Transnational Civil Society's Coalitions. A Way Out of the Zugzwang?

Lisbon Workshop on Transnational Public Participation and Social Movement Activism – Discussion Paper – Transnational Civil Society’s Coalitions. A Way Out of The Zugzwang? – GIANLUCA SGUEO – [email protected]

1

TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY’S COALITIONS A WAY OUT OF THE ZUGZWANG?

GIANLUCA SGUEO

Post-doc researcher – Centre for Social Studies, University of Coimbra. JD Law (University of Rome La Sapienza, 2004); JD Political Sciences (University of Viterbo La Tuscia, 2006). MA in Administrative & Public Law (Scuola Superiore della Pubblica Amministrazione, Rome, 2005). MA in European Law (European Public Law Academy, Athens, 2009). PhD in Public Law (University of Lecce, 2010). [email protected] ; [email protected]

This paper describes the civil society’s involvement in supranational policy-making in terms of a Zugzwang. This is the situation of a player whose turn it is to move and who has no move that does not worsen his/her position. Undoubtedly, over the years civil society’s actors operating at the international level have contributed in fostering stakeholders’ participation. They also have promoted the right to access to documents, and they have fostered the clarity of procedures. Yet, the influence of civil society actors operating beyond the States has proven to be erratic and temporary. Their accountability rate has proven fable, and their efficiency has been criticized. Hence, the metaphor of the Zugzwang: the larger is the number of non-state actors operating at the supranational level, and the more they get involved in supranational policy-making, the greater its effectiveness seems to be challenged. Is there a way out of the Zugzwang? This paper argues that the growing number of hierarchically organized and formalized fora of civil society actors – which are named “interlocutory coalitions” – may be considered as a plausible solution to span counterproductive confrontation among the many voices from civil society, and as an opportunity to better advocate towards International Organizations. Viewed as such, interlocutory coalitions appear as loopholes helpful to non-state actors to fulfil its mandates as well as means to enforce the democratization of the supranational legal arena. The paper is divided into two parts. Part I focuses on the description of interlocutory coalitions. This empirical account serves three main purposes: (1) first, to map the most important networks of non-state actors; (2) second, to provide a foundation for the claim that these networks are increasingly active in the supranational arena; (3) third, to describe how interlocutory coalitions interacts with International Organizations. Part II expounds the tensions related with the rise of interlocutory coalitions and considers the possible future evolutions of transnational civil society’s networking. The former include: (1) the problems related to the coalitions’ functioning. Holding civil society groups together in a coalition is a difficult task. This is especially apparent when networks grow bigger and, in consequence, the likeliness of controversial positions among its members increases; (2) the possibility that different coalitions enter in competition; (3) the loss of creativity and experimentation that might occur when the same standards and practices are massively recycled from different coalitions.


2

SUMMARY: 1. The Zugzwang. – 2. The Interlocutory Coalitions. – 3. Four Examples of Interlocutory Coalitions – 4. Composition, Size, Juridical Status, and Membership. – 5.1 Coalitions’ Tasks. Mediation. – 5.2 External Mediation. Rule-making Activities. – 5.3 Implementation and Enforcement Activities. – 6. The Problem of Effectiveness. – 7. The Problem of Accountability. – 8. Conclusions. Are Interlocutory Coalitions a Way out of the Zugzwang?

1. The Zugzwang

The term Zugzwang has been officially used in the game of chess since 1858. The term indicates the situation of a player whose turn it is to move and who has no move that does not worsen his/her position (Nowakowski, 1996; Müller and Pajeken, 2008). Borrowing from this definition, this paper’s basic assumption is that the role and the presence of civil society in the supranational legal sphere can be described in terms of a Zugzwang.

As already argued by many scholars (Salamon and Anheier, 1996; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Krut, 1997; Held, 1995; Shaw, 1995; Falk, 1995; Steiner and Alston, 2000; Anheier et al., 2001; Martens, 2004; Cullen and Morrow, 2001; Lipschutz, 1992; Otto, 1996; Charnovitz, 1996; Ghils, 1992), non-state actors are increasingly operating on a worldwide rather than just a national stage. Business companies, multinationals, trade unions, media, religious and social bodies play a prominent role in the elaboration of policies and regulatory standards in the supranational legal sphere. The economic agents, for instance, lobby for the recognition of common standards in the regulatory frameworks under which they operate, in order to obtain stable conditions for investments in foreign countries. Other social actors, NGOs for instance, try to raise awareness and knowledge in the international community by lobbying national and international public institutions for a number of causes, including the protection of human rights, the acknowledgement of stronger environmental safeguards, or the reduction of poverty.

Undoubtedly, the expanding presence of this transboundary civil society – a definition used in this paper to address mainly non-governmental organizations – at the supranational level and its constant interaction with International Organizations (IOs) has benefited the “democratization” of the supranational legal order through the promotion and the circulation of a core of common procedural values. These accomplishments notwithstanding, the transboundary civil society’s influence on supranational decision-making has proven to be erratic, and its benefits have proven to be temporary, showing how rhetoric about democratization of the supranational legal space through civil society’s involvement sometimes runs far beyond real achievements.

a. The Problem of Accountability

Two problems can be depicted. First problem: how can

accountability be provided to IOs by bodies that are not accountable for themselves? Non-state actors’ finances, agenda, and governance are not


3

legitimate. Neither a representative nor an electoral process makes them accountable. At its heart, the only source of legitimacy of international civil society is the factual and diffuse acceptance of its presence and active role in the supranational arena.

b. The Problem of Effectiveness

Second problem: how to avoid that non-state actors’ contribution

to supranational decision-making may distort or delay the decisional workflow? Critics argue that the massive and direct participation of stakeholders in decision-making processes held at the supranational level is perceived as counterproductive, rather than beneficial, for the effectiveness of international decision-making. By contrast, it is argued that a smaller number of participants, working with no influence from the outside, could guarantee faster decisions and would reduce the organizational expenses. If, as critical voices maintain, the discourse over the risks and the costs behind the greater involvement of stakeholders in supranational policy-making proves to be exact, it might be then suggested that the increasing presence of transnational civil society at the supranational level reflects its incapability in playing an effective role in the supranational legal arena.

Hence, the metaphor of the Zugzwang: not only transnational civil society has not been able to prove itself to be accountable, but also the more it has grown, the greater the effectiveness of its contribution in IOs’ decision-making has been challenged.

2. The Interlocutory Coalitions

In the last 15/20 years transnational civil society has progressively coalesced into organized network, or coalitions. This paper names this networks “interlocutory coalitions” (IC). Progressively grown in number and scopes, ICs have gradually assumed a crucial role in the process of diffusion of rules and procedures in the supranational legal arena. The analysis set in the following pages rests on a claim of similarity between the impact of single non-state actors and ICs on IOs’ policy-making. It is argued, however, that such coalitions might give a greater contribute to the meaningful interaction between transnational civil society and IOs. They may thus represent a way out of the Zugzwang.

