Governing Migrant Women:Impacts of Increased Immigration Regulation and Technologies of

Citizenship for Women Fleeing Male Violence

Angela WillmottSOC 782 term paper

Dr. Singh

1

Introduction

Over the past several years immigration and refugee policies

have undergone major amendments that severely inhibit a woman’s

ability to resettle in Canada. Most recently, the passing of

Bill C-31 and changes to spousal sponsorship regulations have

restricted a woman’s ability to secure safe and stable living

conditions within or outside of spousal sponsorships. Women who

are victims of abuse are particularly vulnerable to the negative

repercussions of this new legislation as “precarious status”

(Goldring, Bernstein and Bernhard 2010; Thurston et al. 2013),

restricted access to personal documents, and lack of financial

aid may impede a woman’s ability to remove herself (and often her

children) from an abusive situation (Bhuyab 2010; Burman and

Chantler 2005). In response to stringent reforms on immigration

and refugee policies, violence against women (VAW) organizations

have enhanced and restructured the services they offer. Although

increased efforts by women’s shelters and not-for-profit

2

organizations are effective in assisting many women to escape

abuse, lack of resources and increasing demands of the legal

system continue to problematize permanent resettlement for many

immigrant1 and refugee2 women. As such, the central focus of

this paper will be to examine (1) how recent immigration and

refugee reforms place women at increased risk of male and state

violence and (2) the tactics VAW organizations are employing to

help women overcome abuse and regain their autonomy.

Several key course themes will be used as analytical tools

to provide a contextualized understanding of the interplay

between policy and female migration. Canada has exemplified

strong links between colonialism and immigration (Bhuyab 2012;

Castagna and Sefa Dei 2000; Razack 2000), underscoring the

presence and perpetuation of the progress narrative. An

intersectional analysis sheds light onto how racialized women

1 For the purposes of this paper the term “immigrant” will be defined as persons who have resettled permanently in Canada (CCR N.d.). For women who may be in the process of immigration (e.g. seeking permanent residency) through spousal sponsorship for example, the term “immigrating” will be used to denote that these women have not yet secured permanent legal status in Canada. 2 “Refugee” will be defined using the definition provided by the Government ofCanada that states refugees include those individuals who have fled their country of origin under the “fear of persecution and who are unwilling or unable to return to their home country”.

3

continue to be subordinated within the legal system (Crenshaw

1991) and by state bodies that control movement within and across

its boarders. Additionally, many women who attempt to relocate

to Canada under refugee status are compelled to make claims using

Orientalist tropes of the downtrodden Third World Woman to gain

the sympathy of judges. As Sherene Razack (1998) discusses,

these narratives disempower refugee women and serve to

invisibilize legacies of colonialism that rearticulate the

histories and identities of ‘Other’ women through a Western gaze.

Lastly, although the services offered by many VAW organizations

do help women navigate increased demands of the legal system and

provide various essential service, many of the second stage

training programs offered can be understood as what Barbra

Cruikshank (1999) terms “technologies of citizenship”. I will

argue that programs aimed to ‘empower’ women also serve to

produce specific types of neoliberal citizens that are self-

governing and financially independent, both of which serves the

best interests of the state and acts as another means of

exclusion for those who are unable to mimic this ideal

citizenship.

4

Immigration Policy in Canada: Racial, Class, and Gender Bias

State guidelines that regulate the immigration of

individuals into its boarders are understood to have racial,

sexists and economic biases which allow governments to perpetuate

a mythology of white, male supremacy (Castaga and Sefa Dei 2000;

Feagin 2006; Fleras 2013; Razack 1999). Each of these biases can

serve to limit to female migration into Canada, especially women

emigrating from areas in the Global South3. Beginning with

issues of race, nowhere has this subject been more central to

government policy and discourse than within immigration laws

(Castagna and Sefa Dei 2000:32). Historically within Canada,

“myths about racial groups were summoned to keep out those whose

racially constructed “visibility” subverted/challenged white

norms” (ibid.). Evidence of this can been seen in 1900s when

Canadian immigration officials promoted the myth that individuals

of African and Indian decent would be unable to adjust to the

colder Canadian climate (ibid.). This fictitious belief provided

3 The terms Global South and East will be used to denote women from areas thathave historically taken a subordinate role to countries typically located in the ‘West’. Although I do acknowledge the problems with using this terminology and generalizing all women from these areas, the limited scope of this paper does not allow for a full interrogation of the use of universalizing language

5

a valid excuse to reject applications from these areas and thus

mask overt forms of racial discrimination. More contemporary

examples of racism within state policies can be illustrated by

strict spousal migration regulations that limit immigration from

certain areas because of racialized conceptions of who the ideal

immigration candidate is (Razack 1999; Satzewich 2014:2).

