An edited version of this paper was published in 2002 in the International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43, 1: 45-64 (SAGE Publications). This is the pre-print version of the paper.

Gender Ideologies, Relative Resources, and the Division of Housework in Intimate Relationships: A Test of Hyman Rodman’s Theory of Resources in Cultural Context1

Heike Diefenbach*

*Department of Sociology, Leipzig University, Burgstrasse 21, D- 04109Leipzig, Germany

ABSTRACT

Based on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the theory of resources in cultural context proposed by Hyman Rodman (1967, 1970) is tested by analyzing the impact of spouses’ relative resources on the division of housework in egalitarian, transitional, and traditional cultural contexts. It is found that the relative resources of the spouses are effective not only in transitional cultural contexts, but that they actually have a greater impact on thedivision of housework in transitional contexts than in egalitarian or traditional contexts. In accordance with Rodman’s theory, the analysishas shown that the division of housework between spouses is not easilyexplained by either relative resources or gender ideologies, but that interaction effects must be expected.

Introduction

The division of housework in intimate relationships and the

differential marital power of spouses have become the subject of a

growing body of sociological literature since the 1960s. Obviously,

nothing much has changed since Betty Friedan (1963) described the

1

gender inequality in the United States or more specifically, the

dissatisfaction and the problems of American women with housewifery,

in her famous book, The Feminine Mystique. It is one of the most well-

documented findings in family research that women performed, and still

do perform, the lion’s share of housework (Hochschild and Machung

1989; Lennon and Rosenfield 1994; Rubin 1976; Shelton 1992; Shelton

and John 1996). Explanations of women’s involvement into domestic

tasks were suggested as soon as the phenomenon found entrance into the

sociological literature. The most noted of these explanations probably

is Robert O. Blood and Donald M. Wolfe’s theory of relative resources

(1960). The basic assumption of this theory is that “the balance of

power will be on the side of that partner who contributes the greater

resources to the marriage” (Blood and Wolfe 1960:12). Since husbands

typically are specialized in income generation, while wives work in

part-time jobs or are homemakers, husbands have a relative advantage

in bargaining power. This, so the argument goes, enables them to

withdraw from unpleasant and monotonous housework (Nakhaie 1995). From

this view, the division of labour in the home results from a rational

(or at least a reasonable) decision, but not from ideologies calling

for gender-specific activities for men and women.1 While the findings

from several empirical studies support the theory of relative 2

resources (Ferree 1991; Kamo 1988; Rodman 1970), there is also

contradicting evidence: It has been found that the husband’s authority

is not linearly increasing with his education, his occupational status

and his income (Safilios-Rothschild 1967; Fox 1973). Also, wives who

earn more than their husbands do far more housework than their

husbands (Atkinson and Boles 1984). This still holds true when

husbands are not employed (Brayfield 1992). The gender ideology

perspective on the division of labour in the home can explain these

findings: The division of housework does not result from the relative

resources of the partners, but from how each partner identifies

himself or herself with regard to marital, familial, and occupational

roles that are traditionally linked to gender (Greenstein 1996; Kamo

1988; Sanchez 1994). Thus, the performance of housework reflects the

gender ideologies of the partners: Wives who earn more than their

husbands perform the lion’s share of housework, because they, their

husbands or both hold traditional gender ideologies that ascribe

domestic labour to women. Also, husbands may avoid housework even when

they are economically dependent on their wives, because this provides

an opportunity to behaviorally express an inviolable identification

with the male role (by refusing to adopt characteristics of the female

3

role). Thus, they are “doing gender” in a situation in which they have

access to in spite of their economic dependency (Haddad 1996).

4

Relative Resources in Cultural Context--Hyman Rodman Revisited

In general, the findings indicate that both explanations of the

division of labour in the home--resource theory and the gender

ideology approach--are not mutually exclusive. Instead, it seems that

the relationship between the relative resources of the spouses and

their marital power is mediated by cultural and subcultural norms

concerning gender roles or - as one might prefer to say - gender

ideology. As early as 1967, Hyman Rodman (1967, 1970) described the

interaction between cultural norms and relative resources as follows:

