History, Contemporarism, Creolization

Grzegorz SztabińskiUniversity of Łódź

HISTORY, CONTEMPORARISM, CREOLIZATION

Paulina

Sticky Note

"Art Inquiry. Recherches sur les arts" 2002, vol. IV (XIII)

Grzegorz Sztabiński

History is an element of art and reflection on art in the 20th century. This statement may seem banal, if we understand it as an observation that artistic facts and theoretical approaches in that century just occurred in succession or contemporaneously, that one can establish the dates of their first appearance, the culmination of their influence, and their gradual demise. However, we should also note that the particular artistic and theoretical events not only had their chronology, and their place among the other events of the particular period, but from the moment of their inception were considered both by artists and by art theorists as part of a certain logical sequence. History is thus not reduced to simple chronology, or order of succession, but is regarded as a process governed by rules, leading to the achievement of a certain purpose. We may then ask ourselves to what extent we participate in that process, and whether we like or not the direction it is taking. The idea of universal history as progress towards a goal appeared in a short essay by Kant1, and was developed in Hegel’s philosophy. This does not mean that it had never occurred before. The concept of universal history was not known to the ancient Greeks. Francis Fukuyama points out that Plato and Aristotle viewed history as circular, a cyclical succession of natural phenomena and political systems.2 However, the conception of historical development appears in early Christian thought and is associated with the conviction that all people are equal in the eyes of God. This results in the belief in their similar destination. History is regarded as a finite and purposeful process, beginning with Creation, and ending with the Last Judgment. The world with its history will then cease to exist.

1 I. Kant, 1966, Idee einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgliche Absicht (published in Polish in: T. Kroński, ed.: Kant, Warszawa, p. 174–193).

2 Cf. F. Fukuyama, 1992, The End of History and the Last Man, New York.

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The Christian conception of history influenced many thinkers in the modern era, who tried to discover the inherent rules and the purpose of history, disregarding the role of God as its prime mover. They did not view universal history as a list of events that had occurred, but as purposeful, ordered, universal development, governed by some schema that we may find out and that will then help us understand why things happen in a certain order and what inherent meaning they possess. Thus history lets us discover its role and its purpose in the world. Friedrich Nietzsche wrote about this in his essay “On the advantages and disadvantages of history for life”. He observed, from his perspective, that history had never before been so broadly conceived. Now, he said, the history of humanity was only an extension of the history of animals and plants – a universal historian was even ready to discover the traces of his ancestors in the depths of the ocean, in the form of animated slime. Nietzsche regarded the colossal distance that man had travelled as an amazing miracle, but he found even more amazing the modern man who was able to look back on that distance.3 The philosopher saw both the advantages and the disadvantages of that situation. Being conscious of history makes us different from animals living without it, but at the same time makes it difficult for us to feel happy when it occurs, and to appreciate life. Thus it is both something to be proud of and a liability. Address-ing his 19th century contemporaries, Nietzsche wrote that their knowledge was not a fulfilment of nature’s purpose, but it killed their own nature.4 These critical remarks are directed particularly against the conception of universal history aspiring to the status of science. The earlier, monumental, antiquarian or critical approaches to history had been more natural and closer to the course of human existence, in which we look for paragons of virtue, try to save the memory of things past, or attempt to evaluate them. But when we begin talking about a “universal process”, in Nietzsche’s opinion we let history replace the other spiritual forces, art and religion, as the only supreme authority.5

Obviously, the author had in mind here the conception of Hegel. This philosopher instilled the idea of universal history into the mind of the modern man. History as a whole was regarded as a presentation of the spirit as it develops its self-awareness of its essence.6 At the same time, development was viewed not as a smooth process, but rather as a course of events full of conflicts, turns and

3 F. Nietzsche, Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, Samtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe, in 15 Banden, München 1980, vol. 1. Published in Polish as Niewczesne rozważania, Kraków 1996.

4 Ibid.5 Ibid., p. 144.6 G. W. F. Hegel, 1958, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte, Published in

Polish as Wykłady z filozofii dziejów, Warszawa, p. 27.

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complications, that nevertheless led to progress. Thus various facts, even those which seemed contradictory, could be regarded as elements of the same linear development. Hegel’s great contribution was the inclusion of the unique histories of non-European countries, such as India or China, into the general scheme. Thanks to this, history became truly universal, encompassing the achievements of different civilizations, and at the same time preserving the same general principles. According to Hegel, the world’s history is progress towards awareness and freedom.7

Artists and art theorists began making references to history during the period of the Enlightenment. Earlier they had made use of subjects and forms worked out in the past, which was evidence of their traditionalism rather than of any true appreciation of the role of history. In the 18th century, historical development became an element of the creative intention, of the program of action, because of the necessity to choose between the ancient and the modern models of perfection. There also appeared the idea of progress, now free from any connections with theology or Augustinian “holy history”.

These tendencies became stronger in the Romantic period. It was already Herder who diversified the idea of beauty, rooted it in history, and made it relative to time periods and countries. The unity and stability of the classical conception was thus called into question. Still, the Romanticists, while taking note of historical changes, did not want to give up completely what they regarded as absolute and timeless. An important element of their mental make-up was the desire to reconcile relative and absolute values. They put this into effect either by following Schelling’s model (the absolute is realized in perfect deeds, but the manner of its realization changes historically), or else by following Hegel (the absolute is realized in the course of historical evolution, and the particular stages are the moments of this realization). Both of these models assumed that an artist should study historical phenomena and their attendant values, but not to emulate the past masterpieces, or to put together their best elements, eclectically, to achieve perfection. The aim is rather to discover the rules governing the develop-ment of art and to join in this process with one’s own contribution. The theory of art may refer to the past, but must treat it as a basis for the establishment of future values.

