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Governing science-industry collaborations in the Global South: from networks of power to developmental coalitions

Keston K. Perry Department of Development Studies, SOAS, University of London,

WC1 0XG, London, United Kingdom kk_perry@soas.ac.uk

November 2015

Paper presented at the International Conference on the “Transformation of Research in the South:

policies and outcomes” - January 21-22, 2016, OECD Development Centre, Paris

PRELIMINARY DRAFT UNDER REVIEW – PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITH AUTHOR’S PERMISSION

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Abstract

Policy makers and the international development community have increasingly focused efforts

towards science and technology (S&T) to tackle the most perennial challenges of poverty, climate

change, healthcare, disease, and industrialization in developing countries. With the adoption of the

new Sustainable Development agenda aimed at creating ‘innovation-driven’ societies, governments

are being encouraged to invest more in knowledge production. Some emerging countries, especially

China have witnessed outstanding improvements in S&T performance, creating new optimism for

technological catch up and development. However, such experiences have varied considerably from

the mainstream institutional turn in development in the 1990s associated with ‘good governance’,

promoted by the international financial institutions. This paper focuses on the institutional

underpinnings and process dynamics of S&T policy efforts related to fostering linkages between

scientific research and the productive sector in small developing countries. It first reviews the extant

literature on innovation systems that has become very influential over the past three decades. It

advances a political economy perspective to open the black box of policy-making, introducing

‘networks of power’ and ‘coalitions’ as complementary concepts. Based upon empirical insights of

50 in-depth interviews in Trinidad and Tobago, the paper concludes that improved policy responses

must consider structural constraints to collective action and draw upon historical observations that

delineate the distribution of power among the scientific community, industry associations, donors

and governments. These country-specific dynamics invariably create the conditions that affect the

flow of knowledge and governance capabilities required to effectively design, implement and

enforce S&T policies over time in developing countries.

Keywords: Science & Technology Policy; Networks of power; Developmental coalitions; Governance; Trinidad and Tobago

PRELIMINARY DRAFT - PLEASE DO NOT CITE.

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Introduction

Almost a decade after the global recession and financial crisis, the international community

is in search of a new pathway for understanding and explaining diverse and uneven experiences of

development. To counter the anemic growth rates, climate catastrophe caused in part by past

industrialization, and global inequality that are heavily weighing on governments and citizens across

the world. In what has become an intellectual past time of sighting and model-patterning ‘economic

miracles’ since the second world war, economists and analysts are seeking new remedies and

mechanisms to address perennial challenges. Given the failure of the Washington consensus policies

to bring about convergence (Saad-Filho 2013), researchers in the global North with support and

resistance in the South have identified science and technology as important contributors to

successful industrialization (Dahlman 2007, 40; Amsden 1989; Freeman 1987). However, some

enduring threats and ambiguities linked to closer integration of global markets, financialization and

rules of multilateral agencies of the global crisis loom large in emerging countries, believed to have

once de-coupled from the advanced North (UNCTAD 2015, vi). Simultaneously, policy makers in the

Global South have been in search of a new developmental models and strategies to address their

own difficulties. It appears that China seems to fit the present mold of developmental success and is

perched to overcome the so-called Sisyphean1 challenge through its hybrid model of investment in

new knowledge and local capability building (Wong and Goh 2015, 313). Despite its slowing growth,

China has a registered significant reduction in poverty, effort in renewables, productivity growth,

and increased propensity for innovation (Fu 2014; WIPO 2015). Its investment in science and

technology through emerging technologies and patent registrations has surpassed even the United

States in relative terms (UNESCO 2015, 29). As a result, tremendous optimism about the state of the

world exists alongside much pessimism about the current changes underway brought about by

forces in the global economy. The international development community and Southern governments

1 Franciso Sagasti (2004) identified the Sisyphus challenge as one characterized by developing countries’

struggle to produce new knowledge, since technologies advance and their S&T capabilities remain laggard.

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have therefore turned to science and technology policies to help reduce poverty and improve

prospects for improving productive capabilities and transitions to higher value added, sustainable

economic activities (United Nations 2015, 21).

In addition, smaller economies2, also once bastions of economic miracles, have slipped

below the radar, and often associated as adopters of technological output from the advanced North

and considered incapable of indigenous technological effort (Briguglio 1995: 1616). However, their

ability to be flexible and strategically engage in economic processes, even at the margins has not

gone unnoticed (Bertram and Baldacchino 2009; Roolaht, 2008). These more nuanced explanations

represent a fertile area of research, especially as the political, economic and structural variables in

these countries can help explain big questions such as science and technology and innovation

performance which also matter to the vast majority of developing countries (See table 1).

Table 1 - Macroeconomic, demographic and STI indicators in select small economies

This paper thus responds to some of these growing tensions and developments, given the unfinished

business of industrial development in many countries of the Global South. Policies that support the

deepening of university-industry coalitions have become a critical component of countries’

2 Though many definitions of ‘smallness’ persists given that their diverse growth and human development

experiences, and demographic characteristics change over time (e.g. Singapore), population size of five million or less inhabitants seem a reasonable threshold to describe a small country (Ruprah et al. 2014; Roolaht, 2008).