In traditional cultural settings characterized by patriarchy (such as India)

the cultural norm ascribing all authority to the husband is so strong

that the relative resources of the spouses do not have any effect on

the marital power structure. In cultures with strong egalitarian norms

concerning gender roles (such as Scandinavian countries) there should

be no effect of resources, too. It is in cultural settings that fall

between traditional and egalitarian settings where the relative

resources of the spouses make a difference with regard to the marital

power structure: In these cultures there are few strong norms

concerning gender roles, thus, leaving room for the relative resources

of the spouses as determinants for marital power. Rodman distinguishes

two types of transitional cultural contexts, namely modified patriarchy 5

and a transitional state toward egalitarianism in the narrow sense. In a

modified patriarchy, norms generally prescribe the traditional gender-

specific division of labour, but in the higher social strata these

norms are modified, so that male authority is weaker in higher social

strata than in lower ones. In the transitional state, in the narrow

sense, it is the resources that play the decisive role: Because there

are no clear norms concerning gender-roles, resources are of utmost

importance for the ascription of marital power. It is in this state

that there is a struggle for power between husbands and wives. Any new

resource becoming available provides additional power. Since it is

still the men who are ascribed the role of the provider in the

transitional state and since men in the lower social strata do not

have the same opportunities to fulfill the expectations with regard to

their provider-role as men in the higher social strata, Rodman expects

an association between male authority and social stratum in

transitional cultural contexts (in the narrow sense) that is opposite

to that in modified patriarchy. In all, this means that the resource

theory’s explanatory power is limited to specific cultural (or

historical) settings in which the population is at odds with regard to

gender roles, for instance in transitional cultural contexts.

6

Rodman advanced his theory of resources in cultural context in

order to make plausible the empirical findings produced by the studies

replicating the work of Blood and Wolfe (1960). So, the theory was

designed to explain ex-post-facto. Up to now, no comparative work on a

broad empirical basis has been done in order to test for Rodman’s

theory. This paper makes an attempt to go into this direction by

taking a closer look at the interaction between prevailing gender

ideologies and the relative resources of the spouses when it comes to

explaining the division of household tasks in different countries

representing different cultural contexts.

Objectives and Hypotheses

Blood and Wolfe’s (1960) resource theory as well as Rodman’s (1967,

1970) reformulation of th theory are tailored to explain the marital

power structure. But it is not clear whether the notion of marital

power structure is meant to represent the process of bargaining, the

result of a bargaining process or the availability of means to get one’s way.

Usually, it is measured by asking the respondent who makes the

decisions in their relationship, for instance, about the organization

of the family income or the design of the menu. It is difficult to

construct a good measure for the marital power structure. Making a 7

decision for the couple or the family is not marital power as such,

since decision-making is not identical to power in decision-making.

This is not only a problem of measuring the martial power structure

independently. Rather, “instead of the vast quantity of work in the

area, there is considerable conceptual confusion” (Chafetz 1980:397).

It is thus not only for methodological, but also for theoretical

reasons that the division of household tasks is chosen as the

explanandum in this analysis: Marital power is better conceptualized

by what spouses are actually doing than in who is deciding what to do,

especially when it seems reasonable to suggest that few people like to

do household chores.

With the division of household tasks being the explanandum (or the

dependent variable in the statistical analysis) the main objective of

this study is to test whether there is variation between the cultural

contexts that Rodman distinguishes (i.e., traditional, transitional or

egalitarian contexts). If the division of household tasks was simply a

function of prevailing gender ideologies, one would suggest that

household tasks are almost exclusively dealt with by wives in

traditional cultural contexts. In egalitarian cultural contexts,

household tasks would be equally divided between the spouses. But it

is also possible that an egalitarian gender ideology does not result 8

in equal sharing because arrangements often made to fit the needs and

wishes of both spouses (Hunt and Hunt 1982). Here, much depends on

what actually is regarded as egalitarian, homogamy or complementarity.

Nevertheless, it is expected that couples in egalitarian cultural

contexts share in household tasks more equally than couples in

transitional or traditional cultural frameworks. Greater variation in

the division of housework is also expected in transitional cultural

environments than in traditional or egalitarian cultural contexts

because of the greater flexibility of norms concerning gender roles in

transitional cultures. Since Rodman suggested that transitional

cultures (with regard to gender ideologies) might be modified

patriarchies, it is expected that the division of household tasks

between husbands and wives is more “equal” in the higher social strata

of transitional cultural contexts than in the lower ones.

If the division of labour in the home was a function of the

spouses’ relative resources alone, then one would predict no

systematic variation in the allotment of tasks in different cultural

contexts. Gainful employment of the husband, wife or both, and the

relative contribution each makes to the family income should then

explain the division of chores. According to Rodman, in transitional

cultural contexts there are no clear norms concerning gender-roles, 9

thus, there is the most room for the spouses’ relative resources to

have an impact on the division of housework. Therefore, it is

suggested that the effect of relative resources is stronger in

transitional cultural contexts than in traditional or egalitarian

ones.

To sum up, the main questions to be answered in this paper are: Are

there systematic variations in the division of household tasks

according to the type of cultural context? Is there a more “equal”

sharing in household tasks between husbands and wives in the higher

social strata of transitional cultural contexts than in the lower

ones? How well do the relative resources of the spouses explain the

division of household tasks, and how do norms concerning gender roles

and relative resources of spouses interact?