Hegel’s ideas deeply influenced the way of thinking of the modern man, providing him with a model of resolving the tensions between variety and unity. They also contributed to putting values and aesthetic concepts in the historical context and to making the artists aware of their role in history. Aesthetics essentially abandoned normativism. It no longer formulated “eternal principles”;

7 Ibid., p. 29.

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instead, it turned into philosophical reflection on the masterpieces that appeared in the history of art. It also acknowledged the variety of rules that had governed creative activity in the particular periods. Artists thus could no longer fall back on hard and fast rules and the principles of their application. If they adopted any of them, they had to be aware of the fact that there were other ones, too. Any decision was thus a choice rather than the recognition of the only artistic truth. At the same time, artists began to appreciate change itself. This may have been one result of the French Revolution, which not only increased the awareness of historical change, but also emphasized the role of activism. It made people realize that their actions could change not only ideas and behaviour, but also seemingly inviolate political systems. This gave artists courage to question the existing conceptions of art, and also to cross its boundaries and to engage in social activity. Such realization had particular influence on the 20th century avant-garde. Another impulse was provided by the Marxist conception, with its ambition to gain a “true awareness of history”.

Some postmodernist philosophers, such as Lyotard or Rorty, tend to view the artistic avant-garde of the 20th century as part or predecessor of postmodernism because of the multiplicity of its different tendencies and trends. However, those authors disregard or forget about another important characteristic of this artistic phenomenon. If we examine the history of the 20th century avant-garde, we will see a variety of approaches and directions of exploration, but at the same time the conviction (straightforwardly declared in the theoretical writings of artists and strongly present in their creative practice) that there is only one proper conception of art, one purpose, and one way that leads to it.8 The most important representatives of the avant-garde showed clear inclination towards universalism and a tendency to absolutize their own ideas. They tended to treat their own opinions as a generalized analysis and evaluation of earlier art, and to point the way out of the perceived crisis. It is enough to mention the theoretical writings of Kandinsky, Malevich, or Mondrian, and the Futurist, Constructivist, and Sur-realist manifestos, to see that despite their differences, all of them had ambitions to provide a generalized assessment of the situation, not only of art, but also of man in the 20th century.

What was the ground for those generalizations? What allowed the artists to give themselves the right to evaluate the current situation and to formulate a vision of the future? The explicit or implicit point of reference was universal history. Adopting the assumption (appearing already in the works of Fontenelle,

8 I discuss this more thoroughly in my article “The End of the Avant-garde’s Illusions, and the Liberal Hope”, in: Bulletin de la Société des Sciences et des Lettres de Łódź , series Reserches sur les arts, vol. IX, Łódź 1998.

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Machiavelli, Condorcet, but most clearly formulated by Kant and Hegel) that history is a purposeful, cumulative process, a realization of the principle of progress, they believed that they could discover that principle and thus the final purpose of art.

The avant-garde artists represented various nationalities. However, they did not seek to promote their national traditions, or to give them the status of universally valid solutions to humanity’s problems. On the contrary, even if at the early stage their work incorporated national elements, later they abandoned them deliberately, believing that they were only a small part of the broad spectrum of issues they wished to engage in. They adopted an absolute (Malevich), universal (Mondrian), cosmic (Klee) or panhuman (the Express-ionists, the Surrealists, the Constructivists) point of view. Such visions seemed to give meaning to those artists’ initiatives, and made them feel that they were working for a great cause. They also emphasized the role of human activity and the changing nature of the possible means used at the particular stages of development. The avant-garde artists could thus assume that they were the ones working out the new forms appropriate for the current period, or foresee those which would be adopted in the future – both the forms of art and of life. At the same time, history was a reference point for them in that it allowed them to legitimize what might seem strange or arbitrary in the light of the current criteria. Feeling anxious about his lack of acceptance by the public, an artist could seek confirmation of his views by pointing out that they were justified by some developmental trend of universally conceived art, culture, or civilization.9 That is why the writings of avant-garde artists contain so many references to history. They summed up the history of their discipline, went back to the broadly conceived traditions in art, or to general cultural processes. In this way they attempted to show that what might seem odd and incoherent in the light of the currently accepted principles and criteria of evaluation was well-grounded in history, and was justifiable as a continuation of some developmental processes. It extended the best elements of tradition (carefully chosen), to take another step in the direction of progress in art.

In Poland, this approach was best exemplified by the artistic and theoretical work of Władysław Strzemiński. He made two attempts at constructing a vision of the history of art. In his writings from his Unistic period, he argued that artistic development had always consisted in striving for the maximum unity of the art work. He gave Renaissance, Impressionist, Cubist, Futurist painting, and the work

9 This tendency may be observed since the end of the 19 th century in the texts of Paul Signac (D’Eugene Delacroix au neo-impressionisme, Paris 1899), Maurice Denis (Du symbolisme et de Gauguin vers un nouvel ordre classique, Paris 1912), and later in most texts by avant-garde artists, who found it important to present the “tradition” of their conceptions.