Contemporary literature on racism within public policy suggests

that Cultural Racism has become a common narrative within the

legal system and state politics (Castagna and Sefa Dei 2000).

Cultural Racism describes how beliefs about subordinate cultural

groups in a society are defined by dominant cultural groups

(often white, economically advantaged populations) (Blaut 2006;

Castagna and Sefa Dei 2000; Mendoza 2012:7). Within Cultural

Racism, “we no longer have a superior race, but a superior

culture”, a belief firmly rooted in ideologies of biological

inferiority (Blaut 2006:290). Forms of Cultural Racism can be

seen in court proceedings for female asylum-seekers as success

rates for these cases are “inevitably framed as a flight from a

dysfunctional culture” instead of a woman seeking protection from

a violent man (Razack 1999:48).

6

Beginning with amendments to the Immigration Act in 1906

and1910, the Canadian government has tailored immigration

policies to favour its economic interests (Mendoza 2012:5;

Sherwood 1994). Although racial issues continued to play a role

in immigration policies, in 1962 Canadian immigration regulations

saw massive changes reflecting larger global and societal shifts.

Human rights concerns, decolonization processes, and “the stigma

of racial discrimination” all contributed to the adoption of a

“difference-blind program of entry” that endorsed the entrance of

immigrants who would be able to best support Canada’s economic

progress (Fleras 2013:82; Hawkins 1988:72). This new ideological

approach to immigration was supported by the implementation of a

points-based system of entry where merits were allotted in the

areas of language proficiency, education, employment, and job

skills (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Fleras 2013; Hawkins 1988).

This new approach was formalized in 1978 with the approval of the

Immigration Act (Fleras 2013:82). The screening of migrants for

their economic potential not only satisfied the demands of the

labour market, but scrutinized their ability to participate in

neoliberal citizenship. Consumer practices, investments

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behaviours and connections to global markets (all tenants of

neoliberal citizenship) were seen as favourable immigrant

attributes in their capacity to support Canada’s economic

standing (Fleras 2013:82).

Beyond the racial and economic exclusions that increased

migration controls and citizenship definitions are founded upon

(Castaga and Sefa Dei 2000; Feagin 2006; Sherwood 1994), sex

discrimination also inherently underpins these policies (Baustad

2012; Castaga and Sefa Dei 2000). For example, the points-based

system of entry is understood to favour male applicants with

higher levels of academic credentials or occupational skills

(Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002; Arat-Koc 2012; Fleras 2013).

Immigration reforms in 2002 provide further evidence of sex-based

exclusion with the passing of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

This legislation placed further restrictions on immigration with

specific emphasis on language proficiency, education, income

generating skills, while favouring applicants who would be able

to “easily integrate into the workplace and society” (Fleras

2013:83). Female applicants are particularly vulnerable to these

legal amendments, especially those originating from the Global

8

South. Economically disadvantaged women from developing nations

often do not have the same access to education and or paid

employment as their male counterparts and thus, their ability to

meet strict immigration criteria is greatly reduced (Iredale

2005). This means that many women who want to relocate to Canada

must do so through sponsorship where women become dependent on

their sponsoring party, usually their spouse (Elabor_Idemudila

2000; Guruge and Collins 2008:4). This dependant “is maintained

and perpetuated by various institutional processes” which can

result in the struggle to accesses essential service or escape

abusive situations (Elabor_Idemudila 2000: 91-92). The approval

of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act enhanced restrictions on

sponsorship arrangements (Fleras 2013) which only served to

further restrict legal female migration to Canada (Baustad 2012;

Satzewich 2014).

Spousal Sponsorship and Bill C-31

Following allegations that marriage fraud was becoming a

growing concern within Canada, Minister of Citizenship,

Immigration and Multiculturalism, Jason Kenney, announced new

amendments would be made to spousal sponsorships, requiring

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foreign spouses to remain with their sponsoring partner for a

minimum of two years in order to attain permanent residency

(Kenney 2012). Various groups advocating for victims of ‘fake’

marriages4 and news coverage5 prior to Minister Kenney’s proposed

legislation change suggest that marriage fraud was affecting

thousands of Canadian men and women and that the government was

ill equipped to launch the necessary investigations into this

matter (Arensault 2012). Despite claims that thousands of

Canadians are impacted by illegal nuptials, between 2008 and

2012, the Canada Boarder Services Agency (CBSA) was only able to

confirm receipt of 300 leads on this matter, leading to charges

being laid on 6 individuals and the deportation of a small number

of others (Kenney 2012). When asked for a statement by a reporter

from The Star newspaper in February 2013, the CBSA was unable to

confirm “the number of permanent residencies revoked for alleged

4 Many groups and organizations across Canada have formed to support citizens who are victims of fraudulent marriages. Some of these groups include the Canadian Marriage Fraud Victims Society (CMFVS), Immigration Though Marriage Fraud Facebook page, Voice of Marriage Fraud Facebook page, as well numerous cases being shared at public forums across the nation (Arsenault 2010). 5 Many mainstream Canadian news publications have covered stories related to illegal nuptials including CBC The National, The Star, CBC News British Columbia, The National Post, The Edmonton Journal, and the Toronto Sun. The stories published on this matter are too numerous to list here but any mentioned in the body of this paper will be included the reference section.

