British Journal of Social Psychology (2015)

© 2015 The British Psychological Society

www.wileyonlinelibrary.com

How groups cope with collective responsibility forecological problems: Symbolic coping andcollective emotions

Sabine Caillaud*, Virginie Bonnot, Eugenia Ratiu andSilvia Krauth-GruberParis Descartes University, Sorbonne Paris Cit�e, France

This study explores the way groups cope with collective responsibility for ecological

problems. The social representations approach was adopted, and the collective symbolic

coping model was used as a frame of analysis, integrating collective emotions to enhance

the understanding of coping processes. Theoriginal feature of this study is that the analysis

is at group level. Seven focus groups were conducted with French students. An original

use of focus groups was proposed: Discussions were structured to induce feelings of

collective responsibility and enable observation of how groups cope with such feelings at

various levels (social knowledge; social identities; group dynamics). Two analyses were

conducted: Qualitative analysis of participants’ use of various kinds of knowledge, social

categories and the group dynamics, and lexicometric analysis to reveal how emotions

varied during the different discussion phases. Results showed that groups’ emotional

states moved from negative to positive: They used specific social categories and resorted

to shared stereotypes to cope with collective responsibility and maintain the integrity of

their worldview. Only then did debate become possible again; it was anchored in the

nature-culture dichotomy such that groups switched from group-based to system-based

emotions.

One of the main issues in overcoming ecological problems caused by human activities is

understanding what motivates people to act pro-environmentally. Attribution ofresponsibility and moral emotions have been shown to predict pro-ecological behaviour

(Bamberg & M€oser, 2007; Hunnecke, Bl€obaum, Matthies, & H€oger, 2001; Jang, 2013;Kaiser & Shimoda, 1999; Steg & Nordlund, 2013). Responsibility attributions determine

whether people feel guilty about their personal behaviour or resentment about the

irresponsible behaviour of others (Montada & Kals, 2000); people may also feel indignant

that insufficient action is being taken, or angry about excessive pro-environmental action

(Kals & Russell, 2001; Montada, Kals, & Becker, 2007). The afore-mentioned studies

explain the processes leading to ecological behaviour at an individual level (Kals & Maes,2002); however, ecological problems result from collective actions and have global

consequences. They are discussed at a collective level (i.e., in the media, in group

interactions, at international conferences, etc.). Psychologists should therefore develop a

deeper understanding of the collective processes involved in collective responsibility.

*Correspondence should be addressed to Sabine Caillaud, 71 Avenue Edouard Vaillant, 92774 Boulogne Billancourt, France(email: sabine.caillaud@parisdescartes.fr).

DOI:10.1111/bjso.12126

1

Thus far, little is known about the ways groups cope with collective responsibility for

ecological problems. One way to address this question is to investigate how groups

construct representations in response to collective responsibility. Another is to examine

collective emotional processes induced by collective responsibility. Whilst bothapproaches explicitly recognize social identity negotiations as central, they each

emphasize a specific dimension (social knowledge or emotions) of the coping process.

The originality of the present study lies in combining both approaches to obtain a better

understanding of the way groups – rather than individuals – cope with collective

responsibility. We therefore used focus groups, which can be compared to a ‘thinking

society in miniature’ (Farr & Tafoya, 1992), to study social interactions within groups

facing up to collective responsibility. This method originates from Lewin’s studies of

group interactions and social change (Hamel, 2001; Kalampalikis, 2011) and enables theresearcher to look at group processes involved in construction of representations

(Markova, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar Orvig, 2007).

Collective responsibility through the lens of social representations

Definitions and perceptions of responsibility are socially constructed and vary across

time, history, and context (Kozaka€ı, 2006, 2008). The social representations approach

emphasizes both the content and the dynamics of social thinking (Markova, 2005).

Social representations can be seen as a structured mental – that is, cognitive, evaluative,

affective and symbolic – content about socially relevant phenomena. [. . . .] In the collective

view, social representations are seen as apublic process of creation, elaboration, diffusion and

change of shared knowledge in the everyday discourse. (Wagner, 1994, p. 200)

Our aim was to explore the processes that underpin social representations of

collective responsibility for ecological problems. Social representations theory posits thatwhen groups are confronted with a new object or phenomenon, they will try to integrate

it into existing mental categories (e.g., biotechnology may be anchored in illness

categories; Castro & Gomes, 2005). This cognitive process also has a social dimension.

First, mental categories are socially constructed and socially shared. Second, this process

takes place throughvariousmeans of communication (media, social interactions, etc.) and

in specific social groups (Kalampalikis &Haas, 2008). Furthermore, social representations

have an identity function in that they define group boundaries and are constructed to

improve social identity: They are formed in relation to other groups (Jodelet, 1989;Wagner, 1994) and they imply the attempt to fulfil the group’s project (e.g., mutual

interests, goals; Bauer & Gaskell, 2008). Social representations not only determine social

identity, they are also influenced by social identity: The two constructs are linked

dialogically (Breakwell, 1993). Individuals belong to various social groups which all have

forms of specific knowledge (scientific, political, etc.) that constitute the building blocks

of social representations; in other words, social representations feed themselves on

different kinds of knowledge. Social representations can also reflect a defence against

unwelcome emotions (Joffe, 1999). For example, women in Hong Kong who were afraidof the avian bird flu epidemic anchored their representations of the epidemic in the

stereotype that Mainland China is dirty. Attaching responsibility for the epidemic to these

Others allows them to reduce their fear. This process of symbolic othering protects the

ingroup by maintaining its distance from the outgroup (Joffe & Lee, 2004). One part of

social representations theory is more specifically concerned with the way groups

2 Sabine Caillaud et al.

symbolically cope with threatening novelty, that is how groups construct and transform

their knowledge in response to threatening information, and hence with the study of

social representations in the making (Markova, 2000).

