Generations and Socialization into Political Participation

Hanna Wass M.Pol.Sci.

Doctoral Candidate Department of Political Science

P.O. Box 54 Fin-00014 University of Helsinki

Tel. +358 9 191 24919 Fax. +358 9 191 24832

E-mail: Hanna.Wass@helsinki.fi Paper prepared for presentation at the Politics of Participation conference, Helsinki, August 25-27, 2005.

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Abstract The study examines the differences in the socialization into political participation between four generations using survey data gathered after the parliamentary elections of 2003 in Finland. The analysis is based on the assumption that low turnout amongst the young is not a passing phenomenon but a generational feature partly due to a particularly demobilizatory socializing process common to the whole age cohort. By political socialization, we mean the learning process where an individual assumes various political attitudes, values and patterns of actions stemming from his or her environment. The results show that even though politics have had a relatively small role during the formative years of the youngest generation, this generation has received most encouragement for voting and the attitudinal change during an individual’s life span towards voting and other forms of political participation has been most positive amongst it. Moreover, the youngest generation currently holds more positive feelings towards political participation than the oldest one. Consequently, the study shows that even though there were no differences in the socialization between the generations, the differences in the turnout would be quite similar than whilst taken account only sex and socioeconomic factors. Based on these results we draw a conclusion that the factors behind the low turnout amongst the young generations have to be searched elsewhere instead of political socialization.

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Introduction The aim of this study is to examine the differences in the socialization into political participation between four generations. By political socialization, we mean the learning process where an individual assumes various political attitudes, values and patterns of actions stemming from his or her environment. While the studies in the field of political socialization have been somewhat rare lately, contemporary trends in turnout clearly emphasize the importance of political socialization. This stems from the fact that turnout does not seem to relate the individual’s life cycle as much as it used to do. Instead, abstention has, to a certain extent, become a permanent feature in young adults’ political orientation partly due to a particularly demobilizatory socialization process which is common to the whole age cohort (Anduiza 1999; see also Blais et al. 2004; Franklin 2004; Lyons and Alexander 2000; Martikainen & Wass 2002). Consequently, it is essential to pay attention to the differences in the socialization processes, and especially socialization into political participation, amongst various generations. Students of political science have for long been aware that political participation is strongly connected with age alongside with socioeconomic and attitudinal factors. The turnout has traditionally followed the curve of a semi-circle: the turnout is lowest in the beginning of one’s adult life, rises with age and stays at that level during the middle-age, then gradually decline when a person ages and meets certain physical infirmities (Campell et al. 1960, 493-494; Milbrath & Goel 1977, 114). According to explanation based on individual’s life cycle (see e.g. Campbell et al. 1960), low turnout amongst young age cohorts is a transitory phenomenon as the turnout usually rises as a person ages and adopts several “adult roles” (for general overview, see Highton & Wolfinger 2001, 202-203). Those roles consist of, inter alia, getting married, getting a permanent job, having children and settling down which reduces residential mobility. All of these changes mean a certain entrenchment of life circumstances. The claim is that when particular personal needs, like finding a spouse and a job, have been satisfied, a person can turn his or her attention towards the outside world (ibid.). Recent empirical evidence does not, however, support this hypothesis. An extensive study based on individual level register data from electoral wards for the parliamentary elections of 1987 and 1999 in Finland shows that the turnout does no longer seem to relate to an individual’s life cycle as much as it used to do (Martikainen & Wass 2002).1 To a certain extent, abstention seems to have become a permanent feature in young age cohorts’ political behavior. Moreover, even while holding socioeconomic factors constant, such as education, class, income and housing tenure, the lower turnout of younger voters remain unexplained (Martikainen et al. 2005). As individual’s socioeconomic status usually rises along with age, and those with a higher status vote more likely than those with a lower status, the independent effect of age in turnout refers that the life-cycle explanation needs to be accompanied. In compliance with the explanation based on a generational effect (see e.g. Jennings & Niemi 1981, 120),

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younger voters belong to a certain generation that does not attach very much importance to the electoral process itself, or even feel themselves excluded or alienated from politics, partly stemming from, a particularly demobilizatory socialization process common to the whole age cohort (Anduiza 1999, 28). This explanation is compatible with the paradox or the “puzzle” of declining turnout noted already over twenty years ago (see Abramson & Aldrich 1982; Brody 1978). Although the young age cohorts are better educated than their predecessors, the overall turnout is declining. Consequently, it should be noticed that the younger age cohorts have socialized into the electoral participation during the period when the turnout amongst older people was also declining. Thus, the overall decline of the turnout is due to a complex interweavement of life cycle, generational and period effects (Toivonen 2004, 366). In the Mannheimian theoretical tradition, it is thought that generation is formed by a certain “key experience” which occurs during its members’ formative years (see e.g. Delli Carpini 1986, 8-9).2 Hence, it is important to detect which factors in the young age cohorts’ socialization process have caused the fact that they do not find voting a very appealing form of participation. In this article the question will be approached by examining the differences amongst four generations regarding their socialization into political participation. It should be pointed out that, on the one hand, political socialization functions as a framework for the key experiences as it effects on the impact of those experiences. On the other hand, political socialization may form a key experience by definition. These are quite complicated questions, but the main standpoint of this article is the idea that during a particular period of time, a particular political atmosphere has prevailed, and it has had a large impact on various generations’ attitudes towards political participation (see Grönlund et al. 2005). Firstly, we will look at early socialization taking place in the adolescence. We will analyze what kind of role the politics has had in the childhood of different generations. It will also be explored how common the inheritance of a party identification from a parent to child is amongst different generations. Secondly, the changes in the attitudes towards participation during individual’s life cycle will be studied. Thirdly, political socialization will be connected with the concept of generational consciousness as the respondents are asked to compare their own attitude towards political participation vis-à-vis their views of the attitudes of others’ belonging to the same generation. Fourthly, we will examine how much the differences in the turnout between four generations examined can be explained by various socialization factors. The analyses are based on survey data gathered after the parliamentary elections of 2003 in Finland. The Concept of Political Socialization The term political socialization first appeared in the study of political science in 1959 when Herbert Hyman published a book Political Socialization. Hyman defined the

