European University Institute Department of Political and Social Sciences

Governing Urban Diversity Immigrant Integration Policies and Discourses in Dublin and Vienna

Leila Hadj-Abdou

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the degree of Doctor of Political and Social Sciences of the European University Institute

Examining Board Prof. Rainer Bauböck, European University Institute (Supervisor) Prof. Donatella Della Porta, European University Institute (Co-Supervisor) Prof. Bryan Fanning, University College Dublin Prof. Andrew Geddes, University of Sheffield

© Leila Hadj-Abdou, 2013

No part of this thesis may be copied, reproduced or transmitted without prior permission of the author

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CHAPTER THREE

1. Governing immigration and immigrants at the nation state level: developments and determinants of policy change

“L’exclusion sur la base de la nationalité n’est-elle pas nécessaire pour l’existence de la nationalité et, plus

largement, l’exclusion politique d’un groupe social inclus dans la vie politique n’est-elle pas nécessaire pour l’existence du politique? […] Nos démocraties modernes, dans leurs formes vraies et a fortiori dans leurs

perversions (colonialisme, apartheid et tous régimes négationnistes, fascisme, nazisme et autres totalitarismes), n’échappent pas à la logique qui fonde l’exclusion et la sujétion.” (Sayad 2006, 13)

3.1. Introduction In his seminal work “The Suffering of the Immigrant”, the sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad (2004,

283) reminds us that in the context of modern nation states, the very fact of immigration is

tainted by the idea of being a fault, or an anomaly. To be an immigrant “is a displaced presence

in every sense of the term” (ibid.). Immigration poses a particular challenge to the nation state as

it questions the legitimate foundations of citizenship and of the relationship between citizens and

the state.

European nation states have been bound by the premise of unity, which has usually been

constructed as ethnic homogeneity through a common language, culture, traditions and history.

This unity, although to a great extent fictitious, has been proven to be a central element in

holding nations together (Castles and Miller 2009, 15), and is, as some (Walzer 1983) have

argued, a precondition for democracy and distributive justice. Immigration threatens this unity,

and reveals the problem of linking nationality to citizenship (Castles and Miller 2009, 42ff.).1

Whilst in liberal theory all people are meant to be free and equal (Dworkin 1977), their “right to

have rights”, to use the famous paraphrase of Hannah Arendt (1967, 269), is still realised to a

great extent through membership of a national community. In that context, Benhabib (2004) has

emphasised the “democratic paradox”, which is constitutive of modern types of democracy.

“Modern democracies act in the name of universal principles which are then circumscribed

1 As has been most famously pointed out by Rogers Brubaker, there are different degrees to which states link

nationality to citizenship. Brubaker (1992) distinguished states with an ethnic conception of nationality (expressed by the principle of ius sanguinis) from states that adhere to a civic conception of citizenship (expressed by the principle of ius solis). Despite these gradual differences, citizenship in principle remains connected to nationality. As Zolberg (2000, 513) underlines, even within the French state, which is usually referred to as the paradigmatic civic nation state, an effective distinction arose between the population that was ‘ancestrally’ French and other French citizens.

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within a particular civic community” (Benhabib 2004, 44, emphasis of the author).

Cities, in contrast to the national “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983), are regarded as the

paradigmatic space of encounters with strangers. The urban space is the place of “otherness”, and

in that sense it can be seen as the model of modern citizenship “not expecting citizens to be

engaged with one another as people who share a common fate, but only to accept one another as

strangers who must live together” (Young cit. after Honohan 2007a). The urban space has been

described as a potential home base for cosmopolitan democracy (Bauböck 2003). This potential,

however, is constrained. Even with a decentralised organisation of the state, cities do not operate

as autonomous entities, but are constrained as well as enabled by a national framework. This is

especially true in the case of capital cities, which play a special role in defining and representing

national identity (Kofmann 1998, 283). This is not to say that cities are not agents in their own

right, and may develop their own positioning. In order to detect this particularity, however, it is

necessary to contrast it to the governing of immigration and immigrants at the nation-state level.

In other words, what makes up the specific urban mode of governing is the differences cities

exhibit from their nation states when they respond to the challenge of immigration.

In this chapter, I will first trace the development of political responses to immigration over time

in Austria and Ireland. It is not an attempt to describe the evolution in detail. Instead, the

emphasis will be on trends in the politics of immigration. I will then compare the countries by

outlining features and factors that have shaped policy responses in these two countries. Before

describing and analysing the politics of immigration, it is necessary to identify the key

determinants in helping us to understand the developments.

3.2. Determinants of immigrant and integration policies at the nation-state level

Some migration researchers (Freeman 1995, 2004; Koopmans et al 2005) have attempted to

analyse the politics of immigration to Western Europe in terms of national uniform models (see

Chapter One: shortcomings of national-level studies). Others (Joppke 2007, Brubaker 2003) have

emphasised a trend of convergence. Messina (2009, 2) in turn points out that the politics of

Western Europe, although somewhat less than a uniform model, share several major features.

“Political convergence, however, is not driven by the logic of policy emulation, but rather by a

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kind of parallel path development in which the immigration-receiving states in Western Europe

are initially motivated by a compelling economic self-interest, to embrace mass immigration, and

are subsequently and similarly challenged by its political and policy implications” (ibid.). While

European immigration states share a number of major features, the dynamic interplay of these

factors accounts for different policy outcomes and diversity across European immigration nation

states. Moreover, some driving forces are particular to some states but not others. Any generic,

comparative attempt to identify all relevant factors and to predict their effects is thus destined to

be imperfect. However, some major factors that have an impact do stand out.

The first factor that must be considered is the development of migration inflows. To some degree

these flows are actively steered by states. Particularly in favourable economic times, immigration

is tolerated or even encouraged (Freeman 1995, 886). To a great extent, however, states react to

or try to anticipate the dynamics of migration processes. In the long run, the settlement of

immigrants with different ethno-cultural backgrounds also changes the sense of political

community (Bauböck 2001), which in consequence becomes more inclusive. Recent

developments, described as “illiberal liberalism” (Bauböck and Joppke 2010, Joppke 2007,

Orgad 2010, Triadafilopoulos 2011), have suggested that this inclusive trend, which could be

observed in the past as an effect of the pluralisation of nation states, has started to reverse. Some

authors, moreover, have recently promoted the idea that it is the number of immigrants a country

receives in particular that impacts on policy-making. It has been postulated that there is a trade-

off between the number of immigrants admitted to a country and the rights granted to them

(Ruhs 2009, Bell and Piper 2005). It has been argued that the more rights that are given the

higher the costs for the states admitting immigration. Because of this, states will choose to

restrict either admission rates or rights.

Cummins and Rodriguez (2009), however, found that this was not the case. They observed that

the large numbers of states that grant more rights also have higher numbers of immigrants.

Indeed, as was first pointed out first by Hammar (1990), immigrants in many liberal democracies

have acquired the status of denizens, which has conferred upon them many rights, with the

exception of participation in national elections.

This observation leads us to a second factor: “liberal rights”. In his famous essay “Why liberal

states accept unwanted immigration” Joppke (1998) stated that liberal democracies are

compelled by their own legal and moral principles. In contrast to the post-national claim raised

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most prominently by Soysal (1994), Joppke argues that states actually coerce themselves through

“self-limited sovereignty” as opposed to being coerced by a burgeoning international human

rights regime. Joppke shows in his analysis (see also Joppke 2001) that the expansion of

immigrants’ rights is pushed mostly by domestic courts, often against the wishes of their

restriction-minded governments.

