Gazing at suffering Gaza from suffering Sderot: Seeds of forgiveness and reconciliation amidst the...

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Gazing at Gaza From Sderot: Seeds of Reconciliation Amidst the Turmoil?The burgeoning literature on intergroup forgive-ness and reconciliation has mainly focused on the postviolence phase of the conflict (cf. Christie, Tint, Wagner, & Winter, 2008). Many studies in

Gazing at suffering Gaza from suffering Sderot: Seeds of forgiveness and reconciliation amidst the turmoil?

Yechiel Klar1 and Noa Schori-Eyal2

AbstractMost studies on forgiveness and reconciliation in intergroup conflicts are conducted during the postresolution stages of conflict. The present research was conducted in the south of Israel to examine the issue of forgiveness among people currently enmeshed in active and violent conflict. Study 1 was conducted in the Israeli town of Sderot, which for more than a decade has been under frequent rocket fire from neighboring Palestinian Gaza and has also witnessed numerous Israeli retaliatory attacks on Gaza. Study 2 was conducted among residents of towns and communities close to the Gaza border during the 2014 war. We investigated the potential readiness for mutual forgiveness with Gaza residents, apology, and reparation and help to repair war damage. Mutual forgiveness received considerable support, but apology and reparations did not. Perspective-taking vis-à-vis the Palestinians predicted support for mutual forgiveness in the first but not the second study. Acceptance of moral responsibility and dismissal of exonerating cognitions regarding Israel’s conduct in Gaza predicted readiness for apology and reparations. Hence a step towards mutual forgiveness with the adversarial outgroup is feasible under active conflict mainly because it does not involve culpability.

Keywordsforgiveness, intergroup conflict, reconciliation, 2014 Gaza War

Paper received 17 February 2014; revised version accepted 12 December 2014.

1School of Psychological Studies, Israel2University of Maryland, USA, and the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel

Corresponding author:Yechiel Klar, School of Psychological Sciences, Tel Aviv University, 69978, Tel Aviv, Israel. Email: [email protected]

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this area have been conducted at a temporal dis-tance from the violent events, and with research respondents who were not direct participants in the conflict. In some cases the respondents even needed to be briefed by the researchers about these historical events (e.g., Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Halloran, 2007; Licata & Klein, 2010; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2004, 2006; Wohl, Matheson, Branscombe, & Anisman, 2013). However, other studies have been con-ducted closer to the cessation of open hostilities, such as in Northern Ireland (e.g., Hewstone et al., 2008) and in the former Yugoslavia (Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Čehajić, Brown, & González, 2009).

Given that the belligerence and regret gener-ated in the ongoing phases of the conflict do not miraculously fade away after formal conflict reso-lution or the active wrongdoings cease for other reasons, this postconflict focus is clearly war-ranted and informative. However, we believe that it is also important to study the same issues when the parties are still in the throes of conflict, exchanging fire, and directly exposed to hostilities and violence. Although expectations for full-blown readiness for forgiveness, reparation, and reconciliation might be premature at this chaotic juncture (cf. Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio, & Kenworthy, 2007), looking for the seeds of these processes while parties are still fighting each other might be a worthwhile research endeavor. One of the goals of the current research was to explore the readiness for forgive-ness, reparation, and reconciliation, as well as some of their precursors, among civilians who have been living for more than a decade in an active war zone and in close proximity to their civilian counterparts in the enemy outgroup (Study 1) and even (as it tragically unfolded) dur-ing the days of active war (Study 2).

We also differentiate between unilateral and bilateral intergroup conflicts. In unilateral inter-group conflicts (e.g., the Holocaust, other geno-cides, slavery), one party is distinctly the perpetrator, and the other party is undoubtedly the victim. The perpetrator–victim dichotomy is clear-cut and mutually exclusive in these cases,

and it is also clear which party needs to seek for-giveness and which party is in a position to grant such forgiveness (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

To date, most of the psychological forgiveness and reconciliation literature has been modelled on this type of conflict1 (e.g., Abu-Nimer, 2001; Barkan & Karn, 2006; Gibney, 2008; McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2001; Minow, 1998; Nadler, Malloy, & Fisher, 2008; Tavuchis, 1993). This dictates a number of steps to reconciliation, which require the perpetrator group to acknowl-edge collective responsibility and guilt, make apologies and reparations, and finally offer to rec-oncile. The victim group can accept or reject each of these gestures, and agree or disagree to recon-ciliation. In these conflicts the parties are instructed to first address the past before turning to the future (for a review, see Wohl, Hornsey, & Philpot, 2011)

However, many intergroup and ethno-political conflicts (e.g., Northern Ireland, Middle Eastern conflicts) are bilateral rather than unilateral in nature. In such conflicts, all parties, although not necessarily symmetrical in their power and ability to harm, fulfill the dual role of victims and perpe-trators (Siman-Tov-Nachlieli & Shnabel, 2014). Currently, there is much less research on pro-cesses that may or may not lead to forgiveness and reconciliation in such bilateral conflicts. In this article we looked for potential seeds of for-giveness and reconciliation in a conflict situation in which both parties (or, in fact, those acting in their name) are still exchanging blows and are both inflicting pain on each other.

The Current StudiesThe current studies were conducted in the south-ern Israeli towns and villages that border on the Palestinian Gaza Strip. Study 1 was conducted in May 2013 in the town of Sderot. Since 2001 the residents of Sderot, due to their geographical proximity to the Gaza Strip (less than one mile), have been living in a state of active warfare and have undergone frequent mortar fire and Qassam rocket attacks. Thousands of rockets have fallen on the town, which have resulted in 15 casualties



Klar and Schori-Eyal 3

and hundreds of injured residents (G. M. Diamond, Lipsitz, Fajerman, & Rozenblat, 2010). Daily life in Sderot is always accompanied by per-sistent uncertainty about when and where the next round will be. An early warning system announces a “Code Red” alert via loudspeakers whenever it is able to detect incoming rockets, which provides the residents (whether at home or outside) with only 15 seconds to take cover (G. M. Diamond et al., 2010).2 At the same time, due to the geographical proximity with Gaza, Sderot residents (and the other communities neighbor-ing Gaza) have a good vantage point from which to observe Israeli military attacks on Gaza and their impact on the neighboring Palestinians. The residents of the Gaza Strip on the other side of the border fence (most of them the descendants of the 1948 refugees from southern Israel) suffer from extreme population density, poor living conditions, unemployment, the ongoing eco-nomic blockade of their borders (by both Israel and Egypt), recurring Israeli military aerial attacks, and two large scale Israeli military incur-sions following periods of extended missile attacks on Israel (operations “Cast Lead” in December 2008 and January 2009, and “Pillar of Defense” in November 2012) that resulted in more than a thousand casualties in Gaza.3

Sderot’s situation is shared to great extent by a score of other communities in Israel which include the “Gaza envelope” agricultural commu-nities that are only few miles from the Gaza Strip, and the towns Ashkelon and Netivot, which are often heavily targeted by rockets and missiles dur-ing periods of increased hostility.

