Gendered political socialization in four contexts: political interest and values among junior high...

The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 393–407

Gendered political socialization in four contexts: politicalinterest and values among junior high school students in

China, Japan, Mexico, and the United States

Jeremy D. Mayera,∗, Heather M. Schmidtb

a Government Department, ICC 661, Georgetown University, Washington DC 20057-1034, USAb Case Western Reserve University, USA

Abstract

This article examines whether gender influences the level of political interest, the perception of poli-tics as a male sphere, and the belief in the importance of political participation. By looking at junior highstudents in four countries, we explore whether culture or level of economic development produce gen-dered patterns of political socialization. We conclude that girls valued participation in politics at least asmuch as boys, but that the perception was widespread that politics was a male sphere. The most surprisingfinding was that gender differences in all four countries were small and subtle in most areas examined.© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Men dominate political discourse in most countries on earth, despite the vast differences inpolitical systems, cultures, religions, and family values found in various nations. The family,the first political regime children are inculcated into, is often rife with gender norms thatconvey messages about women’s appropriate roles. Similarly, some governments actively seekto portray politics as welcoming or less welcoming to women’s input. A nation’s cultureand religion, as well as its level of modernization, have all been implicated in the politicalsocialization of gender values. In this study, junior high school students from four nations,China, Mexico, Japan, and the United States were surveyed to examine how boys and girls inthe middle of the socialization process differ in political interest, perceptions of the genderizednature of politics, and the value of participation.

Political socialization has been defined as “the learning process by which the political normsand behaviors acceptable to an ongoing political system are transmitted from generation to

∗ Corresponding author. Present address: Assistant Professor, School of Public Policy, George Mason University,3401 N. Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201. Tel.:+1-703-993-8223.

E-mail address:[email protected] (J.D. Mayer).

0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2004.04.024

394 J.D. Mayer, H.M. Schmidt / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 393–407

generation” (Renshon, 1977, p. 5). Among the values inculcated by every society are genderroles, and the socially sanctioned position of women in the political world. Behavioral normstaught in childhood can create differing attitudes in adult men and women on matters such asappropriate gender roles, the importance of politics, and the value of participation (Chodorow,1978; Langton, 1969; Sapiro, 1983). Of course, political socialization does not cease witharrival at adulthood; events such as entering the workforce have been shown to have distincteffects on women’s political attitudes (Andersen and Cook, 1985; Welch, 1977). Yet despitethe possibility of later changes, studies of American adolescents have consistently revealed agender gap in political interest, although the evidence for a gap in political participation andissue-specific opinion is much less reliable (Sapiro, 1983). Do such differences still characterizeAmerican teenagers, as well as youngsters in three other nations?

The four nations selected differ substantially on a number of key characteristics. China, arapidly modernizing third-world nation in Asia, has a one-party Communist government thathas endorsed market reforms for over two decades. Japan, an advanced first-world economyin Asia, has a parliamentary government of unusual stability. Mexico, a large developingdemocracy located in Latin America was ruled until recently by a single party in a strongpresidential system for seven decades. Finally, the United States, the leading economic andmilitary power in the world, has a republican system of government in a stable two party system.

Our study surveys young people who grew up in environments that differed greatly inlevel of economic development and dominant religious culture. For example, America andJapan are technologically advanced, extraordinarily wealthy nations. Mexico and China, whileexperiencing periods of rapid growth, remain comparatively poor nations. If gender equalityis a norm that is “post-materialist” asInglehart (1987)has argued, then we would expectAmerican and Japanese young people to exhibit smaller gender gaps in political interest andparticipation. Conversely, Japan shares a heritage of Confucian values with China, a heritagerichly encoded with gender norms. Moreover, it is only in the last 50 years that Japan andChina abandoned legal codes that enshrined extraordinary gender inequality. Clearly, “Japanhas become Westernized to a certain degree; nevertheless, it is also true that in value preferencesand in interpersonal relations, the Japanese have managed to retain much of their own traditions”(Ike, 1973, p. 1195). Is genderized political socialization one of these retained traditions?

Mexico, like China, has a powerful tradition of pervasive, traditional gender roles. The patri-archal family in Latin America has been seen as a model through which citizens are socializedinto engendered authoritarianism (Azripe, 1978). At the same time, a more egalitarian viewtowards gender is reported to be on the rise in Mexico and throughout Latin America. Yetsome (Bossen, 1975) have found that modernizing societies often experience greater sexualinequality than do traditional societies. In looking at young people in these four divergentcounties, in which areas do they divide along cultural lines and which along political? Or arestill other patterns present?