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concept as the learning of social patterns mediated by various socialization agencies whose social positions this learning process corresponds (Hyman 1959, 25; see also Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 175). In the study of political socialization, family, school, friends and media have usually been counted as the most salient agencies of socialization (Ljungberg 2003). In his study of research tradition and future possibilities of political socialization, Renshon (1992, 443) remarks that the attraction towards the field of political socialization in 1960’s can much be explained by its compatibility with the behavioralist approach at the time dominating in political science. According to Dahl (1961), behavioralism, emulating natural science, emphasized four major points in studying political process which all could be met by examining political socialization. Firstly, the importance of an individual for the functioning of political institutions and processes became acknowledged. Secondly, behavioralist approach emphasized the importance of developing an interdisciplinary political theory. Thirdly, the systematic measurement strategies were accentuated, and fourthly, the development of generalizable theories regarding political behavior and its causes was aimed (Renshon 1992, 443). Sapiro (2002, 2) states that the major theoretical justification for the study of political socialization was found most explicitly in Almond and Verba’s Civic Culture (1963) and in Easton’s system theory (1965, 1967). At the macro level, political socialization was seen as a crucial mechanism for the development of the political culture (Almond & Verba) that enables democratic institutions and practices to function or for development of a diffuse support (Easton) of the political system. At the micro level, the research of political socialization concentrated on patterns and processes which individuals engage during their development and learning processes, and which contract their relationship to the political context around them. While these two approaches to political socialization are complementary, they have framed the research questions and methods, at a certain extent, into different directions as those orientated at the micro level have concentrated more on developmental and cognitive processes (Sapiro 2002, 2-3). However, the concept of diffuse support was, at least to some degree, able to bridge the gap between macro and micro level approaches (Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 176, referred to Merelman 1972). In contrast to the specific support, diffuse support is not based on the output of the political system but on the political attitudes and values citizens hold towards the prevailing system and is thus essential for its stability. Childhood was viewed as a basis for the diffuse support, and, consequently, much of the early worked concentrated on children (Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 176). In the following decade the study of political socialization flourished. In effect, it was diversified to such a degree that in 1970 Greenstein declared that “Political socialization is a growth stock” (ibid.). According to Greenstein (1970, 970-972), one could indicate at least four prevailing usages for the concept of political socialization: 1) The study of

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children’s political orientations; 2) The study of acquisition of prevailing norms; 3) The study of any political learning, whether of conformity or deviance, and at any stage of individual’s life cycle, and 4) Actual observations of socialization processes, in any aforementioned meaning, taken in to account both the socialized and the socialization agents. Hence, it became obvious that the study in the field needed some clarification. In the late 1970’s, the study of political socialization begun to move into new direction characterized by three interrelated foci (Niemi & Sobieszek, 1977, 210-211). First of all, scholars in the field of political socialization started to pay more attention to the adult life span recognizing that adult attitudes may change more substantially than was acknowledged earlier. The second focus concerned the importance of the life cycle, period effects and generational effects in explaining that change. The third focus was also related to the first two as it emphasized the role of events and environment in general as socialization agents (ibid.). However, from the end of 1970’s the work related to political socialization declined markedly (see e.g. Dudley & Gitelson 2002, 176) and is nowadays much more popular amongst educationalists (Borg 2004, 76-77). The post-modernization theories, aimed at describing the change that the Western societies were facing, gained ground. These theories emphasized amongst other things, the value shift from materialist to post-materialist values (Inglehart 1977), the loosening of traditional collective ties and thus general individualization. The role of an individual was seen central in defining his or her identity and it was recognized that these identities are not necessarily stable but instead negotiable depending on the context. This discussion was somewhat contradictory to the premises of the study of political socialization, which consider political behavior as the result of a learning process where the individual adapts different influences from outside. The Debates on Political Socialization The study of political socialization has also faced some critique (see Greenstein 1970, 273-276). According to Greenstein, it has been claimed that political socialization studies have status quo bias. They are incapable of explaining the processes of pattern-maintenance but not those for change. This criticism points to the branch which is concentrated to study how people absorb prevailing norms. However, Greenstein states, in addition to the fact that prevailing norms may be absorbed, it is also possible to learn to reject them. A person’s behavior can be continuous or discontinuous with his or her own generation or with the preceding generations. Moreover, at the level of political processes and institutions, the effect of individual’s behavior, whether showing continuity or not, may lead either to political continuity or change. In either case, the behavior is partly due to situational stimuli and partly due to persons dispositions regarding attitudes and values, the latter being undeniably learned or “socialized” (ibid.)

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In effect, some changes in the political involvement and participation may be due to the generational replacement stemming from the fact that the young age cohorts have adapted essentially different values and patterns of behavior than the previous ones and keep them throughout their life cycle (see Niemi & Sobieszek 1977, 226; Franklin 2004; Putnam 2000). Although a divergent development of the younger generation does not necessarily, or not even usually, lead to generational cleavages, some potential for that still exists (Niemi & Sobieszek 1977, 224). It is essential to recognize this potential for “clash” between generations given that the Mannheimian model of generations can been considered the first and foremost conflict theory as generations clearly differ from each others due to different key experiences and their concomitant impact on attitudes and values of each generation. However, due to the conservative sound of terms such as “education”, “socializing” and “socialization” it has become more popular to talk about, for example, “empowerment”, although the content of phenomenon under examination has been the same (Borg 2004). Besides having conservative bias, the study of political socialization can be criticized for being normative. If we think, for example, political participation, and the “goal” for a successful socialization process is an individual acting a certain way, we may ask whose values this process ought to project. The various theories of democracy display very differently the ideal amount of participation amongst citizens on one hand and the ideal scope of participation on the other (see e.g. Dalton 1996; Setälä 2003). Consequently, political socialization may very well be used as an explanatory variable while examining the causes of differences in political participation between generations, but we should be careful not to load any prescriptive value in it. To a certain extent, political socialization is always a product of a period: while political participation was more or less voting during the 1950’s and 1960’s, the action repertoire started to expand heavily during the 1970’s, and has widened ever since (see e.g. van Deth 2001). Thus, it is only natural that the image of the citizenship which political socialization process produces varies between different generations. The claim of this study is that it is exactly these differences in political socialization that account the differences in turnout between various generations. The Classification of Generations The division of generations used in this article is generated by J.P. Roos (1987) based on data of Finnish autobiographies. According to Roos, it is possible to identify four Finnish generations: 1) those born in 1900-1919, the generation of war and want; 2) those born in 1920-1930, the generation of reconstruction; 3) those born in 1940-1950, the generation of transformation; and 4) those born in 1960, the generation of suburban. The key experiences for the first one have been poverty, insecurity, and illnesses, disintegration of families due to death of parents, short education and early entering into working life. The life of the next generation has been somewhat similar

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except they experienced some prosperity after the reconstruction. In our analyses, two eldest generations have been combined as the amount of the first one is relatively small in the data used here. Hence, together they form the generation of war and reconstruction. During the parliamentary elections of 2003, they were 64 year-olds or older. Table 1 The Key Experiences of Finnish Generations Generation Year of birth Age in 2003 Key experiences The generation of war and want a