10

marriage fraud” (Keung 2013), bringing into question the validity

of Minister Kenney’s basis for more stringent regulations.

Regardless of the contested statistics surrounding marriage

fraud in Canada, females continue to account for over 60 percent

of sponsored spouses (Baustad 2012); the legal amendments imposed

by Minister Kenney fail to account for distinct vulnerability of

women, especially those in abusive spousal sponsorship, given the

unequal power dynamics that are inherent to the sponsorship

arrangement. Women may feel pressure to remain in abusive

relationships in order to gain permanent residency, leaving the

sponsor in control of her safety and status (Baustad 2012; OWJN

2008). Furthermore, the sponsoring party may use permanent

residency as a manipulation tactic, threatening to declare the

marriage a fraud, which would result in the deportation of the

woman in question (ibid.). In a news article discussing the new

spousal regulations, Shajila Singh, former marriage fraud victim

and illegal nuptial advocate, cautioned that the new legislation

would be “bad for women” because they “might be stuck with an

abusive man” for the two year discretionary period (Cahute 2013).

As mentioned earlier, women, especially those from the Global

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South may not have had the opportunity to garner the education

and employment skills necessary to thrive in Canada’s neoliberal

society. As such, women immigrating under the spousal

sponsorship may be unable to leave an abusive marriage as she

would be unable to secure the resources necessary to support

herself (Thurston et al. 2013:280; OWJN 2008) and/or face

deportation to a home where she may be subjected to further

violence.

Immigrating women experiencing domestic violence may face

further challenges to escaping abuse as norms and cultural/family

beliefs may discourage breaking the bonds of marriage for any

reason (Ahmad et al. 2004; Shirwakar 2004; Thurston et al.

2013:280). Similarly, some cultural practice may use “stigma and

shame” to discourage women from speaking out about domestic abuse

(Thurston et al. 2013); women who do speak out against the

violence they endure may be ostracized from the few

familial/ethno-community ties they have in Canada, resulting in

further barriers to securing her safety (Ahmad et al. 2004;

Bhuyan, Mell, Senturia, Sullivan, & Shiu-Thornton, 2005; Thurston

et al. 2013). In such instances where a woman is forced to flee

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domestic violence during her two year conditional period,

sponsorship reforms do contain a deportation exemption for women

who are able to prove marital abuse. However, the onus is on the

female claimant to substantiate allegations of domestic violence

and this can prove difficult given that she may have hidden signs

of physical abuse, been reluctant to seek medical, and refused

involve the authorities (Bui 2003) for fear of losing her

sponsorship (Baustad 2012). Similar research by Battacharjee

(1997) and Burman and Chantler (2005), in a U.S. and U.K. context

respectively, have illustrated the connection between immigration

laws and spousal abuse for immigrating women. This previous

research has highlighted the “need to address the complexity of

how public, state and institutional practices intersect with

racism, class and gender oppression” in order to better assist

the needs of immigrant women fleeing domestic violence (Burman

and Chantler 2005:60).

Following on the heels of increased spousal sponsorship

regulations, Minister Kenney put forth Bill C-31, which contains

major amendments to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (Canadian

Counsel for Refugees (CCR) N.d.). Two main areas of revision had

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far reaching implications for female refugee claimants including:

(1) shortened time limits for refugee claims, and (2)

unrestricted ability of the state to designate ‘safe’ countries.

Both safe country designation and reduced time limits ultimately

undermine advances made in gender-based persecution by

eliminating legitimate refugee claims through impossible

deadlines and unrealistic legal demands. These amendments also

reinforce orientalists discourses that construct gender based

persecution as residing outside of colonial and imperial

histories while simultaneously masking “the West’s implications

in the contemporary patterns of global economic exploitation and

the political contexts that produce the world’s refugees” (Razack

1998:91).

In accordance with the new requirements of Bill C-31, after

the initial refugee claim is made at the port-of-entry, a written

statement must be submitted to the Immigration and Refugee Board

(IRB) within 15 days (CCR 2012; Showler 2012a, 2012b). For most

applicants, this is not enough time to secure legal counsel and

draft an effective refugee claim. Many claimants are unaware of

services available to them as well as struggling with language

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barriers and emotional trauma, both of which inhibit the drafting

of a thorough refugee claim (CCR 2012; Showler 2012a, 2012b).