On July 8, 2014 the deadliest round of hostili-ties around Gaza so far broke out. Once again the areas neighboring Gaza were subject to fire by thousands of rockets and mortar shells. During this war the existence of dozens of “attack tun-nels” leading to Israeli communities near the bor-ders with Gaza became publically known, and created additional fears of infiltration. At the same time the Gaza Strip was a target of thou-sands of Israeli air strikes, artillery, and ground incursions which resulted in more than two thou-sand casualties, massive physical destruction, and

hundreds of thousands of people being forced to evacuate their homes during this war.

In the current studies, which were conducted in Sderot in Spring 2013 and in the entire area neighboring Gaza during the 2014 Gaza War, we explored how people belonging to one party involved in the conflict, who live near the hostile border, relate to the plight of the people on the other side of the border, who belong to the other party to the conflict. More particularly, we inves-tigated whether seeds of peace-making and future reconciliation can be found even under these circumstances. We looked for support for apology and reparation, and readiness for mutual forgiveness with their enemies/neighbors among the respondents. We also explored potential pre-dictors for readiness to adopt steps to peace and reconciliation with their Gaza neighbors, includ-ing their own suffering, political orientation, religiosity, perspective-taking, acceptance of moral responsibility, and the use of exonerating cognitions.

Which Steps to Reconciliation Are Supported?

Support for Ingroup Apologies and ReparationsGroup apologies (e.g., Blatz & Philpot, 2010; Gibney, 2008; Wohl et al., 2011) and reparations (e.g., Barkan, 2001; Minow, 1998; Wohl et al., 2011) are widely referred to in the psychological literature as major vehicles for peace and recon-ciliation. The perpetrator group which adopts these means signals its “change of character” to the harmed group and to the relevant moral com-munity as well as its acknowledgement of past injustices the group has committed, its acceptance of responsibility for these wrongs, and its inten-tion to redress them (Tavuchis, 1993). This may also help the victimized group to regain a sense of agency and enable the perpetrator group to be reaccepted into the moral community (de Grieff, 2008; Nadler, 2002; Shnabel & Nadler, 2008).

However, two points should be noted in con-sidering the applicability of these means for our




respondents at this particular point in time. First, apology and reparation have been mostly defined in the context of unilateral conflicts, where the perpetrator and victim roles are accepted by the two parties. In bilateral conflicts where both par-ties are simultaneously harming and being harmed by the other party, it is more likely that both parties would tend to assign themselves the victim rather than the perpetrator role (see Roccas et al., 2004; Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012; Siman-Tov-Nachlieli & Shnable, 2014). Consequently, group members in ongoing intergroup conflict might be highly reluctant to accept responsibility for any past wrongdoings or incur their cost. Second, apologies and reparations are directed at correcting the wrongs of the past. Yet, group members when still immersed in the perils of the conflict might prefer to put their focus on hopes for a better future rather than on readdressing past injustices attributed to them.

Support for Intergroup Mutual ForgivenessThe term “mutual forgiveness” was coined by an early 19th-century essayist (Carey, 1815). It is widely applied in interpersonal conflicts such as between married couples or business partners who decide to put mutual accusations and bitter feelings aside or suspend them to find better ways to deal with each other. Mutual forgiveness is dis-cussed in the psychotherapy literature (e.g., E. L. Worthington & DiBlasio, 1990) but as noted by Govier: “This topic is barely mentioned in the philosophical works on forgiveness” (2002, p. viii). This is also the case in the intergroup rec-ognition literature.

However, “mutual forgiveness” is clearly reflected in the Intergroup Forgiveness Scale for Northern Ireland developed by Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, Hamberger, and Niens (2006), which includes items such as “Only when the two communities of Northern Ireland learn to for-give each other can we be free of political vio-lence.” It does not revolve around the past culpability of one of the parties to the conflict. It can be described as a no-fault conflict resolution endeavor (Hart & Hodson, 2008) although it

does not necessarily mean forgetting the past or waiving the right to inquire into it at later and bet-ter times. Thus, it seems worthwhile to assess support or mutual forgiveness in the context of group members who are still in the grip of a vio-lent conflict.

What Predicts Support for the Specific Steps to Reconciliation?We also examined potential predictors of support for apology and reparations, on one hand, and mutual forgiveness, on the other. We explored the role of perceived own and others’ suffering, political orientation, religiosity, acceptance of moral responsibility, the use of exonerating cog-nitions, and perspective-taking.

Perceived SufferingThe effects of perceived suffering during the conflict might unfold in two opposite directions. There is the “suffering begets suffering” effect, in which the greater the felt suffering the lesser the concern for the suffering of the adversary outgroup members. This might be due to ele-vated self-focus on one’s own suffering, which might deplete mental and emotional capacities for empathic concern (Ibanez et al., 2011; Mor & Winquist, 2002; Wilson, 2013; R. Worthington, 2012; Yamada & Decety, 2009), and it can be ascribed to “competitive victimhood” (e.g., Noor et al., 2012) in which acknowledging the suffering of other may be regarded as diminish-ing the exclusivity of people’s own suffering. Perceived suffering may also make the corre-sponding suffering of the adversarial outgroup appear to be fully deserved (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007; Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006).

The opposite possible direction is “altruism born of suffering” (Staub & Vollhardt, 2008; Vollhardt, 2009; Vollhardt & Staub, 2011) where one’s own suffering can sometimes enhance the ability to empathize with human suffering every-where (see also Klar, Schori-Eyal, & Klar, 2013). Own suffering may also increase the desire to put




an end to the conflict, possibly by making peace with the enemy. This has been termed “conflict fatigue” (Kelman, 2004). To the best of our knowledge none of these possibilities has been tested empirically on group members while actu-ally exposed to violent conflicts.