Methodology

Data

The analysis is based on data from the 1994 International Social

Survey Programme (ISSP) concerning “Family and Changing Gender Roles.”

It covers 24 countries on different continents and 33,590 individuals.

The number of respondents in each country varies between 647 in

Northern Ireland to in 2,494 in Spain. Respondents are aged between 1510

and 96. Interviewers asked 15,230 men and 18,323 women (and 37

respondents for which the information about gender is lacking) to give

their opinion on items concerning gender roles, marriage, divorce,

premarital sexual relationships, the perceived effects of mothers’

being gainfully employed on their children, and the role children play

in marriage and divorce, among other things. Respondents were also

asked to indicate their marital status, household composition,

division of household tasks, the management of the family income, and

various demographic characteristics such as their education,

occupation, subjective social class, and income. There are only a few

questions about the respondents’ spouses or life-mates, but among them

is the question about his/her employment. Thus, the ISSP 1994 is

suitable to test Rodman’s theory of resources in various cultural

contexts (at least approximately). The ISSP provides information on

gender roles, some measures of resources of both spouses, and the

division of household tasks in 24 countries. Up to now, the 1994 ISSP

is the only available dataset for comparative analysis on such a broad

scale.

Variables

The Affiliation of Countries to Specific Cultural Contexts11

The main problem with empirically testing Rodman’s theory is how to

decide what are cultural contexts in which traditional or egalitarian

norms concerning gender roles are prevailing, and what are cultural

contexts that can be described as being in transition from traditional

to egalitarian norms. In order not to have to assign countries to a

specific cultural setting on the basis of some arbitrary criterion,

this problem is solved empirically in this study. Agreement or

disagreement with the item “A man’s job is to earn money; a woman’s

job is to look after the home and family” is taken to reflect gender

ideology. At the national level, the 24 countries can be divided into

three groups according to the prevailing ideology (see Table 1).

Statistically, the three groups of countries were identified by

comparing their means on this item and looking for homogeneous

subgroups by computing an analysis of variance. The resulting three

groups shown in Table 1 are considered to represent different cultural

contexts with regard to prevailing gender ideology.

- Table 1 about here -

The first group of countries comprises Canada, East Germany, Sweden,

Norway, The Netherlands, United States, New Zealand, and Israel with 12

high means indicating (strong) disagreement with traditional norms

concerning gender roles. These countries make up the egalitarian

context. The second group: Great Britain, Australia, Northern Ireland,

Ireland, Italy, Spain, West Germany, and Japan, represent countries in

which gender ideology is in transition. The third group of countries

covers Slovenia, Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,

Bulgaria, Russia, and the Philippines. This group represent contexts

in which traditional gender roles reign. Hence, the assignment

procedure results in three groups of eight countries. By comparing the

standard deviations shown in Table 1 it becomes clear that concord is

greatest in the Philippines, while dissension is greatest in Japan,

Austria, and Bulgaria. The countries in which concord is greatest

(std. dev. 1.10) are also those in which respondents disagree most

with traditional gender roles (Canada, East Germany, Sweden, Norway,

The Netherlands) or those in which respondents agree most with

traditional gender roles (Philippines, Poland, Russia). There is a

tendency for the standard deviation to be greater, the closer the mean

is to 3, indicating that respondents are undecided, that is, neither

agree nor disagree. One might say then, that nations in the central

part of Table 1 can be regarded as being in role-transition in two

respects: More respondents in these countries are undecided (neither 13

agree nor disagree) and dissension is greater than in the other

countries.

The division of Household Tasks

The division of household task is the dependent variable in the

analysis. It is an index built on the basis of five items indicating

who does (1) the washing and ironing, (2) small repairs around the

house, (3) who is looking after sick family members, (4) who does the

shopping for groceries, and (5) who is deciding what to have for

dinner. Answers can be “always the woman,” “usually the woman,” “about

equal or both together,” “usually the man,” “always the man” or “is

done by a third person.” For the creation of the index, the last

category was excluded, since the index is meant to represent the

division of household tasks between the spouses. The index ranges from

5 to 25 with 5 indicating that the woman is always doing all the work

and 25 indicating that the man is always doing all the work. So, the

lower the score, the greater the share of household tasks performed by

the woman, and the higher the score, the more work is done by the

man.2

Social class14

In the ISSP, respondents are asked to which social class they ascribe

themselves, that is, lower class, working class, upper working or

lower-middle class, middle class, upper-middle class, or upper class.

This variable was recoded into three categories designating (1) lower

or working class, (2) upper working/lower middle or middle class, and

(3) upper middle or upper class.