The result is that many claims are unfinished or hastily composed

in order to meet the 15 day deadline as claims not submitted

within this time frame results in immediate deportation for the

applicant (Showler 2012b). After a decision has been made on a

refugee application, claimants are only allowed 21 days to appeal

their ruling, if they are permitted to refute the decision at all

(ibid.). Again, time allotted for the appeal process is

inadequate for an individual to gather sufficient evidence and

paperwork to support a successful appeal.

Prior to Bill C-31, the Balanced Refugee Reform Act had granted

the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration restricted authority

to designate certain countries as ‘safe’ (Showler 2012a). This

new legislation has removed ministerial limitations on country

designation, giving Minister Kenney the monopoly on determining

which countries are safe based on refugee acceptance rates (less

than 25 percent) and whether or not the country is understood to

grant basic democratic rights and freedoms to its citizens (CCR

2012; Nafziger N.d.; Showler 2012a). The measures used to

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determine country designation fail to provide a holistic

understanding of the status human rights in any area (Nafziger

N.d.). Gender violence, especially within the marital context,

is often regarded as a private matter despite the consciousness

raising efforts of violence against women (VAW) organizations

over the past several decades (Burman and Chatler 2005). Women

may be unable or hesitant to come forward about abuse they

experience due to “deeply entrenched stereotypes and taboos”

reinforced in their community (Nafziger N.d.:¶ 6). As such, the

basic information used by the minister in the designation process

does not account for the specific vulnerability of women in

general, and the further elevated levels of risk for racialized

women from various ethno-cultural backgrounds. As Kimberely

Crenshaw notes, “the violence that many women experience is often

shaped by other dimensions of their identities, such as race and

class” and these intersectionalities result in the

marginalization of women on multiple dimension of their political

identity (1991:1244). Thus, many women seeking refuge from safe

countries are subjected to further violence at the hands of the

state by policies that ignore the manner in which gender, race,

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class and cultural practices intersect to shape the magnitude of

violence that women experience, regardless of her country of

origin.

Country designation has further significance for refugee

applicants, as claimants from safe countries are not afforded the

basic emergency health care as those individuals from non-

designated areas. Furthermore, safe country claimants are denied

the right of appeal and are fast tracked for their IRB hearing,

being given a mere 30-45 days to appear in court (CCR 2012).

Beyond the health and safety concerns the lack of medical care

presents, expedited hearing schedules do not provide claimants

with enough time to compile an adequate case (Baustad 2012; CCR

2012; Showler 2012a, 2012b; Nafzinger N.d.). The impacts of

these increased regulations are reflected in the 2000 to 2012

statistics that indicate a dramatic decrease in referrals to IRB

courts and an 87 percent drop in refugee claims from designated

countries (ISS of BC 2014:12). The precarious status of refugee

claimants further intensifies “the known difficulties of

acknowledging, speaking about, and escaping domestic violence”

(Burman and Chantler 2005:64). Women may be unaware or unable to

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access the legal resources necessary to substantiate a ‘valid’

application (Baustad 2012; Burman and Chantler 2005). For some

claimants, the IRB hearing may be the first time that they have

been able/required to speak publically about the violence they

suffered, and recounting these events can be extremely

traumatizing (Baustad 2012). Lack of legal aid and trauma are

just two obstacales amongst the multitude of economic, social,

and ethno-cultural barriers preventing women from submitting a

successful claim. These barriers are only further compounded by

expectations of refugee testimony and courtroom proceedings.

Sherene Razack’s analysis of how gender persecution is

contextualized during IRB hearings details how women from the

Global South are compelled to articulate their refugee claims to

appease “notions of Western superiority and Third World

inferiority” (1998:91). Razack asserts that accounts of gender

persecution are only validated when women are envisioned as being

saved from her “dysfunctional, overly patriarchal state” by

Western powers (ibid:104). Therefore, in order for a woman to

make a successful claim, she must present herself as the

“cultural Other” in need of Western salvation, invisibilizing

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legacies of colonialism, imperialism, and racial and economic

subordination that have contributed to the perpetration of gender

violence in Global South (ibid: 92). The orientalist narratives

entrenched in IRB court proceedings are also reflected in the

larger process of country designation as countries believed to be

‘non-safe’ are comprised mainly of areas in the Global South.

Claimants from these areas are granted 60 days to submit their

refugee claim (instead of the 30 allotted to ‘safe’ country

applicants) (CCR 2012), reinforcing the discourse of the Western

saviour. The combination of increased time constraints and

Orientalism in Bill C-31 empowers the state to eliminate valid

refugee claims with bureaucratic hurdles while selectively

permitting admittance to Canada for those that pander to notions

of cultural superiority, both of which subject female claimants

to continual forms of systemic violence.