Two chief factors drive the emergence of interlocutory coalitions.

a. The Supranational Dimension of Transnational Civil Society

The first factor has been already discussed: it is the expansion in

the number of civil society actors which not only are international by means, but also are increasingly dealing with problems of global, rather than just local, dimension, such as environmental protection or human rights.


4

b. Networks’ Benefits Second, and more fundamentally, networks’ membership

generates substantial benefits. Firstly, networks enhance the possibilities for its participants to engage in debate and negotiation with IOs. Secondly, they increase the opportunities to access relevant information and financial resources, and to exchange expertise and best practices. Thirdly, networks offer to their members increased visibility to the outside world. Finally, networks enhance the credibility of their members through the adoption of formal procedures to select participants and to certify their accountability.

For all these reasons, networks are increasingly considered ideal sites by NGOs for developing large-scale strategies to stronger advocate their requests towards IOs. The benefits are, however, mutual. Through the synergies with networks of NGOs, the IOs aim at, first, increasing their democratic legitimacy in the face of growing political challenges; second, and equally important, IOs aim at adopting more appropriate regulations by relying on genuine grassroots support; and, third, they aim at being perceived as accountable in the development of laws and policies. A utilitarian stance may suggest that IOs find it easier to negotiate with a single network instead of managing multiple negotiations with a multitude of NGOs.

3. Four Examples of Interlocutory Coalitions

The definition of IC captures a strikingly wide array of alliances

between Non-State actors. This paper focuses on four coalitions that are considered of particular interest. This empirical account serves the main purpose to describe how coalitions are created, and how they behave in the supranational legal sphere.

a. Pan-European ECO Forum

The first case is provided by the “Pan-European ECO forum”.

The ECO forum coalition was originally established in concomitance to the 1993 “Environment for Europe” Ministerial Conference under the name of “Pan-European NGO Coalition”. The coalition has coordinated civil society’s participation and involvement in the political process set out in the final declaration of the Conference, also known as “EfE process”, ever since. The current name was adopted in 1998, during the negotiations for the ratification of the Convention on Access to Information, Participation and Access to Justice, signed in Aarhus in 1998 (thereinafter, “the Aarhus Convention”). The government representatives decided that non-governmental interested parties should be given the opportunity to express their opinion and ideas. The invitation to participate in the negotiations was then extended to all the NGOs concerned with environmental issues. In order to be more influential, the NGOs that adhered to the invitation melted into the ECO Forum. At present, the Forum is in charge of coordinating the civil society interests with the Meeting of the Parties (MOP) of the Aarhus Convention.


5

b. NGO Forum

Second is the “NGO Forum”, an Asian-led network of civil

society organizations whose mission is to enhance the capacity of civil society to negotiate with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The objectives of the NGO Forum include the stimulation of public awareness; the development of a cohesive framework supported by other public interest groups to develop strategies on issues related to the ADB’s activities; the influence on the ADB to adopt poverty reduction-focused and grassroots-based policies for sustainable development; and, finally, the assistance towards local communities through networks aimed at fighting for equitable, social, and environmental justice, democratic governance, and safeguards in the ADB’s projects.

c. Consultative Platform

Third is the “Consultative Platform”, which collaborates with

the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The Consultative Platform was established in 2004 by the EFSA Management Board (MB) pursuing Article 36 of the Regulation n. 178/2002, which disposes on the EFSA’s duty to establish and to promote a network of organizations operating in the field of food security. The aim of such networking is to facilitate scientific cooperation, to exchange information, and to implement future projects. The Consultative Platform undertakes the main task of improving the relationships between interested parties and the EFSA.

d. Conference of International Non-Governmental

Organisations Fourth is the “Conference of International Non-Governmental

Organisations” (CINGO), which provides a venue where all the NGOs that have been awarded the participatory status by the Council of Europe (COE) can make their initiatives considered. The CINGO was created in 2005, and it is now recognized as an institution of the COE. In view of this, it constitutes a fundamental pillar in the COE “quadrilogue” with the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. Among the tasks that are fulfilled by the CINGO, two deserve further attention. First, the CINGO ensures that the participatory status of single NGOs functions correctly. In so doing, the forum helps to affirm the political role of civil society at the COE. Second, and more relevantly, the CINGO decides on policy lines and defines and adopts action programs.

In order to understand whether, and to what extent the presence

of such coalitions in the supranational legal space impact on supranational policy-making, this paper is divided into two parts. In Part I the activities of interlocutory coalitions are traced. Focus is put on the contribution given by these coalitions to bolstering principles of governance at the supranational level. Part II of the paper is centred on


6

the problems related to the involvement of transnational civil society within the supranational decision-making processes – namely, the accountability problem and the issue of its effectiveness. Building on the analysis set forth in Part I, Part II distinguishes between the contribution given by single non-state actors and by interlocutory coalitions to the evolution of the supranational legal order. The conclusive remarks focus on the possible future evolution of interlocutory coalitions, its development potentials, and the related tensions.

PART I INTERLOCUTORY COALITIONS COMPOSITION AND ACTIVITIES

4. Composition, Size, Juridical Status, and Membership

The next pages will outline the general features that characterize ICs, including their composition, the juridical status, and the activities in which they are involved. The description will be presented by reference to the above examples, and by way of differentiation from other typologies of networks and/or groupings of civil society actors.

a. Composition

Let us start with the composition. The ICs are prevalently

composed of NGOs. Individuals are not admitted as members. In view of that, interlocutory coalitions may be differentiated

from, first, the “social movements” theorized by Tarrow (1998) and Kohn (1935). Social movements are informal networks in which a more heterogeneous number of actors are involved, ranging from individuals, groups of people who act together to achieve specific goals, and only to a minor extent, NGOs.

A second critical distinction has to be made between interlocutory coalitions and trans-governmental committees. The latter are in fact entirely composed of national civil servants. The European “comitology” committees are the best-known example of trans-governmental committees. They are in fact made up of national specialized civil servants and chaired by a functionary of the Commission. Other examples are provided by the “Military Staff Committee”, operating as a consultative body of the U.N. Security Council in all questions regarding military actions for the maintenance of peace and security, and the “Codex Commission”, operating as a subsidiary body of the Codex Alimentarius Commission.

Finally, the composition of the interlocutory coalitions distinguishes them from the committees/groups in which civil servants and individuals without hierarchical relations with their governments are brought together. The “G-20 Group”, for instance, is a permanent group composed of civil servants and private stakeholders that cooperate with the World Trade Organization in the assumption of decisions regarding agriculture. Another example is provided by the “Inter-Agency Standing Committee”, created in 1992 as the central humanitarian policy-making body in the United Nations system. This forum is composed of heads of UN agencies, representatives of the Red


7

Cross and other NGOs consortia. Also the “European National Human Rights Institutions” described by De Beco (2008), and the “global public-policy” networks – described in Reinicke and Deng (2000) –provide interesting examples.

b. Technical and Political Component

A technical and a political component are present in each IC.

The technical component may include scientists, academics, jurists, economists, or more generally experts in specific matters. This “epistemic community” – described by Sand (1991) and Haas (1992, 1999) – provides a source of technical expertise and knowledge to the decisional workflow of the IOs with whom the coalitions cooperate.

