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Genocide in Myanmar: How Conflict ManagementTools Can Halt the Violence Directed towards

Myanmar’s Rohingya Muslims

Christopher Klimovitz

25 November 2013

IP 524: Conflict Management

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A Map/Flag of Myanmar

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Background

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar was formerly named

Burma when it was a British colony until 1948. It was also the

name of the nation-state upon independence until it was changed

to Myanmar in 1989 (Chan 2005:2-3; World Almanac of 1970:507;

World Almanac of 2013:870). From 1962 to 2011, Myanmar was ruled

by a series of military juntas that were extremely brutal towards

dissenters and sought to keep its population in relative poverty,

all while top military officials lived in luxury (Saha 2000:1-2;

Pattison 2012:2). After a civil war and pressure from the United

States of America that prompted the popular Saffron Revolution by

Buddhist monks, the final junta stepped down in 2011 to allow for

a more reform-oriented regime (Winn 2013:3). When this occurred,

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press freedoms were opened and certain religious figures like the

popular monk Ashin Wirathu, took advantage of the new freedoms.

Under the influence of individuals like Wirathu, Myanmar has

become a hotbed for genocide at the expense of the Muslim

minority, the Rohingya (Pattison 2012:2-3; Kyaw 2013:1, 3).

Muslims in Myanmar are generally of the Sunni sect, and are

believed to constitute 13 percent of the population of (Skidmore

and Wilson 2008:177). However, based on census records from 2007,

the Muslim population living within Myanmar may be as low as four

percent, and this was before the new wave of violence began in

2011 (Kyaw 2013:1; Skidmore and Wilson 2008: 177-178). While

there are three other Muslim minority groups in Myanmar, the

largest and most targeted group is the Rohingya (Arakhanis) that

live in Rakhaing State (Parnini et al. 2013:2; Skidmore and Wilson

2008:178). In comparison, 70 percent (60 million people) of

Myanmar’s population are professing Buddhists and include the

majority of the most impoverished peoples in Myanmar (Associated

Press 2013:1; Saha 2000:1). While most Muslims are also very

impoverished in Myanmar, Saha argues that because a minority of

Rohingya have been successful in opening their own businesses and

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getting trade deals with Arab nation-states for Myanmar’s

government, this has created resentment towards the population as

a whole (2000:2-3).

While Islam landed on the shores of what is now Myanmar in

the 1200s, much of today’s crisis began when Muslim refugees

poured over the borders of Bangladesh and Thailand in the 1970s

(Liulan 1998:1-2; Saha 2000:3). While the Burmese government had

recognized the Rohingya as an autonomous population that had

existed within the boundaries of Burma since 1784, an influx of

Muslim refugees from Bangladesh and Thailand prompted harsh

reaction by the government (Chan 2005:2). Though there has been

an uneasy relationship between the ethnic Burmese Buddhists and

Rohingya population since 1799, it was the Citizenship Act of 1982 that

stated Rohingya Muslims can no longer be included within the

‘National Races’ of Burma. This created a situation where

Rohingya were officially deemed foreigners and stateless (Eng

2013:1; Parnini et al. 2013:2-3). When this occurred, 130,000

Rohingya attempted to flee to the Bangladeshi border, but

Bangladesh would not take all of them. At the same time, two

million Rohingya Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) set-up

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refugee camps within Rakhaing State (Pattison 2012:4; Saha

2000:1).

Following the regime change in 2011, a group of 2,500 monks

banded together to form the ‘969 Campaign’ to promote Burmese

culture in an ever-present media generation (Al-Jazeera 2013:2;

Kyaw 2013:1; Popham 2013:3-4). On the surface this sounds

positive. However, the face of the campaign is Ashin Wirathu,

whose sermons vehemently express sentiments like: “Muslims are

like the African carp. They breed quickly and they are very

violent and they eat their own kind. Even though they are

minorities here, we are suffering under the burden they bring us”

(Kyaw 2013:2). According to Kyaw, Wirathu’s (sometimes called the

“Burmese Bin Laden”), sermons are very popular with Myanmar’s

Buddhist population who commonly promote his speeches through

Facebook and merchandise on the streets (2013:2; Al-Jazeera

2013:1). Furthermore, Wirathu has a great deal of political clout

with the government (including opposition leader and Nobel

laureate Aung San Suu Kyi), so much so that he has been pushing

for a “National Identity” law to protect the Buddhist population

from Muslims that are “mad dogs….cannibals….and troublemakers”

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(Eng 2013:2; Kyaw 2013:2-3). For individuals that follow Wirathu,

they strongly believe his mantra that “Our goal is a strategic

one. We represent Burma’s 135 ethnic groups. We are urging

members of those ethnic groups not to follow the Muslim religion

and not to sell anything to Muslims, and that includes paddy

fields and houses” (Popham 2013:1-3).

