Generational Accounts - A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting

Working P a ~ e r 9103

GENERATIONAL ACCOUNTS: A MEANINGF'UL ALTERNATIVE TO DEFICIT ACCOUNTING

by Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff

Alan J. Auerbach is a professor of economics at the University of Pennsylvania and an associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research; Jagadeesh Gokhale is an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland; and Laurence J. Kotlikoff is a professor of economics at Boston University and an associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors thank Jinyong Cai, Ritu Nayyar, Bash Hardeo, and Sharon Parrott for excellent research assistance and Albert Ando, David Bradford, William Gavin, and Mark Sniderman for helpful comments. Jane Gravelle provided a variety of critical data and many useful discussions. Research support from the National Institute of Aging and the National Bureau of Economic Research is gratefully acknowledged.

Working papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The views stated herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

March 1991

www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm

Abstract

This paper presents a set of generational accounts that can be used to assess the fiscal burden that current generations are placing on future generations. The generational accounts indicate, in present value, the net amount that current and future generations are projected to pay to the government now and in the future. These accounts can be understood in terms of the government's intertemporal (long-run) budget constraint. This constraint requires that the sum of generational accounts of all current and future generations plus existing government net wealth be sufficient to finance the present value of current and future government consumption.

The generational accounting system represents an alternative to using the federal budget deficit to gauge intergenerational policy. From a theoretical perspective, the measured deficit need bear no relationship to the underlying intergenerational stance of fiscal policy. Indeed, from a theoretical perspective, the measured deficit simply reflects economically arbitrary labeling of government receipts and payments.

Within the range of reasonable growth and'interest-rate assumptions, the difference between age zero and future generations in generational accounts ranges from 17 to 24 percent. This means that if the fiscal burden on current generations is not increased relative to that projected from current policy (ignoring the federal budget enacted in 1990) and if future generations are treated equally (except for an adjustment for growth), the fiscal burden facing all future generations over their lifetimes will be 17 to 24 percent larger than that facing newborns in 1989. The 1990 federal budget will, if it sticks, significantly reduce the fiscal burden on future generations.

The calculations of generational accounts reported here are based solely on government receipts and expenditures from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), and reflect the age pattern of government receipts and payments as well as the projected substantial aging of the U.S. population.


I. Introduction

The federal deficit is widely viewed as the United States' number one

economic problem. Yet there is no consensus on how to measure the deficit.

Some want to exclude the current Social Security surplus, others want to

include the full value of the savings and loan (S&L) bailout, and others are

concerned about adjustments for unfunded government retirement liabilities,

inflation, growth, and government acquisition and sale of assets. The debate

has not been restricted to politicians. Economists have played a major role

in lobbying for their favorite definitions of the deficit (e.g., Feldstein

[I9741 and Eisner and Pieper [1984]).

Of course, a lot is at stake in how one measures the deficit. Given

current policy, leaving out Social Security surpluses means whopping deficits

through the 1990s, while adjusting for inflation and growth almost turns the

officially defined deficit into a surplus. Because the underlying credo of

fiscal policy is to cut spending or raise taxes to make "the" deficit zero,

the attention given to the deficit's definition is not surprising.

The goal of setting the deficit to zero seems quite strange in light of

our uncertainty about how the deficit should be measured. If we are not sure

what the deficit is, how can we be sure it should be zero? Rather than

continuing to debate the deficit's measurement, perhaps we should first ask

what concept the deficit is supposed to measure and then determine a measure

consistent with that concept.

The conceptual issue associated with the word "deficit" is the

intergenerational distribution of welfare. Specifically, how much are

different generations paying to finance government consumption and to

subsidize each other? Unfortunately, from the perspective of economic theory,

the deficit is an arbitrary accounting construct whose value has no necessary


relation to the question of generational burdens. As demonstrated by

Kotlikoff (1984, 1988, 1989) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), from a

theoretical perspective the government can conduct any fiscal policy it

chooses while simultaneously reporting any size deficit or surplus. It can do

so simply through the choice of how it labels its receipts and payments. - For

example, the government can (and does) label workers' Social Security

contributions "taxes" and retirees' Social Security benefits "transfers."

Suppose, instead, that the government labeled workers' contributions "loans"

to the government and retirees' benefits "return of principal and interest" on

these "loans" plus an additional "old age tax" equal to the difference between

benefits and the "return of principal plus interestn on the "loans." In this

case, the reported deficit would be entirely different not only with respect

to its level, but also with respect to its changes over time.' This is not an

isolated example; every dollar the government takes in or pays out is labeled

in a manner that is economically arbitrary.

If the deficit has no intrinsic relation to generational policy, what

measure does? The answer, according to economic theory, is what we term

generational accounts. These are accounts - one for each generation - that tally, in present value, the amount of receipts less payments the government

can expect to collect from each generation during its remaining life span.

These generational accounts are comprehensive in that they consider all

receipts and payments collected from or paid to all federal, state, and local

governments. In contrast to the deficit, generational accounts are invariant

to changes in accounting labels. This may be seen, for example, by

considering the alternative labeling of Social Security just discussed. For

each generation, the present value of its Social Security "taxn contributions


less its receipts of "transfers" consisting of Social Security benefits is

identically equal to the present value of its "old age tax."

Generational accounts are discussed in the context of the government's

intertemporal budget constraint, which states that the government's current

net wealth plus the present value of the government's net receipts from all

current and future generations (the generational accounts) must be sufficient

to pay for the present value of the government's current and future

consumption. By comparing what the government is projected to take from

current generations with the difference between its projected consumption

expenditures and its current net wealth, one can estimate the amount that

future generations will need to pay. Hence, the generational account approach

indicates directly the burden on future generations imposed by increases in

expenditures on existing generations, including the elderly generations

currently alive. This "zero sum" feature of the government's intertemporal

budget constraint (some generation has to pay for any benefit to another

generation) imposes a useful discipline on fiscal analysis. If the government

were to adopt the accounting framework developed in this study, it would be

required to specify the costs to be borne by future generations for programs

that help existing generations, and vice versa.

The generational accounts can also be used to assess the effects on

national saving of programs to redistribute more or less to current

generations. For example, a decision to lower Medicare benefits means an

increase in the expected present value of net payments to the government by

the existing elderly. The change in the present-value accounts of each

elderly generation due to this policy represents the change in their lifetime

resources. Using recent generation-specific estimates of the propensity to

consume out of lifetime resources developed by Abel, Bernheim, and Kotlikoff


(1991), one can consider the effect of such policy changes on national

consumption and national saving.

The primary sources of data used in this study are the Bureau of the

Census' Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), the Social Security

Administration's population projections, the Bureau of Labor Statistics'

Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CES) from 1980 onward, and the National Income

and Product Accounts (NIPA) reported in the July 1990 Survey of Current

Business . The findings of this paper suggest a larger fiscal burden - 17 to 24

percent larger - on future generations than the burden to be imposed on 1989 newborns under current policy (ignoring the 1990 federal budget deal). These

figures are adjusted for growth; i.e., the increase is 17 to 24 percent above

the increase in fiscal burden that would accompany trend growth. The

assessment that future generations face 17 to 24 percent higher net taxes over

the course of their lifetimes suggests a significant generational problem. If

it is not subverted, the new federal budget deal will substantially reduce, if

not eliminate, the additional burden that would otherwise be imposed on future

generations.

The paper continues in section I1 with a more precise description of both

generational accounts and their relationship to the government's intertemporal

budget constraint. Section I11 describes how one can use the generational

accounts to assess the generational stance of fiscal policy. Section IV

considers the relationship of each generation's account to its own lifetime

budget constraint. Section V provides a detailed description of the data

sources and methodology used in calculating the generational accounts.