Thirdly, responses to immigration remain above all driven by interests of different competing

actors. Migration is perceived as advantageous by some groups, but as negative by others

(Castles 2004, 214). In his observation of immigration politics that were expansive and inclusive,

Freeman (1995) argued that the inclusive nature of immigration politics should firstly be

understood as a result of a collective action dilemma. The benefits of immigration, such as the

availability of a cheap labour force, are concentrated, while its costs, such as increased welfare

spending, are dispersed. The dispersion of costs and the concentration of benefits lead to a

situation in which the easily mobilisable beneficiaries of concentrated benefits, such as

employers, are likely to prevail over the difficult-to-mobilise bearers of diffused costs, the

majority of the population. Secondly, he emphasised that liberal states are characterised by an

“anti-populist norm”. This is characterised by political elites refraining from broaching the issue

of immigration as a problem. In effect, the anti-populist norm pushes elites towards consensual

agreements on immigration and to removing the issue from partisan politics.

The world Freeman observed in the mid-1990s, however, has clearly changed. The “right-wing

fringe” parties Freeman (ibid., 885) described as having failed have proved to be influential

actors in mobilising anti-immigrant sentiment and successfully pushing for restrictive policy

change (de Lange 2008, Mudde 2007). However, as immigrants have become citizens, and

voters, political parties are also competing for their votes. Parties of the left (Givens and Luedtke

2005), in particular, (Messina 2007) are inclined for ideological reasons to represent the interests

of immigrant citizens and to incorporate them into their political structures. Civil society,

including associations of immigrants, has been trying to contest these developments. In the

European context, the European Union is also a decisive player, affecting policies at the nation-

state level (see Chapter Two). Nowadays European Union legislation not only governs the legal

status of European citizens living in another member state, but also regulates the status of TCNs

residing in EU member states.

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Lastly, ideas and discourse are also factors in their own right (Schmidt and Radaelli 2004) in

shaping the politics of immigration. The conception of policy problems cannot be simply

inferred from objective, rational interests. Instead, problems and preferred solutions are

constructed by various actors, drawing on available ideational resources (Boswell, Gedes and

Scholten 2011). Much of the dynamic character of migration policy-making, which European

immigration states have exhibited, is captured by looking at changing policy narratives (Scholten

2011). Narratives about national identity, in particular, enable some responses and constrain

others.

3.3. Developments in Austria and Ireland

Old vs. new immigration nation & continuous vs. recent immigration influx

According to the latest IOM Report (2010, 187), Ireland and Austria are both top-ten destination

countries in Western and Central Europe as defined by the proportion of immigrants as a share of

the total population. Austria ranks seventh, with a percentage of 15.6 and Ireland ranks fourth

(after Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, Switzerland) with a percentage of 19.6. As a result of the

global economic recession, which hit Ireland more severely than many other economies (Barret

2012, 113), migrant inflows declined. Since those migrants who were already in the country,

however, have not left to the same extent as new inflows declined (Krings 2010), it is justifiable

to still refer to Ireland as an immigration state. Population movements to and from Ireland reflect

the economy to a certain extent but, as Barret and Mc Guiness (2012, 27) have described it, there

is no “perfect correlation”. At the time of the last census (2011), which was four years after the

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decline of the Irish economy (20082) began, those born outside the State still accounted for over

17 per cent of the population (Gilmartin 2012, 3).

Although they are both important countries of immigration, their evolution has been quite

different. Austria belongs to the set of West European nation states that experienced mass

migration in the wake of post-war economic growth. These countries have had continuous

immigration inflows, despite a halt in official labour recruitment in 1973-74, and have had

particularly high immigration since the 1990s.

Four distinct phases of immigration can be detected in Austria. Since the mid-1960s the country

has received labour immigration from Turkey and Yugoslavia, immigration which the state

actively encouraged at the beginning. Since the 1970s the country has witnessed a halt in circular

migration and the settlement of immigrant labour, as a result of greater restrictions in

immigration control. The end of the cold war led to a further immigration influx. Between 1987

and 1994 the number of foreigners residing in Austria doubled (Perchinig 2010a, 19). In the

1990s, civil war in Yugoslavia and further family reunification became the main sources of

immigration. With Austria’s accession to the EU, immigration from other EU countries has also

been increasing. Since the mid 2000s EU countries have become the main source of immigration.

From 2006 onwards Germans represent the biggest immigrant group in Austria.

Ireland, along with Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece and Finland, previously countries of

emigration, now fall into the category of new immigration states. These countries started to

receive immigration only in the last 20 to 30 years as a consequence of positive economic

development. Before this, Ireland had been the paradigmatic case of a country exporting labour.

The Irish population shrank from approximately 4.4 million in 1861 to 2.8 million in 1961 (Ruhs

and Quinn 2009). The recent immigration history of Ireland has had six distinct phases. In the

first era, the country witnessed net immigration between 1971 and 1981 (Ugba 2004, 9). These

inflows were mainly composed of returning Irish migrants. Immigration receded again until the

mid-1990s, when Ireland became a country of emigration again. In 1996, however, Ireland

reached a turning point, becoming the last EU member state at that time to become a country of

net immigration (Ruhs and Quinn 2009). These inflows were again mainly composed of

returning Irish nationals. Concurrently, asylum application numbers increased. In the third phase,

from 2002 to 2004, a peak of inflows from non-EU countries occurred. Asylum applications

2 Ireland officially declared it was in a recession in September 2008 (Barret, Kearny, O’Brien 2008, 13)

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reached a peak in 2002 and fell drastically in 2004. As a result of EU enlargement to Central and

Eastern Europe, a fourth phase (2004-2007) saw immigration dominated by EU citizens. In 2006,

net immigration reached its highest level ever. By then, the biggest foreign national groups were

citizens of the United Kingdom, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia respectively. The fifth phase was

characterised by reduced but still significant immigration from new EU member states (Quinn

2009, 15). In the wake of the economic crisis, Ireland is again being transformed into a country

of emigration. In 2009, for the first time since 1995, Ireland experienced net outward migration.

This trend has continued until now (see CSO 2012, Gilmartin 2012). Immigrants from Central

and Eastern EU member states, in particular, have started to leave the country (Joyce 2010, 23).

This brief history of recent immigration shows that while Austria has been a continuous and

relatively old country of continuous immigration, Ireland’s status has oscillated between being a

country of emigration and one of immigration. These divergent developments, however, cannot

be simply regarded as different economic conditions being the dominant pull factor in the two

countries. Policy choices taken, although sometimes contrary to policy-makers’ actual objectives,

have also influenced these divergent immigration patterns. In the following sections, I will

highlight the political responses to immigration for each country over time.

Political responses in Austria

Becoming a country of immigration through recruiting “guest workers”

In Austria four distinct phases of policy approaches towards immigrants can be found.3 In the

first phase, from 1961 to 1973, policy responses were characterised by relatively weak regulation

3 For a comprehensive overview over the history of immigration and policy development over time see, for

example, Bauböck and Perchinig 2006; Perchinig 2010a; Kraler 2011.