Political OrientationA right-wing political orientation has been found in many countries including Israel to be linked to nationalistic sentiments, negativity towards out-groups, ethnocentrism, and support of exclusion-ary ideologies and policies (e.g., Berlet & Lyons, 2000; Betz, 1994; S. Diamond, 1995; Duckitt, 2005; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Shamir & Sagiv-Schifter, 2006; Sprinzak, 1991). Interestingly, political orientation has rarely been studied in the forgiveness and reconciliation area. Based on the literature, it can be expected that a right- (rather than left-) wing political orientation should lead to an unwillingness to forgive, help, or reconcile with the adversarial outgroup.

ReligiosityAlthough forgiveness and reconciliation with one’s enemies are religiously grounded values (e.g., Auerbach, 2005; Batson & Burris, 1994; Gopin, 2001; Rye et al., 2000), so also are values such as outgroup resentment and vengeance (Baron, 1971; Kadayifci-Orellana, 2009; Sanford & Levinson, 1948). Research among Israeli Jews has discovered that religiousness is inversely related to the promo-tion of positive relations between Jews and Arabs (e.g., Kimmerling, 1999; Liebman, 1995; Rynhold, 2005). As in the case of political orientation, religi-osity has been rarely explored in the forgiveness and reconciliation literature.

Moral Responsibility and Exonerating CognitionsAccepting moral responsibility for the ingroup’s harmful acts (or for the harmful consequences of the ingroup’s actions which are perceived as justi-fied) is presumed to pave the way for willingness

for apology, reparation, and possibly mutual for-giveness (Roccas et al., 2006; Scheiber, 2002; Wohl, Branscome, & Klar, 2006; Wohl et al., 2011). However, because experiencing culpability is aversive (Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005), group members may thus use exonerating cognitions in which they minimize the severity of the ingroup’s misconduct or lay the blame on the adversarial group. This may lead to opposition to apology or reparation to the outgroup (Roccas et al., 2006).

Perspective-Taking and Acknowledgement of Outgroup SufferingBeing able to look at the conflict from the point of view of the adversary and empathize with the plight of the human beings on the other side of the conflict are assumed in the psychological lit-erature to be conducive to fostering prosocial behavior and hence greater forgiveness and will-ingness for reconciliation (Batson, 2014; Davis, 1994; Eisenberg, 1986; McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). In the intergroup conflict con-text, Hewstone et al. (2006) found that intergroup perspective-taking was a positive predictor of readiness for intergroup forgiveness among Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Brown and Čehajić (2008) reported a similar result in former Yugoslavia. Both results were obtained after the formal resolution of the vio-lent conflicts. We explored whether the ability to take the perspective of the adversary can be found while still in the heat of the conflict, and whether it was conducive to apology, reparations, and mutual forgiveness.

To summarize, we explore support for differ-ent steps to reconciliation: unilateral (group apol-ogy and reparation) and bilateral (mutual forgiveness). We expect that factors related to acknowledgement of the ingroup’s role as an aggressor (though possibly not the sole aggressor) in the conflict, such as perceived moral responsi-bility and dismissal of exonerating cognitions, would be related to unilateral steps toward recon-ciliation. However, mutual forgiveness, which implicitly apportions blame to the other side as




well, would more likely be related to variables such as perspective-taking, which allow the group members to acknowledge the suffering of the other without taking responsibility for it. Religiosity and right wing political orientation are expected to be opposed to any of the conciliatory steps, while the role of experienced suffering during the conflict is unclear.

Study 1: Sderot 2013The study was conducted in May 2013 in the town of Sderot (population: approximately 21,0004) at a relatively quiet time approximately six months after the end of the Israeli military operation “Pillar of Defense” in Gaza (in November 2012) which was an intensified period of fire from both sides.

Method

RespondentsEighty Jewish residents of Sderot (43 men, age range: 17–72, M = 36.45, SD = 13.92) were approached and completed the study. The responses of five participants indicated that they did not fully understand the language of the questions, and their data were excluded from analysis; the following results pertain only to the respondents who correctly completed the study. Seventy-six percent of the respondents reported that they had been living under rocket fire from Gaza for more than 8 years. Only one respondent had lived under threat for less than a year. Thirty-two percent of respondents indicated that they were secular; 36.3% identified themselves as tra-ditional Jews; and about 19% identified them-selves as either Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox Jews (12.5% did not answer the question). Religiosity was also assessed on a Likert-type scale (1 = com-pletely secular, 7 = very religious; M = 3.45, SD = 1.95). To assess political orientation, respondents were asked to indicate how much they identified with the political right and how much they identi-fied with the political left, and political orienta-tion was calculated by subtracting one from the

other (the higher the score, the more respondents were considered right-wing). More than 38% of the respondents were right-wing, 52% were cen-trists, and 6.7% were left-wing (two respondents declined to answer). Political orientation was also assessed on a Likert-type scale (1= highly left wing, 7 = highly right wing; M = 5.11, SD = 1.79).

ProcedureRespondents were approached in public locations (e.g., local supermarkets, the public library) and were asked to participate in the study in exchange for a gift certificate. The researchers were present while respondents completed the questionnaire and were available to clarify language issues according to need, as Hebrew was not the mother tongue of many respondents.

MeasuresUnless specified otherwise, all measures ranged from 1 (strongly disagree/not at all) to 7 (strongly agree/very much).

Duration of exposure to shell and rocket attacks. Respondents indicated how long they had been living under the threat of missile attacks from Gaza on a scale ranging from “never” to “over 8 years.”

Perceived suffering. Respondents indicated how much they suffered during the periods of time they were exposed to shell and rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip. Four items were used to assess perceived suffering: “It was a difficult time for me”; “It was a difficult time for my family”; “I suffered during this time”; “My family members suffered during this time” (Cronbach’s α = .91).

Exposure to Israeli Defence Force (IDF) military opera-tions in Gaza. Respondents were asked about the extent to which they were exposed to the sights and sounds of the IDF military operations in Gaza, and how these sights affected them: “I have been exposed to the sights and sounds of IDF military operations in Gaza”; “The sights and sounds of IDF military operations in Gaza




have caused me discomfort”; “When exposed to the sights and sounds of IDF military operations in Gaza, I thought of the conditions of the Pales-tinian residents of Gaza.” Response scales ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very often). These items were not designed for use as a single scale, as each of them reflects a different element of exposure to IDF military operations, and are not expected to cohere into a single experience of exposure.