Section VI presents our findings, including policy simulations. Our findings

should be viewed as preliminary because a number of aspects of our


calculations can be improved with the additional data that we are now in the

process of procuring. We simulate 1) the President's proposed capital-gains

tax cut, 2) eliminating the 1983 Social Security benefit cuts scheduled to go

into effect around the turn of the century, 3) growth in Medicare spending in

excess of the economywide growth rate, 4) the impact of the $500 billion SdrL

bailout, 5) slower growth in government consumption spending, and 6) the

budget deal enacted by Congress and signed by the President. Finally,

section VII summarizes our findings and draws conclusions.

11. Generational Accounts

The term "generations" refers in this paper to males and females by

specific years of age. The term "net payments" refers to the difference

between government tax receipts of all types (such as federal and state income

taxes) and government transfer payments of all types (such as Social Security

benefits, unemployment benefits, and food stamps). Finally, all present

values reflect discounting at a pre-tax interest rate.

To make the generational accounts and their relationship to the

government's budget constraint more precise, we write the government's

intertemporal budget constraint for year t in equation (1):

D Q) Q)

(1 1

Nt, t-s + ENt,t++g + w f - L G ~ n - s-0 s-1 s-t j-1 (l+rjIm

The first term on the left-hand side of (1) is the sum of the present value of

the net payments of existing generations. The expression N stands for the t,k

present value of net remaining lifetime payments to the government of the

generation born in year k discounted to year t. The index s in this summation

runs from age 0 to age D, the maximum length of life. Hence, the first


element of this summation is Ntlt, which is the present value of net payments

of the generation born in year t; the last term is Nt,t-D, the present value

of remaining net payments of the oldest generation alive in year t, namely

those born in year t-D. The second term on the left-hand side of (1) is the

sum of the present value of remaining net payments of future generations. The

third term on the left-hand side, wgt, denotes the government's net wealth in

year t. The right-hand side of (1) expresses the present value of government

consumption. In the latter expression, Gs stands for government consumption

expenditure in year s, and r stands for the pre-tax rate of return in year j.

Equation (1) indicates the zero-sum nature of intergenerational fiscal

policy. Holding the right-hand side of equation (1) fixed, increased

(decreased) government payments to (receipts taken from) existing generations

mean a decrease in the first term on the left-hand side of (1) and require an

offsetting increase in the second term on the left-hand side of (1); i.e.,

they require reduced payments to, or increased payments from, future

generations.

The term Ntlk is defined in equation (2):

- In expression (2), TSsk stands for the projected average net payment to the

government made in year s by a member of the generation born in year k. By a

generation's average net payment in year s, we mean the average across all

members of the generation alive in year s of payments made, such as for income

and Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes, less all transfers

received, such as from Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI),

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Unemployment Insurance (UI),


etc. The term PSsk stands for the number of surviving members of the cohort

in year s who were born in year k. For generations born prior to year t, the

summation begins in year t. For generations born in year k, where k>t, the

summation begins in year k. Regardless of the generation's year of birth, the

discounting is always back to year t.

A set of generational accounts is simply a set of values of Nt,k, one for

each existing and future generation, with the property that the combined total

value adds up to the right-hand side of equation (1). In our calculation of

the NtSkts for existing generations (those whose &1989), we distinguish male

from female cohorts, but to ease notation, we do not append sex subscripts to

the terms in equations (1) and (2).

III. Assessing the Intergenerational Stance of Fiscal Policy

Once we have calculated the right-hand side of equation (1) and the first

term on the left-hand side of equation (I), we determine, as a residual, the

value of the second term on the right-hand side of equation (I), which is the

present value of payments required of future generations. We further

determine the amount that needs to be taken from each successive generation to

balance the government's intertemporal budget, assuming that each successive

generation's payment is the same up to an adjustment for real productivity

growth.

This growth-adjusted constant amount is what must be taken from

successive generations to maintain what Kotlikoff.(1989) terms "fiscal

balance." One can compare this measure with the actual amount projected to be

taken under current policy from existing generations, particularly the

generation that has just been born. In other words, these data provide the

answer to the question: Given the projected treatment of current generations


as reflected in the values of their Nt,k's, do we need to take substantially

more from future generations than we are planning (as reflected by current

policy) to take from current generations? In particular, is Nt,t

substantially smaller than Nt,t+l under the assumption that all values of N t, s

for s>t+l equal Nt,t+l, except for an adjustment for productivity growth? 2

Note that our assumption that all values of Nt,, for s>t+l are equal,

except for a growth adjustment, is just one of many assumptions one could make

about the distribution across future generations of their collective net

payment to the government. We could, for example, assume a phase-in of the

additional fiscal burden (which could be negative) to be imposed on new young

generations. Clearly, this would mean that new young generations born after

the phase-in period has elapsed would face a larger (or possibly smaller) Nt,s

than we are calculating here. Our purpose in assuming both 1) growth-adjusted

equal treatment of future generations and 2) that the Nt,,'s of current

generations are those one would project under current policy is to illustrate

the potential intergenerational imbalance in fiscal policy and the potential

need for adjusting current fiscal policy. Our intent is not to claim that

policy will necessarily deal with the intergenerational imbalance by treating

all future generations equally or, indeed, by putting all of the burden on

future generations.

Understanding the size of the Ntlk's for current generations and their

likely magnitude for future generations is not the end of the story with

respect to assessing the intergenerational stance or incidence of fiscal

policy. As studied in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), intergenerational

redistribution will alter the time path of factor prices and, thereby, the

intergenerational distribution of welfare. Such changes in factor prices

result from changes in the supply of capital relative to labor. But the


changes in the supplies of capital and labor can, in turn, be traced back to

changes in consumption and labor supply decisions, which are based on private

lifetime budget constraints. As described in the next section, the Nt,k's

enter private budget constraints. Hence, knowing how their values change is

essential not only for understanding the direct effect of government policy on

the intergenerational welfare distribution, but also for assessing the changes

in factor prices that may result from the policy. Thus, understanding fully

the incidence of intergenerational fiscal policy requires knowledge of changes

in the values of the Nt,k's arising from the policy.

Indeed, one of the future goals of this research is to consider how

policies other than those examined here might affect the values of the Nt,k's

for the elderly and other existing generations and to assess the impact of

such policies on national saving. In a recent study, Abel, Bernheim, and

Kotlikoff (1991) used CES data to calculate average and marginal propensities

to consume of U.S. households according to the age of the household head. We

intend to use these results to determine the U.S. consumption response to a

range of potential intergenerational fiscal policies. A generation's

consumption response to the hypothetical policies will simply be calculated as

the change in the generation's N multiplied by the corresponding marginal t , k

propensity to consume.

IV. How Do the Ntlk's Enter Private Budget Constraints?

The lifetime budget constraint of each generation specifies that the

present value of its consumption must equal its current net wealth, plus the

present value of its human wealth, plus the present value of its net private

intergenerational transfers, less the present value of its net payments to the

government, its Nt,k. This section shows precisely how the NtSk's enter


private budget constraints and how we can use our estimates on the Nt,k's and

additional information to infer the extent of net private intergenerational

transfers.

For the generation born in year k, the year t remaining lifetime budget

constraint is

k+D - - s 1

k+D - S

TI 1 (3) s-t x [ C s , k + l s , k l P s , k j - t + l l + r j = ~:,k+ s=t Es,kPs,k j=t+l a -- l+r j Nt, k*

- The terms Es,k. Is&, and fs ,k stand, respectively, for the average values

in year s of consumption, private net intergenerational transfers, and labor

earnings of the generation born in year k. The term uptnk stands for the year

t net wealth of the generation born in year k. This equation states that the

sum of the present value of the cohort's projected consumption and its net

intergenerational transfers equals the present value of its resources. The

present value of its resources equals, in turn, its net wealth, plus the

present value of its labor earnings, less the present value of its net

payments to the government, Nt,k. Data are available for estimating the

present value of a cohort's consumption, the present value of its labor

earnings, and its current net worth. Hence, in future work we intend to

compare our estimates of N with the projected present value of the cohort's t ,k

remaining lifetime resources. We will also use these data and equation (3) to

derive, as a residual, an estimate of the projected present value of the

cohort's net private intergenerational transfers.