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of immigration control, accompanied by weak rights for immigrants. Policy-making was

dominated by the interests of employers and employees’ interest organisations. Trade unions

were initially opposed to the idea of importing foreign labour. Eventually economic needs and

interests prevailed and trade unions agreed in 1961 to the recruitment of immigrant labour, an

agreement based on the precondition of its temporary limitation (Fassmann and Reeger 2008,

23). In exchange, trade unions were allowed to widen their generic bargaining power by an

institutionalising of agreements in economic and social affairs external to parliament (Perchinig

2010a, 16). Bilateral agreements were signed with Turkey in 1964 and with Yugoslavia in 1966,

and recruitment centres were established in these countries (Gächter 2008).

The official recruitment schemes, however, were soon replaced by more informal recruitment

practices. The bureaucratic process proved to be too time-consuming and costly for employers.

Since Turkey and Yugoslavia both had agreements with Austria that allowed their citizens to

enter the country for tourism purposes, employers soon started to use this loophole for informal

recruitment of labour. New workers entered the country as tourists and employers applied for

work permits for employees after they had already started working. In this first phase,

immigration was driven by economic demand and was barely regulated. Immigrants were

welcomed and seen as an additional source of wealth, but they were not regarded as part of

Austrian society (Fassmann and Reeger 2008, 23). Permanent settlement and integration were

neither stipulated nor wanted.

Reacting in a protectionist manner in times of decreasing demand and economic crises

This phase of weak immigration control regulation and weak rights changed during the 1970s.

The second phase of policy regulation, from 1974 to 1986, was triggered by three developments:

economic stagnation, a consequence of the international oil crisis in 1973; the arrival of the post-

war baby boom cohorts to the labour market, which reduced the demand for foreign labour

(Fassmann and Reeger 2008, 25); and, the growing resistance from Austrian trade unions to

“tourist visa” immigration (Gächter 2008). Immigrant control was tightened. Only those

immigrants who could prove they had a working contract were permitted to re-enter the country.

As a (unintended) result, circular immigration to Austria came to an end and from then on family

reunification has been a main source of immigration to Austria (Bauböck and Perchinig 2006,

730; Gächter 2008, 8-9).

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In employment policy, a legal preference for domestic labour was reinforced and foreign labour

limited to what was necessary for the Austrian labour market. Work permits were granted

exclusively to employers. Despite the fact that immigrants had become residents, immigration

was still conceptualised by policy-makers as a temporary phenomenon. Policies were almost

exclusively orientated towards labour market needs, not granting immigrants any social security

or residence rights (Gächter 2008).4

The slow end of the guest worker regime: transforming aliens to denizens

This guest worker regime, led by the goal of maximising the benefits and minimising the costs of

immigration, began to be phased out at the end of the 1980s. This third phase of Austrian

immigration politics, from 1987 to 1995, was characterised by a fundamental reconfiguration of

the policy field, which still today impacts on policy evolution. There was a trend towards both an

expansion of rights (by no means linear) and tightening of immigration control. Austria moved to

strictly regulated and limited immigration.

The expansion of rights was introduced by a decision of the Constitutional Court in 1987. The

Austrian “aliens’ police law” was annulled twice by the Court, as it contradicted the European

Human Rights Convention (Bauböck and Perchinig 2006, 731; Perchinig 2010a, 18). As a

consequence, the Austrian legislator passed a law protecting foreign citizens against deportation

if they had been previously employed for a five-year period. Further expansion of rights

(particularly regarding social security and employment) for those already resident and employed

for several years, as well as for their descendants, followed in subsequent years. This indicated

that the belief that immigration was a temporary phenomenon had started to erode. The process

of phasing out the guest worker approach, however, was not absolute. In 1993, a seasonal

employment scheme, a new type of guest-worker model, was introduced (Gächter 2008).

Moreover, the fact that Austrian naturalisation law, based on ius sanguinis, did not undergo a

transformation to a paradigm of inclusion but perpetuated the status of aliens (Perchinig 2010a,

19) indicates that immigrants, even though they had become permanent settlers, were still not

4 Immigrant labour forces were entitled to unemployment benefits. However, after these benefits ended they were

not entitled to any further social payments. Without self-sustaining means, this again meant that they would lose their right of residence.

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considered as belonging to the nation.

This process of expansion of (some) rights had gone hand-in-hand with a transformation of the

immigration control system. As Münz and Fassmann (1995, 91) have stated, immigration

policies were at that time motivated by an “unspoken desire for a new Iron Curtain”. Most

notably, Austria was one of the first European countries to adopt an immigration policy based on

a quota system (Çinar and Waldrauch 2006, 49). This marked a substantial policy shift. Whereas

previously policy had been orientated towards the demands of the labour market and regulated

by employment policy, immigration now became a matter of security. Whilst heretofore the

Social Partners had played a vital role, the Ministry of Interior now took the lead in immigration-

related issues (Gächter 2008). As a result, policy-making shifted from being a matter of client

politics (Freeman 1995), decided behind “gilded doors” (Guiraudon 1997), to one negotiated in

the parliamentary arena. In effect, the issue became heavily politicised by all political parties.

The politicisation of immigration by political elites in turn provoked the formation of a civic pro-

immigration movement. In reaction to the referendum “Austria first”, launched by the FPÖ in

1992/93 to restrict immigration, a pro-immigrant mass demonstration was organised for the first

time. 300,000 people took part (Kraler and Sohler 2005, 9).

“Managing immigration” in times of Europeanisation

A fourth phase was initiated in 1995 after Austria acceded to the European Union. The

(ambivalently regarded) trend of rights expansion accompanied by the tightening of immigration

control, which began in the previous phase, continued. However, a new element was introduced.

Europeanisation impacted upon policy-making in this realm. Being a part of the EU meant losing

the possibility for unilateral immigration control. As a result Austria reduced all other channels

of immigration. The necessary implementation of the EU acquis communautaire, however,

largely implied that the rights of immigrants already in the country had to be expanded.

Firstly, the expansion of rights continued to be an effect of the impact of the courts on policy-

making. The European Courts of Human Rights, as well as the domestic Constitutional Court,

pushed for liberalisation. As a result, in 1999, against previous resistance by the Government,

domestic employers and employees’ interest groups, social rights discrimination against foreign

citizens was abolished (Gächter 2008). A change in the office of the Minister of Interior initiated

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the expansion of residence security for long-term settled foreign nationals. The bill on aliens

passed in 1997 was led by the guiding principle “integration before new migration”, which put

the focus on those already resident in the country, while new immigration should be avoided

(Fassmann and Reeger 2008, 26). As mentioned earlier, necessary implementation of the EU

acquis communautaire in the aftermath of EU accession pushed further liberalisation (Perchinig

2010a).

As a result of the 1962 Association Agreement of the EEC with Turkey, Turkish workers

enjoyed, under certain conditions, the same rights as EU citizens. Although the Austrian

government had wilfully ignored these rights, they were now recognised as a result of several

decisions of the Austrian Administrative High Court. Moreover, the disenfranchisement of

foreign citizens from the passive voting right in the Chamber of Labour and Workers’ Council

elections was challenged by the European Union. Following a decision of the Court of Justice of

the European Communities in 2004 on the matter, the European Commission filed a case against

Austria (case C-465/01, Commission of the European Communities v. Republic of Austria,

E.C.R. 2004, I-8294). In consequence, the law was changed in 2006. Passive voting rights now

exist for TCNs in these bodies (ibid.). Furthermore, implementation in 2005 of the EC directive

concerning long-term settled TCNs has improved the situation of immigrant residents to a far-

reaching extent (Perchinig 2010a, 28).