In spite of the presence of scientists of various kinds, however, ICs should not be confused with “think tanks” (Abelson, 2002; Boucher, 2004; Diane, 1996). While the latter only include the technical component, ICs are composed also of a political component. This component includes the activists, who are individuals whose main task is to campaign around specific issues towards the IOs’ bureaucrats. Because of their role, activists may be considered as key players in the coalitions’ tasks.

c. The Number of Components and The Size of Coalitions

The number of each component as well as the number of

participants to a coalition (and therefore the size of coalitions) is subject to iterate variations, depending upon different circumstances. ICs are in fact dynamic (in both processes and structures) rather than static entities. It may happen, for instance, that more coalitions connect into a single, larger network.

d. Voluntary Support

Support to the ICs’ activities is provided on a voluntary basis.

Its participants are in fact autonomous NGOs that share a common purpose or a common set of values. To this extent, the coalitions resemble single NGOs, which are also governed by rules of their own choosing, and indeed depart from compulsory organizations’ organizational schemes.

e. Agreements Governing Coalitions

Agreements governing ICs come in two broad generic types.

Agreements of type “A” contain detailed rules and procedures on coalitions’ activities. This is the case of the Consultative Platform and the CINGO. Agreements of type “B” are relatively vague and open-ended agreements designed primarily to create a framework for cooperation among NGOs with mutual interests and goals. The Pan-European ECO Forum and the NGO Forum’s Agreements fall within this second category.


8

It is, however, possible that agreements of type B develop more detailed rules to govern the relations among its members. Reasons for bolstering formalization on the part of NGOs generally follows increased interaction and mutual confidence among members, and is aimed at increasing the political resonance of their activity. The Pan-European ECO Forum is exemplary to this extent. IOs’ interest in introducing legally binding provisions towards networks’ participants is due to the necessity to certify networks’ legal authority. The NGO Forum, for instance, was created upon the proposal of ADB President, following the huge protests by NGOs and communities affected by ADB projects at the ADB 2000 annual meeting.

Interestingly, in none of the above types of agreement rules and procedures for opt-out are provided. In the absence of a clear regulatory framework, one could deduce that the decision to leave a coalition is left, alternatively, to the discretion of the single participants, to the will of the IO whom network cooperates, or to the joint decision of the other participants.

f. Exclusive Membership

The membership of ICs is not exclusive. The participating

NGOs are allowed to conduct their own programs and activities as well as to join other networks. It might be useful, however, to draw a line between the juridical status of single participating NGOs and the ICs’ juridical status. Broadly speaking, both NGOs and ICs do not have international legal personality. Yet, the former are governed by the laws of the State in which they are incorporated (Martens, 2003), the latter are not subjected to national laws but rather gain indirect international legal recognition from their cooperation with IOs.

From the distinction between the legal personality of single NGOs and ICs two corollaries stand out conceptually. First, to the extent to which the participating NGOs operate on a partnership basis with the coalition – and thus become an integral part of it – they temporarily abdicate their autonomy. This explains why ICs often dispose of a secretariat and a lead organization, which provide coordination to the network; and, also, it explains why initiatives and strategies taken by the coalitions are attributed solely to the coalitions’ – and not to their members’ – responsibility. These conditions are familiar to the idea of corporatism as described by Ottaway (2001). Nonetheless, an empirical perspective may suggest that through the membership to a coalition, single NGOs receive indirect international legal recognition as participants in international law making.

The discourse on membership is also useful to distinguish the ICs from the “global networks”, the “transnational issue networks”, and the “parallel summits”. Global networks generally define informal web of different civil society actors (such as, for instance, grass-roots groups, or social movements). But also, and primarily, they identify a geographical rather than a conceptual identity.

Transnational issue networks are gatherings of actors who are bound together by a core of shared values and work together on issues of international relevance exchanging information and services.


9

However, these networks lack a defined structure to coordinate accession and membership.

Finally, parallel summits, as described by Pianta (2001), are events held contextually to inter-governmental summits, the scope of the former being to challenge the legitimacy of the latter. Therefore, parallel summits have a narrower conceptual identity with respect to the interlocutory coalitions, since their activity is hinged on the topic(s) of the official summits. More generally, this paper omits to consider any NGOs’ coalitions created for a single specific purpose and a limited amount of time, and therefore dissolved as decisions are reached, such as the symposia organized by the World Trade Organization.

f. Supranational Activities

The ICs’ activities are held primarily, and almost exclusively, at

the supranational level. In fact, even when operating locally, these coalitions maintain a close relationship with the supranational level. Take, for instance, the “Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue”. This is a forum of American and European consumer organizations that develop joint consumer policy recommendations to the U.S. government and to the European Commission to promote consumer interest in EU and US policymaking. The European Commission, however, provides financial support and coordination to the forum.

5.1 Coalition’s Tasks. Internal Mediation

The activities in which the ICs are involved are wide in number

and vary in scopes, ranging from political lobbying, public mobilization, campaigning around particular issues as well as monitoring the compliance with international treaties, and managing conflict-resolution activities. In broad terms, however, it might be assumed that each coalition undertakes three main tasks. Indeed, these tasks are not mutually exclusive. Many of the case studies addressed in this paper reveal ICs performing a number of these activities simultaneously.

At its heart, the ICs mediate. Second, and more specifically, ICs may have “rule-making” powers. Third, ICs may have enforcement powers. In the following paragraphs the coalitions’ activities will be illustrated in more specific details, beginning with the description of the elaboration of common strategies, then moving to the analysis of the rule-making activities, and concluding with the examination of the enforcement and implementation functions.

The first and main function of any IC consists of mediation. In technical legal parlance mediation is described as the attempt to settle a legal dispute through the active participation of a neutral third party who works to encourage cooperation between the parties in conflict (Menkel-Meadow, 2002, 2004). Moving from this definition, this paper conceives mediation as an activity which not only involves the bargaining between the positions of participants (internal mediation), but also encompasses negotiations with governmental representatives and, in a latter stage, implementation (external mediation). It might be


10

then argued that, in an early stage the coalitions mediate “internally” between the diverging stakeholders’ interests; later, they mediate between these interests and the IOs’ representatives.

The cases of the Pan-European ECO Forum and the Consultative Platform have been selected to illustrate internal mediation in ICs. In the Pan-European ECO Forum, accession and membership are subjected to simplified and informal procedures. In contrast to the Pan-European ECO Forum, the Consultative Platform adopts a more formalized system of rules, which affects – inter alia – the mediation among its members.

a. ECO Forum

Every NGO that operates within the United Nations Economic

Commission for Europe (UNECE) region, and shares the goal of promoting sustainable development, is a potential eligible member in the ECO forum. Acceptance of the coalition’s agreement is also requested. Membership can be applied for by a simple letter to the Secretariat of the coalition or by registration for the Plenary. Accordingly, membership can be cancelled by a letter without need to indicate reasons. Obviously, while facilitating conditions to access the coalition encourage a large participation, they also bring into being the necessity to mediate in a fast and efficacious way among the diverging positions of its members, and thus to avoid the coalition’s inactivity. To prevent this risk, the ECO Forum adopts two criteria.