As mentioned, in our actual calculations we distinguish generations by

sex as well as age in 1990. Our calculated age- and sex-specific values for

the present value of intergenerational transfers include, therefore,

intragenerational transfers from males to females. Hence, in determining the


magnitude of transfers that are truly intergenerational (across age groups) we

combine the calculated private transfers of male and female generations of the

same age. This provides us with a statement of the net present value of

private transfers given by (received from) both the male and the female

members of a given generation to members of other generations.

In the previous section we discussed comparing the N *s of future t , k

generations with NtPt, which is the net lifetime payments of the generation

that was born at time t. We also discussed comparing the Ntgk*s of all

existing generations under current policy with their respective values under a

different policy. These comparisons, which involve differences (either across

generations or across policies) in NtPk1s, are invariant to the accounting

framework we are adopting, although the absolute values of the Nttk*s depend

on our accounting framework.

To see this point, consider once again the labeling of Social Security

receipts and payments. Although the U.S. government labels Social Security

contributions as "taxes" and Social Security benefits as "transfers," from the

perspective of economic theory one could equally well label these

contributions as "private saving" (invested in government bonds) and label the

benefits as the "return of principal plus interest" on that saving, less an

"old age tax" that would be positive or negative, depending on whether the

Social Security system was less than or more than actuarially fair in present

value. Under either choice of labels, the right-hand side of the budget

constraint (3) would retain the same value, but the division of the right-hand

side between wPt and Nk , would change. It is in this sense that the absolute

value of the Nk,t's depends on the accounting framework. However, regardless

of which way one accounts for (labels) the Social Security system, the change

in the value of Nt,k from a policy change, such as a reduction in Social


Security benefits, would be the same. Under the conventional labeling, the

change in the value of the Nt,k's would simply equal the reduction for

generation k in the time t present value of their receipts from Social

Security. Under the "private saving less an old age taxn labeling, the change

in the value of the NtSk's would simply equal the increase for generation k in

the time t present value of their old age tax.

Although the change in the value of the NtSk's associated with a policy

change is invariant to the accounting convention (the choice of labels for

government receipts and payments), the same is not true for the government's

budget deficit. The same change in policy will lead to different changes in

the reported budget deficit depending on one's choice of labels for government

receipts and payments. For example, consider the impact of an equal reduction

in Social Security contributions and benefit payments under the two labeling

schemes for Social Security. If the contributions are labeled "taxes" and the

benefits are labeled "transfers," this policy change will have no effect on

the budget deficit, since the change in "taxesn equals the change in

"transfern spending. In contrast, if Social Security contributions are

labeled "private saving" and Social Security benefits are labeled "return of

principal plus interest" plus "an old age tax," an equal and simultaneous

reduction in contributions and benefit payments will mean a larger "old age

taxn for elderly recipients and will imply a reduction in the budget deficit.

V. Calculating the Ntlk8s and Other Components o f the Government and Each

Generation ' s In tertemporal Budget Constraints

A . Data Sources for Calculatin~ Net Pavments

According to equation (2), estimating the values of the N 's requires t,k

projections of net payments, the Ts , k's for D+lesZk, population proj actions,


the Ps,k'~ for D+ksZk, and the time path of interest rates. Projections of

the population by age and sex are available from the Social Security

Administration through 2050, and we have extrapolated these projections

through the year 2100 in the course of a study of demographics and saving

(Auerbach, Cai, and Kotlikoff [1990]).

We use SIPP data to calculate the average 1984 values by age and sex of

each of the different types of government receipts and payments covered in

SIPP. The SIPP sample size is roughly 16,000 U.S. households. The SIPP is a

panel survey that reinterviewed respondent households eight times (every four

months) over the course of two years. The first wave of interviews began in

July 1983 and ended in July 1985. Thus, for 1984, there is a complete

calendar year of SIPP data. The government receipts and payments in the SIPP

survey include federal and state income and FICA taxes, food stamps, AFDC and

WIC benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), general relief, unemployment

compensation, Social Security retirement, survivor and disability benefits,

other welfare, foster child care, and other government transfers. Denton

Vaughan (1989) provides a detailed analysis of the improvements in the

measurement of government receipts and payments in the SIPP as compared with

other surveys such as The Current Population Survey.

The major deficiency in SIPP's coverage of government receipts and

payments is with respect to Medicaid and Medicare health care payments. To

determine the average amount of Medicare payments by age (the data are not

available by sex), we use Waldo et al.'s (1989) calculations of average

expenditures by age. Data on Medicaid expenditures by age and sex were

obtained from the Health Care Financing Administration (1990).


B. Determininp Net Pavments

The average values of the receipts and payments by age and sex calculated

from SIPP and the Medicare data a r e used only t o determine the values of these

receipts and payments by age and sex r e l a t i ve t o t h a t of a base age-sex

category, which we take t o be 40-year-old males. Given these r e l a t i v e

p ro f i l e s , we determine our i n i t i a l year (1990) average values of each type of

payment and r ece ip t by age and sex by benchmarking against aggregate t o t a l s

reported i n the NIPA aggregate values of government rece ip t s and t ransfe rs .

We then assume tha t the age- and sex-specific average values of these payments

and rece ip t s i n future years equal those calculated fo r 1990, adjusted f o r an

assumed growth r a t e .

To provide an example of t h i s procedure i n a simple two-period context

where there a r e only young and old, suppose t o t a l rece ip t s of a ce r ta in type

a t a given da te equal $1,000 and suppose we know tha t the average payment fo r

old people equals twice the average for the young. Also suppose we know tha t

there a r e 200 young and 150 old. Then the amount paid by each young person Z

must s a t i s f y $1,000 - Z x 200 + Z x 2 x 150. Solving t h i s equation fo r Z and

multiplying by 2 gives the amount paid on average by o ld people. I f the

growth r a t e is g, then the projected payment of the young (old) k periods from

now is z x (l+g)k 12 x z x ( I + ~ ) ~ ] .

More general ly , we denote by Rrnagi (RfaPi) the average value of the i t h

payment or r ece ip t made by (received by) an age a male (female) i n 1984

divided by the average value of the type i payment ( rece ip t ) made by 40-year-

old males i n 1984. Let Hi,t denote the aggregate revenues (expenditures) of

type i received by (made by) the government i n year t (1990). Finally, l e t

p a , i , t and Ef i, denote, respectively, the average values f o r males and

females of payment ( receipt) i i n year t. Then we have


Equation (4) states that total payments (receipts) of type i in year t equal

the average value of these payments (receipts) for 40-year-old males times the

cross product of the age-sex profile for payment (receipt) i and the

population by age and sex. We use equation (4) to solve for i;D40, i, t. The

values of the P a , i s t ' s a40 and the Cfa, ' s are obtained by multiplying

p40,i,t by RrnaSi and RfaSi, respectively. We assume that papi,, and

Lfa,i,s for s>t equal their respective year t values multiplied by an assumed

growth factor. The term ?fs ,k for males (females) in equation (2) is

determined by summing over i the values of T-k, i, (Gfs-k, +).

Clearly, for certain types of payments and receipts, such as Medicare

benefits, the choice of the proper growth factor may be particularly

difficult. But rather than choose one value, we present results for different

growth rate assumptions. The same type of sensitivity analysis applies to the

choice of the interest rate to be used in the discounting. While the absolute

magnitude of the terms in the government's intertemporal budget constraint are

sensitive to these assumptions, the assessment of the burden being placed on

future generations relative to that being placed on current generations

happens to be not very sensitive to these assumptions.

C. The Treatment of Labor Income Taxes

We determine the relative profile of total labor income by age and sex

from the SIPP data and apply this profile to aggregate labor income taxes.

The aggregate value of labor income tax payments is calculated as 80.4 percent

of total federal, state, and local income taxes, where 80.4 is labor's share


of net national product. In calculating this figure, we assume that labor's

share of proprietorship and partnership income as well as its share of

indirect tax payments equals its share of net national product. The resulting

figure for aggregate labor income taxes is $446.1 billion.