1900-1919 war, want, the lack of or interrupted education, early entering into working

life

The generation of reconstruction a

1920-1939

18-33 scarcity, rationing, gradual increment of

prosperity due to reconstruction

The generation of the transformation

1940-1959 34-43 industrialization, urbanization, widening of education, rapid increases in

standard of life

The generation of suburban

1960-1969 44-63 ”non-experiences”, the lack of experiences of illness, disasters and

wants, smoothness of life, yet recession during early adulthood

The generation of individual choice

1970- 64+ general individualization, the acceleration of technological

development, competition, consumption a The generation of war and want and the generation of reconstruction have been combined as the amount of the first one is relatively small. Together they form the generation of war and reconstruction. Sources: Roos 1987, Purhonen 2002a (the generation of individual choice) Compared to two the eldest generations, the life of the generation of transformation (44-63 year-olds in 2003) has been essentially different. Most of them were born in the countryside and moved to cities as adults, had longer education compared to their ancestors, and became wealthier. The generation of suburban (34-44 year-olds in 2003) also has its’ distinctive features. As a matter a fact, their life has been carefree to the extent that it could be stated that their key experiences have been certain “non-experiences”: their lives have been relatively steady and problems have been small.3 However, this generation has faced the worst economic recession of the post-war period while being young adults in the beginning of 1990’s. The youngest generation, those born in 1970’s and in the beginning of 1980’s (18-33 year-olds during the parliamentary elections of 2003), is more difficult to identify. According to Purhonen (2002a, 15, referred to Hochschild 2000), they could be called the generational of individual choice. Without going into this definition more in depth, we can enumerate some of the possible key experiences for this generation such as the

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economic recession in the beginning of 1990’s and Finland’s accession to the European Union and globalization in general. In the youth barometer of 2004, partly similar age group (15-29) most often named themselves as “it-generation” and “mobile-generation” referring to the expansion of new technology (Wilska 2004, 102-103). However, one unifying feature of this generation may be the lack of common experiences due to the general individualization (see Purhonen 2002a, 15). However, the inability to name key experiences can be caused by the temporal closeness as this generation has existed much shorter period than the previous ones. The summary of the key experiences of each generation is presented in table 1. Data and Statistical Analysis The analysis is based on survey data gathered after the parliamentary elections of 2003 in Finland. The first part of the data was collected via personal interviews (1.270 respondents). For the second part respondents were asked to independently fill so-called omnibus section (753 respondents). The analysis presented here is mostly based on the latter part of the data except for the variable concerning the inheritance of the party choice which are from the first part of the data. This article is a part of a project “Elections and Representative Democracy in Finland” funded by the Academy of Finland (project 8104411). The first part of the analysis is descriptive based on cross-tabulations. Each variable, 1) the role of politics in the respondent’s childhood and adolescence; 2) the amount the respondent received encouraging to vote from his or her parents; 3) the tendency to vote the same party as the respondent’s father voted during respondent’s youth4; 4) the attitudinal change towards voting; 5) the attitudinal change towards other forms of political participation; and 6) the generational consciousness regarding to political participation, is cross-tabulated by generation. The purpose of the cross-tabulations is to examine the differences between the four different generations in their socialization processes. The second part of the analysis is explanatory. We will investigate the impact of three socialization-related variables (the role of politics in the respondent’s childhood and adolescence; the attitudinal change towards voting; and the current attitude towards political participation5) on the relationship between the turnout and the age, i.e. will the differences in the turnout between the generations remain after taken account the differences in their socialization processes.6 This was done by using logistic regression analysis with the first category of each variable as the reference category. The dependent variable, turnout, was weighted separately for men and women in order to correspond with the official turnout from electoral wards for the parliamentary elections of 2003. This was necessary as people have a tendency to over-report their electoral

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participation in surveys (see e.g. Martikainen & Yrjönen 1991, 82; and Pesonen et al 1993, 531 for Finland). Results are presented in terms of odds ratios (ORs). “Odds” mean the probability to vote divided by the probability of not voting. Correspondingly, “the odds ratio” is defined as the ratio of odds in a certain category of an explanatory variable to the odds in the reference category:

ORi=(pi/(1-pi))/(p0/(1-p0)), where pi is the probability of voting in the ith category of an explanatory variable and p0 is the probability of voting in the reference category. Empirical Analysis Socialization during the Childhood and the Adolescence Traditionally, the role of the childhood family has been seen as the primary source of values and attitudes. However, this kind of “inject” model has also been re-examined and it has been shown that different generations have developed their opinions horizontally rather than vertically from a parent to child, due to similar experiences (Connell 1972). Also e.g. Friedman et al. (1972) have noticed that the correlation in social and political values between parents and children is low. As it comes to political engagement, the socialization background, as measured by parents’ education and occupations, does not seem to have a large impact (Jääsaari & Martikainen 1991). On the other hand, an aforementioned survey study by Jääsaari and Martikainen shows that parents’ electoral participation has a clear independent effect on youths’ political interest (ibid., 42). Consequently, it seems quite obvious that the environment where an individual grows up, consisting of family, school and various other social networks, must have some role in shaping the individual’s image of society and his or her place in it.

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Table 2 The Answers to the Question “When you think of your childhood’s and adolescence’s environment, how large role would you say politics had in it?” by Generation (%)

Total Large or relative-ly large

role

Rela-tively small role

No role at all % (n)

The generational of individual choice 16 51 33 100 (176) The generation of suburban 30 46 25 100 (126) The generation of transformation 27 51 23 100 (271) The generation of war and reconstruction 25 56 19 100 (122) Total 24 51 25 100 (695) = 15.04 d.f. = 6 p = 0.02

The respondents’ views of the role of politics during the childhood and the adolescence are presented in table 2. The most of the youth of today, the generation of individual choice, are the children of the generation of transformation. As the latter grew up in an atmosphere of active youth politics, assumingly this activism has been visible in the childhood of their children. Table 2 shows, however, that the politics has clearly had the smallest role in the youngest generation’s childhood and adolescence. Instead, politics has played substantially larger role in the childhood’s and the adolescence’s environment of the two middle generations. In this respect it seems very interesting that only a quarter of the generation of war and reconstruction perceive the role of politics as large or relatively large. Apparently the experiences of war have not been considered political but, instead, perceived mostly as a day to day survival. Moreover, a certain political prudence was distinctive to the post-war atmosphere which, at the level of school and family, could have meant avoidance of delicate political questions. This might have caused the fact that compared to the oldest generation, only a slightly larger portion thinks that politics had a large role in their childhood.

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Table 3 The Answers to the Question ”Have your parents ever offered you any advices or examples about the importance of voting” by Generation (%)

Total Often Rarely Not at all % (n)

The generational of individual choice 34 36 30 100 (163)The generation of suburban 31 32 36 100 (118)The generation of transformation 26 34 40 100 (251)The generation of war and reconstruction 22 20 59 100 (118) Total 28 32 40 100 (650) = 25.92 d.f. = 6 p = 0.00

The advices or examples from one’s parents about the importance of voting do not seem to be very common as shown in table 3. Forty percent of Finns have not received this kind of guidance at all. However, it is worth noting that younger generations have received more advice than the elder ones. This may be due to the fact that amongst the younger generations the first voting experience and advices related to it are still fresh in memory. On the other hand, the lesser interest towards electoral participation amongst the young might have pressed the parents to emphasize the meaning of voting. The parents of current youth belong to a generation, whose turnout is the highest of all generations: for example in parliamentary elections of 1999, the turnout in the age group of 45 to 54 year olds was 75 per cent and amongst 55 to 64 year olds 80 per cent (Martikainen & Wass 2002, 47). As shown in table 2, the politics has the largest role in the childhood and adolescence of approximately 50 year olds of today. Consequently, it appears that they are trying to pass their children the sense of duty to vote which they selves have adapted. The respondents were also asked which party their mother and father voted during the respondents’ adolescence. In table 4 a respondent’s father’s party choice is cross-tabulated with the party choice of a respondent in the parliamentary elections of 2003. We have used father’s party choice because more respondents were able to name that than their mother’s party. This new variable consists of three categories: those voting the same party than one’s father; those voting different party; and those who don’t know their father’s party choice. The respondents whose fathers’ party no longer exists are included in the second class. Those who reported non-voting in the parliamentary elections of 2003 and those who were unwilling to name the party they voted are excluded from the analysis.