The Relative Resources of Spouses

Because resource theory is about relative resources (according to Blood

and Wolfe and Rodman), it does not seem appropriate to use variables

that represent individual characteristics of the respondent when the

corresponding data for the spouse is not available. Therefore, the

explanatory variables in this analysis are ratios indicating whether

it is the respondent or his/her spouse who has most of the resources.

The first measure of the relative resources represents the couple’s

occupational arrangement. It is a combination of two variables that

indicate the current employment status of the respondent and his/her

spouse. This synthetic variable has eight categories: (1) Both spouses

are working full-time or both spouses are working part-time, (2) the 15

husband is working full-time or part-time, while the wife is working

too, but less than her husband,3 (3) the husband is working full-time

or part-time, while the wife is a housewife or unemployed, (4) the

husband is working full-time or part-time, while the wife has not

finished her education yet, is on some training, retired, disabled or

not in the labour force for some other reason, (5) the wife is working

full-time or part-time, while the husband is working too, but less

than his wife, (6) the wife is working full-time or part-time, while

the husband is a houseman or unemployed, (7) the wife is working full-

time or part-time, while the husband has not finished his education

yet, is on some training, retired, disabled or not in the labour force

for some other reason, and (8) both spouses have not finished their

education yet, are retired, disabled or not in the labour force for

some other reason.

The second measure of relative resources is “who earns more money,

the husband or the wife”. This variable has three categories: (1)

husband earns more than the wife, (2) they both earn about the same,

and (3) the wife earns more than the husband.

The third measure indicates how the income is organized in the

relationship. This variable has three categories: (1) husband manages

all the money, (2) money is pooled and each spouse takes out what is 16

needed or the money is kept separate, and (3) the wife manages all the

money.

Statistical Analysis

Apart from descriptive statistical analyses, several one-factorial and

multi-factorial analyses of variance are computed in order to find

statistically significant differences between the means for various

subgroups with regard to the division of household tasks and to

estimate the variation explained by the independent variables. In

other words, it is possible to find out about the differential impact

of factor variables on the dependent variable. It is also possible to

check for the main effects of the factors or explanatory variables as

well as for interaction-effects.

Included in the analysis are only those respondents who are married

or live as married, that is, the analysis is based on information on

21,589 couples. They are referred to as “spouses” or “husbands and

wives,” though, strictly speaking, this term is suitable for married

couples only. In the analyses of variance, cases with missing values

are excluded pairwise. Thus, the number of cases included in the

analyses vary.17

18

Findings

Does husband-wife division of tasks vary between the three cultural

contexts? On the horizontal axis of Figure 1, nations are arranged in

groups representing the different cultural contexts. Egalitarian

countries are shown on the left side; traditional ones are on the

right, and transitional nations are found in the middle. The axis

representing the index for the division of household tasks ranges from

9 to 14 and reproduces a section of the total scale ranging from 5 to

25. Because national means are not lower than 9 or higher than 14, the

categories below 9 and above 14 have been omitted in Figure 1.

- Figure 1 about here -

From Figure 1, it can be seen that there are systematic variations

in the division of household tasks according to the type of cultural

context, but these variations are only partly in the expected

direction: The share of chores done by husbands is greatest in the

eight countries characterized by an egalitarian gender ideology (i.e.,

Canada, East Germany, Sweden, Norway, The Netherlands, United States,

New Zealand, and Israel). Because a mean of 15 on the index indicates 19

an equal share of housework done by wives and husbands, it becomes

clear from Figure 1 that even in cultural contexts where egalitarian

ideology prevails, household tasks are not equally shared. In

countries where traditional ideology prevails, it is not the case that

wives are doing all or the lion’s share of the housework (as would be

indicated by means between 5 and 10), but it is consistent with the

expectation that the means in these countries are lower than in the

countries representing the egalitarian context. Contrary to the

expectation, wives in some transitional countries do more housework

than wives in traditional contexts. Moreover, Figure 1 clearly shows

that in the transitional context, variation between the countries is

greatest with Japan having a mean of 9.45 and West Germany having a

mean of 12.24. This, again, is in line with what was expected.

An analysis of variance including pairwise post-hoc tests shows that

the observed differences between the three cultural contexts with

regard to the division of housework is statistically significant (p

.05). This indicates that there is a relationship between the

prevailing type of gender ideology and the division of housework. The

mean difference with regard to the division of household tasks in the

egalitarian context as compared to the transitional context is 1.56.

In the egalitarian context as compared to the traditional context it 20

is 0.91, and in the traditional context as compared to the

transitional context it is 0.65.

The next test determines whether there are differences is sharing

chores between social strata, as Rodman suggested would be the case

for the transitional context. Figure 2 illustrates the association

between husbands’ and wives’ sharing in housework in different

cultural contexts and the social strata they ascribe themselves to.