D. * We use information on labor earnings in the SIPP to infer the amount of

FICA taxes paid by each household member. From these data we then determine

the relative profile of FICA tax payments by age and sex. This profile is

benchmarked against aggregate social insurance contributions, including

contributions by government workers to their pension funds. The 1989 value of

aggregate contributions for social insurance is $476.8 billion.

E. The Treatment of Capital Income Taxes

Taxes on capital income require special treatment for two related

reasons. First, unlike other taxes, taxes on capital income may be

capitalized into the value of existing (old) assets. Second, the time pattern

of income and tax payments may differ. As a result, capital income taxes must

be attributed with care in order to ensure that they are assigned to the

proper generation. If all forms of capital income were taxed at the same

rate, there would be no such problem. All assets would yield the same rate of

return before tax (adjusted for risk) and each individual would face a rate of

return reduced by the full extent of the tax. However, if tax rates on the

income from some assets, typically older ones, are higher than those facing

income from new assets (e.g., because of investment incentives targeted toward

new investment), a simple arbitrage argument (see, for example, Auerbach and

Kotlikoff [1987], chapter 9) indicates that the extra tax burden on the old


assets should be capitalized into these assets* values, reflecting their less

favorable treatment. This suggests that the flow of capital income taxes

overstates the burden on new investment. On the other hand, the presence of

accelerated depreciation allowances works in the opposite direction, since

initial tax payments from new investment understate the long-run tax burden on

such investments. Although current tax payments overstate the tax burden on

new capital by their inclusion of taxes that are already capitalized in the

value of existing assets, the understatement of the burden on new investment

works in the opposite direction.

We require a method that calculates the value of capitalized taxes and

corrects the flow of taxes for these two measurement problems. The appendix

provides such a method. To illustrate the nature of the correction, consider

the case of cash-flow taxation, in which assets are written off immediately.

A well-known result is that the effective marginal capital income tax rate

under cash-flow taxation is zero. However, taxes would be collected each year

on existing capital assets, and such assets should therefore be valued at a

discount. Assigning these taxes to the assets* initial owners, rather than to

members of future generations who may purchase the assets, recognizes that

future generations may freely invest in new assets and pay a zero rate of tax

on the resulting income. Our correction to actual tax payments should, in

this case, result in a zero tax burden on the income from new assets.

The principle underlying our treatment of intramarginal capital income

taxes and the discounting of other payments and receipts at pre-tax rates of

return is that one can express private intertemporal budget constraints in the

presence of government behavior as 1) the budget constraint that would prevail

in the absence of the government with 2) a single modification to the present


value of resources that equals Nttk, the present value of the generation's net

payment to the government. In other words, one can express private budgets in

terms of pre-tax prices less net taxes valued at pre-tax prices. In the case

of our adjustment for intramarginal capital income taxes, we are simply

valuing capital at its pre-tax price and treating the capitalized value of

taxes as another payment required by the government from the owners of that

capital.

In allocating capital income taxes we 1) correct our estimate of future

capital income taxes to account for their inclusion of taxes on old capital

and the generational timing of capital income taxes, 2) use equation (4) and

the SIPP profile of private net wealth holdings by age and sex to allocate

total 1989 taxes on new capital by age and sex, 3) project future capital

income taxes by age and sex using the 1989 age- and sex-specific values

adjusted for growth, and 4) allocate to 1989 owners of capital as a one-time

tax payment the 1989 capitalized value of the excess taxation of older

capital. The allocation of this one-time tax by age and sex is based on the

SIPP profile of asset holdings by age and sex. Note that in the budget

constraint of each existing generation, we value its holdings of existing

capital at market value plus the capitalized value of intramarginal taxes.

In these calculations, we set aggregate capital income taxes equal to

19.6 percent (capital's share of net national product) of total federal,

state, and local income taxes, plus federal, state, and local corporate taxes

(excluding the profits of the Federal Reserve System), plus estate taxes. The

resulting value of 1989 aggregate capital income taxes is $234.9 billion.

Using the method described in the appendix, we estimate that the flow of

capital income taxes in 1989 overstated the capital income tax burden on new

investment by $6.09 billion and that the capitalized value of excess taxes on


old capital equals $609 billion. These estimates are calculated in the

following manner. We take the value of nonresidential equipment and

structures plus the value of non-owner-occupied housing owned by taxable

investors (both of which are reported in the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds for

1989), $5,488.8 trillion, and multiply this by 11.1 percent, our estimate of

the tax-induced percentage difference between the market value and replacement

cost of these assets. We allocate the $609 billion ($5,488.8 x .Ill) in

capitalized taxes as a one-time tax to those age- and sex-specific 1989

cohorts according to the SIPP profile of relative net wealth holdings by age

and sex.

F. r n t p k 3

Another form of payment to the government is the seignorage it collects

on private holdings of money balances. Net of the negligible costs of

printing money, the government collects, in each year, resources equal to the

real value of new money printed. In holding this money, households forgo the

nominal rate of return available on other assets.

Our strategy for attributing seignorage to different generations may be

illustrated using the analogy of an excise tax on durable goods. Suppose the

government levied such an excise tax. Households would then spend more to

obtain durables, and would therefore face a higher imputed cost of using these

goods until they had depreciated or were sold. If a durable good were sold

(tax free) in the future, it would command a price in excess of its

replacement cost, reflecting the arbitrage with respect to new durables facing

the excise tax. A measure of the net fiscal burden imposed on the household

by the excise tax is the household's tax payment upon purchase less this

recoupment of the tax upon sale, discounted to the present. In the same way,


we attribute the burden of seignorage to households of particular generations

by treating the entire acquisition of money balances as a payment to the

government and the disposition of money balances as a transfer from the

government. This has the effect of imputing a cost equal to the nominal

interest rate on the holding of money balances, and also attributes to all

current and future generations taken together a total fiscal burden equal to

the present value of government receipts from printing money.

We add the present value of such seignorage payments to the present value

of other net payments in forming the Nt,k's. Specifically, we project average

money balances held by each age- and sex-specific generation through the

remainder of its life and add each year's net acquisitions (positive or

negative) of the monetary base to the Nt,k's. As with all of our

calculations, we have been careful to benchmark against national aggregates.

In this case, we have ensured that the sum of age- and sex-specific

generations' net acquisitions of the monetary base equals the Dec. 1988 to

Dec. 1989 change in aggregate base money, which is $21.6 billion.

G. Including: Excise Taxes in the Nt,kh

Excise tax payments are not included in the SIPP data. To determine the

amount of excise taxes paid by the age- and sex-specific generations, we use

the CES data. We use these calculations as well to project each generation's

annual flow and present value of excise taxes. Our benchmark value of

aggregate 1989 excise taxes of $414.0 billion equals the 1989 NIPA value of

total excise taxes, less total property taxes, plus business property taxes;

i.e., we include only those property taxes assessed on business. We use the

U.S. Department of Commerce's (1987) share of business property tax

assessments in total (business plus residential) property tax assessments to


divide total property taxes between businesses and residences. This share is

43.9 percent. In determining the 1989 NIPA value of total excise taxes, we

include those state and local property and excise taxes listed in the NIPA

accounts as "Personal Tax and Nontax Receipts." We do not, however, include

those nontax receipts that are included as part of "Personal Tax and Nontax

Receipts" as excise taxes. Instead, we treat these items, which include

tuition and hospital charges, as a return to government assets.

' s H. Includin~ Residential Pro~ertv Taxes in the Nt,k-

We treat residential property taxes as excise taxes on home ownership and

allocate these taxes by age and sex using an age-sex profile of relative house

values. This profile was obtained from the SIPP data for 1984. In this

calculation, house values for married couples were divided evenly between the

spouses. As in the case of other taxes, we benchmark average property taxes

by age and sex using the 1989 value of total residential property taxes, which

equals $62.4 billion, and we project future average property tax payments

using the 1989 age- and sex-specific averages with an adjustment for growth.