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of Malevich as examples supporting his claim, and he saw the end-point of that general tendency in Unism.10 The second attempt came after he decided to return to the observation of reality as a source of creative impulses. At first, he did not take his urban landscapes of Łódź and his seascapes, painted since the beginning of the 1930s, very seriously, writing (in an essay in Form11) that he “painted them for relaxation, since they did not demand so much effort” as his abstract works. Later, however, his reflections of them became the point of departure for the historical construction contained in his Theory of Vision. Trying to present the history of art as the development of “visual awareness”, he observed in the final part of the book: “It was only when I was writing this chapter that I was able to place properly most of my works created in the 1930s and 1940s. The idealistic and formalist criteria, prevailing in the prewar theories of art, had made impossible their proper placement in relation to other artistic phenomena.”12

Strzemiński also believed that universalistically conceived history of art should be the basis for the organization of museum collections, and for the teaching of art. He tried to put these views into practice in his organizational work for the new Muzeum Sztuki in Łódź and in his work with students. In both cases he considered the historical point of view as necessary, since, as he wrote, “any solution, adopted with no connection to the past, becomes absolute, canonical, one that cannot be questioned.”13 Whether it was his own work, the museum’s collection, or his teaching, he saw their basic universal value not in their potential immortality, their continuing appreciation, but in their contribution to the general artistic development.

History as a point of reference also allowed the artist to distinguish between artistic novelty and fads. The only truly novel concepts are those which find justification in the developmental trends in art, which realise an earlier tendency and open the way for the past. In contrast, accidental, arbitrary dis-coveries are fads. They are devoid of any essential importance, since, remain-ing outside the mainstream of history, they are isolated, insignificant. They may acquire meaning only if some future artist takes up such a proposal, regards it as important, and introduces it into the developmental course of

10 Cf. especially W. Strzemiński, “B=2” (Blok, no. 8–9/1924) and “Dualizm i unizm” (Droga, no. 6–7/ 1927).

11 Cf. the debate between L. Chwistek and W. Strzemiński, in: Forma, no. 3/1935 (cit. after W. Strzemiński, Pisma, ed. Z. Baranowicz, Wrocław 1975, p. 224.

12 W. Strzemiński: Teoria widzenia (2nd ed.), Kraków 1974, p. 238.13 W. Strzemiński, “Sztuka nowoczesna a szkoły artystyczne”, in: Droga, no. 3/1932, cit. in:

Pisma, op. cit., p. 160. I discuss these problems more thoroughly in my article “Strzemiński – niedopełniony projekt. Filozoficzne tło koncepcji sztuki Władysława Strzemińskiego”, in: Włady-sław Strzemiński 1893–1952. Materiały z sesji, Łódź 1994, p. 87–95.

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history. For the modern artists and theorists, the conception of universal art history

was thus an important axiom to fall back upon. To the former, it gave hope. Their work was not accepted by their contemporaries. Their life was a struggle to survive. Yet their conviction that they were part of universal history made them believe that what they did was meaningful and valuable, and that in time it would be appreciated, since it accorded with historical trends. Art theorists, too, did not have to limit themselves to registering new phenomena in art and attempting their random interpretations, but had a chance to construct logically ordered genealogies showing the predecessors of the moderns, and thus legitimize the works which they found important.

Let me give two examples of American critics and art historians who adopted this approach. In his book Cubism and Abstract Art14, Alfred H. Barr, Jr presented a characteristic diagram showing the genealogy of non-figurative art. Starting with Post-impressionism, he showed how the successive artistic tendencies of the first half of the 20th century logically led towards geometrical and non-geometrical abstraction. Thus a historical tendency was to justify the value of this kind of work, presented as developmental necessity. In the 1940s and 1950s, similar reasoning was employed by Clement Greenberg. Wishing to legitimize Pollock’s painting, he presented it as part of the developmental trend of the European avant-garde art.15 Other modernist art critics adopted the same attitude.

Did that tendency find reflection in aesthetics? The answer would require more research. I believe, however, that one can discern its symptoms in the tension that arose in the confrontation of some essential aesthetic concepts with the proposals of avant-garde art. The disputes centered, among others, on the question of whether ready-mades, land art, and Conceptual art belong to the category of art, or whether they should be regarded as anti-art or non-art. Are aesthetic values present at all (and if so, are they important) in avant-garde, and especially neo-avant-garde art? How is one to resolve the question of the aesthetic nature of art? Some authors have thus suggested bringing history into this debate on aesthetic concepts and related issues.16

14 A. H. Barr, Jr., 1936, Cubism and Abstract Art, New York. The diagram was originally placed on the dust cover of the book; in later editions it was moved to the pre-title page.

15 C. Greenberg, 1961, Art and Culture, Boston.16 Cf. B. Dziemidok, 1992, Sztuka – wartości – emocje, Warszawa. The author takes a rather

neutral stance in this debate. He writes: “I believe that it is easiest to defend the aesthetic universality of art on the ground of those philosophical conceptions and methodological orienta-tions which do not take enough account of the historical and cultural contexts of art. Taking into consideration the historical circumstances does not mean that one gives up axiological reflection. The aesthetics which would turn into an account of aesthetic tastes and opinions would cease to

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Postmodernism involves calling into question the traditional role of history. This has taken different forms; I shall examine some of them here, to consider their consequences for art and theoretical reflection on it.

Jean-Francois Lyotard put into doubt the idea of universal history, treating it as a form of ordering of the narratives about actual facts. In his view, history is no longer an objectively existing process, whose laws can be discovered and described. He reduced it to the problem of narration and the question of whether we can still introduce order today into the multitude of events happening in the human and non-human world, arranging them so that they would fit in with the idea of the universal history of mankind?17 He considered several issues. The first concerned the question of who arranges the events – the “self”, i.e. an individual in his/her own name (the first-person narration), or the “Self” – the supra-individual mind, which creates the “grand narratives”? In the latter case (the view predominating in the European tradition), “the efforts of the Self were directed at controlling everything that is given, including itself.”18 This also suggested control over time, whose flow was governed by certain rules and had a definite purpose. However, Postmodernism is inclined towards the former view – the individual perspective.

