Has anything changed? Hume's theory of association and sympathy after the Treatise

ARTICLE

HAS ANYTHING CHANGED?HUME’S THEORY OF ASSOCIATION

AND SYMPATHY AFTER THE TREATISE

Remy Debes

Anyone who has carefully worked through both Hume’s Treatise and histwo principal later works, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understandingand An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, must have noticed aremarkable gap in those later works: the associationist account of sympathyfrom the Treatise has gone missing.1 This mysterious disappearance is all themore puzzling given Hume’s obvious fondness for this part of his theory inthe Treatise. The general principle of the association of ideas is pronouncedin the Abstract to the Treatise to be the greatest discovery of that work, andonce the application of this principle to sympathy is made in Book 2, theaccount which results is simply utilized too many times in the remainder ofthe Treatise to bother counting.2 Indeed, not only does Hume end upcrediting sympathy as the source of our moral sentiments in the Treatise, healso remarks in the conclusion to Book 3 that it is his account of sympathy

1All citations to Hume’s Enquiries are to the Clarendon Critical Editions of An Enquiry

Concerning Human Understanding and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited

by Tom Beauchamp (Oxford Clarendon Press, 2000 and 1998, respectively) with ‘EHU’ and

‘EPM’ respectively, followed by section and paragraph numbers, and also to the Selby-Bigge/

Nidditch edition (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975) by ‘SBN’, followed by page numbers. In the

case of multiple references these numbers are separated by a semicolon. Please note that these

are the scholarly editions, and not the student editions. This is important as I will later have

cause to cite Beauchamp’s introductions to both texts, as well as some of the scholarly

apparatus.2Hume writes in the Abstract,

Thro’ this whole book, there are great pretensions to new discoveries in philosophy;

but if any thing can entitle the author to so glorious a name as that of an inventor, ’tis

the use he makes of the principle of the association of ideas, which enters into most of

his philosophy

(Abs. 35; SBN 661–2)

All citations to Hume’s Abstract to the Treatise, and to the Treatise itself are to David Hume,

A Treatise on Human Nature, edited by David and Mary Norton (Oxford University Press,

2000) with ‘Abs’ or ‘T’, respectively, followed by paragraph numbers in the former and followed

by book, part, section and paragraph numbers in the latter, and also to the Selby-Bigge/

Nidditch edition (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1978) by ‘SBN’, followed by page numbers. In the

case of multiple references these numbers are separated by a semicolon.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy 15(2) 2007: 313 – 338

British Journal for the History of PhilosophyISSN 0960-8788 print/ISSN 1469-3526 online ª 2007 BSHP

http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/09608780701240040

that gives his ethical theory a distinct ‘advantage’ over competing moralsense theories of the time (T. 3.3.6.3; SBN 619). Did Hume, then, really giveup this very dear feature of his philosophy?3

Actually, the question of whether Hume rejected the associationistaccount of sympathy is part of a larger puzzle that centres on the secondEnquiry (hereafter EPM); for also gone from EPM is Hume’s insistence thatsympathy is the source of our moral sentiments. Instead, this fundamentalpsychological role is assigned to the principle of humanity. Perhaps, then,the associationist account of sympathy is missing from Hume’s later workssimply because Hume gave up the thesis that sympathy is the source of ourmoral sentiments? In this light, the puzzle of EPM can really be expressed bytwo questions: first, did Hume reject the claim that sympathy explains ourmoral sentiments? Secondly, did Hume come to reject his earlierassociationist conception of sympathy?4 I have previously argued that thefirst question should be answered in the negative.5 Sympathy’s essential rolein Hume’s moral theory remained the same after the Treatise. More exactly,the principle of humanity, understood as a disposition towards benevolence,is functionally dependent on sympathy (or the process of sympathizing), andthus sympathy is not essentially displaced in EPM. Hume has only chosen tobring to the fore what was always in the background of the Treatise, namelythe critical importance of our original disposition towards humanity orbenevolence. The appearance of substantive change between the two worksis thus best explained as a change in emphasis.

However, even if I am right that sympathy’s ethical role did not essen-tially change in EPM, it remains an open possibility that in his later worksHume abandoned the associationist account of the Treatise. Some answer,then, to the second question of the puzzle is still wanting. In this paper Itake up this challenge, and attempt to solve the mysterious disappearance ofthe associationist account of sympathy, with the ultimate aim of defending ano-change hypothesis. That is, I’ll argue that careful analysis reveals thatHume not only retained the associationist theory of sympathy in his later

3Hume’s attachment to the associationist explanation of sympathy is perhaps made stronger by

carefully noting that it was not the discovery of the principle of association itself about which he

was so excited. Hume surely knew that associationism had been discussed by others before him

(See Beauchamp’s annotative introduction to Section 3 of EHU, p. 134). Rather, as Hume

himself remarks in the Abstract, it was the ‘use’ of this principle that he believed entitled him to

the title of Inventor (see n2). The account of sympathy is, of course, one of Hume’s major

applications of this principle.4This particular puzzle of EPM was discussed at least as early as 1893, when Selby-Bigge made

note of it in his introduction to the Enquiries (pp. xxvi–xxix). Most recently, this puzzle is the

focus of Kate Abramson’s ‘Sympathy and the Project of Hume’s Second Inquiry’ (Archiv fur

Geschichte der Philosophie, 83 (2001) No. 1: 45–80), Rico Vitz’s ‘Sympathy and Benevolence in

Hume’s Moral Psychology’ (Journal of the History of Philosophy 42 (2004) No. 3: 261–75), and

my own ‘Humanity, Sympathy, and the Puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry’ (British Journal for

the History of Philosophy 15 (2007) No. 1: 27–57).5See n4.

314 REMY DEBES

work, he made no substantive changes to this theory, including, in particular,in EPM.

Not all scholars, however, have seen it this way.6 Selby-Bigge, forexample, argues that Hume simply decided to abandon the associationistaccount of sympathy and consequently replaced it with a differentprinciple.7 Similarly, John Rawls suggests that Hume might have realizedthat he had made too much of the associationist mechanism and that suchan account of sympathy yielded only ‘imparted feeling,’ a result that did notsatisfy Hume’s philosophical needs, for it could not by itself explain the‘peculiar’ moral sentiment that Hume thought underwrote the possibility ofgeneral moral agreement. Rawls adds that the account of sympathy in theTreatise depended on a ‘dubious’ idea of the self, which Hume himself laterrejected, and thus might have also led him to reject the Treatise account ofsympathy altogether.8 More moderately, Norman Kemp Smith argues thatthere was a general cooling of Hume’s interest in associationism after theTreatise, which general theoretical shift explains why Hume gave up theassociationist account of sympathy.9 In contrast to all these, however, KateAbramson has recently argued that Hume did not change his doctrine at all.On her account, Hume retained the associationist account of sympathy inEPM, but left out the overt technical discussion of the Treatise in order tofulfil particular literary goals that he thought this technical discussion ofsympathy might jeopardize.10

My argument will thus align me most closely with those such asAbramson who reject any radical change in doctrine by Hume, in favour ofan alternative hypothesis that explains apparent changes in Hume’s work as

6It is worth noting that some scholars simply do not address this puzzle at all or have ignored it

by virtue of ignoring the Enquiries altogether. As to the former, see e.g. John Bricke, Mind and

Morality: An Examination of Hume’s Moral Psychology (Oxford, 1996) and Barry Stroud,

Hume (London, 1977). As to the latter, see Abramson’s discussion of the point, 45.7See n4.8John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, 2000) 101–2. Actually,

at the point where he makes these remarks Rawls does not clearly explain why he thinks

imparted feeling was philosophically insufficient for Hume; but given what Rawls says in

Section 5 of the same chapter, this appears to be what he has in mind (see esp. 93–4). The

dubious idea of the self, which Rawls refers to in the connected point, is of course the so-called

bundle theory of identity.9Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London, 1966) 530–6. Nicholas Capaldi

might also be included here (David Hume: The Newtonian Philosopher (Boston, 1975) 180–7,

esp. 185–6). But I have two principle reasons for not addressing Capaldi directly: (a) to include

Capaldi’s interpretation would muddle my presentation, because his approach shares some

similarities with those of Selby-Bigge and Rawls; (b) while Capaldi does have one unique

solution to the puzzle of sympathy in EPM, like Terence Penelhum, I worry that Capaldi’s

interpretation of the text is confused; see Terence Penelhum, David Hume: An Introduction to

His Philosophical System (West Lafayette, 1992) 155–6. For more response to Capaldi, see Vitz,

268–70.10Abramson, 45–80. Along with Abramson we can also place Rico Vitz, who essentially works

toward the same ends (see esp. 274–5).