The first criterion relies on the organization of the Forum. The coalition is structured hierarchically, with the Plenary on the top of the structure, the Coordination Board and the Secretariat at the centre, and a number of Issue Groups and Focal Points situated at the periphery. The Plenary makes common policy statements and defines the strategies of the Forum. Yet, the content of such statements and strategies results from a multi-level process of bargaining between the members held during the working sessions of the Issue Groups. These are subject-related coalitions (also termed “content coalitions”) appointed by the Plenary and subjected to the duty to report to it. The process of bargaining is completed by the presence of the Focal Points, whose main task is to guarantee the coordination between the members of specific UNECE regions, its key-issues, and the Forum itself. Informal coordination between the Focal Points and the Issue Groups is organized on a daily basis. A more formal coordination is guaranteed by the Coordination Board, which is composed of the representatives of the two organs.

The second criterion to avoid the inactivity of the coalition, given the considerable diversity among the members NGOs, entails the rules governing the voting within each organ. Each member gets one vote. The Plenary takes decisions by consensus. When consensus cannot be reached, the rule of majority applies and decisions are taken by the 2/3 of the participating members. All the other bodies decide by consensus.

As the ECO Forum example suggests, the combination between a multi-level bargaining system and consensus rules may be used to


11

overcome competing visions – a by-product of interest heterogeneity – and to foster compromises. Thus, internal mediation is pursued through a subtraction of the most controversial issues (which are “filtered” in the passage from the Focal Points to the Issue Groups, and from these to the Plenary). As an alternative, diverging positions are mediated through scaling down the impact of the coalitions’ decisions over its members. For instance, strategies may be defined only in their outsets and then single NGOs are left the option to further their application individually. This closely remembers the benefits of soft-law described by Schafer (2006).

b. Consultative Platform

Yet, by leaving the application and enforcement of a strategy

entirely to the members’ willingness may be risky. This is true especially when highly political problems come into discussion. It is for this reason that other ICs adopt more formalized agreements.

Consider the case of the Consultative Platform. According to the terms of reference of this coalition, NGOs, stakeholders’ organizations representing consumers, and food operators active in the food chain are all admitted to join the coalition (Hofmann and Turk, 2007). Accession, however, is precluded to organizations that do not comply with geographical, functional and practical conditions. More specifically, the accessing organizations are requested to set their activity on the European level; they are requested to be competent in the areas of work of the EFSA; they also have to be in frequent contact with the EFSA.

To complement the conditions to access the coalition, the terms of reference introduce two additional criteria. First, members of the MB, the Advisory Forum, the Scientific Committee, and the various Panels of experts of the EFSA participate in the meetings of the Platform. They do not, however, take active part in internal mediation. Their role is aimed solely at ensuring a proper exchange of information among participants, and at providing administrative support to the coalition. In order to coordinate the discussion, the Platform also designates a Chair and two Vice-chairs from among its members. Second, detailed rules discipline the maximum number of participants to the coalition (never more than 30), the frequency of the Platform’s meetings (twice a year) and locations (preferably in Parma).

Differently from the case of the Pan-European ECO Forum, the example of the Consultative Platform suggests that a higher degree of formalization may be used to the scope of facilitating the coalitions’ effectiveness and to avoid its inactivity. This option, however, does not come without costs. Arguably, the stricter are the conditions to access the coalition, the lesser is the number of civil society actors that fulfil these criteria. Needless to say, a narrow number of participants may influence the coalitions’ specific weight on the international level and thus undermine its chances to obtain successful outcomes. This explains why, in the case of the Consultative Platform, associated (or not permanent) members are admitted to join the coalition. A higher formalization of rules may also give origin to a closer control from the part of the IO management on the internal activities of the coalition.


12

5.2 External Mediation. Rule Making Activities

Let us move to external mediation, and specifically on ICs’ “rule

making” powers. Of course, the non-governmental nature of ICs does not permit these consortia to perform genuine rule-making activities. Be that as it may, the definition of rule making appears nevertheless as the most appropriate to describe coalitions’ advocacy towards IOs. To begin with, the constant lobbying pursued by the ICs into IOs’ official negotiations and into the other phases of the policy cycle has often resulted into influencing IOs’ policies and into shaping IOs’ strategic directions (Simmons and De Jonge, 2001; Spiro, 1996; Clark, 1995). Alternatively, Coalitions may also work as catalysts in pressing for termination of rules that do not contribute towards the common interest anymore. In the second place, Coalitions may influence the agenda setting of the IOs. Furthermore, and conclusively, ICs may formulate and spread rules autonomously.

a. Information and Expertise Feed in Decision-Making

When talking about rule-making activities of ICs, one can draw

a distinction between two main functions. The first and more general activity reflects the extent to which information and expertise are feed in the decision-making processes. ICs, for instance, may present written statements during sessions or meetings in order to influence officials and governmental representatives, and to reduce the abstractness of IOs’ officials questioning towards governmental representatives. Also, the major flow of information provided by ICs reduces the likelihood of mistaken analysis, and enriches the quality of the final reports by IO’s officials.

Examples are provided by the activity of the Consultative Platform and the Pan-European ECO Forum. Over the years the Consultative Platform has contributed to shaping EFSA’s policies through providing scientific advice on health claims’ management, genetically modified organisms, and emerging food-chain related risks. Members of the EFSA’s Scientific Committee and the panels of experts – both highly-specialized units which carry out risk assessment work in their respective fields – participate on a regular basis to the Platform’s meetings. In a similar vein, the Issue Groups of the Pan-European ECO Forum make scientific information available to other coalition’s members and governmental representatives involved in the MOP of the Aarhus Convention.

b. Agenda Setting

Information can be feed to decision-making procedures also in a

more proactive way, as in the case of the agenda setting. This activity consists of raising points to be discussed and analyzed during the meetings with IOs’ bureaucrats. Coalitions are particularly interested in influencing the IOs’ travaux préparatoires through pursuing the agenda setting function because, first, it is during this phase that the founding


13

principles for the final documents are usually agreed upon. Moreover, through agenda setting, Coalitions can contribute to the development of new guiding principles from the IO with whom they cooperate.

The examples are numerous. During its 11th meeting held in Parma in December 2009, the Consultative Platform suggested that the EFSA create a Working Group on Emerging Risks to deal rapidly with food/feed chain risks. The proposal stressed the opportunity to involve stakeholders in the Working Group. The NGO Forum is actively involved in the annual meeting of the ADB’s Board of Governors, during which decisions are taken to set the ADB’s policies and programs. In 2008, for instance, the coalition insisted upon the substantial revision of the ADB’s policies on the environment, involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples.

b. Autonomous Spread of Rules

Alternatively, ICs may influence the policies of IOs by

formulating and spreading rules autonomously. The setting of standards, which consist mainly of non-binding

sources of law, including recommendations, codes of conduct, and declarations of intents, provides the most relevant example of this kind. By developing and publicizing such standards, interlocutory coalitions seek to make them more widespread and influential, in order to let them acquire a sort of “soft-law value” which could eventually bind upon IOs (Shelton, 2000; Hunter, 2007).

