Governing carbon, transforming forest politics: A case study of Indonesia's REDD+ Task Force

Governing carbon, transforming forest politics: A casestudy of Indonesia’s REDD+ Task Force

Rini Astuti* and Andrew McGregor*,†*School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, PO Box 600, Wellington 6012,

New Zealand.Email: [email protected]

†Department of Environment and Geography, Macquarie University, Balaclava Road, North Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia.Email: [email protected]

Abstract: The Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus (REDD+)programme seeks to reshape the way we value, govern and interact with forests. Rather thanmanaging forests according to interests in timber, conservation, land or livelihoods, REDD+ encour-ages forms of forest management that prioritise carbon. While international negotiations are shapingthe rules of the programme, how it takes place on the ground will depend on its interpretation andimplementation in different places. In this paper, we are interested in how the REDD+ Task Force(Satgas REDD+), an ad hoc body formed by presidential decree to design and implement REDD+readiness activities in Indonesia, has attempted to mainstream the programme from 2010 to 2013.We develop a governmentality approach to focus on how the Task Force sought to introduce REDD+carbon rationalities to forest politics. Based on extended ethnographic research, we identify threestrategies: adopting and promoting the carbon discourses circulating among global REDD+ com-munities; making carbon visible and governable through mapping technologies; and implementingparticipatory technologies to encourage pro-REDD+ subjectivities. In some ways, the Task Force hasbeen successful in building awareness about forest carbon among forest stakeholders in Indonesia.National civil society organisations, in particular, appear to be supportive of REDD+; however, theyemphasise ‘co-benefits’ framed as ‘Beyond Carbon’, informed by social and environmental justice. Forothers, however, forests remain sources of timber and land, and new strategies are required if REDD+is to have substantial impacts on forest governance in Indonesia. The Task Force’s efforts reveal thedifficult and contested processes through which global climate change programmes come to beembedded in national arenas.

Keywords: carbon rationalities, forest carbon, forest politics, governmentality, Indonesia, REDD+governance

Introduction

Aimed at lowering forest carbon emissionsthrough financing improved forest governanceand socially inclusive land and naturalresources use, the Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation and Forest Degradation Plus(REDD+) programme is attracting widespreadinterest and investment in Indonesia. REDD+introduces new governmental rationalities –ways of constructing, valuing and governingforests – in which forest carbon is used as astandard to measure a country’s performance inkeeping its tropical forests intact and defines thefinancial rewards the country will receive

(Lovell and Liverman, 2010). This new rational-ity is seen by some experts as a fundamentalchange in approach to governing Indonesianforests that is expected to have beneficialimpacts for forest dependent-communitieswhile maximising the economic values of theglobal climate services provided by forests(Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012).

REDD+ is gradually evolving from its initialproposal to reduce emissions from land-usechange and the forestry sector into a multifac-eted scheme to govern human–forest relations(McGregor et al., in press). Thompson et al.(2011) argue that REDD+ implementation func-tions as a form of environmental governance, in

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Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 56, No. 1, April 2015ISSN 1360-7456, pp21–36

© 2015 Victoria University of Wellington and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd doi: 10.1111/apv.12087

which governmental strategies and agencies arelegitimised by a particular framing of environ-mental problems and their proposed solutions.Bulkeley and Newell (2010: 10) agree, suggest-ing that REDD+ contributes to ‘the changingnature of the state and the proliferation of actorsand mechanisms involved in the governing ofthe societies’. In Indonesia, it was the REDD+Task Force (Satgas REDD+), an ad hoc bodyformed by presidential decree, which was giventhe responsibility for developing REDD+ anddesigning strategies to reshape forest govern-ance. The decree mandates the Task Force todevelop a REDD+ National Strategy, a policydocument that outlines how the governmentcan move towards improved carbon manage-ment (Government of Indonesia, 2010a). If theREDD+ Task Force, and the REDD+ programmemore generally, is successful, it will have signifi-cant and widespread impacts on human–forestrelations and forest politics in Indonesia. In thispaper, we ask (i) what are the key strategiesadopted by the REDD+ Task Force to main-stream and govern REDD+ in Indonesia?; (ii)how are these strategies affecting forest poli-tics?; and (iii) to what extent have carbon ration-alities been mainstreamed in forest governance?

We approach the REDD+ Task Force from theperspective of governmentality, an approach, aswill be described more fully below, that directsattention to the techniques through whichthe state and non-state actors seek to directthe conduct of populations (for related workon climate governmentality, see Lovell andLiverman, 2010; McGregor, 2010; Paterson andStripple, 2010; Lövbrand and Stripple, 2011;Gupta et al., 2012; Boer, 2013). The research isbased on nine months of ethnographic researchconducted at the national level in Indonesia.We draw on 45 semi-structured interviews withREDD+ stakeholders including government offi-cials, activists, academics and private sectorrepresentatives. Data from the interviews areenriched with observations and analysis ofrelated documents and policy archives includ-ing the Task Force’s reports to the president, theREDD+ National Strategy, drafts of the Monitor-ing, Reporting and Verification Strategy, theLetter of Intent (LoI) on the cooperation ofREDD+ between Indonesia and Norway, andthe draft of the REDD+ National Safeguard(Prinsip, Kriteria, Indikator Safeguards Indonesia

(PRISAI)). In addition, the lead author has beeninvolved in observing REDD+ meetings andevents, and participating in various REDD+consultations, consultancies and activities.Using a grounded theory approach, the datawere organised and coded by theme and ana-lysed inductively to identify the key strategiesadopted by the Task Force and their emergingimpacts on forest politics and governance.

Our findings are related over four sections.The first section will outline the theoreticalframework of the article. The second will intro-duce the REDD+ Task Force. The third sectionwill report on each of the results of our analysis,before ending with conclusions regarding thesuccess or otherwise of the REDD+ Task Forcein mainstreaming carbon rationalities in forestgovernance in Indonesia.