1. Political socialization and gender

Political socialization is a developmental process in which individuals learn about and typi-cally acquire the values and attitudes necessary to support a given political system. As such, it

J.D. Mayer, H.M. Schmidt / The Social Science Journal 41 (2004) 393–407 395

is a crucial component of a nation’s political culture and political development (Pye & Verba,1965). Many of the most important and enduring conceptions of politics have been engrainedby adulthood; moreover, as Massey notes, “what is learned earliest is retained longest” (1975,p. 32). As the work of Nancy Chodorow and others demonstrate, messages about the gen-der and family structure are often consistent and pervasive throughout childhood (Chodorow,1978; Meyers & Kittay, 1987). Gender is unquestionably a social construct, and has myriadpolitical ramifications (Gilligan, 1982, 1987, 1993). The first political regime most citizensexperience is the family. The family environment is typically suffused with subtle and blatantmessages about gender roles, many with long-term political ramifications (Howe, 1979, p. 53).Studies suggest that from infancy, families treat male and female children differently, and thesesocializing influences may have long-term effects (Kameda, 1995; Meyers & Kittay, 1987).Roberta Sigel found that both boys and girls tend to view their fathers as more knowledgeableabout politics, even when mothers dominate the other non-political aspects of socialization(1990, pp. 243–265). The perception that politics should be a field in which men are especiallypuissant is a prejudice seen in many cultures (although some have questioned the extent towhich political socialization is gendered in the United States, seeTrevor, 1999; Welch, 1977).As Anderson and Cook argued, “there are clear differences in sex-role socialization which canplausibly be argued to have political effects” (1985, p. 608).

2. Political socialization and comparative development

Political socialization is particularly relevant in a comparative context. Political systemsdiffer greatly in their attempts to replicate productive citizens, and this difference may be mostvisible in comparing rich and poor nations (Reading, 1968, p. 354). Some have also argued thatvalues in developed countries can be distinguished from those in developing countries becausecitizens of wealthier countries possess “post-materialist values” such as environmentalism,individualism, rights, and self-expression (Inglehart, 1981; Inglehart and Abrahamson, 1994).Among those “rights” are egalitarian conceptions of gender, in which women possess anabstract, individual right to equal treatment (Inglehart, 1987). Consequently, there should bea greater commitment to gender equality in the United States and Japan than in Mexico andChina, since the more traditional gender role norms have been further eroded in the wealthiercountries.

Yet expecting women’s status to rise inevitably as a nation modernizes and as Western valuesare promulgated is perhaps naive. In the case of China, the reappearance of such practices aswidespread prostitution and bride-selling coincided with the increased interaction with theWest during the Deng era. Earlier, guided by the famous Maoist doctrine of “Women hold uphalf of the sky,” the Chinese government had largely eliminated such egregious acts of violenceagainst women (Ai, 2000; Andors, 1983; Duley, 1987). The Chinese state may have had greaterpower to protect women from male predation prior to the market reforms of the 1970s and1980s. Similarly, revisionist feminists in Mexico have drawn attention to the traditional culturalnorm of “Marianism.” Marianism, antipodal to the better known “machismo,” sees women aspossessing certain virtues, including such politically significant values as greater integrity andpersonal honesty (Stevens, 1994). Some have even argued that it is the Anglo conceptions of


participation that have blinded many researchers to ways in which Latin American women havelong taken part in politics, from peasant organizations to guerrilla movements (Jacquette, 1980).Thus, while modernization may trumpet the abstract equality of the sexes, in practice it mayeradicate doctrines (Maoism, Marianism) which granted women certain societal privileges(unequal, incomplete, and problematic though they may have been). AsBossen (1975)hasargued, it may well be the case that the importation of Western institutions and a modernizingeconomic system may actually increase sexual inequality in developing nations.

3. Traditional cultural and religious influences on sexual socialization

The influence of traditional cultures on gender norms is surely evident in all four countries,and may well differ in strength as it affects socialization. AsXiao (1999)argued:

Because the general social structure is influenced by culture, the content of socialization is alsobased on the salient cultural values of the society. Due to the influence of history and socialsystems, characteristics valued in children in one society may not be valued in another (1999,p. 641).