To portray the dynamics of autonomous formulation of standards and rules by ICs fully, the case of the CINGO can be considered. One of the main instruments used by the CINGO consists of official recommendations. These are documents following an official decision from one of the COE’s institutions in which the CINGO expresses its position and recommends further actions to be adopted to the Committee of Ministers. The most recent proposals include suggestions to introduce formal time limits for decision-making by competent authorities, greater transparency and reasoning in decision-making, and also address general issues such as human rights’ protection.

A fundamental point to emphasize is that even in the circumstances when interlocutory coalitions’ standards are not intended to directly constrain the behaviour of the underlying IOs, they may be nonetheless directed at the borrowers of these institutions, who are demanded to take them into account during the implementation of the projects. This is the case, for instance, of the NGO Forum, who works in close contact with the governments of the Asian and Pacific areas. By developing uniform standards towards’ ADB’s borrowers, the NGO Forum aims at strengthening the existing standards and increasing its influence.

5.3 Implementation and Enforcement Activities

ICs may also have enforcement powers. This is to say that they

can monitor the compliance of specific norms and rules, evaluate the


14

degree to which these rules are achieved in fact, and they can report the possible breaches of these rules to the competent bodies.

Admittedly, none of this is new for NGOs. Since many international agreements lack forceful mechanisms for implementation, NGOs or civil society groups have been often delegated a certain degree of authority and independence to implement rules at the domestic level by IOs, serving as an additional tool for enforcement. Yet, to the extent to which ICs are involved in such activities, a few peculiarities emerge and deserve further discussion. To understand why this is so, and what exactly implementation by ICs means, this paragraph will analyse the various forms of enforcement, both of formal and informal nature.

a. Implementation as Means of Enforcement

In looking at implementation by ICs, focus needs to be put upon

two elements. The first is implementation as means of enforcement. The second is implementation by conflict-resolution.

ICs’ participation in the enforcement of international treaties is particularly established in the environmental and human rights fields (Alston and Crawford, 2000; Jasanoff, 1997; Charlton and May, 1995; Smith et al. 1998). The Pan-European ECO Forum, for instance, over the years has launched many initiatives aimed at examining whether citizens of the Member States who signed the Aarhus Convention are given the opportunity to adequate and effective access to environmental justice. The findings of these initiatives have been widely published. Recommendations to the concerned governments have followed (Mullikin et al., 2004; Atapattu, 2004; Noteboom, 2003).

b. Implementation as Conflict-Resolution

Conceptualized in terms of conflict-resolution, implementation

by ICs relates to formal interventions through which civil society actors participate in complaint proceedings taking place before international jurisdictions, as well as to the informal ways of intervention of civil society actors within international judicial fora.

Formal ways of intervention essentially consists of the possibility to present amicus curiae briefs. Even if, as a matter of principle, the amicus curiae role is not the same as a formal legal right to bring cases to a court, it is nonetheless a way to engage civil society interests’ within the judicial proceedings and raise awareness in the public opinion (Shelton, 1994; Dinah, 1994).

Formal ways of intervention are also exemplified by the petition mechanisms that allow civil society actors to bring such cases as complainants. The collective complaint mechanisms provided by the African Charter of Human and People Rights (Odinkalu and Christenses, 1998), the European Social Charter (Cullen, 2000; Sudre, 1996), and indeed the Aarhus Convention’s communications from the public are all cases in point. In such hypotheses, individuals, NGOs, and other civil society actors, interlocutory coalitions included, are


15

allowed to bring complaints against states that have ratified the concerned agreement.

Informal ways of intervention may include the act of counselling to parties in a dispute, or pressuring parties to initiate proceedings before a court. Also the possibility to appoint experts (as it is in the case of the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention) can be considered as an informal source of leverage to influence policy outcomes (Kravchenk0, 2007; Stallworthy, 2005). Finally, the same holds true for the relation between coalitions and ombudsmen. The functions of ombudsmen are in fact to provide an independent critical appraisal of the quality of administrative action, and to stimulate its future improvements.

c. Dissemination of Information

Finally, enforcement may also come through simple

dissemination of information. Several ICs, for instance, have developed its websites into tools for advertising project-related activities.

The NGO Forum heightens the public debate on the ADB’s development strategies through its website in order to involve its members in monitoring the enforcement and review of ADB’s policies. The Pan-European ECO Forum distributes a monthly newsletter among its members and the general public. The use of newsletters is aimed at revealing the current state of the negotiating processes with IOs and at helping to clarify certain diplomatic issues to the public. The Consultative Platform publishes the minutes of all the official meetings with the EFSA’s representative. Finally, all the official recommendations and the related follow-ups from the CINGO to the COE’s institutions are given publication on the coalition’s website. Other ways to compel enforcement through information are provided by publications related to specific projects’ issues. Both the NGO Forum and the Pan-European ECO Forum diffuse these kinds of publications on a regular basis.

Conceptualized in terms of conflict-resolution, implementation by ICs relates to formal interventions through which civil society actors participate in complaint proceedings taking place before international jurisdictions, as well as to the informal ways of intervention of civil society actors within international judicial fora.

PART II

INTERLOCUTORY COALITIONS DILEMMA

6. The problem of Effectiveness

From the contemplation of the above examples the idea arises that formal and informal ways of interaction between ICs and IOs are likely to guarantee a better balance between diverging civil society’s and governmental interests at the supranational level as well as to improve the quality of IOs’ policy-making.

Yet, the problem behind the accountability and effectiveness of transnational civil society remain unresolved. Hence, the question is:


16

are ICs capable of solve these problems and provide transnational civil society greater legitimacy and stronger effectiveness?

Let us start from the problem of effectiveness. The finding that a closer number of participants in IOs’ decision-making processes would guarantee faster and less expensive decisions have led some observers to express concerns on the active involvement of non-state actors in IOs’ decision-making. Critics argue that a greater use of human resources would diminish the feasibility of rapid substantive results and, because of the longer time schedule needed to process the amount of information provided by a large number of participants, would increment the overall costs of decision-making processes.

Linked to this problem is a second area of concern. Studies on civil society’s participation in international policy-making have pointed out the difficulties for smaller NGOs to keep the pace with the huge number of meetings that inevitably characterise dealings in the international community. While the limited finances and staff resources of small NGOs would substantially reduce their influence on the negotiating processes, the organizational costs of these processes would be nonetheless increased, and the time-schedule would be extended as well. Martin Kaiser has conceptualized this phenomenon in terms of “participation overkill” (Kaiser, 2002). In Kaiser’s opinion, many NGOs choose not to participate in negotiating processes of considerable importance despite being invited to do so.