REDD+ governmentality

In his lecture series ‘Security, Territory andPopulation’, Foucault (2009) introduces theterm ‘governmentality’ to refer to the emer-gence of governmental rationalities oriented atshaping the conduct of populations. Whereasgovernance strategies based on spectacle andthe threat of violence, as well disciplining tech-nologies employed in confined spaces such asschools, factories or prisons focused on indi-viduals (see Foucault, 1979), governmentalityrefers to totalising sets of practices that seek toshape the conduct of entire populations – theway they think, act and behave. Drawing oncalculative technologies such as statistics, newforms of government emerged that sought tomanage the health and productivity of popula-tions by implementing tactics that woulddispose people to think, act and behave in par-ticular ways. Once disposed, populations self-govern their behaviours according to sharednorms, rationalities and practices that are con-sidered to be in the common interest.

Luke (1999) was one of the first researchers toapply Foucault’s ideas to the government ofhuman–environment relations. Adopting thephrase ‘green governmentality’, he focuses onhow states have sought to manage environmen-tal crises by altering the behaviours of popula-tions. Typically, this involves recourse toscientific knowledge and the use of statistics,mapping technologies, satellite images and

R. Astuti and A. McGregor

© 2015 Victoria University of Wellington and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd22

computer modelling to construct truths aboutthe environment and prescribe appropriateconduct for populations to act upon(Rutherford, 2007). REDD+ programmes utiliseeach of these technologies and share three othercore characteristics Luke identifies with greengovernmentality. First, as a form of geo-power,REDD+ is constructed as a necessary political–economic intervention required to address theglobal ecological problem of climate change; inother words, it is the interest of the global popu-lation to adopt REDD+ as a mechanism toprevent climate change (e.g. UNFCCC, 2011;McDermott et al., 2012). Second, REDD+ ispromoted as a form of ecological modernisation– combining economic growth opportunitieswith ecological conservation benefits (for dis-cussion on carbon conservation as a form ofecological modernisation, see Lovell andLiverman, 2010; Gupta et al., 2012; Boer, 2013;Lovell, 2014). Discourses on green economyand environmental economics are employed toframe forests as ‘terrestrial infrastructure forglobal capital’ (Luke, 1999: 106). A final char-acteristic is the establishment of new environ-mental subjectivities – involving identifiableroles, norms, behaviours and practices – peopleare encouraged to adopt in relation to forests asa consequence of REDD+. Such subjectivitiesare a form of self-government, which in the caseof REDD+, encourage forms of conduct guidedby concerns about conserving forest carbon.

REDD+ can also be described as a form ofneoliberal governmentality (Gupta et al., 2012;Boer, 2013; McGregor et al., 2014). Proponentsseek to govern the behaviour of forest stake-holders and forest carbon by putting a price oncarbon and creating financial rewards forimproved forest management (Fletcher, 2010).The broader rationale for the programme pro-motes economic incentives as the means tochange the political ecology of forest destruc-tion, motivating populations to value trees morewhen they are living than when they are cutdown (see Lounella, 2015, this issue). However,REDD+ must compete with other values andinterests, including existing neoliberal practicesthat favour forest destruction by funding timberindustries and agricultural expansion. As a con-sequence, unless REDD+ is able to pay morethan these industries pay, which seems unlikely,programme proponents must mobilise a

broader array of interests than simply economicones if carbon goals are to be realised.

Dean (2009) proposes a framework contain-ing four dimensions for analysing govern-mentality. The first dimension is to unravel fieldsof visibility, or what Li (2007: 7) explains asanalysis of ‘rendering technical’. Rose (1999:33) describes this as practices that construct

The domain to be governed as an intelligiblefield with specifiable limits and particular char-acteristics . . . defining boundaries, renderingthat within them visible, assembling informa-tion about that which is included and devisingtechniques to mobilize the forces and entitiesthus revealed.

In rendering forest governance technical,ongoing struggles over politics and powerbecome marginalised and seemingly resolvableby expert diagnosis. The second dimension isthe analysis of the technical tools of govern-ment, or what Dean (2009) calls the techne ofgovernment. Scholars analysing the techne ofgovernment assess the ‘means, mechanisms,procedures, instruments, tactics, techniques,technologies, and vocabularies’ that are used byagencies to govern human conduct (Dean,2009: 42). The third dimension focuses on theepisteme of government or the form of knowl-edge that is constituted from, and enables, thepractice of governing (Dean, 2009). Researcherslook at how certain regimes of truth that definehow we perceive reality are constructed (Oels,2005). Examples of this include how the dis-course of ecological modernisation enables par-ticular ‘truths’ to be asserted which thenbecome incontestable beliefs to be acted upon.The final dimension of Dean’s framework paysattention to the formation of new identities andsubjects (Feindt and Oels, 2005; Li, 2007;Dean, 2009). To study this final component,scholars ask ‘what forms of person, self, andidentity are presupposed by different practicesof government and what sorts of transformationdo these practices seek?’ (Dean, 2009: 43).

While Dean (2009) does not outline a prac-tical methodology on how to undertake theaforementioned framework, McKee (2009: 466)suggests two interrelated approaches to studygovernmentality: analysis of the ‘discursivefield’ and the examination of the actual ‘inter-

Indonesia’s REDD+ Task Force

© 2015 Victoria University of Wellington and Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd 23

ventionist practices’ through ethnographicinquiries. This approach goes beyond traditionaltext-based discourse analysis by undertakingethnographic research to reveal how the‘conduct of conduct’ is implemented, contestedand challenged, as well as the intended andunintended consequences and effects (Hart,2004; Li, 2007; McKee, 2009). FollowingMcKee, we approach our research through bothethnographic and discursive methodologies,thereby contributing to and extending previousstudies of climate governmentality that mostlyfocus on discourse (e.g. Bäckstrand andLövbrand, 2006; Gupta et al., 2012; Boer,2013). By focusing on the particular politicalecology of Indonesia, this approach offers moredetailed analysis of ‘the exercise of power in situthat is sensitive to both time and place’ (McKee,2009: 482) and captures the tensions, conflictsand multiple struggles between various REDD+actors that may be hidden or erased in theformal documents that are finally produced.

