Fusion Centres in Selected Countries, 2013:

Fusion Centres in Selected Countries, 2013:

Discussion Paper and Annotated

Bibliography

by Elaine Koren

RESEARCH REPORT: 2015–R040

RESEARCH DIVISION

www.publicsafety.gc.ca

FUSION CENTRES IN SELECTED COUNTRIES: PUBLIC SAFETY CANADA 1

The views expressed herein are those of the author and

do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Public Safety Canada.

This study used data sources current as of 2013. Changes since 2013 are not reflected in the document.

Report No. 038

© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2016

Cat. No.: PS14-26/2014E

ISBN No.: 978-1-100-23213-3


Table of Contents

Executive Summary .............................................................................................................. 4

Key Findings ......................................................................................................................... 5

1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 7

2.0 Methodology .................................................................................................................................. 7

2.1 Research Questions ............................................................................................................. 8

2.2 Data Collection and Defining Terms ................................................................................ 8

3.0 Fusion Centres in Selected Countries ........................................................................................... 9

3.1 Australia................................................................................................................................ 9

3.2 European Union ................................................................................................................. 11

3.3 New Zealand ...................................................................................................................... 15

3.4 Singapore ............................................................................................................................ 16

3.5 United Kingdom-based Centres ...................................................................................... 18

3.6 United States ...................................................................................................................... 19

4.0 Discussion ................................................................................................................................... 24

4.1 First Research Question .................................................................................................... 24

4.2 Second Research Question .............................................................................................. 25

4.3 Third Research Question .................................................................................................. 31

4.4 Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC) ............................................................... 33

4.5 Enablers of Maritime Domain Awareness ..................................................................... 34

5.0 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 37

6.0 Acronyms ..................................................................................................................................... 39

7.0 Glossary and Explanatory Terms ................................................................................................. 47

8.0 Annotated Bibliography ................................................................................................................ 53

8.1 Australia.............................................................................................................................. 53

8.2 Canada ................................................................................................................................ 57

8.3 European Union ................................................................................................................. 61

8.4 New Zealand ...................................................................................................................... 69

8.5 Singapore ............................................................................................................................ 72

8.6 United Kingdom-based Centres ...................................................................................... 77

8.7 United States ...................................................................................................................... 84


9.0 Appendices ................................................................................................................................ 102

Appendix 1: Proposed Databases and Keywords for Annotated Bibliography .................................. 102

Appendix 2: Australia: Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction ..................................................................... 118

Appendix 3: EU: Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) ........................................................................... 103

Appendix 4: EU: Common Information Sharing Environment User Communities .............................. 106

Appendix 5: EU: Link between CISE and EUROSUR ........................................................................ 108

Appendix 6: EU: Overview of International Initiatives of Maritime Security ........................................ 109

Appendix 7: EU: European Maritime Surveillance Networking - MARSUR ........................................ 110

Appendix 8: NZ: Roles of the National Maritime Coordination Centre and the Core Agencies .......... 111

Appendix 9: Singapore: Joint Exercises and Patrols Held by Military and Paramilitary

Organizations in Asia ......................................................................................................................... 113

Appendix 10: Singapore: Key Maritime Concerns in Southeast Asia ................................................ 117

Appendix 11: UK-based Centres: Working Together for Peace and Security .................................... 118

Appendix 12: US: Information Sharing Environment ......................................................................... 119

Appendix 13: US: Enterprising Hub Structure ................................................................................... 120

Appendix 14: US: Single Integrated Look-Out List (SILO) ................................................................ 121

Appendix 15: US: FBI Engagement Levels at Fusion Centres .......................................................... 122

Appendix 16: US: Categories of State and Local Support Requests ................................................ 123

Appendix 17: US: Key Performance Indicators and Metrics for the Single Point of Service ............. 125

Appendix 18: US: Maritime Domain Awareness ............................................................................... 127

Appendix 19: Discussion: General Country Comparison .................................................................. 128

10.0 Endnotes ................................................................................................................................... 132


Executive Summary

Today’s maritime challenges go beyond the traditional defence scenario of interstate conflict. They are

more diverse, complex, unpredictable and interwoven. Since the events of September 11, 2001, the threat

posed by international terrorism has undergone a marked change in the public perception of maritime

security. Maritime security threats also include the upsurge in the illegal movement of drugs, human

beings and arms, as well as the growing flow of irregular migrants, such as that from Africa to Europe,

and which has raised the issue of effective maritime governance.

Preventing terrorists from attacking at or from the sea and from crossing maritime borders has become a

major concern for European, North American and Southeast Asian governments. This takes into account

the many chokepoints of global maritime trade, and includes areas such as the Malacca Straits, Suez

Canal, Straits of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb passage, Panama Canal, the German Bight, Strait of

Gibraltar and the English Channel. Protection of sea lines of communication, international harbours, and

the safe passage of global maritime trade through these maritime trade chokepoints is vital.

Many of these challenges are not exclusively of a military nature, and neither military nor a combination

of civilian capabilities alone can deliver effective maritime surveillance. Maintaining maritime security

requires strong and enduring partnerships between civilian and military authorities. This is the raison

d’être for maritime security information fusion centres: strengthening security in regions, by building

common coherent maritime situation pictures and acting as a maritime information hub.

This paper focuses on the governance of maritime security fusion centres that have been established in

Australia, the European Union (EU), New Zealand (NZ), Singapore, the United Kingdom (UK), and the

United States (US). Their experience is compared with the Canadian situation, by looking at the

governance, roles and responsibilities, and their effectiveness. In this paper, the influence of the United

Nations (UN) specialized agencies of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International

Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), as well as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) efforts in

maritime security is also examined.

Each regime shares a number of common characteristics, such as taking an intelligence-led and risk-based

approach to its operations. Integration of information is based on interagency cooperation, and strong

dependence on inter-regional and international cooperation. Each regime faces challenges relating to

governance, information sharing, legal and performance issues. Each of these challenges is considered in

the context of the maritime security information sharing centres in each regime.

Six enablers of maritime domain awareness become apparent from the review of these governance

regimes: consolidated legal and policy strategies; information sharing; data and information standards;

surveillance and technology; commercial interests; and inter-organizational relationships. Those enablers

face three obstacles that take the form of legal, policy and security-related issues. When such obstacles

are present, they affect the governance and effectiveness of the maritime security fusion centre.

Findings of the 9/11 Commission Report indicate that the biggest impediment to ‘connecting the dots’

was the resistance to information sharing between jurisdictions and within jurisdictions, and

recommended a whole-of-government approach to information sharing. Certain countries took note of the

lesson learned, and have set the requirement of common information sharing environment by statute.

Maritime security fusion centres are governed by these statutes.


In the aftermath of 9/11, the expansion of international law to address maritime terrorism reflects the US

objective of getting all international organizations to review their existing legal and technical measures to

prevent terrorist acts. Such efforts were directed at the IMO to prevent potential terrorist acts against ships

at sea and in port, as well as improve security on board ship and ashore in accordance with the US

National Strategy for Maritime Security (September 2005).1

Similar to Canada, all six governments are members of the IMO and the ICAO, each government is

committed to implementing certain legal requirements adopted by those specialized UN agencies,

including standards associated with the chosen mode of transport when moving passengers or cargo

internationally as well as the provision of security requirements for ships and port facilities to counter

potential threats of terrorism. Given economic realities, governments are pressed to avoid duplication of

spending and efforts and it is a continuing challenge to undertake a wide array of tasks with limited

resources. This has led to the need to create economies of scale wherever possible and has resulted in

countries embracing the trend towards ‘joint task forces’ and whole-of-government approaches.

Key Findings

Common characteristics of the country-specific maritime regimes include:

intelligence-led and risk-based approach to operations;

integrated information and interagency cooperation;

requirement to implement both ICAO and IMO standards and agreements;

defined military role, particularly the terms and conditions of providing aid to civil power;

heavy dependence on regional and international cooperation on a range of issues, including

technology for maritime infrastructure or surveillance;

national security rationale prevents the accessibility of sensitive information of performance

audits; and

challenges associated with governance, information-sharing, legal and performance issues.

Regional regimes are different.

The EU Military Staff is made up of Member State representatives, and has been given the

additional requirement of managing crises and operations being conducted in the EU;

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in

Asia is a paramilitary operation based in Singapore with eighteen contracting parties, whose role

involves undertaking joint exercises in the Malacca Strait; and,

the NATO Maritime Command’s (MARCOM) role is to build and maintain the NATO

recognized maritime picture, exploit and disseminate maritime situational awareness information

on behalf of the Alliance.


Transference options from the regimes include the following:

Australia: Looks at the whole-of-government governance structure based on the Australian

maritime security fusion centre. This would involve resolving the information sharing barriers

between non-military and military partners;

European Union: Uses a step-wise process to establish maritime domain awareness by building

on existing regional maritime domain awareness regimes;

European Union: Codifies the framework for MSOC governance, include a requirement to

establish a common information sharing environment;.

Australia and New Zealand: Consider having individuals embedded in the MSOC organization

from each of the relevant maritime security partners for economies of scale of operations.;

Singapore: Establishes a dedicated Internet portal for internal information sharing, and uses

outreach activities to gain trust and show how collected information is safeguarded and used;

United Kingdom: Institutionalizes the requirement of establishing a common database and

information sharing environment, and requires the safeguarding of such information;

United States: Codifies the governance of the federal framework using all governance

mechanisms, such as statutes, policies, regulations, and rules; and,

United States: All requirements for maritime security operations centres must be reinforced top-

down as well as bottom-up to ensure implementation.


1.0 Introduction

About seventy percent of the Earth’s surface is covered with water; 90% of global trade and 50% of the

world’s oil are transported by sea. Maritime areas are vital to the global economy. Therefore, it should not

come as a surprise that the protection of the world’s maritime routes is seen as an essential dimension of

security. A number of maritime events have confirmed the necessity and urgency of tackling the

maritime dimensions of the new threats and challenges that are emerging in the post-Cold War globalized

security environment. These include events such as the terrorist attack against the USS Cole in 2000, the

attack against the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002, and the 2007-2008 boom in piracy off the coasts of

Somalia and southeast Asia.

These events, and the response to the 9/11 Commission Report in the United States (US) have established

a need for intelligence gathering and information sharing on a global scale.

“Since the safety and security of the maritime commons is vital to sustaining the global

environment and the world economy, the US has created an information sharing environment to

achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). Knowing that no country or agency has the

authority or sufficient knowledge to achieve effective MDA single-handedly, the U.S. recognizes

that this process can only be achieved through collaboration, cooperation, and information

sharing amongst international partners, governments, and interagency [groups].”2

Since then, considerable attention has been focused on the need for constructive changes in law

enforcement, military and national intelligence environments in many governments. Information sharing

has become a fundamental requirement for meeting the current challenges of international maritime

security.

Many of the current threats in the maritime domain, such as terrorism and illegal trafficking in drugs,

people and weapons, are transnational or global in nature, and require a concerted approach. Since these

problems cannot be faced by any single state, multinational collaboration is mandatory if adequate MDA

is to be attained. The US Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 of December 2004, recognizes that

the “security of the maritime domain is a global issue.”3 It also states that the integration of US allies with

international and private-sector partners must be enhanced to protect the US interests in the maritime

domain (HSPD 2004, 3).

With this context, this paper focuses on the governance of the fusion or information sharing centres that

have been established in Australia, the European Union (EU), New Zealand (NZ), Singapore, the United

Kingdom (UK) and the US. That experience is then compared to the Canadian situation. In particular, it

looks at their governance, roles and responsibilities and their effectiveness, including related legal issues,

performance metrics and challenges faced when considering the enablers for maritime security

cooperation and awareness. The paper also looks at three regional models, the Regional Cooperation

Agreement Combating Piracy (ReCAAP) in Southeast Asia, the European Maritime Surveillance

(MARSUR) Network and the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) and the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) role of the Allied Maritime Command based in the UK.

2.0 Methodology

The discussion paper and annotated bibliography followed the structured and objective procedures of the

Campbell Systematic Review.4 Using this methodological approach, it includes a systematic review of

academic and grey literature focusing on fusion centres for intelligence and information sharing. The


paper does not, however, refer to all maritime security and information sharing initiatives under

development.

From the database searches, all abstracts were reviewed for relevancy, particularly in relation to subject

matter. All documents relating strictly to national security and defence, aviation and transportation safety,

as well as border security infrastructure were excluded. All documents prior to 2005 were excluded

because the US Presidential Directive NSPD41/HSPD 13 establishing the US security policy, guidelines

and implementation action to improve US national and domestic security by heightening its maritime

security policy, guidelines and programs was released in December 2004. This influenced the direction

followed by the US in its bilateral and multilateral arrangements. An annotated bibliography is included

as a separate section and provides an assessment of 137 relevant papers and websites.

2.1 Research Questions

In different jurisdictions of relevance to Canada, what types of maritime information sharing or fusion

centres are being used?

What challenges were faced by these maritime security centres and how were they resolved?

Are elements of the maritime fusion centre governance systems applicable to the Canadian context?

Findings from this research have a number of possible applications. They may be considered when

developing options for establishing a system of governance on Canada-based fusion centres or Marine

Security Operations Centres (MSOCs). These findings may also be considered in possible future

development of policy or legislation.

2.2 Data Collection and Defining Terms

Eight English language databases were searched using the keywords in Boolean abstract search, including

the title and keyword fields (refer to Appendix 1). The set of keywords chosen reflects the wider

definition of fusion centre given the purposes of this project. The abstracts were reviewed for relevancy,

particularly in relation to subject matter and timeline in which the document was published.

In the literature, the term ‘fusion centre’ is often used interchangeably with ‘information fusion centre,’

‘information sharing centre,’ ‘intelligence sharing centre,’ ‘information-intelligence office’ and

‘information sharing hub.’ In the US, a fusion centre is defined as “an effective mechanism to exchange

information and intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight

crime and terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of sources.”5 Although the term ‘fusion centre’ is

used in the discussion part of the paper, all original terms will appear in the annotated bibliography.

The term ‘maritime’ and ‘marine’ has been found in Canadian and American literature, including related

grey literature. In Europe and the EU and the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the term

‘maritime’ is used. Although the term ‘maritime’ is used in the discussion part of the paper, original terms

will be used in the annotated bibliography.

Key government information was obtained from searches of websites focusing on maritime security and

fusion centres, such as the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports for Congress, US

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Reports to Congressional Requesters, relevant papers from the

EU, and specialized agencies of the United Nations (UN). Grey literature from Australia, the EU, NZ,

Singapore, the UK and the US were used where appropriate.


3.0 Fusion Centres in Selected Countries

The international maritime community responded vigorously to the terrorist events of 9/11. The UN

specialized agency, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)6 developed new security requirements

for ships and port facilities to counter the threat of acts of terrorism. These requirements are set out in the

International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (2002) (Code). The Code7 was adopted under

the provisions of the International Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), and entered into force in

July 2004. These measures relate principally to ships and the interface between ships and ports. The Code

requires ships undertaking international voyages and the port facilities that serve them to adhere to a set

of security standards designed so that the ships, mariners and port-side facilities maintain the appropriate

levels of security at all times.

However, the events of 9/11 also revealed the importance of several initiatives undertaken to heighten

maritime security beyond that of the IMO. Nation States such as Australia, Canada, the EU and the US

have revised their national security policies, including those related to maritime security. In particular, the

events stressed the importance of enhancing US intelligence operations, including a need for constructive

changes in law enforcement intelligence and intelligence-information sharing among the US intelligence

community. This was re-affirmed in the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report, highlighting the

importance of expanding information sharing and strengthening the US homeland security enterprise,

which includes establishment of fusion centres throughout the US. These centres serve as focal points for

the receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information between the federal government

and state, local, tribal, territorial and private sector partners.

The types of fusion centres and their challenges in supporting the maritime security and national security

objectives of their country or region are reviewed in this paper. More specifically, it looks at those centres

directly involved in maritime security, while noting their presence in other areas. Although some issues

such as legal issues, civil liberties, performance, roles, effectiveness and governance are considered, this

paper is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of those issues. Likewise, it is not meant to list every

agency or department involved in maritime security or its function within a fusion centre. Finally, it is not

meant to address all related legal and privacy issues that have been raised regarding the collection of data

within certain fusion centres. Section 3 is a distillation of the information contained in the Annotated

Bibliography and as such, provides an efficient overview of the state of fusion centres in jurisdictions of

importance and relevance to Canada.

3.1 Australia

The Australian government adopted an increased maritime security as a part of its vision to address the

unique challenges of Australia’s strategic situation. To address border integrity issues, Australia invested

in technologies and established stronger linkages with regional and other governments to enhance its

stability, detect and deter threats. This led to establishing fusion centres to ‘fuse’ information to be better

able to prevent, disrupt, investigate and prosecute organized crime and terrorism.

There are four relevant types of information sharing or fusion centres in Australia:

the Australian Crime Commission-led National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability that targets

organized crime;

the Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre that governs the operational and tactical

intelligence information about vessels operating within Australia’s marine environment;


the Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre which coordinates all planning and delivery of

operational activity for the Australian Border Patrol Command (BPC) assets; and

the National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC) that brings together various Australian Government

agencies.

3.1.1 National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability (Fusion)

Officially launched in July 2010 with AUD 14.3 million over four years, the Australian Crime

Commission (ACC) National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability (Fusion) co-locates analysts,

investigators and technical experts to maximize the use of public and private sector data and facilitate

real-time intelligence gathering, information sharing and analysis. Fusion brings together capabilities

from key Commonwealth (Cth) agencies, such as the Australian Federal Police, Department of

Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, Australian Taxation

Office, Centrelink,8 Customs and Border Protection as well as State and Territory law enforcement

authorities.

Fusion has enabled Cth agencies to identify high-threat targets that were previously unknown to law

enforcement. “For example, the entire Fusion capability has identified more than 70 high-threat criminal

targets previously unknown to national law enforcement, and has produced around 1200 intelligence

products for 83 partners this year [2011-12].”9 This example has shown the importance of a collaborative

approach to information sharing and analysis among agencies outside the culture of law enforcement.