The legislature, however, remained reluctant to turn foreign residents into citizens. The access to

Austrian citizenship has actually been restricted in the most recent (1998, 2005,20095) legal

reforms (cf. Çınar and Waldrauch 2007).

Immigration control was also tightened further. Since the turn of the millennium, immigration

has been mostly limited to highly-skilled workers, who enjoy privileged access, and to seasonal

workers, who are prevented from consolidating their residence. Further restrictive measures to

curb and restrict immigration were introduced under the label of ‘integration’. In 2003, Austria

introduced the so-called integration agreement (‘Integrationsvereinbarung’) for TCNs. The

signature on the agreement is a prerequisite for entitlement to a residence permit or its renewal.

The agreement stipulates language and civic education courses. This development is not an

5 In 2013 the Austrian government is contemplating reform of the citizenship law. The planned changes are,

however, widely criticised as not being far-reaching enough. In particular, the fact that double citizenship would still not be permissible is a regular concern of NGOs and opposition parties (see e.g. OTS 0071, 4 February 2013 (the Greens), or OTS 0048, 13 March, 2013 (SOS Mitmensch)).

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Austrian particularity, but has been described as a pattern of European convergence (Carrera

2006, Joppke 2007, Goodman 2010). Austria, however, was one of the driving actors of this

convergence. It had been among those EU Member States that had been successfully pushing for

the imposition of mandatory ‘integration’ requirements in the EC ‘Long Term Residents

Directive’ (LTRD) (Mourão-Permoser 2010; see Chapter Two). In contrast to previous forms of

the concept, ‘integration’ has recently been used primarily as a tool for immigration control.

Recently the Austrian government also introduced a new process to develop proactive integration

policies. In 2007, a consultation process involving scientific experts and NGOs was established

by the Minister of Interior (Perchinig 2010b, 29). In 2008, the newly-elected government

eventually put the development of a National Action Plan “to support the participation of

migrants in the economic and social life” on the official political agenda (Götzelmann 2010,

201). In April 2011, a State Secretariat for Integration in the Federal Ministry of Inner Affairs

was established (Staatsekretariat für Integration 2012, 8). According to Gruber, Peintinger and

Rosenberger (2012, 11), the establishment of the Secretariat and its activities stand for a

qualitative change of immigrant politics in Austria. Conducting a claims analysis of public

statements made by the Secretariat in the Austrian media over the course of a year, they (ibid., 5)

conclude that the new body has given the issue of immigrant integration more prominence even

though, as they emphasise, the Secretariat is hardly in possession of any significant resources or

competences. Most importantly, as Gruber, Peintinger and Rosenberger (2012, 6) argue, the State

Secretariat introduced a new element into the discourse on immigrant integration. Promoting the

motto “integration through achievement”,6 this new actor portrays individual effort as the road to

success and to economic and societal participation. It is thus reproducing a neo-liberal economic

discourse (ibid, 6). The State Secretary for Integration (Staatssekretariat 2012, 2) claims that

“this prioritisation of the merit principle is no one-way street, however”, since it is also aimed at

improving the structural conditions, “facilitating and subsequently also acknowledging

performance”. Indeed the State Secretariat launched a series of initiatives and is funding projects

concerning immigrant integration (see Staatssekretariat 2012 and Staatssekretariat 2011).

However, commensurate changes in the legal framework that structure the opportunities of

immigrants are widely absent (Gruber, Peintinger and Rosenberger 2012, 11).

6 The State Secretariat officially translates this motto as “integration through performance” (see Staatssekretariat

für Integration 2012, 2). In German it is “Integration durch Leistung”. Since the meaning of the German word Leistung corresponds to the English word achievement, I have translated it as such.

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To summarise, with the exception of the latest developments in immigrant integration, which

have been to a great extent more symbolic than substantial, the fourth phase of the Austrian

immigration and immigrant regime, is principally a continuation of the previous phase. Rights of

settled immigrants were widened without facilitating access to citizenship. At the same time,

restrictions on legal entry to the country were further strengthened. However, despite these

continuities, a new factor characterised policy-making in this period, hence it can be described as

a distinct phase: the increasing impact of Europeanisation, and in consequence, some

convergence of Austrian policies with those of other European immigration nations.

Ireland

Recruiting Guest Workers during the Celtic Tiger period

Like post-war Austria, Ireland during times of economic boom (from the mid-1990s onwards)

started to actively recruit labour from abroad. In the beginning, policy-makers encouraged Irish

expatriates in particular to take up employment. According to Hayward and Howard (cit. after

Messina 2009, 5), the decision of policy-makers to target Irish communities abroad reflected

their “fundamental belief that members of the Diaspora, no matter how far removed in terms of

distance and time, will adjust better to life in Ireland than those with no connection to the

country”. After this source dried up, the Irish government began recruitment beyond the Irish

diaspora.

Immigrant labour had relatively easy access to the labour market, but its status was rather

precarious and few social rights were granted. Non-Irish immigrants, as in the guest worker

schemes of Western Europe of the past, were considered to be only temporary guests and were

treated as such. There were no provisions for permanent residence, no automatic right of family

reunification, and permits could be only applied for from outside the country (Allen 2007, 86).

As Ruhs (2005) points out, until 2003, Ireland’s work permit system was almost entirely

employer-led. Policies were designed to serve the needs of the economy. Local employers could

recruit as many non-EEA workers as they wished as long as they applied for them. Free access to

the labour market was also granted to asylum applicants who arrived before 26 July 1999. So, as

Allen (2007, 85) pointed out, “for a brief period humanitarian ethos coincided with an economic

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logic”.

Greater restriction on asylum in particular was soon targeted by policy-makers. The provision

that allowed asylum applicants to enter the labour market was abolished in 1999. With increasing

asylum applications, the provision was considered to be a pull factor, especially for economic

refugees from poorer countries (Allen 2009). Not only were asylum seekers deprived of the right

to work, the Illegal Immigrants Act 2000 created further barriers to asylum. In 2003, Ireland

eventually introduced the concept of “safe country of origin”, according to which applicants

from these countries are automatically presumed not to be in need of refugee protection unless

shown otherwise (Ruhs and Quinn 2009).

Restricting non-European immigration and narrowing the concept of Irishness

In anticipation of EU enlargement in 2004, Ireland also introduced a more interventionist

approach to labour immigration. On the one hand, Ireland, along with Sweden and the United

Kingdom, was one of the few countries of the European Union that granted citizens of the ten

new EU Member States free access to the labour market (Ruhs 2005). On the other hand, it

introduced regulations to restrict immigration from outside the EU to the most highly-skilled and

hard-to-find workers (Quinn 2009, 9). The system became even more restrictive in 2007, and has

been further tightened in recent years as a result of the economic downturn. Ireland did not open

its labour market to the new accession countries Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. This decision

was triggered by increasing concerns about the previous decision to open the labour market to

new EU Member State citizens. These concerns were partly fuelled by the argument that, due to

the restrictive policies of other member states, Ireland had been forced to accept all surplus

labour from the EU10 countries (Gurdgiev 2007).