HAS ANYTHING CHANGED? 315

the result of a corresponding change in his literary, and not philosophical,objectives. But unlike Abramson, who focuses heavily on evidence related toHume’s literary style, method, and goals per se – and which I will refer to asliterary-focused evidence – I will treat of these issues in only a subordinateway. My primary goal is to consider the associationist doctrines themselves,and in particular, when and how they manifest in the textual arguments fromTreatise to EPM; for I am of the opinion that demonstration of literary-focused evidence, while important, can only serve to help justify a presumptionof no-change. More direct evidence is required to close the case.11

Correspondingly, my argument follows both steps: First, to justify apresumption of consistency in the associationist account of sympathy fromTreatise to EPM; and secondly, to present explicit textual evidence of Hume’songoing commitment to associationism in such a way that confirms thispresumption and responds to contrary interpretations. Given this strategy,however, we will first need some understanding of the original associationistaccount of sympathy from the Treatise. This is where I shall begin.

I. THE ASSOCIATIONIST ACCOUNT OF SYMPATHY

At first blush, the Treatise often seems to treat sympathy merely as a kindof imparted feeling, or contagion of sentiment. This is especially true inBook 3. ‘The passions are so contagious’, Hume writes during the discussionof benevolence in 3.3.3, ‘that they pass with the greatest facility from oneperson to another, and produce correspondent movements in all humanbreasts’ (T. 3.3.3.5; SBN 605). Or, even more eloquently: ‘As in stringsequally wound up, the motion of one [man’s mind] communicates itself tothe rest; so all the affections readily pass from one person to another, andbeget correspondent movements in every human creature’ (T. 3.3.1.7; SBN576). Of course, this is no simple process, and Hume has a complicatedexplanation to offer for this phenomenon; hence the elaborate associationistmechanism of sympathy presented in Section 2.1.11, Of the love of fame.

According to Hume, our observation of another person’s behavior raisesan idea in us about the causes of that behaviour, from which we infer afurther idea of a passion via an association of ideas from the memory andexperience of our own passions. This idea of another’s passion is then itselfconverted into an impression (i.e. a feeling12) by a relation of this idea to thelively impression we each have of ourselves; i.e. literally, the impression eachof us has of his or her own ‘self’. In other words, we are endowed with a kind

11I do not mean to imply that Abramson considers only literary-focused evidence. Her scope is

wider than that (e.g. see my n20); but she does not devote much effort towards tracking the

associationist details per se, which is a step I see as crucial.12Recall that, for Hume, ideas and impressions are both types of perception, the latter being

(in general) a more forceful and lively species than the former. Feelings and passions are thus

impressions.

316 REMY DEBES

of self-awareness that, according to Hume, is always so intimately present inour consciousness (even if unnoticed), and also so vivacious, that theassociated idea of another person’s passion is enlivened to a forceresembling the original passion.13 Therefore, whenever we imagine thepassion of another we also cannot help but to feel some likeness of the samepassion because the idea we have of that person’s passion is always sointimately related to our own latent self-awareness that the idea becomes animpression or feeling. We are, in effect, transferring some of the energy fromour own lively impression of ourselves into the idea of another’s passion.14

However, it is precisely this essential relation back to the self, or self-association, in the sympathetic process that provokes part of the problem ofsubjective bias in our moral sentiments, and which is, of course, a majorpoint of discussion for Hume in Book 3. Consider, for example, thefollowing remark from the associationist description of sympathy in 2.1.11:

The stronger the relation [of resemblance] is betwixt ourselves and any object,the more easily does the imagination make the transition, and convey to therelated idea the vivacity of conception, with which we always form the idea of

our own person. Nor is resemblance the only relation, which has this effect, butreceives new force from other relations, that may accompany it. The sentimentsof others have little influence, when far remov’d from us, and require the

relation of contiguity, to make them communicate themselves entirely.(T. 2.1.11.5–6; SBN 318)

The importance of self-association is clear in this passage, and the idearecurs throughout 2.1.11.15 Given this, it is only more striking when Humelater brings the same point to bear, though now in a moral context:

Now ’tis evident, that those [moral] sentiments, whence-ever they are deriv’d,

must vary according to the distance or contiguity of the objects; nor can I feel

13It is a mistake to think Hume here blunders into a manifest contradiction with what he says in

T. 1.4.6 Of Personal Identity. For, T. 1.4.6 only denies that we have a particular kind of idea of

the self, namely an idea of self that is derived from some invariant impression of the self. Hume

never denies in this section that we have any impression of the self. The implication is instead

that our impression (or impressions) of the self is variant, and thus that any idea of self must

reflect this fact. Indeed, this section itself goes on to argue for a notion of self, which is

presumably what Hume refers to at T. 1.4.6.5 as the ‘self’ involved in our passions, and which is

recalled at the start of Book 2 (T. 2.1.2.2). There is, however, a more legitimate worry

concerning sympathy and the notion of self in the Treatise, which I discuss later in Section III.2.14I owe this sentence to Rawls’s description of the same argument (Rawls, 86).15For example,

We may conclude, that relations are requisite to sympathy, not absolutely consider’d

as relations, but by their influence in converting our ideas of the sentiments of others

into the very sentiments, by means of the association betwixt the idea of their persons,

and that of our own.

(T. 2.1.11.16; SBN 322)


the same lively pleasure from the virtues of a person, who liv’d in Greece twothousand years ago, that I feel from the virtues of a familiar friend andacquaintance.

(T. 3.3.1.15; SBN 581)

Again, this sort of remark is not singular, but only one reflection of a centraltheme in Book 3 that is also combined with Hume’s appeal for a generalstandpoint from which we might correct these variations.16 Thus, Humefamously argues towards the end of the Treatise:

In like manner, tho’ sympathy be much fainter than our concern for ourselves,and a sympathy with persons remote from us much fainter than that withpersons near and contiguous; yet we neglect all these differences in our calmjudgments concerning the characters of men. Besides, that we ourselves often

change our situation in this particular, we every day meet with persons, whoare in a different situation from ourselves, and who cou’d never converse withus on any reasonable terms, were we to remain constantly in that situation and

point of view, which is peculiar to us. The intercourse of sentiments, therefore,in society and conversation, makes us form some general inalterable standard,by which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners. And tho’

the heart does not always take part with those general notions, or regulate itslove and hatred by them, yet are they sufficient for discourse, and serve all ourpurposes in company, in the pulpit, on the theatre, and in the schools.

(T. 3.3.3.2; SBN 603)

This passage must already remind us of EPM, where in nearly the samewords Hume stresses the importance of a general standpoint for thecorrection of subjective bias caused by the distortion of proximity orcontiguity.17 Correspondingly, this repetition is a hint that the associationistaccount of the Treatise is retained in EPM. However, this takes us ahead ofourselves; I discuss the corresponding EPM passage in the next section. Theimmediate task is to explain the Treatise account of associationist sympathy.This said, when taken together the two passages just considered reveal thatit is a certain natural tendency towards subjectivity inherent in theassociationist mechanism of sympathy that partly drives Hume’s appealfor a ‘common’ or ‘general’ point of view in making moral judgements. Forit is exactly this natural distortion of sympathy due to proximity orcontiguity with the self that causes a problematic partiality in ourjudgements of virtue and vice, and which the general point of view isintended to correct.18

16The whole of this Section (3.3.1) is especially marked by such passages.17EPM 5.42; SBN 229, also cited and discussed in the next section (see n23).18In making this appeal to Hume’s arguments on sympathetic deliberation, and to the corrective

use of the common viewpoint in particular, it might seem that we have crossed over to a

consideration of Hume’s normative claims regarding sympathy, which might strike some as

muddying the waters. Unfortunately, Hume himself is systematically unclear when it comes to

318 REMY DEBES

How this correction is supposed to work, we can ignore.19 What needs tobe highlighted for our purposes is that Hume’s explanation of this naturalbias is itself a major element of the associationist explanation of sympathy –one which will be instrumental in drawing a connection from the Treatise toEPM. For this reason, we should formally distinguish two key elements inHume’s associationist account of sympathy as it appears in Treatise 2.1.11:

1. The explanation of how ideas of passions get converted into passionsthemselves. It is a compound phenomenon: The observation of anemotion leads the imagination to form an idea of the passion (step one),and then by a relation of this idea of the passion to the impression wehave of ourselves this idea is enlivened into a passion itself (step two).