3.1.2 Maritime Fusion Centres

Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre (AMIFC)

The AMIFC is responsible for the production of operational and tactical intelligence information about

vessels operating within Australia’s marine environment, also known as the Australian Maritime Domain

(AMD).10

The Australian Border Protection Command11

(BPC) is the primary federal law enforcement

organization in the AMD, an area that covers about 11 million square nautical miles. The AMD includes

the territorial sea, contiguous zone, offshore areas predominantly within Australia’s Exclusive Economic

Zone (EEZ), and extends to the area bounded by Australia’s Security Force Authority (SFA) Area.

Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre

The Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC) coordinates all planning and delivery of

operational activity for BPC assets assigned to them. This includes deploying aerial surveillance and

surface response vessels in collaboration with the headquarters joint task force,12

to respond to maritime

security threats. The AMSOC is located in BPC headquarters in Canberra.

BPC’s operations are intelligence-led and risk-based. Through the integration of information and

interagency cooperation, BPC establishes its control strategies that are applied against assessed risk levels

and a threat and risk assessment process. BPS undertakes tactical, operational and strategic threat

assessments, and uses this information to maintain its awareness of the civil maritime security threats.13

BPC provides this information to its stakeholders, updating their awareness of daily activities in the AMD

from the AMSOC.

BPC has embedded liaison officers from the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA),

Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), Customs National Operations Centre of the

Customs and Border Protection Service (CNOC-CBP), and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority


(AMSA). BPC works with the liaison officers from AFMA, AQIS and other Cth agencies to deliver a

coordinated national approach to Australia’s offshore maritime security. AMSA provides maritime safety

services in Australia and Australia’s allocated area of search and rescue (SAR) responsibility. This

includes SAR operations for vessels in distress and for aircraft at sea through the Australian Search and

Rescue (AusSAR), a part of AMSA.

Pursuant to arrangements coordinated by the IMO, the BPC is also Australia’s SFA for the purposes of

responding to acts of violence against ships within the Australian SFA Area, which equates to the

Australian Search and Rescue Region (refer to Figure 1 of Appendix 2). Due to certain maritime security

threats, BPC’s areas of interest are dependent on the type of each threat and range in scope from global to

regional and domestic focal areas.14

3.1.3 National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC)

NTAC’s focus is national security and counterterrorism. It is located in Australia’s Security Intelligence

Services (ASIO) Central Offices in Canberra, and has liaison officers from the Australian Federal Police

(AFP), Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS), the Defence Intelligence Organization (DIO), the

Defence Signals Directorate (DSD), the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), the

Department of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS) and the Office of National Assessments

(ONA).15

NTAC liaison officers maintain online access to their agency’s communications systems and

databases to allow all relevant information to be accessed and reflected in threat assessment advice.

NTAC’s 24/7 capability has enhanced ASIO’s capacity to disseminate advice in response to security

environment developments domestically and internationally.

3.2 European Union

The European Union has a coastline of 136,106 km,16

with an EEZ of about 25 million square km

(including overseas territories).17

More than ninety percent of the EU’s external trade as well as forty

percent of its internal trade are shipped by sea. Eighty percent of the European oil and gas reserves are

located in the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Adriatic Seas.18

“Inevitably, EU institutions for

cooperation and coordination develop more slowly: policing came first via Europol (which developed out

of the inter-governmental TREVI agreement), but the more recent proliferation of pan-EU institutions that

seek ‘fusion’ including the Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Satellite Centre (SATCEN), the

Intelligence Division (INTDIV) of the EU Military Staff (EUMS) have developed as part of the Common

Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and as a response to pre-9/11 crises such as Bosnia and Kosovo.”19

The EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP)20

is the governance framework for the EU’s maritime sector,

and consists of three parts. These are: (1) the European maritime surveillance network works for the safe

use of the marine commons; (2) maritime spatial planning and integrated coastal zone management

provides a planning tool for sustainable decision-making; and (3) a comprehensive and accessible source

of data. This paper focuses on the maritime surveillance network. Figure 2 of Appendix 5 provides

context between the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) in the Integrated Maritime

Surveillance and EUROSUR of the EU Border Surveillance. Figure 3 of Appendix 6 provides an

overview of the international initiatives relating to maritime security from the EU perspective.


3.2.1 European Maritime Surveillance Network

The key components of the European maritime surveillance network are: (a) the integration of maritime

monitoring and situation awareness; (b) the national coordination centres; (c) the platform of

institutionalized information exchange; and (d) the establishment of intercontinental connections with

MDA systems.

The European maritime surveillance network is one of the two main parts of the EUROSUR, the

European External Border Surveillance System, the other being Integrated Border Management, which

includes EU land border surveillance and the Smart Borders System. The network has a maritime

monitoring and a situation awareness component. Systems to be discussed in this section include: the

VRMTC [Virtual-Regional Maritime Traffic Centre], MARSUR [Maritime Surveillance Network],

SUCBAS [Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea], which are parts of the interoperable European

system. Each system is considered below.

Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)

The European-wide Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) Network integrates sea surveillance at the

European level.21

The MARSUR is a network that uses existing naval and maritime information exchange

systems. It was created to avoid duplication of effort and make use of available technologies, data and

information, and enhance cooperation using low-cost solutions for civil-military cooperation to support

maritime safety and security. Table 1 of Appendix 3 highlights MARSUR’s capabilities.

Seventeen EU Member States (MSs) plus Norway are participants in the network, enabling the exchange

of maritime surveillance information between participating states.22

The network aims at improving the

common Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) by linking up military maritime networks and systems with

the services of each national system made available through a dedicated interface ‘MEXS’ (MARSUR

Exchange System).23

The network primarily allows the exchange of operational maritime data, such as

vessel tracks, ship position reports and identification data. Although announced in 2006, the

demonstration phase of the MARSUR began at the end of 2010. Its implementation is planned at the

beginning of 2012, and the Commission expects that the network will be fully operational by 2014.24

Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS)

The Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS) is a technical arrangement between Finland,

Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. SUCBAS aims to: enhance the

maritime awareness in the Baltic Sea, improve cooperation and interaction between the participating

countries’ navies and agencies with responsibilities in the maritime domain, support and deepen the

overall cooperation between the participants by creating a culture of trust and sharing, support maritime

safety, support national environmental agencies in combating environmental risks, and support national

agencies in border control pursuant to the Schengen Agreement.25

It aims to develop technical solutions and procedures to generate a robust and cost-effective system to

share sea surveillance information. The information fed into the system is a national responsibility, and is

owned by the contributing nation. SUCBAS requires each nation state to have the capabilities to position

and identify targets, pass on acquired information to the respective party to aid the recipient to take action

to minimize or stop the risks of incidents. Through the exchange of information between MSs it helps to

compile the recognized national maritime picture.


Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (VRMTC)

The Italian-led Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (VRMTC) is a virtual network environment

connecting the operational centres of participating navies from the Wider Mediterranean Community

(WMC)26

to unclassified information on merchant shipping vessels to improve maritime situational

awareness (MSA). The VRMTC is a regional monitoring system for the Mediterranean and the Black

Sea. It collects relevant information about navigation (i.e., ship’s name, flag, IMO number, position,

destination, etc.) and integrates this information and compares it with that of the VRMTC Data Fusion

Centre in Rome.27

Each participating country provides its maritime situational awareness and Automatic

Identification System (AIS) data. These data are combined to form the common situational awareness and

is made available to the navies from participating countries.

The service-oriented infrastructure for maritime traffic tracking (SMART), still in its formative stages,

will be taking over where VRMTC has left off in providing the next step for the Italian Navy (ITN) MSA

technology systems, following the 2010 interoperability testing. SMART is built upon the standards,

strategies, and capabilities of VRMTC to build and deploy MDA capabilities.28

If needed, contacts are

checked with direct intervention of air naval assets, deployed by the navy or other groups.

3.2.2 National Coordination Centres (NCCs)

The second component of the European maritime surveillance network is the system of National

Coordination Centres (NCCs). In 2011, the NCC mandates were expanded under the EU Regulation SEC

(2011) 1536-1538 to prevent irregular migration and cross-border crime. These are required for both land

and maritime external borders. The MARSUR and NCCs have a role in sharing information, coordinating

and responding to an event (e.g., victims at sea, irregular migrants and cross-border crime). Figure 4 of

Appendix 7 provides context on how MDA cooperation between smaller regional groups connect with the

EU-based MARSUR.

Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs)

The second component of the European maritime surveillance network is the system of Maritime Rescue

Coordination Centres (MRCCs), also known as National Rescue Coordination Centres. This system was

established in the EU in accordance with the IMO Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR

Convention). Each nation state is required to establish rescue coordination centres and subcentres, and is

encouraged to enter into SAR agreements with neighbouring states to establish SAR regional centres.

The SAR Convention identifies emergency or alert procedures that are to be followed during SAR

operations.

SAR operations necessitate cooperation between MSs and the equivalent rescue coordination centres in

neighbouring countries. This cooperation includes both issue management as well as human or physical

resource assistance. Although the SAR organizations in EU countries are structured differently, the

cooperation is provided without regard to geographical responsibility areas. The main principle for

cooperation is the rescue centre that most efficiently might solve the task takes on its operational

management, while the other rescue centres contribute resources as needed.

Member States (MSs) Differences

Ideally, the national authorities in charge of rescue coordination centres are included in the EUROSUR

national coordination centre.29

However, where the EUROSUR national coordination centre is different

from those in charge of coordinating search and rescue, close collaboration between them should be


established. Often this takes the form of placing a liaison officer in the EUROSUR national coordination

centre.

There is no consistency within each MS of the EU regarding the co-existence of the EUROSUR national

coordination centre (for border management) and the MRCC (for search and rescue). On the one hand, the

EUROSUR and the MRCC are headed by the same national authorities, including a coastguard presence.

For example, Greece established its Hellenic Coast Guard (Ministry of Citizens Protection) as the national

authority for its EUROSUR and its MRCC. On the other hand, these centres can be in separate locations

and under different management. In addition, the coastguard function can be provided by a number of

agencies and departments. For example, Germany established a network of different authorities with a

joint operational centre to coordinate operations at sea, the Maritime Safety and Security Centre

(MSSC),30

located in Cuxhaven.31

3.2.3 Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)

In February 2002, the EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN), formerly a crisis reaction centre, was given

the task of serving as a permanent intelligence analysis entity to assist the EU Council in policy and the

preparation of decisions in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy. SITCEN is part of the

General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and reports to the Secretary General/High Representative

(SG/HR).

The SITCEN is mandated to undertake the following tasks on an ongoing basis: monitoring international

developments; the provision of early warning; the reception, evaluation, and dissemination of information

and evaluations to concerned users; as well as a contact point for the SG/HR. In time of crisis, the

SITCEN continues its functions of: “providing early warning; situation monitoring; situation assessment;

provision of facilities for any crisis task force; and to serve as an operational contact point for the SG/HR,

as well as for similar national or international situation centres/crisis cells.”32

3.2.4 Information Sharing Platform

The Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)

The EU CISE information sharing platform is the third network component. It is being jointly developed

by the Commission, the EU and the European Economic Area Member States. The CISE will integrate

existing surveillance system and networks and establish the conditions for increased exchange of

information between maritime authorities to obtain an enhanced basic maritime situation awareness

picture, such as the MARSUR Exchange System (MEXS).33

Table 2 of Appendix 4 lists the CISE

monitoring and support functions. Figure 2 of Appendix 5 shows the link between the CISE in Integrated

Maritime Surveillance and the EUROSUR of EU border surveillance. “Thus, the EU seeks to achieve

something similar to the US Information Sharing Environment (ISE) based in the Office of the Director of

National Intelligence.”34

3.2.5 Intercontinental Network Connections

The gradual achievement of an integrated network of vessel tracking and e-navigation systems includes

satellite monitoring and long range identification and tracking (LRIT). These types of space-based

systems enable the establishment intercontinental connections with further MDA systems in the Pacific

and Indian Oceans.


There are at least four basic types of such systems that need to be used in conjunction with each other in a

process. Two of the four use active sensors: Synthetic Aperture Radar satellites (SARSats); and Electro-

Optical (EO) imaging satellites. The other two are based on communications systems: individual

transponders linked to communication satellites (e.g., Iridium, OrbComm, etc.) and Automatic

Identification System (AIS).35,36

3.3 New Zealand

Since the events of 9/11, New Zealand has been forced to face the global nature of maritime threats, as

well as participate in international efforts to improve its maritime security.37

During the past ten years,

NZ’s ability to monitor and control activities in its maritime zones has seen significant change. The

government reviewed its maritime surveillance capability, producing the 2001 Maritime Patrol Review

(MPR), which assessed the civilian requirements for maritime patrols and surveillance and how they

could be met.38

Among the recommendations included was establishing a National Maritime Coordination

Centre (NMCC) to “collect information and manage tasking for all forms of military and civilian

maritime surveillance to meet civilian needs.”39

The report also indicated that the NMCC would liaise

with the National Maritime Search and Rescue Centre.40

3.3.1 National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC)

The NMCC works on behalf of a range of government agencies.41

However, it has direct responsibility

and reporting lines to the Comptroller Customs. The NMCC is operationally independent with multi-

agency governance, and provides a whole-of-government coordination service to maximize the efficient

and effective use of NZ’s civilian maritime patrol and surveillance assets and related information, for

civilian purposes, including the Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ).42

Although the MPR expected that the NMCC would ‘identify policy gaps and related issues regarding

maritime surveillance and patrol,’ a scarcity of resources has impeded this effort.43

The NMCC distributes

information through the Multi-Agency Network – Restricted (MAN-R) to which the NZ Defence Force

(NZDF), the NMCC, Customs, Maritime New Zealand and the police currently have access.44

Challenges

have existed with extending this access to other departments such as the Ministry of Fisheries due to

constraints related to security processes and legal constraints relating to contractual provisions or

statutory limitations.45

3.3.2 Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) & Rescue Coordination Centre (RCCNZ)

The MOC is primarily the continuous monitoring of internationally designated call and reply distress

frequencies for SOLAS (Safety of Life At Sea) responsibilities. NZ’s area of responsibility stretches from

the equator to the South Pole and from halfway across the Tasman Sea to halfway towards South

America.46

The MOC assists the Rescue Coordination Centre of New Zealand (RCCNZ) with

communications,47

including the 24/7 monitoring of radio frequencies for distress messages.48

The RCCNZ is responsible for coordinating all major maritime and aviation search and rescue (SAR)

missions within NZ’s SAR region. The RCCNZ also provides secondary support services in situations

such as determining the search areas for Police, Coastguard and other countries’ SAR authorities on

request; providing maritime assistance services; and receiving and relaying marine and aviation accident

reports.49

Once a search and rescue is underway, SAR officers monitor the progress of the operation,

update the plans as information is presented and manages the operation.50


3.3.3 Combined Threat Assessment Group (CTAG)

Within the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) is an interdepartmental group, known as

the CTAG, which is responsible for providing timely and accurate assessment of terrorist and criminal

threats of physical harm to NZ interests and its people. CTAG has liaison officers from the NZ Police, the

NZ Government Communications Security Bureau, the NZ Defence Force, Maritime New Zealand, and

the NZ Customs Service.51

3.4 Singapore

In the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the surge in maritime piracy and robbery in Southeast

Asia led to the drafting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) and establishing the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre.

Beyond the homeland security re-orientation and re-organization post 9/11, a key aspect of most maritime

security initiatives is the importance of leveraging multinational cooperation for success.

Maritime security is of paramount importance in the Southeast Asian Malacca Strait, a prime spot for

piracy and potential threats of terrorism. Maritime security cooperation is based on three principles.52

First, the primary responsibility lies with the coastal states of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Second, the international community, such as the IMO and major user states, has a role to play. Third, all

measures taken must be in accordance with International Law and respect the sovereignty of the coastal

states.

“The Malacca Strait is mainly divided between Indonesia and Malaysia (with Singapore located along the

strait) with a ‘strict but disputed’ boundary existing between their territorial claims.”53

Singapore,

Indonesia and Malaysia undertook cooperative measures to combat piracy and armed robbery against

ships in 2004 and 2005. Since most attacks on ships in or near the Straits took place in a port, in a

territorial sea of one of the three coastal States, or in the archipelagic waters of Indonesia, these three

states took steps to enhance cooperation to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships by launching

the trilateral Malacca Straits Sea Patrols.54

Singapore also established the Maritime Command and

Control Centre (Changi C2 Centre) in March 2007 to combat maritime terrorism.

3.4.1 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships

in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC)

The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) was established under the Agreement, is a non-

military operation based in Singapore at the Changi C2 Centre since 2006. The eighteen Contracting

Parties to ReCAAP are the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of

Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of India, Japan, the

Republic of Korea (South Korea), the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Republic of the Union of

Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of the Philippines, the

Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the

United Kingdom and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.55,56

Table 3 of Appendix 9 lists the joint exercises and patrols held by military and paramilitary organizations

in Asia. The ReCAAP ISC facilitates communications and information exchange between Contracting

Parties.


3.4.2 The Changi Maritime Command and Control Centre (Changi C2 Centre)

The Changi C2 Centre is a Royal Singapore Navy (RSN) facility for multinational cooperation, built next

to the Changi Naval Base, and houses three centres, namely, the Singapore Maritime Security Centre

(SMSC), the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) and the Multinational Operations and Exercises Centre

(MOEC).57

The Changi base protects the sea line of communications and defends the country from

maritime threats in the coastal waters of the Singapore Strait. It serves the international and national

maritime agencies to increase the security of Singapore.

Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC)

The SMSC brings together elements from domestic maritime agencies, such as the Republic of Singapore

Navy, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, and the Police Coast Guard.58

The SMSC plans its

maritime security operations from the Inter-Agency Coordination Centre in the event of maritime

incidents or crises. It also promotes regional and extra-regional collaboration in maritime security matters.

Information Fusion Centre (IFC)

The IFC is a RSN purpose-built, multinational, military facility based in the Changi C2 Centre at the

Changi Naval Base, and is unique in Southeast Asia.59

The IFC is a regional node for information sharing

to improve MDA and strengthen regional maritime security. In addition, there are multiple international

liaison officers (ILOs) who are integrated and work at the IFC. The ILOs act as national liaison officers

with their respective operation centres, while representing their navies and other national agencies. Table

4 of Appendix 10 identifies key maritime concerns of Southeast Asia.

