 2006/5/15. 38 See for example, Cynthia Enloe (2004), Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire, University of California Press, pp.119-121.

- 14 -

be eased. However, Takichi Nishiyama, a former journalist for Mainichi Newspapers, criticises as follows:

In the restoration of Okinawa, such catchphrases as "the same level as the mainland without nuclear", and "the post-war period does not end without Okinawa’s return" camouflaged the negative side of Okinawa’s return to Japan. In the reorganization of U.S. forces, we can also witness that the crucial reforms of security in which the U.S. Forces and the Self-Defense Forces unification are silently progressing, under phrases like "maintenance of a military deterrent", and "reduction of burden 39 ".

Masaaki Gabe has also presented a similar argument. Referring to the word "reduction of burden" relating to the reorganization of U.S. forces, he contends that;

Priority is put on the reorganization of the U.S. Forces rather than a reduction of burden. For the U.S. Forces, it is aimed to make bases easier to use and it is the relocation to Guam of marines that comes first. The transfer to Guam is no less than 8,000. But, is the maintenance of a deterrent possible, if the U.S. changes its basic policies? It will be said that Japan pays money for the Marines to go to Guam. This is inconsistent with the previous rational provided by the Japanese government for the Marines to be stationed in Okinawa. Moreover, there are more facilities which should be returned if 17,000 marines including civilian employees are to move to Guam. I hear that the reduction of burden is only an excuse40.

What Gabe mentioned is the Japanese government’s explanation to keep the US forces in Okinawa. It was said that Okinawa is the key island for the US forces in maintaining Japan’s security, thus the bases must be placed there. Accordingly, the concept of a "reduction of burden" has been abused in the logic of national strategy, like human security. Indeed, human security has been abused by national logic. As I argued, the concept of human security has been closely involved with the desire of Japan to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council. It can now be expected that since Japan’s dream seems difficult, the importance of the concept of human security for the Japanese government will diminish. In fact, the government declared in June 2006, that it will reduce its ODA by 2 to 4 % per year for the coming five years in the report entitled "the statement of principles of economic

39 Okinawa Times, op., cit. 40 Ibid.

- 15 -

fiscal management" which will have significant influence on Japan’s budget for the coming five years41. 4. Criticism from Political Realism: E.H. Carr and Hannah Arendt Abuse of human security by state-centred logic reminds us of Hannah Arendt’s argument about the scientists of the atomic bombs. She repeatedly pointed out the simplicity of the scientists who did not refuse to manufacture the atomic bomb and that the scientists were unable to expect that the government would stop consulting with them entirely about the use of the bombs, once they were manufactured42. So, what does this mean for IR? Does it indicate that we have to re-visit the first great debate of international relations again? E. H. Carr argued as follows:

The view that nineteenth-century liberal democracy was based, not on a balance of forces peculiar to the economic development of the period and the countries concerned, but on a priori rational principles which had only to be applied in other contexts to produce similar results, was essentially utopian43.

He maintained that universal Utopianism resulted in a paradoxical consequence in which, while it puts its theoretical foundation on the liberal democracy, it ended up resulting in the global ruin.

When the theories of liberal democracy were transplanted, by a purely intellectual process, to a period and to countries whose stage of development and whose practical needs were utterly different from those of Western Europe in the nineteenth century, sterility and disillusionment were the inevitable sequel 44 .

The logic of national security regularly trifles with and abuses universalised languages and human-centred principles such as human rights and democracy. The “War on Terror”, which entails the desire for the expansion of liberal democracy, is the most recent example of this, and the degrading media coverage in Japan towards North 41 Asahi Shimbun, 2006/06/26 42 Hannah Arendt (1958), The Human Condition, Chicago: University Press of Chicago, (trans. by Hayao Shimizu, Ningen no Joken, Tokyo: Chikumashobo, 1994, pp.13-14) and Hannah Arendt (1970), On Violence, New York: Hartcourt, (trans. by Masuyuki Yamada, Boryoku ni Tsuite, Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2000). 43 E.H. Carr (1981), The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p.29. 44 Ibid.