Confucianism in particular may inculcate gender inequality. Under traditional Confucian be-liefs, wife beating (not only by the husband but also by his parents), the selling of disobedientwives, concubinage, footbinding, and tremendous legal disparities were tolerated (Duley, 1987,p. 240;Sangwha, 1999). While egregious examples of gender violence were permitted in theWest for centuries, many oppressive practices were common and legal in both China and Japanuntil well into this century. Despite the mid-century reforms, Confucianism remains importantin both countries. Confucianism has been most broadly defined as “a complex of attitudes andguides to behavior that spread from China” (Rozman, 1991). Confucianism remains a powerfulforce inculcated through family and societal institutions such as schools, corporations, and peergroups. In Japan, the instruction of Confucianism occurs in the schools, through the teachingof “meue no hito” (respect for elders) in “dotoku” (morals) classes (Smith, 1996). Both Japanand China unabashedly utilize the public and private schools to inculcate Confucian morals inchildren (Smith, 1996; Xiao, 1999).

Confucianism is rife with messages about gender norms. Within traditional Asian families,the idea of equality even among siblings of the same gender is foreign; a hierarchical rela-tionship between older and younger, and between male and female, is always present (Wu,1968). “The basic Confucian model is the patriarchal family” (Ellwood & Pilgrim, 1985). Thedenigration of the female in Confucian societies has emerged as one of the sources of internalcriticism of tradition in Japan and other Asian countries that are experiencing modernization(Smith, 1996). Still, some have suggested that the Japanese family is changing to a moreWestern model, under the force of economic and cultural change. “Modern Japan has rapidlyurbanized. The once solid kinship-based communities are breaking down, and large extendedfamilies have been replaced by nuclear ones” (Oikawa, 2000).

Confucianism inculcates respect for authority in all citizens. However, it may also teachgreater passivity to female citizens. Just as the socialization of girls in the West has beenseen by some as a cause of lower participation levels and higher passivity among adult females


(Langton, 1969, pp. 30–31), the same process may take place in Confucian countries. Similarly,the roots of gender oppression in politics in Latin America may be found in the family:

The authoritarianism of the father (padre-macho) at the heart of the family in hispanic familiesresponds to a political necessity. Children learn to tolerate a paternal despot in the family, whoobliges them to fear and to obey. Thus, they are converted into citizens who will tolerate thesame type of despotism in a dictator or political leader (Azripe, 1978).

While the forces of traditional paternalism may be more evident in Mexico, Japan, andChina, surely they are not absent in the U.S. case. To ignore the gendered nature of much ofAmerican home life would be nothing short of triumphalism. It remains true that many childrenin the United States are raised in homes where the father is the acknowledged as the sole leader(Folbre, 1987). Moreover, compared to most European countries, Judeo-Christian values, oftenrife with gendered messages of male leadership, are far more influential in the United States(Xiao, 1999). Despite the perception that sexual equality is a “Western value,” many childrenraised in the United States may still be socialized to adopt more traditional gender roles.

4. Governmental guidance of gender socialization

In comparing Japan, China, Mexico, and the United States, there also arises the question ofgovernmental guidance of the political socialization process, particularly as it relates to gender.Prior research shows that students in developing nations tend to put more faith in teachersthan in their parents as compared to students in developed nations (Nathan & Remy, 1977). Athird-world state working to aggressively inculcate gender norms may have greater ability to doso than a first-world government. For example, China takes great pains to indoctrinate its youngpeople with the appropriate political and social views. Such activities by the state can serve tolessen the impact of traditional political socialization agents. In countries in which “politicalauthorities have extensive control over the activities of the citizens. . . parental influence maybe heavily circumscribed by direct competition from those agents socialization, especiallyschools and peer organizations, controlled by the political authorities” (Beck, 1977, p. 127).In the field of gender equality in particular, the Chinese government has, since the Communistrevolution, attempted to aggressively combat traditional conceptions of women’s secondarystatus (Ai, 2000; Duley, 1987). As noted above, it is the Chinese Communist government whichhas most strongly attacked traditional the gender norms of Confucian society. Of course, giventhe continued dominance of men in nearly every aspect of Chinese politics and economy (Ai,2000), one might question the depth of the China’s leaders’ commitment to gender equality.Some argue that the embedded Confucian patriarchal system remained influential even at theacme of Communist power in China (Sangwha, 1999).