Perspective-taking vis-à-vis the Palestinians in Gaza. Respondents were asked about their empathy (or lack of empathy) toward the Palestinian residents of Gaza, as reflected in their ability and willing-ness to take their perspective. This measure was based on other scales (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; Brown & Čehajić, 2008; Hew-stone et al., 2006) and included four items: “I tried to understand what Palestinians in Gaza were going through”; “I wondered how Palestin-ians in Gaza were feeling”; “I tried to look at things that happened during the operation from the Gaza Palestinians’ point of view”; “I was able to understand the Gaza Palestinians’ point of view” (α = .92).

Perceived outgroup suffering. Two items assessed respondents’ perception of Palestinian hardship and suffering during the military operation: “It was a difficult time for the Palestinians” and “The Palestinians suffered during the operation” (r = .91, p < .01).

Exonerating cognitions. Five items assessed respondents’ endorsement of exonerating cogni-tions to justify the ingroup’s possible moral trans-gressions (based on Roccas et al., 2006): “If the Palestinians in Gaza were willing to live in peace with Israel, Israel wouldn’t be forced to operate against them”; “Under the circumstances, any other state would treat the Palestinians in Gaza very harshly”; “Even if there is any truth to the media portrayal of Israel’s actions during the ‘Cast Lead’ military operation, it is dwarfed by what the Palestinians in Gaza did to Israelis”; “Considering the circumstances that led to the operation, Israel’s actions toward the Palestinians

were completely justified”; “I think the Palestini-ans brought their current situation upon them-selves” (α = .74).

Acceptance of moral responsibility. Three items, based on Roccas et al. (2006), assessed respondents’ level of acceptance (or lack of acceptance) of moral responsibility for Israel’s harmful actions toward the Palestinians: “Israel bears a moral responsibil-ity for the Palestinians’ situation in Gaza”; “Israel is responsible for much of the Gaza Palestinians’ suffering during the military operations and actions”; “I feel morally responsible for the situa-tion of the Gaza Palestinians” (α = .74).

Support for ingroup apology. Two items assessed respondents’ support for apology and expres-sions of remorse by the ingroup: “The State of Israel ought to express remorse over its actions in Gaza during the military operations (e.g., opera-tion ‘Cast Lead’)”; “The State of Israel should apologize to the Gaza Palestinians for its actions during the military operations in Gaza” (r = .60).

Support of reparation and help to the outgroup. Four items assessed respondents’ support for Israeli reparation and help to Palestinians in Gaza: “Israel ought to compensate the Palestinians in Gaza for damage caused by its actions during the [military] operation”; “I believe Israel ought to assist in repairing the damage it caused in Gaza in recent years”; “I think Palestinians in Gaza should receive some compensation from Israel for what happened during the military operations”; “I think Israel should help Gaza residents who lost their homes to rebuild them” (α = .85).

Support for mutual forgiveness. Four items (based on Hewstone et al., 2004) assessed respondents’ sup-port for mutual forgiveness between Israelis and Palestinians: “Israelis and Palestinians must learn to refrain from retaliation in response to political violence”; “Only when Israelis and Palestinians learn to forgive each other can we be free of political violence”; “Israelis and Palestinians can never let go of the past and progress to the future unless they learn to forget the past”; “In order for




Israelis and Palestinians to progress into the future, they must put the past out of their minds” (α = .73).

Results and DiscussionWe begin by presenting the main descriptive results.

Perceived suffering during periods of time under rocket threat was high (M = 5.60, SD = 1.45). More than 75% of the respondents indi-cated that the time under rocket threat was a difficult or very difficult time for their families and 62% indicated that it was very difficult or difficult for them as well. The majority of the respondents acknowledged that the Palestinian residents of Gaza have suffered considerably during the years of confrontation (M = 5.22, SD = 2.08).

The vast majority of the respondents (81%) indicated that they were frequently directly exposed to the sights and sounds of the IDF operating in Gaza. When asked whether this exposure caused them discomfort, one third of the respondents (35%) reported a substantial level of unease. A smaller percentage (14%) also reported that these sights and sounds made them contemplate (frequently or very fre-quently) the condition of the Palestinians in Gaza. About 20% of the respondents replied that the sight of the IDF operating in Gaza did not cause any discomfort at all, and 30% indi-cated that they never thought about the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza when exposed to IDF activity. Thus, acknowledging the suffering of the other party does not automatically entail caring and compassion toward enemy outgroup members.

Overall, respondents were moderately prone to taking the perspective of the outgroup; the average score for this measure was slightly lower than the scale midpoint (M = 3.35, SD = 1.87). Exonerating cognitions for the ingroup’s actions towards the Palestinians in Gaza were high (M = 5.42, SD = 1.38), and moral responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza was quite low (M = 2.49, SD = 1.46).

Support for Apology and Reparation, and for Mutual ForgivenessA major goal of the current studies was to assess the willingness of group members who are highly exposed to the perils of the conflict to move toward reconciliation with the other group. We first looked at support for apology to the Palestinians in Gaza for the harm caused by Israeli military operations. We found that such a step was resolutely rejected by most of the respondents (M = 1.74, SD = 1.16). Similarly, when actual reparations and help in repairing the war damage in Gaza were raised, the suggestion received very little support (M = 1.97, SD = 1.28). However, the reactions toward mutual forgive-ness between Israelis and the Palestinians of Gaza were significantly more supportive than for apology and reparation, M = 4.86, SD = 1.65; t(72) = 15.17, p < .001, t(72) = 12.91, p < .001, respectively. In fact, 55 (out of the 75 respond-ents) were supportive of this mutual forgiveness.

Predictors of Support for the Different Conciliatory StepsAnother major goal of the current studies was to explore the possible precursors of support for different steps towards reconciliation (i.e., apol-ogy, reparation, and mutual forgiveness). We first conducted a factor analysis to determine whether all three steps were distinct from each other. We found that readiness for apology and reparation loaded on the same factor, whereas readiness for mutual forgiveness constituted a different factor. We therefore conducted two linear regression analyses to determine the predictors of each of the two emerging factors. In all these analyses the potential predictors were duration of exposure to rocket attacks, perceived suffering, perspective-taking, perceived outgroup suffering, political ori-entation, religiosity, acceptance of moral responsibility, and endorsement of exonerating cognitions.

In the first linear regression analysis, the crite-rion variable was support for an Israeli apology and reparation. It was positively predicted by




moral responsibility (β = .43, p < .01), negatively predicted by exonerating cognitions (β = −.20, p < .05), and negatively predicted by political ori-entation (β = −.19, p < .05; R2 = .55, F = 13.74). It was also marginally positively predicted by per-spective-taking (β = .22, p = .06). In the second regression analysis, support for mutual forgive-ness was positively predicted by perspective-tak-ing (β = .41, p < .01) and duration of threat (β = .22, p < .05) and it was also negatively predicted by religiosity (β = −.25, p < .05; R2 = .30, F = 5.35).