The next question is whether, in the case of supra-individual approach, there is anything like “we”, the “we” able to think and sense this continuity or dis-continuity.19 Lyotard observes that the perspective of universal history, with its characteristic grand narratives, consists in the annexation of the apparent outsiders. The “third person”, at first remaining outside us as the emancipative avant-garde, will finally become part of the community of speakers.20 In consequence, we observe a tendency to overcome individual differences. “The first person’s role in this tradition is actually to control the word and the sense: let the political word belong to the people, the social word to the worker, the economic word to the poor; let the individual rule the universal, and let the last be the first.”21 This view, which Lyotard did not ascribe to the artistic avant-garde, nevertheless reflects well the intentions of its representatives. The manifestos were written by individuals, but formulated in the name of that “we”. Sometimes they were devised by a group of artists. But their ambitions were greater. It was assumed that the “we” had no boundaries and would expand until it included

be a philosophical discipline” (p. 35–36).17 L.-F. Lyotard, Le Postmoderne explique aux enfants. Correspondance 1982–1985, Paris

1988.18 Ibid.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.

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everybody.22 In the situation created by the decline of modernity, there is no controlling

agent. As Lyotard pointed out, that is why the term “postmodernism” may denote the meeting of contrary perspectives.23 There is no single superordinate historical perspective. There are only individual attempts to determine the sense of what is happening. Lyotard gives the Confessions of St Augustine as an early example of such an approach. Containing some reflections on time, they show (unlike De Civitate Dei) that no one can control or rule it.24

Another kind of Postmodernist approach to the problem, also suggesting the decreasing role of history, was presented in 1989 by Francis Fukuyama in his article “The end of history?”. Referring to the views of Hegel and his follower Alexander Kojeve he wrote that the driving force of history in the past were ideological conflicts, also extending to religion, morality, and art. The fall of Fascism, and later of Communism, eliminates the last sources of global tension. Essentially there is now no alternative to the liberal society (in political and economic terms) and the greatly diversified consumer culture. Therefore, with the disappearance of global conflicts that are its driving force, we are witnessing the end of universally conceived history. There will of course be greater or smaller wars, protests, coup d’etats, but their range and role will be limited and they will have no influence on defining another universally important stage in the developmental history of mankind. Similarly, in the sphere of culture, no tendency will turn out to be broader or more permanent. According to Fukuyama, in the post-historical period there will be no art and no philosophy [in the traditional sense of those terms, G.S.], but only taking care of the museum of human history.25 Such a museum, as one can predict, will also be differently conceived. Its organization will not be determined by the logic of the develop-mental trends in art. If they will be taken into account at all, it will be as a documentation of old ways of thinking, when our lives were ordered by history.

What are the consequences of the situation presented here for the appreciation of the values of art? Has the challenging or denial of the conception of universal history opened any new vistas? The well-known Italian art critic Achille Bonito Oliva wrote in mid-1980s that the disturbance of the structural balance of history occurred without prior notice and caught people unawares with no remedial measures and no qualified personnel, since the system of prognosis had also

22 One example is probably the shortest of the avant-garde manifestos put forward by the members of the Die Brücke group.

23 J.-F. Lyotard, op. cit.24 Cf. G. Invernizzi, “Is Post-Modernism Over?” An Interview with Jean-Francois Lyotard.

Praxis. The West Australian Journal of Contemporary Art, summer 1987, p. 11.25 F. Fukuyama, 1989, “The end of history?” in: The National Interest, no. 16/1989.

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broken down.26 This remark is hardly enthusiastic; if anything, it expresses anxiety. Perhaps we are so used to grand narratives that when we lose faith in the universality, determination, and clarity of the expected future, we feel confused when everything around us is particular, accidental, obscure? If this is indeed so, the problem will be solved if we abandon our earlier habits and work out new ways of behaviour appropriate for the new situation. These may apply to different areas of activity. Let us look at their occurrence in art and in reflection on art.

The difference between the modernist and the postmodernist approaches to art as reflected in critical texts on art has been studied by David Carrier. In his article “Theoretical Perspectives on the Arts, Sciences and Technology”, he took as his point of departure Clement Greenberg’s book Art and Culture, already mentioned here. Regarding it as a typical example of the modernist reflection on art, Carrier claims that its author thinks along the lines of Jane Austen’s novels and Descartes’ Meditations. All of those books start with the presentation of some problem (in the critical text: some currently important creative problem, e.g. that of space in painting; in the novels – the question of who will marry the heroine; in the philosophical treatise – e.g. the question of truth). Then the authors present various past approaches to these problems (e.g. the creative approaches to space adopted by Cezanne, by Cubism, etc.; the story of the past potential pretenders to the heroine’s hand, and their elimination in consequence of their shortcomings; some truths presented as philosophically tenable); lastly, there comes the final solution (the current conception of space in art; happy marriage; the idea of experiential justification of our knowledge). This modernist way of thinking assumes that a historical narration of broader or narrower range will justify the only proper conclusion as a necessary consequence of develop-ment. Carrier argues that postmodernism gives up this type of narration and generally this type of thinking. Examining the critical reflection of Joseph Masheck27, the novels of Samuel Beckett, and Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein, he points out that their development is not effected by means of a narrative sequence or the history of the past approaches to the problem, and the purpose is not the solution of the problem. Each such book “assembles a sequence of observations and in effect asks the reader to grasp the general thesis of the book by thinking about those examples.”28 The role of the plot development or historical development is thus reduced or eliminated in favour of a series of associations.