I. Treatment of Social Security and Other Government Transfers

We divide total government transfer payments excluding federal, state,

and local civil service, railroad retirement, and veterans' benefits into six

categories: OASDI (including Federal Supplementary Security Income), hospital

insurance (HI or Medicare), AFDC, general welfare (including Medicaid),

unemployment insurance (UI), and food stamps (including WIC). We use the SIPP

data to determine relative profiles by age and sex of each of these categories

of government transfers. To determine average 1989 values.of these transfer

payments, we benchmark the relative profiles against the NIPA aggregates using


equation (4). The absolute average values of each type of transfer. payment by

age and sex in future years are assumed to equal their respective 1989 values

adjusted for growth. The one exception to this procedure is with respect to

future Social Security benefits. We make a rough adjustment for the impact of

the 1983 Social Security amendments on future benefits of the baby boom and

subsequent generations. These amendments reduce future Social Security

benefits by 1) phasing in a two-year delay in the receipt of normal retirement

benefits and 2) subjecting an increasing share of Social Security benefits to

federal income taxation. Our adjustment involves reducing the average Social

Security benefits of each new cohort who reaches age 65 in the year 2000 and

beyond. The reduction in each year's post-age-65 benefit is 1 percent for

cohorts who are age 65 in the year 2000, 2 percent for cohorts who are age 65

in 2001, 3 percent for cohorts who are age 65 in 2002, etc., with a maximum

reduction of 15 percent. Thus, cohorts who reach age 65 in 2014 or later

experience a 15-percent reduction in the average annual value of their post-

age-64 Social Security benefits relative to the growth-adjusted value of the

same Social Security benefits prevailing in 1989.

J . Calculatin~~~ -ent Consum~tion

Our procedure for projecting the future path of total government

consumption is to decompose total 1990 government consumption expenditures

into 1) expenditures on those aged 0-24, 25-64, and 65+ and 2) non-age-

specific expenditures, such as d e f e n ~ e . ~ We denote year t expenditures on

- those aged 0 to 24 divided by the year t population aged 0 to 64 as

gy,t,

where y stands for young. We denote &,, , and zo, as the corresponding year

t average government consumption expenditures on the middle-aged (those 25 to

64) and old (those 65 and older). Finally, we denote gt as the year t level


of non-age-specific government expenditures divided by the total year t

- - - - population. We assume that the values of g y y s ~ Cys. g o , and gs for s>t

equal their respective year t values multiplied by a common growth factor.

Total government consumption expenditures in year s are then determined as

where Py,s, PmYs, Po,,, and Ps stand for the population of young, middle-aged,

old, and the total population in year s. We use the OECD's 1986 division of

total U.S. government consumption expenditures among the four expenditure

categories plus our benchmark value of aggregate expenditures, Gs9 to

- - - - determine the values of h y t , gost, and gt. The OECD's division of

U.S. government consumption expenditures was 29.1 percent on the young (aged

0-24), 6.0 percent on the middle-aged (aged 25-64), 7.1 percent on the old

(65+), and the remaining 57.8 percent on the total population. Our measure of

Gt is the 1989 NIPA value of total government consumption expenditures plus

the value of civil service, military, and veterans' retirement, medical, and

disability benefits. We include these additional payments as part of

government consumption rather than as transfer payments because they are part

of government compensation to its employees. The resulting value for 1989

total government consumption expenditures is $1.142 trillion.

An important issue in considering government as well as private

consumption is the treatment of durable goods. The proper economic treatment

involves imputing rent on private and government durables and including this

rent (and excluding expenditures on durables) in private and government

consumption, respectively. Except for housing, however, NIPA treats


expenditures on durables as current consumption. While we follow the same

treatment of durable goods in this paper, future analysis will adjust for the

proper economic treatment of private and government expenditures on durables.

K.

Because we want our generational accounts and analysis of different

generations' private budget constraints to be consistent with NIPA data,

including the total (federal, state, and local) government deficit, we take as

our measure of 1989 total government net wealth net government interest

payments divided by the sum of 1) our assumed real interest rate and 2) an

assumed 5 percent inflation rate.4 Our measure of government net interest

payments is $79.4 billion smaller than the NIPA figure of $131.8 billion

because we categorize state and local nontax receipts as positive capital

income earned on state and local assets. Assuming a 6 percent real interest

rate, the 1989 value of government net wealth is -$571 billion.

L. ;h

The 1984 SIPP data are used to determine the age- and sex-specific

relative wealth profile. Specifically, we calculate the weighted-average

values of net wealth by age and sex for 1984 and normalize these values by the

weighted-average value of net wealth of 40-year-old males. This provides

values of Qma and qfa, the relative age-sex wealth profile. Total private-

sector wealth in 1989 can then be written as


where p40, stands for the average wealth of a 40-year-old male in year t,

and is total 1989 private net wealth. Equation (6) may be used to solve

for p40, t. The corresponding values of pa, a 4 0 and qfa,, are determined by multiplying p 4 0 by Q~~ and gfj , respectively.

In using the SIPP data, we distribute household wealth to the owner of

that wealth, where the ownership is indicated. In the case of married

couples, we allocate half of the household's total wealth to each spouse. We

set future values of net wealth by age and sex equal to the 1989 values

adjusted for growth.

M. The Choice of Interest Rate

The government budget constraint given in equation (1) depends crucially

on the choice of the interest rate r that is used in discounting future flows

to and from the government sector. If all such flows were certain and

riskless, it would.clearly be appropriate to use the government's borrowing

rate, essentially a risk-free rate, in our calculations. Given that these

flows are only estimated, however, which rate is appropriate to use?

The answer to this question depends on what we mean by fiscal balance in

the presence of uncertainty. On the one hand, there is a straightforward

argument that the government's actual borrowing rate is still appropriate.

Suppose, for example, that a future receipt has an expected value of x, but

that the true value of the receipt may turn out to be higher or lower. If it

is higher, the government will have to borrow a bit more; if it is less, less

borrowing will be required. Assuming that the government's borrowing rate is

not affected by these fluctuations, the discounted values will cancel in a

calculation of expected discounted revenue, leaving the discounted value of

the expected revenue x in the budget constraint. Thus, if we wish to consider


the payments from future generations that we expect will be needed to provide

fiscal balance, the procedure based on expected flows discounted with the

government's borrowing rate is correct.

However, expected fiscal balance may not be the only valid measure, or

even the most informative measure, about fiscal incidence. After all, raising

a future individual's fiscal burden by $100 in some cases and lowering it by

$100 with the same probability in others needn't be a matter of indifference

to the individual if he is risk averse. If the increased burden is associated

with other negative news (as will be true, for example, if government revenue

needs to rise during recessions), then these deviations from expected revenues

will not cancel from the taxpayer's perspective. To reflect this, we might

wish to discount future receipts with a higher discount rate that accounts for

this risk. The effect will be to raise the level of receipts necessary for

fiscal balance to be achieved, reflecting the fact that the burden of

uncertain taxes exceeds their expected value. Likewise, the treatment of

government spending and transfers should be adjusted for risk, although one

should use the same discount rate only if the fluctuations in such spending

have the same risk characteristics as taxes do.

In our simulations below, we make different interest-rate assumptions in

calculating fiscal balance in order to accommodate the alternative views just

discussed. The first approach is to apply a low, risk-free rate to the

projected flows, in keeping with the view of fiscal balance as expected

balance. The second is to apply a market rate, adjusted for risk, in our

discounting of all of the flows in the government's budget constraint. This

approach is consistent with fiscal balance being satisfied in risk-adjusted

terms.


VI. Findings

A.

Tables 1 and 2 contain the generational accounts for males and females

for different combinations of growth-rate and interest-rate assumptions.

Tables la-c and 2a-c contain the same information for alternative assumptions

about population structure, the treatment of capital income taxation, and the

discount rate, which we will discuss after reviewing the results in the first

two tables.