Country Population (in

thousands)

Per capita income PPP$

R&D as as % of GDP (GERD)

Researchers per million population

HDI ranking

% of high technology exports

Botswana 2,021 16, 105 0.53 923 (2005) 109 1.2

Costa Rica 4,872 12, 733 0.48 1,289 (2011) 68 39.6

Estonia 1,287 23, 631 2.18 3,541 (2012) 33 10.7

Finland 5,426 38, 271 3.55 7,482 (2012) 24 8.5

Mauritius 1,244 14, 901 0.37 (2005) -- 63 0.9

Singapore 5, 412 60, 800 2.1 6,438 (2012) 9 45.3

Trinidad & Tobago

1.341 26,550 0.04 758 (2011) 64 --

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development strategies (Kruss et al 2015). From this perspective, science and technology (S&T)

policies refer to intentional efforts by government to improve research and technological capabilities

that are germane to the needs of societal actors, including firms, citizens and non-governmental

organizations, industry groups, research institutes and the state bureaucracy. We demonstrate by

use of earlier insights in political economy and heterodox institutional analysis in development

studies that the interplay of activities at the national level through a network of actors and groups

are important in understanding the nature of these policy making efforts and the varying degrees of

success and evolution of science-industry coalitions in developing countries. Indeed, local entities

can exercise organizational power through formal institutions, but in developing countries informal

institutional structures matter for policy and developmental outcomes (Khan, 2010). Increasingly, as

multilateral organizations support these attempts at the national level through financial and

technical assistance, their participation matters for the configuration of power channeled through

knowledge sharing and production configurations (Girvan 2007). Informal structures are pervasive in

developing countries and have implications for developing domestic industrial capacities, given

firms’ weak linkages to research, fragmented administrative institutions, and state-level institutional

performance in meeting broad-based developmental objectives. The role of the state apparatus in

some ways are being overshadowed by these multilateral interventions and further undermined by

limited governance capacity to coordinate among university researchers and industry players. The

paper thus aims to open the ‘black box’ of policy-making in developing countries, with specific

reference to a small developing country, Trinidad and Tobago. The next section of the paper critically

assesses the national innovation systems literature from the perspective of the actors/groups

involved in the process of interactive learning, which has important in understanding institutional

evolution between university and industry in both advanced and developing economies. We then

explain the concepts of networks of power and coalitions adopted here to understand the dynamics

of these power-sensitive networks, their informal and formal orientations and the governance

related issues in a developing country context. Then, we conduct a historical profile the Trinidad and

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Tobago science and technology system. The paper then concludes by drawing policy insights and

summarizes the major arguments elaborated.

Searching for a science and technology - developmental model

Early political economists, notably Karl Marx, Freidrich List and Joseph Schumpeter have

been the forebears in analyzing and understanding the deep connections between science and the

productive sector. In the first instance, Marx understood science as embodied in the skills and

knowledge of workers in the production process (Nola 2013). Marx further demonstrated a complex

understanding of the role of research as a response to the changing dynamics of technology to

improve the productivity of certain technological tools (ibid.). The noted thinker expressed such

nuanced interactions in relation to the importance of chemistry in the use of dyes in weaving cloth

(Nola 2013; Rosenberg 1982). Though this insight may seem insignificant nowadays given the highly

fast-moving technological world we live in, it was quite fundamental. The belief that human beings

could exercise forcible control over the vagaries of nature through industrial expansion of advanced

capitalist countries has in some ways created unanticipated problems, like environmental

degradation, which disproportionately affect developing countries. This has in turn provoked the

need for increased investments in scientific knowledge to tackle these problems (Doherty 2015). But

indeed systematic science has had important benefits to the economy and society as a whole. As List

(1841), whose treatise ‘The National System of Political Economy’ became quite influential as

justification for industrial policy in Western Europe and the United States, puts it:

There scarcely exists a manufacturing business which has no relation to physics, mechanics,

chemistry, mathematics or to the art of design, etc. No progress, no new discoveries and

inventions can be made in these sciences by which a hundred industries and processes could

not be improved or altered. In the manufacturing State, therefore, sciences and arts must

necessarily become popular, (cited in Freeman 1995, 6)

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These functional characteristics of science normally refer to experiments and systematic study of

natural reality, but can also extend to the experiential realm of human beings in their social world.

Thus, in current social science, indigenous or local knowledge has taken on new meaning for their

potential role in transforming economic or social structures in developing countries, without the

need to depend on new knowledge in research centers in the North. In areas of medicine and health,

for example local practices and ways of knowing in India have proven quite useful. Interestingly,

there is a tension between the ‘preferred’ methods of science and their reliability, and the increasing

need to respond to local challenges in the Global South. Northern researchers and engineers are

now even making use of this local knowledge and creating blended remedies. As a result, these

developments have given rise to concerns about knowledge expropriation by Northern scholars in

the context of weak intellectual property protection and stalled industrial expansion in the South.

In contemporary Africa, the Science Technology and Innovation Strategy (2024) adopted at a

high level political meeting hosted by the African Union is the continent wide S&T policy for

development. The proposals, though criticized for lack of funding by states and demonstrating an

outmoded linear approach to science and technology policy, remains a foremost indigenously

devised agenda for Africa’s development (Marcelle 2014). The vision etched on the preface by

former President Kwame Nkumah in 1963 at the height of the nationalist agenda across the

continent emphasizes large industrial and infrastructural projects reminiscent of the industrialization

by substitution policies of the early independence era. This vision has largely been unrealized. In the

new STISA, leaders have agreed that for African countries to succeed they must invest more in S&T,

including R&D, institutional frameworks and research infrastructure (Africa Union 2014). The

initiative is however challenged by its focus on scientific knowledge outcomes as opposed to a

process that considers the complex interactions between science, technology and the productive

sector. Such African economies may have converged along institutional trajectories due to their wide

adoption of structural adjustment policies, but their technological development has been stalled

(Archibugi and Filippetti 2015; Jerven 2015). The private sector has also been conspicuously omitted

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from the policy formulation efforts and governance structure of the strategy despite seemingly

rhetorical reference to its importance (NEPAD 2014). It also appears that its long-range goals are

inconsistent with the prevailing conditions and capacity constraints on the African continent, as well

as the diversity and different levels of development among African countries. In this regard, it treats

African countries as a single political economy, when in fact institutional capacities differ, societal

structures and the configuration of power relations defined through historical processes all matter

for economic transformation (Whitfield and Gray 2014).