The government is in a rock and a hard place because the

people of Myanmar who elected them are on the side of Wirathu

(Winn 2013:1). The government is also unable to stop the violence

because of Western pressures to modernize. By modernizing and

opening social media in Myanmar, Western pressures have created a

double-edge sword where the government has been forced into

active sponsorship of the “apartheid-system” of violence that has

manifested on the streets against the Rohingya (Pennington

2013:1-2; Winn 2013:1). If the government were to crack down on

Wirathu, the fear is that the rage would turn towards the

government (Pennington 2013:2-3). At the same time, this has

allowed some government forces to collaborate with the ‘969

Campaign’ by directly funneling money and support to uproot

Rohingya settlements (Popham 2013:3-4).

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When allegations of rape against Buddhist women by Muslim

men appeared on Wirathu’s network in August 2013, over a 1,000

Buddhist rioters stormed Rohingya refugee camps. In total, 42

homes and a few mosques were burned, as well as 35 Muslim-owned

businesses, and hundreds of Rohingya were killed and another

150,000 fled (Popham 2013:1-2; Winn 2013:2-3). The tragedy has

only been inflamed since August when further Facebook claims that

oil shortages were caused by Muslims. In response, a man dowsed a

Rohingya woman in gasoline and set her on fire (Ehrlich 2013:2).

Both government and NGO hospitals in the region have reported a

rise in homeless Muslims looking for medical treatment, as well

as some Buddhists who have been suspected of conspiring against

the ‘969 Campaign’ (Arab News 2013:2-3). Thousands of people have

been treated but many others have been turned away because of

limited resources. Overall, only $27.90 per person is spent on

healthcare in Myanmar, which only adds insult to injury (Arab

News 2013:3).

In November 2013, 800 Buddhist students rallied against the

“terrorist Bengalis” and the BBC and CBC reported that 60-70

Rohingya people drowned off the coast of Myanmar looking to

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escape the violence (BBC 2013:1; CBC 2013:1; Open-Equal-Free

2013:1). This is all while the Burmese government has looked to

strengthen deportation laws against Muslims as further alleged

reports of rape against a Buddhist girl have been released by

Wirathu’s network (BBC 2013:1; Zaw 2013:1-2). While arrests have

been made against three Rohingya teenagers, as usual, the

validity of the claims has yet to be authenticated or recognized

(The Stateless 2013:1). As of this date, thousands of Rohingya

have been displaced while hundreds have been murdered (Pennington

2013:2). Overall, this is a case of genocide that cannot remain

ignored. Based on protocol 6(1) and 6(3) of the Geneva Convention,

Myanmar’s government, Ashin Wirathu, and the ‘969 Campaign’ are

all guilty of genocide. Similarly to what was found in the

International Criminal Court’s decision of the Prosecutor v. Ferdinand

Nahimana (2003), media was used to ignite ethnic hatred that

amounted to “an intent to destroy”, which is an act of genocide

regardless of whether or not the events occur during peace or war

time (Holocaust Museum 2013:1; Nahimana Case charges 2003:2; ICRC

2013:1).

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The Stage of the Conflict: Crisis, Escalation, and

Deterrence to Entrapment

According to the framework that is presented in Understanding

Conflict and Conflict Analysis by Ho-Won Jeong, the genocidal in Myanmar

is in crisis and/or escalation mode (2008:162). As stated by

Jeong, crisis and escalation modes occur when “An engagement in

intense hostile behavior is often reinforced by a sense of crisis

which stems from warnings of acute danger requiring immediate

reaction. In many escalation cases, the stakes unintentionally

rise to crisis levels, especially when each party does not fully

assess the broader consequences of individual action” (2008:162).