26 A. B. Oliva, “Points d’histoire recente”, in: Nouvelle Biennale de Paris 1985 (exhibition catalogue), Paris 1985, p. 52.

27 J. Mascheck, 1984, Historical Present: Essays of the 1970s, Ann Arbor, Michigan.28 D. Carrier, 1985, “Theoretical Perspectives on the Arts, Sciences and Technology, Part II,:

Post-modernist Art Criticism”, Leonardo, no. 2, p. 112.

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Carrier states that “if Greenberg [...] is like Descartes in offering a linear narrative framework, Masheck is like Wittgenstein in presenting us with many examples and asking us to see their significance.”29

I have quoted those reflections of the American author because they suggest that there is a tendency in postmodernist culture for even farther-going criticism of the importance of continuity and generalization than that represented by Lyotard. Now not only the macro-narratives, but also the mini-stories are being questioned. Instead, we are offered a text that is an assembly of fragments, without any general introduction into the problem, any development, and any conclusions. It seems to correspond best with the contemporary understanding of art, which has eliminated the principle of logical development. Within this approach, the question about the value of art provokes the answer that it is not guaranteed by history, or by the ordered sequence of changes that history involves. It has to be established and challenged within each current context, over and over again.

The tendency to emphasize the present moment, while at the same time denying the importance of a logical development can also be observed in artistic practice since early 1980s. This was pointed out by Germano Celant, who has called it contemporaryism. It “turns the present into an absolute frame of reference, an indisputable truth, whose revelation can be defined and demonstrated.”30 Contemporaryism does not mean that time is totally ignored, that it is no longer taken into account in art. However, it flows in different directions, for example from the future into the present or from the present into the past. That is why the prefix “neo-”, which has appeared in the names of many tendencies in art in the 1980s and 1990s did not indicate that something was new in the sense of being more current or oriented towards the future and the discovery of as yet unexplored territories. On the contrary, it often meant turning towards the more or less distant past, the eclectic use of the past achievements in art (as in Neo-Fauvism, Neo-Expressionism, Neo Neo, Neo Geo, Neo-Concept-ualism, etc.) In this way the contemporary, formerly conceived as a transitory stage between the past and the future, has turned into the hyper-contemporary, i.e. the state almost devoid of relativity, which becomes its own ceremony, a kind of ritual. In this situation, as Celant observes, “art no longer functions as the foundation of the contemporary; it is the contemporary that justifies art.”31

Consequently, the laboriousness of the creative process is an impediment. If artists paint at all, they work quickly, without refining the details. They like to use

29 Ibid.30 G. Celant, 1988, Unexpressionism. Art. Beyond the Contemporary, New York, p. 5.31 Ibid., p. 7.

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photographs or the video camera, which yield instant results. The objects or installations they create are provisional. There has been a resurgence of interest in performance art, but not because of its depth or the immediacy of its contact with the viewer, but because of its ephemeral, improvisational quality. As Celant puts it, “Subtracted from time and from productive obstacles, the contemporary turns into the cult of the contemporary.”32

What are the consequences of this situation? In his book Unexpressionism, the Italian author regards contemporaryism as a symptom of pathology and conformism. He is looking for artists who will be able to oppose it. A different attitude is represented by the publications devoted to the analysis of the digital media. They usually claim that the development of these media, the emergence of the Internet, constitute a deviation from the normal course of history and challenge its role. The authors point to virtual reality, in which the vectors of time are directed differently than we are accustomed to, which leads to the questioning of the rigorous division into the past and the future.

A good example of such an approach is Sean Cubitt’s book Digital Aesthetics. The author argues that 20th century art used to be in a state of permanent crisis. It only gave weak signs of its existence, or it would pull out its own roots to become noticed. Thus it manifested its own impotence, its confusion or bad faith coupled with its notorious distrust of fact, reality, and events. Cubitt does not concentrate on these symptoms, however, but on the fact that there is an alternative, in the form of the art that communicates or presents itself as communication. The achievements of digital technology let us believe that it might solve the problems which have preoccupied people for centuries. One such long-standing issue was the desire to reconcile the universal with the individual. Many aesthetic utopias claimed that art was the place where these elements were in peaceful co-existence. This aim was also pursued by the avant-gardes of the 20th century. Yet if these hopes were fulfilled at all, it was only partially and on a micro-scale – for example in the form of small communities centered around the particular artistic conceptions and achievements. Today the growing use of computers and the development of the Internet create a chance for a truly universal community. But does it give any space to individuality and differences? Cubitt wants to believe that they are possible, that we will break through the glass wall at the end of history and create the conditions for genuinely global and democratic future.33

Cubitt’s reflections on digital aesthetics seem to be grounded in the study of history, but they also seem to contain a vision of the future. One may get the impression that the author is formulating a bold conception of improving the

32 Ibid.33 S. Cubitt, 1998, Digital Aesthetics, London, p. 151.

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critical condition that art was in throughout the whole of the 20th century by introducing the new media. Do we then have to do with a return to the technological current within the avant-garde, characterized by the use of more or less advanced mechanical devices, and later computer art, cybernetic boxes (cyborgs), works created with the use of holography, photographic media, video art, etc.? The ideologists of this current were R. Buckminster Fuller and Marshall McLuhan.34 Is Cubitt inspired by their way of thinking about art and culture in general? Are we really breaking through here from the present towards the future? I have some doubts about this. His proposal does not concern the use of the most modern technology to create new kinds of art. Instead, he claims that we should go beyond the paradigm of such explorations and the changes they stimulate. The Internet – bringing together the senders and the receivers in an interactive game, decentralized, will be the locus of the permanent present. It effectively does away with historicity. The virtual world derived from informa-tion matrixes has no past, no present, and no future, or rather all these vectors intertwine and alternate there. This does not mean, of course, that the techno-logical principles on which the digital interactive game is based will never be changed or improved. But the general model of its functioning will remain the same, and this is where its post-historicity comes from.