In sum, the main trust of the above critiques is to suggest that inclusiveness is more a theoretical concept than a realistic one. The participation of civil society’s groups to IO’s policy-making should therefore be constrained by more formal rules, and circumscribed to few selected NGOs.

a. Effectiveness Through Formalization

This paper does not engage this claim directly. It limits to argue

that formalized networks of NGOs, such as the ICs, may offer a viable solution to the issue of the effectiveness as well as to the issues related to smaller NGOs dealing with IOs. As for the latter concern, the benefits that ICs provide to their members and IOs have been already discussed. Smaller NGOs, which comply with the criteria for accession to the coalitions, gain the financial and administrative support of a stronger organization. On the part of the IOs, dealing with a single coalition facilitates rapidity and reduce costs in decision-making processes.

b. Effectiveness Through Agreements

One could also allege that the agreements governing the

interlocutory coalitions, both of type A and B, often contain provisions specifically designed to avoid such issue. In coalitions governed by agreements of type A, the conditions for the accession to the network and for participating to the organization of its activities are aimed – inter alia – at favouring an effective dialogue with IOs’ representatives. Consider, for instance, the Consultative Platform’s terms of reference.


17

The criteria that govern the number of participants, the frequency, and the location of meetings are all aimed at improving effectiveness.

The same applies for the rules regarding the appointment of Chairs, Vice-Chairs and the mandate of the Platform. The CINGO’s rules of procedure distribute the coalitions’ functions among its internal organs having regard to guarantee the greater possible efficacy of its actions. The Conference identifies the general actions needed to organize its participation in the COE Quadrilogue, and ensures the correct functioning of the participatory status. The Bureau implements the internal and external communication policy of the CINGO, particularly at the EU level. Finally, the Committees’ and Transversal Groups’ purpose is to facilitate the co-ordination between single members NGOs, and also to serve as common interlocutors for all COE bodies. Additionally, the rules of procedure regulate the organization, the frequency and the time-schedule of the CINGO’s official meetings.

Also in coalitions governed by agreements of type B a regulatory framework provides for the better co-ordination of coalitions’ activities. The NGO Forum’s by-laws contain provisions on the organization of the coalition’s activities, including the provision of timelines for the organization of a meeting and the adoption of decisions. The Pan-European ECO Forum appoints a Coordination Board in order to represent the coalition in the official processes.

Thus defined, interlocutory coalitions’ penetration into global

governance evokes Margaret Keck’s and Kathrin Sikkink’s “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink, 2007; Warren, 2008), according to which the appeals by external actors towards the international community bounce back and put pressure on IOs and national governments.

7. The Problem of Accountability

In introducing the benefits of NGOs’ networks, this article has

stressed the opportunities for IOs lying behind cooperation with transnational civil society, and particularly with coalitions of NGOs. Cooperation with ICs is particularly profitable for IOs aiming at being perceived as accountable because it replaces the domestic channels of influence to hold the public powers liable, providing legitimization to its decision-making processes. To such an extent, the scope of the ICs would be, in the telling phrase of Prewitt, that of “compensatory mechanisms” (Prewitt, 1998).

The main objection to this position – and more generally to the efforts put by IOs into developing closer contacts with civil society – is that civil society actors operating at the supranational level are not accountable themselves. They cannot therefore provide for the accountability of the institutions with which they collaborate (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Fowler, 1997; Lewis, 2001; Kaldor, 2003; Goodin, 2003).

Of course, a full analysis of the accountability problem in IOs and the related efforts in increasing contacts with civil society actors is far beyond the scope of this paper. This paragraph will hint toward the


18

problem only to the extent necessary to analyze whether the ICs may be regarded as a solution in responding to the above critiques on supranational civil society’s accountability, and why. In order to do so, the very concept of accountability will be defined by pointing at its diverse aspects, and each of those will be put in confrontation with the structure and activities of interlocutory coalitions.

a. Functional and Strategic Accountability

While, in contemporary legal discourse, accountability stands as

an all-encompassing concept that includes all the attributes of an ideal governance structure, this paper describes it in narrower terms, by pointing at its internal and external aspects. Functional accountability relates to internal management practices and financial responsibility towards the members of an organization. Strategic accountability relates to the relationship between the organization and its beneficiaries, and more generally to the international community.

When applied to transnational civil society, functional and strategic accountability are countered by a number of key-issues, namely the vast number and the provenience of transnational civil society groups. The elevate number of civil society actors would make the effective cooperation between civil society’s groups and IOs impractical. Besides, the fact that the current supranational arena is dominated by large, English-language speaking, Northern NGOs would amplify certain political views that are not reflective of the views of developing countries.

a. Accreditation Standards

While both these objections are truthful and hard to be disagreed

with, account should be taken on the fact that, as already pointed out before, a salient characteristic of the ICs is the establishment of accreditation standards. Participating NGOs to a coalition must fulfil specific criteria to become part of it, including the possession of an executive organization, financial independence from governmental bodies, international standing, independent governance, geographical affiliation, adherence to behavioural standards, and commitment to common goals. As Arthur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos (Benz and Papadopoulos, 2003) have pointed out, governance through networks is based on the acceptation of rules from its participant.

In order to become members of the Consultative Platform, for instance, the representative organizations have to receive the formal permission from the Member State in which they operate. Then both the EFSA’s Executive Director and the MB, on the basis of conditions devised to verify that the candidates are qualified in the relevant field, scrutinize their candidatures. A variant of this possibility is that the IO itself imposes the accreditation criteria, as in the case of CINGO. Participatory status is granted by the COE to international NGOs that are particularly representative at the European level and in the fields of their competence. In addition, NGOs with participatory status should be capable of supporting the achievement the COE’s goals by contributing


19

to its activities and by making its work known among the European public.

b. Controls to Coalitions’ Activities

ICs itself are hinged to the respect of fiscal, peer, and

supervisory controls. The donors to the coalitions exercise the fiscal controls. Albeit interlocutory coalitions are not-for-profit networks, it would be incorrect to think that contributions from individuals and public bodies do not play an important role in their operations. Sponsors and contributors may decide to interrupt their donations whether the coalitions would not perform efficiently in its activities towards IOs. The peer controls consist of the possibility that those NGOs who have delegated authority to the coalition may withdraw such authority when the coalition does not respect anymore certain perspectives and values. Once NGOs have become constituents of a network, in fact, they are eager to monitor their colleagues’ consideration for the agreed standards, since their own reputation might be affected by it. Finally, the same IO with which the ICs cooperate exercises supervisory controls (Kehoane and Nye, 1972, 2001).

Considered as such – that is to say networks that are functionally accountable through the assessment of its members’ qualities, and strategically accountable through fiscal, peer, and supervisory controls – ICs move the problem of accountability from the single civil society actors’ source of legitimacy to the legitimacy of the political discourse in which they are involved. The challenge, in other words, is no longer whether supranational civil society may provide accountability to IOs, but rather which channels are to be preferred to influence policy outcomes in the institutions.

8. Conclusions. Are Interlocutory Coalitions a Way out of the Zugzwang?

This paper has underlined the role of transboundary networks of

civil society actors and their influence on supranational policy-making. In the attempt to describe the relationship between civil society’s networks and IOs, the analysis has focused on ICs, stressing the reasons for which they exist and the aims towards which their endeavours are directed. The presence of hierarchically organized and formalized fora for discussion and advocacy – which is, by all measures, a thumbnail sketch of the ICs – has resulted as a plausible solution to span counterproductive confrontation among international NGOs, and to promote more concrete impact upon the formation of IOs’ will as enshrined in its decisions. Viewed as such, ICs appear as loopholes helpful to NGOs to fulfil its mandates as well as means to enforce the democratization of the supranational legal arena.