Technologies of citizenship and empowerment in VAW organizations

Current trends in Canadian immigration indicate an overall

devolution of policy control and enforcement to provincial and

municipal levels of government (Bhuyan 2012). Subsequently, local

governments are increasingly being called upon to manage the

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integration and resettlement of new immigrant populations (Bhuyan

2012; Nyers 2010), mirroring neoliberal governance techniques

that diffuse responsibility for regulating the population to non-

federal forms of government and non-state actors (Porter 2012).

Nongovernmental service providers play a large role in the

immigrant integration process, with many organizations offering a

variety of provisions such as temporary housing, job skills

training, counselling, and community referrals. As previously

noted, changes to immigration policies have made it increasingly

difficult for women to migrate to Canada independently, leaving

many women vulnerable to abuse. Using Barbra Cruikshank’s (1999)

understanding of “technologies of citizenship”, the tactics used

by two VAW organizations to empower immigrant women and women

with precarious status to overcome their challenges to attain

legal citizenship, personal safety and successful relocation will

be examined.

Within democratic societies, the political has become

reconstituted at the social level where distinctions between “the

personal and the political, the economy and the state, the

voluntary and the coercive” become unclear (Cruikshank 1999:6).

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The comingling of government structures with social forces

enables state authorities to extend their reach, impacting

institutions, groups, and individual actors in a single action

(ibid.: 8-10). These forms of social government are described by

Cruikshank as modes of governance that operate outside the bounds

of the state, yet influence lower level government, social reform

movements, and citizens to act in its interest (1999:9). This

form of population management is similar to Wolch’s (1990)

discussion of “parastate actors” or nongovernmental groups that

receive state funding in order to provide support to those in

need (as cited in Bhuyan 2012:212). ‘Helping’ organizations,

illustrate the blurring of the “political, judicial, and the

administrative” (Cruikshank 1999:17) as well as the transfer of

responsibility for immigrant and refugee integration to local

forms of government and parastate actors (Bhuyan 2012:212). The

muddying of social structures and institutions contributes to an

inability to identify an ultimate source of authority or power,

leading to conditions where many take responsibility, yet none

are responsible. For example, in an investigation of locked

dumpsters in her area, Cruikshank (1999) describes how many local

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store owners, municipal employees, and local politicians

expressed a vested interest in keeping city waste receptacles

locked, yet no one could identify the authority behind the

regulation that initiated securing the refuse bins. She uses

this case to illustrate the “facelessness of power” and how it

functions to mask state political agendas while enabling

governments to thwart accountability for the policies they enact

(1999:17). Lack of accountability on behalf of governing bodies

is further perpetrated within neoliberal democracies that

champion freedom and autonomy for individuals, while

simultaneously cultivating citizens whose interests are aligned

with that of the state. As Cruikshank aptly states, “citizens

are not born; they are made” through the governance6 of

populations that guide and encourage certain practices rather

than using domination to discourage unwanted behaviour (1999:4).

It is within the realm of social governance that “discourses,

programs, and other tactics” are applied to manage the day-to-day

actions of individuals and transform the passive and subordinated

subject into the empowered citizen (ibid:1).

6 Cruikshank uses Foucault’s understanding of governance which he describes asthe “conduct of conduct” ( as cited in Cruikshank 1999:4).

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Cruikshank (1999) describes techniques of governance

perpetrated by organizations that promote empowerment discourse

(such as VAW shelters) as “technologies of citizenship”.

Development of this term is premised upon Foucault’s discussion

of bio-power which seeks to promote specific kinds of

subjectivity, invest individuals with a “set of goals and

understandings”, and structure possible responses to individual

failures or crisis (Cruikshank 1999: 40-41). Technologies of

citizenship function to constitute and regularize citizens yet

are dependent upon the voluntary involvement by the individuals

they shape (ibid: 2-4). Much like the democratic structure

itself, technologies of citizenship and the empowerment discourse

they employ contain the “twin possibilities of domination and

freedom” (ibid: 2). These strategies of governance may

“legitimate the formation of certain social roles, and produce

particular organizational arrangements in society, creating unity

or division among the citizenry” (Mettler 1998:4). For example,

immigrant and refugee women fleeing violence may be viewed as

unable or unwilling secure their financial autonomy to thrive in

their new community, being cast as an economic drain or a Third

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World victim. In both cases, women face impediments to personal

security and community integration which facilitates the

promotion and perpetuation of empowerment programming designed to

transform women into active and responsible citizens. This is not

to say that empowerment strategies used by VAW organizations are

not beneficial for women who adopt them. As Cruikshank notes,

“the will to empower is both enabling and constraining” (1999:2),

highlighting that although these programs do assist women to

better their circumstances, they inherently restrict ‘acceptable’

behaviour. This is achieved by narrowing pathways to self-

sufficiency and promoting neoliberal conceptualizations of

success, both of which serve in the state’s best interest. In

order to further explore how technologies of citizenship impact

immigrant women/women with precarious status and are linked to

larger socio-political discourses, services and support

programming at two VAW organizations on the west coast of Canada

will be investigated.