- 16 -

Korea is another. Both of these reinforce the perception that inside is safer than outside, and therefore there is a need to strengthen state sovereignty. Probably, this has two meanings. Once this universality is accepted by those who hold the power in deciding the meaning of the word, concrete human lives are immediately separated from the universal principles, and thus abandoned like the case of Okinawans. Universalism is, in this way, connected only with the logic of national security and the images of dangerous and barbaric acts abroad provided by the nation-state. These images are very serious and are often directly connected to an unquestioned use of violence. And still more important is that people would stop considering, once this universality is established, as Arendt also pointed out45. A political dialog will be converted into a technical issue and, as a result, language will be transposed into a series of clichés. People lose their languages and the hegemony of "universality" appears, under which national interest as the symbolic logic is lying. Here we encounter the most important problem of human security. The word "safety", which is displaced from concrete place and time, hides the power relations behind the scene which often escapes critical inquiry. Arendt states that these theories are dangerous not only because they appear as reasonable with the proofs of the present trend which such theories claim to understand, but also because they hypnotise as they seem to be immanently consistent46. However, this hypnotism is the very reason for threats to people’s safety on a micro level. When we adopt a word universally, then we often get hypnotised and cease critically assessing the word, and lose the ability to return it to its original meaning or imagine the possibility of people’s lives being threatened by the application of it is a diverse place and time. This is exemplified by the paradoxical state of contemporary liberal democracy in which democracy has been used to fight against “Others”. The universally-adopted term has been used and abused repeatedly by hegemonic powers to intervene with carefully selected “barbaric” states where economic interests are expected. In addition to this, the term democracy is now entangled with the concept of security, and generates the undemocratic image of outside. After the 9.11 attacks,

45 Ibid, p.14. 46 Hannah Arendt, op.cit., (2000), p.102.

- 17 -

liberal democracy and security have been used in this way and this inevitably leads to the Empire of liberal democracy.

‘Democracy’ functions as the standard bearer of the US-led ‘war on terror’, which is fought in the name of preserving ‘our democratic way of life’ against the enemy who, as George W. Bush is fond of saying, ‘hates freedom’. Thus, we are told that the only way to guarantee security at home is to promote democracy abroad. So not only does the export of democracy, or at least a specific version of it, serve as the pretext for violent regime change and the extension of the global hegemony of the United States, it also operates as a marker for what is politically acceptable today47.

The reason and hypnotism of the age is, in this way, formulated and articulated ubiquitously and generating and regenerating the strict demarcation between such artificially produced binary oppositions as the “Civilised West” and the “Barbaric East”, “Democratic Japan” and “Authoritarian North Korea”, and “us” and “them”. They have been repeatedly used in mass media and everyday conversations in referring to the internal safety and external barbarity, which in turn guarantees and strengthens the identity of “Self”. The meanings of security is thus controlled and maintained by the hegemonic power with the purpose of reinforcing of the prevailing international order. In this sense, the construction of “Others” is a result of the identity production of the “Self”. The security of the “Self”, the freedom from fear of the “Self”, leads to a possibility of producing the very existence of the barbaric. Thus, the Iraq War and the “War on Terror” can be regarded as not benefiting the security of ordinary citizens or those who live in Western nations, nor world peace, let alone the locals of the conflict areas. It is rather a result of the identity production of those whose identity is at risk. The binary oppositions formulated in this way are extremely dangerous particularly when linked to the nation-state which is the only legitimate bearer and exerciser of violence. The barbaric “Others” are regarded to be the subjects who need to be tamed, disciplined, and educated not just for world peace, but ironically for them. This is frequently exercised in an extremely violent form typically exemplified by the Iraq War. In some cases, this violent perception towards “Others” appears in completely different, or opposite, forms. Wendy Brown, for example, contends that tolerance reflects the

47 Saul Newman and Michael P. Levine (2006), “War, Politics and Race: Reflections on Violence in the ‘War on Terror’”, Theoria, August, p.27.