In terms of social rights, Ireland introduced ‘ethnic nepotism’, as Fanning (2009b, 11) calls it.

The Social Welfare Act, which links the enjoyment of social rights to habitual residence, entered

into force in 2004 and removed core social rights from new immigrants, including child benefit,

unemployment benefit and disability benefit (Allen 2007, 94). As the Minister for Social and

Family Affairs pointed out, this regulation was meant, to “restrict access to social assistance and

child benefit payments for people from other countries, who have little or no connection with

Ireland” (Anucuta et al 2010, 3).7 In the same vein, the right to citizenship was restricted in

7 Recent debates, however, revealed that the habitual residence clause also affects Irish nationals who are

18

2004. As a result of a referendum, passed by a majority of 79 per cent (Honohan 2010, 821), the

automatic constitutional citizenship right of children of immigrants born in Ireland was removed.

Instead of expanding rights in Ireland, rights were narrowed. Although the status of TCNs who

are long-term residents is regulated by a directive of the European Commission (2003/109/EC),

Ireland does not grant any status to long-term residents. This is possible because Ireland has an

opt-in/opt-out option with respect to immigration and integration measures, negotiated as part of

the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.

In the late 2000s however, Ireland started to establish proactive integration measures. In 2007, a

ministerial post on integration matters was established, held by a Junior Minister of State

(Boucher 2010, 3). A first comprehensive policy, “Integration Strategy and Diversity

Management” was published by the then Minister of State Conor Lenihan in 2008. The budget of

the Ministry was, however, very small and measures were thus few. As Fanning (2009, 16) has

emphasised, “Irish integration policy ultimately defines the national interest in neo-liberal terms

and privatises responsibility for integration to individual migrants.” The ministerial post of

Immigrant Integration was abolished by the new government (after the 2011 general election)

and its responsibilities incorporated into the Department of Justice and Equality (Office for the

Promotion of Migrant Integration). In one of my interviews, in which I asked why the office of

the Minister for Integration was abolished, I was told by a TD and current Minister of

Government:

“In general terms I think there was a perception that it was not that very effective, and that the

situation now had been changing very considerably from the time that it was set up, in terms of

numbers and need for integration […] there wereless numbers to be dealt with and that there

were less asylum seekers coming into the country, and therefore everything was becoming more

manageable. […] it was felt there was no need to have a separate integration minister.”

In essence, the recession and the resulting decline of immigration have reinforced the “laissez-

faire integration strategy that largely devoted integration processes to individuals, families, local

communities, relevant public bodies, NGOs, and businesses that employed migrants (Boucher

2010, 1)”. The fact that the economic crisis has “served to entrench Irish laissez-faire policy”

(ibid., 3) has been particularly demonstrated by financial cutbacks, which have been

emigrants returning to Ireland. Figures from the Department of Social Protection show that 1,723 Irish nationals were refused welfare payments in 2008 and 2009 because they did not fit the residency rule (Irish Times, 17. January 2011, Irish Times, 28 October 2010)

19

implemented from 2008 onwards. As a result of the economic crisis, many departments have

seen cuts but they were particularly acute in the equality sector (Loyal 2010, 92). In the wake of

the recession, the then still existent Minister of Integration’s budget was cut by 26 per cent. The

National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism was abolished, and the

Equality Authority and the Irish Human Rights Commission saw their budgets cut by 43 per cent

and 23 per cent respectively (ibid.).

3.4. Comparison

Economic imperative

Although the way in which the two countries were transformed into immigration countries have

been different – hence different groups of immigrants have settled in both countries – they have

followed a similar trajectory. In both cases, transformation took place in the context of economic

growth. During times of economic boom both countries eagerly availed of the additional supply

of foreign labour. Guest worker policies had clearly failed in the post-war European

immigration-receiving states, and the objective of using immigrants to satisfy a labour shortage

during times of economic growth and then sending them back in times of recession had not been

met, Austria is a paradigmatic example of this policy failure, with Ireland introducing a similar

model.

One factor, however, renders the Irish policy outcome different to that witnessed in Austria.

Ireland halted immigration from TCNs as soon as a labour reservoir of EU citizens was available

from the enlarged Europe. Circular migration thus could be partly preserved as an effect of the

right of free movement granted to European citizens within the EU.

Indeed labour recruitment in Ireland initially targeted the Irish diaspora. This indicates that in

addition to considerations of economic utility, ideas of national identity also shaped policy

development. For Messina (2009, 6), the fact of the “subsequent and rapid shift of foreign labour

sources away from the expatriate community and from countries with which Ireland has deep

historical and psychological bonds to those with which it has few cultural, political, or social

ties” shows however that Ireland’s immigration policy is primarily led by politically defined

economic interests.

The fact that policies are still largely economy-driven is also expressed by the attempt of both

20

countries to attract highly-skilled labour. In this regard, policies reflect a trend that can be

observed throughout the “developed world”. Today, official policies target highly-skilled

workers, while low-skilled labour is only admitted in limited numbers through temporary and

seasonal work schemes (Castles 2006).

Employers and employees interest organisations

The fact that immigration politics were strongly driven by economic interests indicates that in

both countries employers were vital actors in policy-making. As was alluded earlier in Austria

labour interest organisations, in particular trade unions, were another influential actor. While

employers were and are in need of low- and middle-skilled labour, the trade unions have been,

until today, reluctant to accept immigration, which they perceive as competition for the domestic

labour force. In reaction to the 2004 enlargement, the Austrian trade unions were among the most

active unions in Europe in supporting national calls for transitional measures to protect host

country labour markets (Hyland n.d.). Similarly, in Ireland, the trade union movement operates

within a corporatist political model. The Irish trade unions, however, were much more in favour

of immigrant labour than in Austria. They recognised the need for additional labour to sustain

economic growth (Krings 2009, 78). Furthermore, they responded with a rights-based approach

to the increased shares of immigrant workers in the workforce, thereby aiming to organise and

mobilise immigrant workers (Hyland n.d., 9). In recent years, however, Ireland’s trade unions

have also shifted to a more regulatory approach. They promoted the restriction of immigrant

labour to those sectors that exhibit a genuine labour shortage, and supported restrictions on

Romanian and Bulgarian nationals’ access to the labour market after EU accession in 2007. The

unions became anxious that immigration might be exploited by employers to drive down wages

and employment conditions (Krings 2009, 102).