5. Data and methods

Surveys were distributed in four countries, Japan, China, Mexico, and the United States. Theage group selected for analysis was junior high school students, grades 7–9. AsSigel (1995)noted, there are many methodological problems that arise in focusing on children younger than12. All students were surveyed in the summer of 1999.


The distribution method in each country was somewhat different. In the United States, severalpublic junior high and high school principals were approached, and permission received. InChina, surveys were distributed at three elite private schools, and in two standard public schools.In Japan, surveys were distributed in one public junior high school, three “jukus” or after schoolcram schools, and a private cultural group. In the USA, all surveys were conducted in suburbanand semi-rural environments in Michigan. In China, the surveys were done in urban and ruralareas near Guangzhou (the economic center of southern China), and in Japan, surveys weredistributed in two suburbs of Tokyo, Saitama prefecture and Numazu city. In Mexico, surveyswere distributed in public schools in a semi-rural area in Oaxaca, a relatively impoverishedregion.1 Although the sampled populations are not strictly comparable, the survey provides thefirst opportunity to examine junior high school age gender role differences in political mattersin these countries. Particularly in China, such research is uncommon.

Students were questioned on their age, gender, family structure, and international travelexposure. Questions about political interest, frequency of discussion about politics with parents,and whether boys or girls were more interested in politics were included. Students were alsopresented with a series of questions that tapped into their level of trust in their political system.Students were also asked questions about their family structure and power within their family.

Interest in politics was measured on a four-point scale in response to the question: “Howwould you rate your interest in politics? Very interested, interested, not really interested,uninterested.” Similarly, parental interaction was measured on a four-point scale in responseto the question: “How often do you discuss politics with your mother (father)? Very often,often, not very often, never.” Students were also asked if they felt that boys or girls were moreinterested in politics. The intent of this question was to measure “third person” effects. Evenif respondents do not actually differ by sex in their level of political interest, if girls perceivepolitics as a male domain, this may have important political implications, or whatPeterson andRunyan (1993)label “internalized stereotypes.”

Political trust was assessed with three questions: “The President (prime minister) truly workshard for the sake of all the people, not just for himself or his party” (agree/disagree). “Howmuch does the government care about the problems in the daily lives of ordinary citizens?”“How much does the president (prime minister) care about the problems in the daily lives ofordinary citizens?”2 Factor analysis demonstrated that these three variables were interrelated,loading onto an underlying construct of trust at over 0.70. Thus, a scale was created from thethree trust variables, ranging from 1 to 12 (alpha reliability coefficient 0.75).3

Students were queried on their adherence to democratic norms, by asking them whetherthe best solution to the problem of government is to have wise and benevolent leaders operatewithout citizen input. This question allows us to measure how greatly the respondents valuedpolitical participation, to see if there are cross-national gender differences.

6. Results

At first glance, it appears there is almost no difference in political interest between boysand girls in the four countries studied. As shown onPlate 1, while there were vast differencesby country in terms of political interest, the gender gap in the four nations was quite small.


Plate 1. Gender and political interest: China, Japan, United States, and Mexico.

However, a more complex pattern unfolds when the data are subjected to OLS regression. Usingmultivariate controls, gender gaps emerge in China and the United States, and les significantlyin Mexico, while there remains no difference in political interest by sex in Japan. As shownonTable 1, in three of four nations, sex does affect political interest among adolescents, and inthe expected direction: boys were more interested in politics. Moreover, the effect is strongestin the United States, and absent in the other first-world country, Japan.

In the case of the United States, sex had significant influence on political interest in themultivariate model, along with discussions with both parents. That both parents were equallyinfluential contradicts whatSigel (1990)found; in her data, the American father was seen asthe more important agent of political socialization. At least in regards to political interest,discussions with the mother had equal impact. In China as well, sex affected political interestin the predicted direction, along with political discussions with parents, trust in government,age, and travel abroad. Also, China was the only country in which believing that politics wassomething girls were interested in predicted the respondent’s level of interest in politics. InMexico, however, sex was only significant at the .10 level, while parental discussions, alongwith travel outside Mexico, were influential on political interest.

For Japan, the sole reliable predictor of political interest was discussion, not with the father,but with the mother. This differs withKubota and Ward’s (1970)study which found that thefather was more influential on political socialization in Japan. One possibility is that Japanesemothers are more because the Japanese family structure remains more traditional. Over 70%of Japanese children surveyed indicated that their mother’s primary job was housewife, amuch higher level than in the other nations.Beck (1977)argued that female politicization


Table 1Sources of political interest: four country regression models

Variables China Japan United States Mexico

β Coefficient S.E. β Coefficient S.E. β Coefficient S.E. β Coefficient S.E.