- Figure 2 about here –

In the egalitarian context, there is no big difference between the

social strata with regard to the sharing in housework, though in the

upper social stratum, husbands do slightly more housework (= 13.3)

than in the lower (= 13.1) and middle strata (= 12.9). Within the

egalitarian context, regardless of social strata, housework is not

shared equally (i.e., means are lower than 15). Husbands in the

traditional context do slightly more housework when they ascribe

themselves or are ascribed by their wives to the middle class (=

12.1) as compared to the lower social stratum ( = 11.9), but in the

upper social stratum ( = 11.8) they do slightly less than in the

lower one. Again, there are no big differences between the social 21

classes. In the transitional context, husbands in the middle class (

= 11.4) do less than husbands in the lower class ( = 11.8), and

husbands in the upper class do the least housework ( = 10.8). This is

contrary to what Rodman suggested with regard to modified

patriarchies. In the transitional context, the biggest difference is

the one between husbands in the lower class and husbands in the upper

class (amounting to one point on the scale), while in the other

cultural contexts the biggest differences amount to 0.4 or 0.3 points

on the scale. While upper-class husbands in the egalitarian context

are those who perform the greatest share of household tasks, upper-

class husbands in the transitional context are the ones who do the

least housework.

- Table 2 about here -

In the next step of the analysis, the relative resources of spouses

in the three contexts are considered. Table 2 presents the descriptive

results from the bivariate analysis. Opposed to what one might expect,

it is not in the traditional context that wives have the least

resources, but in the transitional one. Firstly, husbands earns more

than wives more often and wives earns more than husbands less often in22

the transitional context than in the other contexts. Secondly, money

is managed jointly or kept seperate less often in the transitional

context, while the husband manages all the money more often in the

transitional context than in the other contexts. Finally, an

occupational arrangement in which the husband is working full-time or

part-time while the wife is unemployed or a housewife, is found much

more often in the transitional context than in the other contexts:

28.8 percent of all the couples in the transitional context have such

an occupational arrangement, but only 15.3 percent of the couples in

the egalitarian context and 11.7 percent of the couples in the

traditional context. At the same time, an occupational arrangement in

which the husband and the wife are both working full-time or part-time

is less often chosen by couples in the transitional context (24.6

percent) than by couples in the other situations (37.3 percent in the

egalitarian context and 40.6 percent in the traditional culture). The

overall impression from Table 2 is that the practice of the couples in

the transitional category is what one would have expected according to

a gender ideology that ascribes the role of the provider to the man

while the woman is the housekeeper, for instance, in the traditional

context. Obviously, the expression of gender ideologies and the

relevant practices are divergent. 23

Bivariate analysis of the associations between the division of tasks

and the cultural context on the one hand, and between the division of

tasks and each of the variables indicating spouses’ relative resources

on the other hand, produce the results shown in Table 3. Cultural

context has the strongest association with the division of chores,

followed by the organization of income and the occupational

arrangement. Which spouse earns more money is only weakly associated

with the division of household tasks.

- Table 3 about here -

It was hypothesized that the effect of variables representing the

spouses’ relative resources is strongest in the transitional culture

because of the greater flexibility of gender ideologies in this

context as compared to the egalitarian or traditional environments.

Table 4 shows the differential impact that relative resources have on

the allocation of chores in each of the three cultures.

- Table 4 about here -

24

For two of the three indicators of resources the hypothesis is

confirmed: The impact of who earns more money and of the organization

of the income in the relationship is strongest in the transitional

context. Concerning the occupational arrangement, the expectation is

refuted: The occupational arrangement has the strongest impact on the

division of tasks in the egalitarian context. Further, from Table 4 it

is clear that all three variables indicating relative resources of the

spouses have the smallest impact on the allocation of chores in the

traditional context, which confirms our expectations.

The bivariate analysis shows that the cultural context as well as

the relative resources have an impact on the division of tasks. The

question to be answered now is whether the effects prove to be

statistically significant. In order to test this, a multi-factorial

analysis of variance including the cultural context and the relative

resources variables as independent variables was computed. Since

information on who earns more money is only collected when both

partners are gainfully employed, this variable is excluded from the

multi-factorial analysis in order to minimize the loss of cases. To

keep the multivariate analysis simple, “occupational arrangement” was

recoded into a variable with three categories: (1) both partners are

working full-time or part-time, or they are both not in the labour 25

force; (2) the husband is working more than the wife (with “working

more” meaning that he is working for more hours per week in gainful

employment); and (3) the wife is working more than the husband. The

age of the respondent is included into the analysis as a covariate

though it is a non-relational variable, because for most countries

included in the ISSP it is plausible to expect that the age

differences between the partners are not very large. The hypothesis is

that younger couples will share housework more equally than older

ones. In addition to the main effects of the factors and the

covariate, interactions are allowed for.