One of the critiques of governmentalityresearch is that researchers can fall into the trapof seeing governance as a completed pre-planned project that has succeeded in produc-ing new subjectivities (see Pat O’Malley andClifford, 1997). This would be particularlyfoolish in the case of REDD+, which, after sevenyears of its policy negotiation, is still beingdebated politically and scientifically. REDD+ isan incomplete project, continuously being rear-ranged and modified. Recognising this, weapproach REDD+ as comprising ongoing andmalleable sets of knowledge and practice thatare far from complete and always contested.Hence, we focus on REDD+ not as a historicalstudy but as a programme in the making, glean-ing insights into the dynamic processes andtactics that are potentially shaping the formationof new episteme. With these insights in mind,we now turn our attention to the REDD+ TaskForce and how it sought to govern forest carbonand transform forest politics through REDD+ inIndonesia.

The REDD+ Task Force

Seeking profits from extractive industries suchas mining, logging and plantation developmenthas been the dominant rationality governingIndonesian forests. This paradigm, tainted occa-

sionally with rent-seeking practices and backedby political gangsterism, continues to weakenforest governance and accumulate resources forthe benefit of a small elite (Saich et al., 2010).Consequently, an abundance of problems suchas conflicts over tenure, forest boundary dis-putes, concession overlaps and corruption aretypically found in the country’s forest manage-ment (Indarto et al., 2012). Taking the aboveissues into account and considering the com-plexities and claims of cross-sectoral bureaucra-cies, preparing REDD+ implementation inIndonesia is an unenviable task (Caldecottet al., 2013). Nevertheless, REDD+ is posi-tioned as a key element in realising Indonesia’spledge to reduce emissions by 26% by 2020 or41% reduction with international support(Indarto et al., 2012). The commitment was fol-lowed by offers from international donors inter-ested in supporting the development andimplementation of REDD+ programmes. Themost significant offer was from Norway, whichagreed to enter into a partnership worth US$1billion aimed at developing Indonesia’s capac-ity to implement REDD+ (Government ofIndonesia, 2010b). The signing of the LoI pavedthe way for the establishment of the REDD+Task Force through Presidential Decree No. 19,2010, which aims to accelerate the nationalREDD+ readiness processes (Government ofIndonesia, 2010b).1

Having strong presidential support, the TaskForce was established within the President’sUnit for Development Monitoring and Over-sight (UKP4). However, its formation as an adhoc body was perceived as having little legiti-macy or authority to orchestrate REDD+ gov-ernance among related ministries (e.g. AntaraNews, 2011; Adi, 2013). Luttrell et al. (2012)highlight President Yudhoyono’s tendencyduring his leadership to create ad hoc bodiesand commissions to address bottlenecks inachieving government’s goals, instead of tack-ling the appointed ministries head on. Thisapproach sparked tensions between the existingbureaucracies and the newly established insti-tutions (Luttrell et al., 2012). Awkward relationsexist between the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) andthe Task Force as there have been someinstances in which the former’s bureaucratshave been undermining and questioning the lat-ter’s capacity and authority in governing



REDD+ (e.g. Antara News, 2011). Howeverstrong the president’s support for the Task Forceis, there remain bureaucracies and politicalconstellations that have little interest in theREDD+ agenda (Luttrell et al., 2012).

The appointment of Kuntoro Mangkusubrotoas the Task Force’s leader, while well receivedby donors because of his acclaimed role in post-tsunami work, contributed to further tensions.Ministries were reluctant to engage too openlybecause of his dual role as head of UKP4, thebody authorised by the president to review howministries performed. On the other hand, strongsupport for the Task Force’s work comes fromsome non-government organisations (NGOs),which welcome opportunities for wider anddirect engagements in shaping the developmentof REDD+ policies and broader forest govern-ance. Supportive NGOs indicated in interviewsthat the formation of an independent Task Forcewas essential in ensuring the process was par-ticipatory, something that would not have hap-pened if it had been led by an existing ministry.Hence, the president’s decision to establish theTask Force was considered by many to be a boldstatement of a ‘business not-as-usual’ approachin forest governance reform (Academic A,2013). However, it is also seen as potentiallycreating confusion and overlap with MoFresponsibilities (Luttrell et al., 2012).

The REDD+ Task Force originally had sixworking groups (WGs) focused on: the REDD+National Strategy; REDD+ Institutions; FundingInstruments; Measurement Reporting and Veri-fication (MRV) and Moratorium Implementa-tion; Pilot Provinces; and Communication andMulti-Stakeholder Engagement (Satgas REDD,2011). Members of the WGs were representa-tives from technical ministries and stateagencies including the MoF, Ministry of Devel-opment Planning (Bappenas), National LandAgency, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of HomeAffairs, Ministry of Environment, NationalCouncil on Climate Change, Ministry of StateSecretary and UKP4 (Satgas REDD, 2011).Members were also drawn from environmentalNGOs and indigenous community organisa-tions, such as AMAN (Indigenous Peoples Alli-ance of the Archipelago), ICEL (IndonesiaCentre for Environmental Law), World WideFund for Nature (WWF) Program Indonesia andHUMA (Association for Community and

Ecology-Based Law Reform) (Satgas REDD,2011). Supported by a US$30 million start-upfund as part of the Norway–Indonesia partner-ship (Caldecott et al., 2013), the WGs wereformed as technical teams within theTask Force, responsible for delivering the pre-paratory work required for enabling REDD+implementation.