Likewise, regarding Latin America, scholars have increasingly sought to explain the

widespread under-performance of S&T institutions in the region, which were prior to 1980s high on

the political agenda and considered important for productive activity. Some scholar posit that these

achievements saw a reversal in the 1980s and 1990s (Crespi and Detrunit 2014). Particularly in the

small countries of Central America, experiences with S&T policies, with Costa Rica as an outlier, have

been mixed and based upon foreign investment and imports, while there were improvements in

education and other policies (Padilla-Perez and Gaudin 2014). Based on the innovation systems

approach, they outline the missing links or systemic failures to the effective design and

implementation of S&T policies as a common feature in the poor performance of these countries

and a number of developing nations. Apart from the lack of funding and political commitment,

readers are left less the wiser about the causal mechanisms that underpin the structure of these

developing countries, name how institutions and politics interact, and how these matter for both

financing policy and relational dynamics of the system that improve learning capabilities over time.

New empirical investigations have also found that Latin American firms demonstrate a high degree

of heterogeneity which presents augmented challenges in targeting policy instruments (Grazzi et al.

2016, forthcoming). Though acknowledging the sup-optimal performance of capitalist development

in Latin America compared to other regions, innovation systems scholars gloss over the critical role

of politics in the process of S&T policy that help determine outcomes and implementation. This

particular gap is the focus of this paper. In the successful later industrializers, industrial policies

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based upon learning from emerging technologies and not necessarily borrowing has been important

in new industrializing countries (Amsden 1989). Additionally, such learning gaps in Latin America are

important for its limited industrial transformation (Cassialato et al. 2003; Khan and Blankenburg

2009). The barriers erected by trade measures and capital investment for true indigenous economic

development is partly responsible for this apparent stagnation and strengthening old modes of

production (Brenner 1977; Khan 2005). The basis of the transformation related to S&T investment

now advocated depends on a number of variables, linkages and processes that spur an indigenous

process of capitalist transformation.

Conventional frameworks for science and technology policy: a review

Innovation systems

In the mid-1980s, some economists self-described as neo-Schumpeterians and evolutionary

scholars conceptualized the notion of ‘innovation systems’ situated ostensibly in a national

framework. Innovation systems refer to “an open, evolving and complex system that encompasses

relationships within and between organizations, institutions and socio-economic structures which

determine the rate and direction of innovation and competence-building emanating from processes

of science-based and experience-based learning” (Lundvall et al, 2009, pp. 6). Building upon the

work by Winter and Nelson (1982) that sought to provide appreciative and fundamental principles of

firm-level learning, technological adoption and strategy formation, IS scholars utilized these

important insights and introduced the role of institutions. This intellectual project sought to distance

itself from the mainstream theoretical tenets of neoclassical economics and provide routinized and

path-dependent view of firms’ technological and organizational practices. Certainly, its theorization

was in one way or the other influenced by historical developments at the time linked to the rapid

growth and industrialization of North and South East Asian countries and insights from other

capitalist economies (Freeman 1995). According to Sharif (2006, 749) the concept evolved in relation

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to “a reaction to the prevailing orthodoxy in economics, the wider geo-political context, and

strategic links between the academic and policy worlds”. Drawing upon insights of Joseph

Schumpeter and particularly the work by Friedrich List, they purported an understanding of

advanced capitalist economies and the relations between the scientific system of knowledge and the

production structure that diffused increasingly complex technologies (Freeman 1987). In the

postwar period, such highly integrated innovation systems were noticed in fast growing and newly

industrialized countries such as Japan (Freeman 1987). Latterly, observations from other East Asian

countries, in particular South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong and less successful cases in

Thailand and Argentina were assessed (Nelson 1993). The institutionalization of the IS approach has

also played a significant part in its diffusion and popularity, especially through multilateral agencies

like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations

Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (Lundvall et al. 2002). In this framework,

innovative performance is based upon a complex set of interactions and learning among actors and

institutions which produce disseminate and apply various kinds of knowledge for economic purposes

(Lundvall 2010).

More recent work applying the systemic framework focuses on governance frameworks and

the rationale for STI policies. From this perspective, greater focus was placed on functions and roles

of actors for innovation policy and less on the actors/groups in the policy process (Hekkert et. al.,

2006; Archibugi and Fillipetti 2015). The function of the innovation system is to utilize and generate

technological artifacts for which capabilities of actors give rise to the creation of economic value

(Carlsson et al. 2002). Using a multi-level framework, Archiugi and Fillipetti (2015) suggest on the

one hand that the systemic dimensions of education, social cohesion and political institutions have

converged across countries, while capacities, openness infrastructure have diverged and are the

causes of wide gaps in absorptive capacity and capabilities between rich and poor countries. Smits

and Kuhlmann (2004) delineate the functions as interface management, design and organization,

learning and experimentation, strategic intelligence, as well as demand articulation, strategy and

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vision development. The role of governance and the interrelated forms by which governance takes

place in STI have come to the fore, where actors engage in game-like, discovery processes to

determine how they cooperate to achieve the various supportive functions (Smits and Kuhlmann,

2010). In this way, Chaminade and Padilla-Perez (2016, forthcoming) posit that developing countries

have often utilized the systemic framework as an imitative tool, which has yet brought about greater

alignment between policy objectives, design instruments and specific problems. This policy transfer

has implications for the policy capacity of developing countries and how they proceed in designing

public actions and institutions to improve innovation outcomes (Karo and Kattell 2014).