Collective symbolic coping with collective responsibility

Social groups familiarize themselves with novelty and strangeness through a process of

‘collective symbolic coping’, but this process does not necessarily result in a fully fledged

social representation (Wagner & Kronberger, 2001). Symbolic coping, defined as ‘the

activity of a collectivity that attempts to maintain the integrity of its worldview bymaking

sense of any new phenomenon’ (Wagner, Kronberger, & Seifert, 2002, p. 325), provides

ways of interpreting and dealing with a new threat (Gilles et al., 2011). The four stages ofsymbolic coping (awareness, divergence, convergence, and normalization) have been

investigated in two empirical studies (based on media analysis and public survey data),

one related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs; Wagner et al., 2002) and one

related to avian influenza (Gilles et al., 2011). In the first stage, awareness, the public

becomes aware of a phenomenon which has significance for it. During this stage, media

coverage of the phenomenon increases and creates an awareness of danger. During the

second stage, divergence, the phenomenon is confronted with different existing

repertoires of interpretations, different images are used, and different kinds of knowledgeare called up to make sense of it. The public makes use of both scientific knowledge and

fantasy-filled images (e.g., that eating a genetically modified fruit could modify a person’s

genes). The process of othering is likely to occur during this stage (Gilles et al., 2011). At

the third stage, convergence, some of these interpretations are adopted by the majority

and others are abandoned. Thus, the group converges towards a new interpretation

which may take the form of metaphors, images, or inter-related beliefs. Finally, in the last

stage, normalization, initial interpretations created in the context of emergency and

threat, can become more scientific, less emotional, and less fantasy-filled.The collective symbolic copingmodel offers a thought-provoking frame to engage in a

temporal analysis, to study social representations in the making. To date, the model has

only been applied to a special kind of social communication (mass media) and to

frightening objects (e.g., illness, GMOs) on a macro-social level (media and survey data).

We adopted the symbolic coping model as a frame of analysis allowing us to explore the

ways in which groups cope symbolically with collective responsibility for ecological

problems during social interactions. As collective responsibility is often associated with

negative moral emotions (Kals & Russell, 2001), we proposed to integrate an analysis ofemotions into the coping process.

Collective responsibility and collective emotions

Collective emotions are emotions that are felt because one’s group or one of its members

was or is exposed to an emotion-eliciting event. They can be experienced without any

direct, personal involvement, requiring only that the individual self-categorizes as a

member of the relevant group and identifieswith it (Wohl, Branscombe,&Klar, 2006). Forinstance, if individuals judge their group to be responsible for a harmful event (appraisal),

and if they identify sufficiently with the group (social identification), they might

experience collective guilt or shame. For example, French person might feel guilty for

pollution as a citizen of an industrialized country or as a French citizen; in both cases, the

subject of collective emotions is not an individual but a group member (Kuppens &

Yzerbyt, 2012).

Collective coping with ecological problems 3

Collective emotions and social identity are bidirectionally linked. When a social

category becomes salient, people may feel collective emotions on behalf of their social

group (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2012). Simultaneously, emotions can affect self-categoriza-

tion (Livingstone, Bruder, Spears, Manstead, & Sheperd, 2011) or identification with theingroup (Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Thus, when individuals self-categorize as member

of a group which is held responsible for a harmful event they experience negative

collective emotions and feel that their social identity is threatened (Wohl et al., 2006).

Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that under these circumstances,

group members will use identity management strategies to restore a positive social

identity. Research on collective emotions and ecological problems hasmainly considered

the positive outcomes of collective emotions. For instance, collective guilt induces desire

to repair environmental damage and collective anger increase the willingness to punishpolluters (Ferguson & Branscombe, 2010; Harth, Leach, & Kessler, 2013). These

experimental studies focused on individual processes. Participants were given the

opportunity to act (or to express their intention to act) pro-environmentally as soon as

they experienced the negative emotion. In real life, however, people do not always have

this behavioural opportunity and therefore need to use other coping strategies. Because

collective emotions are based both on cognitive appraisal (i.e., attribution of responsi-

bility) and on social identification, people can develop coping strategies at these two

levels. On the one hand, there are coping strategieswhich seek tominimize the severity ofthe harmdone or appraise it as legitimate (Wohl et al., 2006) or overestimate the temporal

distance for a harm caused in the past (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2010). These appraisal-

related strategies are based on knowledge transformation and can be considered

examples of symbolic coping.

Another way of coping with negative collective emotions is to adopt identity

negotiation strategies to achieve a positive social identity (Deaux & Ethier, 1998).

According to social identity theory (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999;

Tajfel & Turner, 1979), identity strategies can be personal (leaving the ingroup) orcollective (e.g., using new dimensions for ingroup comparisons; changing group values;

changing the comparison groups; and entering into competition with the outgroup)

depending on the specific intergroup context.