- 18 -

violent disposition of the Self. They are different sides of the same coin. However, she argues tolerance, as such, is not the problem.

Rather, the call for tolerance, the invocation of tolerance, and the attempt to instantiate tolerance are all signs of identity production and identity management in the context of orders of stratification or marginalization in which the production, the management, and the their context are disavowed. In short, they are signs of a buried order of politics48.

Thus, tolerance too can be understood as a symptom that the identity of the “Self” is at risk. This danger leads the “Self” to be tolerant to “Others” precisely because it needs to fortify its territory. This is interestingly done at the very moment the “Self” superficially advocates and supports “Others”49. This extremity of violence or tolerance comes not out of unexpected acts of “evil”. Rather, it emanates from universally adopted principles of prevailing norms and values. William Connolly, for example, argued that violent acts towards “Others” often emanate from a sense of guilt when one fails to satisfy the required political and social norms and values which are prevailing and dominating the society.

The modern normal, responsible individual can redirect resentment against the human condition into the self, first, by treating the rational, self-interested, free, and principled individuals as morally responsible for wilful deviation from normal identity and, second, by treating that in itself and other selves which falls below the threshold of responsibility as a natural defect in need of conquest or conversion, punishment or love. The modern individual, in short, contains resentment against the human condition in its own identity, and this comes out most clearly in the intensity of the resentment it expresses against any other who deviate significantly from that identity50.

48 Wendy Brown (2006), Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.14. 49 Brown shows how the Bush administration was tolerant to Arab Americans right after the September 11 attack. She quotes President Bush’s remarks such as “Our nation must be mindful that there are thousands of Arab Americans…who love their flag just as much as…[we] do. And we must be mindful that as we seek to win the war that we treat Arab Americans and Muslims with the respect they deserve”, “It is my honor to be meeting with leaders who feel just the same way I do. They’re outraged, they’re sad. They love America just as much as I do”, which was expressed after the meeting with Islamic leaders in DC, Brown argues “Multiculturalist talk does not come easily or naturally to Bush: he reinstalls a “we” and a “they” at the very moment he is trying to dispel the distinction.” Wendy Brown (2006), pp.99-100. 50 William Connolly (1991), Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p.80.

- 19 -

This identity leads to violent acts in the sense of guilt and resentment towards him/herself which have stemmed from the “absence of necessity in what you are”51.

This explanation of violent actions on the basis of internal guilt and resentment also explains the condescending love and kindness towards “inferior Others”. The guilt is, in this case, released by the appreciation and affection provided by others52. This is the reason for the sudden emergence of the love-turn-hate syndrome and stalking behaviour when the “Self” is disregarded and treated badly by a partner who has been assigned by the Self an inferior position in family relations. What is at stake here is the extent to which the power of the norms and principles forcibly transplanted and internalised in the subject is exercised, regardless of whether it is in a liberal democracy or patriarchy. Thus, the question to address in the context of human security is whether this is promoting a violent disposition emanating from hegemonic discourses of modernity, or rejecting them by accepting the diversity among/within individuals. It seems like human security was originally created in order to promote diversity among/within individuals and societies. This was precisely the reason why agents of human security included NGOs and CSOs within it. This was a courageous attempt because it would have reduced the importance of nation-states in the context of contemporary world affairs even though they provided the main financial support to promote human security. However, in the course of promoting human security, it was hijacked by the patrons and has been used and abused in an opposite direction. As I argued, the Japanese government has used it in order to promote its political position in the UN. This is exemplified by the sharp contrast between the ways in that it promotes itself in the context of the UN Security Council, and the way it has been treating Okinawa and the US base issue.