Furthermore, it is argued that as events spiral into

escalation that contexts and decisions that may have held back

harsher action also breakdown in favor of urgency, surprise, and

instability (Jeong 2008:163). With escalation has risen

deterrence, in which the Buddhist population that agrees with the

‘969 Campaign’ decides to intensify its antagonism against the

Rohingya. These actions may all be part of a measure to ensure

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that the Rohingya advance violence themselves (this is regardless

of whether the threat is real or not) (Jeong 2008:163-164).

Jeong continues this premise by contending that “The danger

of escalation strategies to deter the other’s action is

attributed to psychological decision-making characteristics.

There is a tendency that threat or coercive acts harden the

attitudes of the adversary instead of yielding submission”

(2008:164-165). This may be the case because the Rohingya are a

smaller portion of the population without the capabilities to

strike back. Or, it could be that fear of more repression and

ethnic cleansing that keeps them from acting out in violence.

However, one must question how long it may take until some of the

Rohingya to decide to take the fight to the ‘969 Campaign’.

Already signs of the latter are being seen in as this genocide

may escalate into another civil war. Over the last few months a

number of threats and unsuccessful attacks against Wirathu have

been attempted in the city of Mandalay. However, the same attacks

against Wirathu have given him the ability to state that it was

the handiwork of Islamic extremists (Popham 2013:3-4).

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If this guerilla warfare continues it may very well turn

into entrapment that may entrench both sides in open conflict and

thus a stalemate (Jeong 2008:167-168). Recently, Human Rights

Watch has reported that Muslim terrorists from various al-Qa’ida

affiliates from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Myanmar

itself, have been found providing arms and money to brigades that

pledge to fight the government (Popham 2013:3-4). Such groups may

be responsible for the attacks Wirathu and the president of

Myanmar since the summer (Popham 2013:4). Interestingly, such

attacks may have a silver lining because some Western powers have

threatened continued foreign investment if the fighting is not

curtailed (Popham 2013:4).

A Conflict Analysis Framework: Ho-Won Jeong’s Model

The following conflict map, as provided by Ho-Won Jeong,

will help to analyze the genocide that is taking place in

Myanmar. By doing so, it may help to further understand what the

goals of all the parties involved are and their perspectives and

aspirations (2008:21). Through the study of relationships and

identity it will assist conflict management specialists to

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discover ways to prevent future atrocities after the violence has

subsided (Jeong 2008:22).

Parties:

The main constituencies in this conflict are the ‘969 Campaign’

that is headed by Ashin Wirathu; the government of Myanmar; the

Rohingya Muslim population; al-Qa’ida affiliates; and

international actors (nation-states and NGOs).

-The ‘969 Campaign’/Ashin Wirathu: The ‘969 Campaign’ that is

headed by Ashin Wirathu is one of the main contenders in this

conflict. Through the power of social media, Wirathu directs the

‘969 Campaign’ to recruit Buddhist followers to act out in

violence against the Rohingya Muslim minority. The organization

has stated its goal as one of bringing superiority to the

Buddhist population.

-The Rohingya Muslim Minority: The second main contender in this

conflict. This minority has been targeted for decades by various

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military juntas and now the ‘969 Campaign’. Already classified as

an IDP population, the Rohingyas has been brutally victimized

because of their religious beliefs, their ethnicity, and claims

by incendiary Buddhist voices that they have been stealing wealth

away from the state.

-The Government of Myanmar: The government of Myanmar serves as

both a main contender and potential intermediary in this

conflict. The government is a main contender because of the

continued support and protection it has provided Wirathu and the

‘969 Campaign’. In addition, what dissent the government has

provided against the atrocities has been very quiet and nearly

non-existent in finding methods to quell the violence. However,

for the violence to stop the government will have to play the

role of a willing intermediary that wants to end the campaign’s

wave of violence before it escalates further. The government will

have to promise to continue reforms all while halting hate speech

and hate groups. To bring legitimacy this may take a ‘truth

commission’.