Political parties

In Austria, the politics of immigration since the 1990s has been strongly influenced by party

competition. The immigration issue has been widely politicised and exploited by all political

parties in order to attract potential voters. This led to a restrictive policy output. The

politicisation was generated by the erosion of consociational politics in Austria and the

21

development of a conflict democracy (Melchior 2005). Commencing in the 1980s, the Austrian

party system has transformed from a two-party system dominated by the Social Democrats

(SPÖ) and the Peoples Party (ÖVP), to a moderate party pluralism. The newly emerging Green

Party and the rising Freedom Party (FPÖ), although in opposite ways, used the issue of

immigration to sharpen their profile and to mobilise potential voters (Bauböck and Perchinig

2006, 732). Against the widely held belief that the Freedom Party had put immigration on the

political agenda, the findings of Zuser (1996, 17), however, show that it was the Social

Democratic Party that first politicised immigration in 1990. The Freedom Party then successfully

took over the role as the main anti-immigrant force. In the 1999 general election, it got 26.9 per

cent of the votes, ranking second behind the Social Democrats (SPÖ). Despite heavy protests by

Austrian civil society and diplomatic initiatives by EU member states (Ahtisaari, Frowein and

Oreja 2000), the FPÖ became a partner in a new two-party coalition government led by the

conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP). As a consequence of participation, the party split in

2005. Especially The successor party, led by Heinz Christian Strache, remained an influential

force in mobilising anti-immigrant feeling. The Strache-led FPÖ obtained 17.8 per cent of the

vote in the last general election in 2008, whilst the second successor party, the Alliance for the

Future of Austria (BZÖ), won 10.7 per cent (BMI 2008).

In Ireland, in contrast, the issue is hardly politicised at all. There is no advocate party for

immigrants, nor is there a significant anti-immigrant force. Irish parties have had little incentive

thus far to broach the issue as a problem, and in doing so to undercut the supply of foreign labour

needed during the Celtic Tiger period (Messina 2009, 16). No strong incentives to incorporate

immigrants into the political parties or to advocate on their behalf exist either, as the majority

does not possess citizenship and is not granted national election voting rights yet.

In contrast to Austria, where the far right has been successfully pushing for a restrictive policy

response (Betz 2001), no far-right party has so far been able to establish itself in Ireland (Garner

2007b, Smith 2008, O’Malley 2008). Past attempts to establish a single issue party, such as

Immigrant Control Platform, have failed. Parties explicitly opposed to immigration have always

gained less than 1 per cent of votes where they stood for elections. This in part reflects the Irish

party system’s anomalous nature, which is not characterised by a left/right dichotomy, but by the

legacy of political division over the “national question”, which is the question of reunification of

22

Ireland (cf. Garner 2007b, 110).

With the exception of the last general election, in 2011, when the Labour Party received 19.4 per

cent of the votes, the nationalist parties Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Sinn Féin (and their

predecessor parties beforehand) have won over 70 per cent of the vote at every election since

1926 (ibid.). O’Malley’s analysis (2008) suggests that Sinn-Féin’s anti-establishment position

and its radical nationalism in particular might be attractive to the type of voter who, in other

countries and with a nationalist profile, might support a far right party. Mutwarasibo and Fanning

(2007, 442) remark, that one reason for the relative absence of single issue politics on asylum

and immigration might be that populist concerns have been successfully absorbed into the

political mainstream. Indeed, populist patterns of mobilisation were used by some political

entrepreneurs in the debate surrounding the 2004 constitutional referendum on citizenship

(Garner 2007a; Lentin 2007). However, they do not represent a constant feature of Irish policy-

making regarding immigration (see Chapter Seven). So, while Austrian political parties find

themselves positioned competitively in immigration policy terms in order to mobilise their

voters, power struggles between political parties over immigration policy do not explain policy

development in Ireland. Conversely, policy developments reflect a consensus among policy-

makers, led by the overall economic interests of the state.

Civil society/NGOs

In both countries NGOs have sought to influence government policy to expand immigrant rights.

Pro-immigrant NGOs in both Ireland and Austria have access to the policy-making process. One

characteristic of Austria’s consensual democracy is that organised interests are incorporated into

the pre-parliamentarian policy making process. This is also to the benefit of civic society. Since

the early 1990s, pro-immigrant civil society organisations have become increasingly

professional, and have issued their opinion within the framework of the institutionalised

procedure of evaluating legislative proposals (Meyer and Peintinger 2011).

In Ireland, a social partnership between the state and the voluntary sector exists – one that

attributes to civil society a consulting role in policy-making. It has been noted, however, that the

Irish state “uses a form of ‘social partnership light’ on immigration related issues which allows it

to solicit yet disregard pro-migrant interest input” (Cullen 2009, 112). Cullen (2009, 116),

23

however, argues that social partnership has provided pro-migrant NGOs with the possibility of

establishing strategic networks, and through this, exerting influence on parties and trade unions.

While in both national settings NGOs can claim a form of inclusion in policy-making, this access

alone does not guarantee influence. Moreover, there are no indicators that civil society

organisations have had a major impact on policy responses thus far, even though they may have

mitigated some policies through raising-awareness.

National mobilisation of immigrant actors themselves remains largely marginal in both states.

The analysis of Meyer and Peintinger (2011) of pro-migrant mobilisation in Austrian media

coverage reveals that migrant-led NGOs did not take any visible role in mobilisation. For

Ireland, it has been pointed out that the access for migrant-led NGOs to policy-setting arenas is

hampered by majority population-led NGOs and policy-makers’ perception of them as

unrepresentative, disorganised, divided and weak (Spencer cit. after Cullen 2009, 128).

Courts

Ireland and Austria exhibit some differences concerning the role courts have played in policy

development. In Austria, as documented earlier, the Constitutional Court was a driving force in

broadening the rights of settled immigrants. This process of broadening rights had been initiated

by the domestic Constitutional Court in response to the European Human Rights Convention.

This indicates the importance of the international human rights regime, as it limits the ability of

the state to steer migration policies. These liberal norms eventually prevented the continuation of

the Austrian guest-worker approach, and have thus tamed the “democratic dilemma” described

by Walzer (1983), which is the subjection of a part of the permanent population to legislation

without representation.

In Ireland the importance of rights was less of a constraint than in Austria. Loyal (2011, 122)

argues that the Irish judiciary is integrally involved in creating and producing the social

domination of migrants in Irish society. As Loyal (ibid.) points out, within the context of large-

scale emigration during the 1980s, and to a lesser extent in the early 1990s, judicial decisions

concerning the defence of individual rights and the protection of the family unit tended to

conflict with state attempts to curtail migrant rights to residence.

As immigration increased during the 1990s, however, a shift took place in judicial decision-

24

making. Corresponding with the interests of the government, the judiciary began to conceive of

migrants as a collective threat to state sovereignty. Loyal (ibid.) stresses that in the new

atmosphere the judiciary became less inclined to defend individual, human or substantive rights,

and the integrity of the family as a “sacred institution” (see the 1937 Irish constitution for the

ideologically-loaded concept of family).

During the 1990s, constitutional norms regarding protection of the family were still enforced by

the courts. A ruling by the Irish Supreme Court in 1989 (Fajujonu v. Minister for Justice [1990],

2 IR 151) found that the Irish-born (and therefore Irish citizen) child of a foreign national couple

had a right to the “care, company and parentage” of his or her family in the state. Following this

case, foreign national parents of Irish citizen children were generally granted residency in Ireland

(Quinn 2006, 15).

This right has been restricted, however, by a Supreme Court ruling in 2003 on an almost

identical case to the Fajujonu one (Loyal 2011, 131). In Lobes and Osayandes v. the Minister for

Justice, the court decided to restrict automatic residency rights for non-national parents of Irish-

citizen children (ibid.) The ruling stated that an Irish citizen child of non-Irish parents could be

potentially deported with her/his parents unless the non-Irish parent(s) agreed to be deported

without their child (Fanning 2009, 20). Although the majority of the judges claimed the ruling

was in conformity with the previous Fajujono ruling, the decision was clearly a reversal (Loyal

2011, 132). The judges justified their decision by underlining three differences between the

cases:

“The cases are very different. First, the facts and circumstances are very different. Secondly,

these cases call for an analysis at a different time, they are to be analysed under a different

legislative scheme, a legislative scheme under which the applicants may apply and appeal, and a

scheme giving the applicants more rights than existed previously. Thirdly, the State is now part

of the Dublin Convention.” (cit. after Loyal 2011, 132).