The Republic of Singapore Navy has also installed multiple systems in the Information Fusion Centre

(IFC), including the Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) Internet portal60

to facilitate

information sharing between the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) countries.61

ReMIX shows

the Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) using the shipping database, the Open and Analyzed Shipping

Information System (OASIS); and while making use of the anomaly detection software, the Sense

Making and Research Tool (SMART).

Multinational Operations and Exercises Centre (MOEC)

The MOEC is the centre for the planning and conducting of multinational operations or exercises. The

MOEC has hosted exercises conducted by the Five Power Defence Arrangements62

(FPDA) and the

WPNS.63

In May 2013, the RSN hosted the Maritime Information Sharing Exercise (MARISX) 2013 and

the 4th WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise (WMSX). The MARISX 2013, a scenario-driven and shore-based

exercise that aimed to validate linkages among participating operation centres and practice information

sharing processes among regional navies, was held at the MOEC. The WMSX was held at the Changi C2

Centre in Changi Naval Base.64


3.5 United Kingdom-based Centres

Maritime security has always been essential to the UK and continues to be today. “International shipping

carries over 80% of world trade and 92% of British trade, while UK ports move 582 million tonnes of

cargo and over 5.38 million containers annually.”65

Challenges to the UK maritime security range from

piracy in international waters to transnational organized criminal activities such as human smuggling,

cybercrime and terrorism.66

The Department for Transport (DfT) is responsible for the UK National

Maritime Security Programme.67

“The National Maritime Security Programme covers all commercial maritime operations and, by

regulation, the DfT applies the programme to passenger ships carrying more than twelve passengers and

to cargo vessels (over 500 tonnes) as well as Mobile Offshore Drilling Units and their port facilities.”68

The UK programme brings together the maritime security regime and the related international and

European initiatives to provide comprehensive protective security for UK ships and ports. For example, in

the area of UK MDA, the DfT has responsibility for security which is based on the IMO SOLAS Chapter

XI-2 and the IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). The EU Regulations on

enhancing ship and port facility security transposes SOLAS XI-2 and the ISPS Code into UK law, and

requires EU MSs to introduce effective sanctions for breaching provisions of the regulation.

The National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC), established in April 2011, is an interagency

government body located at the Northwood Headquarters in north London, which also houses the NATO

Allied Maritime Command Operation Centre (MARCOM). Figure 5 of Appendix 11 shows how

international organizations do not work in isolation and how each contributes to peace and security,

including maritime security. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), an executive agency of the

DfT, is responsible for implementing the Maritime Safety Policy, including the Maritime Rescue

Coordination Centres (MRCCs).

3.5.1 National Maritime Information Centre (NMIC)

The NMIC brings together government departments and agencies having the responsibility for maritime

safety, security and environment in one organization, and is accountable to the Home Office. The NMIC

is an information centre that develops a single picture of maritime activity, bringing together intelligence

and monitoring carried out by government agencies such as the UK Border Agency, the MCA, Police, the

Royal Navy (RN), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), so threats and risks can be recognized

and quickly countered.69

NMIC’s location at Northwood allows it to benefit from existing military structures and protocols for

information sharing. Work continues to overcome the issue of data-sharing across other agencies, both

national and international. EU work assists the international component to build better understanding and

maritime surveillance by establishing the EU platform, the European Defence Agency MARSUR

Exchange system (MEXS).

3.5.2 Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres (MRCCs)

The MRCCs report directly to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA). The MCA has the

responsibility for the MRCC network on the UK coastline.70

The MRCC network is being revised to

allow for a more integrated search and rescue coordination service by taking advantage of state-of-the-art

communication technology and centres. The updated communications network is anticipated to be

available in 2015.71


3.5.3 Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre (DGIFC)

The DGIFC is part of the Joint Forces Intelligence Group (JFIG) within the UK Defence Intelligence

(DI), and is located at RAF Brampton in Cambridgeshire, UK. “DGIFC’s role is to support Defence

Planning, current operations and the intelligence assessment process.”72

DGIFC provides specialist,

advanced imagery intelligence to the armed forces and other intelligence partners through the exploitation

of satellite imaging systems in addition to airborne and ground-based collection systems.

3.5.4 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)

The JTAC is the UK’s centre for the analysis and assessment of international terrorism, and is based in

the Security Service’s HQ at Thames House in London, UK.73

JTAC also sets threat levels and issues

warnings of threats and other terrorist-related subjects for customers from a range of UK government

departments and agencies, and produces reports on trends, terrorist networks and capabilities. JTAC, a

multi-agency body, has staff attached from various Government Departments, the military and law

enforcement,74

and works closely with International Counter Terrorism branch. It is a separate

organization consisting of representatives from sixteen departments and agencies, forming a key part of

the National Intelligence Machinery.75

3.5.5 NATO Allied Maritime Command’s Maritime Operation Centres (NATO MOC)

NATO’s ability to determine its maritime situational awareness (MSA) depends on certain organizations

to manage and process data. The Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) is NATO’s one-stop shop for

all matters in the North Atlantic Alliance and is based at Northwood Headquarters, Middlesex, UK.76

The

Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is situated in the Northwood location, adjacent to the EUCOM’s Joint

Analysis Center (JAC) at RAF Molesworth, UK.77

The Maritime Operations Centre is the core of the maritime information gathering. The MC HQ

coordinates MSA activities in its respective Surveillance Coordination Area (SCA) to build and maintain

the NATO Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP), and exploit and disseminate MSA information on behalf

of the Alliance. MARCOM establishes relationships, facilitates continuous and mutual exchange of

information, and coordinates surveillance activities with national MOCs.78

NATO Shipping Centre (NSC)

MARCOM HQ Northwood also houses “the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), which was set to be the

liaison between NATO naval forces and the merchant shipping community and the primary point of

contact with NATO’s military authorities.”79

The NSC is also the contact point with national shipping

authorities and international maritime agencies. It compiles the commercial shipping plot based on

voluntary information provided by cooperating ships.

As part of the MARCOM HQ Northwood, the NSC is located near the commands of other allied navies,

including the EU Operation ATALANTA. The NSC is permanently manned by NATO staff, the primary

advisors to shipping about risks and possible interference maritime operations.80

3.6 United States

Since the events of 9/11, US federal government has been facing the challenge of maritime security by

strengthening its strategies and blending public and private maritime security activities. Figure 6 of

Appendix 12 illustrates the steps taken by the US federal government in the aftermath of 9/11 to establish


a common information sharing environment. But even an enhanced national effort was considered

insufficient. The US also focused on international cooperation for safeguarding those lawful private and

public commercial and other activities in the maritime domain from terrorism and criminal activity.

MDA requires having an effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain

that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the US and its international partners.

This requires multinational collaboration and information sharing. Figure 7 of Appendix 13 profiles the

national concept of operations to achieve MDA, using an enterprising hub structure.

Improved MDA, as part of the implementation of 9/11 Commission recommendations to expand

information sharing among others, the US established fusion centres. There are various models in use

with different governance structures, and types of information sought for analysis and interpretation.

Figure 10 of Appendix 18 gives a MDA overview, and shows that MDA functions on many levels, from

local to global, has different layers of situational and sensor awareness.

Each level of maritime situational awareness (MSA) involves management, collection, fusion and

analysis, and net-centric dissemination. First, the US federal intelligence fusion centres or information

sharing centres are either governed by the Department of Defense (DOD) or the US Coast Guard (USCG)

with specific mandates focusing on maritime domain awareness and responding to maritime security

challenges such as smuggling, transnational criminal activity and terrorism.81

Second, there are the USCG

operated Interagency Operations Centres (IOCs), which were created to help port agencies collaborate in

cases of first response, law enforcement, and homeland security operations.82

Third, the rescue

coordination centres are operated by the USCG and the US Air Force (USAF), and are responsible for

coordinating rescue response to distress.83

Fourth, there is the domestic network of state, local and

regional institutions that were originally created to improve the sharing of anti-terrorism intelligence

among different state, local and federal law enforcement agencies. These centres were developed

independently and remain quite different from one another; for many, the scope of their mission has been

expanded to cover “all crimes and all hazards.”84

Finally, DOD’s response to the findings of the 9/11

Commission Report is considered.85

3.6.1 US Federal Intelligence Fusion Centres

National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO)

The NMIO, formerly known as the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), was created as the

national focal point for maritime intelligence to establish a unified national approach consistent with the

National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) and is situated in Suitland, MD. The NMIO was created

to advance federal government collaboration and unity of effort as outlined in the 9/11 Commission

Report and on related Presidential directives, national strategies, and plans focused on maritime security.

The NMIO is responsible for developing and building participation in a Single Integrated Look-Out

(SILO)86

as shown in Figure 8 of Appendix 14.

The NMIO brings together the military intelligence operations for the Navy (Office of Naval Intelligence

[ONI] and the Naval Information Warfare Activity [NIWA]), the Marine Corps (Marine Corps

Intelligence Activity [MCIA]) and the Coast Guard (Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center

[USCG-ICC] and its Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centres on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts).87

It

performs a national-level, interdepartmental role to facilitate the proactive integration of intelligence

within the maritime domain (i.e., it neither collects nor produces intelligence).

Since the navy and the marines fall under the DOD and the Coast Guard reports to the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS), the NMIO does not represent a single command. It provides a united source of

maritime intelligence at the national level, provides direct support to the National Security Staff, and


facilitates information sharing and collaboration across the Global Maritime Community of Interest, such

as the three services involved and DOD as well as other national departments and agencies needing

maritime intelligence.88

Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)

The ONI is located within the NMIO; and provides maritime intelligence to key strategic, operational and

tactical decision makers. Their mission involves providing intelligence on seaborne terrorism, weapons

and technology proliferation, and narcotics and smuggling activities that directly supports the Navy and

civil and national decision makers and agencies.89

Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA)

The MCIA is located within the NMIO in Suitland, MA and in Quantico, VA. The MCIA determines

what missions the Marine Corps needs to carry out as well as who will need to be trained for that mission.

Their mission is to provide intelligence services to the Marine Corps and the US Intelligence Community

(IC). These services are based on expeditionary mission profiles in coastal areas. It provides support for

doctrine and force structure development, systems and equipment acquisition, war-gaming, and training

and education.

The Intelligence Coordination Centre (ICC)

The ICC is located within the NMIO, and maintains a 24/7 intelligence watch providing the indications

and warning input. The ICC is the USCG’s national-level intelligence centre,90

and is responsible for

analysis and response to its intelligence requirements. It manages collection requirements, tasking, and

requests for information between the USCG and Intelligence Community partners.

The Pacific and Atlantic Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centres (MIFCs)

The MIFCs91

serve as key nodes for fusion, analysis, and dissemination of maritime intelligence and

information at the operational and tactical level. The centres provide tactical intelligence support to the

USCG District and Sector intelligence staff in their area. MIFCs focus on technical intelligence

capabilities, intelligence support to targeting, and analysis. “Field level commands determine the

periodicity, level of detail, and topics for MIFC intelligence analysis and production.”92

The Atlantic MIFC is located in Dam Neck, VA, and describes itself as a “one-stop tactical intelligence

provider for Coast Guard decision-makers within the Atlantic Area.”93

The facility houses 75 personnel,

both military and civilian, and provides direct intelligence to Atlantic Area commanders. At the fusion

centre’s hub, the USCG surveys computers while a large television screen displays tracking maps, station

locators, radar, CNN and other news networks. The Pacific MIFC is located in Alameda, CA.

Both MIFCs provide information to operational units and work in collaboration with the ICC at the

NMIO in Suitland, MD. “Together, particularly at the NMIO, the relationship between the two entities

[MIFCs] is important.”94

3.6.2 Interagency Operations Centres (IOCs)

In accordance with the Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act, DHS has established

the Interagency Operations Centres (IOCs) in the country’s 35 most critical or largest marine ports.95

The

USCG IOC project96

was developed to improve the multi-agency maritime security operations and

advance cooperation among the partner agencies at these ports.97

The IOCs have three key functions:


Integrated Vessel Targeting (IVT);98

Interagency Operations Planning (IOP);99

and Operations

Monitoring (OM).100,101

3.6.3 Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs)

The Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs) are operated by the USCG and the USAF. The RCCs receive

Cospas-Sarsat102

distress alerts sent by the US Mission Control Center (USMCC) and are responsible for

coordinating the rescue response to the distress. Each service takes a different approach to search and

rescue (SAR).103

The US Air Force Rescue Coordination Center (USAF RCC) serves as the single agency responsible for

coordinating on-land federal SAR activities in the continental US, Mexico and Canada. The USAF RCC

operates 24/7 and ties into the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) alerting system and the US

Mission Control Center. The USAF RCC computer system contains resource files that list federal and

state organizations that can conduct or assist in SAR efforts throughout North America.

The USCG coordinates and conducts maritime SAR missions, and the response involves multi-mission

stations, cutters, aircraft and boats linked by communications networks. The National SAR Plan divides

the US area of SAR responsibility into internationally recognized inland and maritime SAR regions.

USCG RCCs are set up to cover specific geographic areas and act as command and coordination centres.

These areas of responsibility are divided among the nine USCG District commands and its two Rescue

Sub-Centres in Puerto Rico and Guam.

3.6.4 National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)

The NCTC was established by Presidential Executive Order 13354 (August 2004), and codified by the

IRTPA. NCTC implements the 9/11 Commission recommendation that “Breaking the older mold of

national government organizations, this NCTC should be a center for joint operational planning and joint

intelligence, staffed by personnel from the various agencies.”104

NCTC’s mandate is derived from

IRTPA, as supplemented by other statutes, Executive Orders and Intelligence Community Directives.

The NCTC follows the policy direction of the President, and National and Homeland Security

Councils.105

3.6.5 National Network of Fusion Centres

Across the US, there is a network of intelligence fusion centres, which are state- and-locally-owned and

operated entities. These were to serve as focal points to improve the sharing of counterterrorism

intelligence among the different state, local and federal law enforcement agencies within the state and

local environment as well as DOD, tribal, and territorial partners, and the private sector. This growth took

place in the absence of any legal framework for regulating the centres’ activities.

The shift in the fusion centre mandate was linked to several factors, including an initiative by a few states

that found favour with most other states, the need for local and non-law enforcement buy-in, and the need

for resources. The leadership at some of the fusion centres has admitted that their switch to an “all

hazards” approach was due to better access to grant funding,106

and that “it was impossible to create ‘buy-

in’ amongst local law enforcement agencies and other public sectors if a fusion centre was solely focused

on counterterrorism, as the centre’s partners often did not feel threatened by terrorism, nor did they think

that their community would produce would-be terrorists.”107

The question of ownership of any fusion centre is important, particularly in the US. “This question of

ownership throws up a clear distinction with developments in the US where more fusion centres are state-


wide and owned by state police or bureaus of investigation.”108

Due to their origins and development,

some have referred to this type of fusion centre as “state police intelligence on steroids.”109

Table 5 of Appendix 16 describes the categories of state and local requests that are received and tracked

by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Figure 9 of Appendix 15 focuses on DHS’ efforts to

coordinate and enhance its support and information sharing with fusion centres. Table 6 of Appendix 6

lists the key performance indicators and metrics used by DHS to evaluate for the single point of service at

fusion centres.

3.6.6 Department of Defence’s (DOD) Response

DOD’s response to 9/11 and related changes that occurred afterwards relate to the findings of the 9/11

Commission Report. Specifically, it relates to the connectivity to domestic intelligence agencies such as

fusion centres. The 9/11 Commission Report found that the civilian and military focal points of the US

airspace, namely “the FAA and NORAD were not prepared for the attacks launched against them and

could not put together an effective homeland defence against the attack.”110

The report notes that

NORAD’s Northeast Air Defence Sector personnel did the best they could. It adds that individual FAA

controllers, facility managers, and command centre managers made and flawlessly executed sound orders.

However, the report also found that both senior military and FAA leaders had no effective communication

with each other, causing difficulties with chain of command communications, including the President’s

ability to reach certain senior officials.

US Northern Command

In the aftermath of 9/11, the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) was established in October 2002,

“to provide command and control of DOD homeland defence efforts and to coordinate defence support of

civil authorities.”111

USNORTHCOM became responsible for planning, organizing, and executing

homeland defence and civil support missions within the continental US, Alaska and territorial waters, and

the coordination of security cooperation with Canada and Mexico. In addition, the US Northern

Command’s area of responsibility includes the coastal approaches of the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico and

the US Virgin Islands.

“Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) is the most widely recognized form of DOD Civil Support

because it usually consists of support for high-profile emergencies such as natural or manmade disasters

that often invoke Presidential or state emergency/disaster declarations.”112

The DHS National Response

Plan issued in December 2004 states that “DOD civil support is generally provided only when local, state

and other federal resources are ‘overwhelmed.’”113

The Command can only assist the lead agency when

ordered to do so because, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (PCA) prohibits military forces to become

directly involved in law enforcement.114

The USNORTHCOM J2 provides ‘accurate, timely, and relevant’ indications and warnings of potential

threats against North America to USNORTHCOM Commander and his subordinate commands.115

The

J2’s mission is to provide predictive actionable estimates and timely warnings of worldwide threats

against North America using all-source intelligence and law enforcement information. Figure 10 of

Appendix 18 shows that MDA functions on many level, from the local to global, with different layers of

situational and sensor awareness.


4.0 Discussion

“The maritime domain security relies on the ability to build a comprehensive awareness of maritime

activity.”116

The paper reviews the efforts made by countries relevant to Canada in establishing maritime

domain security, including Australia, the European Union and its Member States, New Zealand,

Singapore, the United Kingdom,117

and the United States. It also considers the influence of international

efforts in the IMO and NATO.

The terrorist attack of 9/11 forced a dramatic change in how the US organized itself to protect its citizens

and borders. For the maritime domain, the concept of persistent awareness replaced sea power as just one

element of an international conflict. The agenda was greatly broadened to include maritime terrorism,

piracy and armed robbery and transnational criminal activities (e.g., drug smuggling, small arms and light

weapons trafficking, human trafficking, cargo theft, etc.). The US passed the Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) and established its National Strategy for Maritime Security in

September 2005 to create an information sharing environment in which “full and complete national and

international coordination, cooperation, and intelligence and information sharing among public and

private entities are required to protect and secure the maritime domain.”118

4.1 First Research Question

In different jurisdictions of relevance to Canada, what types of maritime information sharing or fusion

centres are being used?