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Table 4 The Inheritance of Party Identification by Generation (%) Total Voted

the same party than a father

Voted diffe-rent party than

a father

Does not

know father’s

party

% (n)

The generational of individual choice 31 28 42 100 (233)The generation of suburban 30 49 21 100 (159)The generation of transformation 35 44 21 100 (335)The generation of war and reconstruction 35 41 25 100 (158) Total 33 40 27 100 (885) = 39.90 d.f. = 6 p = 0.00

Table 4 shows that one third of the respondents have voted the same party as their fathers used to vote, 40 per cent voted some other party and slightly over a quarter didn’t know their fathers’ party choice. The generations don’t markedly differ from each other regarding their inheritance to party identification. Moreover, there seems to be quite little change over time: in the parliamentary elections of 1966 in Finland 40 per cent voted the same party as their fathers and 24 per cent were unable to name their fathers’ party (Pesonen 1972, 336). This comes as no surprise given that many studies concerning the United States have shown that parents’ party identification plays a major role in their children’s political orientation, although different political issues also have a strong impact on the party choice strengthening with age (Niemi & Jennings 1991) and the partisan inheritance eroded by the antipartisan period pressures of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s (Beck & Jenning 1991). The large portion of those in the youngest generation who are not aware of their fathers’ party identification is, however, worth of further investigation. The fact that 42 per cent of the generation of individual choice is unable to name their father’s party is a clear signal of the “privatization” of politics. For instance, the eldest generation was born in a society divided into halves due to the civil war in 1917-1918. In that context parents’ party preference was reflected in the whole family (see e.g. Jääsaari 1986, 263). Nowadays the party choice seems to be a private matter even inside of the family and one’s political views are not necessarily reflected in other forms of action and can not be judged from outside. It is possible to give three alternative or supplementary interpretations for this phenomenon. First of all, it might be the case that it has become less common to talk about politics between the members of the family. Secondly, even though some discussion takes place, children can’t “read” their parents’ party choice

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from their opinions due to the lack of civic literacy (see. Milner 2002). The third option is that children simply are not interested anymore in their parents’ political orientation as they view their own political identity separately from those. In all of these cases, the inheritance of the party identification becomes impossible because children can’t place their parents on a political map. The inheritance of the party choice looks somewhat different while examining only those respondents who know their father’s party (data not shown here).7 Over half (53 %) of those in the generation of individual choice whom were able to name their father’s party orientation, voted the same party in the parliamentary elections of 2003. This seems reasonable as a part of this generation still lived at home during these elections and had not exposed to other socialization agents such as tertiary education and work at the same extent than the older ones. In no other generation the proportion of those voting in accordance with their father’s party preference is that large. It is the second largest in the generation of war and reconstruction (46 %), third largest amongst the generation of transformation (44 %) and weakest in the generation of suburban. This is somewhat surprising given that amongst the generation of suburban politics had largest role during their adolescence compared to other generations. Moreover, they have received more examples and advices concerning the importance of voting than any other generation. For some reason, this kind of input has not been transferred into action unlike to their parents. However, as the youngest generation is concerned, the role of the socialization becomes clearly visible. Amongstst those whom thought the politics had a large or a relatively large role during their adolescence, only 28 per cent didn’t know their fathers’ political orientation. Amongstst those whom had often had directions about the importance of voting only 24 per cent didn’t know their fathers’ party and 52 per cent voted the same party. Socialization into Political Participation during Individual’s Life Cycle As noted earlier in this article, an individual’s political socialization does not have a certain end point but instead continues throughout one’s life cycle (Alapuro 1969, 6; Jääsaari 1986, 172). Due to the change in individuals’ life circumstances or the societal change in general, the attitudes towards political participation may be reconstituted. It is possible to examine the differences in attitudes of persons of same age during the different periods of time via attitudinal statements such as “I think one fulfills his civic duty if he votes regularly” often stated in surveys. However, without a panel study we cannot gain a full picture of how a particular individual’s views have changed during his of her life span.

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Current attitude towards political participation

+ +/- - + the

discoverers the assenters the eased

offs

+/- the participants

the neutrals the critics

The change in attitudes towards political participation during individuals’ life cycle

- the holders the

disappointed

the rejecters

Figure 1 The Typology of Political Socialization. + positive / change into positive direction +/- neutral / no change - negative / change into negative direction In figure 1 a respondent’s current attitude towards political participation has been cross-tabulated with his or her view of the change that has occurred in these attitudes during his or her life cycle. Hence, we obtain a typology consisting of nine categories which represent different types of socialization. The socialization into electoral participation based on that typology is presented in table 58 and the socialization into other forms of political participation in table 69. Table 5 The Change in the Attitudes Towards Electoral Participation During Life Cycle by Generation (%)

Total The

dis-

cove-

rers

The

as-

sen-

ters

Tthe

ea-

sed

offs

The

parti-

ci-

pants

The

neut-

rals

The

cri-

tics

The

hol-

ders

The

dis-

sa-

poin-

teed

The

re-

ject-

ters

% (n)

18-33 28 13 2 30 20 2 2 2 2 100 (171)

34-43 26 13 1 20 19 4 2 9 6 100 (127)

44-63 17 7 1 32 23 3 3 6 9 100 (263)

64+ 18 11 4 24 21 4 4 7 7 100 (115)

Total 22 10 2 28 21 3 3 6 6 100 (676)

= 42.02 d.f. = 24 p = 0.01 18-33 The generational of individual choice 34-43 The generation of suburban 44-63 The generation of transformation 64+ The generation of war and reconstruction