In an effort to re-establish the micro-foundations of innovation systems, some recent

critiques of the IS approach suggest that it hardly takes account of the market mechanism and

relevant incentive structures, which eschew the presence of entrepreneurs and the profit motive

that drive innovative activity (Autio et al. 2014; Braunerhjelm and Henrekson 2015). Moreover, the

specific nature of the institutional framework that supports individual action might be lost in its

institutional emphasis (Acs et al. 2014). Thus industrial actors and scientists, both of whom belong to

groups and systems, endowed with various capabilities and characteristics may not be well

understood. In this sense, the role of intermediaries as knowledge diffusion and intelligence

gathering in their political roles has fallen below the analytical radar (Watkins et al. 2015). STI

policies then need refocusing from the structural frameworks and institutions that make up the

policy landscape towards the firm-level dynamics (Marcelle 2016, forthcoming). These arguments

hearken to earlier insights on the technological and learning capabilities3 from the 1980s and 1990s

which emphasized the rate of technological change in developing countries can be attributed to the

nature of their firms, learning mechanisms and their accumulation of technological capabilities

(Farrell 1977, cited in Marcelle, 2009; Bell and Pavitt 1984, 1995, 1997; Bell and Figueiredo 2012;

Hobday 1995). The challenge of aligning the policy-making efforts to the micro-level evidence has in

fact ignored the specific nature of institutions and the wider context of developing countries (Lall

3 Technological capability is defined as "the ability to harness reason and scientific know-how to solve the

particular problems of a specific society" (Farrell, 1977, as cited in Marcelle, 2009).

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2000). From this perspective, the role of government is comes in for sharp critique by micro analysts,

as the level of intervention varied across space and time and not consistent as often proposed

(Hobday et al. 2001). However, the analytical dichotomy of innovation associated with advanced

economies and ‘learning’ in developing countries seems to eschew important theoretical and

empirical insights that can contribute to more effective policy-making (Lorentzen, 2009). The

capacities that reside within and across governance agencies to effectively design implement and

enforce any science and technology policies are often not well understood. In large measure, these

governance agencies are treated as impersonal and highly aggregated formal structures whereas

they are highly heterogeneous and reflect the features of the society in which they are embedded or

created.

Latin American scholars have come closest to understanding and nuancing the social and

political underpinnings of science and technological knowledge in economic development processes.

Starting with the use of the IS framework, they develop insights into social nature of innovation

processes that interact with context that characterize new forms of production and firm

development (Lastres et al. 2003). They also acknowledge that the major drawback for many

developing countries is their ability to learn (Arocena and Sutz 2003). The present gap between Latin

American economies and more advanced economies are attributed in part to the institutional

characteristics of Latin American economies, with the extraction of rents from natural resource

activities by elites which reinforce patterns of inequality and resist economic change (Cimoli and

Rovira 2008). These scholars also specifically take non-economic and intangible factors into account

as part of the process of social change which is driven by the relationships between its social actors

(Lastres et al. 2003). The significant shift in state-led support in the 1960s and 70s to market-

oriented reforms appeared to have been a significant obstacle to innovation driven growth and

undermined political support for technological development (Alcorta and Perez 1998). From this

point of view, they conclude that

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Societies face different options and they can choose between a set of possible growth

trajectories. This choice– which has to do with complex variables related to institutions and

political economy and their interplay with the economic structure and the dynamics of

technological progress at each point in time - is more important in the long term than initial

endowments (Cimoli et al. 2006).

In their expanded notion of innovation of innovation systems, Cassialota and colleagues (2015)

recognize that power and hierarchy, following from structural developmentalists, exist in relation to

the economy’s position in the international global system. Indeed, these scholars seek to locate and

define Latin America on its own terms and ushers in a welcome critique to the narrow

conceptualizations of innovation systems based on highly aggregated formal structures without

detailed attention to context and politics. But, these modifications miss important institutional,

political and social processes that underpin the capitalist transformations that developing countries

are undergoing that delve into the class formations, informal power dynamics and expanded notion

of rent (Khan 1995, 2005, 2010). In fact they fail to relate to and engage the wider power relations

and conflict related to processes of change among various groups merely based upon technical or

static formulations (Fine and Saad-Filho 2014). Even, in this sense the process of governance that is

creating or employing institutional mechanisms to formulate and implement policy interventions are

subject to power configurations, capabilities and the exercise of power within and across

organizational contexts (Khan, 2010).

Networks of power4 and coalitions in developing countries

4 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the Globelics 2015 conference for the useful sociological term to

describe the core ideas presented here, which has since been elaborated upon. In this paper, we define power

along the lines of Mushtaq Khan (2010) as ‘holding power’. For Khan, holding power is a relational concept

which describes the ability of people, groups or organisations to hold out in conflicts based not simply on their

economic resources but capabilities and connections to other influential groups. Leftwich (2004, 2007) also

defines power as ‘the ability to influence the behaviour of others in a manner not of their choosing…power is

seldom dominated by a single institution by overlapping, checking and countervailing sources of power’.