Because of slow progress in completing itsmandates, the Task Force had its nine- monthappointment initially extended until December2012. An additional four WGs were formed onLegal Review and Law Enforcement, REDD+Mainstreaming, Knowledge Management andthe Moratorium, which was separated fromMRV to form WGs of their own (Satgas REDD,2012). A third version of the Task Force main-tained the 10 WGs and finished its mandate inJune 2013 (Satgas REDD, 2012, 2013a) (seeTable 1). The breadth of issues addressed bythe WGs emphasises complexity and effortinvolved in implementing REDD+ in Indonesiaand the challenge of introducing carbon ration-alities to existing forest politics.

During the three years of its appointment, theTask Force published 387 documents, devel-oped a REDD+ National Strategy, finalised thedraft of MRV National Strategy, appointed pilotprovinces and prepared the architecture of theREDD+ Agency, which has continued the TaskForce’s work since 2014. The National Strategyoutlines five main pillars that have to be com-pleted to set high-quality standards for forestcarbon mitigation activities (Indonesian REDD+Task Force, 2012). One of the pillars highlightsthe need to change forest governance bymainstreaming REDD+ in Indonesia. The forma-tion and themes of the WGs (particularlythose on REDD+ Mainstreaming and Commu-nication and Multi-Stakeholder Engagement)reflect these challenges, emphasising the effortrequired for REDD+ proponents to change theconduct of forest stakeholders in ways that areoriented towards carbon conservation. In thefollowing section, we detail three of the moreinfluential governmental strategies adopted.

Normalising carbon rationalities

In the following discussion, we identify threetechnes being adopted by the REDD+ TaskForce to mainstream the programme in Indone-



sia. Each attempts to not only make the man-agement of forest carbon possible but also tomake it ‘normal’ or ‘commonsense’ within aforest politics context that has never been con-cerned about carbon. The technologies wereidentified through interviews and analysis andinvolve the introduction and promotion ofcarbon concepts and languages, renderingforest carbon visible through mapping practicesand encouraging the production of pro-REDD+subjectivities.

Communicating forest carbon

In Indonesia, forest governance has traditionallybeen shaped by conflicting discourses variouslyprioritising economic development, communitylivelihoods and environmental conservation(Resosudarmo, 2005; Li, 2007). To thesethemes, the REDD+ Task Force has sought tointroduce and embed specialised carbon con-cepts and languages proliferating amongREDD+ experts internationally (for discussionon carbon languages and discourses, see Feindtand Oels, 2005; Oels, 2005). In internationalREDD+ communities, carbon concepts such asleakage, additionality and permanence are usedto understand, communicate and articulate thebehaviour of forest carbon (van Oosterzee et al.,2012; see also Paasgard, 2015, this issue). Suchterminologies provide new ways of constructingand valuing land use and types, as evident inthe following quote involving a member of oneof the WGs:

We pay a lot of attention to peatland due to thehigh amount of carbon they store, such asthose in Central Kalimantan and Riau. HavingREDD+ projects on peatland good forus [Indonesia] . . . We could argue for theadditionality of having these types of projectsbecause otherwise these forests will be openedfor plantations. These precious peatlands willbe dried and sometimes even burnt to make iteasy to plant . . . It’s a massive problem . . .[Peatland fires] cause carbon leakage and hazepollution . . . It’s not good for our reputation,its not good for our relations with neighbouringcountries (WG member T, 2014, emphasisadded).

The deployment of technical and scientificconcepts and vocabularies, most of which arepoorly understood by non-REDD+ forest stake-holders, has become a powerful tool in legiti-mising and envisioning the programme.

The promotion of carbon concepts is particu-larly apparent in the draft Monitoring, Reportingand Verification (MRV) Strategy that was devel-oped under guidance from the REDD+ TaskForce. The MRV Strategy outlines procedures forassessing and guiding sub-national programmesor activities at the project level. It provides alevel of accountability for carbon buyersknowing that carbon produced in Indonesia iscoming through certain verification and valida-tion methods that comply with internationalstandards. In so doing, the MRV Strategy func-tions as a technology to shape the conduct ofthose involved in a REDD+ project. Those who

Table 1. Working groups of the REDD+ Task Force

Task Force version 1 Task Force version 2 Task Force version 3

Based on the PresidentialDecree No. 19/2010

Based on the Presidential Decree No.25/2011

Based on the Presidential Decree No.5/2013

September 2010 to June 2011 July 2011 to December 2012 January 2013 to June 2013REDD+ National Strategy REDD+ National Strategy REDD+ National StrategyREDD+ Institution REDD+ Institution REDD+ InstitutionMRV Strategy and Moratorium

ImplementationMRV Strategy and Institution MRV Strategy and Institution

Pilot Provinces Pilot Provinces Pilot ProvincesCommunication and

Stakeholder EngagementCommunication and Stakeholder

EngagementCommunication and Stakeholder

EngagementFunding Instruments Funding Instruments Funding Instruments

Moratorium Monitoring Moratorium MonitoringLegal Review and Law Enforcement Legal Review and Law EnforcementREDD+ Mainstreaming REDD+ MainstreamingKnowledge Management Knowledge Management

MRV, Measurement Reporting and Verification; REDD+, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus.



do not conduct themselves according to thecarbon rules and concepts are excluded fromcertified emission reduction certificates, whilethose who do are rewarded with certificates andthe potential of financial gains. As an example,a member of the WG on Funding Instrumentsexplained:

It is necessary to have the principle in place todiscourage a sub-national government deci-sion to implement REDD+ in a particular areawhile giving up neighbouring areas for loggingor plantation that will result in carbon leakagewhich subsequently affects the incentive thesub-national government will receive (WGmember A, 2013).

Concepts like leakage, additionality and per-manence establish particular ‘truths’ aboutforest carbon, asserting that it can be controlledand calculated, thereby making its manage-ment appear achievable and commonsense(Bäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006). Standardsand guidelines create uniformity for carbonacross space and time to enable it to be tradedthrough internationally recognised mechanismssuch as Verified Carbon Standard (Governmentof Indonesia, 2012a).