Should the opposition drawn here between universal history (often written with a capital H) and contemporaryism be understood as an antithesis of the modernist (totalizing) and the postmodernist (fragmenting) conceptions? Some-times one may get such an impression reading the publications of the authors taking up these issues. The critique of the universalizing approaches carried out in the 1970s and 1980s from various standpoints was out to question the value of “the modernist project”, and so focused on pointing out the various types of enslavement and limitations, resulting from the subordination of heterogeneous multiplicity to uniform principles. What the critics took into account was the possibility of changing the perspective, rather than the prospect of living, thinking, and acting in an individualized and fragmented world. The debate on globalization begun in the 1990s can thus be regarded as another stage of reflec-tion on these issues. Most of the criticism directed earlier toward totalitarian ideas does not apply (or so it is at least assumed) to globalization. There is no propagation of a leading ideology, no desire to introduce one system by force, no subordination of “I” to some “we”. Globalization is not opposed to fragmenta-tion. One may even get an impression that it is favourable to it and supports it. With all this, however, it often turns out to involve a hidden process of sub-ordination, regarded as unjust and limiting, which is evidenced by the rising

34 Cf. S. Morawski, 1985, Na zakręcie: od sztuki do po-sztuki. Kraków, p. 264–265.

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number of anti-globalist movements. They regard globalization as a dangerous tendency, the more so that it is undefined, elusive, posing as something else by incorporating many elements of the postmodernist discourses of emancipation.35

I will not attempt here an in-depth analysis of the problems of globalization. There is already extensive literature on the subject, taking account of various, especially economic and cultural aspects of this phenomenon. However, I would like to focus on the motifs relevant for the relations between historicism and contemporaryism, as discussed in this article, and to consider how globalization may influence these relations.

The universalizing narratives of Heglism and Marxism concerning the rational development of the world’s history involved the highlighting of the role of some communities and ignoring others. In his philosophy of history, Hegel notoriously claimed that Africa did not play a part in the history of the world, because it did not show any dynamics, and did not join in the process of universal progress. Similarly, Marx, writing about the consequences of the British rule in India, argued that the history of India had been shaped by a succession of invasions. The invaders established their kingdoms without opposition from the passive, unresisting and unchanging societies. From this point of view, the British rule had a twofold effect. On the one hand, it destroyed the established traditions. On the other hand, however, it regenerated the country, laying the foundations for the Western society in Asia and introducing it in this way into the course of universal history.

Apart from the arrogance of these discourses, they assumed that colonization and loss of identity were ultimately beneficial for the non-European countries, since they brought them into the mainstream of universal history. This was of course based on the conviction that the privileged, European, Western point of view was one that should be adopted by the whole mankind. As a result of such thinking, historicism was compatible with the practice of imperialism.36

Globalization does not follow this mental model or the practices associated with it. It is not (at least not explicitly) interested in domination. On the contrary, the formation of a global community can proceed only if the local differences are taken into account. Individualism and diversity are valuable and appreciated. It is pointed out that the same phenomena may have both local and global character.37

35 Cf. A. Domosławski, 2002, Świat nie na sprzedaż. Rozmowy o globalizacji i kontestacji. Warszawa. This book is a collection of interviews conducted by the Polish journalist with the leaders of the anti-globalization movement during a convention in Porto Alegre.

36 Cf. R. Young, 1990, White Mythologies: Writing History and the West, London.37 Z. Mlinar, 1992, “Introduction”, in: Globalization and Territorial Identities, Aldershot, p. 2–

5; see also Z. Melosik, 2000, “Ponowoczesność: między globalizmem, amerykanizacją i funda-mentalizmem”, in: Edukacja w świecie współczesnym, ed. R. Leppert, Kraków, p. 18–21.

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Thus there is no subjugation of the individual and the unique to any general processes, but rather the tendency to treat them as aspects of one phenomenon. Globalization is not assimilation, but appreciation of variety. According to its proponents, it aims at opening the formerly closed communities to the world, enriching its diversity. The local is to complement the global with its tradition and achievements, and on the other hand it should also absorb the world’s diversity. In this way local cultures can become global ones. The world’s accomplishments will find their way to every region, and at the same time the accomplishments of every region will be known globally. People will thus be able to partake in the universal, while preserving their own tradition.