All of these tables show positive values for the accounts of young and

middle-aged cohorts alive in 1989, indicating that these generations will, on

balance, pay more in present value than they receive. For generations of

males aged 65 and older, the net present value of payments is negative. This

primarily reflects the fact that older generations, whose members are

typically retired, can expect to pay relatively little in labor income taxes

and payroll taxes over the rest of their lives, while receiving significant

Social Security, Medicare, and retirement benefits. For females, the

generational accounts are negative for those aged 55 and over. The younger

age at which this occurs for women is attributable to the lower labor-force

participation rates of women and the fact that many women receive Social

Security benefits as dependents of older spouses.

In tables 1 and 2, the values of the accounts more than double between

age zero and age 25. For example, in the case g-.0075 and r-.06 (which we

take as our "base case"), the age zero account for males is $73.7 thousand and

the age 25 account is $193.0 thousand. This simply reflects the fact that 25-

year-olds are closer to their peak taxpaying years than are newborns. The

accounts are most negative around age 75. For the base case, the age 75

account is -$41.5 thousand.


The bottom row of each table, labeled "Future Generations," indicates the

present value of amounts that males and females born in 1990 will pay, on

average, assuming that subsequent generations pay this same amount except for

an adjustment for growth. For the base case, this amount is $89.5 thousand

for males. This means that males born in 1990 will be greeted with a bill

from all levels of government of $89.5 thousand, which is 20.5 percent larger

than the bill facing newborns in 1989, adjusted for growth (the amount that

the 1989 newborns are expected to pay, on average [$73.7 thousand], times one

plus the growth rate [1.0075], or $74.3 thousand). Males born in 1991 will

face a bill for $90.2 thousand, which equals $89.5 thousand multiplied by

1.0075; males born in 1992 will pay $90.8 thousand ($89.5 thousand times

1.0075 squared), and so forth. For females born in 1990, the bill will be

$44.2 thousand, based on the assumption that future female and male "birth

bills" have the same ratio as those of age zero males and females in 1989.

Tables la-c (males) and 2a-c (females) present the same calculations

under different assumptions. Tables la and 2a show the results of assuming

that no further demographic change will occur in the United States, i.e., that

the population age distribution will be constant after 1990. These tables are

helpful in understanding the fiscal impact of the continuing demographic

transition to an older population. Assuming that the population structure

remains constant, the tables show that younger generations, those who will

bear the brunt of the fiscal burdens from the demographic shift, would be

better off. This is particularly true for males.

Tables lb and 2b demonstrate the importance of our special treatment of

capital income taxes. Treating all capital income taxes as marginal taxes on

new capital income lowers the fiscal burden on older living generations, since

these groups are no longer being assigned the reduction in capital values


associated with the inframarginal taxation of old capital. Very young living

generations would face a somewhat higher fiscal burden, since these groups

hold little capital and will face many years of somewhat higher marginal tax

rates. On balance, the reduced capital income taxes facing older living

generations and the slightly increased capital income taxes facing younger

living generations imply a considerably larger burden on future generations.

For the base case parameters, accounts of future generations are now 33.3

percent (rather than 20.5 percent) larger than the growth-adjusted value for

newborns in 1989. Thus, failure to take account of the capitalization of some

capital income taxes causes one to understate the viability of the current tax

structure by ignoring the taxes that will be collected on the income from

previously acquired capital.

As we indicated above, the choice of which discount rate to use in these

tables depends on how one interprets the concept of fiscal balance in the

context of uncertainty. The preceding tables have presented generational

accounts for a range around 6 percent, corresponding to our "high" interest-

rate assumption. Tables lc and 2c repeat the exercise of tables 1 and 2, but

for a lower range of interest rates centered around 3 percent, closer to the

real government borrowing rate. The most significant effect of this change is

to increase the measured burdens facing newborns, since these burdens are

based largely on discounted payments and receipts that will occur many years

hence. However, the same conclusion reached above, that the burdens must rise

for future generations, still holds here.

The robustness of this last result is amplified by table 3, which

presents for a wide range of growth- and interest-rate combinations the

percentage difference in payments required from future generations. The table

indicates that for a range of reasonable growth- and interest-rate


assumptions, current policy implies that future generations will face larger

fiscal burdens than those faced by current age zero generations (adjusted for

growth). For the base case, the difference is 20.5 percent. For the low-

interest-rate case with the same rate of productivity growth (r-.03, g-.0075),

the percentage difference is somewhat larger, about 21.6 percent. More

optimistic growth-rate assumptions do not materially affect the conclusion of

a roughly 20 to 22 percent larger (growth-adjusted) burden on future

generations as compared with that on current generations.

B. 1

Appendix tables 1 and 2 provide for current male and female generations a

breakdown of the accounts by different types of receipts and expenditures.

The growth and interest rates used in the tables are the base-case values.

All figures are present values. For example, males who are 30 years old in

1989 will, on average, pay $194.5 thousand in present value to the government

over the course of their remaining lives. This figure reflects the difference

between the $222.8 thousand in the present value of payments to the government

less the $28.3 thousand in the present value of receipts from the government.

The largest source of present-value payments is the $74.4 thousand in FICA and

other payroll taxes, followed by $69.6 thousand in labor income taxes, $38.4

thousand in capital income taxes, and $34.2 thousand in excise taxes. The

largest sources of present-value receipts are $14.3 thousand in Social

Security OASDI benefits, followed by $5.4 thousand in general welfare (which

includes Medicaid), $4.6 thousand in Medicare, and $2.3 thousand in

unemployment insurance benefits.

Appendix tables 3 and 4 further clarify the determinants of these present

values. They detail, for different 1989 male and female generations, the


annual flows of payments and receipts (measured in constant 1989 dollars) that

members of these generations are projected rn pay, on average, in specific

years in the future. For a male who is 30 years old in 1989, total 1989 net

payments are, on average, $14,104. His average net payment 30 years later

when he reaches age 60 is projected to equal $32,294. The tables show clearly

the age pattern of the government's various payments and receipts. For

example, OASDI benefits for a male who is 30 years old in 1989 are, on

average, only $106, but grow to $10,221 at age 80.

C. The Effect of Policv Changes on Generational Accounts

Tables 4 and 4a explore the impact on generational accounts of a variety

of alternative fiscal policies, assuming 6 and 3 percent rates of interest,

respectively. Both tables assume the base-case .0075 growth rate. The tables

compare the generational accounts of newborn and future generations before and

after the change in policy. Appendix tables 5 and 6 indicate the impact of

the various policies on the generational accounts of older generations,

assuming base-case parameter values. Appendix tables 5a and 6a repeat the

analysis assuming a 3 percent interest rate.

Capital Gains Tax Cut

The first policy considered is the administration's 1989 capital gains

tax cut proposal. In analyzing this proposal, we used the Joint Committee on

Taxation's (JCT) revenue estimates; specifically, we raised or lowered

projected cohort-specific average capital income tax payments each year in the

future by a factor that would leave total projected capital income tax

payments in that year larger or smaller by the amount of revenue gain or loss

projected by the JCT. The results of this experiment indicate that the


administration's proposal would place an additional burden in present value of

approximately $1,271 ($629) on each future generation of males (females).

Appendix tables 5 and 6 and 5a and 6a indicate that most of the benefits from

the capital gains proposal would accrue to currently middle-aged generations.

For example, assuming base-case parameters, 45-year-old males are, on average,

projected to receive roughly $600 in present value as a result of the capital

gains tax cut proposal.

No Reduction in Social Security

The next policy experiment involves a cancellation of the 1983 Social

Security amendments. In this simulation, we do not reduce future Social

Security benefits of generations attaining age 65 in the year 2000 and beyond

according to the procedure described in this section. The impact of reversing

the Social Security amendments is particularly strong for middle-aged men and

women. According to appendix tables 5 and 6, for base-case parameters. 40-

year-old men would benefit by about $2,600, and 40-year-old women by

approximately $2,400, in present value from such a reversal in policy.