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Table 5 shows that every other Finns’ attitude towards electoral participation has remained stable throughout his or her life. Most of those whose attitudes have changed belong to a group called “the discoverers” meaning that their current positive standpoint towards voting is a consequence of an alteration into a positive direction. The second largest group is called “the assenters” consisting of those whose attitudes have changed into a more positive direction but still are more neutral than positive. Those whose views about electoral participation have changed into a more negative direction form only about 15 per cent of respondents. This observation is somewhat surprising given the decline in overall turnout during the past few decades. Moreover, the group “the discoverers” is larger amongstst two second youngest generations than in the generation of war and reconstruction. Although this positive attitude amongstst younger generations does not necessarily seem be actualized into voting, as we will see later in this article, at the attitudinal level these cohorts are very potential voters. It is also worth of noting that “rejecters”, people whose current unfavorable attitude is due to an attitudinal change into a more negative direction, form four times larger group amongst generation of transformation (9 %) than they form amongst the generation of individual choice (2 %). Table 6 The Change in the Attitudes Towards Other Forms of Participation During Life Cycle by Generation (%)

Total The

dis-

cove-

rers

The

as-

sen-

ters

Tthe

ea-

sed

offs

The

parti-

ci-

pants

The

neut-

rals

The

cri-

tics

The

hol-

ders

The

dis-

sa-

poin-

teed

The

re-

ject-

ters

% (n)

18-33 29 7 1 30 23 2 1 4 2 100 (168)

34-43 20 11 - 24 25 8 4 6 2 100 (123)

44-63 22 6 1 28 28 6 2 3 4 100 (253)

64+ 17 4 3 28 24 8 4 9 5 100 (105)

Total 23 7 1 28 25 6 2 5 3 100 (649)

= 32.99 d.f. = 24 p = 0.10 18-33 The generational of individual choice 34-43 The generation of suburban 44-63 The generation of transformation 64+ The generation of war and reconstruction The change in attitudes towards other forms of political participation is shown in table 6. As compared to the electoral participation, those whose views have remained the same form even bigger group, 60 per cent, when it comes to other forms of political participation. Over 50 per cent of respondents have currently either a positive or a neutral standpoint towards other forms of political participation and there has not

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occurred any change in these attitudes during their life span. Overall, the composition of different groups is quite similar to those concerning the electoral participation. However, it should be noted that the differences between generations are not statistically significant (p=0.10). Notwithstanding, we can still get some indicators from the differences by comparing expected and observed counts. The portion of “the discoverers” is somewhat larger amongst the youngest generation as expected, and, respectively, the portion of “the critics” is smaller, although it is even smaller amongst “the holders”. This seems reasonable as the members of the youngest generation are living the active phase of their lives (from 18 to 40 year-olds, see Roos 1987) also concerning political awakening, and this phase is taking place during the period where a lot of conversation about new forms of participation is going on. However, it is quite fascinating that this kind of “discovery of participation” holds also for electoral participation as well. This observation is compatible with the previous investigations: the different forms of participation are rather supplementary with each other than exclusionary (see e.g. Hellsten 2003). In the eldest generation the portion of observed counts for “the discoverers” and “the assenters” are smaller than expected, and respectively, larger for “the critics”, for “the holders” and for “the disappointed”. Every fifth’s of the generation of war and reconstruction attitude towards other forms of political participation have become more negative, although only 16 per cent currently holds a negative outlook towards that kind of participation. It could be the case that sometimes negative reporting in media about the movements critical towards globalization has changed the image of civic action into a less appealing or a less legitimate direction in the minds of the elderly. Generational Consciousness and Political Participation As mentioned in the introduction, the process of socialization is strongly connected with the concept of generation. Certain shared key experiences that a birth cohort faces during their formative years can shape its orientation towards the society into a similar direction, at least to some extent (Mannheim 1952; Virtanen 1999; Virtanen 2001). One reflection of this orientation is a political participation. For instance, the lower turnout amongst the young can be caused by the certain demobilizatory socialization processes (Anduiza 1999, 28). As a matter a fact, it is partly these demobilizatory socialization processes which make them a generation. While thinking this way, the concept of generational consciousness becomes essential. By generational consciousness we mean the individuals’ idea that he or she belongs to a certain generation connected with a special bond (see e.g. Purhonen 2002b; Wilska 2004). In order to talk about “voter generations”, for instance, a member of a given age cohort should feel that his or her orientation towards political participation is quite similar than his or her peers. The statement “in my generation everybody votes” could be characteristic for this kind of feeling.

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Table 7 The Respondents Attitude towards Political Participation vis-à-vis His/Her View of the Attitudes of Others’ Belonging to Same Generation by Generation (%)

Total + +

+ +/-

+ -

+/- +

+/- +/-

+/- -

- +

- +/-

- - % (n)

18-33 28 15 16 5 20 10 2 1 3 100 (173) 34-43 31 9 6 14 21 7 2 4 6 100 (127) 44-63 43 9 2 16 16 3 4 2 5 100 (257) 64+ 43 6 2 17 17 6 2 1 7 100 (109)

Total 37 10 7 13 18 6 3 2 5 100 (666) = 83.51 d.f. = 24 p = 0.00

18-33 The generational of individual choice 34-43 The generation of suburban 44-63 The generation of transformation 64+ The generation of war and reconstruction +positive, +/- neutral, - negative The bolded upper row of the column shows the respondents’ own attitude towards political participation and the lower row his/her view of the attitudes of the others’ belonging to same generation. In table 7 we examine how different generations feel about political participation compared to their views of the attitudes of their peers. First of all, it is worth noting that the amount of those identifying to their generation, regarding to political participation, varies substantially between different generations. While 60 per cent of all respondents consider their attitude similar to that of the others’ belonging to same generation, the corresponding figure amongst the youngest generation is only 51 per cent and amongst the oldest generation 67 per cent.10 Amongst the generation of transformation, the share of identifiers is 64 per cent. This observation is compatible with the finding that generational consciousness is larger amongst the so-called baby boomers, which refers partly to the same age group than the generation of transformation, than amongst the younger age cohorts (Purhonen 2002b, 39).11 Table 7 shows that over one third of Finns’ own attitude towards political participation and the view of the attitudes of same generation are positive. Almost fifth belongs to a category where a respondent’s own attitude is neutral and the image of other’s attitude is similar. However, again the view about the compatibility of respondent’s own orientation towards participation with his or her idea of that of his or her peers varies according to generation. A dividing line seems to be the generation of suburban. The youngest generation has much more positive attitude towards participation than they think their peers have. It seems to be the opposite amongst the two oldest generations. For instance, amongstst the generation of suburban, 14 per cent feel neutral towards participation but thinks that others of the same generation have a positive attitude. In the youngest generation only 6 per cent has a negative attitude as a whole of which three