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International Actors: Most nation-states that deal with Myanmar

are currently quiet about the genocide, but they could play

powerful intermediaries. Nation-states like the United States of

America, United Kingdom, China, India, Bangladesh, and Thailand,

will all have to step-up economic and political pressures against

the government of Myanmar to quell the ‘969 campaign’s’ violent

actions. Such measures may have to include UN Article VI economic

sanctions and political deals that make it difficult for the

continued support of the ‘campaign’. Moreover, this plan may very

well need United Nations ground forces to ensure that the

government of Myanmar is upholding its treaties. For NGOs,

governments may need to provide further economic assistance so

that stronger humanitarian assistance is better distributed.

al-Qa’ida Affiliates: Such actors are called veto groups that

once entrenched in the conflict will bring direct and indirect

sabotage methods to the political process (Jeong 2008:23). While

terrorist groups may help to level the fighting, it may also

prolong the conflict and further help Wirathu’s followers gain

credibility where they do not need it or create a self-fulfilling

prophecy. In turn, this may bring larger power players on the

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side of the government of Myanmar or could create a larger

regional conflict. This will only spell further doom for the

Rohingya, the innocent people of Myanmar, and the region as a

whole.

Goals:

According to Jeong, “’goals’ can be defined as desirable future

conditions that originally motivate the partisans to contest with

one another….The pursuit of these goals entails costs, unless

they are gained without resistance” (2008:24).

-The ‘969 Campaign’/Ashin Wirathu: Wirathu’s goal has been

clearly spelled out: to rid Myanmar of Islam. In turn, Wirathu

claims that he wants to bolster the power of the ethnic clans

that he are of “true” Burmese heritage. Furthermore, his wishes

for greater power have helped to elevate him to celebrity level

in Myanmar.

-The Rohingya Muslim Minority: The Rohingyas want peace and to

safely practice their beliefs. They wish for guarantees of human

rights and to be recognized as Burmese citizens with some

autonomy, as they had been from 1948 until 1982.

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-The Government of Myanmar: The government of Myanmar wants

further economic and political aid to give itself legitimacy on

the world stage. For decades, Myanmar was regarded as an

international pariah. The government has made it clear that it

wants to progress with human rights, but has been unable to do so

because of collaboration with an organization that professes

genocide. Either the government cracks down on the new freedoms

and feels the wrath of the international community and its

citizens, or it stands idle to the genocide of a people that live

within its borders but are legally stateless.

-The International Community: The original goal of particular

actors like the United States was to simply open the economic

doors of Myanmar to the outside world (Myanmar also has a great

deal of mineral wealth that the West desires) (Brennan 2013:1).

In principle this is a noble idea. However, it also allowed for

individuals with shady goals to enter the political system and

gain credibility where they should not have. The global community

has ignored this crisis and instead is still pressuring Myanmar

to continue economic progression at any cost.

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- al-Qa’ida Affiliates: al-Qa’ida’s goal is to find cleavages

where it can enter the conflict to combat the regime in power. By

using the conflict as a disguise to protect the Muslim minority

it has sparked fears of Islamic terrorism in Myanmar. This has

also given the ‘969 Campaign’ further reasons to combat the

Rohingya.

Issues:

Issues can vary greatly in conflict and can become easily

contested (Jeong 2008:25). In most cases of conflict, there is

more to the situation than what is visible on the surface; and

these issues can easily change as the conflict progresses. The

heart of the issue is exactly what Jeong states about national

identity and struggle to find self-esteem. A nation-state like

Myanmar has only had one identity for decades, and that has been

the will of the juntas in power. Since that grip has lessened, it

has dredged-up old fears and beliefs that were masked by the ugly

visage of equal government repression towards all Burmese

peoples. Jeong brilliantly expresses that such manifestations of

cruelty against minorities like the Rohingya are systemic

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outcries of pain where a clear national identity has yet to be

formed (2008:25). In not being able to form a coherent national

identity, any threat or desire for autonomy by a particular

culture within a nation-state will hit a nerve (Jeong 2008:25).

The national government is trying to ensure its own survival and

autonomy or power-sharing may be seen as a threat to it very

survival (Jeong 2008:25).

Interests:

As stated by Jeong, interests are “the political, economic,

occupational, and social aspirations of individuals and groups.