2. The claim that the degree or extent to which the enlivening process in (1)takes place depends on one’s relationship to the person with whom oneis sympathizing; if the relationship is distant or remote, the effect isdiminished.20

This, of course, is only a rough sketch and not intended as an analysis of thephilosophical merits of the associationist account itself; but as our task isonly to determine whether Hume has carried this account over to EPM, thissketch will suffice. Let us, then, now try to determine if this account didindeed survive the Treatise.

II. JUSTIFYING THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSISTENCY

To be clear, nothing like Section 2.1.11 of the Treatise, or any other formaldiscussion of the associationist mechanism of sympathy, occurs anywhere inEPM. This is partly why there is a pertinent interpretive problem in the firstplace. At the same time, perhaps we should not expect such an account inEPM. EPM, it seems safe to say, is supposed to be the reworking of Book 3of the Treatise. Book 2, on the other hand, where Section 2.1.11 appears,was represented (albeit much reduced) by A Dissertation on the Passions.And I do think we find explicit associationist details in the Dissertation,which I consider in the next section. However, even without an explicit

distinguishing his normative arguments from the (moral) psychology in which those arguments

are saturated. It is an ambiguity that seems to be a deep, perhaps inescapable, feature of Hume’s

philosophy. I do not think it is an ambiguity we need to sort out here, for I have only introduced

these normative comments to put into relief certain aspects of the associationist account of

sympathy that will help establish the philosophical consistency between the Treatise and

Enquiry for which I am arguing in this paper.19I address Hume’s arguments for the correction of bias in our moral sentiments in more detail

in ‘Humanity, Sympathy, and the Puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry’.20I am grateful to Louis Loeb for suggesting this clarification of the two elements of the

associationist account.


reiteration of the associationist account there are good reasons to thinkHume retained the associationist features of sympathy in EPM. Corre-spondingly, let me first present the case for making this our startingassumption prior to any textual analysis of associationism per se.

First, as mentioned at the start, I have elsewhere argued that carefulconsideration of Hume’s account of humanity in EPM generates acompelling argument for thinking that EPM, despite its undeniableemphasis on humanity as the source of our moral sentiments, still assignssympathy a fundamental and necessary role in the generation of suchsentiments.21 To reiterate, humanity as a principle in EPM (understood asan original disposition towards benevolence, or an original motive of goodwill towards our fellow human beings) functionally requires sympathy as arepresentational mechanism. Once presented with an affective object (somepassion of another person, real or imagined), the disposition of humanityraises a pleasing sentiment in us by which we make our moral distinctions.The pay-off is thus an interpretation that makes good sense of Hume’semphasis in EPM on humanity as the source of our moral sentiments(rather than sympathy), but without the unhappy hypothesis that Humeabandoned the very innovation he believed gave his moral system adistinct ‘advantage’ over other competing moral sense theories – mainly,the essential role of sympathy in the generation of our moral sentiments.For, if I am right, sympathy remains essential in EPM because it is thenecessary representational mediator to humanity. But this implies thatsympathy’s highlighted ethical role in the Treatise can be understood tohave undergone no essential change in EPM, which itself is one powerful,albeit indirect, reason to assume the associationist part of Hume’s theoryof sympathy also did not change.

There is, however, also more direct evidence supporting this sameassumption. It appears that all the major deliberative features of sympathyare retained from the Treatise to EPM. That is, in both works, sympatheticdeliberation requires both that we consider the tendency of traits to benefit thepossessor or others, and that we consider only the typical effects of that trait.22

This is important in itself, butwhat is especially remarkable iswhat is implicit inthis observation: EPM still leans on the principle that the effects of sympathyvarywith relationships anddistance.And, asnoted in the last section, this just isa major element of the associationist account of sympathy from the Treatise.Thus, in prose almost identical to the Treatise, Hume argues in EPM,

Sympathy, we shall allow, is much fainter than our concern for ourselves, andsympathy with persons remote from us, much fainter than that with persons

near and contiguous; but for this very reason it is necessary for us, in our calm

21See n4.22This particular parallel between the Treatise and EPM is extensively analysed in Kate

Abramson’s ‘Sympathy and the Project of Hume’s Second Inquiry’.

320 REMY DEBES

judgments and discourse concerning the characters of men, to neglect all thesedifferences, and render our sentiments more public and social.

(EPM 5.42; SBN 229)23

Again, EPM does not try to explain the variance of passion with distance, orany other aspect of sympathy, explicitly by association; so this evidence isnot conclusive. Still, that Hume did not change this particular feature ofsympathy – a feature closely linked with the original associationist accountof the Treatise – must count as a prima facie reason to believe that the restof the associationist account also remained unchanged.

Finally, it must count for something that, however much he ignores it,Hume never outright rejects the associationist account of sympathy from theTreatise.24 Indeed, as already hinted, Hume continues to utilize part of thataccount in A Dissertation on the Passions. Also, the general principle ofassociationism clearly appears in all his later work; so surely, the mere factthat he does not include the explicit associationist explanation of sympathyin EPM cannot alone support the conclusion that Hume abandoned thisexplanation. It raises a puzzle, certainly, but based on these initial con-siderations, the most plausible starting assumption in response to this puzzleshould be that nothing has essentially changed.

Of course, some explanation on our part is still required for why explicitdiscussion of the associationist mechanism is left out of EPM, but a simpleexplanation is readily available. Hume’s own Advertisement for thecollected edition of his works, Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects(hereafter Essays and Treatises), in which EPM appeared from 1753 until1777 (the last edition Hume made corrections to before his death25), statesthat any changes in these works correct for ‘some negligences in his formerreasoning,’ but ‘more in the expression’. This comment gives us no reason tothink Hume had a motive to change the substance of his account ofsympathy, only that he desired to make his ‘expression’ more clear so thatEPM might be more publicly successful (as well as everything else in theEssays and Treatises).26 Indeed, to say that some of the corrections make up

23This passage is literally almost identical to T. 3.3.3.2. For a striking word-for-word

comparison, see Beauchamp’s introduction to EPM (Intro., lvii).24There is a particular passage in EPM at 5.13 (SBN 217), which might tempt one to think

Hume has abandoned the associationist account of sympathy. Indeed, this passage is a

cornerstone in Capaldi’s own argument advocating Hume’s rejection of the associationist

mechanism of sympathy (Capaldi, 180–1). Rico Vitz, however, has ably demonstrated that

upon closer reading this passage does not amount to such a rejection of the associationist

mechanism, and Capaldi was wrong to think otherwise (Vitz, 268–70).25The 1772 edition was, however, the last edition Hume personally saw all the way through the

press. This raises some questions about the authority of the 1777 edition, which I discuss near

the end of this paper.26Abramson also makes this point in more elaborate fashion (Abramson, 64–71; see especially

section II.B & C). Some of the evidence from Hume’s correspondence that I present below she

also considers.


for former ‘negligences’ in reasoning does not so much suggest that Humethought the substance of his former arguments incorrect, as it does that hebelieved there was some carelessness in how he executed the presentation ofthose arguments. At a minimum, as Kate Abramson has argued, it is hard tocontest that Hume’s public opinion about the differences between the texts –that is, what he wanted his readers and critics to think – was that thechanges were merely in the manner of expression. In particular, Abramsonpoints out that in light of the fact that the associationist mechanism ofsympathy in the Treatise had already been misunderstood or ignored bycritics, it made sense for a writer bent on public success to suppress thedetails of this account.27 Certainly, on any first reading it must be admittedthis is exactly how both Enquiries come off, as a simplification. The mostcursory comparison of the contents according to section heading in theTreatise and the Enquiries makes this clear.28

Our case need not rest here. Various remarks Hume made in his personalcorrespondence resonate with the foregoing ‘simplification’ hypothesis.Most notable, perhaps, are his rather well-known comments to GilbertElliot in March or April, 1751:

I believe the philosophical Essays contain every thing of Consequence relatingto the Understanding, which you would meet with in the Treatise; & I give youmy Advice against reading the latter. By shortening & simplifying theQuestions, I really render them much more complete. Addo dum minuo. The

philosophical principles are the same in both.29

This is clearly encouraging evidence for my hypothesis, though we should becautious not to make too much of it. The scope of ‘philosophical principles’is unclear, and just after this last sentence Hume goes on to say that, owingto the age at which he composed the Treatise, it must ‘necessarily be verydefective’ (although again, with no specification of how).30 Still, the letter issuggestive. Hume only describes himself as shortening and simplifying thequestions, not necessarily changing anything in the original answers. Eventhe Latin phrase of the letter leans this way: ‘I add while I decrease in size.’31

Moreover, Hume expresses nearly identical sentiments in a second letter a

27Abramson, see especially section III.A. For more evidence that Hume was quite clear in public

that the differences between the works was essentially one of presentation, not content, see

Anthony Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief (London, 1961) 1–3.28See also, Flew, 3–5.29David Hume, The Letters of David Hume, ed. J. Y. T. Greig, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1932) 1: 158;

hereafter, Letters.30I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for urging mention of this letter and noting the

ambiguous scope of ‘principles’ mentioned therein, as well as encouraging further consideration

of Hume’s correspondence generally.31I agree with M. A. Stewart’s translation of the Latin, both in this letter and the next; letters,

the significance of which, Beauchamp also notes in his introduction to EPM (Intro., xiii).