These results suggest a considerable openness among our respondents to a bilateral mutual for-giveness step where Israelis and Palestinians should “put the past out of their minds” and “learn to forgive each other” to end hostilities and mutual suffering. This support was facilitated by basic empathic concern for the human beings on the other side, as indicated by the perspective-taking ability and also by the time respondents had spent under rocket threat. This latter precur-sor may indicate some effect for “conflict fatigue” (Kelman, 2004) which may, in its turn, stimulate a wish to put an end to the conflict in peaceful means. However, support for forgiveness was found in this study to be hampered by religiosity, which in many cases is associated with intoler-ance and animosity toward the outgroup mem-bers (e.g., Kimmerling, 1999; Liebman, 1995; Rynhold, 2005). It is noteworthy that the two “morality” variables in our study (i.e., acceptance of moral responsibility on one hand and endorse-ment of exonerating cognitions on the other hand) were not implicated in support for mutual forgiveness. Empathy toward the others together with self-concern seemed to promote forgive-ness, and religiosity to inhibit it.

In contrast to the openness to the idea of mutual forgiveness, the reactions to the unilateral steps, apologies, and reparation toward the Palestinians in Gaza, were almost entirely nega-tive. As implied theoretically, support for these steps which entail acceptance of ingroup moral responsibility for the plight of the adversarial out-group was facilitated by acceptance of moral responsibility and inhibited by endorsement of exonerating cognitions and by right wing political

orientation. These results, coupled with the lack of effect for the empathy variables (i.e., perspec-tive-taking and acknowledgement of outgroup suffering) suggest that support for apology and reparation to the adversary outgroup are mostly born out of moral considerations (i.e., acceptance of moral responsibility and avoidance of exoner-ating cognitions) and they are not a direct result of empathy with the plight of the adversarial out-group. The relations between empathy and moral-ity considerations require additional discussion.

Thus, Study 1 is, as far as we know, a unique attempt to explore the readiness for mutual for-giveness and reconciliation among group mem-bers when they are still immersed in the violent conflict. Given the novelty of this research, we sought to replicate it in a second study. At the beginning of July 2014, a new round of violence erupted between Gaza and Israel, even more ferocious than the previous ones. Study 2 was conducted in the Israeli areas bordering on the Gaza Strip during this period of active warfare.

Study 2This study was conducted on August 10, which was the 33rd day of the 2014 Gaza War. The day the study took place followed a failed 3-day tem-porary ceasefire and was a day of combat for the inhabitants of the areas near the Gaza Strip: about 40 rockets and mortar shells were launched from Gaza that day (as in the entire prior month) towards the areas in which the study was con-ducted. Due to their proximity to the border, these areas were exposed to the most fire com-pared to other regions in Israel, and they had the shortest warning times, ranging from 15 to 30 seconds, and sometimes (as in the case of mortar attacks) none. The respondents completed the study in their homes via the Internet.

Method

Respondents and ProcedureRespondents were 123 (65 females, 58 males; age range: 18–72, M = 34.52, SD = 12.57) Jewish




residents of the areas bordering on Gaza (20 kilo-meters or less from the border). This included the towns of Sderot, Ashkelon, and Netivot and the villages (i.e., moshavim and kibbutzim) near the bor-der. The study was distributed to a random sam-ple from a very large web panel pool recruited by an academic research company from the geo-graphical areas neighboring the Gaza Strip. All accessed questionnaires were returned com-pleted. Fifty percent of the respondents had been living under rocket fire from Gaza for more than 8 years (and a further 21% had been affected for from 6 to 8 years). Only five respondents had lived under threat for less than a year. About 50% of the respondents defined themselves as secular Jews, 36% as traditional Jews and 16% as Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox. Religiosity was assessed on a seven-point Likert-type scale (M = 2.99, SD = 2.01). As in Study 1, the respondents leaned to the political right. Over 40% (42.2%) of respondents described themselves as right-wing, 46.1% were centrists, and 8.8% were left-wing (M = 5.14, SD = 1.82; three respondents declined to answer).

MeasuresThe measures were similar to those used in Study 1, with several changes described next. The measures included: Duration of exposure to shell and rockets threat; perceived suffering (α = .92); perspective-taking vis-à-vis the Palestinians

in Gaza (α = .88); perceived outgroup suffering (r = .92; p < .01); exonerating cognitions (α = .72); moral responsibility (α = .71); support for ingroup apology and reparation to the Palestinians in Gaza (α = .88); and support for mutual forgiveness (α = .77).

A new measure was added to the study: Support for allowing/preventing international aid and reconstruction of infrastructure. In light of the severe humanitarian crisis and enormous physical destruction in Gaza that would require extensive recovery funds, and given the mixed attitudes among the Israeli public toward such materials and funding that might be used instead for the rebuilding of military infrastructure (e.g., attack tunnels directed at Israel), we also included four additional items exploring these issues: “Israel should allow international parties (such as UN bodies) to rebuild the infrastructure and buildings in Gaza Strip”; “Israel should allow the passage of material and medical supplies if sent by international organizations”; “Israel should prevent the reconstruction of infrastructure in Gaza because it will result in a new terrorist infra-structure” (reversed); “Israel should make it dif-ficult for international parties to assist the Gaza residents” (reversed; α = .84).

Results and DiscussionWe first conducted a factor analysis in order to confirm that support for Israeli apology and

Table 1. Zero-order correlations between variables (Study 1, N = 80).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Perceived suffering (self) 2. Perceived suffering (outgroup) .03 3. Perspective- taking −.05 .60** 4. Exonerating cognitions .51** .23* .00 5. Moral responsibility −.10 .43** .58** −.18 6. Support for apology −.03 .14 .37** −.27* .57** 7. Support for reparations −.13 .23* .49** −.29** .69** .69** 8. Support for mutual forgiveness .12 .36** .44** .16 .23* .20 .13 9. Religiosity −.02 −.14 −.24* .14 −.26* −.32** −.36** −.34** 10. Political orientation .22 −.20 −.41** .17 −.48** −.36** −.47** −.20 .22

*p < .05; **p < .01.




reparation was distinct from mutual forgiveness, as in Study 1, and was a distinct factor from sup-port for allowing/preventing international aid and reconstruction of infrastructure. As expected, the three elements measured loaded on three dif-ferent factors.5 We therefore proceeded to ana-lyze them separately.