The Task Force also created a national socialand environmental safeguard document knownas PRISAI, outlining a variety of proceduralmeasures being implemented to ensure pro-grammes meet social and environmental stand-ards (Satgas REDD, 2013b). Through the PRISAI,other REDD+ terminologies oriented at govern-ing forest communities are apparent. The termssafeguards and FPIC (free prior informedconsent), for example, position social and envi-ronmental concerns as resolvable through theapplication of a set of processes and proce-dures. FPIC is a participation and consultationtechnology built to govern both REDD+ devel-opers’ and forest communities’ mechanisms toproduce consent and express grievance. Safe-guards, meanwhile, is a set of normative prin-ciples that have to be adopted by REDD+developers to minimise negative impact theREDD+ projects have towards the communityand the environment.

From a governmentality perspective, theincorporation of new terms, oriented at govern-ing the behaviour of carbon and governing the

behaviours of people living in carbon-rich land-scapes, within standardised policies and proce-dures, is a mechanism through which REDD+proponents seek to facilitate the ‘conduct ofconduct’. They provide norms and knowledgethrough which human and non-human (forestsand carbon) behaviours can be calculated,valued and, if necessary, reoriented. This newway of talking about and constructing forests isaided by high-resolution satellite images, com-puter modelling and sophisticated knowledgeon carbon accounting. As a consequence,attention naturally flows to the technical issuessuch terminologies highlight. Hence, in thefollowing example, an Indonesian academicconcentrates on the difficulties posed byadditionality:

Papua and East Kalimantan each has a verydifferent historical emission, with the latterhaving high planned and unplanned deforesta-tion rates compared to the former. If we areusing historical reference to define the baselinethen how could we justify the additionality ofhaving REDD+ project in Papua compared toEast Kalimantan, as some buyers will think thatit is a false investment to make in an area thathad no real danger of deforestation? (Aca-demic Y, 2014, emphasis added)

In this example, the introduction of carbonterminologies provides a means of discussingand framing forest management in ways that arefar removed from the biodiversity, livelihoodand economic concerns that would previouslyhave been used to consider deforestation (seealso Boer, 2013). As such, REDD+ is addingnew dimensions to the already complicatedpolitics of Indonesia’s forests. Particular scien-tific and economic claims about carbon arebeing authorised and promoted in place of, orat least in competition with, other ways ofknowing and being. The prioritisation of suchlanguages favours some over others, withREDD+ being driven by specialist technicalcommunities. It benefits those national-scaleactors closely connected to the programme,while marginalising more distant forest commu-nities who, nevertheless, will be deeply affectedby REDD+ decisions.

Prioritising forests as carbon sinks has notbeen uncontested, meeting resistance from avariety of stakeholders including those with



vested interests in forest conversion (see Indartoet al., 2012). A high-ranking oil palm plantationrepresentative, for example, reflects broaderdiscontent when refuting the Task Force’s claimof there being a sustainable growth opportunityprovided by REDD+, claiming ‘REDD+ is alosing battle for Indonesia’s economic andenergy sovereignty’ (Private sector A, 2013).This argument is echoed by the Ministry of Agri-culture, which highlights the negative impactsthe forest moratorium policy implementationhas for economic growth, as the policy hasclosed opportunities to open new palm oil plan-tations on peatland (see Astuti, 2013).

While those interested in forest conversionquestion the economic benefits of the pro-gramme, civil society has also resisted the car-bonisation of Indonesia’s forests, for differentreasons. One group opts for critical resistancetowards the neoliberal characteristics ofREDD+, framing it as a ‘false solution for eco-logical crises’ offered by developed countries(Activist A, 2013). Civil-society-led anti-REDD+arguments are now well established amongsome global environmental and indigenous net-works (e.g. Boas, 2011) and represented mostvisibly by Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia(WALHI) in Indonesia. A second group opts forcritical engagement with REDD+, althoughemphasises the ‘co-benefits’ regarding im-proved indigenous rights recognition and forestgovernance. Proponents of this view believeREDD+ has ‘room for manoeuvre’ on social andenvironmental concerns (Activist B, 2013). Thelatter argument, which is the predominant posi-tion of national NGOs, has influenced the nar-ratives emerging from the Task Force, which sawNGOs as a source of political support and alli-ance. Hence, the phrase ‘beyond carbon, morethan just forests’ was adopted by the Task Forceat the United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2012 in Doha inresponse to civil society concerns.

The ‘beyond carbon’ strategy was wellreceived by the NGOs, which see it as a steptowards broader acknowledgement of their coresocial and environmental concerns. As one ofthe interviewees argued, ‘the language framingof “beyond carbon” is the Task Force manoeuvreto support NGOs struggles’ (Activist B, 2013).This is through the adoption of a series ofstrategies including participative approaches,

addressing environmental crimes and reviewingillegal forest licences (Government of Indonesia,2012b; Lal, 2012). Kuntoro Mangkusubroto,head of the Task Force, explains:

We are leaving the old paradigm of havingtrees cut and getting revenues from this, andentering a new era: the trees will stand, and atthe same time revenues are received and peo-ple’s welfare is improved, that to me is movingbeyond carbon . . . that’s the essence ofREDD+ (Lal, 2012: 3, emphasis added).

Despite the ‘beyond carbon’ framing, carbonrationalities are still central to the approach, asemissions reductions ultimately finance theimprovements. However, the narrative hasmoved beyond purely financial incentives toassociate REDD+ more closely with social andenvironmental justice, as evident in the imagesfrequently used in the Task Force’s presentations(e.g. Fig. 1). Mainstreaming these latter con-cerns has made REDD+ more easily acceptableto civil society. REDD+ shifts from an ecologicalmodernisation framing to one that incorporatesthe ideals of civic environmentalism (seeBäckstrand and Lövbrand, 2006), where theemphasis shifts from prioritising carbon towardsa greater focus on alleviating crises of govern-ance, poverty and biodiversity.