Faster Medicare Growth

The third policy we consider is faster growth in Medicare expenditures.

Rather than projecting current spending levels forward at the growth rate of

other spending, we assume that medical costs will continue to rise more

quickly than other government expenses. In particular, we assume that the

rate of growth of Medicare expenditures is 2 percentage points higher than the

economy's growth rate for the 20-year period between 1990 and 2010. The

experiment produces a sharp jump in the extra burden to be placed on future

generations: With base-case parameters, newborns in 1990 will face an extra


burden of $15.8 thousand for males and $7.2 thousand for females; these

figures translate into a 42.7 percent larger burden on future generations than

on current age zero generations, adjusted for growth. The simulated Medicare

policy provides a sizable benefit to existing older generations. For example,

65-year-old males are estimated to receive an additional $5.1 thousand in

present value from this policy option.

Given the extraordinary growth in health care spending in recent years,

one might well believe that this simulation represents a more realistic view

of current policy than our "current policyn projection, which assumes only

trend growth in Medicare. Clearly, there are alternative views of what

constitutes the expected near- and longer-term treatment of current

generations. Ideally, one would have information on the public's expectation

of the future treatment of current generations to guide in the formation of

the "current policyn projection. Certainly, in assessing current policy,

there is no reason to restrict oneself to what is actually legislated. We

offer our "current policy" projection as an initial benchmark from which to

consider possibly more realistic assessments of the future treatment of

current generations.

Savings and Loan Bailout

The recent savings and loan debacle and bailout illustrates the

difficulties of measuring "the" deficit. The episode has prompted debates

about whether bailout financing should be "off-budgetn and whether the funds

raised should "count" toward the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings targets. Such

discussions are really irrelevant if the goal is to determine who will bear

the costs of this mammoth new government spending program. To model this, we

assume that the government issues $500 billion of new bonds in 1990 to make


good the claims against the insolvent S a s , and raises taxes only on new

generations. We treat the bailout essentially as the undoing of a casualty

loss, in that the current generations are assumed to be kept whole by the

bailout; i.e., the $500 billion simply offsets $500 billion in losses caused

by the insolvencies. Tables 4 and 4a indicate that this exercise will cost

each 1990 newborn male $9.4 thousand assuming a 6 percent interest rate, and

$4.2 thousand assuming a 3 percent interest rate.

Slower Growth in Government Consumption

One of the goals of those who seek to improve the fiscal situation is to

"get spending under control." We model this by simulating the effects of zero

growth in government consumption for a period of 10 years with the growth in

government consumption after the 10-year period occurring at the assumed

economywide growth rate. For base-case parameters, the impact of this reduced

spending is to lower the burden of future generations substantially, by about

$24.7 thousand per male and $12.2 thousand per female. The large impact of

this policy can be understood by considering the size of its effect with

reference to the terms entering the government's intertemporal budget

constraint given in equation (1). Under our base-case assumptions, the

present value of government consumption is $25.386 trillion, the present value

of payments by existing generations is $21.166 trillion, government net wealth

is $ -0.516 trillion, and the present value of payments by future generations

is $4.737 trillion. The simulated 10-year policy of zero growth in government

consumption followed by trend growth means the level of government consumption

in year 10 and beyond is lower than under the "current policy" simulation.

The effect of this policy is to lower the present value of government


consumption by $1.307 trillion, which is sizable compared to what would

otherwise be the burden on future generations, namely $4.736 trillion.

The Government's New Budget Deal

We examine three alternative views of the recent budget deal. The first

alternative, A, assumes that the changes made to taxes and spending will be

permanent; the second, B, assumes that only the reductions in government

consumption spending will be permanent; and the third, C, assumes that the

provisions will last for only five years, after which taxes and government

consumption spending will revert to the values they would have had without the

budget deal.5 The results indicate that the importance of the budget deal

depends very much on its duration. If the deal is temporary, case C, future

male generations will benefit by $6.4 thousand, but if it is permanent, case

A, they will benefit by $39.7 thousand. The loss to current generations is

also quite sensitive to the duration of the new policy. If kept in place, it

will, for example, mean a $4.3 thousand present value loss to current 35-year-

old males. If it is temporary, the loss to current 35-year-old males is only

about $900. Appendix tables 5, 5a, 6, and 6a indicate that the current

elderly will pay a considerable share of the total costs to current

generations of the new legislation, although this share differs depending on

the longevity of the policy.

In understanding the magnitude of the new budget deal, it may help to

consider its effects on the components of the government's intertemporal

budget constraint. In the simulation(s) in which the budget deal is

permanent, the present value of government consumption falls by $1.262

trillion; in the temporary case, it falls by $175 billion. In the permanent


simulation, the present value burden on existing generations rises by $864

billion; in the temporary simulation, it rises by $161 billion.

V I I . Summary

The ongoing debate about how to define the federal budget deficit is

symptomatic of the need for a proper conceptual framework for describing

generational policy. Unfortunately, the budget deficit, no matter how it is

defined, cannot provide a proper assessment of generational policy. As an

alternative to economically arbitrary budget deficits, this paper has provided

a set of generational accounts indicating the net present value of payments of

existing generations to the government. We have used these accounts and

additional data concerning the government's intertemporal budget constraint to

assess the magnitude of the fiscal burden being placed on future generations

by current generations and to consider the burden on future generations of a

set of hypothetical fiscal policies. The findings suggest that unless policy

toward existing generations, including those who have just been born, is

substantially altered (for example, through a real adherence to the 1990

budget deal), future generations will face a roughly 20-percent larger net tax

burden over the course of their lifetimes than current newborns.


Footnotes

1. 1, Appendix to Chapter 4, reports both the conventional deficit and the deficit that arises from defining Social Security contributions as "loans" to the government.

2. Our question is related to that posed in recent empirical studies (e.g., Hamilton and Flavin [I9861 and Wilcox [1989]); it asks whether government debt will explode given current policy. However, we address the question of intertemporal government budget balance in a different and, in our view, more satisfactory manner.

3. The fact that components of government consumption expenditures are targeted toward specific age groups suggests including the present value of such expenditures in forming the N 's and the ESsk's in equation (3). In t,k future work we intend to present the generational accounts both including and excluding the present value of age-specific government consumption spending in forming the Nt , k's and the Es k'"' However, for the economic, as opposed to accounting, questions of how t e N 's of future generations compare with

t k those of the current newborn generation and how changes in policy will change the values of the Nt,k's for existing generations, the inclusion or exclusion of age-specific government consumption spending on existing generations is irrelevant. The analysis of the differential incidence of redistributing across generations the burden of paying for the government's consumption can be conducted holding the generational pattern of government consumption expenditures constant.

4. For future work in which we will measure imputed rent on government durables, we will also take account of government tangible assets using measurements reported by Eisner and Pieper (1984) and Boskin et al. (1987).

5. In these simulations, we assume that total taxes are increased in 1991 by $21.7 billion, in 1992 by $32.3 billion, in 1993 by $30.4 billion, in 1994 by $35.1 billion, and in 1995 by $35.1 billion. The respective annual reductions in total transfer payments are $3.4 billion, $5.9 billion, $8.4 billion, $11.4 billion, and $13.4 billion. Finally, the respective annual reductions in total government consumption are $15.8 billion, $32.2 billion, $46.1 billion, $62.7 billion, and $73.5 billion. These aggregate figures as well as the composition of taxes and transfers across the different types of taxes and transfers were obtained from Congressional documents describing the budget deal.


References

Abel, Andrew, Douglas Bernheim, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, "Does the Propensity to Consume Increase with Age?," mimeo, 1991.

Auerbach, Alan J., "The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Economic Pers~ectives, 1987, l(1) pp. 73-86.

Auerbach, Alan J., "Corporate Taxation in the United States," Brookinas Papers on Economic Activity, 1983, 2, pp. 451-513.