Finally, coping with emotions is a social activity because people have a strong

tendency to talk about their emotionswith others, so-called emotional disclosure or social

sharing. The social sharing of emotions (Rim�e, 2005, 2007) ismotivated by a desire to feel

better and by the need to develop a better understanding of the emotion-inducing event

that may have threatened one’s world view; it is a process which fulfils several socialfunctions. Talking with others about one’s emotions allows people to obtain

social validation of their appropriateness and relevance and improves the quality of their

social relationships. Through discourse, the social sharing of emotion leads to a

reorganization of social knowledge and contributes to the construction of social

representations (Rim�e, 2005, 2007). In summary, emotions play an important role in

reactions to novelty or strangeness and should therefore be taken into consideration in an

analysis of coping processes.

Aims of the study

This study explores processes for coping with collective responsibility for ecological

problems during social interactions. We analysed coping processes in terms of

4 Sabine Caillaud et al.

construction and transformation of social knowledge (symbolic coping) and emotional

processes (emotional coping) using focus groups.

Focus groups can be understood [. . .] as a simulation of these routine but relatively

inaccessible communicative contexts that can help us discover the processes by which

meaning is socially constructed through everyday talk. (Lunt & Livingstone, 1996, p. 85)

Focus groups differ from natural group discussions as the researcher ensures thatdiscussion remains focused on the topic of interest (Barbour, 2008; Kitzinger, 1994;

Kitzinger & Barbour, 1999). Focus groups also differ from group interviews as group

interactions are encouraged and are used to produce data (Acocella, 2012; Kitzinger,

1994). They can be used as a ‘laboratory of observation’ in which the discussion is

organized in accordance with specific research aims (Caillaud & Kalampalikis, 2013;

Kalampalikis, 2011). The novel feature of ourmethodwas thatwe developed several tasks

that were used to structure group discussion around the induction of collective

responsibility, the negotiation of identities, and the attribution of responsibility forecological problems.

We adopted an integrative, dynamic approach based on the symbolic coping model

and on the concept of collective emotions; hence, we hypothesized that in the initial

stage, when groups became aware of their collective responsibility for ecological

problems, they would experience negative collective emotions. At the second stage

(akin to the divergence phase), we anticipated that different interpretations making

use of diverse kinds of knowledge would emerge and that a variety of coping

strategies would be developed, for example identity negotiation and othering (e.g.,attribution of responsibility to others). In the third stage (comparable to the

convergence phase), we expected to see successful coping reflected in a reduction in

negative emotions and in convergence on a consensual interpretation allowing for a

positive social identity. As we were investigating coping over a brief time period

(focus groups), the fourth and final stage (normalization), characterized by less

emotional and fantasy-filled interpretations but more scientific explanations, might not

occur.

Method

Participants and focus group structure

Seven focus groups were recruited, each comprising between four and six participants

(N = 30). The samplewas a convenient, homogeneous sample of undergraduate students

in psychology with a mean age of 20.1 years (range 19–26 years). Most participants werewomen (76.6%), and nonewere engaged in the protection of the environment. Theywere

invited to take part in a study on social interactions relating to current social problems.

The focus groups were held in a university room. The moderator used the following

introduction to initiate the focus group sessions:

Iwill ask you to carry out and discuss some tasks. The topic of the discussion is a current affairs

topic related to ecology. The discussion will last about one hour, and I will show you

documents and ask you questions. I will let you talk about it together. There are no right or

wrong answers; what we are looking for is your opinions, your points of view, and the ways

you talk together.

Collective coping with ecological problems 5

Next, the moderator presented the various tasks around which the group discussion

would be structured. He asked for more details if taken for granted ideas or beliefs or

paradoxes emerged during discussion (Kitzinger, 1994), but otherwise remained in the

background. Note that although the topic of discussion was structured, the dynamics ofthe groupwere not (Morgan, 1996). Discussion timewas unrestricted. Themean duration

of each focus group discussion was about one hour and 14 min. All focus groups were

videotaped and transcribed.

The focus groups were structured around three tasks (Table 1). The ecological

footprint task was used to create a situation in which collective responsibility for

ecological problems became prominent. This task has previously been used successfully

to induce collective guilt in experimental contexts (Mallett, Melchiori, & Strickroth,

2013). It consists of a 21-item questionnaire that asks participants to provide informationabout their everyday practices in relation to energy use, water use, transportation,

housing, alimentation, etc. We modified the questions so that participants were asked to

respond collectively to questions about the everyday practices of people in general (e.g.,

in general, do they buy organic products? [yes/no] Do they take a shower every day? [yes/

no] Howmany kilometres do they drive their car per week? etc.). Collective negotiations

and discussionswere required to agree a group response. The term people in generalwas

chosen to encourage participants to refer freely to social groups that were relevant to

Table 1. Structure of focus groups and specific research aims

Tasks Aims Steps for analysis

What the analysis is

looking for

Ecological

footprint task

Creating conditions where

collective responsibility

for ecological problems

can emerge

Step 1: Answering the

questionnaire

Initial state (reference for

next section):

- Kinds of knowledge used

- Emotional state

- Social categorizations

participants refer to

Step 2: Discovering and

commenting on the

ecological

footprint obtained

- Emotional state

- Spontaneous coping

strategies used

Comparisons task Main focus:

Social dimensions/

identity negotiation

Step 3 - Relevant levels of social

categorization

- Comparisons used to

cope with collective

responsibility

- Kinds of knowledge used

- Emotional state

Responsibility

attribution task

Main focus: Different kinds

of social knowledge

Step 4 - Kinds of knowledge used

to explain ecological

problems

- Kinds of social

categorizations becoming

relevant

- Emotional state

6 Sabine Caillaud et al.

them. Participants knew from the instructions that the questionnaire was intended to

measure the ecological footprint. At the end of the questionnaire, the group obtained the

size of the ecological footprint, in terms of the number of planets necessary to satisfy all

the needs for natural resources, and they were invited to comment freely on it. For thepurpose of analysis, the task was divided into two parts: The period during which the

group answered the questionnaire and the period after they discovered their score.