The attempts of the REDD+ Task Force topromote carbon rationalities in Indonesia areincomplete, as REDD+ is still widely debatedand forest governance remains a contestedspace. However, through governmental tech-nologies that promote REDD+ terminologiesand concepts in policies, reports and consulta-tions, carbon rationalities are becoming moreacceptable and mainstream. So too are dis-courses of social and environmental justice,which through the participative strategies ofNGOs (discussed further below), are becomingmore visible and apparent in the REDD+ Strat-egy and Task Force activities.

Visualising forest carbon

The Task Force’s efforts to normalise carbonrationalities through introducing specialist lan-guages and concepts were accompanied bymapping practices oriented at making carbonvisible. Maps that show the carbon density of



forests were frequently used in Task Force pres-entations to highlight narratives regardingREDD+ opportunities, potentials and threats(e.g. Fig. 2). The maps inform stakeholders ofthe forest types that store high amounts ofcarbon and can therefore be made profitablethrough REDD+. In some cases, carbon mapsare overlaid with other types of spatial informa-tion, such as mining concessions in a particularprovince, as shown in a map produced byThe United Nations Programme on ReducingEmissions from Deforestation and ForestDegradation (UN-REDD) programme in CentralSulawesi (Fig. 3) (Blyth et al., 2012). In this map,

overlapping areas of high carbon density andmining concessions can be used as basic infor-mation to discuss the economic trade-offsbetween REDD+ and mining interests.

Carbon maps function as important visualisa-tion technologies to steer forest policy develop-ment and decision-making processes towardsREDD+ goals. In an interview, a governmentofficial highlights her experience on the way shecommunicates the urgency of REDD+ pro-gramme to her intended audience:

Since COP 13 in Bali, it is common to discusssustainable development and the green

Figure 1. Images represent REDD+ beyond carbon approach (in Mangkusubroto, 2013). REDD+, Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation and Forest Degradation Plus.



economy using a map of Indonesia that isoverlaid with a map of carbon potential that isstored in Indonesia’s forests. The audiences areusually quick to make a connection betweenthe topic that I intended to speak with thepresentation slide . . . I think this map speaksfor itself (Government official A, 2014).

Carbon maps serve as ‘almost everydayimages’ (O’Neill and Smith, 2014) in the discus-sion of climate mitigation and forest govern-ance. In visualising a certain element within theforest, they frame a particular way of seeing. Thecarbon map hides the immense complexity anduncertainties within carbon measurement andaccounting (for discussion on carbon account-ing, see Gibbs et al., 2007; Asner, 2009) andrenders an intangible molecule visible and real,while potentially obscuring other socio-ecological data and ways of seeing. In Figure 2and Figure 3, for example, carbon is clearlyprioritised over other forest interests in biodiver-sity, livelihoods and timber. Mapping technolo-gies help in drawing boundaries around whatreaders should consider normal and important,being essential in visualising carbon as politi-cally, economically and scientifically accept-able and governable (O’Neill and Smith, 2014).

In 2011, reflecting the country’s REDD+ambitions, a presidential decree imposed amoratorium on new licences for the develop-ment of primary forest and peatland. The pro-

motion of peatland to a conservation status akinto forests, despite generally being much lessbiodiverse, is a direct reflection of the highamount of carbon stored in these areas andreflects the changing criteria being used tovalue different socio-ecological systems.However, attempts to map primary forest andpeatland have proved difficult, with differentactors referring to peatlands in different ways(Caldecott et al., 2013). Three different ‘official/authoritative definitions’ of peat have beenissued by three different ministries, that is, MoF,Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Environ-ment. Consequently, each of the ministries hasalso released different thematic maps ofpeatland, reflecting their own visualisation strat-egies and priorities.

In response, the Task Force has engaged witha national donor-funded strategy known as OneMap that seeks to provide a single authoritativemap to guide all land use decisions in Indone-sia. To seek consensus on One Map in regard topeatlands, a series of expert meetings were heldby the Task Force’s WG on the moratorium. Amember of the WG explains:

Through the One Map processes we will haveone source of spatial information. The accu-racy of which will not be doubted by anyactors. If we could control one variable of thespatial governance debates in Indonesia,including the definition of peatland, then the

Figure 2. Map of Indonesian forest carbon stock (IFCA, 2008 in Masripatin, 2010)



rest of the debates will voluntarily follow thecontrolled variable (WG member B, 2013).

One Map then seeks to establish ‘one truth’about the amount of carbon stored in differentland types upon which the practices of REDD+governance can be built. Through this technol-ogy, the outcomes of which are accessiblethrough public web portals, the carbon valuesof different land types become standardised and

mainstreamed within land-use planning. Thetechnology thereby makes carbon visible toauthorities at all levels, requiring them to con-sider carbon, and REDD+ more generally, intheir land use decisions. In the process, thecarbon values calculated and embedded intoOne Map are intended to influence the conductand decisions of land-use authorities and, as aconsequence, govern human–forest interac-tions. Those who may value forests for other

Figure 3. Map of mining concessions in relation to total carbon in Central Sulawesi (Blyth et al., 2012)



reasons, such as forest communities, or devel-opers, are invisible, and potentially disem-powered, by these technologies.