Like Canada, all jurisdictions reviewed for this paper are members of the IMO, and the International Civil

Aviation Organization (ICAO).119

Only the EU and certain of its Member States, the UK and the US, in

addition to Canada, are members of NATO. Despite this distinction, post 9/11 the international

community responded forcefully, to counter the threat of maritime terrorism. Evidence of this is seen in

the speed with which international law in the area of maritime and transportation security occurred and

practiced.

“Traditionally, the IMO has been concerned with maritime safety and marine environmental protection,

not security.”120

Following adoption of IMO Resolution A.924 (22),121

existing IMO instruments were

reviewed and updated to adopt maritime security measures.122

Through the US’ work in each international

organization, new security measures and treaties were created and adopted by these entities.

Implementation of these new requirements increased resource pressures and influenced the types and

number of fusion centres that were created domestically.

At least three types of maritime fusion centres were developed to respond to each country’s needs. The

types of centres include:

centres for the implementation of IMO maritime safety and new security requirements, such as

the Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs);

centres to provide operational and tactical information about vessels operating within that

country’s maritime domain, giving the recognized maritime picture and maritime situational

awareness, and providing an additional layer of maritime and national security; and

centres that achieve fusion of data by using a whole-of-government approach to identify high-

threat criminal targets to combat transnational crime or counter terrorism.


The regional centres are multidimensional networks that are either based in one centre or in a network of

centres for achieving a specific task. These include:

the NATO Allied Maritime Command Operation Centre (MARCOM), NATO’s one-stop shop for

all matters in the North Atlantic Alliance and the NATO Shipping Centre, based Northwood

Headquarters, Middlesex, UK;

the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in

Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) is a non-military operation based at the Changi

Command and Control Centre in Singapore; and

the European-wide maritime surveillance network that includes the Virtual Regional Maritime

Traffic Centre (VRMTC), a military operation; Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR), a non-

military operation; the Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea (SUCBAS), a military operation;

and related infrastructure based throughout the EU (except in Ireland and the UK).

4.2 Second Research Question

What challenges were faced by these maritime security centres and how were they resolved?

These fusion centres face challenges not unlike that seen by the Canadian Marine Security Operations

Centres (MSOCs). These challenges can be grouped in four categories: (a) governance; (b) information

sharing; (c) legal; and (d) performance issues.

A. Governance of Maritime Security Centres

The foremost issues associated with governance in relation to the maritime security centres are

accountability, roles and responsibility, and transparency. Each issue related to governance is reviewed

for comparative purposes.

Accountability is the means of enforcing responsibility. A Minister must provide an account to

Parliament, or Secretary to the US Congress and the public of how their responsibilities have

been carried out. Whether the fusion centre uses interagency governance or reports to one

Minister/Secretary, the reporting lines of accountability must be clear.

Roles and responsibilities are found in the legislation that empowers the authorized individuals to

undertake certain actions on behalf of the government. The types of assets required and related

tasking are often determined in policy frameworks, guidance and, in certain circumstances, rules

and regulations.

Transparency consists of disclosure of government information that can be accessible by the

public in an understandable and usable form. Mechanisms used by governments to increase

transparency include constitutional oversight, laws and processes such as audit and evaluation,

committee oversight reporting, and access to information provisions.

The governance of each maritime intelligence fusion centre varied according to the nature of the support

relationship between the agencies using the centre and those responsible for its operations. In each of the

maritime intelligence fusion centres reviewed, the military intelligence and operations groups were

operating in conjunction with other government departments and agencies in either a primary or

supporting role.


Country Approaches

In Australia, each maritime information centre (i.e., Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre and

the Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre) reports directly to at least one minister but due to the

task force nature of the organization (the Border Protection Command [BPC]) each member of the task

force also acts as liaison to their home agency. The BPC is accountable to both the Minister for Customs

and Border Protection and the Minister for Defence.123

The organization chart reinforces this multi-

purpose approach, whereby, the BPC head has operational control of the Australian Defence Force (ADF)

and Customs assets and members. These operations are subject to annual performance reporting

requirements.

Similarly, New Zealand has also adopted the whole-of-government approach to address its maritime

intelligence-information fusion centre requirements. The National Maritime Coordination Centre

(NMCC), a product of Cabinet approval (Dec 2006),124

operates independently with a multi-agency

approach to governance, and reports directly to the Comptroller Customs. Its operations are subject to

annual performance reporting requirements.

Singapore used a primarily military focus at its Changi Command and Control Centre to house the

Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC),125

which brings together the relevant military and civilian

agencies involved in maritime security. Both the Information Fusion Centre (IFC)126

and the

Multinational Operations and Exercises Centres (MOEC)127

are Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN)

purpose-built, multinational military facilities. The MOEC is used for the planning and conducting of

multinational exercises with groups such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements and the WPNS. All

maritime centres report to the Minister of Defence (Navy).

Similar to the approach followed by Singapore, the UK took the whole-of-government approach for the

governance and management of its maritime intelligence fusion centre, the National Maritime

Information Centre (NMIC),128

which is located at the Northwood Naval Base, in Molesworth, UK,

reporting to the Minister of Home Office. However, its network of Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres

(MRCCs) is accountable to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).129

These operations are subject

to annual performance reporting requirements.

In the aftermath of 9/11, three types of US federal maritime intelligence fusion centres were authorized by

federal statutes. The National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO) is accountable to the

Secretary of Defence (Navy, Marine Corps) and the Secretary of Homeland Defence (USCG). Their roles

and responsibilities are determined by federal statutes, including frequency of reporting. The Interagency

Operations Centres (IOCs) are governed by the USCG and its multi-agency partners in the federal, state

and local jurisdictions, including reporting and monitoring. The Rescue Coordination Centres (RCCs)

report on the basis of function. The USAF RCCs report to the Secretary of Defence, the USCG SAR

Program report to the Secretary of Homeland Defence. Both programs also report to the National Search

and Rescue Committee,130

which is charged with national oversight of SAR and matters of interagency

interest within the US.

Regional Approaches – European Union (EU)

Due to the EU’s challenges of interoperability and fragmented maritime security approaches, the

Commission adopted the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP). The IMP program was established by EU

Regulation No. 1255/2011, which dictated its initial funding and established legal obligations for all EU

Member States and the Commission. Article 13 of the Regulation requires the Commission to report to

the European Parliament at regular intervals. Any progress reports must include an evaluation of the

program’s impact on other EU policies.131


Regional Approaches – North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) provides a mechanism for 26 of 28 NATO member states that

collaboratively develop and share information and intelligence, and contribute to maritime security. The

NIFC is military-led, and US-sponsored MOU organization chartered by NATO’s Military Committee,

and is located in the UK. It is directed by the Military Committee to significantly contribute to NATO

Allied Command Operations key intelligence activities. The NIFC remains outside national chains of

command and NATO's permanent and crisis manning structures, and falls under the operational command

of SACEUR through his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Intelligence at SHAPE.132

National Network of Fusion Centres (US State and Local Fusion Centres)

The 9/11 Commission Report emphasized the importance of information sharing between federal

intelligence agencies and local law enforcement to prevent future terrorist attacks. These ‘fusion centres’

were created to facilitate the transfer of information among local, state and federal officials. These entities

are run by state and local governments, and federal rules do not apply. However, since the federal

government provides funding and expertise to these centres, such funding often requires these fusion

centres to report to both state and federal officials. To create basic standards across the network, DHS and

DOJ have established voluntary Fusion Center Guidelines, and fusion centres that adopt the guidelines

are offered additional funding.

B. Information Sharing in Maritime Security Centres

Information classification relates to the use of sensors, sources, quality indicators, deployment schedules,

etc. Related caveats on the release of sharing classified information will also slow down or prevent the

exchange of data.

The 9/11 Commission Report also found that the biggest impediment to ‘connecting the dots’ was the

resistance to information sharing between jurisdictions and within jurisdictions, and recommended a

government-wide approach to information sharing. This led to a statutory requirement in certain countries

for establishing common information sharing environments for a whole-of-government approach to be

used in fusion centres and other contexts. These approaches do not address the possible interoperability

issues occurring when sharing of such information between nations or regions.

Country Approaches

The Australian Maritime Information System (AMIS) was established to coordinate information sharing

between key federal agencies, such as Customs and Defence133

along Australia’s maritime approaches,

covering up to 1,000 nautical miles from its coastline. Other surveillance systems used include satellites,

over-the-horizon radar such as the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN), and the long-range

identification and tracking of ships (LRIT). The BPC works in conjunction with a number of

Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies to collect, analyze, and assess information relating to the

security of Australia's offshore maritime areas.

New Zealand uses the NMCC to disseminate certain information among all relevant agencies using the

multi-agency network-restricted (MAN-R), to which the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), the

NMCC, New Zealand Customs Service (Customs), Maritime New Zealand, NZ Police and the Ministry

of Fisheries (MOF), all have access.134


Singapore’s information sharing challenges are shared by most of the countries reviewed: specifically,

‘the need to build a certain level of trust and confidence among the agencies involved.’ The IFC uses

various information-sharing systems, such as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium’s (WPNS) Regional

Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX),135

the Malacca’s Straits Patrol’s Information System (MSPIS),

the satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification Tracking System

(LRIT), and analyze maritime information. The IFC works closely with other established information

sharing centres for a more comprehensive coverage of the maritime domain.136

To support the national framework architecture, the NMIC uses Telesto, a UK operational ship tracking

system that draws on a diverse set of data sources to construct a maritime situational picture

automatically.137

This capability gives the NMIC staff an understanding of the global maritime integrated

shipping information138

to support homeland defence and pursuit of transnational criminal activity in the

maritime domain. The NMIC also uses the Maritime Event Tracking and Information System (METIS)

domestically and the MARSUR Exchange system (MEXS) internationally.139

In the 9/11 Commission Report, breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to use relevant

intelligence are identified as key factors in the failure to prevent the 9/11 attacks.140

The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) contains the requirement to create an

‘Information Sharing Environment (ISE).’141

The ISE was intended to be a “decentralized, distributed,

and coordinated environment …with ‘applicable legal standards relating to privacy and civil liberties.’”142

More specifically, the Act directed that the ISE provide and facilitate the means of sharing terrorism

information among all appropriate federal, state, local and tribal entities and the private sector through the

use of policy guidelines and technologies.143

The National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)144

connects communities who need to exchange information. Its development process is the basis for the

ISE’s sharing standards.

The US military has developed its Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange (CENTRIX)

system as one interoperable channel for promoting its global maritime network, routinely used by the US

Navy.145

It also has its secure Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet) for dedicated use when

needed.


Due to the types of challenges facing the EU maritime domain, the EU developed a process to achieve a

common information sharing environment (CISE) that provides: a platform to ensure interoperability, and

enable the exchange of information between sectoral systems both operational,146

and those being

developed by the EU and its Member States; improving maritime situational awareness;147

and efficiency

and cost-effectiveness associated with the collection of information.148

The network aims at improving the

common Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) by linking up military maritime networks and systems with

the services of each national system made available through a dedicated interface ‘MEXS’ and be

operational by 2014.149

Regional Approaches – North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

The NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC) required software to develop the IFC intelligence

information architecture that is interoperable with its NATO members. “The Linked Operational

Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE) system and NATO’s Battlefield Information and Collection

Exploitation System (BICES)”150

were added to NIFC’s intelligence information architecture. LOCE is

the only US systems gateway to other NATO C4I systems151

and it “provides US forces, NATO forces,


and other national allied military organizations with near real time, correlated situation and order of battle

information.”152

Regional Approaches – Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery

against Ships in Asia Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC)

The surge in maritime piracy and robbery in Southeast Asia following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led

to the signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against

Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) by sixteen countries in 2004.153

To ensure interoperability between each of the

eighteen contracting parties, ReCAAP ISC was housed in the Changi C2. The ReCAAP ISC launched a

web-based information sharing system, called Information Network (IFN) System that facilitates

communications, information exchange and operational cooperation between participating member

countries; and improves ReCAAP’s incident response to combat piracy and armed robbery.


Fusion centres may be useful conduits for information, as state and local law enforcement officers are

often the last line of defence against terrorist activity and attacks. Despite best intentions, these fusion

centres have problems with information dissemination which has been remedied in part by DHS provision

of access to classified data networks and portals for terrorist-related threat information to all fusion centre

staff.154

Clearance issues are being addressed by the provision of clearances to numerous state and local

personnel, and standard operating procedures that have been standardized by DHS using the National

Information Exchange Model (NIEM), a joint DHS, DOJ and Global Justice initiative designed to

standardize information exchange, by the PM-ISE.155

C. Legal Issues in Maritime Security Centres

The main legal issues range from a variety of global, regional and bilateral agreements addressing

particular threats to maritime security, as well as the domestic legal arrangements that have been put in

place either to respond to, or to pre-empt certain international initiatives, or have not been put in place.

The policy dimensions related to maritime security consist of the existing informal arrangements and

agreements or those needed between states to combat maritime threats, as well as the motivations for

putting them in place. It is important to recognize that maritime security is not a legal puzzle involving an

assessment of applicable rules, reconciling conflicting principles and identifying what legal gaps that may

exist and how they should be resolved while, at the same time, taking into consideration the framework

within which these rules operate.

A number of factors have contributed to the existing legal frameworks that have been adopted by each

government. The expansion of international law to address the threat of maritime terrorism is reflective of

the alliance each government has with the US. In the aftermath of 9/11, the US pressed the IMO and other

international organizations to review existing international legal and technical measures to prevent and

suppress terrorist acts. In the IMO, these efforts were directed at the prevention and suppression of

terrorist acts against ships at sea and in port, and to improve security on board and ashore pursuant to the

US National Strategy for Maritime Security of September 2005 (NSMS). Each government, as a member

of the IMO, has adopted such measures due in part to their alliance with the US, and the fact that, they

too, are “highly dependent on the oceans for its security and welfare of its people and economy.”156

The

government- and regional-specific detailed analysis on legal issues is found in Appendix 22.


Country and Regional Approaches

Each country reviewed has its own version of a national security act, including Singapore which has

established its Internal Security Act (ISA). The objectives are all similar: tackle serious threats to social

and political security and counter terrorist threats. At the same, these Acts have provided the authority for

the collection of intelligence and security information in addition to maritime security legislation

associated with Customs, Migration and Transportation.

In addition, each of these countries is a member of the ICAO, which focuses on aviation safety and

security, and the IMO that is responsible for measures to improve the safety and security of international

shipping and prevent marine pollution from ships. Consequently, each of these countries and regions has

adopted the relevant provisions to implement the related aviation and maritime security requirements,

such as establishing fusion centres to achieve these aims.

D. Performance Issues in Maritime Security Centres

Although the issue of transparency intersects with that of performance, it is only through a performance

audit or review of an activity that raises issues of effectiveness and efficiency of the program or initiative.

Such issues surface in international organizations, such as the IMO that has a number of new performance

standards and functional requirements that must be observed by its member states in their implementation

of the IMO instruments related to maritime security such as the ISPS Code.

By conducting performance audits, evaluations or reviews of maritime security centres, governments and

international organizations are better able to determine whether the centre or member state is able to meet

the performance standards of the mandate requirement. Governments can also determine whether they

are getting value-for-money associated with its investments in the centre. However, this sensitive

information is not available in open source.

Country and Regional Approaches

In 2010, New Zealand undertook a performance audit of the NMCC to determine its effectiveness in

coordinating maritime patrols. The audit determined that more work was needed, “the NMCC’s

effectiveness in coordinating maritime patrols is evolving and should improve as new systems and patrol

resources are introduced.”157

National security rationale prevents the accessibility of performance audits for most of the US federal

fusion centres. However, there is a performance audit available relating to the USCG’s Interagency

Operations Centres (IOCs). The IOCs are designed to share maritime information with the USCG port

partners. Based on the GAO158

findings, the USCG will be providing parameters for the WatchKeeper

system administrator to collect and report. It is also conducting surveys of all users of the system four

months post its delivery in a port, to determine the effectiveness of the WatchKeeper system, a software

platform that was developed to improve tactical decision making, situational awareness, operations

monitoring and data processing at the US’ largest ports.


Sharing of information with third countries enables them to take the required steps to rescue persons in

distress at sea. This information exchange can also allow third countries to take operational measures

against irregular migrants, a “possible risk from a human rights or refugee law perspective.”159

Data

protection issues have also emerged since in principle, the information and data shared through

EUROSUR is not meant to include personal data.


The Commission has included a safeguard in the EUROSUR Regulation prohibiting the exchange of any

information that a third country could use “to identify persons or groups of persons who are under a

serious risk of being subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or any other

violation of fundamental rights.”160

However, the Regulation does not provide a mechanism to monitor

whether this practice is being observed.


A number of third party perspectives, such as that of the ACLU and Cincotta, in addition to those

provided by the GAO, the DHS Office of Inspector General, have outlined a series of overall concerns

associated with the operations of the state- and locally-owned national network of fusion centres, initially

established in the absence of any legal framework for regulating fusion centre activities. Appendix 16,

Table 5 identifies the categories of state and local support requests to DHS Office of Intelligence and

Analysis.161

Appendix 17, Table 6 lists the measures, goals, key performance indicators and metrics for a

single point of service identified by the GAO report.162

A lack of regulation quickly led to ‘mission creep,’ which the US Senate Subcommittee found

disconcerting. “The Subcommittee investigation found that many fusion centres lack either the capability

or stated objective of contributing meaningfully to the federal counterterrorism mission. Many centres

didn’t consider counterterrorism as an explicit part of their mission, and federal officials said some were

simply not concerned with doing counterterrorism work.”163

Measures Taken

The state and major urban fusion centres serve as focal points for the receipt, analysis, gathering, sharing,

and safeguarding of threat-related information between the US federal government and the state, local,

tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments and the private sector. Since 2003, the US federal government

has cooperated with state and local entities to establish guidance to enable the individual fusion centres to

operate at a baseline level of capability and form an integrated National Network of Fusion Centres.

In 2004 and 2005, many states began creating fusion centres with various local, state and federal funds.