- Figure 3 about here -

Figure 3 shows the significant factors and interaction effects in

the model and how much of the variance of the task-division they

explain: 24.2 percent of the variance is explained by factors and

interactions that are not statistically significant in the model.

Among the statistically significant factors in the model, the

organization of income in the relationship explains 19.4 percent of

the variance and the cultural context explains 16.4 percent. The age

of the respondent explains 24.2 percent of the variance, thus, having 26

the highest explanatory power of all the main effects in the model.

From the interactions, only the 2-way interaction between the

occupational arrangement and the cultural context (10.3 percent of the

variance explained) and the 3-way interaction between the occupational

arrangement, the cultural context, and the respondent’s age (5.5

percent of the variance explained) is significant. Overall, the

model’s R2 is only .119 indicating that the variables included in the

model explain the allocation of chores only poorly.

- Figure 4 about here -

Figures 4 and 5 show how much of the variance of the division of

housework is explained by factor variables and interaction effects in

the egalitarian context or the transitional context, respectively. In

the transitional context, the variables included in the model explain

the division of housework better (R2 = .123) than in the egalitarian

context (R2 = .065), though the explanatory power of the model is poor

in both cultural contexts.

- Figure 5 about here -

27

In the traditional context, none of the factor variables and none of

the interactions are statistically significant. Accordingly, the model

fit in the traditional category is very poor with R2 = .023. So, the

variables representing the spouses’ relative resources have most

explanatory power in the transitional context and no explanatory power

in the traditional environment, which supports our initial prediction.

Moreover, it is striking that in the egalitarian context (Figure 4),

all statistically significant effects are main effects, while in the

transitional context (Figure 5), in addition to the main effects of

the occupational arrangement and the organization of income in the

relationship, all 2-way interaction effects and even the 3-way

interaction effect are significant, thus, indicating that in the

transitional context, relative resources makes a difference with

regard to task-division indirectly via specific constellations.

Conclusion

This paper began by questioning whether it is true, according to

Rodman (1967, 1970), that the resource explanation for differential

power in intimate relationships is a culture-specific theory in the

sense that it applies to Western cultures (i.e., North America and

most parts of Europe), because it is in these cultures that the norms 28

concerning gender roles are flexible or--as he put it--in transition

from traditional to egalitarian values. Though the findings from 24

nations do not support the view that relative resources are only

effective in Western cultures or transitional cultural contexts, the

results show that they actually have a greater impact on the division

of tasks in transitional contexts than in the egalitarian or

traditional categories (see Table 4 and Figures 4 and 5). Moreover,

interaction effects between the different measures of relative

resources and the distribution of tasks are only significant in the

transitional context. This might be interpreted as pointing to a

bargaining processes in which the lack of resources is decisive for

the assessment of other resources (or the lack of other resources). In

all, the effects of different kinds of resources and different

constellations of resources are much less patterned or predictable in

the transitional context than in the egalitarian or the traditional

groups. So, in general the data supports Rodman’s resource theory in

cultural context. The analysis did not substantiate Rodman’s notion of

modified patriarchies, because in the transitional context, upper-

class husbands do less housework than lower-class husbands and middle-

class husbands (see Figure 2). Of course, this does not exclude the

29

possibility that there might be specific transitional cultural

environments that support Rodman’s notion of a modified patriarchy.

Apart from the findings that are of direct significance for the test

of Rodman’s resource theory in cultural context, the analysis produced

some striking results that are worth being discussed here. First,

couples in the transitional context are those whose arrangements with

regard to earning money, organization of income, and occupational

arrangement agree most with what is usually called the traditional

model, in the sense that the man is the provider while the woman is

the housewife (see Table 2). Also, the arrangements found in the

traditional context cannot be understood against the backdrop of the

prevailing gender ideology. It happens to be the case that in the

traditional context the wife is more likely to earn more than the

husband and that the wife works full-time or part-time, while the

husband is unemployed or a houseman. Of course, this is not according

to the view that a man should be the provider of the family, while the

woman should look after the home and family. Rather, this seems to be

according to pressures of the job market. In the traditional context,

the overall economic situation simply may not allow for an adjustment

of practices to the prevailing gender ideology. If this line of

argument is right, the overall political or economic situation of a 30

country will be relevant for the living arrangements that are realized

between partners in intimate relationships in addition to gender

ideologies and relative resources. The mere fact that these

relationships are intimate ones, does not mean that the only factors

shaping them are individual preferences and individual or relative

resources: There must be room for the preferences and resources to

come into play.