Sex −0.2∗ 0.09 −0.13 0.13 −0.5∗∗∗ 0.11 −0.5∗ 0.27Age 0.09∗∗ 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.08Travel abroad 0.23∗ 0.12 0.01 0.17 0.15 0.13 2.2∗∗∗ 0.8Talk with mom 0.23∗∗∗ 0.09 0.45∗∗∗ 0.1 0.48∗∗∗ 0.1 0.56∗∗∗ 0.19Talk with dad 0.48∗∗∗ 0.07 0.02 0.1 0.54∗∗∗ 0.08 0.51∗∗∗ 0.19Individualism 0.12 0.15 −0.17 0.13 −0.01 0.11 −0.26 0.28Mistrust −0.06∗∗ 0.03 −0.02 0.03 −0.01 0.02 0.05 0.06Family structure −0.00 0.03 −0.01 0.06 −0.01 0.04 0.02 0.1Boys/girls more

interested0.56∗∗∗ 0.11 −0.07 0.16 0.29 0.19 0.17 0.34

Constant 3.4∗∗∗ 0.85 3.5∗∗∗ 1.1 4.7∗∗∗ 1.0 0.34 2.1

AdjustedR2 0.24 0.11 0.39 0.32Standard error of

the estimate1.04 0.95 0.96 1.2

N 978 790 1190 756

∗ Statistical significance at .10 level.∗∗ Statistical significance at .05 level.∗∗∗ Statistical significance at .01 level.

will gradually lead to mothers supplanting fathers as the primary source of family politicalsocialization, with the notable caveat that this will not occur if mothers join the workforce inequal numbers, thereby losing their advantages of exposure and contact with the children. InJapan, the male breadwinner model of family life remains quite strong, perhaps accountingfor the mother’s dominant role in encouraging political interest among Japanese children. Inaddition, some have argued that the mother-child bond is the single most important factor inthe Japanese social structure, thus offering yet another plausible explanation for the mother’sinfluence (Rozman, 1991).

In two of four countries, China and the United States, boys clearly were more interestedin politics, when other factors were controlled. Moreover, in all four countries, the level ofdiscussion with at least one parent was highly influential on the level of political interest in theyoung. In no country did there appear to be a difference in the amount of political discourseparents had with male and female offspring. And no nation showed a significant differencein amount of discussion with father versus mother.4 This, at least in the American sample,contradicts much prior research which establishes the father as the more influential figure inchildhood political socialization (Greenstein, 1960; Jennings & Niemi, 1971; Sapiro, 1983,p. 43). Of course, the advancement of women in American politics since these studies wereconducted has been substantial. While still far from achieving a proportionate share of politicalpower, women have been elected to Congress from almost every state in the union, and are apowerful voting block in the Senate on certain select issues.

Still, why were boys more interested in politics than girls in China and the United States? Thedifferences found in political interest among boys and girls in the above multivariate analysisare not a result of parents engaging in more frequent discussions of political topics with their


Plate 2. Perceptions of political interest: China, Japan, United States, and Mexico.

male children. Nor do they result from fathers taking a dominant role in political instruction,thus providing a gender cue to boys and girls (except possibly in the case of China, where thefather’s influence was approximately twice as great as the mother’s, seeTable 1). What thenmight explain the difference?

Perhaps the answer is in the perception that politics is for boys. Among Chinese adolescents,perceptions about the gendered nature of politics were influential on the level of politicalinterest of the respondent. While the bivariate analysis reveals no gender gap in interest, andthe multivariate case only convincingly shows it in China and the United States, we nowexamine whether respondents perceive a gender gap in political interest.