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Beyond consideration that trust and interaction matter among institutions and

organizations, in the public and private sphere, in innovation systems and triple helix models, we are

left without an adequate explanation of the nature of such interactions and how various actors

influence the process of learning and innovation. Michael Mann (1986, 1) describes “societies as

constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting socio-spatial networks of power”. In this very

same sense, policies that are derived in a particular context are not only technical instruments

designed to address systemic or market failures, but are connected to social processes in which

organizations exercise power to seek rents and new sources of incomes (Khan, 1995, 2010). In this

way, their degree of effectiveness in different contexts depends on to the distribution of power and

technical capabilities across different economic, bureaucratic and political organizations that employ

various rent-seeking 5 strategies (Khan, 2013b). Peter Evans (2004) recognized this point by

explaining that institutional mono-cropping becomes fashionable by agents since it seems an easier

and manageable method of pursuing reforms rather than understanding the governance

arrangements and capacity to implement ‘best practice’ solutions. It is during the process of

capitalist accumulation, in which developing countries undergo significant structural changes, driven

in large part by a dominant sector or small number of firms in disparate sectors. This process

underpins the nascent character of linkages between the research community, and the S&T

infrastructure and the productive sector in developing countries (Rosenberg, 1982; Krishna et al.,

2000). The relations among the scientific community, industrial sectors and governance apparatus

are thus not channeled through highly impersonal bureaucratic structures, or Weberian governance

systems. In the context of onerous liberal market-oriented reforms, these interactions occur in a

highly particularistic and informal manner can result in contestation among actors and particular

sections of the science community gaining benefits, while other productive areas of research are

neglected (Krishna et al. 2000; Arora et al. 2013). These shifts also reflect the highly political nature

5 Rents refer to “incomes higher than the minimum a person or organization would have accepted, the minimum

usally being defined as the income in the next best opportunity available to that individual or organization”

(Khan 2013b, 249). These can include rents made on the allocations of land, creation and long-term protection

of property rights, or purchase of assets, that are made through intervention by a public authority.

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of S&T governance and its dynamic mechanisms expressed in relation to different issues across

institutional contexts (Borras 2012, 430). For instance, since research uptake and pursuit of

technological initiatives are communicated or understood best through demonstration effects often

facilitated by intermediaries like industry associations they may adopt sometimes myopic principle

rather than what may be socially beneficial. In the same sense, adoption of foreign technological

solutions and use of foreign consultants seem much more attractive than untested local research in

developing countries. Research is met with high levels of skepticism especially for firms which are

able to generate sufficient profits from their low-technology activities. Trust is built up or diminished

at the point of communication or demonstration or based on kinship ties of the utility of scientific

application. These dynamics are therefore mediated through the political settlement.

The political settlement described as the structure of relations consolidated through the

interaction of institutions and power among organizations and groups are important for political

stability and economic development. Different sources of rents and the heterogeneity of actors in a

specific policy locus helps determine the nature of rent-seeking activities, the conditions under

which they are sought as well as the possible outcomes from the process of engagement among

these organizations. This focus on process features instead of necessarily establishing causal links to

outcomes from the political settlement extends the PS framework in a more dynamic way and is the

basis of the analysis here. In STI policy, the close linkages that are fostered across institutional

structures – the state, via political or bureaucratic elites, business groups and industrial researchers -

matter in how the capitalist process unfolds and how governance of relevant policies can have

diverse outcomes. Following Riain (2000) these complex interactions occur not only in a hierarchical

or top-down manner as the original work on political settlements (Khan 2010) suggests but through

increasingly multi-faceted networks. For science technology and innovation policy, the diversity of

actors and institutions in the network exercise varying levels of influence across local, transnational

and national contexts simultaneously, the effects of which depend on the nature and quality of

informal relations – or how well people in these different settings are acquainted each other. The

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rules of engagement therefore often are not only subject to high-level regulations set by multilateral

lending agencies, but are interact with the local modus operandi. Policy entrepreneurs and other

bureaucratic agents may have some greater degree of influence that previously thought as process

legitimacy is based on their knowledge of the context. In addition, though they may seek to openly

follow conditions set or frameworks that are embedded in the support regimes, their control over

the process is both contingent upon the relative power they can mobilize and their knowledge of

how things work.

In this environment, clientelism still operates to support the sustainability of the system but

the specific nature of the STI environment and the distribution of power and benefits can be a lot

more dynamic and multi-layered. This dynamism characterizes the extent of productive output from

the application and integration of technological and scientific knowledge among industrial actors,

how intermediaries support the former through intelligence gathering and policy advocacy to the

state or even external sources for incentives and even where the state receives its finances for the

formulation and implementation of policy (Doner and Schneider 2000; Hobday et al. 2001; Lucas

1997; Scerri and Lastres 2013; Watkins et al., 2015). The business sector may also be unable to

articulate positions on STI policy because of its membership has little experience or knowledge given

the very few pockets of activity or that certain sectors may dominate, reflecting the industrial

structure of the economy. The institutional capacity of industry associations are mediated by the

depth of its information-gathering and knowledge generation activities, its insulation from

government influence and ability to articulate independent positions, and level of centralization,

which is also determined by the composition of its membership (Lucas, 1997). Across these

boundaries, rents are important for various activities and are allocated not solely on instrumental or

a needs basis or through some transparent process but are determined by the power and capacity of

the resulting recipient (Khan, 2000). Public-funded universities can be susceptible to policy, political

and intra-organizational changes and struggles; and their industrial research programs made to be

dependent on patronage and bargaining. Thus, researchers in developing countries can to pursue

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industrial-oriented research with the support and interactions between themselves and private

sector groups. The demand for knowledge among private sector groups can wane with the industrial

activity when the political environment and policy impetus is weak or non-existent (Brimble and

Doner 2007, 1021-1022) or they perceive their needs can be better met through imported

technological solutions. The intensity of research destined for industry is often created through a

strategic university partner who maintains close organizational ties with business leaders and groups

and demonstrate performance over time. As a result, the university and domestic research system

may have limited capacity to marshal local problem solving capabilities and knowledge, can suffer

from weaker institutional linkages and vulnerability towards the private sector and thus may not be

able to exercise a great degree of policy influence compared to international sources of knowledge.