These aspirations are what the parties are motivated to achieve”

(2008:26). Furthermore, when interests contradict one another it

can cause conflict and competition (Jeong 2008:26). The main

competing interest within this conflict is the perceived struggle

for power. For the government and the Buddhist majority it is the

fear that being Muslim equates with being a traitor to the

religious majority, and thus the state. The Rohingya do want

autonomy, but at this current time not to take over the

government as many Buddhist-Burmese fear. At the same time, the

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government wants to ensure that it continues to receive Western

backing, even if it means keeping the reports of violence as

minimal as possible. To hold onto power, policymakers are forced

to listen to the ‘969 Campaign’ at the plight of the ethnic

minorities that are still viewed as stateless peoples. Moreover,

despite some condemnation from outside powers the desire for

entering Myanmar into the international system has blinded the

West to the genocide at hand.

Value Differences:

Through scales of beliefs and values, groups of people within

society can either be legitimized or de-legitimatized based on

internal struggles and behaviors (Jeong 2008:27). In the

situation in Myanmar, the Rohingya embrace a cultural and

religious set of ideologies that differ from the majority of

ethnic Burmese nationals. While the Rohingya have sought to keep

their cultural practices through peaceful outlets, the wider

Buddhist population views their cultural practices as foreign.

Interestingly, both sides in this conflict have stated that they

want to protect their values and beliefs, which only causes

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animosity and fear between both parties. The government has

decided to support the Buddhists involved in this conflict and

this has only marginalized the Rohingya further.

Human Needs:

This is the “inherent drive” to protect national identity,

recognition as a human being, and to safeguard security. When

groups of people are alienated from the rest of society because

of their beliefs, it helps to make a conflict more intractable

(Jeong 2008:27-28). The Rohingya, like the Palestinians, seek

long-lasting socio-political protections that do not bring

further alienation or damage to their people or the rest of

society in Myanmar (Jeong 2008:28).

Strategies, Tactics, and Culture:

In this conflict, the ‘969 Campaign’ has decided to employ

tactics of confrontation and severe suppression that have

amounted to murder, physical and mental abuse, de-humanization,

and destruction of property that has further displaced the

Rohingya population. The government, in turn, has remained silent

on the matters or has at times been willing participants. For the

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Rohingya, it has generally been to flee from the violence but

this is difficult to do when the entire minority population is

regarded in IDP status and no other nation-states are willing to

allow the Rohingya access to basic human rights assistance. Some

NGOs have used limited Western media sources to get the

information out about the atrocities. However, corporate US media

stations have remained silent on the matter. Overall, in this

conflict the ‘969 Campaign’ is the contending party that is

subjugating a smaller and weaker opponent that is trapped in an

avoidance policy stance (Jeong 2008:30-32). Intervention steps to

end this conflict will be discussed further in this paper.

Gary T. Furlong’s and Christopher Moore’s Model I: The Circle of

Conflict

This model is essential to understanding and resolving the

conflict in Myanmar because it specifically relates to the

underlying “drivers” and causes of the conflict (Furling and

Moore 2005:29). By understanding the roots of the conflict it

will allow conflict management experts and practitioners the

ability to understand how to turn off the fuel that ignites the

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conflict (Furlong and Moore 2005:29). In this model interests are

viewed through the lens of values, relationships,

externals/moods, data and structures:

In the Values category, the religious, ethical and moral views of

the Buddhist, Muslim, and ‘969 Campaign’ parties must be

reviewed. The Rohingya Muslims want cultural and religious

autonomy and acceptance in Myanmar. The ‘969 Campaign’ wants to

destroy all Muslim-held cultural beliefs or businesses in

Myanmar, as well as to build a Buddhist-Burmese ethnic state with

the ‘Campaign’ in power. On the other hand, not all Buddhists or

ethnic Burmese are involved in the genocide or want anything to

do with it. But, because of growing tensions and fears it may

force neutral people to take sides or risk their own lives.

In the Relationship category, both the monks involved in the ‘969

Campaign’ and the Rohingya were targeted by previous government

juntas. However, since the last junta left power in 2011, the

monks (especially Wirathu) that drives ‘969’ seek to monopolize

power and have decided to use the Rohingya as their scapegoats.