Plate 2indicates that an overwhelming majority of all adolescents surveyed believe thatpolitics is for boys, even though the respondents’ own surveys indicate that boys are onlysomewhat more interested, and only when other factors are controlled for. Boys in all fourcountries had a consistent view that politics belonged to them. Among girls in our study, therange was much wider. Girls in the two developing nations, Mexico and China, were far lesslikely to see politics as a male province, while girls in both of the liberal democracies wereeven more likely than their male peers to envision politics as something in which boys weremore interested. (It should be noted that even in Mexico and China, however, a majority ofgirls still felt that politics was more for boys than girls.) Additionally, as shown onTable 2,the sex differences in perceptions of political interest did not hold up when other influenceswere controlled for, except in China. There is thus, in three of the four nations, both boys andgirls see the political world as attracting the interest of boys to a greater degree. Althoughthat attitude was not shown to influence political interest except in China, when the data were


Table 2Partial correlations of sex on perceptions of political interest among boys and girls, and on valuing participation

Variable China Japan United States Mexico

Boys/girls more interested in politics sex∗ .25∗∗∗ NS NS NSValue of participation sex∗ .14∗∗∗ NS .12∗ NS

Partial correlations, controlling for age, travel abroad, political discussions with mother and father, politicalinterest, individualism, trust in government, and family structure. Numbers are Pearson’s coefficients. Positivecorrelation coefficients indicate that girls were more likely to believe girls were more interested in politics thanboys (row 1) and that girls were more likely to value participation (row 2).∗Statistical significance at .10 level,∗∗statistical significance at .05 level, and∗∗∗statistical significance at .01 level.

divided by country and by sex, it becomes clear that the perception that boys are more interestedin politics affects only girls in China (not shown). The more a girl believed that politics wasfor boys, the less interested she was in politics. Similarly, in a gender divided regression onU.S. respondents, girls’ political interest was shown to be negatively affected by the perceptionthat boys were more interested in politics (not shown). Other research has suggested girls atthis age begin to do worse in science and math courses because such topics are perceived tobe male-dominated (Sapiro, 1983, p. 41). Since girls apparently perceive politics as a malesphere, and are less interested as a result, do they therefore adopt a more passive attitude towardspolitics?

Apparently not.Plate 3shows the survey results by sex and country to the question “Ifwe get good leaders in government, the best way to improve the country is for the people

Plate 3. Gender and participation: China, Japan, United States, and Mexico.


to leave everything to them rather than for the people to discuss things among themselves.”The question measures the value of democratic participation against passivity, and we mightexpect that, since girls and boys in all four nations see politics as a male interest, participationwould be valued less by girls. However, in every country, girls were more likely than boys tovalue participation, although only by marginal levels in one country. When subjected to partialcorrelations analysis, controlling for age, travel abroad, political interest, political discussionswith parents, trust in government, level of individualism, and family structure, the relationshipbetween sex and valuing participation became somewhat more complex. In Japan and Mexico,sex and valuing participation were unrelated. In China, a weak (Pearson’s correlation value:.14) but statistically significant relationship was identified, and it predicted that girls valuedparticipation more than boys, even when good leaders were at the helm. Similarly, a marginaleffect was found in the U.S. sample (.11, significant at .10 level) that also predicted greaterendorsement of participation by girls. Significantly, in none of the four countries were girlsless prone to endorse participation.

7. Discussion

The four nations under study differ tremendously on a number of economic, political, histor-ical, and social factors. However, this exploratory examination of sexual differences in politicalattitudes among adolescents suggests that many of the assumptions about sex and politics arefar too simplistic. The large differences in political interest which earlier American studies hadfound (Greenstein, 1965; Langton, 1969) were not present, but in three of four countries, sexdid predict political interest to be higher for boys, though the effect was subtle. The impactof sex, however, was real, and contrasts with studies that find negligible sexual differences inpolitical socialization (Easton & Dennis, 1969; Orum, Cohen, Grassmuck, & Orum, 1974).The belief that politics was a male domain was found consistently in all four countries, andamong both sexes. However, in no country did we find that girls valued participation less thanboys. Indeed, in some countries, girls valued it more.

The many factors which might have been expected to neatly divide the data appeared un-influential. For example, respondents in the two Confucian nations did not demonstrate acommitment to patriarchal norms greater than did those in the United States or Mexico. Nordid girls in the two developing nations of China and Mexico show less interest in politics thandid boys in those countries.

Thus, we are left with a paradox. Girls are, in reality, somewhat less interested in politics inthree of four countries, but despite the near universal assumption that politics is “a boys thing,”girls value political participation at least as much as boys do, in all four nations. They value itmore, but are interested in it less, and see it as a male domain?

Perhaps the paradox is easily resolvable. One reason girls value participation more than boysmay be precisely because they perceive politics as a male-dominated sphere. Boys may believethat the “good leaders” named in the question will be more amenable to their concerns, whilegirls may expect that these leaders will be men. No woman has led China, Japan, Mexico, orthe United States in the modern era, and men dominate all four nation’s national politics. Girlscould thus easily make the assumption that the hypothetical leaders in the question were men.