322 REMY DEBES

few years later, but with a more certain emphasis that the change is only oneof expression:

Above all, the positive Air, which prevails in that Book [the Treatise], & which

may be imputed to the Ardor of Youth, so much displeases me, that I have notPatience to review it. But what Success the same Doctrines, better illustrated &exprest, may meet with (emphasis added).32

In this last sentence Hume is surely referring to his later work including bothEnquires, thus adding confidence to our hypothesis.33

Moreover, Hume’s letters just after the publication of the Treatise sug-gest both that he developed this limited worry with the presentation of theTreatise very early on, and also that the positive reception of his new Essays,Moral and Political might have motivated him to make significant changes inthe stylistic presentation of the Treatise arguments. Hume writes in 1742:

The Essays are all sold in London, as I am informed by two letters fromEnglish gentlemen of my acquaintance. There is a demand for them; and asone of them tells me, Innys, the great bookseller in Paul’s Churchyard,wonders there is not a new edition, for that he cannot find copies for his

customers. I am also told that Dr Butler has every where recommended them;so that I hope they will have some success. They may prove like dung withmarl, and bring forward the rest of my Philosophy, which is of a more durable,

though of a harder and more stubborn nature.34

First, here again Hume’s reservation with the ‘harder more stubborn’Treatise seems to be only in terms of its style. Indeed, he notes the content as‘durable.’ Secondly, we can also see in this letter Hume’s amused excitementwith the success of his new work, which, as its title suggests, was cast inmuch easier ‘essay’ style, quite unlike the Treatise. The success of this newwork thus provides further motive for thinking Hume was bent on a changein literary presentation for his later philosophy, specifically, in a style closerto the Essays, Moral and Political. As some confirmation of this, as TomBeauchamp points out, when An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding(hereafter EHU) was first published in 1748, its title was markedly different.It was, Philosophical Essays Concerning Human Understanding. Beauchampargues, ‘The form and content together with the title given to these[Philosophical] Essays indicate the influence of the essay style.’35 Further-

32Feb. 1754, to John Stewart, Letters, 1: 187. Hume concludes this sentence, ‘Ad huc sub judice

lis est’ (The case is not yet decided).33Beauchamp concurs, see EPM (Intro., xiii).3413 Jun. 1742, to Henry Home, Letters, 1: 42–3.35EPM (Intro. xvi). Beauchamp continues:

Hume’s objective in calling the new 1748 group of essays philosophical (unlike the

earlier essays, whose titles included the terms moral and political – and, later, both


more, Beauchamp notes that as late as 1755 Hume was still referring to EHUas ‘essays’ in his correspondence and Hume even referred to EPM as ‘theseEssays’ in its first edition (1751).36 There is, then, good indication that Humewas generally influenced by the new ‘essay’ style of writing he used in Essays,Moral and Political, and that he saw himself as extending this style to theEnquiries. When we conjoin this motive to Hume’s public and privatestatements indicating dissatisfaction with the expression of the Treatise ratherthan its content, we have a strong alternative explanation for any apparentchanges between the Treatise and Hume’s later work.37

This might seem too fast. It is, of course, literally brief, both as anexamination of Hume’s correspondence and as a treatment of the influenceof the essay style on his later work. More specifically, the evidence isarguably inconclusive. As I already admitted, for example, there is someambiguity in the private correspondence cited in support of the no-changehypothesis. We are thus, in short, drawing hasty conclusions.

I disagree. At least, in so far as this complaint is concerned, I think there isno real worry; for, to be fair, a direct analysis of this literary-focused evidencewas never my central goal. My goal in this respect was only to present aplausible alternative story for the changes we find in Hume, and is itself onlyone component of the overall justification for the no-change hypothesis. Forthis purpose, I think the foregoing argument and evidence is sufficient.38

However, I suspect that this is not the whole complaint. Surely, one must bethinking, not every change in Hume’s later work is merely the result of a shift

political and literary) may have been to convey publicly that he was recasting his

philosophy in the more amiable essay style mentioned in the Advertisement to his 1741

essays, and also to establish a commercially important work. The genre freed him of

the systematic structure and detailed argumentation that had proved strenuous and

perplexing for readers of the Treatise.36EPM (Intro, xvii). I have brought forward only a portion of Beauchamp’s total evidence in

this regard.37Kemp Smith has argued, contra bothmyself andAbramson, that regardless of what Hume stated

publicly, his private correspondence reveals a genuine rejection of the principles and arguments of

the Treatise (Kemp Smith, 531–2). I do not, however, find Kemp Smith’s evidence on this point

convincing. First, Hume is often, and clearly, excessively self-deprecating in his private discussions

of his work. Secondly, nothingHume says in the letters Kemp Smith quotes is inconsistent withmy

or Abramson’s argument. Hume was willing to call the Treatise flawed in order to win a better

reception for his later work, especially the Enquiries. Indeed, two of Kemp Smith’s quoted letters

(one to Hutcheson, whose endorsement it is well-known Hume desired, and another to an

‘unfriendly critic’) do not actually decry the philosophical principles of the Treatise as they do the

enthusiasm with which the Treatise advanced those principles. Indeed, these are exactly the same

sentiments we have elsewhere seen Hume to combine with comments indicting that it was only the

style with which he was dissatisfied. At the very least, Kemp Smith’s reading cannot be considered

any more plausible than mine and Abramson’s. I leave more specific debate over Hume’s

correspondence in the hands of Abramson, whom I believe persuasively argues the case.38Moreover, as noted already, there are very good extant examinations which do conduct careful

examinations of this literary-focused evidence. In particular, I have endorsed Abramson (See nn24,

25), Flew (nn25, 26), and Beauchamp (n34) for their work on various aspects of these arguments.

324 REMY DEBES

in expression – this would seem highly implausible. But here I agree. Thus,that this is notmy hypothesis must be made clear. Here then is a summation ofmy claim thus far: Given (a) the consistency in sympathy’s ethical role fromTreatise to EPM; (b) Hume’s reaffirmation of certain elements of theassociationist account of sympathy in the EPM description of sympatheticdeliberation; (c) the fact that Hume never explicitly rejects the associationistaccount of sympathy in any later work; combined with (d) his own commentsindicating that the flaws of the Treatise were predominantly ones ofexpression rather than content; and (e) the evidence suggesting Hume wasmotivated by a more simple and less complicated essay style – given all this,there is very good reason and evidence for thinking that Hume believed inparticular that his presentation of associationism in the Treatise, including theassociationist explanation of sympathy, was too difficult or poorly describedfor his expected audience to understand. Better, then, for him to leave itimplied when possible, especially in EPM where what is important is that wecan share in the passions of others by sympathy, but not necessarily how thispsychological process works. That is, because it is not directly essential thatthe reader of EPM knows or is thinking of the principles of mind by whichsympathy is explained in order to appreciate the force of EPM’s broaderethical arguments, Hume only avoided discussion of these principles, but didnot abandon or weaken in his commitment to them. At least, I have by thispoint defended a strong presumption in favour of this conclusion. Those whowould find a change in this regard from the Treatise to EPM would thus needto present substantial textual evidence to undermine this presumption. I donot think, however, that the text will tell in their favour.39

III. TRACKING THE TEXTUAL CLUES

In this section I turn to a direct consideration of textual evidence pertainingto associationism. I must, however, first register a caveat. There is no silverbullet in this matter. It is not as if the missing account of sympathy is lurkingon the back of some unturned page in Hume’s later work. As with any good

39It might be objected that despite all his comments public and private Hume himself might be

underestimating the extent to which the substance of his work changed. To say definitively,

then, that the omission of the associationist account of sympathy is nothing more than a mere

change in expression, we would need carefully to lay out some general principles for deciding

between two hypotheses: that a given omission is a mere simplification or change in expression

(say, for strategic literary goals), and that the omission reflects a genuine change in view. This

would be, however, an extensive project in itself: too big at least to be handled adequately in this

paper. However, my objectives and conclusions in this paper do considerably advance such a

project; for in so far as part of the grounds we would want for deciding between these two

hypotheses in any given instance is based on a consideration of broader theoretical context, the

conceptual role and features of the theory or principle in question, and literary-focused

evidence, we have already begun mounting a case in favour of a no-change hypothesis.