Respondents reported that the time of war was difficult for their families (M = 5.76, SD = 1.45) and for themselves (M = 5.35 SD = 1.74). They also acknowledged that war time was equally difficult for the Palestinians in Gaza (M = 5.63, SD = 1.69).

Perspective-taking was moderate (M = 3.73, SD = 1.72), while endorsement of exonerating cognitions was high (M = 5.68, SD = 1.18) and acceptance of moral responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza was low.

Support for Mutual Forgiveness, and Apology and ReparationMost respondents were unwilling to support repa-ration to the Palestinians in Gaza, both symbolic (an apology) and material (providing direct help; M = 1.67, SD = 1.15). However, when asked whether Israel should allow (or prevent) deployment of

international aid to alleviate immediate humanitar-ian needs and the reconstruction of Gaza infra-structure and buildings, the respondents were significantly more supportive (M = 3.48, SD = 1.42) than toward Israeli reparations, t(122) = 17.39, p < .001.

Support for mutual forgiveness between Israelis and Gaza people was moderate (M = 3.97, SD = 1.68). Sixty-nine respondents (out of the 123 respondents) supported rather than opposed this step. Support for this step was sig-nificantly greater than for apology, t(122) = 15.76, p < .001 or reparation t(122) = 12.40, p < .001.

Predictors of Support for the Different Conciliatory StepsTo predict support for Israeli apology and repara-tion, allowing international reparation, and mutual forgiveness we conducted a series of three regression analyses similar to the ones con-ducted in Study 1. The predictor variables in all analyses were perceived suffering, perceived suf-fering of the Palestinians in Gaza, perspective-taking, moral responsibility, exonerating cognitions, political orientation, religiosity, and duration of exposure to rocket fire.

Table 2. Zero-order correlations between variables (Study 2, N = 123).

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1. Perceived suffering (self) 2. Perceived suffering

(outgroup)−.18*

3. Perspective- taking .03 .50** 4. Exonerating cognitions .15 −.05 −.31** 5. Moral responsibility −.15 .21* .43** −.50** 6. Support for apology −.14 .18* .42** −.57** .73** 7. Support for international

reparations−.23* .52** .39** −.30** .52** .49**

8. Support for Israeli reparations

−.06 .28** .37** −.44** .64** .70** .66**

9. Support for mutual forgiveness

.00 .23* .19* −.12 .41** .26** .41** .45**

10. Religiosity .02 −.15 −.14 .15 −.28** −.22* −.39** −.36** −.42** 11. Political orientation .08 −.28** −.38** .40** −.54** −.48** −.61** −.58** −.44** .45**

*p < .05; **p < .01.




In the first linear regression analysis, we pre-dicted support for Israeli apology and reparation. This was positively predicted by moral responsi-bility (β = .55, p < .01), and negatively predicted by exonerating cognitions (β = −.19, p < .01). It was also negatively predicted by duration of expo-sure to threat (β = −.11, p < .05; R2 = .65, F = 28.69). In the second linear regression, support for reparation by the international community was positively predicted by perceived suffering of the Palestinians (β = .36, p < .01) and by moral responsibility (β = .22, p < .01), and negatively predicted by political orientation (β = −.33, p < .01). It was also marginally predicted by religiosity (β = −.13, p = .054; R2 = .54, F = 18.88). In the third regression analysis, support for mutual for-giveness was positively predicted by moral respon-sibility (β = .29, p < .01), and negatively predicted by religiosity (β = −.25, p < .01) and by political orientation (β = −.23, p < .01; R2 = .29, F = 7.08).

Comparing the results of this study, con-ducted during active fighting, to the data collected a year earlier, we found considerable stability of the levels of different attitudes and emotions. The level of perspective-taking was not signifi-cantly different from Study 1. Also similar to the previous study, endorsement of exonerating cog-nitions was high (M = 5.68, SD = 1.18) and acceptance of moral responsibility for the plight of the Palestinians in Gaza was low (M = 2.11, SD = 1.28), in fact, lower than the same measure in the previous study (p = .06). Wartime respond-ents in Study 2 still showed a moderate level of support for mutual forgiveness with Gaza and they were also moderately positively inclined toward permitting international bodies to send aid to help the recovery effort in Gaza. In con-trast, in this study as in Study 1, there was little support for apology and payment of Israeli direct reparations to Gaza.

What accounts for these differences? One pos-sible explanation is that respondents supported more “low cost” steps to reconciliation such as the passage of international aid (which does not require the ingroup to incur the cost) over the more pricy pathways. However, another explana-tion is that respondents showed a preference for

those steps that do not cast them as the blame-worthy party in the conflict (i.e., mutual forgive-ness and authorization of international aid) over those who do (i.e., apology and reparation). This latter explanation is consistent with the finding that apology and reparation were positively pre-dicted in both studies by moral responsibility and were negatively associated with exonerating cogni-tions. That is, they were intimately connected with morality consideration. In this study duration of time under threat was negatively related to sup-port for apology. Thus, while extended time under threat may increase the eagerness to end the con-flict by mutual forgiveness (in Study 1) it decreases the willingness for saying sorry to the other side.

One notable difference between Study 2 and Study 1 was the absence of perspective-taking as a precursor of mutual forgiveness in Study 2. Interestingly, the perspective-taking measure (with items such as “I wondered how Palestinians in Gaza were feeling” or “I tried to look at things that happened during the operation from the Gaza Palestinians’ point of view”) was not sig-nificantly lower in Study 2 as compared with Study 1, but it was no longer associated with will-ingness for mutual forgiveness. It can be specu-lated that attempting to read the situation from the standpoint of the enemy during war and intense conflict situations does not always indi-cate empathic concern with the opponent; rather, it can be derived out of partisan strategic think-ing. However, the perceived suffering of the Palestinians in Gaza was positively related to sup-port of international help for the postwar recov-ery of Gaza which might indicate some empathy effect even during the wartime situation. Religion and right-wing political orientation, on the other hand, retained their negative contribution to con-ciliatory steps toward the Palestinians.