Before concluding, one more crucial question needs to be answered. Are ICs concretely influencing the effectiveness of global civil society at the supranational level? Can we thus understood ICs as a way out of the zugzwang?


20

In order to answer this question, this section organizes as follows: a preliminary distinction will be made between the contribution to the shaping of principles of governance at the supranational level given by single NGOs and ICs, respectively. A few concluding reflections will be made on civil society networks’ potential to grow bigger and more influential in future.

a. Contribution from single NGOs and Interlocutory Coalitions The first and main distinction to be discussed separates between

the contribution to shaping international law given by single NGOs and coalitions of NGOs. Undoubtedly, both contribute in fostering stakeholders’ participation, access to documents, clarity of procedures, clear drafting, predictability of behaviour towards specific topics, and consistency in the interpretation and application of the law within the IOs’ rule making. Yet, as already explained, single NGOs’ influence on IO’s decision-making has proven to be erratic and temporary. On the formal level, this owes mainly to three factors. Firstly, because of the excessive number of competing civil society players operating at the international level, all at the same time. Secondly, because of the lack of accountability of such actors. Thirdly, because of the pluri-centristic nature of supranational governance. Albeit, in some respects, this polycentric system of governance has provided the bedrock for civil society’s presence in the supranational sphere, in other relevant respects it has challenged the formation of a homogeneous civil society with a shared identity of its constituency.

The same handicaps are unlikely to constrain ICs. In the first place, the above analysis has demonstrated that these coalitions are not only designed to bring NGOs with common goals together, but also that they operate as out-and-out “bargaining systems” between NGOs and IOs, the former increasing the breadth and scope of the interests considered by the latter and providing both political and scientific support to it. In doing so, ICs have integrated the conduct of IOs more effectively than single NGOs, facilitating the participation of multiple voices in the concerned administrative determinations, negotiating issues on transparency, and promoting the opportunity for individuals to challenge IOs’ decisions in independent judicial fora. Additionally, certification criteria and restricted access to such coalitions have “filtered” the number of participants, and guaranteed greater accountability. As a result, ICs have championed the sense of communality in civil society actors.

b. The Paradigm of Meta-Networks

Apart from the above arguments, the consistency of

interlocutory coalitions to transnational civil society’s value can also be drawn on the basis of speculation on future scenarios in supranational civil society networking.

It might be suggested that an evolutionary process in supranational civil society’s networking is already under way, at the end of which new organizational forms, or meta-networks, are likely to


21

emerge. The empirical picture confirms this: not only the number of civil society networks that operate on the margins of the IOs that license them in the first place is increasing, but also existing coalitions are increasingly merging in meta-coalitions in order to stronger advocate its positions in supranational policy-making.

ICs such as the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, an alliance of nine of the largest international humanitarian organizations and networks working with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the NGO Working Group on the World Bank, or the Social Platform – an umbrella organization for Brussels-based social NGOs and networks of national NGOS in the various Member States aimed at facilitating participatory democracy in the EU by promoting the consistent involvement of NGOs within structured civil dialogue with EU institutions – seems to confirm this assumption.

The paradigm of meta-networks demonstrates how transnational civil society is increasingly organized in networks to support its activities, and how a closer collaboration between non-state actors has developed through networks’ activity. Building upon this claim, it might be argued that networks constitute a way out of the zugzwang which is currently experienced by supranational civil society’s groups.

c. Tensions behind Networking

Yet this assumption remains uncharted by official statistics and

only superficially explored in its counter-effects. Networking in civil society shows a number of tensions.

The most evident one is related with its functioning. Holding NGOs together in a coalition is a difficult task. This is especially apparent when networks grow bigger and, in consequence, the likeliness of controversial positions increases. On the one hand, associational forms like the ICs are the best option to foster a broad range of interests of large constituencies and to contain the increasing number and diversity of its members. Also, coalitions’ dimensions matter to both its members and IOs. Participants to a Coalition are aware of the fact that the more a network of civil society actors grows in capacity, the greater its strength is in advocacy. IOs understand that even setting the goals of supranational policy-making becomes an impractical task except in very general terms. At a time in which regulation increasingly concerns objects and situations whose heterogeneity and complexity escapes the cognitive capacities of IOs’ decision-making bodies, cooperation with large coalitions of civil society actors becomes fundamental for sound policy-making. On the other hand, however, a bigger network is also a weaker network, due to the wide range of adherents with different views, sizes, and strategies.

A second tension may occur between different coalitions in competition. As noted by Kumi Naidoo (Naidoo, 2006), cross-border activism has not yet successfully created a veritable global civil society, due to the fact that no organizations can truly claim representation in all of the countries of the world. The current situation, Naidoo argues, is better described as dominated by a large number of civil society cross-border groups who, to a greater or lesser extent coordinate their


22

activities depending upon their interest in similar issues. This situation, this paper posits, creates not only the basis for cooperation, but also and perhaps more frequently, for competition. This is particularly the case of bigger coalitions, which encompass a great diversity of actors and are not guided by a clear leadership.

A third tension may occur when particular IOs refuse to co-operate with a coalition on the basis of rules or standards formerly approved by a different IO, assuming their uniqueness or the presence of important differences.

Lastly, a fourth tension relates to the loss of creativity and experimentation that might occur when the same standards and practices are massively recycled from different coalitions.