mystery, we must instead look for clues. When all is said and done, I believethat what we do find clearly confirms the presumption of consistency.40

1. Preliminary Evidence

No one can deny that Hume is to some degree committed to associationistexplanations well past the Treatise. Although the distinctive associationistexplanation of sympathy has admittedly disappeared, there is, of course, stillplenty of talk about association in general throughout his later work. Humeeven assigns an entire section in EHU to this topic (explicitly entitled Of theAssociation of Ideas). In fact, because in the Treatise the explicit treatment ofthe association of ideas is only one section of one part of one book, thatHume devotes one of only twelve sections to the subject in EHU arguablyhighlights its treatment more in the latter than in the former. Further, there isa fair amount of associationist detail in the account of belief in Section 5.2 ofEHU. Even Hume’s transition into this section is important evidence for myhypothesis, for it is clear by what he says in the transition that he thinks thissection, which is so heavily infused with associationist detail, can be skippedwithout harm by the reader. It is, Hume tells us, only for those who have alove of the abstract: ‘As to readers of a different taste; the remaining part ofthis section is not calculated for them, and the following enquiries may wellbe understood, though it be neglected’ (EHU 5.9; SBN 47). This would thusseem to be more grist for mymill. For the content of the section demonstratesHume’s continued commitment to the principle of association and thisparticular comment demonstrates Hume’s willingness to bracket these detailsto facilitate better an understanding of his philosophy.

To all this evidence from EHU we can add that the account of probabilityin Section 6 seems to give at least a truncated version of the associationistexplanation of judgments of probability found in Treatise 3.3.11–12.Granted, the detail and elaboration is greatly reduced; but again, this is justwhat we should expect if my hypothesis is correct. Moreover, lookingbeyond just EHU there is a great deal of associationist explanation anddetail in Hume’s A Dissertation on the Passions (hereafter just Dissertation),which to reiterate, seems to represent Hume’s attempt to present againsome of Book 2 of the Treatise.41 The Dissertation is far shorter than Book2, and focuses largely on the secondary passions; but like the Treatise itexplains these passions by the thoroughly associationist ‘double relation ofideas’; Hume even says of the Dissertation, it ‘depends entirely’ on this

40I am grateful to Louis Loeb for his many comments and suggestions on this section of the

paper, especially his suggestion to consider Hume’s less studied A Dissertation of the Passions,

considered below.41A Dissertation on the Passions first appeared as part of Hume’s Four Dissertations. All

references to Hume’s Dissertation are to David Hume, A Dissertation on the Passions, edited by

T. H. Green and T. H. Grosse (London, 1875) Vol. II, pp. 139–62.

326 REMY DEBES

argument.42 Because it is shorter than Book 2 of the Treatise, this inclusion ofassociationist material has a highlighted significance, for clearly Humethought it was (at least part of) what was most worth recasting. This isconfirmed by the fact that Hume does not just include the associationistdetail for argumentative purposes in the Dissertation, he extols it: theassociationist principles have a ‘mighty influence on every operation, both ofthe understanding and passions’, which is ‘not commonly much insisted onby philosophers’.43 In this last comment we must hear the echo of the samepride Hume expressed for his associationist theory in the Abstract to theTreatise. Finally, I direct the reader to the last paragraph of the Dissertation,where Hume seems to be referring again to the principle of association,remarking that his purpose in this work is satisfied if he has demonstrated theinfluence of a ‘certain regular mechanism’ on the passions.44

Having said all this, however, the real point to stress is that for nearlytwenty years these works did not appear individually. EHU and theDissertationwere from 1758–77 seamlessly bonded alongside EPM as a singlevolume in the Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Indeed, these parti-cular works appeared in Essays and Treatises in the same order that thetopics originally held in the Treatise: EHU, the Dissertation, then EPM.45

Whatever else might be said, then, Hume evidently did not abandon theprinciple of association at the time of EPM. He simply relegated itsdiscussion to more appropriate locations.

We need not, however, rely solely on this sort of indirect argument toextend our hypothesis to EPM. There is some interesting evidence fromEPM itself demonstrating both a background commitment to association-ism but with the same sort of general willingness to forgo the full details forthe sake of broader (now ethical) argumentative objectives. For a start, itmust be noted that explicit conceptual reference to the association of ideas ismade in EPM, even if only three times,46 so the idea is not totally absent.More subtle, but important, consider this remark from the discussion ofqualities we approve because of their usefulness to ourselves:

There is no rule in painting or statuary more indispensible than that ofbalancing the figures, and placing them with the greatest exactness on theirproper centre of gravity. A figure, which is not justly balanced, is ugly; because

it conveys the disagreeable ideas of fall, harm, and pain.(EPM 6.28; SBN 245)

42Hume, Dissertation, 4.1, 158.43Hume, Dissertation, 2.6, 144–5. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for calling my

attention to this passage as well as for pointing out the relevance to my argument of the

publication history of the Dissertation and EHU, mentioned below.44Hume, Dissertation, 166.45Also included in this collected work were the original Essays, Moral and Political, the

dissertations on Tragedy and Taste, and The Natural History of Religion. For an excellent

history of Hume’s publications including a schematic of the evolution of the Essays and

Treatises, see Beauchamp’s introduction to EPM, xxvii.46EPM 4.7; SBN 207; 5.14, 218; 5.38, 225.


The last sentence not only smacks of associationism, it hints specifically atsympathetic association.47 In fact, these lines are nearly identical to thosemadein the Treatise on the same subject, only in the Treatise Hume draws theconnection to sympathy explicitly. Thus, the parallel passage in the Treatiseends: ‘Which ideas are painful, when by sympathy they acquire any degree offorce and vivacity’ (T. 2.2.5.19; SBN 364). When we look more closely at thefull context of this passage in the Treatise, we cannot fail to be struck by theheavy emphasis on sympathetic association throughout the whole section(2.2.5).48 Such verbatim transfer strongly suggests that Hume had in mind thisadditional associationist detail from the Treatise when writing EPM.

Finally, there is one further remark from EPM that I think worthy ofconsideration in this preliminary review of evidence. This comes in the midstof Hume’s discussion of the effects of poetry in Section 7 of EPM: ‘[A]llkinds of passion, even the most disagreeable, such as grief and anger, areobserved, when excited by poetry, to convey a satisfaction, from amechanism of nature, not easy to be explained’ (EPM 7.26; SBN 259).

Hume is here referencing the paradoxical fact that we take pleasure indramatic tragedy, where our experience of even the most despairing tale ismixed with some enjoyment when that despair is sufficiently dressed ineloquent language or vivid imagery (a subject he also addresses, though witha similarly abbreviated explanation, in Of Tragedy).49 But as we can see,Hume begs off any explanation of the ‘mechanism of nature’ responsible forthis phenomenon on the grounds of its complexity. Yet, we know from theTreatise how Hume would attempt such an explanation: via the associationof ideas.50 Indeed, there is association along multiple lines.

First, Hume’s account of belief and imagination in the Treatise arguesthat there is a certain satisfaction of mind in any strong or forceful idea,

47Hume’s footnote to this passage also has associationist themes, though not of a sympathetic

character (EPM n33).48Indeed, a central goal of T. 2.2.5 is to prove the importance of sympathy in our esteem for the

rich over other possible explanations.49David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, 2nd edn

(LibertyClassics, 1987).50Of Tragedy arguably moves one step closer to an explanation than EPM. Hume there offers

this account:

[T]his extraordinary effect proceeds from that very eloquence with which the

melancholy scene is represented. The genius required to paint objects in a lively

manner, the art employed in collecting all the pathetic circumstances, the judgment

displayed in disposing them; the exercise, I say, of these noble talents, together with

the force of expression, and beauty of oratorial numbers, diffuse the highest

satisfaction on the audience, and excite the most delightful movements.

(Of Tragedy, para. 9)

Again, this is only a half-explanation, for how this diffusion and excitement work is never

explained in this essay. Here too, though, I think we know what Hume has in mind. For talk of

‘diffusion’ is a hallmark of associationism. Indeed, the further thesis of this essay is that the ‘energy’

of the painful passions actually enlivens the predominant pleasure we feel from the beauty of the

eloquence. Surely such a conversion or transfusion begs for an associationist explanation.