The second task, a comparisons task, offered participants the opportunity to compare

this ecological footprint score with the scores of other groups. Participants were shown

28 cards bearing the name of a group (inhabitants of diverse cities, countries and

continents of varying developmental levels – rich countries, emerging countries – and foran inhabitant of the world) on the front and the corresponding ecological footprint score

on the back. Groups were invited to choose five cards to turn and comment on. Thiscomparison task allowed us to examine the social strategies used by groups to achieve a

positive social identity (identity negotiation) in more detail. The explanations and images

used by the groups in their comments on the cards were analysed to provide insight into

the different kinds of knowledge they used.

Finally, the responsibility attribution task focused on social knowledge. Groupswere

asked to discuss the agents responsible for global climate change. They were invited to

write the names of all responsible agents on sticky notepapers (there were no restrictions

on discussion time or number of agents nominated) and to rank them on a continuum ofresponsibility. The continuum was represented by a large arrow approximately 50 cm

long which was placed on the table. Groups were allowed to place and replace the sticky

notepapers representing the various agents at different places on the continuum during

the course of the debate. The researcher noted the final order. Table 1 provides an

overview of the structure of the discussion. We were interested in the social, emotional,

and cognitive content of the discussion at each stage.

Dialogical content analysis and lexicometric analysis

Two methods of analyses relating to different theoretical approaches – social represen-

tations and collective emotions – were used in a triangulation perspective to provide an

integrated perspective on the data (Flick, 2008; Flick, Garms-Homolova, Herrmann,Kuck,

& R€ohnsch, 2012). In analyses, we considered the discussions in terms of four steps

(answering the ecological footprint questionnaire; discovering the group’s ecological

footprint score; social comparison; attribution of responsibility).

First, we carried out dialogical content analysis (Markova et al., 2007); this is amethodused to describe the content and dynamic of discussions (Caillaud & Kalampalikis, 2013;

Strauss, 1987). This analysis is epistemologically distinct from discourse analysis

(McKinlay, Potter, & Wetherell, 1993; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) but shares some of its

tools and assumptions. Much social knowledge is implicit and tends not to be expressed

directly in discourse, so both discourse analysis and dialogical content analysis make

inferences from observed phenomena by referring to the context of discourse (Van Dijk,

2008). The Atlas-ti software (Friese, 2012) was used to support this analysis.

The first step in dialogical content analysis consists of making an open coding of thetranscripts of the discussions whilst paying special attention to topics relevant to the

research. Social knowledge is the kind of knowledge and the type of arguments deployed

by participants during group discussions (Table 2). Social identity encompasses the

social categories used by participants as indicated by the names of groups they mention,

the comparisons they make, and the pronouns they use. The dynamics of the group

Collective coping with ecological problems 7

discussion were analysed in terms of debate and consensus, as revealed by use of

connectors of oppositions, non-verbal behaviour (e.g., laughter), and affirmative and

supportive arguments (Markova et al., 2007).

In the second step, we compared group discussions by looking for similarities and

differences to capture the specific response patterns of the groups.

In the third step, quantitative indicators (e.g., number of pronouns; number and type

of connectors, etc.) were used to confirm or reject the apparent response patterns

uncovered in the previous step.Emotions were investigated using Emotaix, computer software that detects words

related to emotions (Piolat & Bannour, 2009). This lexicometric text analysis is based on

evidence that people’s language carries information about ongoing emotional processes

(Cohn, Mehl, & Pennebaker, 2004; Tausczik, Faase, Pennebaker, & Petrie, 2012). We

explored the evolution of emotions during the discussions by calculating the percentages

of positive and negative emotional words in each part of the discussions. Results are

reported as percentages (emotional words as a proportion of the total number of words

for each part of the discussion).

Results

Results are presented separately for each of the four steps of the group discussionwith anemphasis on groupdynamics, social identities, the type of knowledge, and the emotions in

evidence. Group similarities and differences are also noted. Table 3 provides an overview

of the main results.

Table 2. Codes used for the different kinds of knowledge and their definitions

Kinds of

knowledge Definitions Examples

Sociological

knowledge

Groups refer

to arguments on a

macro-social level

aiming to explain

how society functions

Z: I think there is also the fact that people travel more now

W: Globalisation

Z: So and hmm they are well we have more cars

Y: Globalisation includes everything; globalisation is the

one what covers all things. . ./. . . responsible for allkind of individualism.

Everyday

knowledge

Group’s

argument refers

to examples from

their daily life

V: ‘You think that people in general buy a lot of books and

newspapers, count 3000’ not a lot now, because

of internet

S: Not a lot

U:Well they are people who buy some

T: Newspapers oh yes they are . . ./. . . and even books, in

the subway you see a lot of people with books

Folk

psychology

Group’s

argument refers

to ‘human nature’

N: I think we should show pictures shocking people,

or something like this

R: It’s stupid, that we become aware only when

something happens to us

Scientific

knowledge

Groups use

arguments on

a scientific level

F: And trees? no. . .?