British Columbia continues to be an attractive location for

immigrant resettlement with 2012 statistics revealing that it is

the fourth most popular province for relocation, just trailing

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Alberta with 44, 113 new immigrants (Citizenship and Immigration

Canada (CIC) 2013b). In 2012, Government reports indicate that

131, 430 women had permanent residency status in Canada (CIC

2013a), with 79 percent of the total number of BC permanent

residency holders residing in the Vancouver area (CIC 2013b.). In

the same year, female refugees numbered 49, 622 (CIC 2013c) with

94 percent of all claimants residing in the Lower Mainland,

reflecting high concentrations in Vancouver, Surrey, and Burnaby

(ISS of BC 2014:15). The large numbers of immigrant and refugee

women in Vancouver and several of its neighbouring cities

indicate that the BC Lower Mainland is a viable location for

further research on immigrant and refugee women who may be

dealing with issues of violence. Unlike larger metropolitan

areas such as Toronto where several studies have been conducted

that touch on the issue of immigration/refugees, VAW

organizations, and partner violence (Ahmad et al. 2004; Bhuyan

2012; Singh 2011; Singh 2010), research on this complex issue in

the Vancouver area is currently insufficient. In light of the

immigration and refugee demographics and the lack of research in

this urban location, the empowerment strategies of two VAW

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organizations in this area have been selected in order to gain a

better understanding of how this BC metropolis is addressing the

needs of immigrant and refugee women seeking shelter from abuse

and the threat of deportation.

The Vancouver Rape Relief and Women’s Shelter (VRRWS) is

located in in the east end of Vancouver, an area occupied by high

concentrations of marginalized individuals often vulnerable to

participation criminal activity, drug addiction, and

solicitation. The VRRWS offers support programs and temporary

housing to women suffering from abuse and sexual assault for the

past 41 years. The facility reserves its ten beds for women who

face the immediate threat of male violence, so immigrant and

refugee women fleeing partner violence in another country may be

channeled to other organizations. Although the organization’s

mandate is not tailored to address the needs of women with

precarious status, recent influx of clients without official

documentation or citizenship has forced support workers to expand

their legal and housing services to meet this growing demand. In

special cases where immigrant and refugee women have no other

place to take refuge, they are granted admittance to the shelter,

26

in large part to assist them with IRB paperwork and trail

preparation. The organization operates without any government

funding, relying on private donations and volunteer labour to

serve the needs of their community (VRRWS 2008).

The second organization that will be investigated is Harmony

House, located in the city of Surrey. Harmony House is a program

run by the Progressive Intercultural Community Services Society

(PICS) which works in partnership with BC Housing. BC Housing

operates under the lead authority of the Minister Responsible for

Housing, Rich Coleman and is responsible for the planning,

development and administration of subsidized housing initiatives

at the provincial level (BC Housing 2010). More specifically, BC

Housing is involved in providing emergency, supportive and

subsidized housing as well as rental assistance for at-risk

individuals (ibid.). PICS is a not-for-profit, United Way agency

that works with the provincial government to provide programs and

services to marginalized groups, including women and new

immigrants (PICS 2013). Harmony House was developed by PICS as a

second stage, long-term housing initiative for immigrant women

and children fleeing domestic violence. The facility offers

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eight beds and a variety of educational and support programs

aimed to “empower women to become independent and self-sufficient

leaders in their community” (PICS 2013). Harmony House is

specifically tailored to meet the cultural and religious needs of

“South Asian clients” offering specific services such as dietary

and food storage requirements (BC Housing 2010). Although

Harmony House may have access to greater resources as it receives

both government and private funding, it also has to satisfy

interests of both of the sponsoring bodies. As Rupaleem Bhuyan

(2012) notes, it can be particularly problematic for helping

agencies to meet stringent government mandates and the interests

of private sponsors while providing the best possible assistance

to clients when issues of citizenship and violence against women

are involved7.

Barbra Cruikshank emphasizes the significance of the

voluntary nature of welfare and social programming (1999:23);

7 The article by Bhuyan(2010) specifically details how VAW organizations act as “parastate” actors and are often forced to negotiate citizenship for the women they help. I believe that the idea of navigating the interests of clients and appeasing state bodies can be applied more generally to the Harmony House example presented above. Although Harmony House does not appearto directly address issues of precarious status, the organization is forced tonegotiate the contingencies that often accompany state and private funding, while providing the most effective support for their female clientele.