General DiscussionOne major thrust of this research was the timing of the inquiry. In Study 1, Sderot respondents were approached in summer 2013 when they were (and still are at the time of writing) under chronic threat of mortars and rockets from Gaza and living with




the strains and insecurities of an emergency situa-tion which has lasted for more than a decade. At the same time, they could observe the devastating effects of the military strikes delivered by their own group on the outgroup, their Gazan neighbors/enemies on the other side of the border. Study 2, which was conducted in the wider area of the entire Israeli border with the Gaza Strip, took place in summer 2014 when the hostilities turned into a full-fledged war between Israel and Gaza. Thus the cur-rent studies can be viewed as snapshots from an ongoing violent conflict. They raise the question of whether the seeds of forgiveness and reconciliation can be found even at such difficult times among those who are adversely affected by the conflict—and if so, what are they comprised of.

In both studies there was considerable sup-port for the idea of mutual forgiveness measured by items such as “Only when Israelis and Palestinians learn to forgive each other can we be free of political violence” or “In order for Israelis and Palestinians to progress into the future, they must put the past out of their minds” (cf. Hewstone et al., 2004). Support for this particular bilateral conciliatory step was greater in the 2013 than in the 2014 wartime study, but it was still substantial even in the latter study. In the wartime study, there was also substantial support for the notion that Israel would permit the deployment of international aid to Gaza to assist its postwar recovery. In contrast, support for the two unilat-eral steps, apology and reparation was low both in the 2013 and the 2014 studies. We suggest two major reasons for this disparity:

1. We are the victims not the perpetrators. Endorsement of apologies and repara-tion, as a way to advance peace and recon-ciliation, requires the proposing party to accept moral responsibility for its conflict-related deeds. Furthermore, it strongly implies that this party is the perpetrator. As already noted, in bilateral conflicts, where the two conflicting parties compete over the role of the victim, acceptance that one’s party is the perpetrator would be rare (Noor et al., 2012). As shown in the current studies, conducted under

conditions of chronic (Study 1) and acute (Study 2) conflict threat, acceptance of moral responsibility for the conflict (e.g., “I feel morally responsible for the situation of the Gaza Palestinians”) was low, and endorse-ment of exonerating cognitions (e.g., “If the Palestinians in Gaza were willing to live in peace with Israel, Israel wouldn’t be forced to operate against them”) was high. Thus, our respond-ents were opposed to being framed as the culpable party in the conflict.

Analyses of intergroup apologies internation-ally suggest, consistently with the current results, that unilateral apologies are mainly effective when the social roles of the wronged and wrongdoing groups are mutually accepted by both parties of the conflict and the pertinent moral commu-nity (Kampf & Löwenheim, 2012). However, in bilateral conflicts, where both parties claim the role of the wronged and victimized party, there is a preference for alternative “symmetrical settle-ment rituals” in which “each side strives to achieve appeasement and restore balance to wounded relationships” (Kampf & Löwenheim, 2012, p. 43). The “mutual forgiveness” step fits the symmetrical settlement ritual pattern. It ena-bles each of the parties to make conciliatory moves toward the other party in the conflict with-out being denounced as the villain in the conflict. The differences in attributed culpability to the ingroup between apology and reparation on the one hand, and mutual forgiveness and authoriza-tion of international aid, on the other, may explain the differential reception of these strate-gies in our studies.

2. Focus on the future or the past. Another factor that might contribute to the differential reception of apology and reparation and that of mutual forgiveness is their tempo-ral foci: apology and reparations focus on correcting the past. Mutual forgiveness, on the other hand (in the spirit of, “let bygones be bygones” or “let’s bury the hatchet”) is more directly oriented towards turning a new leaf in the relations between the two groups rather than attempting to




settle or even address the difficult past. It is plausible that when struggling with the difficulties of the present, group mem-bers prefer to look more toward the promises of the future rather than dwell on past events, especially those that put them in an unfavorable light. Interestingly, political leaders in peace making drives often urge their audiences to focus on the future rather than the past.

An eminent example is Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s address to the Israeli Parliament in his historic surprise visit to Israel in November 1977. In addressing his adversaries (just 4 years after launching the 1973 war against Israel) Sadat was far from being apologetic or reprimanding and he suggested focusing on the (shared) future rather than on the (divided) past. Sadat said:

Ladies and Gentlemen, there are moments in the life of nations and peoples when it is incumbent on those known for their wisdom and clarity of vision to overlook the past, with all its complexities and weighing memories, in a bold drive towards new horizons.6

The Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin ech-oed the same sentiment in his response speech: “Let us not be daunted by memories of the past, even if they are bitter to us all. We must overcome them, and focus on what lies ahead: on our Peoples, on our children, on our common future.”7 Years later in 1993, during the signing of the Israeli–Palestinian Declaration of Principles with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), another Israeli Prime Minister—Yitzhak Rabin—repeated the same plea: “We wish to open a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together; a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighbor-liness, of mutual respect, of understanding.”8

Similar patterns encouraging the adversarial groups’ people to look toward the future rather than the past also characterize peace speeches and other messages by the leaders in Northern Ireland on both sides (Rosler, 2013).

But Can the Past Be Ignored When Paving New Paths to Peace?

The previous analysis suggests that faced with the immediate dangers of current conflict, group members (and sometimes their leaders) may be motivated to view the past, especially when unfa-vorable and unflattering, as an unnecessary bur-den that hinders any movement ahead toward peace and reconciliation. The urge to ignore the hurtful past and jump to hopeful visions of the future is easy to understand. However, is this a realistic aspiration? The history of the Gaza–Israel conflict may further be used to explore this issue. One of the most evocative eulogies in Israeli history was delivered in April 1956 by Moshe Dayan, then the Chief of Staff of the Israeli army. It was delivered at the funeral of Roi Rothberg, a member of Kibbutz Nahal Oz (which is on the border with Gaza) who was shot and killed when attempting to chase away a group of Gaza residents from the Kibbutz fields. Dayan lamented:

Early yesterday morning Roi was murdered. The quiet of the spring morning dazzled him and he did not see those waiting in ambush for him, at the edge of the furrow. Let us not cast the blame on the murderers today. Why should we declare their burning hatred for us? For eight years they have been sitting in the refugee camps in Gaza, and before their eyes we have been transforming the lands and the villages, where they and their fathers dwelt, into our estate. It is not among the Arabs in Gaza, but in our own midst that we must seek Roi’s blood.9

This was not an apologetic statement or one aim-ing for peace. In fact it was pessimistic and, according to some, a highly militaristic address (Kimmerling, 1993). However, in this 1956 eulogy Dayan violated one of the most cherished taboos in Israeli society, in that he directly connected the Palestinian belligerence in Gaza toward Israel to the outcome of the 1948 war that brought about the creation of the independent state of Israel but




also created the Gaza predicament. Gaza, which is one of the poorest and most densely populated areas in the world, was in 2014 home to 1.76 mil-lion people, most of whom are the descendants of the 1948 refugees from the south of Israel (Yashiv, 2014). It might be argued that overlook-ing the historical dimension of the Gaza–Israel conflict may impair the ability to look for real paths out of this conflict. Hasson (2010) argued that Israelis look at Gaza people as either “vic-tims” or “enemies” and these subjective perspec-tives are highly consequential. Hasson writes:

Policy recommendations regarding the future of the Gaza enclave and the relations between the Palestinians in Gaza and Israel are guided by the different perspectives and narratives associated with them. A victim perspective, for instance, would recommend the removal of border closures and blockades which are devastating for Gaza’s economy. On the other hand, an enemy perspective would focus on Palestinian violence to justify encirclement of the Gaza Strip by a separation fence. (2010, p. 386)

He suggests that “a change of perspectives and narratives is essential for any progress in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict” (2010, p. 386).