The coordinating mechanism for these linkages comes from different sources, which impact

upon their effectiveness. The state can support the fostering and institutionalization of these

linkages but this depends upon how the political leaders and policy officials view the private sector

(Brimble and Doner 2007). In recent times, multilateral lending agencies are playing an increasing

role in facilitating these networks, supposedly to prevent corruption and unproductive rent-seeking.

The multilateral organizations are usually seen as more insulated from the national environment and

thus can impose its rules with greater consistency. They have become an important player in

developing countries innovation ecosystems and political economies more widely to facilitate the

transition to a knowledge based economy (Goel et al. 2004; Mayorga 1997). They serve as funding

sources and institutional repositories by providing loans and grants to governments for STI policy

formulation and implementation and expertise to conduct consultancies (Guttal 2006). Their role as

diffusors of concepts has been acknowledged in STI policy area (Lundvall 2007). More widely, as

knowledge generators refer to their political and institutional influence in developing countries

(Girvan 2007; Toye 2005). From this perspective, given their significant human and material

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resources compared to developing countries, they can create knowledge hierarchies6 between

themselves and their developing countries counterparts (Girvan, 2007). Instead of investing in local

research capability they can undermine the development of such resources and the institutional

compulsions to generate context-specific research and solutions to productive sector and challenges

and collective action. However, their policy influence must be understood in a complex way, not

always directly imposing their own doctrines, but flexible based on their own internal struggles and

engagement country-level actors’ (Toye 2005). In addition, depending on the policy domain and the

number of other donors and the level of activity, it can create further complexity, by diluting the

state’s resources to engage meaningfully, or generate competition among donors to provide support

which can be beneficial for the state to select among options or diversify its support arrangements.

If however, there is a single important donor supporting STI policy, this can prove somewhat

detrimental in the face of weak policy capacity or negotiating power caused by political /

bureaucratic fragmentation and a lack of skills in STI policy and in relevant research domains. The

incentives for pursuit of specific strategies or diverse approaches to policy making and social

learning, become narrowed or limited as relevant actors demand more from this single source, and

can lead to further contestation.

These features and forces in the political and institutional context of developing countries

give rise to the ability of governments to design and implement policies that aim at fostering

collective action and developmental coalitions to address productivity constraints and achieve

higher levels of economic and social development. The provision of incentives to firms or scientific

researchers working alongside is not sufficient for ensuring high levels of learning and effort (Khan

2013a). This is the challenge in developing countries, even when they seek or receive outside

support through consultants and international organizations. The governance conditions required

level of effort, coordination of investment and research activity aligned to industrial output are not

present and can lead to serious failures. International organizations often ignore these aspects as

6 ‘A set of epistemic/ideological systems, with so-called international (that is, Northern) knowledge at the top

and so-called local (that is, Southern) knowledge at the bottom’ (Girvan, 2007, pp. 16).

19

they take governance to mean the international standard of developed countries (Evans 2004). The

integration of knowledge in the form of scientific expertise, business practice and policy making

among various interests is important to international organizations and relate to their power to

generate knowledge, as well as mobilize and provoke actors along particular lines. However, in this

process, the ability of marshaling such interests should lie with the state and its organs, and its

capacity to enforce collective responses to productivity challenges (Khan 2013b). In the present

environment in which global economic and political pressures significantly circumscribe entry points

and economic activities in developing countries, coalitions7 are useful institutional arrangements to

bring about social and productive change. It is noted that the configurations of those coalitions need

to take account of the specific social and institutional context and the needs of the country in

question to advance its developmental objectives (Girvan 2006). From this point of view, new forays

in the politics of development emphasize the form and functions of leadership and the context are

co-constitutive and have the potential to shape different trajectories (Leftwich 2010). According to

Khan (2010, pp. 66) the minimum requirements for developmental coalitions are long time horizon,

facilitated by political leadership and governance arrangements, with effective implementation

capabilities and technological capabilities in the country. The collaboration across institutional

boundaries complicates the framework further, especially if the coalition may not reside in a single

organization or level of activity. Shifting from on trajectory to another is accompanied by expansion

in capabilities, and credible commitments by state actors to provide and offer the necessary types of

support and investments. Developmental coalitions are characterized broadly of groups or classes of

people along capitalist, administrative and workers or the poor that create incentives for other

groups to act according to particular collective ambitions (Bresser-Pereira and Ianoni 2015).

Historical evidence suggests that the emergence of coalitions in various settings can result

from deliberative effort made in policy or can be a serendipitous reaction to prevailing exigencies

resulting from informal networks (Doner et al. 2005; Freeman 1987; Leftwich 1995; Riain 2004;

7 Coalitions are ‘individuals or groups that come together, formally or informally, to achieve goals that they

could not so do on their own’. (Wheeler and Leftwich 2012)