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getting individuals to understand that their prosperity is

dependent upon their investment with ‘helping’ agencies allows

organizations to invisibilize coercive tactics while continuing

to structure “the field of possible actions” citizens may engage

in (ibid.). With regards to the subject of voluntary

participation, the VRRWS continues to have high rates of “self-

referral” as support workers report many women seek out

assistance from the agency after seeing pamphlets or signs posted

in the downtown east side. The self-referral process exemplifies

Cruikshank’s assertion that individuals are both empowered and

constrained by strategies designed to assist them. Clients of

the VRRWS actively choose to find assistance to support them

through their crisis situation, yet the types of programs and

support offered this agency directs their future actions in

specific ways which may not be exclusively beneficial for their

individual needs. Again, it is important to emphasize that the

intent is not to imply that the VRRWS is deliberately coercing

women into programming or to detract from the central role this

agency has in offering refuge to victims of male violence.

However, reflecting upon an example of a client with precarious

29

status, the legal service offered at the VRRWS may inspire her to

make a claim for refugee status. In doing so, improvement of her

circumstance is dependent upon the outcome of the IRB hearing,

yet the interests of the state are served despite the outcome of

the trial: if she deemed to be a refugee, then she is falls

within the realm of acceptable legal status and can be more

effectively governed; if her claim is denied then another illegal

person is removed from Canadian soil, resulting in further

fortification of the nation’s borders.

In addition to self-referral, women may come to use the

services of the VRRWS and Harmony House through recommendation by

another agency. Other organization will refer

immigrant/precarious status women to VRRWS if support workers

believe that she is the victim of male violence. Similarly, the

8 beds offered at Harmony House are generally allocated through

referral from a first stage transition house (BC Housing 2012).

The woman in question must comply with the referral process yet

the act of transferring individuals from one agency to another

further demonstrates the channelling of behaviour and action into

restricted courses of action. Agency to agency referral also

30

illustrates tactics of governing at a distance, especially in the

instance of Harmony House which operates in conjunction with the

BC government and many other umbrella organizations. Harmony

House and VRRWS, along with other organizations, work to improve

the lives of women at the day-today level which does have

positive impacts for women but also extends the reach of the

government through application of the “art of social conduct”8

(Cruikshank 1999:8). In particular, the second-stage housing at

Harmony House demonstrates how social conduct is instilled in

women as clients are encouraged to take part in employment and

empowerment training as a spring board for reintegration into

community life. The sub-text of this initiative implies that

successful relocation is dependent upon a woman’s ability to

adopt the skills and values of the neo-liberal citizen, further

supporting Cruikshank’s understanding of social service providers

as technologies of citizenship.

8 Cruikshank references J.A. Hobson work, The Social Problem, to describe how governments were able to enhance management of populations through the application of the “art of social conduct” (1999: 7). She describes how this process is constituted through the aligning of individual liberties and state interests (ibid.). The result of social conduct being integrated into the dominant discourse meant that governments were able to control citizens with minimal state intervention via influence on the daily “habits, desires, and interests” of individuals (ibid: 8).

31

The programming and care offered at both VRRWS and Harmony

House explicitly express that their services are structured to

empower their clients to take control of their lives and support

them on their journey to become active citizens:

Harmony House provides support and assistance through individual one-to-one sessions, confidence building exercises, goal setting, group therapy, and a variety of group sessions that are focused on health/wellness and empowerment” (PICS Women’s Housing Application Form 2013).

Our mission is to provide safe housing, education, support,and practical assistance for women and children fleeing domestic violence. Our vision is to empower women to become independent and self-sufficient leaders of the community (Harmony House 2013).

Women who have adequate economic means have more choices…..when women have economic autonomy, their basic human entitlement needs can be met, and women can realize their potential to fully participate in society (VRRSW 2010a: ¶7).

Through coming together and sharing our experiences, we cangain awareness of our situation and raise our collective consciousness about male violence against women. We can find ways to support each other and work cooperatively. Wecan be powerful enough to make the changes in our lives andin our world that really will make a difference (VRRWS 2010b: ¶3).

The last comment published by the VRRWS is directed to both

clients and potential volunteers and support workers. By

operating under the shared vision of women’s empowerment, both

victims of male violence and the women who support them take

responsibility and express a vested interest in improving the

32

lives of DV survivors. Although much of the literature on the

VRRWS website is highly critical of government policies and

immigration regulations, the modes of resistance and means

through which social assistance can be achieved are limited by

the structure of the agency itself. The shelter cannot be seen

to condone violent demonstrations or other means of resistance

that may result in harm to advocates or those they are protesting

against for fear of a loss of public support or punitive legal

action. Instead, dissenting views against state legislation or

practices are expressed through conventional channels such as

campaigning, peaceful protest, and written proposals for

legislative amendments that do have some impact, but continue to

illustrate the restriction of possible actions and behaviours as

discussed by Cruikshank.