G: No it produces oxygen. It eats up dioxygen and

produces oxygen? It’s good

8 Sabine Caillaud et al.

Ecological footprint task

The emotional atmosphere in the first part of the discussions was generally positive; this

was reflected in the predominance ofwords referring to positive emotions, for example, ‘I

was so happy’, ‘it makes us feel better’, ‘I had seen something so funny’, etc. These

positive emotions were mainly linked to participants being pleased that they were taking

part in a study where they just had to talk to each other.The social identities spontaneously mobilized by participants when responding to the

questionnaire were ‘French’ (48 occurrences) and ‘Parisian’ (110 occurrences, 81 of

which were in the context of questions about transportation):

FG1R: ‘transportation, car, evaluate the number of kilometres people in general travel by

car per week’

[. . .]

N: Because, from suburbs to Paris there are, how many, about 50 kilometres?

Concerning social knowledge, results revealed that participants referred mainly to

everyday knowledge that helped them to answer the questions. For example,

participants referred to the traffic they observed on a daily basis to judge how many

kilometres people drove per week (FG2 B: ‘but it is amazing how much traffic there is

every morning and evening’). In the same way, they used lay sociological knowledge to

answer questions about consumption behaviour (FG2 D: ‘It depends on financialresources, nowadays, it is a clich�e that in general the people who buy organic are

people who have money’).

Comparisons of the seven focus groups in this part of the discussion made it clear that

there were differences in the extent to which group members drew on personal

Table 3. Summary of the main results

Collective responsibility:

Dimensions and evolutions

Answering the

questionnaire

Comments on

their ecological

footprint

Comparisons

task

Responsibility

and attribution

task

Emotional state

(% of emotional words)

Negative words 0.23 0.98 0.49 0.42

Positive words 0.38 0.21 0.65 0.15

Group dynamic Humour/

consensus

Consensus Debate

% of connectors of

oppositions

(but, however. . .)

1.91 1.78 1.67 2.38

% of connectors of

comparisons (as, like. . .)0.15 0.38 0.48 0.22

Social categories used We as Parisians

or French

Rich/poor Rich/poor;

city/country

Nature/society

Types of knowledge Folk sociology,

everyday

knowledge

Folk psychology Stereotypical

knowledge

Folk ecology and

folk sociology

Collective coping with ecological problems 9

experience during the ecological footprint task. Participants in four of the groups often

referred to their ownway of life (58.5% of pronouns referred to the focus group or to one

of the participant or to their family). In the remaining three groups, the discussion stayed

at amore general, abstract level (62.1% of pronouns referred to people in general). As willbe shown later, this difference had consequences for the comparison task.

Furthermore, there were differences between the groups which anticipated a bad

score (n = 4) and thosewhich did not (n = 3); in subsequent analyses, this group variable

(anticipated score) was found to be associated with differences in coping strategies.

Discovering the ecological footprint

When discovering their ecological footprint (mean score = 4.1 planets), the frequency ofwords referring to negative emotions was significantly higher than in the first task, 0.23%

versus 0.98%; v2(1, 46,322) = 54.6, p < .001. Interestingly, the most frequent references

to negative emotions were not related to anxiety (0.17%; ‘that’s horrible, it’s a little bit

alarming’) butwords referring to unease (0.63%; ‘this testwilldepress us’, ‘oh it’s so sad’,

‘we really are in the shit’, ‘now that isa shock’, ‘we arebastards’). These emotionalwords

were attached to the pronoun ‘we’ (the French ‘on’ and ‘nous’). The frequency of this

pronoun increased during this second stage of the discussion, from 12.2% during the first

stage to 30.9% during the second stage, v2(1, 3,947) = 16.9, p < .001. At the same time,the frequency of the pronoun ‘I’ decreased, from 36.9% to 25.6%, v2(1, 3,947) = 12.06,

p < .001. These results strongly suggest that the emotions being expressed were

collective.

Groups used different strategies to manage the negative emotions they expressed.

Those who had anticipated a bad ecological footprint used strategies to deny

responsibility:

FG2

C:Well it is enormous (laughing)

D: Yes, but at the same time we were pushed into our way of life.

Those who had not anticipated a bad score were more likely to minimize the negative

consequences by emphasizing that their own group’s high ecological footprint iscompensated for by those who consume and pollute less. However, this strategy led to

feelings of guilt about social inequity:

FG5

F: The number of planets to meet the needs. . .but that’s horrible, 4 planets.G: It’s sad. Yes but really we answered for French people.

F: Yes but, but it is based on our habits.

G: But poor countries do not consume as much as we do. . . we are bastards

(laughing)

(she turns the questionnaire over and puts it on the other side of the table)

Concerning group dynamics, laughter and jokingwere used ten timesmore frequently

when discussing the size of the group’s ecological footprint than in other parts of the

discussion, another indication of the discomfort this subject caused. Finally, the frequency

of connectors of comparisons (Table 3)was also highest during this part of the discussion,

becoming as important as in the third part where comparison was proposed, v2(1,

10 Sabine Caillaud et al.

73,496) = 40.6,p < .001. This confirms that groups spontaneously use social comparison

to copewith collective responsibility. Twogroups even explicitly asked themoderator for

comparisons or reference points.