This argument coincides with one of the major findings of the current studies; namely, the strong objection on the part of the respondents to be portrayed as the perpetrator group in the conflict. It raises the question of ways in which parties in an active conflict can be made attentive to the tragedy of the other side and cognizant of the interdependence (rather than difference) of the fate of the two groups entangled in the con-flict. Such a realization may be crucial for new paths to conflict resolution; however, it might be seriously hampered by unwillingness to assume moral responsibility for the conflict (cf. Noor et al., 2012). Can such unwillingness be over-come? Shnabel, Halabi, and Noor (2013) recently suggested the concept of “common victim iden-tity” (see also “inclusive victimhood”; Vollhardt, 2009; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014), in which the two

groups recategorize themselves and the other group as both victims and perpetrators. However, given that group members often have ambivalent feelings toward placing themselves in both the victim and perpetrator roles (Klar, Schori-Eyal, & Roccas, 2014) other more transformative frame-works of relations between parties in conflict should be developed that bypass the victim–per-petrator dichotomy, and which enable each group to relate to the tragedy of the other side. Creating such innovative frameworks remains a challenge for further work in the area of conflict resolution.

One of the major goals of the current studies was to explore key precursors of support for rec-onciliation. As theoretically expected (cf. Kimmerling, 1999; Liebman, 1995; Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Sprinzak, 1991), religiosity and right-wing political orientations emerged as bar-riers to almost all forms of reconciliation. The role of experienced suffering was less conclu-sive: duration of exposure to rocket threat was found to positively predict support for mutual forgiveness (in Study 1) but it was also found to reduce the wish for apology to the other side. The more subjective measure of perceived suf-fering did not yield any significant relations with the different modes of reconciliation. It is pos-sible that the effects of suffering are qualified by other conditions (e.g., they can be moderated by different world views; cf. Vollhardt, 2009). The current studies did not, however, detect such interaction effects, calling for more research on this issue.

Two categories of variables that appeared to be involved in forms of reconciliation were empathy and morality. In Study 1, perspective-taking (together with duration of exposure to threat) positively predicted support for mutual forgiveness but not support for apology and rep-aration. In Study 2, awareness of out-group suf-fering, another empathy-related variable, predicted support for authorization of interna-tional aid to Gaza. In addition, the two moral-ity-related variables, acceptance of moral responsibility and endorsement of exonerating cognitions, predicted support for apology and




reparation in both studies. Acceptance of moral responsibility was also related to support for mutual forgiveness in Study 2. Taken together, the findings suggest that empathy and morality are only partly related to each other in supporting reconciliation, in that morality is related also to support of the most demanding modes, that is, unilateral apology and reparations which require acceptance of moral responsibility for the con-flict and its outcomes. Neuroscience laboratory research (e.g., Decety & Cowell, 2014; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2006) has pointed to the complex relations between the morality and empathy systems in the brain. Given the importance of these two sys-tems to reconciliation, more research on the interrelations between empathy, morality, and reconciliation is needed.

The current studies, while enabling an exami-nation of group members exposed to chronic and acute violent conflict, are not without their limitations. First, this research focuses on one party in the conflict (i.e., the Israelis and not the Palestinians). Second, the correlational nature of the studies limits our ability to draw conclusions about causality; manipulating people’s willingness to take the out-group’s perspective and moral responsibility are future directions that are worth pursuing. Another potential direction would be to follow up our respondents as events in Gaza–Israel relations unfold (hopefully for the better for both sides).

Overall these studies shed light on rarely examined processes of reconciliation during active and violent stages of intergroup conflict. By providing a glimpse of precursors of forgive-ness and reconciliation among people who are both subject to ongoing threat and witnesses to the ongoing plight of their enemies, this initial research underscores the importance of further investigations on these issues among members of groups embroiled in protracted conflict.

AcknowledgementsThe authors are indebted to Inbar Asaraf, Mai Rosenberg, and Einam Wiener for collecting the Study 1 data.

FundingThis research received no specific grant from any fund-ing agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes1. In fact, the unilateral model of conflict is even

echoed in the Call for Papers for the current spe-cial issue which invites studies: “involving mem-bers of groups that have perpetrated the harm or those who have been victimized by it.”

2. This lengthy exposure to the perils of ongoing warfare in Sderot has been documented in several psychological studies dealing mainly with coping and clinical responses to these stressful experi-ences (e.g., Albin et al., 2009; Bar-Haim, 2010; G. M. Diamond et al., 2010; Farhi, Lauden, & Fariger, 2008; Henrich & Shahar, 2008; Nuttman-Shwartz & Dekel, 2009; Wald et al., 2011).

3. The suffering and trauma in Gaza and their clini-cal implications are also well documented (e.g., Aqeel, Al-Ghzawi, Khatib, Kharma, & Nawasreh, 2011; Khamis, 2012; Kolltveit et al., 2012; Thabet, Tawahina, Sarraj, Henely, Pelleick, & Vostanis, 2013)

4. Source: Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, retrieved from http://www.cbs.gov.il/publications13/ local_authorities11_1531/pdf/342_1031.pdf

5. We conducted EFA using varimax rotation; three factors had eigenvalues higher than 1, and the items in the three scales appeared as three factors with no significant cross loadings.

6. Source: http://knesset.gov.il/description/eng/doc/ Speech_sadat_1977_eng.htm

7. Source: https://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/ beginspeech_eng.htm

8. Source: http://www.rabincenter.org.il/Items/ 01100/signingoftheDeclationofPrinciples.pdf

9. Source: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/ Quote/dayanq.html

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