Both Harmony House and VRRWS use a peer counselling model

where support workers and other women work to counsel each other

through their personal struggles with male violence. It is

believed that the common experience of male violence acts as a

unifying force, bringing together women within and across racial,

cultural, and socio-economic differences. Implications for peer

33

involved counselling include empowerment to speak of her history

of abuse and to lend strength to women facing violent

circumstances. Here women engage in community building, a skill

which can later be applied during reintegration into greater

society. Peer counselling also contributes to women becoming

active citizens in that they are not simply receiving counselling

but are taking part in support programming which they, in turn,

may recommend to other DV survivors. Again, this process

demonstrates how individuals are channeled into specific avenues

of support as well as the importance of voluntary participation

and personal investment with helping agencies for technologies of

citizenship to be most effective.

Harmony House offers “life-skills training and confidence

building exercises”, employment training and volunteer

opportunities to help women “lead independent and purposeful

lives” (PICS Harmony House 2013). Although this type of

programming is beneficial to many women, especially those fleeing

violence, the requirements of admittance to Harmony House

necessitate a detailed employment and familial background as well

as legal status in Canada (PICS Women’s Housing Application Form

34

2013). This means that women with precarious status, who may

arguably be at increased levels of risk for partner violence,

would be unable to seek assistance from this agency. The

extensive information requirements on the application form also

may also detract deserving candidates from attaining a shelter

bed as language barriers and lack of supporting documentation may

result in incorrect or incomplete application submission. This

eliminates clients who may be most in need of assistance from

Harmony House, perhaps by default giving support to women who are

more able to reintegrate into neo-liberal society (via their work

experience and access to legal documentation). In addition, the

extensive application form allows services providers and other

agency referrals access to information about the immigrant women

at Harmony House (with her consent). This process can be linked

to Foucaldian notions of biopolitics, where the political

rationality “turns human needs, welfare, and desires into the

terrain of governance” (Cruikshank 1999:19). By gaining detailed

accounts of the lives of Harmony House clients, this information

can be used by governing bodies can create more effective

strategies for immigrant integration and programs for survivors

35

of male violence. Although this new programming may have many

positive impacts for immigrant women, it will simultaneously

enhance the power of the state at the social level and contribute

to the constitution of ideal types of neoliberal citizenship.

ConclusionContemporary neoliberal governments and capitalist economies

have facilitated the subordination of the Global South, forcing

many people from these regions to migrate to areas where poverty

and conflict are less prevalent (Baustad 2012). Although the

Canadian government is complicit in creating the conditions that

foster the need to migrate, current immigration policies ensure

that few women from the global south or Eastern Europe are able

to migrate to Canada using legal channels (ibid.). More

specifically, enhanced restrictions on spousal sponsorship and

Bill C-31 fail to account for the gender, race, and class

distinctions that further subordinate women fleeing violence in

another country or experiencing abuse at the hands of her

sponsor. As previously noted, evidence of the negative impacts

of stringent immigration regulations are reflected the declining

IRB approval rates and increased frequency with which

36

immigrant/precarious status women are soliciting the assistance

of anti-violence organizations, such as the VRRWS and Harmony

House. Further amendments to immigration regulations appear to

be one avenue that governments are able to able to eliminate

claims from applicants who are less likely to emulate

characteristics of neoliberal citizenship and thus, restrict

movement of individuals who are stigmatized as economic or social

liabilities.

Women who are in a positions to accept the service of

helping organizations such as VRRWS or Harmony House, empowerment

strategies and various training programs are offered in order to

support them in their journey to secure their personal safety and

community (re)integration. The use of anti-violence agencies and

the support programs offered can be understood as technologies of

citizenship that function to align individual progress with state

interests, while simultaneously extending the reach of government

power through influence on the day-to-day activities of citizens

(Cruikshank 1999). Although community programming does offer

positive impacts to immigrant/precarious status women fleeing

abuse, it is important to understand how these initiatives

37

ultimately benefits governing bodies while masking the coercive

nature of social support. Perhaps a more critical understanding

of the structure and services offered at agencies such as VRRWS

and Harmony House can help discern programs that are most

beneficial to clients in need and where the line between

individual improvement and support of government agendas lies.

Ultimately, technologies of citizenship and enhanced immigration

regulations function to restrict and procure particular types of

citizens who both shape and are shaped by Canadian society.

Therefore, critiques of empowerment programs and new immigration

policy can also contribute towards discovering new modes of

resistance against dominant discourses that influence the

policies and practise currently disadvantaging immigrant and

refugee women.

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