It is also possible that there is a lag time before perceptions of the genderized nature of politicscan agree with the reality in these nations. The real gap in political interest among boys andgirls was simply not as apparent as the perceived gap in any nation. Alternatively, however,it may simply be that the question measured, not political participation, but the abstract valueof political participation. In future research, the focus might profitably turn to more concreteexamples of true participation.

In terms of the gender gap in specific countries, the most intriguing finding is the totalabsence of the father as an agent of political socialization in Japan. Japan was the only na-tion in which discussing politics with the father had no influence on political interest forboys or girls, while in Japan, discussions with the mother mattered for both sexes. Most puz-zling of all, Japanese respondents reported that they talked with their fathers about politicsabout as much as they did with their mothers. Apparently, only hearing it from the mothermattered.

What is perhaps most stunning about the findings above is the extraordinary similarity in thegender gap among these four nations.5 Our survey found a fairly weak relationship betweensex and political interest in three of four countries. Boys and girls reported, in all four nations,similar frequency of political discussion with male and female parents. Parents are talkingpolitics with their children in all four nations without any perceptible gender gap. Yet wefound near uniform perceptions in the four countries that politics was for boys among bothsexes in each nation. Similarly, the value of participation question revealed no gender gapin any nation, except when girls valued political participation somewhat more than boys did.These similarities may not have similar causes, but our data do not reveal the answer to thatquestion.

Indeed, the lack of the gender gap on key questions may be a product of different forcesin each nation. First, in China, the adoption of a “one-child” policy may have led to parentsspending more time socializing their female children to the political world than they would havepreviously. Moreover, the role of the state in endorsing gender equality cannot be ignored. Chinais one of the world leaders in female labor force participation, and China’s earnings differentialbetween men and women is one of the smallest recorded (Hsieh & Burgess, 1994). Xaio recentlyconcluded, in a study of socialization in China and the United States, that “policies that promotewomen’s independence, such as those adopted in China, are very important in reducing genderinequality, which in turn helps foster similar socialization values among women and men”(1999, p. 649). As in China, Japanese families are becoming smaller (although not as a resultof government policy), which may cause increased similarity in the socialization of boys andgirls. Alternatively, the cause of the decline in distinct male/female socialization in Japan maywell be the rise of “post-material” values of sexual equality, as Inglehart expected.

Political scientist Margaret Trevor recently observed that in the United States “(t)he forces ofpolitical socialization affecting boys and girls are more similar today than at any time before”(1999, p. 63). In this study, gender differences in political socialization were smaller in allfour countries than we might have predicted based on prior research. Despite the extraordinaryvariety in political culture that the adolescent respondents experienced in these four nations,the gender gap was remarkably similar and remarkably small. This suggests that Trevor’s boldconclusion about the increasing similarity of political socialization for American boys and girlsmay be applicable in other countries as well.


Notes

1. Class is clearly a variable that is not controlled for, not only because of the sites that wereaccessible in the four countries, but also because the authorities in two countries wereunwilling to allow questions about family income. The nations also differ greatly in what“middle-class” means.

2. In Japan, “prime minister” was substituted for president.3. While a certain degree of skepticism is called for in interpreting data from a one-party

state, the surveys were distributed anonymously, and several students did not hesitate tocriticize such popular Chinese figures as current prime minister Zhu Rongji and foundingicon Mao Tse Tung. More surprisingly, a number of Chinese students chose Americansas their most admired political figure. We therefore tentatively reject the idea that theChinese result showing greater faith in women’s role in the political world can be simplydismissed as fearful students giving politically correct responses. Such responses may,however, reflect a deep and prolonged indoctrination process. One of the authors of thisarticle was a teacher at a Chinese private school for a year, and witnessed how studentswere required to watch the official Chinese news on a nightly basis. AsAndors (1983)andDuley (1987)have argued, the Chinese state has taken a firm stance in favor of genderequity, which may explain some of the findings.

4. However, there were cross-national differences in overall level of political discourse,with respondents in the first world countries of Japan and the United States indicatingslightly more frequent discussions with parents about political matters (not shown).

5. It is even more surprising given the cross-country differences shown in, for example,Plates 1 and 3, in which great disparities in political interest and the value of politicalparticipation can be seen among countries, but not within countries by sex.

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