At the time, no standards or guidelines were in existence to assist with interoperability and

communication issues with other centres at the state, regional, and federal levels. Instead of creating

integrated information sharing at all levels of government, the centres became silos of information,

incapable of information exchange. In response, DOJ and DHS created guidelines for these fusion centres

to integrate public safety and private sector entities.164

In 2011, “DHS, in collaboration with Fusion Center Directors and federal interagency partners, instituted

a repeatable annual assessment process to monitor the maturity of the National Network of Fusion

Centers and provide objective data to inform federal investments in fusion centers.”165

4.3 Third Research Question

Are elements of the maritime fusion centre governance systems applicable to the Canadian context?

Using the US definition “a fusion centre is an effective mechanism to exchange information and

intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and

terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of sources.”166

This section examines the potential of

transferability of elements of the six reviewed regimes to the Canadian context.


With resources continuing to be stretched to support multiple government taskings, governments need to

find ways of accomplishing more with less. With increasing demands and static or decreasing resources,

fusion centres may become another tool for maximizing available resources and building trusted

relationships.167

The principal role of a fusion centre is the collection, fusion and analysis, and net-centric

dissemination of criminal and terrorist intelligence and other information, such as threat and risk

assessments, to support efforts to anticipate, identify, prevent or monitor possible criminal and terrorist

activity. The process can involve every level and relevant department or agency of government involved

in maritime security, possibly private sector entities and the public. The level of involvement of some of

these participants will vary based on the specific circumstances.

Common Characteristics of the Regimes

Each regime has taken an intelligence-led and risk-based approach to its operations. Through the

integration of information and interagency cooperation, each fusion centre undertakes tactical, operational

and strategic threat assessments, and uses this information to maintain its awareness of the maritime

security threats.

All six governments are members of the ICAO and the IMO. Each government is committed to

implementing certain legal requirements adopted by specialized UN agencies, including standards

associated with the chosen mode of transport when moving passengers or cargo internationally as well as

the provision of security requirements for ships and port facilities to counter potential threats of terrorism.

Each country regime has defined the role of its military, particularly the terms and conditions of providing

aid to civil power, which involves the political decision to release state resources (in the form of military,

national guard, national police) to sub-national authorities in cases of emergency.168,169,170,171,172

The regional regimes are completely different. The EU has a Military Staff (EUMS) made up of

representatives from its Member States. The EUMS has additional functions regarding the management

of crises and operations being conducted in the EU.173

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) is a paramilitary operation based

in Singapore with eighteen contracting parties. Their role involves undertaking joint exercises and patrols

held by military and paramilitary organizations in the Malacca Strait.174

The NATO Maritime

Command’s role in maritime security is to build and maintain the NATO RMP, exploit and disseminate

MSA information on behalf of the Alliance.175

Each fusion centre is heavily dependent on regional and international cooperation. This includes

international cooperation agreements using administrative arrangements on a range of issues, such as

cooperation in technology for maritime infrastructure protection at ports and harbours, and integrated

information sharing.

Australian and New Zealand Transference

Informally, there is potential for transference of parts of the Australian and New Zealand regimes to

Canada such as the whole-of-government governance structure. Both countries have much in common in

terms of their history, demographics, economies and foreign policy interests, including their participation

in the Commonwealth of Nations.176

For example, Canada could look at establishing a whole-of-

government governance structure based on the Australian and New Zealand maritime fusion centre

models. Personnel from the maritime security departments and agencies could become part of a task force

such as the BPC in Australia or be embedded in the organization from each of the relevant maritime

security partners for economies of scale of operations.


It would require addressing the information sharing barriers between non-military and military partners

by using legislative and technological solutions to ensure non-fettered access to maritime security

information to all relevant partners. For example, Australia concentrated its border resources and control

in a single person, a force commander responsible for both military and customs issues (with two deputies

who specialize in each area). As in NZ, Canada could consider establishing an information sharing

environment for disseminating MSA intelligence to its partners.

EU Transference

Canada could consider using a step-wise process177

to establish its national maritime domain awareness

by building on its existing regional MDA systems. This would involve using existing infrastructure to

reduce the barriers to entry, in particular, the cost for each partner to participate in the short- to medium-

term. Canada could also look at codifying its governance framework for the MSOCs that could include an

obligation to establish a common information sharing environment.

Singapore Transference

Canada could consider establishing a dedicated information exchange Internet portal similar to the

mechanism used for the WPNS. The MSOCs could also address lack of trust issues using outreach

activities showing how the information is safeguarded and used.

United Kingdom Transference

Recognizing that the UK’s single-window approach to maritime security may lead to challenges related to

information sharing Canada could consider establishing a statute to institutionalize the requirement to set-

up a common database and information sharing environment and require the safeguarding of such

information to be used as initially intended (i.e., intelligence, evidence, prevention or prosecution).

United States Transference

The US defence and security178

arrangements with Canada are more extensive than with any other

country. For example, the US and Canada share NATO mutual security commitments and their military

forces cooperate on continental defense within the framework of the binational North American

Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD).

Canada could consider codifying the governance framework for the MSOCs. All US federal maritime

fusion centres are based on statute or a combination of statute and Executive Orders that provides clarity

in the roles and responsibilities of the relevant maritime security agencies and departments. This

framework is intended to establish the US concept of maritime domain awareness depicted in Figure 10 in

Appendix 18. Through such a framework, an information sharing platform could be added, along the lines

of the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) of the Information Sharing Environment (Section

1016 of the IRTPA).

4.4 Marine Security Operations Centre (MSOC)

The federal National Security Policy (2004) called for the establishment of Marine Security Operations

Centres (MSOCs) as part of a six point plan to strengthen Canadian maritime security. Since then, three

MSOCs have been established, two coastal MSOCs led by DND (in Halifax, NS and Esquimalt, BC), and

a third MSOC led by the RCMP in Niagara-on-the-Lake, ON. Five federal partners, members of an

interdepartmental working group with maritime security responsibilities, and known as the


Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group (IMSWG),179

were allocated resources for their

participation.

Currently, there is no formal chain of command. Instead, the various departments have representatives

collaborating at each of the three MSOCs. This co-location allows departmental representatives to access

their respective operations centres. The information systems bring to focus the need for coordinated

action when an anomaly has been detected. The fragmented governance structure challenges the MSOCs

to combine their information effectively and efficiently, particularly when issues of asset and tasking of

the centres remains open.180

Moreover, without clear accountability, roles and responsibilities identified

by statute, there is potential for not connecting the dots or having the information fall into a ‘void’ within

or between agencies due to unclear accountability.

The Canadian MSOC regime is compared with the challenges faced by the six governments reviewed.

These are governance, information sharing, legal, and performance issues. Refer to Appendix 19 for a

general country comparison of maritime security fusion centre regimes.

4.5 Enablers of Maritime Domain Awareness

This review of the maritime security fusion centres in different jurisdictions led to the identification of a

number of ‘enablers’ that may help to shape the MDA at the domestic, regional and possibly at global

levels. Certain enablers help each jurisdiction to consider further cooperation at the global level, (i.e.,

international maritime security cooperation).181

These enablers consist of: “(1) consolidated legal and policy strategies; (2) information sharing; (3) data

and information standards; (4) surveillance and technology; (5) commercial interests; and (6) inter-

organizational relationships.”182

(1) Consolidated Legal and Policy Strategies

Each of the nation states reviewed are participants in international fora to develop cooperation strategies

promoting information sharing in fora, such as the IMO, ICAO, and NATO. Such strategies have enabled

governments to overcome their internal caveats and allow for the free exchange of data with their partners

to the agreement. Although most nation states are able and willing to share their data, often certain

obstacles emerge and must be addressed. These obstacles can be either legal, policy or related to

security.183

Legal Obstacles

The findings of the 9/11 Commission Report underlined the need for constructive changes in domestic

legislation that prevented US civilian agencies from sharing information with the military or other

government jurisdictions. In the wake of 9/11, many governments changed their privacy legislation to

permit such information exchanges for reasons of national security. However, issues still remain

regarding the sharing of information from commercial sources with third parties because of licensing and

contractual restrictions.184

Similar prohibitions occur with the sharing of information being used in an

ongoing criminal investigation or in judicial proceedings.185

In the Canadian context, the MSOCs do not

have a formal chain governance structure.

Any new statute must take into account the provisions of the Privacy Act and the Charter of Rights and

Freedoms when seeking to empower the MSOCs to disseminate its information to all relevant maritime

security agencies.


Policy Obstacles

Often, cooperating nation states and organizations need to understand why such information must be

shared so they are better able to develop policies and procedures for information exchange.186

Parties to

the agreement must be able to trust one another to use the shared data for the commonly agreed purposes.

Information sharing and safeguarding it with the appropriate levels of data protection must be understood

by the parties to prevent any unforeseen disclosure to non-compliant entities. “Clearly defined

ownership187

of data shared among nation states must include provisions to establish how the data is

safeguarded as it passes among nations.”188

Security Obstacles

Security obstacles refer to related information about sensors, sources, quality indicators, deployment

schedules, routine patrol areas, etc. Often the caveats on the sharing of classified information slow down

the exchange of data. At times, such delays are unnecessary when the data was over classified. Nation

states must establish protocols to allow for the exchange of information with partners subject to domestic

regulatory requirements governing the release of personal, commercially sensitive, or classified

information.

(2) Information Sharing

Information sharing among the appropriate agencies and partners is necessary to achieve a secure

maritime environment.189

“As a general rule, the more fragmented the structures of governance, the less

likely it is that states will combine their information effectively.”190

An extreme case is the US, which has

17 federal intelligence agencies and 18,000 law enforcement agencies at the federal, state, local and tribal

levels.191

This was reaffirmed in the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report, stressing a need for

establishing a common information sharing environment, and was identified as a key factor in that

‘intelligence failure.’192

However, the problems are not just related to ‘connecting the dots’ but also to bridging the ‘voids’ into

which information falls within and between agencies because there are insufficient resources to review

everything. Globalization and nation state de-regulation have combined to challenge the traditional

configuration of western intelligence agencies that almost always reflect the policy divides between

domestic and foreign,193,194

and between ‘law enforcement’ and ‘intelligence’ agencies.

Police and intelligence agencies are different institutions that have different mandates and cultures.

Failure to share information may not be due to ‘short-sightedness’ but because of more complex questions

related to mandates and resources.195

Since 9/11, the separation of policing and intelligence has been

considerably reduced in Europe and the US. “The problems sharing information is minimized to the

extent that action takes the form of disruption or prevention but if the objective is to bring alleged

terrorists to court then the issue remains as to how ‘intelligence’ can be deployed in support of

prosecution.”196

In most of the maritime security fusion centres reviewed, have established a mechanism for disseminating

certain information among all relevant agencies using information sharing environment platforms. In

Australia, the Australian Maritime Information System (AMIS) is used to disseminate maritime security

information.197

New Zealand uses its Multi-Agency Network – Restricted (MAN-R), which gives access

to all relevant maritime security agencies.198

Singapore uses its Regional Maritime Information Exchange

(ReMIX) Internet portal to disseminate its information,199

as well as its ACCESS system.200

The US

information sharing environment uses the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) platform in

addition to a number of other systems.201

The EU seeks to develop something similar to the US ISE with


the establishment of a common information sharing environment platform using the MARSUR Exchange

System (MEXS).202

Due to the fragmented governance of the MSOCs, there are challenges in communications and sharing of

information. In particular, there are issues related to “efficiencies in vertical and horizontal reporting and

the interdepartmental flow of maritime interests.”203

(3) Data/Information Standards

Data standardization is the basis for global maritime data and information exchange. It removes

ambiguities and identifies inconsistencies that could result in poor decision-making.204

Certain standards

currently exist in the IMO, such as the data transmitted through shipboard Automatic Identification

Systems (AIS) and the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) service.205

Safety and security protocols have been established for the civil air transportation system at the ICAO.

However, a similar convention to support international maritime standards and governance for maritime

situational awareness would be required.206

Additional maritime standards should focus on “defining data

formats, system exchange protocols, the categorization of Vessels of Interest (VOI), training programs

and standardizing classification processes”207

to facilitate information exchange while considering

policies and processes for safeguarding information.

(4) Surveillance and Technology

Technology provides the means to conduct maritime surveillance, facilitate the transfer of data, and

transform the data into actionable maritime domain awareness information. This requires the presence and

persistent surveillance activities for data collection on a national scale. Any collection “presence must be

persistent over time to track vessel movements, perform trend analysis and identify anomalies.”208

Due to the allocation of limited surveillance resources available, the distribution of maritime information

should be managed among nation states and regional maritime security agreements. Although AIS and

LRIT systems are self-reporting, they do not provide a comprehensive, dependable maritime picture.209

Data is also needed from other sources such as radar, electro-optical sensors, acoustic sensors, space-

based sensors, ground-based, air or satellite imagery, Vessel Monitoring Systems, Vessel Traffic

Management Services.210

Technology acquisition to support the exchange of data is driven by national requirements, not

international cooperation. Since there is an overarching need for interoperability of technologies between

nation states or multinational organizations, the use of commonly accepted standards is important.

(5) Commercial Interests

Since more than 90% of world trade is shipped by sea, and communications cables on the seabed carry

95% of the world’s cyberspace traffic, there is little dispute on the importance of keeping commercial sea

lanes safe.211

Concerns have been raised about a threat of an economic disruption due to the free flow of

shipping that will threaten the global economy. Commercial maritime interests can also be compromised

by illicit supply chains run by organized crime and terrorist elements.212

“Establishing processes that leverage the regional and global flow of maritime security information, and

synthesize it into local, timely intelligence updates for the benefit of merchant shipping traffic is a first

step in controlling risk, and cost.”213

Such systems would allow vessel masters and shipping companies

to construct a local maritime picture and take mitigating action as required. “A well aligned maritime


regulatory and security cooperation system based on a voluntary exchange of commercial maritime

information will promote the intermodal marine transportation system.”214

(6) Inter-Organizational Relationships

The need for maritime security cooperation and governance is not well understood. A clear rationale must

be provided to decision-makers. Currently, like-minded nation states, such as Canada and the US,

converge on a collective need to ensure access to the maritime commons and adopt a collaborative

approach to preserve safety and security on the high seas, leading to formal bilateral, regional and

multilateral agreements and alliances, such as ICAO and IMO agreements, ReCAAP and NATO.

5.0 Conclusion

Since 9/11, a large number of countries globally have realized that their safety and economic security

depends on the secure use of the world’s oceans. Maritime security depends on the ability to build a

comprehensive awareness of maritime activity, (i.e., achieve Maritime Domain Awareness). Many of the

threats in the maritime domain, such as terrorism, piracy and organized crime are global in scope; these

problems cannot be addressed by any single state. Multinational collaboration is necessary to develop

collaborative maritime domain awareness.

This paper looked at the governance of maritime security fusion centres that were established as part of

the strategy to enhance maritime security at the national, regional and global levels. With the concurrent

technological developments such as intercontinental network connections from satellite systems, over-

the-horizon radar, and near-shore and harbour acoustics have been incorporated into most countries’

layered approach to increase security. The governmental and military organizations reviewed already

possess valuable data for inputs into the shared maritime situational awareness, but are unable to capture

all of the necessary data alone. It is only through the sharing of information between these governments,

and to their relevant domestic departments, UN-specialized agencies such as the ICAO and IMO, and the

private sector is the real value-added behind these maritime security fusion centres.

Six enablers of maritime domain awareness emerged from the review of these governance regimes, in

particular, consolidated legal and policy strategies, information sharing, data and information standards,

surveillance and technology, commercial interests and inter-organizational relationships. These factors are

enablers provided the three obstacles to successful governance are addressed, more specifically, legal,

policy and security obstacles. The 9/11 Commission Report highlighted such obstacles were contributing

factors to intelligence failures, and stressed the need for constructive changes in legislation that prevented

civilian agencies from sharing information with the military or other government jurisdictions be

resolved.

Like Canada, all six governments examined in this paper, Australia, the European Union and its Member

States, New Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States are members of the ICAO

and the IMO. Each maritime security fusion centre regime is heavily dependent on regional and

international cooperation. Each of their governments has committed to implement the UN agreements

developed in those fora to contribute to the overall maritime domain awareness and ensure safety and

security of maritime infrastructure protection at ports, harbours and vessels.

These regimes have common approaches that may be of interest to Canada when looking at its

governance approach for the Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs). All six regimes have

recognized the need to create economies of scale whenever possible and have resulted in whole-of-

government approaches and joint task force approaches for operations. Also, these regimes are in various


stages of implementing their IMO and ICAO obligations, and have followed the US’ progress in its

development of its maritime security fusion centre development in all jurisdictions.

Each regime also has certain features that may be of interest to the Canadian maritime security centres.

Whether it considers using the task force approach similar to that of Australia, or follows a step-wise

approach use towards interoperability as pursued by the European Union, any governance decision taken

should ensure accountability, identify roles and responsibilities of the MSOC personnel, and be

transparent. Any chosen approach to resolve the information sharing issue should take into account the

provisions of the Privacy Act and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and interoperability issues with its

partners in maritime security, such as the US and NATO.