The proponents of globalization consequently claim that it will be accomp-anied by the revival and formation of the islands of identity and of diversity. Uniqueness will not be an obstacle on the road to the universal, but an advantage, something that will draw attention. A growing number of various experiences will be shared by a growing number of people. In this way, the sense of “self” will be complemented by the new sense of “us”, global in character. It will not be based on territorial contiguity, co-operation inspired by a leader or some dominant idea, but will involve people not knowing each other personally, but forming a unity because of their participation in the world’s culture made up by diverse, but universally accessible and comprehensible elements. The same heroes will shape the imagination of the viewers of satellite TV. The problems of the people living in a small corner of the world will be known to and reflected upon by us all, thanks to the news programmes of a global range. This will create a broader, but shallower sense of “us”. Social relations will form across cultures. Individuals’ actions are already performed in the context of global information media, though their life is still lived in narrower geographical and cultural communities. In their own countries and homes, though preserving some tradi-tional forms of life and culture, people begin to take account (thanks to television and the Internet) of the values very different from those they used to live by.38

The new media thus play an important role in the process of globalization, at least in its cultural aspect. Television, and even more so the Internet, give us a chance of creating a world-wide cultural community, regardless of where we live. The range of this problem is evidenced by the fact that some homeless people living in improvised shacks in the peripheries of great cities surf the Internet on a regular basis. This suggests that cultural globalization is in-dependent of the material well-being of its participants, comprising both the wealthy and the poor. The latter no longer create their own sub-culture, which

38 Cf. R. Strassold, “Globalism and Localism: Theoretical Reflections and Some Evidence”, in: Globalization and Territorial Identities, op. cit., p. 45.

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would articulate their unique problems, but participate in the concerns common to all. This shows that the earlier ideological divisions determined by economic conditions often turn out to be irrelevant, and are replaced by new ones.39 They bring together people coming from different countries and different social strata, with the same views on nature preservation, feminist ideas, sexual preferences (gay and lesbian movements), or attitudes towards globalization.

Global culture thus does not have any definite national past, from which it could be logically derived. It does not have its history. It comes from “every-where” and “nowhere”, since it combines and intertwines such diverse elements that it is impossible to point to its genesis. Its past, if one tries to pinpoint it for some purpose, is always constructed, since it relies on different partial data. What belongs to the past in one particular construal, may turn out to be the present or the future in another. All these categories thus become relative, and in effect the global culture becomes timeless. Its elements have so many contexts that they ultimately appear decontextualized.

What influence does all this have on people’s identity and on art? In 1993, Jean Bernabé, Patrick Chamoiseau,and Raphael Confiant published (as a French/ English edition) their book loge de la créolité / In Praise of Creoleness. Taking as their point of departure the local situation of the Caribbean culture, they extended their observations, finding the equivalents of this culture in Africa, Australasia, South America, and even the United States. They argue that Creole-ness is a kind of mental envelope, within which our small internal world is built with full awareness of what happens outside it. Thus it is not closed but remains open, taking in various other elements.

Creolization as a historical phenomenon was a consequence of the colonial domination. Diversity was then an unavoidable consequence of the impossibility of preserving one’s cultural identity. This “yoke of history”, as the authors call it40, accounted for the fact that elements of the Caribbean, European, African, Asiatic, and Mediterranean cultures were integrated in the same territory. But the term “Creolization” has now been extended and may be used to refer to the situation of contemporary culture. According to Okwui Enwezor, the director of the Documenta 11 exhibition, the “situational flux” characteristic for it inspires analogical phenomena, though with different causes, context, and range. The historical Creole communities were rooted in the institutions of slavery and

39 One example is the ecological movement. It is also worth noting that organizing their protests, the anti-globalists communicate using the Internet. That is why some of them prefer to call themselves not anti-globalists but alter-globalists, since they regard globalization as irreversible (cf. Domosławski, op. cit., p. 7).

40 J. Bernabe, P. Chamoiseau, R. Confiant, 1993, Eloge de la Créolité/In praise of Creoleness (bilingual ed., Paris, p. 87.

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colonialism, while the present diversity and hybridization results from the global institutionalization of capitalism. Yet as regards the construal of personality, language, ethnicity, and race, similar mechanisms are involved. Enwezor argues that in recent years, through the waves of migration, Creolization emerged as the dominant modality of the practices of contemporary life, modelling the patterns of dwelling, in which a rich flow of images and cultural symbols expressed in material culture and in language results in their interpenetration and diversifica-tion.41

Can one thus equate the two phenomena of globalization and Creolization? Is Creolization just a cultural consequence of globalization processes? Enwezor points out that the convergence of different traditions and types of historical awareness, characteristic for contemporary culture, does not always proceed smoothly and without conflict. Often these encounters are violent, because of the forces of cultural inheritance and the fact that the principles of exchange and interpenetration are not symmetrical. There appear some strategies of resistance, aimed at preserving the integrity of non-dominant cultures. That is why, as he writes, if globalization has defined and transformed earlier distribution of capital, Creolization constitutes its strongest cultural counter-point. While globalization aims at consolidation and homogenization, Creolization tends towards diver-sification and diffusion.42

The debate on contemporary reality often juxtaposes the concepts of glob-alization and Americanization, and the terms are often regarded as different

names for the same phenomenon. But they can be also distinguished. While globalization, positively interpreted, is viewed as involving multiplicity and variety, giving universal dimension to local phenomena by putting them in a global context, Americanization is associated with the dominant position of the United States. It is, however, usually emphasized that this domination does not consist in simple, direct imposition of the American tradition, or in imperial subjugation. Just the opposite: the national or folkloristic elements of different cultures are taken into account, but only as targets of commercial and marketing strategies. Thus the goal is not centralization and unification, but the acknowledgement of the world’s achievements, though viewed from the perspective of the consumerist system, presented as the only rational choice. It is suggested that there is no dominance and subjugation, but only common sense, which tells us that the best thing we can do with our tradition is to offer it as a commodity on the world-wide cultural market. There is thus no brutal breaking

41 O. Enwezor, 2002, “The Black Box”, in: Documenta 11, Platform5: Exhibition, Kassel, p. 51.

42 Ibid.

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down of opposition, but rather taming and temptation as the ways of overcoming the resistance of the particular.43 The goal is not the elimination of differences. Zbyszko Melosik argues that “this whole process is not aimed at forming helpless and incapacitated cultures, but ones that are dynamic, able to develop – but within the logic of consumption and commercialism.”44