Comparison Task

Figure 1 displays the number of groups who turned over each card and the mean rank

order in which cards were turned.

Groups whose members gave personal examples when answering the footprint

questionnaire chose to turn the ‘rich countries’ card first, whereas those who answered

on the basis of more general knowledge and examples turned the ‘poor countries’ card

first. This difference in the choice of comparison emphasizes that comparisons servespecific aims. Comparing their score with that of rich countries allows participants to

position their group.

FG7

W: Ecological footprint for rich countries, 3.4 planets.Y: We had exaggerated

Groups used the comparison with poor countries to reassure themselves, on the

grounds that the poor countries’ lower ecological footprint counterbalanced the high

ecological footprint of rich countries (FG2 ‘B: So less than one planet, well, they could

hmm so there would be some left over’).

Note that although participants spontaneously chose French or Parisian identities as

the frame of reference for the ecological footprint task, in the comparison stage they didnot choose these cards in order to confirm their score. Instead, they turned to the

supraordinate categories of ‘rich’ and ‘poor countries’. In other words, when facing up to

collective responsibility groups preferred to compare themselves with broader social

categories in awaywhichpotentially allowed them to dilute their own responsibility. This

social identity switch was associated with stereotypical descriptions of the comparison

target:

FG3

K: The African. Now the African

L: That will hurt.

J: Nought point. . . (laughing).I: Yeah, but over there there is nothing to eat. . .

Figure 1. Number of groups who returned each card, and mean rank (on the top of the bar).

Collective coping with ecological problems 11

K: There is no water. They don’t overconsume water. In my opinion they don’t

overconsume electricity either.

[. . .]

L: Above all they are happier over there.

I:Hmm. . . the problem is that in the end, if you have nothing, inmy opinion, you tend

to relativise things so that hmm. . . you can accept things better

(silence for 4 s).

K:Andwhat they have, they are happy about. . .No, you go over there, you alwayswill

be welcome. . . they always smile and are nice, they will always help. Every problem

has a solution. . . they are nice.L: So we should all go and take a course in Africa (laughing).

K: Yes. To learn being ecological. . .

The last card turned by all the groups was that of a country supposed to be a big

polluter (USA, United Arab Emirates or China). Again, these comparison targets were

associated with stereotypical descriptions which emphasized the target’s responsibility:

FG3

K: I was there [USA], they all have big cars. . . well. . . over there a Clio really is like

something from another planet. You never see one there because there are only

enormous cars. So already, for this reason, they must consume a lot. And then they

really eat. . .L: Even waste trucks are enormous.

Another categorization, city versus countryside, was used by groups to justify both

their own high footprint and explain the unexpectedly low scores of other countries.

First, when groups compared their own footprint with that of rich countries, and

discovered a huge difference to their own disadvantage, they activated their city identity

to justify their greater pollution rate (FG1: ‘N: It’s worse [for us] because it is a big city and

in big cities there is a lot of consumption’). Second, groups also used the city-countrysidecategorization when the ecological footprint of a comparison target was smaller than

expected. For example, participants expected China to have a high footprint, so on

discovering that China’s score was lower than that of rich countries, they justified the

difference by reference to the proportion of Chinese people living in the countryside:

FG3

K: And the Chinese. Beware! (laughing)

J: One point two.

I: Less than the world [average]

K: Hey. . . I am sure that’s because a lot of them live in the countryside, this is the

reason. They make the balance. . . the people in isolated areas.

L: That’s for sure. They are still using ploughs pulled by oxen you know (laughing)

However, these comparisons were linked to the observation that individuals cannot

act differently as their way of life depends on where they live:

FG4O: We have to change our way of life.

M: I will walk home! (laughing)

12 Sabine Caillaud et al.

Q: You will arrive next week.

P: A pilgrimage. So you’ll be sleeping at the university. . .Q: Yeah.

M: I have no other solution.

During the comparison task, the group dynamic was marked by an absence of debate;

this was indicated by the lower frequency of connectors of oppositions compared with

other stages of the discussion, v2(1, 73,496) = 5.8, p = .015. Instead, there was

widespread consensus among participants. The few passages coded ‘debate’ referred

to discussions about what card to turn next.Finally, compared with the previous part of the discussion, the frequency of words

related to negative emotions (specifically, references to a sense of unease) decreased from

0.98% to 0.49%, v2(1, 14,310) = 9.14, p = .002, whereas the frequency of positive

emotional words (specifically, words related to wellbeing: ‘they are happy’, ‘this will be

funny’, ‘it could be comforting’) increased from 0.21% to 0.65%, v2(1, 14,310) = 8.04,

p = .004. The proportion of pronouns I andWe remained the same. These results suggest

that the comparison task has a positive effect on the emotional state of group members.

Responsibility attribution task

Figure 2 shows the causal agents for climate change listed by participants (e.g., industries,

nature, deforestation, etc.). Participants referred to specific kinds of lay knowledge such

as folk ecology and also mobilized scientific knowledge about climate change processes(causes and consequences) to determine the causal agents of climate change:

FG6

S: Well actually trees absorb CO2, and as they cut treesT: There is more CO2

S: Less CO2 is absorbed

T: And then there is more in the air

S: So more comes back

T: [Levels] Go up

S: In the ozone layer (looks up), and this is an important factor

They also anchored the debate about individual responsibility using folk sociology:

FG4

Q: Wait, if there are industries it is because they are they are consumers.