23

BIBLIOGRAPHY ABELSON, D.E. (2002), Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes, Montreal ALSTON, P. and CRAWFORD, J. (eds.), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge University Press ANHEIER, H. et al. (2001), Introducing Global Civil Society. LSE Working Paper, http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/CSHS/civilSociety/yearBook/chapterPdfs/2001/chapter01.pdf ATAPATTU, S. (2004), The Public Health Impact of Global Environmental Problems and the Role of International Law. American Journal of Law and Medicine, 30 BENZ, A. and PAPADOPOULOS, Y. (2003), Is Network Governance Democratic? Different Assessments for the National and International Level. Centre for Democratic Governance Working Paper, available at www.demnetgov.ruc.dk/conference/papers/HelsingoerAB-YPI.pdf BLUEMEL, E.B. (2005-2006), Overcoming NGO Accountability Concerns in International Governance. Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 31 BOUCHER, S. (ed.) (2004), Europe and Its Think Tanks: A Promise To Be Fulfilled, Paris CHARLTON, R. and MAY, R. (1995), NGOs, Politics, Projects and Probity: A Policy Implementation Perspective. Third World Quarterly, 16 CHARNOVITZ, S. (1996-1997), Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International governance. Michigan Journal of International Law, 18 CLARK, A.M. (1995), Non-Governmental Organizations and their Influence on International Society. Journal of International Affairs, 48 CULLEN, H. (2000), The Collective Complaints Mechanism of the European Social Charter. European Law Review, 25 CULLEN, H. and MORROW, K. (2001), International civil society in international law: The growth of NGO participation. Non-State Actors and International Law, 1 DAHL, R. (2009), Can International Organizations be Democratic? Rethinking the Sceptical Argument. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA - ABRI JOINT INTERNATIONAL MEETING, Pontifical Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro Campus, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Jul 22, 2009, http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p380873_index.html DE BECO, G. (2008), Networks of European National Human Rights Institutions. European Law Journal, 14 DIANE, S. (1996), Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process, London DINAH, S. (1994), The Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings. American Journal of International Law, 88 EDWARDS, M. and HULME, D. (1996), Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, London FALK, R. (1995), On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Cambridge University Press FOWLER, A. (1997), Striking a Balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Development, London GHILS, P. (1992), International Civil Society: International Non-governmental Organizations in the International System. The International Journal of Science in Society, 44 (417) GOODIN, R.E. (2003), Democratic Accountability: The Third Sector and All. John F. Kennedy School of Government, Working Paper no. 19 HAAS, P.M. (1997), Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination. International Organizations, 46 HAAS, P.M. (1999), Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control. International Organizations, 34 HARDENBROOK, A. (2007), The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector’s Attempt at Environmental Responsibility. Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 40 HELD, D. (1995), Democracy and the Global Legal Order, Stanford University Press HOFMANN, H.C.H. and TURK, A. (2007), The Development of Integrated Administration in the EU and its Consequences. European Law Journal, 13 HUNTER, D.B. (2007-2008), Civil Society Networks and the Development of Environmental Standards at International Institutions. Chicago Journal of International Law, 8 JASANOFF, S. (1997), NGOs and the Environment: From Knowledge to Action, Third World Quarterly, 18 KAISER, M. (2002), National Forest Programmes and Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations: Participatory Overkill or Real Opportunity for Strengthening Ecological Needs of Forest Related Policies, available at www.greenpeace.com KALDOR, M. (2003), Civil Society and Accountability. Journal of Human Development, 4 KECK, M.E. and SIKKINK, K. (1998), Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, New York KEHOANE, R.O. and NYE, J.S. (1972), Transnational Relations in World Politics, Cambridge University Press KEHOANE, R.O. and NYE, J.S. (2001) Democracy, Accountability and Global Governance. Harvard University Politics Research Group, Working Paper No. 01-4, 2001, available at www.ksg.harvard.edu/prg/nye/ggajune.pdf. KOHN, H. (1935), Pan-Movements. In: Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, New York


24

KRAVCHENKO, S. (2007), The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, 1 KRUT, R. (1997), Globalization and Civil Society: NGO Influence in International Decision Making, Geneva LEWIS, D. (2001), The Management of Non-Governmental Development Organisations: An Introduction, London and New York LIPSCHUTZ, R.D. (1992), Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society. Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 389 MARTENS, K. (2003) Examining the (Non-)Status of NGOs in International Law. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, 10 MARTENS, K. (2004), NGOs in the UN System: Examining Formal and Informal Mechanisms of Interaction. International Law Journal of Civil Society, 11 MENKEL-MEADOW, C. (2002), When Litigation is Not the Only Way: Consensus Building and Mediation As Public Interest Lawyering. Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 10 MENKEL-MEADOW, C. (2004), From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context. Journal of Legal Education, 54 MULLIKIN, T.S and SMITH, N.S., CHAMPION, M.T. (204-2005), Inextricably Intertwined – Environmental Management and the Public. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 17 MÜLLER, K. and PAJEKEN, W. (2008), How to Play Chess Endings, Gambit Publications NAIDOO, K. (2006), Claiming Global Power: Transnational civil Society and Global Governance. In BATLIWALA, S. AND BROWN, D. (eds), Transnational Civil Society. An Introduction NOTEBOOM, C. (2003), Addressing the External Effects of Internal Environmental Decisions: Public Access to Environmental Information in the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm. NYU Environmental Law Journal, 22 NOWAKOWSKI, R. (1996), Games of No Chance, Cambridge University Press ODINKALU, C.A. and CHRISTENSES, C. (1998), The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Development of its Non-State Communication Procedures. Human Rights Quarterly OTTAWAY, M. (2001), Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, Non-governmental Organization Networks, and Transnational Business. Global Governance, 7 OTTO, D. (1996), Non-governmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society. Human Rights Quarterly, 18 (107) PIANTA, M. (2001), Parallel Summits of Global Civil Society. In ANHEIER, H. et al. (eds.) Global Civil Society, London PREWITT, K. (ed.) (1998), Networks in International Capacity Building: Cases from Sub-Saharan Africa. SSRC Working Paper, New York Social Science Research Council REINICKE, W.H. and DENG, F. (2000), Critical Choices. The United Nations, Networks, and the Future of Global Governance, Ottawa SALAMON, L. and ANHEIER, H. (1996), The Emerging Non-Profit Sector, Manchester University Press SAND, P.H. (1991), Lessons Learned in Global Environmental Governance. BC Environmental Affair Law Review, 18 SCHAFER, A. (2006), Resolving Deadlock: Why International Organisations Introduce Soft Law. European Law Journal, 2 SHAW, M. (1995), Global Society and International Relations, Cambridge University Press SHELTON, D. (1994), The Participation of Non-governmental Organizations in International Judicial Proceedings. American Journal of International Law, 88 SHELTON, D. (ed.) (2001), Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System, Oxford 2000. SIMMONS, P.J. and DE JONGE OUDRAAT, D. (eds.) (2001), Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned, Washington SMITH, J., and PAGNUCCO, R., LOPEZ, J.R. (1998), Globalizing Human Rights: The Work of Transnational Human Rights NGOs in the 1990s. Human Rights Quarterly, 20 SORENSEN, E. (2007), Governance Network as a Frame for Inter-Demoi Participation and Deliberation. Working paper 2007:1, Centre for Democratic Network Governance Roskilde University, available at www.ruc.dk/demnetgov SPIRO, P.J. (1996), New Global Potentates: Non-governmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace. Cardozo Law Review, 18 STALLWORTHY, M. (2005), Whither Environmental Human Rights?. Environmental Law Review, 7 STEINER, H.J. and ALSTON, P. (2000), International Human Rights in Context, Oxford University Press SUDRE, F. (1996), Le protocole additionnel à la charte européenne prévoyant un système de réclamations collectives. Revue Générale de Droit International Public, 3 SUZUKI, E. and NANWANI, S. (2005), Responsibility of International Organizations: The Accountability Mechanisms of Multilateral Development Banks. Michigan Journal of International Law, 27 TARROW, S. (2001), Power in Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Cambridge 1998 Tarrow, S. (2006), Transnational Politics: Contentions and Institutions in International Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4 WARREN, M.E., Governance-Driven Democratization. Working paper 2008:3, Centre for Democratic Network Governance Roskilde University, available at www.ruc.dk/demnetgov

Transnational Civil Society's Coalitions. A Way Out of the Zugzwang?

Documents

Transcript of Transnational Civil Society's Coalitions. A Way Out of the Zugzwang?