The increasing number of asylum seekers and negative media reporting provoked an atmosphere

conducive to a restrictive attitude, supportive of the government, by the Irish judiciary. As one

judge clarified:

“There is manifestly a distinction to be drawn between a situation where the number of persons

seeking to enter the State in one year is very low, for example 30 or 40, and the situation where

25

many thousands seek to do so. In the latter situation, the […] necessity to maintain the integrity

of such a system in the interests of the common good is far greater than in the former case” (cit.

after Loyal 2011, 132).

A similar approach, defending the immigration system in place, was taken by the Supreme Court

in the case Bode v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform & Ors. The Supreme Court

overruled a decision of the High Court, which argued that by denying Bode the right to remain in

the state with his Irish-born daughter, the Minister for Justice was in denial of constitutional and

legal rights, particularly concerning the family rights protected by the Irish Constitution and the

European Convention of Human Rights Act (ibid, 133). The Supreme Court argued in favour of

the absolute discretion of the Minister of Justice, established by policy-makers in the new Irish

Born Child Scheme (ibid, 134).

The Bode decision was reversed in May 2008 in the cases of Oguekwe v. Minister for Justice,

Equality and Law Reform, and Dimbo v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform. This

demonstrates that the established judicial view on state sovereignty at the expense of individual

human rights might be more rigid than it appeared to be.

At the same time the role of courts, as the Irish case makes clear, is not necessarily a challenge to

restrictive policy-makers. The effect of the global human rights regime is clearly limited.

Europeanisation

Although both states are members of the European Union and therefore Europeanisation is a

factor that intervenes in policy-making, the impact of this intervention differs strongly.

Particularly since the 2000s, policy-making in Austria has been driven by the need to implement

EC directives. This triggered the expansion of immigrant rights, and has partly led to policy

convergence with other European immigration countries. This convergence is, however, not only

a result of downloading EU policies, but also a result of uploading policy preferences at the EU

level. Austria was an active player in the negotiation of directives in the domain of immigration

and immigrant integration. The Austrian government considerably shaped the directives on long-

term residence and family reunion (Carrera and Wiesbrock 2009, 9) ) (both directives adopted in

2003), and in this way has contributed to the paradigm shift at the EU level, which has

established a notion of integration based on conditionality, as described in Chapter Two of this

26

thesis. Thus, although Europeanisation has significantly shaped policy-making and has led to an

extension of immigrants rights in Austria, it has to be emphasised that the legal European

framework has been likewise shaped by Austria and access to these rights has become more

restrictive (see Chapter Two).

Ireland, in turn, is less affected by Europeanisation from above than Austria is. This is, firstly,

because Irish policy-making is strongly influenced by the Common Travel Area that Ireland

shares with the United Kingdom, the Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey. Policy choices,

especially border policies, therefore, often follow decisions taken by the United Kingdom.

Secondly, and related to this first factor, Ireland and the United Kingdom have opt-in/opt-out

rights with respect to immigration and integration measures, negotiated as part of the Treaty of

Amsterdam in 1997 (Boucher 2008). Ireland has given an undertaking to opt-in to measures that

do not compromise the Common Travel Area with the United Kingdom (Quinn 2009, 7). In

2008, The Irish Times counted how many EU measures Ireland had not adopted. According to

this, Ireland has decided not to adopt at least 53 different EU measures in the field of

immigration and asylum (cit. after Boucher 2008, 9). Despite this opt-in/opt-out regulation

Europeanisation has led to some notable expansion of immigrants’ rights. In 2008, for example,

the European Court of Justice ruled that the government should not prevent third-country

spouses of EU citizens from living in Ireland on the grounds of not having prior lawful residence

in another member state (Metock and Others v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform in

Case C-127/08). This provided residence rights to significant numbers of non-EU nationals’

spouses, who otherwise would have been deported (Joyce 2009, 13).

Europeanisation, moreover, also indirectly impacted on Ireland’s policy choices to an abstract

extent. The fact that movement of EU citizens within the European Union could no longer be

controlled by nation states led Austria and Ireland to implement a heightened control of

movement that could still be regulated, namely the movement of TCNs. Moreover, the fact that

Ireland underwent its transformation to an immigration nation quite recently makes it potentially

more receptive to “social learning” (Geddes 2003) – from the European Union and from

European Union member states. As has been pointed out by Gray (2006, 120), integration

policies in Ireland are shaped to a significant extent by EU guidance (see also Chapter Two of

this thesis).

27

National identity and public ideas about immigration

National identities are not static but evolve and transform over time. As a result of the

pluralisation of nation states in the wake of immigration, ideas about national unity are

renegotiated. In Austria, however, pluralisation did not lead to a re-imaging of the country as

diverse. Austrian political elites are still hesitant to define Austria as an immigration country

(Çinar 2004, 47; Hahn 2007), and this shapes policy responses to a great extent. As Bauböck

(1996) has argued, the definition of immigrants as outsiders has been instrumental in shaping the

boundaries of an insecure national identity. After 1945, the Austrian nation gradually replaced

previously dominant notions of pan-Germanic belonging and developed a narrative of an

Austrian particularism (Karner 2009 and 2005). Although Austria distanced itself from German

nationalism, this did not alleviate exclusive ideas of belonging. Even during the Habsburg

monarchy, assimilation of the empire’s immigrant minorities in the metropolis was a

precondition for upward mobility and integration. During the inter-war period it was a condition

of the right to stay. The necessity of complete assimilation in the past led to an enduring

repression of the ethnically diverse origins of the Austrian nation state (Bauböck 1996, 24) and

the reproduction of the idea of an ethno-cultural nation.

This exclusive conception is confirmed by public opinion in Austria. A study published in 2010

revealed that 80 per cent of Austrians wish that immigrants would adapt better to the Austrian

lifestyle, 49 per cent argued that immigrants should be sent back to prevent shortages of jobs,

and 43 per cent were against granting immigrants political rights (Friesl, Renner and Wieser

2010). The study also showed that hostile anti-immigrant opinion has increased over the years

(ibid.). Analysing data of the European Value Study 2011 (covering 45 European states),

Rosenberger and Seeber (2011) conclude that the Austrian public is more hostile to migrants than

any other public.

In Ireland conceptions of national identity are more multi-layered. According to Fanning (2009

and 2010), the Irish nation-building process is characterised by two rival concepts: a cultural one

and a developmental one. While the first one is associated with the Irish language and

Catholicism, the second, which has dominated Ireland since the 1950s, emphasises economic

growth, social liberalism and the individualisation of Irish life (Fanning 2009, 15). A liberal

approach to immigration, for the benefit of economic growth, does not, therefore, contradict the

28

image of national identity but actually fits in with it. The Irish tend to view immigrants as

making an important economic contribution (Messina 2009, 9).