The Rohingya argue that they have been specifically targeted for

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their religious, ethnic, and cultural beliefs in the past and now

even more so. Many within the Buddhist-Burmese population feel

that the Rohingya have monopolized the economic sector and this

makes them responsible for the economic hardships.

In the Externals/Moods category, the ‘969 Campaign’ seeks to build

power for itself through the will of the people. ‘969’ feels that

it has been suppressed in the past and needs to do whatever

necessary to keep itself in the seat of power.

In the Data category, facts are widely seen different between the

two communities, in which this has developed into a zero-sum

game. For ‘969’, the Rohingya Muslims are the problem and

everything about them and related to them must be destroyed,

whatever the cost. For the Rohingya it is not just about keeping

their beliefs and practices alive; it is about staying alive in

general. In turn, the government and outside actors have

interpreted these events as tragic but it is more in the interest

of the global community to keep Myanmar’s government propped-up,

whatever the cost. The assumptions being reported about each side

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is becoming more entrenched and this is further cleaving Myanmar

in half.

In the Structure category, the situation on the ground is hampered

by limited structural and authority resources that can stop the

actors involved from producing further hate speech against the

Rohingya. If this continues it is feared that this may drive some

of the Rohingya population to arms against the government, which

this will only feed into the narrative that ‘969’ holds firm to.

The international community must ask hard questions of the

government before “progress” can really be called progress.

The Next Steps: Ending the Genocide and Ensuring Protections for

All Burmese

Myanmar is a nation-state that is in severe need of not only

scrutiny and pressure to bring ethnic violence and genocide to a

close, but also peace and reconciliation. Based on the history of

previous genocides, this conflict may only become more entrenched

and harder to stop if nothing is done soon. The goal for Conflict

Management experts and practitioners is to successfully end the

conflict all while ensuring the long-term rebuilding of a society

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that has been on the brink of collapse. To end the genocide it

will take the power of the international community as a whole to

do more than stand idle and it will take all the Burmese to find

inner calm. Although Myanmar has taken some positive steps in

entering the twenty-first century, its human rights records have

slid backwards. Overall, Myanmar’s government must have no choice

but to ensure that the Rohingya are protected as any other ethnic

group within its borders. The following plan is suggested for a

commitment to resolution and de-escalation.

I. Stop the Violence

Before healing can begin the violence must end. In the first

place, the international community must recognize that the

violence in Myanmar is a genocide that cannot be ignored. This

will need the assistance of major news networks to bring

attention to the public of Western nation-states. In the case of

Myanmar where the violence is continuing to escalate, the

international community (particularly the United States) must

strengthen economic constraints on the government, but not so far

to watch it collapse. More importantly, it will take actors like

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the United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Russian

Federation, and China (i.e. the Security Council), Bangladesh,

and India, to have meaningful dialogue that forces Myanmar’s

government to crack down on Wirathu’s sermons. If Myanmar is not

willing to accept dialogue or if the measures collapse, it will

take Security Council to set-up Right II Peace accords so that

United Nations forces can handle the situation on the ground.

When UN Peacekeepers arrive it will create a presence that

protects the Rohingya from further attacks and will allow for the

ability to dismantle the networks that Wirathu has built.

According to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, this could

allow them to meet with Burmese policymakers to craft legislation

that ensures the rights and protections of an autonomous Rohingya

population, as well as the safe return of displaced persons

(Shaikh 2013:1). Furthermore, this also allows Burmese and UN

Peacekeepers to arrest Wirathu and his ‘969’ organization so that

they can stand for war crimes and genocide trials. By setting up

a tribunal to charge Wirathu, his closest followers, and his

benefactors, it will create a clear sign that the perpetrators no

longer have access to public media sources. Access to open and

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free media is essential, but in cases where media has been

corrupted there will need recognition that hate speech does not

count as a viable media outlet. At the same time, this will only

be part of step one. It will take much more than one tribunal to

heal wounds and ensure that a lasting negative or positive peace.

II. Build Peace and Confidence

For the people of Myanmar the truth of what occurred must be

made open to the public. For this to occur a “truth commission”

must be created to allow the atrocities to be given a human face

and for the voices of the oppressed and oppressors to speak. By

getting this information into the open it will allow for further

reconciliation to occur over time. As argued by Jeong, such

conflicts will take different conciliation tools at the same time

so that there is a longer lasting equilibrium (2008:183-184). The

international community and NGOs must not abandon the people of

Myanmar and must understand that it will take time for conditions

where people accept one another (Jeong 2008:185).