51 William Connolly (1994), “Beyond Good and Evil: the Ethical Sensibility of Michel Foucault”, Political Theory, Vol.21, No.3, p.367. In order to avoid the violent tendency in the unsatisfied individuals, William Connolly introduces a new concept “agonistic respect”. It is “a social relation of respect for the opponent against whom you define yourself even while you resist its imperatives and strive to delimit its spaces of hegemony”. This is somewhat related to Chantal Mouffe’s argument of “Agonistic Model of Democracy”. See Chantal Mouffe (2000), The Democratic Paradox, London: Verso , p.80. 52 Needless to say, this family relation of co-dependency is not maintained solely by the aggressors. It is also maintained by the victims. See for example, Sayoko Shinoda (2003), Aishisugiru Kazokuga Kowarerutoki, Tokyo: Iwanamishoten , and (1998), Aijoto Iunano Shihai, Tokyo: Kairyusya.

- 20 -

I am very much aware that this does not necessarily mean that human security is completely useless. It does contain the possibility for theoretical advancement in a sense as it incorporates the term “human” into the context of security. This is revolutionary, since it may end up giving us a new perception towards the subject of IR and thus a new picture of world affairs, which has been totally dominated by the hegemony of the nation state. What we need to be cautious about is preventing the separation of the term from its initially planned purpose, and maintaining it in the implementation phase.

- 21 -

Working Paper Series No.1

James R. Simpson, Future of the Dairy Industries in China, Japan and the United States: Conflict Resolution in the Doha Round of WTO Agricultural Trade Negotiations

No.2 K. Palanisami, Sustainable Management of Tank Irrigation Systems in South India

No.3 Nobuko Nagasaki, Satyagraha as a Non-violent Means of Conflict Resolution

No.4 Yoshio Kawamura, and Zhan Jin, WTO/FTA and the Issues of Regional Disparity

No.5 Shin’ichi Takeuchi, Political Liberalization or Armed Conflicts? Political Changes in Post-Cold War Africa

No.6 Daniel C. Bach, Regional Governance and State Reconstruction in Africa

No.7 Eghosa E. Osaghae, Ethnicity and the State in Africa

No.8 Kazuo Takahashi, The Kurdish Situation in Iraq

No.9 Kaoru Sugihara, East Asia, Middle East and the World Economy: Further Notes on the Oil Triangle

No.10 Kosuke Shimizu, Discourses of Leadership and Japanese Political Economy: Three Phallus-centrists

No.11 Nao Sato, The Composition and Job Structure of Female-Headed Households: A Case Study of

a Rural Village in Siemreap Province, Cambodia No.12

Takuya Misu, The United States and the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)

No.13 Om Prakash, Asia and the Rise of the Early Modern World Economy

No.14 Takehiko Ochiai, Regional Security in Africa

No.15 Masahisa Kawabata, An Overview of the Debate on the African State

No.16 Kazuo Takahashi, The Middle East, the Middle Kingdom and Japan

No.17 Tomoya Suzuki, Macroeconomic Impacts of Terrorism: Evidence from Indonesia in the

Post-Suharto Era

No.18 Kenichi Matsui, International Energy Regime: Role of Knowledge and Energy and Climate

Change Issues

No.19 Kazuo Takahashi, Not the Most Popular Decision: Japan’s Ground Self Defense Force Goes to

Iraq

No.20 Gyanendra Pandey, The Punjabi Village Community: in Violence and in Resettlement

No.21 Yoshio Kawamura, Participatory Community Development and a Role of Social Statistical Analysis: Case of the JICA-Indonesia Project-Takalar Model

No.22 Takashi Inoguchi, The Place of the United States in the Triangle of Japan, China and India

No.23 Ruby Lal, Colonialism and the Debate on Muslim Respectability

Afrasian Centre for Peace and Development StudiesRyukoku University

1-5 Yokotani, Seta, Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, JAPAN ISBN 978-4-903625-25-6