Furthermore, it became clear from this analysis that even in the

egalitarian context, there is unequal sharing of labour in the home

(and outside the home) between husbands and wives (see Figure 1). As

was mentioned before, it is not clear whether an egalitarian gender

ideology implies that men and women do the same things (inside and

outside the home), or that men and women are free to do the things

they know best or want most. The increasing status of women across the

world is a is a slow going process, however, as the opportunities for

women rises, the less rewarding will such unequal arrangements be for

the majority of women. In line with this argument the findings

indicate that in the egalitarian context, age and occupational

arrangement explain the division of housework best (see Figure 4).

It is clear that the debate about what determines the differential

power of spouses, gender ideologies or relative resources must reckon 31

with interaction effects. Moreover, it is not true that different

kinds of resources necessarily accompany each other (see Table 2). For

example, in all cultural contexts, wives are more likely than husbands

to manage the money, but this does not mean that wives are more likely

than husbands to earn more money or work more. Here, we also have to

expect interaction effects.

In connection with the organization of income, resource theory fails

as it is not clear whether martial power stems from having resources or

from allocating resources. For instance, the organization of income can

be regarded as a specific qualification needed for housekeeping, which

in turn suggests greater involvement in housework. In addition, in

some situations the organization of income might reflect the sole

decision of one spouse.

It should also be noted that the resources considered in this

analysis cannot explain the division of housework as shown by the poor

fit of the models. Thus, further research is required to account for

the division of household tasks between husbands and wives. While this

study is a specific test for Rodman’s theory of resources in cultural

context, it is certainly plausible to assume that there are variables

that would have a significant effect if they were introduced into the

multivariate model, for example, the number and age of children. 32

In testing Rodman's theory this paper provides an empirically based

measure of the three cultural constructs. Though this procedure might

draw criticism, it is less arbitrary than alternative procedures.

Finally, the measures of relative resources are drawn from Western

perspectives and excludes such variables as the age-difference between

the spouses. This raises the question of what a resource means in

specific cultures. Since our test of resource theory is inconclusive,

it is difficult to determine whether the findings simply refutes

resource theory or whether the specification of the resources is

flawed. Future research needs to explore these methodological and

theoretical issues in order to further our understanding of the impact

of relative resources on differential power in intimate relationships.

NOTES

1 Similarly, Gary Becker suggested that women havebiologically-based comparative advantages over men in thehousehold sector and that “households with only men or onlywomen are less efficient because they are unable to profitfrom the sexual difference in comparative advantages”(1993:38-39). Again, the gender-specific division of labour isregarded as being rational for the simple reason that gainsfrom (increased) specialization are greater than the gainsfrom involvement in the same activity.

2 Note that the index comprises one item that, unfortunately,does not measure an activity, as the other items do, but a

33

decision (i.e., item 5 “who is deciding what to have fordinner”).

3 If the husband is working full-time, the wife is workingpart-time or she is a helping family member. If the husband isworking part-time, the wife is working for a few hours perweek or she is a helping family member.

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Brayfield, A.A. 1992. “Employment Resources and Housework in Canada.”

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Chafetz, J. 1980. “Conflict Resolution in Marriage.” Journal of Family

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Friedan, B. 1963. The Feminine Mystique. New York: Dell Publishing.

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Hochschild, A.R. and A. Machung. 1989. The Second Shift: Working Parents and

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Hunt, J.G. and L.L. Hunt. 1982. “The Dualities of Careers and

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Rubin, L. 1976. Worlds of Pain. New York: Basic Books.

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37

TABLES AND FIGURES (start on following page)

38

Table 1: Gender role orientations across 24 nations (ranked means)*

Country

Mean Std.Dev.

Cases Extremecategory(1)

Extremecategory(5)