20

Ritchie 2005; Saylor 2014). They respond to specific institutional, technological and economic forces

and triggers that prevail in a society to address particular problems. The likelihood of such coalitions

having a developmental effect over time would require strategic coordination on the part of

governance agencies, given their specific capabilities and the context of power relationships relative

to other actors in the system. At a macro level, the political settlement represents a path-

dependent, continuous variable in the process of accumulation of power among various groups and

entities. Its incremental modification can be realized in the long term through the organization of

new coalitions and mobilizations (Khan 2010). No prescriptive model for state-market relations

exists; and model replication often leads to unintended and negative results. At the same time, nor

is the argument being made for the inevitable march to neoliberal globalization or market

conformity (Ghosh 2015). The role of donors in such a framework becomes thorny as they are

viewed as external actors and can view politics in very narrow and conservative sense when

delivering support to various actors in the system (Hughes and Hutchinson 2012). Additionally,

university researchers and industrial research organizations form part of these coalitional

configurations, but they role can operate at a lower level, be circumspect depending on their source

of funding, the organizational culture towards problem-solving or basic research, and their past track

record in successfully delivering projects to businesses. These institutes play important roles in

domestic knowledge creation, human capital formation, characterized by informal exchanges and

non-codified knowledge transfers, but are affected by institutional interests and embedded in the

local political economy. These analytical propositions do not therefore call for the reproduction of

the North-east Asian ‘developmental states’, or ‘embedded autonomy’ or some other formulaic

model, as observers in the 19908s onwards have conceptualized, but to an in-depth understanding

of the confluence of interests, incentives and structures consistent with each country’s specific

historical, political and social struggles and their institutional characteristics. These features require

a specific explanation and of the historical and institutional evolution of S&T institutions in relation

21

to industrial development in developing countries in the contemporary period, which will be

outlined hereafter in relation to Trinidad and Tobago.

Figure 3 - Networks of power - institutional arrangements and corresponding governance capabilities

among the relevant groups and actors in the system

Science & Technology Institutions and Industrial Development in Trinidad and Tobago

In Trinidad and Tobago, the institutional foundations for science and technology were

initially laid in the colonial period with the establishment of a number of research and administrative

arms of the state. During this time, the British government held the reins of power in terms of

administration, policy stances towards industrial development, and the general direction of the

economy. This period witnessed the rudimentary establishment and exploration of S&T activities

that was detailed in the Moyne Commission’s report and later legislated in the Colonial and Welfare

22

Development Act (ODI 1964). The Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture and the Cocoa Research

Unit were both established and have since been integrated into the University of the West Indies

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1979). In the period preceding the declaration of independence in 1962,

colonial administrators were ambivalent to give commitments to stimulating industrial, as this may

have strengthened compulsions for a domestic capitalist class and weakened the trade relationship

with Great Britain (Farrell 1980). Since discovery of fossilized petroleum in the 1866, economic

activity, domestic and foreign policy undertakings, and the prospects of economic and social

development have been predominated by the fortunes of the commodity in the national political

economy and its international markets prices (Braveboy-Wagner 2010; Boopsingh and Mcguire

2014). The industrialization thrust that was led by the Prime Minister, with intellectual leadership

from Arthur Lewis initiated policies and legislative activities, namely the first in a series of Five Year

Development Plans (1963) to woo foreign industrialists through incentives and tax concessions to

establish manufacturing operations in the country (Farrell 2012). As a newly independent state, in

1963 Trinidad and Tobago sent a delegation to the Conference on the Application of Science and

Technology for the Benefit of Less Developed Areas, where it made representations on the need to

conduct an assessment of relevant STI institutions and make training opportunities available for

nationals, especially in its mineral production sector (USAID 1963). They emphasized (1) good

geological coverage; (2) study of the problems of secondary oil recovery; (3) study of the uses and

effects of water encountered in drilling for oil; (4) diversification of oil and mineral products; (5) low

government salaries; (6) a civil service board; (7) increased attendance in 81 world conferences to

keep up-to-date; and (8) educating local people in their local problems (USAID 1963, 81-82). The

offshore petroleum sector remained largely in the hands of foreign capitalists and generated

significant incomes that empowered this group up to the present time. According to Mytelka (1993)

these factors set the condition for the entrenchment of oligopolistic market populated by foreign

firms in the local economy. Most of their technological inputs and capability are endowed at their

headquarters, with some expertise drawn from the local context (Pantin 1987).

23

In 1968, the government led by Prime Minister Eric Williams established the National

Scientific Advisory Committee (NSAC) led by engineer and first local Dean of the Faculty of

Engineering, Professor Kenneth Julien. Professor Julien became very instrumental in the resource-

based transition from a petroleum economy to natural gas based as he spearheaded the first

committee to explore the utility of gas from petroleum flaring (Julien, pers. comm). With the

commitment of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Professor Julien led a coalition of state, private

companies, technology partners, and technical staff at the University of the West Indies (UWI) to

monetize natural gas in Trinidad and Tobago (Best 2012). Additionally, in 1970, the Caribbean

Industrial Research Institute (CARIRI) was established with support from two United Nations

agencies. UNIDO and UNDP provided some initial funding and served as consultants to deliver an

organizational framework for the Institute, which was contested by the government leading the

latter to invest in order that the organization met its vision and needs (Ali 1993). The government

was able to afford these expenditures due in large part to the oil boom of the 1970s which saw

significant revenues generated through commodity exports from foreign multinationals (Best 2012).

Until 1975, the main agents driving investments in science and technology in the petroleum sector

were state agents who comprised task forces and committees with links to the university and foreign

companies who were able to gain important concessions from the government for exploration and

production activities. In its natural gas thrust foreign consultants also played an important role in

framing decisions for government (Pantin 1987). Subsequently, additional efforts to institutionalize

science and technology in the economy gave rise to the National Institute of Higher Education,

Research in Science and Technology (NIHERST) in 1984, for which it was also believed to be a tactic

of then Prime Minister Williams to sideline and disempower a leading bureaucrat, Frank Rampersad

who was appointed as its first President (Manchouk, pers. comm.). During Rampersad’s tenure, a

number of agricultural studies and experiments with scientific researchers to promote tissue culture

research, especially in cocoa and other crops were carried out with limited input and demand from

the private sector to invest and commercialize the research (Manchouk, pers. comm). NIHERST has

24

since become the focal point for research on S&T indicators and science popularization activities,

and has witnessed serious effects of political changes which have weakened its statutory mandate.