Figure 2. Written answers to the question ‘who is responsible for climate change?’ (Font size stands for

the frequencies of citation).

Collective coping with ecological problems 13

O:No, because at the same time, both are linked you know. It’s a vicious circle. At the

same time, we. . .we create demand, because we need industries to live and because

they producewhatwe demand, yeahwhatwe need to live, just eating and this kind of

thing. But at the same time. . . they in the interests of producing more to make moremoney, they created for us, I mean, well, we don’t need 36 sorts of shampoo. It’s all

the same stuff. So what are we doing? We change shampoos every week, you know

what I mean?

The frequency of connectors of opposition was significantly higher in this part of the

discussion than in other parts, v2(1, 73,496) = 17.63, p < .001. Indeed, 52% of debates

took place during this task although it represented only 21% of the whole discussion in

terms of number ofwords. The debateswere structured around various dichotomies (e.g.,humans/their inventions; Table 4 for an exhaustive view and examples).

These dichotomies can be categorized under the supra-code nature/society, where

nature is a minor causal agent of climate change and society the main agent. The way

participants categorized humans determined the side of the dichotomy with which they

were aligned. As ‘human beings’, they were considered as small polluters (‘as we

breathe’), but as ‘consumers’, theywere placed on the high-polluters’ side (Figure 2). The

parallel use of folk ecology and folk sociology anchored the debate in the nature/society

dichotomy, allowing humans to be located on either side.

Table 4. Dichotomies structuring discussion about responsibilities for climate change

Dichotomies Used in groups Examples

Individuals/

industries

FG2, FG4, FG6 FG2

D:Well you see, there are things we are obligated, it is our

way of life well I mean hmm for responsibility we can

put more hmm

B: Anyway it’s a vicious circle it’s industries which

A: Yeah of course

B:Which push consumers and well consumers well it’s

only swindle (laughing)

Humans/their

inventions

FG1, FG5, FG6 FG6

V: Hmm yeah but Mans [French word for Humans] I think at

least (S takes the card and places it on the other side) Mans

do industries, Mans invented nuclear energy it all is Mans,

isn’t it? We can’t put cows

R: No I didn’t invent nuclear energy

S: You are not a man (laughing)

R: No it isn’t it is a woman who invented it

Overpopulation/

ways of life

and social

regulations

FG3, FG6, FG7 FG3

K: Already humans, the problem is that there are too many

people. Also we first have to eradicate the population.

I: Yes

K: This is quite difficult. . . eradicating peopleL: I think it isn’t inevitable. Yes OK it will stagnate but I think

that if you better distribute things. . .K: Yes but do you agree to give in? Are people ready to give in?

Do people agree to give up their part for anybody else?

14 Sabine Caillaud et al.

In comparison with the previous part of the discussion, positive emotions decreased,

from0.65% to 0.15%,v2(1, 27,174) = 46.07,p < .001,whilst negative emotions remained

unchanged (0.49% and 0.42%, respectively), v2(1, 27,174) = 0.87, p = .34. More words

expressing negative emotions were used than words expressing positive emotions, v2(1,222) = 19.69, p < .001.Words referring to unease were still themost frequent emotional

words (0.34%). However, this negative emotional atmosphere (which was still more

positive than when the groups discovered their ecological footprint) was now unrelated

to everyday practices; instead, it was anchored in societal and global accounts of

pollution.

Discussion

The focus of this study was on collective rather than individual processes involved in the

elaboration and transformation of social representations, and on the management of

emotions when groups face up to their collective responsibility for ecological problems.

Most experimental studies have offered participants the opportunity to cope with

responsibility for environmental problems by adopting or expressing an intention to act

pro-environmentally; in contrast, we investigated the coping strategies groups call onwhen not offered this option.

The results confirmed that when faced with information highlighting collective

responsibility for ecological problems, groups experienced negative collective

emotions, mostly related to discomfort. The unease or embarrassment participants

experienced was also reflected in the jokes they used to play down the situation.

Groups used two main strategies to cope with their collective responsibility and the

negative emotions this elicited; they either denied any responsibility or minimized the

consequences of pollution by asserting that not all countries polluted as much as theydid. Spontaneous social comparisons with poor countries were an example of this

latter strategy.

Thus, identity negotiation was used as a coping strategy. Groups switched from the

social identities French andParisian to inhabitant of a rich country (as opposed to ‘poor

country’) and to city inhabitant (as opposed to ‘countryside’ inhabitant). If debates about

global ecological problems are usually anchored in national categories (Caillaud & Flick,

2013; Selge & Fischer, 2011), our results suggest that when their national group is

perceived to be responsible for environmental problems, groups turn to other categoriesthat allow them to restore a more positive social identity. Changing the level of

comparison is a well-known social identity strategy for restoring a positive identity (Tajfel

& Turner, 1979). In this study, participants collectively negotiated group identity by

establishing and maintaining a high group consensus and using stereotypical represen-

tations of other groups (othering). Groups referred both to folk psychology (‘poor

countries would do the same if they could’), emphasizing the bad side of ‘human nature’

that permits a banalization of pollution (see Morton & Postmes, 2011 at individual level),

and to the stereotype that the people of poor countries are ‘happier than we are’. In thisway, perceived social inequities were rendered irrelevant and thus not in need of further

debate. In fact, it has been suggested that when people are exposed to complementary

stereotypes as ‘poor but happy’, they are more inclined to judge the system inwhich they

live as just and legitimate (Kay & Jost, 2003). The reduction in expressions of negative

emotion suggests that groupsuse social knowledge and social categorizations strategically

to maintain a positive social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and maintain the integrity of