This is also reflected in the relatively favourable public opinion towards immigrants in Ireland

(Bauer, Loftsrom and Zimmermann 2001, Messina 2009, for some counter evidence see Haynes,

Devereux and Breen 2009, Garner 2007, 443). According to findings from Haynes, Devereux

and Breen (2009, 4, 6) Polish immigrants8 are especially seen in a positive light because of their

perceived work ethic and contributions to the Irish economy. With the economic recession this

trend recently has started to reverse to some extent, though. According to the findings of

McGinnity et al (2013, 9) based on date from the European Social Survey positive evaluations of

immigrants peaked in 2006 before falling in 2008 and again in 2010, at a time when

unemployment was rising rapidly. The proportion of respondents who would allow no

immigrants from poorer countries outside the European Union to Ireland increased from six

percent in 2002 to 22 per cent in 2010 (ibid, 66).

Another decisive ideational element that makes Irish policies potentially inclusive to immigrants

is the idea of the Irish having been a nation of emigration, who themselves suffered exploitation

(Fanning 2009, Glynn 2009). Glynn (2009, 166) has shown that this narrative was central to the

formulation of initially expansive asylum policies by policy-makers (see also Chapter Seven, on

the role of the collective memory on discourses about immigrants in Dublin).

The inclusive potential of these narratives is limited, however, as indicated by the recent rise of

anti-immigrant sentiment. This limitation can also be seen in the debates on citizenship during

the 2004 referendum campaign. Fanning (2007) argues that in the wake of the referendum, which

removed the automatic constitutional right to citizenship for children of non-national parents, a

national self-image emerged that reinforced the dualism between national and non-national. The

“yes” campaigns emphasised that people “with no social, historic or cultural links to Ireland

should not be able to freely confer Irish citizenship on their children” (Garner 2007, 441).

Cultural similarity, therefore, is a crucial element of belonging. In the mid-1990s, when

immigration started to be viewed as a problem, it was cultural arguments that were mainly

referred to (see Chapter Seven of this thesis). Likewise, the opening of the labour market to

citizens of the new EU Member States in 2004 was legitimised through cultural similarity. This

8 For an in-depth study on attitudes towards Polish immigrants in Ireland see Scheibner and Morrison 2009.

29

is illustrated by a statement of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) general secretary, who

stated in 2007:

“We are fortunate, I think, that the impact of this transition has been softened by two significant

factors: a booming economy and an influx of people from Europe who are culturally similar to

the indigenous population. Had, these conditions not existed I doubt that such a rapid change

could have been accommodated with so little social dislocation” (cit. after Hyland, 8).

Perception of Inflows

As stated before, the development of inflows is one potential factor that determines policy

response. It is evident that increasing inflows of “unwanted immigration” create a potential

demand for more immigration control. This can be observed in both Ireland and Austria. In

Austria, in particular, the fall of the Iron Curtain led to an exaggerated fear of an influx of

“millions” of alien workers to Austria. An intense public political debate about immigration

started in 1990 on the occasion of the first Romanian asylum applications (Zuser 1999, 64). By

then perception of immigration as a matter of labour market demand had started to change to one

of a matter of security, which led to the introduction of a strict border control regime. The major

topoi throughout the 1990s were related to the criminality of immigrants.

Other major issues that arose during the decade were the ‘over-use’ of the welfare system by

immigrants and the pressure immigrants allegedly exercised on the labour market (König and

Perchinig 2005, 7). Although immigration could have been potentially seen as a solution to

problems of Austria’s ageing demography, and to the financing of the public pension system,

there was a consensus among political elites not to promote this view (ibid.). In the 2000s, the

perception of immigration was still initially framed by political elites in terms of economic costs

and security dangers. This has changed in recent years as a perception of the culturally alien

immigrant has strengthened. Muslim immigration, in particular, has increasingly come under the

spotlight of political debates (Rosenberger and Hadj-Abdou 2013). The perception of

immigration in Austria is thus predominantly negative, a perception that corresponds with the

general restrictive policy approach.

In Ireland, immigration is seen less as a problem. Immigration was perceived as a major source

of Ireland’s economic success. However, anti asylum seeker rhetoric in particular is used to

30

justify restrictive policies (Fanning 2009, 62). Most notably, the peak of asylum applications at

the beginning of the 2000s was accompanied by a heated debate on asylum seekers’ abuse of

Ireland’s liberal citizenship regulation. Asylum seekers were accused of coming to Ireland to

give birth to their children in order to obtain right of residence. Directors of Dublin-based

maternity hospitals raised concerns in that regard, and in 2002 the issue was eventually taken

over by the political elites (see Chapter Seven of this thesis). The debate culminated in the

decision to hold a citizenship referendum in 2004, which proposed removing the constitutional

rights of citizenship to Irish-born children of immigrants (Mutwarasibo and Fanning 2007, 442;

447 ff.).

Policy change in both countries thus relied on discursively constructed images of immigrants as

exploiters of the system. Whilst the discourse in Ireland differentiated between wanted

immigration, recognised as beneficial to the country, and unwanted immigration, stigmatised as

abusing the system, a more negative picture prevails in Austria (see also Chapter Seven of this

thesis).

3.5. Concluding summary

This chapter has sketched the evolution of Austria and Ireland in becoming nations of

immigration. It has outlined policy responses to this evolution and compared possible factors that

shaped these responses. The comparison revealed that in both countries the immigration regime

is a product of the peculiar immigration history of the countries, as well as the dynamic interplay

of interests and ideas about the nation and the perception of immigrants. Both national polities

initially established guest worker regimes, characterised by the will to maximise the benefits of

immigration and minimise the costs. The importance of civil rights and the impact of

Europeanisation has mitigated the exclusive Austrian policy approach and rendered it more

inclusive to immigrant residents over time. This was less evident in Ireland, partly reflective of

the fact that immigration is a much more recent and unprecedented phenomenon. In overall

terms both states exhibit a ‘weak multiculturalism’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2007, 56), and

restricted access to the state for TCNs. When comparing the two countries, what stands out is the

different levels of native backlash against immigration (although there are indicators, that in the

31

wake of the economic downturn this trend is changing) and the emergence of immigration as a

matter of party competition. In stark contrast to Ireland, politicisation has been the main driver of

restrictive policy change in Austria.

The Irish national self-image, emphasising an economic developmental idea, potentially enables

a more inclusive (or at least more open) approach towards immigration than the dominant ethno-

national concept in Austria does. However, immigration has also generally strengthened

exclusive concepts in Ireland.9 This is reflected in the 2004 Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act,

which has enhanced a national/non-national dualism, whilst subsequent legislation has made

immigration for ‘unwanted immigrants’ (e. g. asylum seekers) more difficult.

The comparison hence suggests that although Ireland was a latecomer to immigration, and the

politics of immigration vary to some extent, Ireland has eventually followed a similar trajectory

to Austria. This is not to suggest that the two immigration regimes are identical. Despite some

convergence they remain specific and internally complex. In order to understand this complexity

it is necessary to take a closer look at the responses in the different policy arenas. This will be

done in the following chapter.

9 According to Gurdgiev (2007), in 1994 Ireland was the third most liberal country in terms of migration

restrictions within the EU15. By 2004, the country was more restrictive in its migration policies than the UK, Germany, Finland, Austria and Greece with respect to non-EU nationals.