6.0 Acronyms

Australia

ACC Australian Crime Commission

ACC Act Australian Crime Commission Act 2002

ADF Australian Defence Force

AFMA Australian Fisheries Management Authority

AFP Australian Federal Police

AMD Australian Maritime Domain

AMIFC Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre

AMIS Australian Maritime Identification System

AMSA Australian Maritime Security Authority

AMSOC Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre

AMSRAP Australian Maritime Security Risk Assessment Process

AQIS Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service

ASIO Australia’s National Security Intelligence Services

AUD Australian Dollar

AusSAR Australian Search and Rescue

BPC Border Protection Command

CBPC Commander of Border Protection Command

Cth Commonwealth

Fusion National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability

GAMSA Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements

NTAC National Threat Assessment Centre

SFA Security Forces Authority

Canada

CBSA Canada Border Services Agency

CCG Canadian Coast Guard

CF Canadian Forces

CJOS Combined Joint Operations from the Sea

CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service

DFO Department of Fisheries and Oceans

DND Department of National Defence

IMSWG Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group

MARLANT Maritime Forces Atlantic

MERP Maritime Event Response Protocol

MIMDEX Marine Security Information Management and Data Exchange System

MSOC Marine Security Operations Centre

NCO Network-Centric Operations

NCW Net-Centric Warfare

NEO Network Enabled Operations

NIEM National Information Exchange Model

NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command

NSIP NATO Security Investment Program

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

RCN Royal Canadian Navy


TC Transport Canada

European Union

ARA Annual Risk Analysis

CCME Central Command for Maritime Emergencies

CDP Capability Development Plan

CFSP Common Foreign & Security Policy

CHENS Chiefs of European Navies

CIREFI Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of

Frontiers and Immigration

CISE Common Information Sharing Environment

CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management

Commission European Commission

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

DG ENTR Directorate-General for Enterprise & Industry

DG ENV Directorate-General for Environment

DG HOME Directorate-General for Home Affairs

DG MARE Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs & Fisheries

DG MOVE Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport

DG TAXUD Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs Union

EDA European Defence Agency

EEA European Economic Area

EEAS European External Action Service

EMSA European Maritime Safety Agency

EMSS European Maritime Security Strategy

EO Electro-Optical imaging satellite

EOS European Organisation of Security

EPN European Patrol Network

ESS European Security Strategy

EU European Union

EUMC European Union Military Committee

EUMS European Union Military Staff

EUROMARFOR European Union Maritime Force

EURONEC European Network Enabled Capability

EUROPOL European Police Service

EUROSUR European External Border Surveillance System

EUSC European Union Satellite Centre

EU European Union

FRAN FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network

FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the

External Borders of the Member States of the European Union

FRONTEX ARA FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis report

GMES Global Monitoring for Environment and Security

IBM Integrated Border Management

IEM Integrated Emergency Management

IMP Integrated Maritime Policy

IMS Integrated Maritime Surveillance

INTDIV Intelligence Division

ISTAR Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Reconnaissance

ITN Italian Navy


JRC Joint Research Centre

MARSUR European Maritime Surveillance

MCBA Maritime Capacity Building Agency

MERAC Maritime Emergency Reporting and Assessment Centre

MEXS MARSUR Exchange System

MHD Military Home Defence

MO Military Operations

MOC Maritime Operational Concept

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

MS Member State

MSO Maritime Security Operations

MSSC Maritime Safety and Security Centre

MSSIS Maritime Safety and Security Information System

NCC National Coordination Centre (EUROSUR)

NEC Network Enabled Capability

NMSC National Maritime Surveillance Centre

NOA Note of Accession

NRCC National Rescue Coordination Centre

OA Operational Arrangement

OGMSA Office of Global Maritime Situational Awareness

PMG Politico-Military Group

PSC Political and Security Committee

SAFESEANET Safe Sea Network

SARSats Synthetic Aperture Radar Satellites

SATCEN Satellite Centre

SBC Schengen Border Code

SG/HR Secretary General/High Representative

SIIMS System for Integrated Interagency Maritime Surveillance

SIS I Schengen Information System

SITCEN Situation Centre

SMART Service-oriented infrastructure for Maritime Traffic Tracking

SUCBAS Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea

SUCFIS Sea Surveillance Cooperation Finland Sweden

TRMN Trans-Regional Maritime Network

VRMTC Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre

VTMIS Vessel Traffic Monitoring and Information Systems

WMC Wider Mediterranean Community

New Zealand

CTAG Combined Threat Assessment Group

DPMC Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

ILO International Liaison Officer

JBMS Joint Border Management System

MAN-R Multi-Agency Network - Restricted

MCC Maritime Coordination Centre

MOC Maritime Operations Centre

MOF Ministry of Finance

MPR Maritime Patrol Review

MSA Maritime Safety Authority

NMCC National Maritime Coordination Centre


NMSRC National Maritime Search and Rescue Centre

NZ New Zealand

NZDF NZ Defence Force

NZSIS NZ Security Intelligence Service

OAG Office of the Controller and Auditor General

ODESC(M) Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination

(Maritime)

RCCNZ Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand

ReMIX Regional Maritime Information Exchange

RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force

RNZN Royal New Zealand Navy

Singapore

ARF ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

Changi C2 Centre Changi Command and Control Centre

CMDA Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness

COSCOM Coastal Command

IFC Information Fusion Centre

IFN Information Network System

ILO International Liaison Officer

JAMSI Japan’s Asian Maritime Security Initiative

JCG Japanese Coast Guard

MARISX Maritime Information Sharing Exercise

MOEC Multinational Operations and Exercises Centre

MSP IS Malacca Strait Patrols Information System

OASIS Open and Analyzed Shipping Information System

ReCAAP Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed

Robbery against Ships

ReCAAP ISC ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre

RAPPICC Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Coordination Centre

ReMIX Regional Maritime Info-sharing Exchange

RSN Republic of Singapore Navy

SMART Sense Making and Research Tool

SMSC Singapore Maritime Security Centre

United Kingdom-based Centres

CCA Civil Contingencies Act

CISE Common Information Sharing Environment

DfT Department for Transport

DGC Defence Geographic Centre

DGIFC Defence Geospatial Intelligence Fusion Centre

DHO Defence HUMINT Organisation

DI Defence Intelligence

EPA Emergency Powers Act

FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office

HUMINT Human Intelligence

IFC Information Fusion Centre

IMINT Imagery Intelligence


JAC Joint Analysis Centre

JAGO Joint Aeronautical and Geospatial Organisation

JFIG Joint Forces Intelligence Group

JIC Joint Intelligence Committee

JTAC Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre

LOCE Linked Operations Centres Europe (NATO)

MACA Military Aid to Civil Authorities

MACP Military Aid to Civil Power

MARCOM Maritime Command (NATO)

MASINT Measurement and Signatures Intelligence

MCA Maritime and Coastguard Agency

MOD Ministry of Defence

MRCC Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre

MSOG Maritime Security Oversight Group

NATO-ISAF NATO’s International Security Assistance Force

NEC Network Enabled Capability

NIFC NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Centre

NNEC NATO Network Enabled Capability

NMIC National Maritime Information Centre

NSC NATO Shipping Centre

NSIP NATO Security Investment Program

OSINT Open Source Intelligence

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams

RAF Royal Air Force

RN Royal Navy

SCA Surveillance Coordination Area (NATO)

SIGINT Signals Intelligence

UK United Kingdom

UKG United Kingdom Government

United States

ACLU American Civil Liberties Union

BAT Biometric Automated Toolset

BJA Bureau of Justice Assistance

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CGCG Coast Guard Cryptologic Group

CGIS Coast Guard Investigative Services

CICC Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council

CIS Citizenship and Immigration Services

COC critical operational capabilities

CWID Coalition Warrior Interoperability Division

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

EC Enabling capabilities

EO Executive Order

EOC Emergency Operations Centre

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation


FCIU Fusion Center Integration Unit

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FIG Field Intelligence Group

FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act

GAO Government Accountability Office

GMII Global Maritime Intelligence Integration

GSP Global Space Partnership

HIDTA High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area

HAS Homeland Security Act

HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive

HSPI Homeland Security Policy Initiative

I&W Incidence and Warning

I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis

IC Intelligence Community

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IOC Interagency Operations Centre

IOP Interagency Operations Planning

IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act

ISE Information Sharing Environment

ITACG Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group

IVT Integrated Vessel Targeting

JTTF Joint Terrorism Task Force

MARAD Maritime Administration

MCIA Marine Corps Intelligence Activity

MIFC LANT Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Atlantic

MIFC PAC Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center Pacific

MOTR US Maritime Operational Threat Response

MSCA Military Support to Civil Authorities

MSSIS Maritime Safety and Security Information System

MSSR Maritime Security Sector Reform

NCISP National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

NFCA National Fusion Center Association

NGB National Guard Bureau

NIAG NMIO Interagency Advisory Group

NIEM National Information Exchange Model

NIWA Naval Information Warfare Activity

NMIC National Maritime Intelligence Center

NMIO National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office

NORAD North American Aerospace Defence Command

NSA National Security Act

NSI Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative

NSMS National Strategy for Maritime Security

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

OIG Office of Inspector General

OM Operations Monitoring

OMB Office of Management and Budget

ONDCP Office of National Drug Control Policy

ONI Office of Naval Intelligence

PJBD Permanent Joint Board on Defence


REAL ID Act Improved Security for Driver’s License and Personal Identification Card

Act of 2005

RISS Regional Information Sharing System

RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative

SAR Suspicious Activity Reporting

SecDef Secretary of Defence

SILO Single Integrated Look-Out

SLPO State and Local Program Office

SLSR State and Local Support Requests

SMDA Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness

SPS Single Point of Service

Subcommittee Senate Subcommittee

USAF US Air Force

USAF RCC US Air Force Rescue Coordination Center

USCG US Coast Guard

USCG-ICC US Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center

USEUCOM US European Command

USMCC US Mission Control Center

USNORTHCOM US Northern Command

USNORTHCOM J2 US Northern Command Intelligence Directorate

USPACOM US Pacific Command

US United States

USG United States Government

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commonly Used Terms

AIS Automatic Identification System

C2 Command and Control

CSI US Container Security Initiative

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

GPS Global Positioning System

ILP Intelligence-Led Policing

KPI Key Performance Indicator

LRIT Long-Range Identification and Tracking

MACA Military Aid to Civil Authorities

MACP Military Aid to Civilian Power

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness

MSA Maritime Situational Awareness

MSI Maritime Safety Information

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

PIA Privacy Impact Assessment

POE Port of Entry

RCC Rescue Coordination Centre

RMP Recognized Maritime Picture

SAR Search and Rescue

SLOC Sea lines of Communication

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UHF Ultra-High Frequency

VHF Very High Frequency


VMS Vessel Monitoring System

VOI Vessel of Interest

VPN Virtual Private Network

VTS Vessel Traffic System

WOG Whole-Of-Government

International Organizations & related terms

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CMFC Combined Maritime Forces Central Command

CMFP Combined Maritime Forces Pacific

CoE Council of Europe

Commonwealth Commonwealth of Nations

FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

IMO International Maritime Organization

ISPS IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security Code

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NIFC NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

SAR Convention IMO Convention on Search and Rescue

SOLAS IMO Safety of Life at Sea Convention

SUA Convention IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Maritime Navigation

SUA Protocol IMO 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention

UN United Nations

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea

UNCTOC United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime

UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolutions

WMSX WPNS Multilateral Sea Exercise

WPNS Western Pacific Naval Symposium


7.0 Glossary and Explanatory Terms

28 CFR Part 23—“28 US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 is a regulation and guideline for

law enforcement agencies. It contains implementing standards for operating multijurisdictional criminal

intelligence systems receiving federal grant funding. It specifically provides guidance in five primary

areas: (1) submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, (2) security, (3) inquiry, (4)

dissemination, and (5) the review-and-purge process. This regulation also helps ensure the protection of

the privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties of individuals during the collection and exchange of

intelligence information.”1

All Crimes – “An approach that incorporates terrorism and other high-risk threats into the existing crime

fighting framework to ensure that possible precursor crimes are screened and analyzed for linkages to

larger scale terrorist or other crimes. This approach recognizes that there is a nexus between types of

criminal activity (for example, illegal drug operations, gangs, money laundering, fraud, identity theft, and

terrorism). Using an all-crimes approach does not imply that a fusion center must address every single

crime that occurs within its area of responsibility. Rather, the routine risk assessment that a fusion center

develops or supports development of should assist in prioritizing which crimes and/or hazards a state or

region should address and, in the development of a collection plan, identify what other sources of

information may be useful for examining possible connections with other crimes.”2

All Hazards – “Refers to preparedness for terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies within

the US. Within the context of the fusion process, some fusion centers have defined their mission to

include an all-hazards approach. While the application of this approach varies, in general, it means that

the fusion center has identified and prioritized types of major disasters and emergencies, beyond terrorism

and crime, that could occur within their jurisdiction and gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information

which would assist the relevant responsible agencies (law enforcement, fire, public health, emergency

management, critical infrastructure, etc.) with the prevention, protection, response, or recovery efforts of

those incidents.”3

1United States Department of Homeland Security. 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report,

Washington, D.C., June 2013:93:59, [accessed 2013-08-08] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%2

0Final%20Report.pdf 2United States Department of Homeland Security. 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report,






0Final%20Report.pdf

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20Centers%20Final%20Report.pdf







Canada – Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs) - The MSOCs will accomplish maritime

situational awareness from the collection, integration and analysis of information sources of the relevant

government agencies involved in marine security. This assists in the detection, assessment and support of

a coordinated response to a marine security threat, incident or significant marine event.4

Counterterrorism – “Practices, tactics, techniques, and strategies designed to prevent, deter, and respond

to terrorism. Within the context of the fusion process, a fusion center with a counterterrorism mission is

one that identifies and prioritizes potential terrorist threats that could occur within its area of

responsibility and gathers, analyzes, and disseminates information which would assist the relevant

responsible agencies (e.g., law enforcement, intelligence, and critical infrastructure) with the prevention,

protection, response, or recovery efforts of those incidents.”5

Fusion Centre – “A fusion centre is an effective and efficient mechanism to exchange information and

intelligence, maximize resources, streamline operations, and improve the ability to fight crime and

terrorism by analyzing data from a variety of sources.”6

Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) – “Small cells of highly-trained, locally-based investigators,

analysts, linguists, SWAT experts, and other specialists from dozens of US law enforcement and

intelligence agencies. This multiagency effort is led by the US Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI

and is designed to combine the resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement.”7

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) – “A unified process for reporting,

tracking, and accessing SARs in a manner that rigorously protects the privacy and civil liberties of

Americans.”8

Recognized Centre – “A centre that has been designated as a fusion centre by the Governor of the state

but that has not been designated as the state’s primary fusion centre, in accordance with the US Federal

Resource Allocation Criteria policy.”9

4Public Safety Canada. Ad Hoc DG Meeting: Future of the MSOCs Program, April 4, 2012:17:2.




0Final%20Report.pdf 6United States Department of Justice. Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and

Intelligence in a New Era, Executive Summary, Office of Justice Programs: Global Justice Information Sharing

Initiative, 2008:8:3, [accessed 2013-06-24] from:

https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf. 7United States Department of Homeland Security. 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report,






0Final%20Report.pdf



https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf






Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) – “Official documentation of observed behavior reasonably

indicative of preoperational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity.”10

Threat Assessment – “An assessment of a criminal or terrorist presence within a jurisdiction combined

with an evaluation of the potential targets of that presence and a statement of probability that the criminal

or terrorist will commit an unlawful act. The assessment focuses on the criminal’s or terrorist’s

opportunity, capability, and willingness to fulfill the threat.”11

UK Military Aid to the Civil Authorities – “The provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities (MACA) is

guided by 3 criteria:

Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the

private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.

The Civil Authority lacks the required level of capability to fulfill the task and it is unreasonable

or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.

The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available

resources.”12

Generally, Military Aid to Civil Power (MACP) is requested to assist the Civil Power in dealing with a

variety of criminal and malicious activities. In addition to Common Law, all MACP support requires the

approval of a Defence Minister. The statutory basis for the provision of support, Section 2 of the 1964

Emergency Powers Act (EPA) and the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA).13




0Final%20Report.pdf 10

United States Department of Homeland Security. 2012 National Network of Fusion Centers Final Report,








Ministry of Defence. Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication 02

(2nd

Edition), published September 2007:317:2-1, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61965/defenceconrtibution1.pdf 13

Ministry of Defence. Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication 02

(2nd


https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61965/defenceconrtibution1.pdf










US E-Government Act of 2002 – “This act strives, among other things, to enhance protection for personal

information in government information systems and information collections by requiring that agencies

conduct privacy impact assessments (PIA). A PIA is an analysis of how personal information is collected,

stored, shared, and managed in a federal system. According to Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

guidance, a PIA is to (1) ensure that handling conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy

requirements regarding privacy; (2) determine the risks and effects of collecting, maintaining, and

disseminating information in identifiable form in an electronic information system; and (3) examine and

evaluate protections and alternative processes for handling information to mitigate potential privacy

risks.215

Agencies are required to conduct PIAs before developing or procuring information technology

that collects, maintains, or disseminates information that is in a personally identifiable form, and before

initiating any new data collections involving personal information that will be collected, maintained, or

disseminated using information technology if the same questions are asked of 10 or more people. To the

extent that PIAs are made publicly available they provide explanations to the public about such things as

the information that will be collected, why it is being collected, how it is to be used, and how the system

and data will be maintained and protected.216

”14

US Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007 – “The Act requires federal agencies to report

annually to Congress on pattern-based analyses of electronic databases used to identify predictive patterns

or anomalies that indicate terrorist or criminal activity. The Act excludes analyses that are subject-based,

that use personal identifiers or inputs associated with individuals, and those that are solely to detect fraud,

waste, and abuse in government agencies or programs, or for government computer security.217,15”

US Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) – “This Act defines federal

requirements for securing information and information systems that support federal agency operations and

assets. It requires agencies to develop agency-wide information security programs that extend to

contractors and other providers of federal data and systems.218

Under FISMA, information security means

protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,

modification, or destruction, including controls necessary to preserve authorized restrictions on access

and disclosure to protect personal privacy.”16

US Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA)219

– “This Act requires DHS to establish a Chief Privacy

Officer to oversee its implementation of privacy protections. According to the act, the Chief Privacy

Officer is responsible for, among other things, providing assurance that the agency’s use of technologies

sustains privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information and that

14United States Government Accountability Office. Data Mining: DHS Needs to Improve Executive Oversight of

Systems Supporting Counterterrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-11-742, Washington, D.C.,

September 2011:70:10, [accessed 2013-06-17] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585288.pdf. 15

United States Government Accountability Office. Data Mining: DHS Needs to Improve Executive Oversight of


September 2011:70:10-11, [accessed 2013-06-17] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585288.pdf. 16



September 2011:70:10, [accessed 2013-06-17] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585288.pdf.

http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585288.pdf




personal information within systems of records is handled in compliance with fair information practices

as set out in the Privacy Act.”17

US Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) – The IRTPA amended the

National Security Act of 1947, creating the position of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and his or

her office. The IRTPA gave the DNI authority over the intelligence budget, authority to shift a certain

amount of resources among agencies to accomplish specified missions, and approval authority concerning

personnel decisions for top leadership positions in the Intelligence Community (IC) outside of

Department of Defence. The Act also established issue-oriented Intelligence Planning (IP) centers to

coordinate national level intelligence positions on functional or regional problem sets, such as

counterterrorism. The IRTPA defined the term national intelligence to mean: All intelligence, regardless

of the source from which derived and including information gathered within or outside the US that (1)

pertains to more than one USG agency, and (2) involves threats to the US, its people, and property or

interests; the development, proliferation, or use of weapons of mass destruction; or any other matter

bearing on US national or homeland security.18

US National Security Act (NSA) – The National Security Act of 1947 created the framework for the

Intelligence Community (IC). The Act established the National Security Council, Director of Central

Intelligence (DCI), and Department of Defense (DOD). The Act also identifies the organizations that

make up the IC.19

US Privacy Act (5 US Code Section 553) – “This Act places limitations on agencies’ collection,

disclosure, and use of personal information maintained in systems of records.220

The Privacy Act requires

that when agencies establish or make changes to a system of records, they must notify the public through

a system of records notice in the Federal Register. This notice should identify, among other things, the

categories of data collected, the categories of individuals about whom information is collected, the

purposes for which the information is used (including, for example, intended sharing of the information),

and procedures that individuals can use to review and correct personal information.”20

US Title 10 and Title 50, US Code –both Titles, when used in combination, regulate the activities and

funding of the US Intelligence Community (IC), including the Department of Defense elements of the IC.