During this time Myanmar’s government must address the

population and apologize for the genocide committed towards the

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Rohingya and must repatriate the 170,000+ displaced persons with

full security and dignity in a new Myanmar (Pattison 2012:1-2).

Through further negotiations by Rohingya and Buddhist

policymakers it will allow the nation to recognize that political

and religious fractures will not serve the people of Myanmar in a

modernizing society (Jeong 2008:186). Furthermore, through

meaningful dialogue with policymakers and “truth commissions” it

will allow all the people of Myanmar to see that they can share

the same space and continue to work with one another. If nothing

else, meaningful communication between Rohingya and Buddhists

will begin to formulate a coherent Burmese culture; all while

building understanding that differences can still bring unity.

Since the root of this conflict is about building a national

identity/civil society that include all groups this will be the

time and it will be a formative time that will be make-it or

break-it. To ensure a positive future, this will take NGOs and

conflict management experts that are willing and attentive to the

needs of various communities (and this will certainly take

decades to build the trust). When a peaceful national identity

has been formed, it will still take succeeding generations to

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band together to continue the message of tolerance and peace.

After the international community has withdrawn its forces, it

will have to be the people of Myanmar who are the ones who are

willing to pick up the pieces and embrace one another regardless

of race, gender, creed, religion, wealth, etc…

III. Additional Steps

Additional steps for both Myanmar and the international

community must regard healthcare, economic growth, and education

infrastructure. Through IGOs and NGOs like the International Red

Cross and Amnesty International, quality education and mental and

physical health services will have to be expanded and constructed

for all Burmese, regardless of ethnicity, creed, or religious

background. A nation-state with poor healthcare infrastructure

will not be able to progress nor can a nation-state survive the

test of time with an undereducated population. At this current

time, Buddhist mobs have forced thousands of Rohingya children

out of the school system and into the arms of poverty. According

to the Washington Post on some days around 1,000 children are sent

to madrassas across northern Myanmar (2013:1). At these

P a g e | 31

madrassas, children are crammed into small rooms with sparse

formal teaching by unpaid teachers that cannot provide books

because of the conflict (Washington Post 2013:1). With a

population of children that are undereducated and may face a

myriad of mental/physical health conditions throughout their

lives, it is a real fear that radicalism or disillusionment may

become more common across the Rohingya population. This is

unacceptable and is something that must be reversed.

Political Economy is essential for all Burmese because it

will take private and public sector growth to provide positions

for all ethnic groups in Myanmar. If fair-trade companies and the

government can hire people from all different backgrounds it will

help different ethnic groups to comingle with one another. At the

same time, it will provide money and a building infrastructure

for a nation-state that is very far behind in growth when

compared to its neighbors. Moreover, for many of these steps to

progress and civil society it must take the nation-state’s

policymakers to continue to press ahead with democratic reforms

and to develop a legal system that does not stand for hate

speech. When rule of law is seen as an effective outlet for

P a g e | 32

society it will symbolize further positive measures by Myanmar’s

transition towards peace, prosperity, and democracy.

In the worst case scenario, Myanmar’s society may become

fractured like the community in British Northern Ireland. If this

were to happen, it could unfortunately be expected that many

ethnic groups will continue to lack trust of one another or the

government. While this may be beneficial in some scenarios, in

many other cases it will only continue to show that there are

deep cleavages in society that have never been able to heal and

there are spoilers who do not want them to heal. To prevent the

peace process from going down this avenue, it will take long-term

measures and pledges by a government that is willing to provide

protection for all of its citizens. More importantly, it will take

facilitation and support by all ethnic groups to bring healing

and understanding to a situation that at this time lacks peace or

understanding. If nothing else, conflict management and

reconciliation is what will save Myanmar and will help a society

tearing itself apart begin to piece itself back together. The old

saying that a house divided is pertinent to the case study of

Myanmar. When warfare and genocide becomes the law no one

P a g e | 33

benefits, no one wins. In the spirit of Gandhi, There is no way to

peace, there is only peace.

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