19

per cent thinks that others have more positive attitude. The corresponding figures amongstst the generation of transformation are 11 per cent of which six per cent see their peers having more positive attitude. During recent years, much attention has been paid in the public debate to the political apathy amongst the young age groups. In the light of figures presented in table 7, at the level of attitudes, this seems to be a myth that also young people themselves have adopted. Amongst the youngest generation, 59 per cent have a positive attitude towards participation but, at the same time, only 35 per cent assess that their peers have similar views. Correspondingly, 29 per cent of this generation thinks that the representatives of their generation have a negative standpoint towards political participation, although, on the basis of respondents’ own views, no more than six per cent actually feels negatively towards participation. In the generation of transformation only 10 per cent assesses that others in their generation have negative standpoint concerning political participation while 11 per cent actually feels that way. In this respect it is also worth of noting that only 23 per cent of 15 to 29 year-olds thinks that their generation’s political influence will grow in the future larger than their predecessors and half of them assesses that it will remain the same than nowadays. This quite a pessimistic view might be a consequence of the powerful role in the decision-making that the generation of transformation had overtaken already in 1970’s (Wilska 2004, 108; for the political influence of the baby-boomers see Borg & Ruostetsaari 2002). In order to sum up, it appears that contemporary young adults’ image of their generations’ views does not reflect the reality. Based on their own opinions, the younger age cohorts could be more active than the elder generations. However, it almost seems as this negative image of their peers’ views partly hinders them from actual participation. On the other hand, this negative image is also a realistic one as the representatives of the media and the scholars frequently discuss the lack of interest towards participation amongstst the young. While this debate is certainly indispensable and well-grounded, it is worth noting that it partly constitutes a self-concept of this generation as a citizen and, more importantly, forms in part a socialization milieu for younger ones. Effects of Age and Socialization Factors on Turnout In order to form a more comprehensive picture of the differences in the socialization processes between different generations we will look at the effects of socialization factors on turnout. The main point is to find out how these factors affect the differences in turnout between various generations. Firstly, table 8 shows that the turnout amongst the youngest generation (56 %) is substantially lower than amongst the elder ones, as expected. Moreover, clear differences in the turnout can also be observed according to the role of politics during respondent’s adolescence, the change in attitudes towards

20

voting and the current attitude towards political participation. The bivariate models confirm these interpretations as all the differences between groups turn out to be statistically significant and follow the same direction. In model 2 sex and three socioeconomic variables (education, social class and income) have been adjusted. It shows a similar result than a previous study (see Martikainen et al. 2005): compared to the reference group of the youngest generation, clear differences between generations can be detected even though the effect of generation is slightly attenuated amongst the generation of suburban and amongst the generation of transformation after adjusting for major socioeconomic factors.12 For the former the attenuation is 19 per cent and for the latter five per cent. The fact that odds ratio of the generation of war and reconstruction is slightly larger than before the adjustment emphasizes the point stated earlier: the difference in turnout between the youngest and the eldest generation would be greater if there were no socioeconomic differences between them given that the youngest generation is better educated (see ibid., 17). Model 3 shows that adjusting for generation and the role of politics during the adolescence in addition to the sex and the socioeconomic factors attenuate the differences in the odds ratios for voting between generations as compared to the youngest generation. Although some attenuation takes place, the results are not statistically significant. In model 4 the change in the attitudes towards voting has been included in the analysis. As compared to the previous model, this new variable increases the odds ratios for the two middle generations (OR=1.96 and OR=2.48). However, the difference between the youngest and the eldest generation is not statistically significant and the difference between the youngest and the second youngest generation only slightly significant. In order to interpret this finding it is worth of mentioning that amongst the reference group, the generation of individual choice, 33 per cent of respondents’ attitudes towards voting have changed into a more positive direction during their lives as the corresponding figure for the generation of suburban is only 21 per cent and for the two eldest generations 28 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. Hence, adding this variable into analysis does not change a lot the original differences in odds ratios between the various generations (model 2) but we can suspect that if the youngest generation hadn’t have faced this change in attitudes into more positive direction, the differences would be even greater. In model 5 we can see that adjusting for the current attitude towards the political participation strengthens the difference between the eldest generation and the generation of individual choice (OR=3.15) and also between it and the second youngest generation (OR=2.26). It should be noted, however, that the results are only slightly statistically significant. The strengthening of the differences is due to the fact that the youngest generation has much often a positive attitude towards political participation as 29 per cent feels positive about it while amongst the generation of suburban the corresponding

21

figure is 16 per cent and amongst the eldest generation 17 per cent. However, in the generation of transformation 39 per cent have a positive attitude towards political participation. Even though this last model explains only 35 per cent of total variance in the turnout it is not a cause of concern here as our purpose is not to explain the turnout as such but to examine the effect of the socialization variables on the differences in turnout between various generations. All in all, these findings show that the differences in the turnout would be quite the same amongst the elder generations and the youngest one even though there were no differences in the socialization process, i.e. if the youngest generation had not changed their attitudes towards voting into a more positive direction more often than other generations and if it did not feel more positively towards political participation as the generation of suburban and the generation of war and reconstruction. The elder generations are clearly “better-offs” compared to the youngest one only in regards to the role of politics during adolescence, but as we saw, it doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on the odds ratios of voting amongst generations. The differences in the turnout between generations show, for their part, that even their better position regarding the socialization factors does not give a stimulus for voting for the large part of the youngest generation, although inside the youngest generation the turnout is substantially higher amongst those whose attitude towards electoral participation has changed into a more positive direction and who feel positive about political participation compared to those whom feel the opposite. Consequently, it appears that the differences in the turnout between generations can not be explained by the socialization related factors as they can not be explained by the socioeconomic factors either.

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Table 8 Effects of Age and Socialization Factors on Turnout. Turnout (%) and Odds Ratios (OR) in Multivariate Models (** p<0.01, * p<0.05, (*) p<0.10).

Multivariate Models

Turnout

(%)

Model 1:

Bivariate

model

Model 2:

sex +

ses +

adjusted

Model 3:

sex+

ses+

gen +

role

Model 4:

+ change

Model 5:

+ attitude

Generation (gen)

The generation of individual choice

(18-33)

62 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00

The generation of suburban (34-

43)

65 1.93** 1.75* 1.17 1.96(*) 2.26(*)

The generation of transformation

(44-63)

76 2.75** 2.67** 1.76(*) 2.48** 2.47*

The generation of war and

reconstruction (64+)

74 2.31** 2.34* 2.09

2.40 3.15(*)

Role of Politics during the

Adolescence (role)

None 57 1.00 1,00 1,00 1.00 1.00

Relatively small 75 2.28** 2.20* 2.16** 1.66(*) 1.47

Large 79 2.81** 3.13** 2.95** 2.13* 1.48

Change in Attitudes

towards Voting (change)

More critical 39 1.00 1.00 - 1.00 1.00

No change 80 6.20** 5.79** - 6.54** 5.07**

More positive 81 6.66** 7.77** - 11.80** 6.50**

Current Attitude

towards Political Participation

(attitude)

Critical 40 1.00 1.00 - - 1.00

Neutral 64 2.73** 2.66* - - 1.73

Positive 89 11.92** 14.53** - - 7.08**

Constant 0.68 0.16** 0.92**

N 665 642 623

Nagelkerke R² 0.13 0.25 0.35

Cases predicted correctly (%) 82.5 85.1 85.4

Notes: The dependent variable is weighted separately for men and women in order to correspond with the official turnout from the electoral wards for the parliamentary elections of 2003. Model 1 shows the