n % n %

Canada 4.02 1.03 1426 40 2.8 54137.6

East-Germany 3.96 1.01 1079 32 2.9 338

30.8

Sweden 3.91 1.06 1244 31 2.4 43934.5

Norway 3.82 1.09 2062 63 3.0 63530.4

Netherlands 3.61 1.10 1946 87 4.4 392

19.9

USA 3.54 1.15 1414 76 5.3 29620.5

NewZealand 3.53 1.14 1020 40 3.8 215

20.5

Israel 3.51 1.25 1271 110 8.5 29422.8

GreatBritain 3.44 1.15 960 50 5.1 167

17.0

Australia 3.44 1.19 1767 91 5.1 37521.1

NorthernIreland 3.33 1.16 633 37 5.7 93

14.4

Ireland 3.28 1.29 920 88 9.4 17418.6

Italy 3.26 1.28 1015 105 10.3 19619.3

39

Spain 3.21 1.25 2426 216 8.7 34113.7

West-Germany 3.15 1.32 2263 290 12.5 402

17.3

Japan 3.07 1.49 1285 261 20.0 35327.0

Slovenia 3.02 1.21 1017 111 10.8 10310.0

Austria 2.80 1.45 953 241 24.7 16617.0

CzechRepublic 2.55 1.22 1015 236 23.0 70 6.8

Hungary 2.31 1.28 1494 568 37.9 105 7.0

Poland 2.30 1.09 1554 386 24.2 35 2.2

Bulgaria 2.29 1.38 1082 431 38.3 12310.9

Russia 2.20 1.10 1921 590 29.5 32 1.6

Philippines 2.16 0.81 1200 169 14.1 12 1.0

Total 3.21 1.32 32967 4349 12.9 589717.6

* Gender role orientation was measured with the item “A man’s job is toearn money; a woman’s job is to look after the home and family”. The answercategories were: 1=strongly agree, 2=agree, 3=neither agree nor disagree,4=disagree, 5=strongly disagree.

40

Figure 1: The division of household tasks between husbands and wives in 24countries

41

Country

divi

sion

of

hous

ehol

d ta

sks

(ind

ex):

mea

ns

14

13

12

11

10

9

Figure 2: The division of household tasks between husbands and wives indifferent cultural contexts and different social classes

42

social class

uppermiddlelower

divi

sion

of

hous

ehol

d ta

sks

(ind

ex):

mea

ns

14,0

13,5

13,0

12,5

12,0

11,5

11,0

10,5

10,0

9,5

9,0

cultural context

egalitarian

transitional

traditional

Table 2: The distribution of relative resources in different cultural contexts (column percentages)

cultural context

egalitariantransitional

traditional

Occupational arrangement

Both are working full-time or part-time 37.3 24.6 40.6Husband is working full- or part-time; Wife is working less thanhusband 16.1 16.0 5.8Husband is working full- or part-time; Wife is unemployed or housewife 15.3 28.8 11.7Husband is working full- or part-time; Wife is not working for otherreasons (education, retired, disabled) 4.9 4.0 7.8Wife is working full- or part-time; Husband is working less than wife 1.3 0.9 1.7Wife is working full- or part-time; Husband is unemployed or houseman 1.9 1.2 2.4Wife is working full- or part-time; Husband is not working for otherreasons (education, retired, disabled) 5.0 2.8 4.7Both are not in the labour-force (education, retired, disabled) 18.2 21.7 25.4

Who earns more money?

Husband 75.9 79.3 68.9Both the same 13.9 14.3 18.7Wife 10.3 6.4 12.4

43

Organization of income in the relationship

Husbands manages all the money 5.9 11.6 6.6Money is managed jointly and each spouse takes out what s/he needs ormoney is kept seperate 86.7 65.7 70.1Wife manages all the money 7.4 22.6 23.2

44

Table 3: The impact of the cultural context and of the variables representing thespouses’ relative resources on the division of household tasks

Dependent variable:division of householdtasks (index)

Etanumber ofcases

cultural context .227 18925

occupational arrangement .178 14884

who earns more money? .126 12733

organization of the income .213 18757

Table 4: The differential impact of variables representing the spouses’ relativeresources on the division of household tasks in different cultural contexts(eta)

dependent variable:division of householdtasks (index) in

theegalitariancontext

thetransitionalcontext

thetraditionalcontext

occupationalarrangement

.222(n=5271)

.202(n=4745)

.070(n=4868)

who earns more money? .139(n=4402)

.174(n=4016)

.086(n=4315)

organization of theincome in therelationship

.111(n=6349)

.277(n=6331)

.110(n=6077)

46

Figure 3: Variance of ‘division of household tasks’ explained by factor variables andinteraction effects

Main effects:1 cultural context2 organization of income3 age2-way interaction effects:4 occupational arrangement with cultural context3-way interaction effects:5 occupational arrangement with cultural context with age

6 not significant

47

3

6

2

1

45

24,2%

24,2%

19,4%

16,4%

10,3%5,5%

Figure 4: Variance of ‘division of household tasks’ explained by factor variables andinteraction effects in the egalitarian context

Main effects:1 occupational arrangement2 organization of income3 age

4 not significant

48

1

2

3

4

23,8%

18,4%

37,5%

20,3%

Figure 5: Variance of “division of household tasks” explained by factor variables andinteraction effects in the transitional context

Main effects:1 occupational arrangement2 organization of income2-way interaction effects:3 occupational arrangement with organization of income4 occupational arrangement with age5 organization of income with age3-way interaction effects:6 occupational arrangement with organization of income with age

49

1

2

3

4

5

6

8,2%

25,9%

10,3%

30,6%

14,3%

10,6%