328 REMY DEBES

partly because its assent to such an idea is made easier by the idea’s vivacity(T. 1.3.10.6; SBN 121).51 How is this achieved in fiction? One principalmethod is by associating, to some degree, the elements of any fictional plotwith the truth. The vivacity of that which is already accepted as true thendiffuses ‘by so many pipes and canals’ to what is imagined (T. 1.3.10.7; SBN120–2). Correspondingly, Hume notes the frequency with which any poet orauthor borrows fragments from historical events for the details of settingand character. By this the imagination is pleased: ‘Belief must please theimagination by means of the force and vivacity which attends it; since everyidea, which has force and vivacity, is found to be agreeable’ (T. 1.3.10.7;SBN 122).52 Moreover, these poetic representations also engage oursentiments by sympathy. This is the broader point of the EPM passage inwhich the reference to a ‘mechanism of nature’ occurs. But, as Hume arguesin the Treatise, by an association of ideas these passions felt by sympathy inturn spread their energy back onto the original ideas and beliefs that causedthem (in this case poetic representations), compounding the vivacity of theseideas in our minds (T. 1.3.10.4; SBN 120); and the force of association is notyet exhausted.

In section 2.3.8, Hume argues that anywhere the imagination is presentedby great distance in time or space it experiences some pleasure in thecontemplation, and he notes that these ideas are often associated with, andthus convey a satisfaction to, poetic representation. Such representationfrequently has either a great physical setting (e.g. by oceans, in fields, on aplatform atop a castle wall, etc.) or is set in some distant past (e.g. Greektragedies). Hume even seems to suggest in this section that the mereelevation of the imagination by eloquence, when consciously noted, ispleasurable by conveying to us an idea of literal ascent (T. 2.3.8.7; SBN434). Less abstract, Hume frequently remarks upon the pleasure we take inthe presentation of a good arrangement of parts, be it an apartment or body,poem or play. This pleasure arises from the ideas with which we associatesuch good arrangement: the effects of that arrangement for its owner, thepleasure the author or architect takes in its careful creation and the genius ittook to create it, the comfort and ease we associate with all things ordered,

51The full explanation of Hume’s thought on this point, regarding the connection between belief

and the associated ideas of solidity, strength, etc., that attend causal or probable reasoning, as

well as the satisfaction we take in ideas enlivened in this way, is well beyond the scope of this

paper. I only hope my summary has not assumed too much, so that the following points may be

admitted despite this short cut.52In fact, poetic vividness alone can generate the requisite vivacity, sometimes even more

effectively than what we believe by custom and experience. Hume writes,

’Tis difficult for us to withhold our assent from what is painted out to us in all the

colours of eloquence; and the vivacity produc’d by the fancy is in many cases greater

than that which arises from custom and experience. We are hurry’d away by the lively

imagination of our author or companion; and even he himself is often a victim to his

own fire and genius.

(T. 1.3.10.8; SBN 123)


etc. Indeed, these last sorts of association Hume attributes as a centralcomponent to our sense of beauty (T. 2.1.8; SBN 298–303).

I suspect this process of tracing lines of association could continue. Thepoint is, Hume does have an idea of how the supposed ‘mechanism ofnature’ mentioned in EPM works; that mechanism is the association ofideas; and he is right, that mechanism is not easily explained. Leaving outthe explanation does allow the broader point of the passage to stay in focus.Thus, Hume’s reference to this mechanism along with his phrasing supportsour starting assumption that Hume retained the associationist mechanism,but that by the time of EPM he was hesitant to recount its explanation.

None of this is meant to imply that Hume’s commitment to all theassociationist theories of the Treatise is unquestionable. Case in point, inSection 12 of EHU, belief in the external world seems to be consigned to aprimitive or basic instinct, whereas, by contrast, Treatise 1.4.2 contains anelaborate associationist explanation of this belief. While it might be arguedthat this change is also simply the result of Hume’s effort to simplify his laterwork, on the face of it associationism does seem to have dropped out of thepicture here. Still, it is enough for the moment to have shown Hume’scontinued general commitment to associationism. Indeed, given thepreponderance of evidence supporting a retained general commitment toassociationism and in light of the fact that Hume never actually gives acontrasting explanation of sympathy (as one might argue he did, say, forbelief in the external world), the text tells in favour of the presupposition ofconsistency. At a minimum, there just does not seem to be enough evidenceto preclude us from thinking that Hume would be willing to fill in theassociationist details of sympathy, were we able to inquire after them.

2. Contrary Interpretations

An objection, however, now looms. If Hume did take the time to makeexplicit his commitment to associationism in or about the Enquiries, thenwhy refrain from doing so in his explanation of sympathy in EPM? That is,if Hume is still committed to an associationist explanation of sympathy, as Iclaim, then why not make such a commitment explicit given that he isobviously not averse to endorsing associationism generally? Yes, I’ve given astory that would provide an answer to this question, but is it the only story?In light of the very same evidence that seems to make plain Hume’s generalcontinued commitment to associationism, the disappearance of the explicitassociationist explanation of sympathy per se in EPM (or any later work)does not just raise a puzzle about Hume’s commitment to such anexplanation, as I implied in Section II. This would trivialize its disappearance.Rather, the disappearance must itself count as evidence in favour of thehypothesis that Hume changed positions. If we still want some explanation forwhy Hume might have made such a change, there is another possible story to

330 REMY DEBES

tell. Hume, it could be argued, developed doubts about associationism ingeneral, and about that element of sympathy meant to explain how the selfconverts ideas into impressions in particular; not enough to abandon theprinciple of association altogether, perhaps, but enough to make changes.

Something like this is just what Kemp Smith and John Rawls arguehappened to Hume (with Kemp Smith emphasizing general doubt andRawls emphasizing the particular doubt about the role of self in thesympathy process).53 Kemp Smith’s point is simple: if we compare Hume’sattitude towards the Treatise just after its publication, as expressed in theAbstract, to what we find in the Enquiries, we cannot fail to be impressed bya marked cooling of enthusiasm for associationism. Thus, consider againwhat Hume says in the Abstract:

Thro’ this whole book, there are great pretensions to new discoveries in

philosophy; but if any thing can entitle the author to so glorious a name asthat of an inventor, ’tis the use he makes of the principle of the association ofideas, which enters into most of his philosophy

(Abs. 35; SBN 661–2)

How surprising it is then, Kemp Smith observes, that the same author whowrote this would spend only ‘three short paragraphs’ explicitly discussingassociationism in EHU (even if it does receive its own section), not to mentionleaving out the associationist explanation of sympathy.54 Of course, right awaywe must be suspicious of Kemp Smith’s argument, given that we have alreadyconsidered how similar Hume’s expression of pride for associationism in theDissertation is to the Abstract. Nevertheless, I agree that, at first blush, thesection on associationism in EHU appears significantly shorter than wewould expect for someone so emphatic. We cannot, then, dismiss KempSmith’s ‘cooling’ claim just yet. Moreover, there is the second half of theobjection.

Neither Kemp Smith nor Rawls deny that sympathy qua sympathizing –that is, the ability to share (somehow) the feelings of other persons – stillexists in EPM. However, both do think that Hume gave up on what Idescribed as the first element of the associationist account of sympathy fromthe Treatise, which stresses how the self converts ideas into impressions.Thus, Kemp Smith writes of the Enquiries, ‘The silence is complete as regardsthe nature of our awareness of the self.’55 More pointedly, Rawls argues,‘Perhaps Hume felt that in the Treatise he had pushed the account ofsympathy too far . . . and that, as presented, his account relied on a dubious

53See nn8 and 9 respectively. This particular argument of Kemp Smith’s is conjoined to the

claim that Hume’s private correspondence suspects Hume of a philosophical rejection of the

Treatise, but I find this further claim dubious: see n37.54Kemp Smith, 533.55Kemp Smith, 534.


idea of the self, which he came to think mistaken.’56 Of course, if this line ofinterpretation is correct, some other explanation of the phenomenon ofsympathy in lieu of the associationist account must be attributed to Hume.But, why not think Hume has shifted to treating sympathy as a brute,unexplained psychological fact?57 We just are the kinds of creature that arecapable of sympathy. End of story.

Here again, however, I simply do not think this reading is supported bythe text. On the contrary, when all the evidence is in, the text supports thepresumption of consistency.58 To demonstrate this, it will be best to considerthe two parts of the foregoing objection in turn.