23

bivariate models including generation and socialization variables. The effect of these factors on turnout is shown in odds ratios. Each category of generation and socialization variables is compared to the reference group with an odds ratio of 1.00. Model 2 shows separately the odds ratios of voting in each categories of generation and socialization variables while adjusting for sex and socioeconomic factors (ses). Socioeconomic factors include education (1 = lower secondary education, 2 = upper secondary level education and lowest level tertiary education, 3 = lower and higher level tertiary education), social class (1 = manual workers, 2 = lower middle class, 3 = upper middle class, 4 = entrepreneurs, 5 = farmers, 6 = pensioners, 7 = students, 8 = unemployed, 9 = others) and income per household (1 = lowest quartile, 2 = second quartile, 3 = third quartile, 4 = fourth quartile). Model 3 simultaneously includes the effects of sex, socioeconomic factors, generation and the role of politics during the adolescence. In model 4 the effect of attitudinal change towards voting is added. Model 5 also includes the current attitude towards political participation. Conclusions In this article we have examined the socialization into political participation amongst four Finnish generations. The results show that as far as political participation is concerned, the socialization processes of different generations clearly differ from each another. However, these differences are hardly straightforward and consequently, their interpretation can be somewhat challenging. While looking at the early socialization, we can see that the role of politics in the childhood and the adolescence has clearly been the smallest during the adolescence of the youngest generation, the generation of individual choice. However, this generation has received most advice about the importance of voting from their parents. Most of their parents are in their 50’s, belonging to the generation whose adolescence politics has a larger role and whose turnout is higher that the turnout at the aggregate level. Consequently, it seems that this generation of transformation has tried to pass their children the sense of obligation to participate which they have adopted themselves. The inheritance of the party choice is somewhat more unusual amongst the two youngest generations than it is amongst the elder ones. However, the fact that over forty per cent of the youngest generation, the generation of individual choice, is not aware of which party their father voted while they were young suggests that the decision to vote a different party has not always been a conscious one. Instead, nowadays children seem to be less aware about their parents’ political orientation reflecting certain privatization of the politics. All in all, excluding the advices to vote, the results show that the role of the family and the childhood environment as the socialization agents has declined with time. It is also worth noting that at the level of attitudes, the youngest generation has more positive feelings towards political participation than the oldest one. Moreover,

24

attitudinal change during an individual’s life span towards voting and other forms of political participation has been most positive amongst the youngest generation. While almost one fifth’s attitude of the generation of transformation towards electoral participation has changed into a more negative direction throughout their life span, the corresponding figure amongst the youngest generation is only six per cent. However, amongst every generation those whose attitudes have remained the same form the majority. As it comes to the generational consciousness concerning political participation, generations once again differ from each other in a fascinating way. The younger generations feel more positively about political participation compared to their views of the attitudes of the others belonging to the same generation. Amongst the older generations this ratio is opposite. On the other hand, it should be noted that generational consciousness – in this case the compatibility of respondent’s own attitude with his or her views of attitudes of the other representatives of the same generation – grows linearly with age. While only a half of the youngest generation think that they are typical members of their generation as it comes to political participation, the corresponding figure amongst the generation of transformation is 64 per cent and amongst the generation of war and reconstruction 67 per cent. Consequently, at the level of attitudes, a relatively small interest towards political participation does not seem to be a combining feature of the younger generation. If anything, it appears that the young generations have adopted the image of the young age groups as being politically passive which have been widely discussed in the media. Finally, we examined how socialization-related factors affect to the differences in the turnout between generations. The results show that the differences in the turnout would be quite similar than whilst taken account only sex and socioeconomic factors. Although the youngest generation is clearly “better-offs” regarding some of the socialization factors, their low turnout show that they still can not find enough stimulus to actually cast a vote. As has been shown earlier (Martikainen et al. 2005) and confirmed here, the low turnout amongst the young can not be explained by their lower socioeconomic status either. Consequently, the explanation for the tendency of the young generation to vote less than the elder ones needs to be searched elsewhere. One possibility is that the younger generation views the whole idea of representation in a different way than their predecessors. This might be due to the increase in competence, the difficulties of parties to represent voters whose interest are widely divided and the appearance of so-called do-it-yourself politics. However, this remains a focus for a further study.

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Grönlund, Kimmo, Heikki Paloheimo, Jan Sundberg, Risto Sänkiaho ja Hanna Wass (2005): Kiinnittyminen politiikkaan. Teoksessa Paloheimo, Heikki (toim.): Vaalit ja edustuksellinen demokratia Suomessa. Helsinki: WSOY. Hellsten, Villiina (2003): Uusi politiikka ja poliittisen osallistumisen moninaistuminen: haaste edusteukselliselle demokratialle? Teoksessa Paakkunainen, Kari (toim.): ”Kyllä politiikalle, mutta...” Nuoret ja eduskuntavaalit 2003. Helsinki: Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/ Nuorisotutkimusseura, julkaisuja 35. Nuorisoasianneuvottelukunta, julkaisuja 27. Highton, Benjamin and Raymond E. Wolfinger (2001): The First Seven Years of Political Life Cycle. American Journal of Political Science 45:1, 202-209. Hyman, Herbert. (1959): Political Socialization. Glencoe, III.: Free Press. Inglehart, Ronald (1977): The Silent Revolution. Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jennings, M. Kent and Niemi, Richard G (1981): Generations and Politics. A Panel Study of Young Adults and Their Parents. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Jääsaari, Johanna (1986): Sukupolvet, elämäntapa ja politiikka. Politiikka 28:2, 258-281. Jääsaari, Johanna ja Martikainen, Tuomo (1991): Nuorten poliittiset valinnat. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Ljungberg, Elisabet (2003): Politisk socialisation – ett forskningsområde som söker sin identitet. Politiikka 45:2, 133-147. Lyons, William and Alexander, Robert (2000): A Tale of Two Electorates: Generational Replacement and the decline of Voting in Presidential Elections. Journal of Politics 62:4, 1014-1034. Martikainen, Pekka, Tuomo Martikainen, and Hanna Wass (2005): The Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on Voter Turnout in Finland: A Register Based Study of 2.9 Million Voters. European Journal of Political Research 44:5, 645-669. Martikainen, Tuomo ja Wass, Hanna (2002a): Laskeva äänestysaktiivisuus sukupolvi-ilmiönä. Politiikka 44:1, 17-30. Martikainen, Tuomo ja Wass, Hanna (2002b): Äänettömät yhtiömiehet. Osallistuminen vuosien 1987 ja 1999 eduskuntavaaleihin. Vaalit 2002:1. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus. Martikainen, Tuomo ja Yrjönen, Risto (1991): Vaalit, puolueet ja yhteiskunnan muutos. Tilastokeskus, Tutkimuksia 178. Helsinki: Tilastokeskus. Milbrath, Lester W. and Goel, M. L. (1977): Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally.