Both Titles 10 and 50, US Code, reinforce with legislative authority the roles of the Secretary of Defence

and his subordinate officers in the conduct of intelligence. The statutory authority provided to the

17United States Government Accountability Office. Data Mining: DHS Needs to Improve Executive Oversight of


September 2011:70:10, [accessed 2013-06-17] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585288.pdf. 18

United States Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, December 17,

2004, [accessed 2013-08-11] from: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf. 19

Title 50 US Code, Chapter 15, National Security, Public Law 113-121. 20



September 2011:70:9, [accessed 2013-06-17] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585288.pdf.


http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-108publ458.pdf



President by Title 10, US Code; Title 50, US Code; and the IRTPA, are relied on as the legal foundation

for EO 12333.21

US Executive Order (EO) 12333 of 1981, as amended, is the Presidential directive that provides the

goals, direction, duties, and responsibilities that pertain to the national intelligence effort, including the

DOD elements. It also outlines the national IC, its elements, and its roles and functions, and includes

guidelines on oversight and implementation.22

21Title 10 (Armed Forces) and Title 50 (War and National Defense) US Code

22 Executive Order 12333 of 1981 (as amended), [accessed 2013-06-17] from:

https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1261

https://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1261


8.0 Annotated Bibliography

The annotated bibliography provides a concise summary of each source, identifying its purpose or

research question where applicable, its method of investigation and its main conclusions.

8.1 Australia

Australian Border Protection Command. Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre, BPC Website,

updated July 27, 2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from: http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5783.asp.

The core business of the Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre (AMIFC) is to produce the

operational and tactical intelligence information regarding vessels operating within Australia's maritime

environment is described.

Australian Border Protection Command. The Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre, BPC

Website, updated July 20, 2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from: http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5786.asp.

The Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC) coordinates the planning and delivery of

current operational activity for all Customs and Border Protection assets assigned to Border Protection

Command (BPC) is profiled.

Australian Border Protection Command. Border Protection Command Intelligence Centre, BPC Website,


The Border Protection Command (BPC) Intelligence Centre processes and analyzes information and

intelligence relating to offshore maritime areas.

Australian Border Protection Command. Border Protection Command (about us), BPC Website, updated

July 8, 2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from: http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5599.asp

The BPC organizational chart shows its command structure.

Australian Border Protection Command. Headquarters Joint Task Force 639 (hqjtf639), BPC Website,


The role of the BPC Headquarters Joint Task Force is briefly outlined.

Australian Border Protection Command. Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements

(GAMSA), Commonwealth of Australia, 2009:188, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:

http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/GAMSA.pdf.

The Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA) provides a common reference point

to the management of security in Australia’s maritime domain. It identifies the various stakeholders that

manage Australia’s maritime security. They include the Commonwealth (Cth) Government, state and

territory governments, industry and the general public. GAMSA identifies the roles and responsibilities of

the multiple government agencies that contribute to managing maritime security. The Cth Government

and state and territorial governments have overlapping jurisdiction for maritime security issues in the

areas such as fisheries, environment, maritime security threats, and ports and transport infrastructure.

http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5783.asp





http://www.customs.gov.au/webdata/resources/files/GAMSA.pdf


Chapter 3 summarizes Australia’s standing arrangements to manage security threats in the maritime

domain. The Australian Maritime Security Risk Assessment Process (AMSRAP) allows regular

assessments of security threats in the maritime domain to be carried out, providing advice to the

government on such items as the government’s response to maritime security threats and the allocation of

resources. The AMSRAP also guides how the portfolio agencies are to apply risk management strategies

so that the government response is proportional to the maritime security threat and government priorities

and pressures, which, in turn, informs the allocation of resources.

GAMSA identifies the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) maritime security role: to provide maritime

surveillance; transportation; maritime surface response; intelligence collection and fusion; security;

tactical response forces; and command and control on behalf of the Cth. It also notes that the ADF’s

traditional role has evolved into a range of domestic security tasks dealing with non-traditional threats,

such as natural disasters, pandemics, and threats to national sovereignty in the form of illegal

immigration, illegal fishing and other illegal activity in Australia’s offshore maritime domain.

Australian Crime Commission. Australian Crime Commission Annual Report 2011-12, Commonwealth

of Australia, 2012:278, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:

http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/annual_reports/1112/ACC_AR_2011-

2012.pdf.

The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) reported its development of mining criminal intelligence

holdings using the ACC-led National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability (Fusion). During phase two

of the Fusion Implementation Program, the ACC improved the underlying technologies and analysis tools

that enabled improved data analysis and generated leads, which led to a more efficient sharing of relevant

intelligence with ACC partners.

The Fusion is a key pillar of the Commonwealth Organised Crime Strategic Framework that supports the

federal response to organized crime. Launched in July 2010, the Fusion project was allocated AUD 14.3

million over four years. It brings together experts, analysts and investigators from law enforcement,

national security and related agencies, each with access to their department’s information records.221

The

Fusion allows the ACC to unlock more insights from the combined data holdings to get a more

comprehensive picture of criminal targets, risks, threats and vulnerabilities than is possible working in

isolation. “The Fusion capability has identified more than 70 high-threat criminal targets previously

unknown to national law enforcement, and has produced around 1200 intelligence products for 83

partners this year.”222

Australian Government. Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006,

Canberra, ACT, No. 3, 2006:49, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006A00003/Download.

The Defence Act of 1903 was revised to accommodate specific instances where the Australian military aid

to civilian power is permitted and under what conditions. The amendment has expanded the military’s

mandate to include incidents in the Australian offshore area (Schedule 1), an area known as a site of

various types of transnational organized criminal activities, such as human smuggling and illegal fishing.

Section 51CA of the revised Act allows for the Commonwealth Government to have the military respond

under specific conditions, such as an extraordinary emergency crisis. The revised Act allows the use of the

defence force to protect the Commonwealth interests and States and self-governing Territories under Part

IIIAAA.

http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/annual_reports/1112/ACC_AR_2011-2012.pdf

http://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/annual_reports/1112/ACC_AR_2011-2012.pdf

http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006A00003/Download


Australian Government Border Protection Command. “About us,” Border Protection Command Website,

[accessed 2013-07-16] from: http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5599.asp

The BPC website describes its current organizational structure and mandate.

Barkley, Hugh. “Australian Border Protection Command,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime

Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 1, January 2012:16:4-5, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:

http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO%20Quarterly.pdf.

The author describes the Australian Border Protection Command’s (BPC) role, responsibilities and

shareholders. Its mission is, in collaboration with other Commonwealth government agencies and

stakeholders to protect Australia’s national interest by mitigating, or eliminating risks posed by security

threats (Barkley 2012, 4). The BPC is directly responsible for coordinating and controlling operations

relating to the following maritime security threats: illegal activity in protected areas; marine pollution;

prohibited imports and exports; illegal exploitation of natural resources; irregular maritime migrants;

compromises to biosecurity; piracy, robbery and violence at sea; and maritime terrorism.

The ABPC is the primary law enforcement organisation in the Australian Maritime Domain (AMD), an

area which covers approximately 11 million square nautical miles.223

The AMD includes the territorial

sea, contiguous zone, offshore areas predominantly within Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ),

and extends to the area bounded by Australia’s Security Force Authority Area, as shown in Figure 1 of

Appendix 2. The author identifies the size of the AMD and varying environmental conditions (i.e.,

tropical to monsoon conditions) as key challenges, which have an intelligence-led and risk-based

response.

Bateman, Sam. “Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches,” Security Challenges, 3(3), August

2007:109-129, [accessed 2013-07-16] from:

http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol3no3Bateman.pdf.

The author reviews current policies, responses, threats, concepts and capabilities for securing the

maritime approaches in Australia (Bateman 2007, 109). Bateman identifies reasons why a focus on these

approaches is now more important than ever. The author concludes that although considerable progress

has been made towards a more integrated approach to the task, there is still some way to go before there is

an effective and efficient integrated system in place for securing Australia’s maritime approaches

(Bateman 2007, 128-129). The author recommends the establishment of an Australian Maritime

Surveillance and Enforcement Authority to fill the gap.

Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. “Australia, New Zealand and Maritime

Security,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New

Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge, 2010:277:1-21.

The authors explore what is meant by ‘maritime security,’ as articulated in both Australia and New

Zealand, and they consider some of the particular dimensions that exist collectively and individually for

each country (Klein et al. 2010, 5). They note that the term ‘maritime security’ has different meaning

depending on the characteristics that influence the observer. There is a traditional view of security

focused on military threats. “For example, the US Naval Operations Concept refers to the goals of

‘maritime security operations’ as including ensuring the freedom of navigation, the flow of commerce and

the protection of ocean resources, as well as securing ‘the maritime domain from nation-state threats,

terrorism, drug trafficking and other forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and

illegal seaborne immigration.”224


http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO%20Quarterly.pdf

http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePDFs/vol3no3Bateman.pdf


The authors observe that maritime security is of ‘vital importance’ to both countries, since their combined

maritime jurisdiction225

extends from the Indian Ocean and the Timor and Arafura Seas to as far south as

the Southern Ocean adjacent to claimed Antarctic territories and sub-Antarctic islands, all of the Tasman

Sea, and the eastern outer points in the South Pacific (Klein et al. 2010, 11). Each country has an interest

in the stability of the Asian, Pacific and Southern Ocean regions. The authors state that “both countries

have demonstrated commitment to the global initiatives designed to enhance maritime security; such as

the Proliferation Security Initiative.”226

Although each of these countries has a unique geographical

location, the authors conclude that many of the problems and their solutions are also applicable in other

parts of the world (Klein et al. 2010, 21).

Klein, Natalie. “Intelligence Gathering and Information Sharing for Maritime Security Purposes under

International Law,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and

New Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge,

2010:277:224-241.

The author considers some of the key legal and political arrangements established by states to improve

intelligence gathering and information sharing to promote maritime security.227

These include the

Proliferation Security Initiative, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety

of Maritime Navigation (1988 SUA Convention) and its 2005 Protocol (2005 SUA Protocol),228

and the

Long Range Identification and Tracking Regulation229

to the International Convention for the Safety of

Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention).230

The author indicates that the latter is of particular relevance for

Australia due to its creation of the Australian Maritime Identification System (AMIS), which is intended

to identify all vessel traffic entering Australian ports or transiting within 200 miles of Australia’s coast

(i.e., within Australia’s EEZ).

The author reviews information sharing arrangements established for criminal law enforcement purposes

in light of the contribution made by navies and law enforcement officials to counter transnational crime,

as well as illegal fishing activities. The author also highlights the venues of information available to

government officials, the legal obstacles faced in securing this information and how weaknesses in the

existing legal framework of intelligence gathering and information sharing may be overcome.

Rahman, Chris. The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy,

Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 24, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Department of Defence,

Canberra, ACT, 2008:78, [accessed 2013-07-26] from:

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA24.pdf.

The author describes the Global Maritime Partnership Initiative’s (GMPI) implications for the Royal

Australian Navy (RAN), which broadens the navy’s focus from the traditional role of deterrence and

fighting wars to one that emphasizes “the protection of shipping and safety of sea lanes, the maintenance

of stable and lawful maritime domain and prosecution of the fight against transnational terrorist groups,

including the ability to influence events on shore.”231

For effective operations, the GMPI requires high

levels of international political support to initiate cooperation and is very dependent on technology

(Rahman 2008, 6).

The author concludes that the GMPI offers a ‘sound organizing concept’ to frame enhanced maritime

security cooperation. However, the GMPI represents a policy framework that links existing initiatives

and programs, and encourages new ones to be developed where they are most needed (Rahman 2008, 57).

He notes that “the development and integration of technology for MDA purposes is both inevitable and

necessary, but it is also important to the maritime security requirements drive technological solutions.”232

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA24.pdf


Rothwell, Donald R. “Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary and Anticipated

Challenges for Australia and New Zealand,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy

Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R.

editors, Routledge, 2010:277:242-259.

The author reviews some of the outstanding contemporary challenges to maritime security, such as piracy,

transnational crime, creeping jurisdiction, and maritime safety, search and rescue. The author also

considers some anticipated or ‘horizon’ issues that must be ultimately responded to, such as climate

change, and responsiveness and adaptability. Rothwell concludes that “determining the limits of maritime

security remains an ongoing challenge.”233

Scott, Shirley V. “Whose Security is it and how much of it do we want: The US Influence on the

International Law against Maritime Terrorism,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy



The author reflects on ‘whose security’ is being increased by the recent expansion of international,

Australian and New Zealand law on maritime security. In particular, Scott assesses the extent to which

recent developments in international law respond to the threat of maritime terrorism has been steered by

the US and the implications this has for Australia and NZ (Scott 2010, 77).

The preservation of freedom of the seas, a top US national priority, is one of the three broad principles

that supported the 2005 US National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS).234

The author adds that the

US influence on the international law of maritime security means that international law will emphasize

issues that are of US priority and that the gaps in the US legal framework will be broadly reflected as well

(Scott 2010, 91). The author concludes that there is a close fit between the maritime security interests of

the US and Australasia, since any attack on the US would likely have a huge impact on the global and

national economies (Scott 2010, 93). It was concluded that it is appropriate that both Australian and New

Zealand officials contribute to international US-sponsored initiatives to create a more secure maritime

environment.

8.2 Canada

Aikins, Greg. “Network-Centric Operations and Interdepartmental Marine Security,” Canadian Naval

Review, 1(3), Fall 2005:44:20-23, [accessed 2013-06-26] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-

content/uploads/public/vol1num3/vol1num3art5.pdf.

The author explores how the explosion of new information technology has forced changes to the tools of

conflict “but also to the methodologies used to employ them, and even the environment in which they are

employed.”235

The author introduces terms, such as ‘Net-Centric Warfare’ (NCW), Network-Centric

Operations (NCO) and Network-Enabled Operations to describe key aspects of this information evolution

(Aikins 2005, 20).

Aikins notes that the concept of network-centric operations was developed from commercial applications

of modern communications technology. These have provided a competitive edge to those who embraced

its capability, such as replacement of inventory with information (Aikins 2005, 20). The author adds that

NCO is about leveraging information from a collaborative intelligence/operations environment so that all

participants have a common perception of the situation. By creating a seamless and collaborative

intelligence and decision-making environment, reconfiguring command and control elements into smaller

but just as effective units could be contemplated (Aikins 2005, 21).

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol1num3/vol1num3art5.pdf



The author notes that the Marine Security Information Management and Data Exchange system

(MIMDEX) project that was approved by the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group

(IMSWG) is the most ambitious Canadian interagency information system initiative since 9/11 (Aikins

2005, 22). He adds that “unfortunately the pace of progress has been glacial in the face of legal and

bureaucratic stumbling blocks.”236

He notes that the Auditor General commented that, “The importance of

intelligence in the fight against terrorism cannot be overstated. Coordinating the efforts of the agencies

involved is acknowledged as critical to their overall effectiveness.”237

This led to the Senate

recommendation to fast-track the MIMDEX system.

According to the author, the key to success of a net-centric approach to security is shifting the paradigm

from ‘need to know’ to ‘need to share’ (Aikins 2005, 23). The latter approach requires a shift in the

traditional approach to intelligence to ensure maximum participation and derived benefit. In his view,

“MIMDEX holds out the promise that Canada will evolve from a reactionary approach to the

asymmetrical threat to an aggressive proactive stance that places public safety as a single goal for a single

team formed of players from various backgrounds and organizations.”238

Avis, Peter. “Best Practices for Canadian Maritime Security – A Comparison of Three National

Approaches,” Canadian Military Journal,Winter 2006-2007:33-39, [accessed 2013-06-12] from:

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/doc/notice-avis-eng.pdf.

The author compares different national approaches to maritime security to identify a methodology to

determine best practices for consideration by the Canadian government (Avis 2006-2007, 33). The author

asserts that “these best practices help us to understand what choices are available to various western

democracies in the new battlespace.” He concludes that “by using the four key government security

activities – collaboration, [maritime] domain awareness, safeguarding and responsiveness, the maritime

environment can be strategically organized” (Avis 2006-2007, 39).

Department of National Defence Canada. Evaluation of the NATO Contribution Program, 1258-184

(Chief Review Services), March 2011:113, [accessed 2013-06-12] from: http://www.crs-

csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/pdf/2011/P0924-eng.pdf.

The report evaluates the NATO Contribution Program that covers 17 separate programs and activities.

The NATO Military Budget and NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) are two core programs with

compulsory participation for all NATO member nations (DND 2011, vi). The report notes that

participation in 15 non-core programs and activities is optional. During the evaluation period of Fiscal

Year (FY) 2005/06 to FY 2009/10, the Department of National Defence (DND) contributions totalled

CAD 836 million through the NATO Contribution Program (DND 2011, vi).

The report notes that the Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC) was established using a Memorandum of

Understanding (MOU) among NATO members to provide timely, all-source, comprehensive and

effective network-enabled operational and strategic intelligence for NATO (DND 2011, 49). “The IFC is

part of the NATO force structure and has been granted international status as a NATO international

military organization.”239

Although the IFC is permanently assigned to NATO and supports NATO

Command Arrangements, it is not part of the NATO command structure. The IFC is co-located with the

US European Command (USEUCOM) Joint Analysis Centre (JAC) at RAF Molesworth, UK, to benefit

from existing infrastructure and logistics support.