In the 1980s with the onset of the debt crisis, and the end of the boom years, the

government had to make adjustments, and invited the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and

World Bank to assist. Despite the ongoing tumults in the international commodity markets and the

local economy, an important S&T development during the 1980s occurred at the Trinidad and

Tobago External Telecommunications Company Limited (TEXTEL) and Trinidad and Tobago

Telephone Company Limited (TELCO), a British-owned Cable and Wireless (C&W) subsidiary had

instituted a research and development (R&D) department led by a locally trained engineer. The R&D

department staffed with significant research, technical and engineering capabilities was responsible

for the engineering, installation and maintenance of the Digital Multiplex Switching (DMS) Systems

which placed the company at the helm in the region (Joseph Remy, pers. comm.). According to the

source:

The Board with four C & W members, who were able to convince local Board members to

abandon the strategic direction that TELCO was taking after Neilson McKay laid down the

platform for the DMS and the upgrade of the outside Plant Network. Our best years were

between 1983 and 1989, but after the merger, things went awry (Remy, pers. comm.).

During this period, there were collaborations with private sector associations, namely the

Coconut Growers’ Association, and CARIRI who expertise and knowledge invested to find a

technological solution to “de-husking” tropical coconuts (Charles, pers. comm.). Their collaboration

lasted approximately ten years before they invented a device by mere serendipity that automatically

removed the outer shell of the coconut. This invention would support the growth of the coconut

sector and entrepreneurs in the sector, which later attracted attention from United States institutes

such as Georgia Tech University to further experiment with the device. These advances in the

industrial research capacities of local S&T institutions occurred amidst structural adjustment and the

25

loss in manufacturing activities (Barclay 2005), which later experienced significant cutbacks to

government support to CARIRI during the late 1980s and 1990s (Umaharan, pers. comm. ).

Figure 2 - Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for the years (1991-2003)

In the current period, more formal efforts to create an S&T policy in the early 2000s have

been subjected to intra-organizational conflict, limited inter-agency collaboration across

government, little political commitment that have thus far delayed such policies and their

implementation (Guinet 2014). In fact, in 2004 a Ministry of Science, Technology and Tertiary

Education was set up, which oversaw several efforts, bringing together stakeholders across

government, private sector, and research community, but with limited internal expertise and

traction at the political level (Ramkissoon and Kahwa 2015, 163). In 2004, a Science and Technology

policy report was drafted with a number of measures outlined, including greater funding to science

26

and new institutional structures (Sankat et al. 2004, 5). There is presently some renewed vigor

around university-industry partnerships beginning at the UWI’s Engineering department (King and

Cameron 2013), and recently with support from the Trinidad and Tobago Energy chamber to

promote energy services (King, pers. comm.). Such proposals do not seem to have received wide

support among the various groups as in previous times as personal relationships and interactions

matter (King and Cameron 2013, 87). The earlier coalitions that made certain progressive steps have

not been easily reproduced in the present period, and have been stuck at the policy design stage,

impeded by information and knowledge disjunctures provoked by powerful players, thereby

curtailing effective implementation of S&T policy and concerted efforts towards a thriving S&T

ecosystem.

Conclusion: towards a governance capability approach

The foregoing analysis has important implications for producing the right mix of policies,

institutional reforms and political actions necessary for S&T in Trinidad and Tobago, as well as other

developing countries. It is clear that political commitment and demand from private players matter.

Though there is some policy input necessary to spur more active and increased interest from the

private sector, such cannot be necessarily externally driven. However, the governance challenges are

not easily overcome by good governance principles associated with secure property rights,

transparency and low corruption (Altenberg 2009, 45; UNESCO 2015, 208; Fagerberg and Shrolec

2008, 1420). But it is important to learn from in-country experiences to understand the political

conditions, historical transitions and institutional mechanisms that created the circumstances of

momentary progress to advance more sustained efforts. In addition, a process of identifying the

constraints to sustained action based on these examples is essential to avert bottlenecks. Over time,

the institutional and political context which enabled more decisive state-coordinated action in the

pre-Washington consensus period have been significantly modified and has transformed relations

27

among the various groups, namely the scientific community, which has focused more on

commercialization, less on social problem-solving; the governance agencies fragmented due to

economic policy changes; and the industrial sector which has been hollowed out making way for

enterprises interested in short-term gains. Therefore, the coordination capabilities of the state need

improved bolstering to transition from networks of power that reproduce inter-organizational

conflict and promote increased participation of external bodies. It is noted that though multilateral

bodies need to play a role, their distance from the process leave them with little knowledge of the

contextual specificities and the modus operandi that has fostered coalitions in the past. Their

increased role however cannot be ignored, in offering external funding and technical support in no

way should supplant local knowledge and experimentation, need to reinforce domestic capability

building efforts in research and productive exchanges, or direct the process based on externally

imposed institutional rules (see Carraz. 2012). Blended approaches that incrementally develop

certain thresholds of accountability can be employed and tinkered with, which do not undermine

local efforts. These complex interactions and power dynamics outlined in Figure 6.1., demonstrate

that the complex problem solving skills needed in the research sector in partnership with industries

are mediated by the governance capabilities of the state to coordinate and support those efforts. In

this way, developing country policy makers and actors could gradually build their S&T capabilities

through collective action, cognizant that their local experiences matter in the promotion of

developmental outcomes.

28

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