First, then, I think the supposed ‘cooling’ is considerably less certain thanKemp Smith suggests. We have already pointed out a number of points inEHU where Hume shows no sign of wanting to conceal his commitment toassociationism, and we noted that this commitment clearly extends to thecontemporaneous Dissertation, evidence Kemp Smith seems to downplay.Secondly, upon further reflection, I do not think the short ‘three paragraph’presentation of associationism in EHU is as surprising as Kemp Smith wouldhave us believe – at least, based on what is said in the Abstract. Consider: theAbstract, though of the Treatise, seems to represent an exercise for how Humewants to recast mostly just Book 1 of that work. Hume does not evenintroduce the ‘second volume’ (Book 2) on the passions until paragraph 30 of

56Rawls, 102.57Kemp Smith hints that this is indeed the case. Unfortunately, he further suggests that this

brute psychological phenomenon is straightforwardly identical to the EPM notion of humanity:

The Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals is a restatement of [Book III of the

Treatise], almost the only fundamental change being in respect of sympathy, which is

now treated as an ultimate propensity of the Mind, and which he now also entitles

sometimes ‘benevolence’ and sometimes ‘humanity’.

(533)

Whatever else one thinks, however, about the possibility of sympathy being an ‘ultimate

propensity of the Mind’ in EPM, I hope my analysis of humanity in ‘Humanity, Sympathy, and

the Puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry’ now makes it clear that this sort of further claim by

Kemp Smith is, at best, mistaken. Sympathy is not conceptually identical to humanity in EPM.58If there is a deep difficulty in responding to this objection, it is not because it is incredibly

persuasive. It is plausible, yes, but it is not more plausible than the alternative I have suggested.

Given the textual evidence considered so far, both interpretations – that Hume disowned the

associationist account of sympathy and that Hume only left out the explicit associationist

description of sympathy for strategic purposes – seem open possibilities. For example, even if

we accept Kemp Smith’s claim that Hume cooled on his commitment to associationism, this still

would not necessarily entail that he dropped associationism for the purposes of explaining

sympathy. Indeed, Kemp Smith’s claim is entirely compatible with my hypothesis. If Hume

really did lose enthusiasm for associationism, he might have decided not to emphasize its role in

sympathy, which would explain why much of what he does say in EPM about sympathy is so

subtle. If there is a problem in responding to the objection, then it is not a matter of its

persuasiveness. The problem is, rather, that there is no piece of textual evidence I can find that

would unequivocally decide between the no-change hypothesis I am advocating and the kind of

story suggested by Kemp Smith or Rawls. Nevertheless, what I say next strikes me as shifting

the burden of proof heavily onto the Kemp Smith–Rawls-type interpretation.

332 REMY DEBES

the Abstract (of 35 total; see Abs. 30; SBN 659–60), and he never discussesBook 3. Secondly, it is fairly clear from the Abstract that Hume considers themain argument of Book 1 of theTreatise to be causal inference and the relationof cause and effect, when we consider: (a) Illustrating and explaining (as Humeputs it) the ‘CHIEF ARGUMENT’ of the Treatise – though again, really justBook 1 – is the subtitle to the Abstract; and (b) the subjects of causal inferenceand relation of cause and effect comprise the bulk of the discussion of theAbstract (Abs. 8–26; SBN 649–57). Of course, these same subjects are also thefocus of EHU, so in this sense, the Abstract is a sort of prospectus for EHU.59

In this light, then, it is less remarkable that the principle of association getslimited explicit attention in EHU. The general principle of association does notseem to be what Hume considered the ‘chief argument’ in need of recasting.Moreover, given that the Abstract seems to sketch the goals and content ofEHU but also still extols the principle of association, there is no reason to thinkthe ‘three short paragraphs’ of EHU entail a cooling of Hume’s enthusiasm forassociationism, as Kemp Smith suggests. That is, if we understand theAbstractto be a model for EHU, then Hume seems perfectly willing to stress theimportance of the principle of association and his own enthusiasm for thatprinciple alongside the ‘chief argument,’ even though the latter occupies morethan two-thirds of his attention.60

Furthermore, the persuasiveness of Kemp Smith’s emphasis that Section 3of EHU consists of only ‘three short paragraphs’ discussing the associationof ideas, rides on whether or not we think the posthumous 1777 edition ofthe Enquiries is the definitive statement of Hume’s philosophical convic-tions. As Beauchamp notes, there are fifteen additional paragraphs inSection 3 of EHU that appeared in all editions from 1748 to 1772.61 Moreremarkable in light of our goal to defend a presupposition of consistencyregarding sympathy and association is the content of these paragraphs: theyare examples of how the association of ideas in literature serves to engage areader’s interest; and not just any sort of engagement; but passionateengagement. That is, just as he does in EPM, in these additional passages ofEHU, Hume is stressing the importance of an author’s ability to marshal akind of sympathetic engagement from his readers.62 Only in EHU, we havean associationist explanation of this sort of passionate engagement.

Thus, in EHU, Hume argues that when we are sympathetically engagedwith some character or characters of a drama or history, it is critical for

59Beauchamp seems to agree with this; see his introduction to EHU, xv–xvi.60It could be added that the Abstract praise for the principle of association is for the ‘use’ Hume

makes of the principle. So again, maybe it is no surprise that what we see in EHU (and all

Hume’s later work) is extensive application of associationism and not a discussion of

associationism itself. See also n3.61The additional sections are paras 4–18. Beauchamp’s note is at p. 18.62See esp. Section 5 Part 2. I discuss in greater detail EPM Section 5 Part 2, the role of sympathy

in artistic representation, and Hume’s own literary examples in ‘Humanity, Sympathy, and the

Puzzle of Hume’s Second Enquiry’.


literary success that the author maintains a closely connected series of eventsand scenes if our interest is to remain lively. Hume writes,

The strong connexion of the events, as it facilitates the passage of the thoughtor imagination from one to another, facilitates also the transfusion of thepassions, and preserves the affections still in the same channel and direction.

Our sympathy and concern for EVE prepares the way for a like sympathy withADAM: The affection is preserved almost entire in the transition; and themind seizes immediately the new object as strongly related to that which

formerly engaged its attention.(EHU 3.12)63

To break this smooth flow of ideas, Hume adds, by the sudden introductionof a new and unrelated character must be avoided by all authors, because itrisks breaking the associationist process sustaining the reader’s sympatheticengagement:

How must it extinguish this warmth of affection . . . to find so sensible a breachor vacuity in the course of the passions, by means of this breach in the

connexion of ideas; and instead of carrying the sympathy of one scene into thefollowing, to be obliged, every moment, to excite a new concern, and take partin a new scene of action?

(EHU 3.13)

Admittedly, Hume is not here explaining sympathy per se as an association ofideas. If these paragraphs did offer any such explicit statement, the supposedmystery we are trying to solve would be far less contentious. Rather, theseparagraphs argue that where we do sympathize with the passions of thecharacters in one scene, our sympathy is carried more easily to a new scene tothe extent that the new scene is related to the one preceding it. For, Humeexplains, passions excited by one object transfer ‘easily to another objectconnected with it’ (EHU 3.18). Still this ties associationism very closely tosympathy, for why else would sympathy be maintained in this fashion if notbecause this sympathy depends on the ideas I have of those character’spassions? Better: it depends on how well or fully I entertain those ideas. Theliterary details must be closely associated because it is exactly these detailswhich allow me to imagine the plight or good fortune of the characters,which is just to say that the literary details give me the idea of thosecharacter’s sufferings or joys. Is the stage not clearly set, then, for anassociationist explanation of sympathy?

Even though these paragraphs do not rule out sympathy being the resultof some brute psychological fact, the close connection Hume draws between

63There is no correlate SBN number for any of these passages as Nidditch/Selby-Bigge use only

the text of the 1777 edition of EHU.

334 REMY DEBES

the transfer of passion via an association of ideas and sympatheticengagement with literary characters, supports much better the hypothesisthat Hume still thinks sympathy depends on an association of ideas. At thevery least, it becomes hard to accept Kemp Smith’s suggestion that somesort of ‘cooling’ in Hume’s commitment to associationism led him to rejectthe associationist explanation of sympathy. For, these extra paragraphsfrom EHU make Hume’s continued commitment to the principle ofassociation even more obvious, and I do not see why we should ignore them.Kemp Smith ignores them because he treats the 1777 edition of EHU asdefinitive, but how could this question itself have a definitive answer? It isnot certain that Hume did intentionally delete these passages, for there is noclear evidence that this was his decision. At least Hume nowhere clearlyexplains the change.64 Moreover, even if the change was intentional, he didretain the passages until at least 1772, which is a time that seems well beyondany attempt on his part to significantly revise either his earlier or his laterwork.65 Finally, what Hume says in the conclusion to these paragraphswould seem to give us a satisfactory answer that is perfectly in line with thehypothesis I have been defending:

These loose hints I have thrown together, in order to excite the curiosity of

philosophers, and beget a suspicion at least, if not a full persuasion, that thissubject is very copious, and that many operations of the human mind dependon the connexion or association of ideas, which is here explained. Particularly,

the sympathy between the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appearremarkable; while we observe that the affections, excited by one object, passeasily to another object connected with it; but transfuse themselves with

difficulty, or not at all, along different objects, which have no manner ofconnexion together . . . The full explanation of this principle and all itsconsequences would lead us into reasonings too profound and too copiousfor this enquiry. It is sufficient, at present, to have established this conclusion,

that the three connecting principles of all ideas are the relations ofResemblance, Contiguity, and Causation.