Auerbach, Alan J., and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Dvnamic_Fiscal, Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Auerbach, Alan J., and James Hines, "Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of Investment," in Martin S. Feldstein, ed., T h m n Capital Accumulation, Chicago, Ill.: Chicago University Press, 1987.

Auerbach, Alan J., Robert Hagemann, Laurence J. Kotlikoff, and Giuseppe Nicoletti, "The Economics of Aging Populations: The Case of Four OECD Economies," OECD Staff Pa~ers, 1989.

Auerbach, Alan J., Jinyong Cai, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, "U.S. Demographics and Saving: Predictions of Three Saving Models," forthcoming in Carne~ie- V y , 1990.

Boskin, Michael J., Mark S. Robinson, and A. M. Huber, "Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the United States, 1947-85," NBER Working Paper No. 2352, August 1987.

The Economic Report of the President 1982, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

Eisner, Robert, and Paul J. Pieper, "A New View of the Federal Debt and Budget Deficits," American Economic Review, March 1984, 74(1), pp. 11-29.

Feldstein, Martin S., "Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation," Journal, Sept./Oct. 1974, 82(5), pp. 905-26.

Hamilton, James D., and Marjorie A. Flavin, "On the Limitations of Government Borrowing: A Framework for Empirical Testing," American Economic Review, September 1986, 76, pp. 808-19.

Health Care Financing Administration, HCDA-2082 0 Care. El ibles e C s , Fiscal Year 1989, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.

Kotlikoff, Laurence J., "From Deficit Delusion to the Fiscal Balance Rule - Looking for a Sensible Way to Measure Fiscal Policy," NBER working paper, March 1989.

Kotlikoff, Laurence J., "The Deficit is not a Meaningful Measure of Fiscal Policy," Science, September 1988.


Kotlikoff, Laurence J., "Taxation and Savings - A Neoclassical Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, 22, December 1984, 22, pp. 1576-1629.

Vaughan, Denton R., "Reflections on the Income Estimates from the Initial Panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)," Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security Administration, Office of Policy Research and Statistics, September 1989.

Waldo, Daniel R., Sally T. Sonnefeld, and David R. McKusick, "Health Expenditures by Age Group, 1977 and 1987," Health Care Financiqg, Summer 1989, lO(4).

Wilcox, David W., "The Sustainability of Government Deficits: Implications of the Present Value Borrowing Constraint," Journal of Money. Credit and Bankinq, August 1989, 21, pp. 291-306.

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1987 Census of Governments' Taxable Pro~ertv Values, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987.


Generation's Age i n 1989

Future Generations

Table 1

Accounts for Age Zero and Future Male Generations

Swrce: Authors1 calculations


Table 2

Accounts for Age Zero and Future Female Generations

Generationls Age i n 1989

Future Generations

(thousands of dollars)

Source: Authors1 calculations


Table l a

Acccnnts for Age Zero and Future Hale Generations

Cenerationls Age i n 1989

Future

Generations

Population Age-Distribution Constant after 1989

(thousands of do1 Lars)



Table 2a

Accovlts for Age Zero and Future Femele Generations


Future Generations

Population Age-Distrikrtion Constant a f ter 1989




Table l b


No Intramrginel Capital Incane Tax


Generat ion's Age i n 1989 r=.05 rz.06 r=.07

Future Generat ions 105.3 81.2 64.9



Table 2b

Accounts for Age Zero and Future Feimle Generations

Generation* s Age i n 1989

Future Generat ions

No lntrenrerginel Capital Incone Tax


Source: Authors* calculations


Table l c



Future Generations

Low Interestdate Range

(thousands of do1 lars)



Table 2c

Accounts for Age Zero and Future Fenmle Generations

Generat ion's Age i n 1989

Future Generat ions

Low Interestdate Range

(thousands of do1 Lars)



Table 3

Percentage Difference i n Accounts

of Age Zero (Growth Adjusted) and Future Generations

Interest Rate g=0 g=.0025 g=.005 g=.OO75 gx.01 g=.0125 g=.015 g=.0175 gn.02

Source: Authorsr calculations


Tab

le 4

Ab

solu

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Appendix

The Allocation of Capital Income Taxes

As mentioned in the text, there are two related problems with using

capital income taxes as measured to determine the burden of capital income

taxation. First, existing assets may have excess future taxes capitalized

into their values; such taxes should not be assigned to new investors even if

these taxes occur in the future. On the other hand, the timing of tax

payments from new investment may have a different pattern than would an income

tax, meaning that the ratio of current annual tax payments to income may not

provide an accurate measure of the effective marginal tax rate facing new

investment.

In this .appendix, we derive the formula used to calculate the capitalized

value of taxes on existing capital and the correction needed to transform

total capital income tax payments into an estimate of capital income tax

payments on new investment. Our formula is based on the user cost of capital

approach (see, for example, Auerbach [1983]), which assumes that the marginal

product of capital equals the user cost of capital, C, where

where r is the investor's required after-tax return, 6 is the investment's

economic rate of depreciation, r is the investor's marginal tax rate, and z is

the present value of depreciation allowances. We wish to calculate two

measures. The first, which we denote by Q, is the tax-based discount on old

capital, which equals the difference between tax savings from depreciation

allowances per unit of new capital and those available per unit of existing

capital :


where zO is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of old

capital.

Measured capital income tax payments are not based on the effective rate

of tax on new capital m, where

Instead they are based on an average tax rate, a, where

and b is the average current depreciation deduction per unit of total capital.

Comparing (A3) and (A4) indicates that we must correct measured taxes per unit

of capital by subtracting from a(C-6) the term A, where

(A5 ) A = (a-m) (C-6 ) .

To calculate the terms zO in (A2) and b in (A4), we must consider past

patterns of investment. Assume investment grows at rate n. Then at date 0

(the present) the nominal amount of capital purchased at date -s was Ioe-

("*Is, where x is the inflation rate. If this investment has been written

off at the constant geometric rate $, the asset at date 0 has a basis of Ioe'

("+")s~+s and receives depreciation allowances of $ times this basis. Thus,

total allowances on the existing capital stock K are


Since the capital stock equals the sum of depreciated net investment, we have

Equations (A6) and (A7) imply

The present value of all depreciation allowances on old capital equals

the basis of each vintage multiplied by the present value of remaining

depreciation deductions on that vintage, or

A

where z is the present value of depreciation allowances per unit of

depreciated basis.

Substituting (A3), (A4), and (A8) into (A5) yields

Substituting (A9) into (A2) implies

Expressions (A10) and (All) may be simplified if we make the realistic (under

A

current tax law) assumption that z - z; thus


and

We assume that 6n.08 and n=.03. These values are roughly consistent with

the average depreciation rates and past growth rates for equipment and

structures (see Auerbach and Hines [1987]). We further assume for purposes of

these calculations that r-.04. For these values and for an inflation rate of

4 percent, depreciation allowances (the right-hand side of [A14]) provide

roughly the same present value as true economic depreciation (the left-hand

side of [A141 ) .

When r-v.04 and 69.08, we have from (A14) that e.16. For our calculation of

the actual value of z based on this value of $, we assume p.05 to maintain

consistency with our other calculations. (Using p.04 rather than .05 has no

important impact on the results.) In addition, we assume that the tax rate r

equals .32. This value is less than the statutory rate of .34, with the

difference reflecting the small difference between corporate and personal

statutory rates. These assumptions lead to the values A-.00111 and Q-.Ill.

This value of Q is consistent with earlier direct calculations based on tax

provisions similar to those enacted in 1986 (Auerbach and Hines [1987]).

These fractions are multiplied by $5,488.8 billion, the value of depreciable

assets held by taxable investors in 1989, to arrive at the numbers cited in


the text , namely, a $6.09 bi l l ion subtraction from current total capital

income taxes and a $609 b i l l i on capitalized burden on old capital.


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11

2.5

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Generational Accounts - A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting

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Transcript of Generational Accounts - A Meaningful Alternative to Deficit Accounting