Collective coping with ecological problems 15

their worldview (Rim�e, 2005, 2007). The high consensus in this part of the discussion

illustrates how social sharing of emotion allows groups to validate their interpretation of

an emotional event (Rim�e, 2007). This result is also compatible with research using a

system justification framework (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002) which showsthat justifying a systemhelps people to alleviate negative emotions (Jost,Wakslak,&Tyler,

2008;Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007).We suspect that the use of large, supraordinate

categories such as rich countries enables groups to dilute responsibility and reduce the

extent to which they feel they have control over climate change. But people with low

perceived personal control are less likely to behave pro-environmentally (Bamberg &

M€oser, 2007) and more likely to support and justify the system in which they live (Kay &

Friesen, 2011).

In the last part, when groupswere discussing the causal agents of climate change, theyreferred to folk sociology and folk ecology to anchor their debate in nature versus culture

categorizations. As humans belong to both categories, disentangling the responsibility

that is attributed to humans as ‘social animals’ from that which is attributed to them as

‘consumers’ is almost impossible.Moreover, during this part, the discussion becamemore

general and abstract than during the ecological footprint task,whichhadmainlymobilized

everyday knowledge. Participants mainly blamed ‘the system’ (industry, overconsump-

tion, transport. . .), thus distinguishing ‘humans’ from these perceived autonomous,

exogenous agents. It is possible that transferring responsibility to the system allowsgroups to play down their own responsibility and emphasize their lack of control, which

may increase support for the status quo and increase confidence in a system that

contributes to climate change (Kay & Friesen, 2011).

Taken together, our results showing strategic shifts in social identity in response to

collective responsibility open upnewavenues for research on collective emotions. Group

identification should not only be considered and studied as a necessary antecedent (Wohl

et al., 2006) or consequence (Kessler&Hollbach, 2005) of collective emotions but also as

a dynamic response to threat. This collective strategy is possible because participantsshare implicit knowledge (e.g., stereotypes) they can call upon as soon as necessary. This

confirms that stereotypes are not only heuristics but also dynamic toolswhich can be used

strategically by groups when coping with a threatening situation (Stott & Drury, 2004).

Stereotypes can be considered as ‘exonerating cognitions’ that undermine negative

emotions such as collective guilt (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2003; Wohl et al., 2006).

Moreover, future research should investigate emotions ‘that are either elicited by or

directed towards some aspect of the social system’ (Solak, Jost, S€umer, & Clore, 2012, p.

677). It is not always necessary for a specific group identity to be activated for individualsto feel such emotions (moral outrage would be an example). Indeed, it is possible that

emotions expressed during the first and secondphases of the groupdiscussion (ecological

footprint and comparison tasks; i.e., group-based emotions) are different in type from the

negative emotions expressed during the last phase, in which a shift to the overarching

‘human’ category left participants with no other human social group to which they could

compare (system-based emotions). As the induction of collective responsibility can have

negative outcomes (e.g., resort to stereotypes, denial of responsibility), it should be used

with care in environmental campaigns.Contrary to the expected diversity of interpretations (divergence), the awareness

stage was followed immediately by the development of widespread consensus, a

process which seemed to allow groups to maintain the integrity of their worldview. The

process of othering also occurred at this stage. Only subsequently did debate take

place, anchored in pre-existing categories that enabled the group to experience less

16 Sabine Caillaud et al.

threatening (system-based) emotions. These results suggest that the collective symbolic

coping model could be adapted to encompass different levels of coping and to deal with

different kinds of emotions (threat, embarrassment, etc.). The analysis of emotional

processes occurring during the discussion enriches our understanding of symboliccoping and our understanding of why groups draw on different forms of social

knowledge and different social identities. This study should thus encourage researchers

working within the social representations framework to be more aware of emotional

processes. This study represents one attempt to do this through an original use of focus

groups.

In the nineties, focus groups were used anew as a stand-alone method by

considering that group dynamics could be viewed not as biases affecting research on

attitudes but as part of the social process of constructing representations and meanings(Lunt & Livingstone, 1996). More recently, it has been proposed that specific stimuli or

tasks could be used to strengthen the focus of discussions (Caillaud & Kalampalikis,

2013; Kalampalikis, 2011). This study went a step further. We used an original

technique – inducing a sense of collective responsibility via the ecological footprint task– to provide us with the opportunity to observe collective coping and study social

representations in the making. This method allows the researcher to analyse the use of

social knowledge and social categories and to measure emotions and analyse how they

change during social interactions. It thus counters a criticism which has been levelledagainst social representations theory (Jost & Ignatow, 2001), namely that it sometimes

fails to demonstrate empirically that social representations serve specific functions, for

example coping with threatening objects (e.g., collective responsibility for ecological

problems). Our results illustrate how social knowledge, social identities, and group

dynamics change during group discussions, and how such changes are accompanied by

changes in the emotional atmosphere. If experiments are rarely epistemologically

appropriate for social representations research, it should be possible to develop

alternative methods for providing evidence that social representations serve to copewith threat.

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Received 18 September 2014; revised version received 29 July 2015

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