(EHU 3.18)

So here we see both how closely together Hume was tying sympathy and theprinciple of association, but also we see more evidence of a desire to avoidthose details of his associationist explanations that he feared his readersmight misunderstand. Thus, it seems far less plausible to assume a ‘cooling’of his commitment to associationism than that Hume was either worriedabout his reader’s ability to understand the full complexity of the

64Beauchamp points this out in his explanation of the rationale for the text used in the

Clarendon Critical Edition of EHU, 217–18.65I owe this observation to an anonymous reviewer. For evidence of this claim, see Beauchamp’s

introduction to EHU, esp. xxxix–xlv.


associationist principles or that such a complex discussion would subvert theoverall philosophical progress of the enquiry (or both).

So much, then, for the first part of the objection. The claim that Humegives up on his idea that the self converts ideas into impressions, and for thisreason abandons the associationist account of sympathy, is a somewhatdifferent matter. Again, the associationist mechanism as explained in theTreatise certainly requires an idea or impression of the self in order toenliven the idea we have of another’s passion into a genuine impression orfeeling (this was the first element of the account). Yet, in the Appendix tothe Treatise Hume expresses some disappointment with his own bundletheory of the self which would do this work of converting an idea into animpression in the sympathetic process.66 Moreover, there is no replacementdiscussion of the self in Hume’s later work (not one which would compare tothe Treatise at any rate), so there is at least an apparent problem here.However, the problem is easily solved if it can be shown that, regardless ofwhether or not Hume changed his conception of self, he supplied somenotion of the self that would satisfy the first element of the associationistaccount of sympathy. There is good evidence to think Hume did just this,but to make this case, we must again expand the scope of evidence, for,while Kemp Smith was right that the Enquiries are virtually silent on thenature of our awareness of the self, the Dissertation is not.

First, the Dissertation devotes a great deal of space to explaining theindirect passions. Granted, Hume does not use the distinguishing label of‘indirect’ in this work, but it is clear that he has the same type of passions inmind. Recall, whereas EHU and EPM are clearly meant to address thetopics of Book 1 and 3 respectively of the Treatise, it seems clear that theDissertation is meant to address Book 2, where the indirect passions werefirst explained. More important, according to the Treatise the indirectpassions of pride and humility, love and hatred, arise from a ‘doublerelation’ of impressions and ideas, which is itself a complex associationistmechanism, and in the Dissertation Hume again stresses this ‘doublerelation’ while explaining the same set of passions.67 This is one reason whythe Dissertation stands as good evidence for Hume’s continued commitmentto associationism in the first place. Consider now how Hume applies thedouble relation account in the case of love and hatred: Whatever causes apleasure or pain in us, but is related to or connected with another person,makes this person the object of our affection or disgust.68 We relate both theidea of the cause (usually some character trait or action) back to its owner,and we relate the pleasure or displeasure that this cause raises in us with the

66See the Appendix to the Treatise 20–1; SBN 635–6.67Thus Hume remarks in the Dissertation, ‘The present theory of the passions depends entirely

on the double relations of sentiments and ideas, and the mutual assistance, which these relations

lend to each other’ (4.1, 158).68Hume, Dissertation, 3.1, 155–6.

336 REMY DEBES

kinds of feelings that we usually have towards other people (i.e. pleasurablefeelings felt towards others are usually related to love, and painful feelings,hatred). In the case of pride and humility, however, the cause of our pleasureor pain is ourselves, and hence we relate the idea of the cause back to theself. Right away then, we see that some idea of the self is essential forHume’s account of the indirect passions of pride and humility. This isexplicit in the Treatise, of course, but the fact that Hume does not give uphis ‘double relation’ account of the indirect passions in the Dissertationshows that Hume is still willing to allow some perception (idea orimpression) of the self, whatever metaphysical construal or constructionshould attach to that notion, and to lean on it for associationist purposes.Given that, as we noted earlier, the Dissertation was seamlessly bondedbetween EHU and EPM (in a way that mirrors the structure of theTreatise) from 1758–77, it seems safe to assume there is a notion of selfavailable to support the associationist account of sympathy that I amarguing is active in EPM.

However, there might appear to be some shortfall. As Hume describes itin the Treatise the account of sympathy seems to require an impression ofthe self, not just an idea of the self. The double relation explanation of prideand humility does not require such an impression, only an idea of the self.Nevertheless, impressions and ideas are similar in kind, and the latter arederived from the former, so it is not clear that anything is really at stakehere. The central point is that contra those who stress Hume’s dissatisfac-tion with the bundle theory of the self, however great that dissatisfaction, itdoes not prevent Hume from thinking that there is some perception of theself which he can invoke for associationist purposes. In confirmation we findthis striking remark in the midst of the Dissertation, where Hume isexplaining a familiar aspect of sympathy:

A person, who is related to us, or connected with us, by blood, by similitude of

fortune, of adventures, profession, or country, soon becomes an agreeablecompanion to us; because we enter easily and familiarly into his sentimentsand conceptions: Nothing is strange or new to us: Our imagination, passing

from self, which is ever intimately present to us, runs smoothly along therelation or connexion, and conceives with a full sympathy the person, who isnearly related to self.69

If Hume has any scruples about appealing to a notion of ‘self,’ they are notevident here. He even reasserts the Treatise claim that whatever this notionis, it is always intimately present to us – something we saw at the very startto be important for the associationist mechanism of sympathy. It seemsclear, then, that whether or not he changed his understanding of the self,

69Hume, Dissertation, 3.4, 156 (emphases added).


Hume still thinks there is some legitimate notion of self to which he canappeal in his associationist explanations.

Of course, the Dissertation never explicitly explains sympathy through anassociationist mechanism. Worse, because the Dissertation does seem torepresent Hume’s attempt to recast Book 2 of the Treatise, where the originalaccount of sympathywas presented, theDissertationwould seem a likely placeto find such an explanation. I do not think however, that these smalladmissions cannot upset the no-change hypothesis I have been advocating. Ialready warned that the associationist account of sympathy is never explicitlyrepeated inHume’s later work.We cannot, then, reasonably expect to solve itsdisappearance so directly. Besides, somewhat paradoxically I think even theseadmissionswould ultimatelywork tomyadvantage. Supposewe think the factthat Hume does not repeat the associationist account of sympathy is itself areason to think any strict textual appeal inconclusive; thenwemust expand thescope of evidence even further. In so far as this move would includeconsideration of the philosophical backdrop of sympathy, then it seems to methat once againwe are pressured to assume that nothing has changed. At least,if we combine all that I have said in this paper with my further argument andevidence from ‘Humanity, Sympathy, and the Puzzle of Hume’s SecondEnquiry’ demonstrating that sympathy’s ethical role in EPMhas not changedfrom the Treatise, then this latter argument and evidence take on redoubledsignificance in favour of the presumption of consistency. Granted, this sort oftwo-step appealmight seem abit grand; but this is a complicated problem, andcomplicated problems sometimes require complicated answers.

And yet, by way of conclusion, I submit that the argument of this paperdoes not require such outsourcing. I think the text does confirm the no-change hypothesis. At least, in so far as Hume’s associationist account ofsympathy is concerned, we have simply seen too much evidence in favor ofconsistency between his early and later work, and too little against, for us tothink Hume has given up on this part of his philosophy. In short, we do notneed Hume explicitly to repeat the associationist account of sympathy inorder for us to conclude that there is no substantive change after the Treatisein this regard. The full burden of proof is, therefore, on those who wouldcontinue to interpret Hume otherwise. The text does not necessitate thiscontrary interpretation, and Hume’s broader philosophy tells against it.70

University of Memphis

70I am especially grateful to Louis Loeb, whose comments on a related paper were originally

responsible for putting me on the trail of the ‘missing’ account of sympathy, and whose expert

advice was invaluable as I began to work out the arguments of this paper. I am also grateful to

an anonymous referee at BJHP for many insightful comments and suggestions. I also wish to

thank John Rogers and Lori Watson. Finally, I am indebted to Alex Hughes for some help in

the eleventh hour and to Robert Gressis for his helpful comments and stylistic suggestions on

the penultimate draft.

338 REMY DEBES

Has anything changed? Hume's theory of association and sympathy after the Treatise

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