Engaging forest carbon

A further governmental technology applied bythe Task Force sought to produce pro-REDD+subjectivities through the provision of partici-pative technologies. These technologies are atype of disciplinary governmentality, whichrather than providing financial incentives toshape behaviour as is common underneoliberal governmentalities, sought consensusthrough engagement and agreement on sharednorms and principles (see Fletcher, 2010). Par-ticipation is considered an important compo-nent of REDD+ governance, with researcherscalling for more collaborative REDD+ policy-making processes between public authorities,civil societies and forest communities (e.g.Kosoy et al., 2008; Blom et al., 2010). Forsyth(2009) argues for equal participation of allREDD+ stakeholders in the policy-making pro-cesses, as project implementation is vital forgood governance. Donors, such as Norway,and civil society actors also call for inclusivepolicy-making processes that will openwindows of opportunities for public monitor-ing. The inclusive approaches adopted by theTask Force include, among other things, publicconsultations, focus group discussions, WGsand partnerships that were conducted through-out the readiness phase (Satgas REDD, 2011,2012, 2013a).

Technologies of participation and consulta-tion assembled multiple stakeholders withdiverse interests to reach consensus on particu-lar political decisions. Examples include theWGs described earlier, one of which conducteda series of public consultations to help developthe REDD+ National Strategy. A governmentofficial involved in the development of the strat-egy explains that:

[T]he first version of the REDD+ National Strat-egy produced under the coordination of Min-istry of Development Planning was deemed astoo critical toward the MoF, by putting almostall the blame on the ministry’s weak forestgovernance as the underlying cause of defor-estation and forest degradation in Indonesia.

The second version developed under the coor-dination of the REDD+ Task Force and hasbeen through series of public consultationsand government meetings. It is seen as aproduct that will less likely offend any particu-lar institution (Government official B, 2013).

Activists described the ‘countless’ meetingsand dialogues held within in each of the WGsfor the purpose of seeking agreement on policydrafts being discussed. The internal processeswere complemented with national and sub-national public consultation processesand focus group discussions with multipleREDD+ stakeholders (Satgas REDD, 2011,2012, 2013a). As such, the technologiesenabled the Task Force to introduce REDD+concepts and rationalities to a broader group offorest stakeholders while at the same time jus-tifying the policy or decision as a product ofdemocratic practices. Several environmentalactivists noted during interviews that they con-sidered the Task Force to have developed goodmechanisms for successfully engaging civilsociety, particularly through the establishmentof WGs. One of the interviewees highlightedthe processes, saying ‘despite still lacking trans-parency for the Task Force’s high level politicaldecision making, NGOs were present in almostall aspects of the REDD+ policy making withinthe WGs’ (Activist C, 2013). Another activistpointed out that his ‘trusted colleagues’ werepart of the WGs and that he has no doubt abouttheir commitment to fight for social and envi-ronmental justice within these structures (Activ-ist D, 2013). However, as the two quoteshighlight, there are still transparency issues par-ticularly in the higher level decision-makingprocesses. In addition, the absence of the par-liament’s involvement in the REDD+ policy-making together with the issues regarding theunclear legitimacy of NGOs representation hasbeen criticised as undermining democraticprocess and violating REDD+ procedural justice(Luttrell et al., 2012; Sikor, 2013).

There can be little doubt, though, that thisapproach has given civil society access todecision-making processes involving REDD+,potentially influencing future forests manage-ment at a level that was previously out of reach.Interviews suggest that WGs provided opportu-nities for vigorous discussions over policyand principle that led to the ‘beyond carbon’



narrative. However, participatory technologiescan also set the terms of the debate and framethe structures through which issues should beresolved. Mirroring what Li (2007: 234)observed in a different context, stakeholderstended to engage in these processes through‘the forms of maps, diagrams, charts or otherforms of templates’ supplied by those organisingthe participatory activities. As such, participa-tory technologies can be used to render thepolitical complexities of REDD+ actors’ posi-tions and concerns intelligible and calculable,as ‘only then can specific intervention bedevised’ (Li, 2007: 6; Boer, 2013). While it is notalways the case, the content of the templateswas usually prepared according to the interestbest suited to the Task Force’s agenda, narrow-ing the scope of debates by prioritising carbon,for example, while (quite possibly inadvertently)marginalising other values and claims.

Within the WGs, civil society representativeswere repositioned as expert advisers, ratherthan social or environmental activists, and givenauthority and responsibility for shaping andlegitimising REDD+ policies and infrastructures.According to our interviews, this new subjec-tivity sometimes placed representatives inawkward situations, particularly when they rep-resented the REDD+ Task Force and sought toengage civil society colleagues in a process ofpolicy or project negotiation. Similar awkward-ness was related by activists positioned ‘outside’of the bureaucratic system, who highlighted thedifficulties in critiquing the Task Force as theywere ‘confronted by their friends and not thereal government bureaucrats’ (Activist A, 2013).In addition, many activists participating in theWGs reported that it made them less critical ofthe Task Force and REDD+ in general. An activ-ist member of the WG on REDD+ NationalStrategy explained:

After knowing the complexity of bureaucracyand the politics involved in the REDD+ policymaking processes, it is difficult for me toaccuse the Task Force, especially Kuntoro, fornot doing his best. If I were in his position Iwouldn’t be able to achieve what he has beenachieved so far (Activist B, 2013).

A subtle shift was evident among somemembers of the WGs who were beginning to

adopt more formal expert subjectivities overactivist ones. These members took on consul-tancy roles, working under professional con-tracts with the Task Force, rather than working asactivists representing their organisations. Thiswas evident in the conduct, vocabularies used,intonation and sometimes the agenda or interestthat was prioritised during policy or projectdebates and negotiations. One activist who hasadopted an expert subjectivity explained:

It is sometimes unavoidable to lower myexpectation during policy negotiations. Notonly did I lower my expectation, but also thetone of my voice . . . I realize that I speak notonly to my activist colleagues, but also to otherpeoples who are coming from different back-ground with different agenda and interests . . .This is what I mean as a cost for negotiating thespace in order to reach consensus amongdiverse interests (Activist E, 2014).