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Milner, Henry (2002): Civic Literacy. How Informed Citizens Make Democracy Work. Hanover and London: Tufts University, University Press of New England. Niemi, Richard G. and Sobieszek, Barbara I. (1977): Political Socialization. Annual Review of Sociology 3, 209-233. Niemi, Richard G. and Jennings, M. Kent (1991): Issues and Inheritance in the Formation of Party Identification. American Journal of Political Science 35:4, 970-988. Perea, Eva (1999): Youth Turnout in National Parliamentary Elections. In Youth Voter Participation. Involving Today’s Young in Tomorrow’s Democracy. Stockholm: The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Pesonen, Pertti (1972): Suomalaisten puolueiden kannatussiirtymät. Teoksessa Pesonen, Pertti (toim.): Protestivaalit, nuorisovaalit: tutkielmia kansanedustajien vaaleista 1966, 1970 ja 1972. Helsinki: Ylioppilastuki. Pesonen, Pertti, Risto Sänkiaho ja Sami Borg (1993): Vaalikansan äänivalta. Tutkimus eduskuntavaaleista ja valitsijakunnasta Suomen poliittisessa järjestelmässä. Helsinki: WSOY. Purhonen, Semi. (2002a): Sukupolvikäsitteen kolme ulottuvuutta. Diskursiivisen dimension merkitys sukupolvitietoisuuden rakentumisessa. Sosiologia 39:1, 4-17. Purhonen, Semi. (2002b): Suurten ikäluokkien itsetietoisuus sukupolvena. Hyvinvointikatsaus 1/2002, 37-41. Putnam, Robert D. (2000): Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster. Renshon, Stanley (1992): Political Socialization. In Mary Hawkesworth ja Maurice Kogan (eds): Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, Volume 1, 443-470. London: Routledge. Roos, J-P. (1987): Suomalainen elämä. Tutkimus tavallisten suomalaisten elämäkerroista. Helsinki : Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura. Sapiro, Virginia (2004): Not Your Parents Political Socialization: Introduction for a New Generation. Annual Review of Political Science 7, 1-23. Setälä, Maija (2003): Demokratian arvo. Teoriat, käytännöt ja mahdollisuudet. Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Toivonen, Timo (2004): Generation (Cohort) as Explanans of Social Behavior. Teoksessa Wiberg, Matti (ed.): Reasoned Choices. Turku: Finnish Political Science Association.

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van Deth, Jan W. (2001): Studying Political Participation: towards a Theory of Everything? Introductory paper prepared for delivery at the Joint Sessions of Workshops of the European Consortium of Political Research, Workshop: “Electronic Democracy: Mobilisation, Organisation and Participation via new ICTs”. Grenoble, 6-11 April 2001. Virtanen, Matti (1999). Sukupolven tasot, fraktiot ja elämänkaari. Sosiologia 36:2, 81-94. Virtanen, Matti (2001) Fennomanian perilliset. Poliittiset traditiot ja sukupolven dynamiikka. Hämeenlinna: Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seuran toimituksia 831. Wilska, Terhi (2004): Nuorten kollektiivinen sukupolvitietoisuus nuorisobarometrin valossa. Teoksessa Wilska, Terhi (toim.): Oman elämänsä yrittäjät? Nuorisobarometri 2004. Helsinki: Nuorisoasianneuvottelukunta, julkaisuja 28. Nuorisotutkimusverkosto/Nuorisotutkimusseura, julkaisuja 44.

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1 The data used in the referred study are compiled by Statistics Finland. Also the data on the parliamentary elections of 1979, based on a sample of 185 voting districts (see Martikainen & Yrjönen 1984), was used. 2 Delli Carpini, as many others, refers to German sociologist Karl Mannheim, whose essay on generations was first published in 1928 and transleted into English in 1952. The standing point of Mannheims’ concept analysis was to distinguish the biological generations from the generations based on common experiences (see Virtanen 1999; Virtanen 2001). According to Mannheim, generation is a dynamic social process consisting of three different levels which rise from bottom to top. The first of these is a biological age cohort, the second is generation location and the third is called generation as actuality. The generation location refers to the common basis of experiences shared amongst particular age cohort while the term “generation as actulity” requires that these common ecperience has a mobilizatory effect on this cohort and it actively participates in social movements characteristic to the period they live in (Mannheim 1952; see also Virtanen 1999, 82-83). 3 The interpretation of key experiences of the suburban generation presented here is somewhat different than the original by Roos (1981). According to Roos, the lack of experiences has been the common feature for the generation of transformation. However, it seems reasonable to assume that certain easiness of life has faced the older generation predominantly during their adulthood and, consequently, has been the key feature of adolescence for their children which form the generation of suburban. 4 We have chosen a father’s party because more respondents were able to name it compared to mother’s party. 5 It should be pointed out that the current attitude towards political participation seems to be a conventional attitudinal variable. While this is certainly true, it can also be seen as the current end point of the socialization into political participation, which, naturally, might change in the future. Moreover, the main reason why the change in attitude towards voting and the current attitude towards political participation are included separately is to gain more detailed and more easily readable analyses. 6 We have excluded the advices from the parents’ concerning the voting from the final model. This variable somewhat skewed the whole model as for some unknown reason many of those who had not voted in the elections 2003 decided not to answer on this question. Consequently, even the weighted overall turnout amongstst those who answered this question was 92 per cent. 7 For this section I owe to Heikki Paloheimo. 8 The current attitude towards political participation has been measured by the question “How do you feel about political participation?” The options were very positively, quite positively, not positively nor negatively, quite negatively, very negatively and don’t know. This question is somewhat problematic as it is not specified to electoral participation but instead it refers to political participation in general. While interpreting the results one should keep in mind this inaccuracy in consepts. The attitude towards electoral participation was measured by the question “How much your attitude towards electoral participation has changed during your life?” The options were changed much more positive, changed somewhat more positive, has not changed either more positive nor more negative, changed somewhat more positive, changed much more postive. 9 The current attitude towards political participation is measured like similar way than in table 5. The change towards other forms of political participation was measure by the question “How much your attitude towards eother forms of political participation (e.g. contacting the officials, signing petitions,

30

participating in demonstrations) has changed during your life? The options were the same than with electoral participation (see endnote 5). 10 It is worth of noting that in the Youth Barometer of 2004, only six per cent of the 15 to 29 year-olds stated that do not belong to any generation (Wilska 2004, 102). Consequently, a generational consciousness regarding to political participation seems to be surprisingly low amongst the young at least the way measured here. 11 It was also noted in the referred study that generational consciousness of the baby boomers is larger than their predecessor’ which does not seem to hold with political participation. 12 Percent attenuation after adjusting for other variables can be calculated using the formula: 100*((ORi1-ORi2)/(ORi1-1)), where ORi1 denotes the odds ratio for social class is obtained from the unadjusted model and ORi2 denotes the odds ratio for the same social class i obtained from the model that also includes the adjusted variables. I owe to Pekka Martikainen for this calculation (see Martikainen et al. 2005).