I believe that while Creolization may be regarded as a phenomenon remaining within the scope of broadly conceived globalization processes, the Americanized version certainly runs counter to them. The transformation of the circulation of capital within the contemporary world economics and the intermingling of elements in Americanized culture seem to share one feature – in both cases, the apparent freedom and variety hide the laws of competition; they define the principles of behaviour, suggesting that the future belongs to those companies and corporations which take account of individual differences. The situation on the particular market does not result from free interplay of configurations, but from the rules of economy and marketing. In the face of such consolidation and instrumentalization hidden under the surface of variety and diversification, Creolization is a quest for independence. It rejects hidden manipulation; it seeks the acceptance of multiplicity and the creation of changing, occasional arrange-ments not serving any hidden purposes.

The traditional awareness of history associated with art derived either from the accumulation of local experiences and traditions, or from a vision of universal history. In both cases, the emphasis on the continuity of history, and the directionality of changes served the purpose of consolidating national (or universalized, pan-human) identity. The awareness of following in the footsteps of earlier generations was to create a sense of identification with the community, to place the person within the process of change, the continuous sequence of transformations. It was the ground for the belief in the common fate. The artistic avant-garde of the 20th century partly destroyed that order. It called into question the importance of the local traditions and promoted artistic universalism. At the same time it introduced into the tradition of universal art the elements of non-European cultures that had been previously ignored. It reworked the criteria of artistic achievement, suggesting a change in their hierarchy, but it did not dispute the role of history and its basic vectors.

Postmodernism calls into question the identity of history. The turn towards history, observable especially in the works from the late 1970s and early 1980s

43 Cf. S. Hall, 1991, The Local and the Global. Globalization and Ethnicity, in: Culture, Globalization, and the World-System. Contemporary Conditions for the Representation of Identity, ed. A. King. London, p. 28–29.

44 Melosik, op. cit., p. 27.

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was illusory, since it consisted not in upholding, but in destroying the sequential order, in depreciating the developmental continuity in art. The earlier categories of universal art have been dispersed. Local traditions are brought to light not as elements of a larger whole, but as isolated, fragmentary causal chains which may be used differently depending on the context.45 In effect, however, they have become artificial, suspended in a void. Contemporaryism is the equalization of local traditions, and at the same time turning them into elements universally available for any kind of recycling. In its Americanized version, globalization is the acceptance of this situation as a comfortable point of departure for commercial manipulation. Thus the acknowledgement of differences ties in with the strict, but hidden principles of global commerce and consumption. In contrast, Creolization seems to involve the possession of many pasts, and search-ing for identity not through joining in some established tradition, but through attempts to form a unity out of multiplicity. Such attempts were made by Creoles, forced by the political circumstances to look for their “self” among a multitude of traditions. Today the contemporary culture may be putting us in a similar situation. Anyway, such a quest seems to be much more valuable than the escape

into fundamentalism accepting exclusively only one of the local traditions and aggressively negating all the others.46

transl. Alina Kwiatkowska

HISTORIA, KONTEMPORARYZM, KREOLIZACJA(streszczenie)

Idea historii powszechnej, która miała być czynnikiem uniwersalizującym, stała się, według myślicieli postmodernistycznych, elementem ucisku i niesprawiedliwości. Historycyzm pokrył się z praktyką imperializmu. Czy podobnie było w sztuce? Autor analizuje problem odwołując się do przykładu dwudziestowiecznej awangardy artystycznej.

W latach osiemdziesiątych historycyzmowi sprowadzającemu całość dziejów do jednego uporządkowanego, ukierunkowanego nurtu, przeciwstawiono kontemporaryzm. Rozwój przebiega

45 One example is the exhibition and the accompanying publication UNESCO. 40 ans. 40 artistes. 40 pays (Paris 1988) which was described by the organizers as “a geological cross-section of world culture”. In the introduction we can read that “cultural identities are affirmed here in each picture. But the reference to a symbol, the composition, the colours – the past which fills the work – is as obvious as a common modernity of the creative touch” (p. 5).

46 Cf. Fundamentalism Comprehended, ed. M. E. Marty and R. S. Appleby, Chicago–London 1984.

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wielokierunkowo, często jego linie zostają odwrócone, w związku z tym, liczy się przede wszystkim chwila obecna.

Czy te kontrowersje mają konsekwencje odnoszące się do debaty na temat globalizacji? Sama idea globalizacji nie jest precyzyjna. Podkreśla się w niej zarówno szanse nadania temu, co lokalne, dotąd zamknięte, znaczenia międzynarodowego, jak też wskazuje, że zróżnicowanie i hybrydyzacja odbywają się w ramach jednolitej logiki konsumpcji i komercji. Odpowiednikiem kulturowym jest kreolizacja. Wcześniejsze objawy tego problemu związane były z niewolnictwem i kolonializmem. Dziś jednak, w rezultacie oddziaływania technik telekomunikacyjnych wszyscy stajemy się kulturowymi Kreolami. Czy można w tej sytuacji odnaleźć swą tożsamość? Z pewnością nie przez odwołanie się do tradycji historycznej uniwersalnej lub narodowej. Kreolizacja związana jest z po-siadaniem wielu przeszłości i poszukiwaniem w każdej chwili, wciąż na nowo własnego „ja”. Po-stawa taka jest o wiele wartościowsza od poddania się tendencjom fundamentalistycznym.

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History, Contemporarism, Creolization

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