Whereas shifting subjectivities were evidentamong some civil society representatives in theWGs, such shifts were less apparent amonggovernment officials. Those who participated inthe WGs did so as individuals rather than rep-resentatives and there was little evidence thatany shift in their personal stance on REDD+ wasof influence within their ministries. Three con-secutive Task Force reports to the president citedthis as a problem in implementing politicaldecisions agreed to by the WGs and to beexecuted within the ministries or state agencies(Satgas REDD, 2011, 2012, 2013a). Rather thanbuying into the Task Force’s vision, some min-istries appear to be actively resisting the car-bonisation of forests by questioning the TaskForce’s authority and capacity, despite the par-ticipatory approach adopted. The most apparentexample is the initiative to develop a REDD+registry and safeguard information system initi-ated by MoF, in parallel and in conflict with thedevelopment of the registry and safeguardmechanism proposed by the Task Force.Another example is the difference in positionbetween the Task Force and MoF concerning theimplementation of the first forest moratoriumpolicy, as the MoF chose to question the nega-tive impact of the policy for economic develop-ment. Despite having overlapping interactionsin various meetings, the two institutions seem toneglect each other’s initiatives and positions.



Consequently, confusion has arisen amongREDD+ actors, especially project developers,regarding whose mechanisms they shouldfollow. MoF’s resistance towards the initiativesdelivered by the Task Force is a good example ofthe limit to the practice of government the TaskForce has tried to exercise (Li, 2007).

Conclusion

The REDD+ Task Force had an unenviabletask – to change the political ecology drivingIndonesia’s high rate of forest destruction. Withcontested legitimacy, it sought to mainstreamcarbon rationalities within hotly contestedforest landscapes. It has made progress in build-ing awareness about carbon, with most foreststakeholders at the national scale at least beingaware of REDD+ and the potential carboneconomies involved (e.g. Lillegraven andSombolinggi, 2014). Drawing on the notion ofgovernmentality and based on extended ethno-graphic research, this paper has argued that theREDD+ Task Force drew on three key strategiesin its attempts to mainstream carbon rationali-ties among forest stakeholders. These involvedthe adoption and promotion of carbon lan-guages and concepts, mapping strategies thatmake carbon visible and governable, andthrough participative technologies that engagedstakeholders in decision-making processes andconsultation. Through these approaches, a newepisteme is evolving based on the carbonisationof Indonesia’s forests.

The consequences of these strategies are yetto become fully known – indeed carbon issimply the latest ingredient to be thrown intothe heated arena of Indonesia’s forest politics.For example, some three and a half years afterthe Task Force was formed, and after many mil-lions of dollars have been invested, only oneREDD+ project located in Indonesia has beensuccessful in selling carbon credits. Yet somethings have changed. The governmental tech-nologies applied have helped REDD+ stake-holders visualise carbon as a governable entity.The specialist communities of scientists, econo-mists and activists who produce REDD+ maps,concepts and approaches are becomingempowered, and those that can engage withthese discourses have new opportunities toposition themselves effectively in a REDD+

regime. Those who do not, including the thou-sands of forest communities across Indonesia,risk marginalisation, as REDD+ decisions maybe made that can affect their interests withouttheir knowledge or understanding.

Already new REDD+ savvy public–privatecommunity sector alliances have formed thatcombine diverse interests such as saving tropi-cal rainforests, preventing global warming, pro-tecting local livelihoods and pursuing profitfrom carbon economies. New rules, roles andresponsibilities are emerging, including thepotential for greater dialogue and alliancesbetween civil society groups and forest authori-ties. All these factors increase the likelihood thatissues of social and environmental justice willbe addressed in forest governance, but they alsoraise troubling questions about the future role ofcivil society organisations and representatives ifthey become incorporated into governmentalprocesses rather than remaining independent. Akey challenge will be to ensure the non-carboninterests of forest communities play an impor-tant role in REDD+ futures, and their strugglesare recognised and incorporated, rather thanreduced to a set of technical procedures.

Many other challenges are still to be over-come. Carbon rationalities are becoming morecommon and more widely understood, yet theyare far from dominant in Indonesia’s forest poli-tics. Some forest stakeholders are opposed tocarbon trading and seek changes to forest gov-ernance through other mechanisms. Otherstakeholders are profiting the existing politicalecology of forest destruction and are resistant tocarbon rationalities. Clearly, forest governancebased on managing carbon will legitimise someactors and forms of expertise and knowledgeover others. The REDD+ Agency, which has nowreplaced the Task Force as the authority imple-menting REDD+ in Indonesia, faces a bumpyroad ahead.2 It will need to harness a differentarray of governmental tactics to bring compet-ing agencies and, most importantly, vestedprivate sector interests, into REDD+ visions ofhuman–forest relationships.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the gen-erous funding of the Royal Society of NewZealand who supported this research through



the Marsden Fund. We thank our many researchparticipants for their time and insights, and twoanonymous reviewers for their insightful sug-gestions and feedback.

Notes

1 The presidential decree mandates the Task Force to (i)ensure the development of the REDD+ National Strat-egy; (ii) design and prepare a REDD+ national agency;(iii) prepare an instrument and mechanism for REDD+funding and financing; (iv) formulate the MRV strategyand establish an independent MRV agency; (v) developcriteria for selecting pilot provinces; and (iv) implementthe agreed activities stated within the LoI between Indo-nesia and Norway.

2 Citing the overlapping authorities between the REDD+Agency and the Environment and Forestry Ministry(MEF), the MEF minister proposed to disband theREDD+ Agency and merge it under the ministry’s yet toform Directorate General of Climate Change Mitigation.The plan was due out in January 2015 and is politicallysupported by the Administrative and BureaucraticReform Minister, while being criticised by some NGOs,including AMAN. AMAN’s secretary general expressedhis concerns about the role of the agency in advancingindigenous rights recognition. The MEF is the new min-istry formed under President Joko Widodo. It merges twoministries: the Ministry of Environment and the Ministryof Forestry.

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Governing carbon, transforming forest politics: A case study of Indonesia's REDD+ Task Force

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