The report stresses that Canada benefits from participation in the IFC “by acquiring enhanced situational

awareness and intelligence concerning NATO operations, access to national intelligence from NATO

member nations, an opportunity to oversee intelligence production to benefit Canadian Forces (CF)

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo7/no4/doc/notice-avis-eng.pdf

http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-rapports/pdf/2011/P0924-eng.pdf



contributions to NATO operations, participation in the feedback loop to improve the product, and value-

added exchanges with Americans who are co-located at the base.”240

Government of Canada. Marine Security Operations Centre (East) Awareness Brief, Marine Security

Operations Centres Project, PowerPoint, July 2013:42.

The presentation provides an overview of the Marine Security Operations Centre’s (MSOC) strengths and

challenges given its current framework.

Haydon, Peter and Middlemiss, Dan. “A Conversation with Rear-Admiral Dan McNeil,” Canadian Naval

Review, 1(2), Summer 2005:44:15-21, [accessed 2013-06-26] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-

content/uploads/public/vol1num2/vol1num2.pdf.

The authors interviewed Rear-Admiral Dan McNeil, Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic, who

discussed his role and options for enhancing Canada’s marine security (Haydon and Middlemiss 2005,

15). Further to issuance of the new defence policy statement, McNeil noted that his agreement with the

acknowledgement that “the Canadian Forces are responsible for surveillance and that Canada is an

operational theatre.”241

The Rear-Admiral added that this allows for the CF “to reach out and work with

not just marine security but security in its wider dimension throughout Atlantic Canada.”242

The Rear-Admiral referred to the Marine Security Operations Centre, which is an incremental

improvement to the operations centre that was there.243

He added that the Chief of Defence Staff had

asked MARLANT (Maritime Forces Atlantic) to integrate and unify operations by ‘making plans’ and

‘exercising plans’ along the lines of the DND security policy. McNeil postulated that the MSOC would

“become a new headquarters that would also be the headquarters of the Joint Task Force Atlantic, in

cooperation with all those other government departments and agencies that have a security dimension.”244

Moreover, he referred to the need for a cultural change from the traditional parts of the military into the

security structure that includes everything from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) to the

RCMP to the Border Services Agency. He added that the importance of working together in partnership

in response to maritime security and other types of threats (Haydon and Middlemiss 2005, 18).

Kinney, Laureen. “Canada’s Marine Security,” Canadian Naval Review, 4(4), Winter 2009:44:15-19,

[accessed 2013-06-26] from:

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol4num4/vol4num4art4.pdf.

The author defines national security as “security of a state as a whole from all threats arising from land,

sea or air,”245

noting that marine security as a subset, seeks to respond to potential threats arising from the

marine environment (Kinney 2009, 15). Since 9/11, marine security has evolved in Canada, a country

with major maritime interests and about 200,000 kilometers of coastline. An extensive framework and

processes have been established to heighten the security of Canada’s marine transportation system, which

has led to marine security initiatives domestically and internationally.

The author identifies three types of threat scenarios predominate in assessing the marine environment.

“First, the system (e.g., people, vessels, port facilities) is a potential terrorist target in its own right.

Second, the system can serve as a conduit for an attack (e.g., delivery of perpetrators, or a weapon of

mass destruction to a target either in Canada or against our allies such as the United States). Third,

elements of the system could serve as a weapon targeted against people or facilities (e.g., a vessel could

be used to attack targets).”246

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol1num2/vol1num2.pdf




The author notes that two of the MSOCs were established on the east and west coasts and a third was

being established for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway (Kinney 2009, 18). Kinney states that

their primary purpose is “to produce coordinated information and intelligence to support marine security

activities for national security, law enforcement and marine response operations generally.”247

Key

MSOC partners include the IMSWG and those that provide asset support and maritime expertise, such as

DND, RCMP, CBSA, CCG, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and Transport Canada (TC).

Canada is seeking to coordinate its MSOC activities with the US Coast Guard (USCG) Operations

Centres to heighten North American marine security cooperation (Kinney 2009, 18).

Macneil, Ernie, Lieutenant Commander. “NORAD and Maritime Domain Awareness,” NMIO Technical

Bulletin: National Maritime Intelligence-Information Office, Volume 2, April 2012:16:6-7, [accessed

2013-07-03] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL2.pdf.

Since 2006, the Canada-United States North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) has also

been tasked with warning Canada and the US of threats from the maritime environment (Macneil 2012,

6). NORAD’s Maritime Warning is intended to facilitate a response that could be unilateral, bi-lateral or

bi-national depending on the national intent. NORAD has also become increasingly involved in North

American maritime domain awareness (MDA) which includes involvement with both nation’s

government maritime and security agencies, expansion into the maritime advisory realm, and a closer

watch on Arctic maritime developments.

NORAD’s maritime area of operations is global. Potential maritime threats that NORAD may encounter

include state and non-state sponsored threats, such as weapon proliferation, illegal immigration linked to

terrorism, threats to the global maritime supply chain, and threats to critical maritime infrastructure

(Macneil 2012, 6). One of NORAD’s tasks is to warn of maritime threats at sea, in port or within internal

waterways by providing a timely warning to facilitate a threat response by the appropriate agencies of the

two countries. The author notes that maritime surveillance and control are not part of the NORAD

maritime operations and will continue to be executed by national commands and, as appropriate,

coordinated bilaterally between the two countries.

National Defence and the Canadian Forces Mobile Version. “Canada Awarded Full Member Status in the

Western Pacific Naval Symposium,” News Room Items, October 26, 2010:1, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3628.

An announcement on Canada’s full member status in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium is

highlighted.

Peer, David (ed.). Closing the Gap: Enhance Maritime Security Cooperation and Awareness, Maritime

Security Occasional Paper No. 16, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS,

2012:94, [accessed 2013-07-26] from:

http://maritimesecurityconference.org/read_ahead/Closing%20the%20Gap.pdf.

The author presents an analysis of the white paper, “A Framework for Enhanced International Maritime

Security Cooperation and Awareness,” based on the proceedings of the Dalhousie Maritime Security

conference (Peer 2012, 3). The Combined Joint Operations from the Sea (CJOS) White Paper in Chapter

1 proposes a cooperative framework to avoid the traditional limits related to state jurisdiction and enable

action on the high seas by non-flag state actors (CJOS 2012, 31-32). The Maritime Security Workshop

proceedings in Chapter 2 examines the best practices of regional and whole-of-government approaches to

maritime security to identify options to inform the debate of global issues (Peer 2012, 55-82). Finally,

Chapter 3 gives an analysis of the white paper based on areas of agreement. Although there was

consensus that there is a role for an international body to set standards to improve cooperation among

http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL2.pdf

http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/mobil/news-nouvelles-eng.asp?id=3628

http://maritimesecurityconference.org/read_ahead/Closing%20the%20Gap.pdf


states in maritime security, the choice of IMO as the preferred body was questioned (Middlemiss 2012,

89-90).

Public Safety Canada. National Information Exchange Model (NIEM), last updated (2013-08-07),

[accessed 2013-08-15] from: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/niem/index-eng.aspx

The webpage outlines the National Information Exchange Model (NIEM) being developed and used in

Canada.

Public Safety Canada. Ad Hoc DG Meeting: Future of the MSOCs Program, April 4, 2012:17.

The presentation reviews the Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOCs) partners’ mandates, MSOC’s

status and looks at possible next steps.

Smith, Alex. The Accountability of Deputy Ministers Before Parliament, Parliamentary Information and

Research Service, Library of Parliament, PRB 05-48E, February 2, 2006:8, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0548-e.pdf.

The author seeks to clarify the debate surrounding the accountability of deputy ministers before

parliamentary committees. The author presents the traditional understanding of ministerial and deputy

ministerial accountability as presented by the Privy Council Office (Smith 2006, 1). The author reviews a

number of changes that have taken place over the past 30 years, including the UK accounting officer

position (Smith 2006, 5). The author also looks at possible changes to the Deputy Minister position

(Smith 2006, 6-7), and concludes by looking at possible future developments (Smith 2006, 7-8).

Supreme Court of Canada. Privacy Act (Canada) (Re) 2001 SCC 89, [2001] 3 SCR 905, [accessed 2013-

08-15] from: http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2001/2001scc89/2001scc89.html

The decision outlines the SCC ruling on the matter of consistent use of department collected information.

8.3 European Union

Archick, Kristin, Coordinator; Ek, Carl, Gallis, Paul, Miko, Francis T., and Woehrel, Steven. European

Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, US Congressional Research Service Report for

Congress, RL33573, July 24, 2006:47, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf.

The authors examine the homeland security and counterterrorist measures in six European countries:

Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom (Archick et al. 2006, 1). None of these

European countries have developed a single entity equivalent to the US Department of Homeland

Security (DHS). Aspects of homeland security and counterterrorism are parts of the mandate of a number

of departments and agencies rather than the overarching approach taken by the US. In the UK, Germany

and Belgium, responsibility for homeland security is split among federal, regional or state governments

(Archick et al. 2006, 1). The authors note the European countries are struggling to find an appropriate

balance between measures to improve security and respect civil liberties (Archick et al. 2006, 2).

Beckh, Joachim. “Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) Networking in the European Union,” European

Security and Defence, 2011:67-69, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:

https://beckh.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/maritime-surveillance-marsur-networking-in-the-european-

union/.

http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/bt/niem/index-eng.aspx

http://www.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/researchpublications/prb0548-e.pdf

http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/2001/2001scc89/2001scc89.html

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf

https://beckh.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/maritime-surveillance-marsur-networking-in-the-european-union/



According to the author, the European Union (EU) merchant vessel fleet represents the world’s largest

fleet transporting about 90% of the EU’s external, and over 40% of its domestic, trade (Beckh 2011, 67).

Although the Mediterranean Sea represents only 1% of all ocean area, the author notes that it carries 16%

of all commercial maritime traffic, and 25% of all transported goods. Given the dynamics in the current

environment, the author observes that the European Commission (Commission) proposed an Integrated

Maritime Policy to enable ‘the responsible decision makers to combine their expertise and resources’

(Beckh 2011, 67). The Cooperation in Networks is an approach defined as Network Enabled Capability

(NEC), NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC); the European Network Enabled Capability

(EURONEC) or also as the Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) (Beckh 2011, 68). The

author notes that the aim is “People exchanging information based on mutual interests and trust.”248

Launched in 2006, MARSUR creates a network using existing naval and maritime information systems to

avoid duplication of efforts and the use of already available technologies, data and information to enhance

cooperation in a simple, efficient and low cost solution for civil-military cooperation (refer to Table 1 of

Appendix 3). Fifteen Member States in the European Defence Agency (EDA) created a basic MARSUR-

network for the maritime systems of Finland, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Sweden. The network

enhances data and information exchange for the conduct of maritime operations under the EU Common

Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), a major element of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

MARSUR uses existing resources by having EU Member State naval headquarters link their national

systems to the dedicated ‘MEXS’ (MARSUR Exchange System) interface, which ensures secure interface

over the Internet. The MARSUR project was implemented for €930,000.

Belgian Standing Committee (ed.). Fusion Centres Throughout Europe: All Source Threat Assessments in

the Fight Against Terrorism, Belgium Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, Intersentia,

Brussels, 2010:220.

After a number of terrorist events, the 9/11 attacks in the US, the 2004 attacks in Madrid and the 2005

London bombings, the editor noted the need for countries to: improve their strategic analysis of the

terrorist threat; boost their operational coordination among the relevant security agencies, such as

customs, intelligence, police, security services; and to provide a more comprehensive policy response

(BSC 2010, xxi). The editor added that a large number of countries have undertaken programs to collect

and analyze relevant information in the fight against terrorism, and to produce integrated threat

assessments.

This review sought to identify European counterparts of the Belgian Fusion Centre. The review was

limited to the 27 European Member States, plus the Joint Situation Centre of the EU. The editor noted

their choice of allowing the bodies or services that have been mandated with producing ‘integrated ad hoc

or strategic analyses about terrorism’ within each Member State. In addition to the EU Joint Situation

Centre, 19 EU Member States responded, which gave more insight into the way each Member State

interpreted the EU recommendation since the competence for “national security remains the sole

responsibility of each Member State.”249

Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards

the integration of maritime surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU

maritime domain, COM (2009), Brussels, 15.10.2009:12, [accessed 2013-07-04] from: http://eur-

lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0538:FIN:EN:PDF.

The report sets out the guiding principles for the development of a common information sharing

environment (CISE) for the EU maritime domain (Commission 2009, 3). The report outlines the process

and approach for its establishment pending support by its Member States.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0538:FIN:EN:PDF



Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the

Regions: An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM (2007), Brussels, 10.10.2007:16,

[accessed 2013-07-04] from: http://eur-


The report describes the Commission’s integrated approach to maritime governance. Its integrated

governance framework consists of: maritime surveillance, which is critical for the safe and secure use of

the marine commons; maritime spatial planning, which is used for sustainable decision-making; and a

comprehensive and accessible source of data (Commission 2007, 5). The report also outlines action areas

for the application of its policy including maximising the sustainable use of the oceans and seas, building

a knowledge and innovation base for the maritime policy, delivering the highest quality of life in coastal

regions, promoting Europe’s leadership in international maritime affairs, and raising the visibility of

maritime Europe (Commission 2007, 7-15).

Council of the European Union. Council and the European Parliament reach a provisional agreement on

the EUROSUR system, Press Release, Brussels, 14 June 2013:2, [accessed 2013-07-22] from:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137471.pdf.

The Council of the European Union issued a press release announcing that it reached a provisional

agreement on the EUROSUR system, by endorsing the regulation. The regulation will enter into force

from December 2, 2013 for the southern and eastern Member States and to the remaining Member States

from December 1, 2014.

Council of the European Union. Council conclusions on the Integrated Maritime Policy, General Affairs

Council Meeting Luxembourg, 24 June 2013:5, [accessed 2013-07-29] from:

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/agricult/137604.pdf.

The Council of the European Union supplied a press release announcing that their conclusions on the

Integrated Maritime Policy, and the launch of its various components such as the CISE.

European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council:

Establishing the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM (2011) 873 Final,

Brussels,12.12.2011:43, [accessed 2013-07-04] from: http://eur-


The legislative proposal is “to improve the situational awareness and reaction capability of Member States

and the Agency when preventing irregular migration and cross-border crime at the external land and

maritime borders (Article 1).”250

The regulation prescribes the establishment of a common framework

(Article 4) with the assignment of clear authorities and responsibilities to each national coordination

centre for border surveillance in the Member States (Article 5) and the Agency (Article 6). This involves

both the land and maritime agencies. Each centre is required to provide both effective and efficient

management of resources and personnel at the national level, and the Agency shall communicate with

each other using the communication network to exchange both unclassified and classified

communications (EC 2011, 2).

The proposal further stipulates that all maritime traffic data are to be provided by the SafeSeaNet system

under Directives 2002/59/EC. The relevant information in SafeSeaNet will also be made available for

other purposes besides maritime safety, maritime security and marine environment protection and become

part of the surveillance tools in the Eurosur framework (EC 2011, 2).



http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137471.pdf

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/agricult/137604.pdf




European Commission. Eurostat: Statistics in focus, 47/2009:12:1, [accessed 2013-07-04] from:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5281405/KS-SF-09-047-EN.PDF/121dae7c-a53c-464a-

baca-a314e652f4e7.

The report identifies the key figures for EU coastal regions and sea areas. These coastal regions are

defined as standard statistical regions, which have at least half of their population within 50 km of the

coast. The coastal data include six main sea basins which border EU territory. All data are used to develop

the EU Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP).

European Commission Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Integrating Maritime Surveillance,

Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Draft Roadmap

towards establishing the Common Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the EU

maritime domain, COM(2010) 584 final, 2010:24, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:

http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/documents/integrating_mariti

me_surveillance_en.pdf.

The European Commission’s (Commission) Europe’s 2020 Strategy requires Member States to act

together to improve the exchange of maritime surveillance data. The CISE for the surveillance of the EU

maritime domain allows for increased information exchange between maritime authorities, which may

lead to improved and more cost-effective maritime surveillance. The added value of integrating maritime

surveillance presents sectoral maritime awareness to the EU User Communities of EU Member States and

European Economic Area (EEA) States.251

Refer to Table 2 in Appendix 4 for a detailed listing of the

participants of the CISE User Communities.

European Defence Agency. Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR), Fact sheet, October 10, 2012: 2, [accessed

2013-06-04] from: http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/eda-factsheets/marsur-factsheet-

v2_09102012_cs5_bleu.

A brief overview of the Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) Network is provided.

European Organisation for Security. EOS Recommendations for an Integrated Surveillance of the EU

Maritime Domain, June 2012:72, [accessed 2013-06-25] from:

https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10316215/eos-recommendations-for-an-integrated-

surveillance-of-the-eu-.

The European Organisation for Security (EOS)252

White Paper’s main focus is the current EUROSUR and

CISE initiatives and how they could fit into a more comprehensive approach on Integrated Maritime

Surveillance (IMS) (EOS 2012, 6). Given the myriad of initiatives and multiple actors involved in the

EU’s external maritime borders, the EOS stresses the need for a “more comprehensive and harmonized

European approach [that] would be more effective, ensuring that available resources are spent with higher

efficiency and that policies and activities are more strongly correlated and better coordinated.”253

The

EOS recommends that the EU and its Member States should put in place an IMS approach that would

consider improved coordination and wider implementation of EUROSUR, implement the CISE platform,

and create an ‘Internet of the SEA’, with services and applications leveraging on the CISE and enlarging

the latter’s functionality (EOS 2012, 7). Figure 2 in Appendix 5 shows the link between the CISE in the

IMS and the EUROSUR of the EU Border Surveillance.

European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Regulation (EU) No. 1255/2011 of the

European Parliament and of the Council: establishing a Programme to support the further development of

an Integrated Maritime Policy,” Official Journal of the European Union, 30 November 2011:10,

[accessed 2013-07-29] from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011R1255.

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5281405/KS-SF-09-047-EN.PDF/121dae7c-a53c-464a-baca-a314e652f4e7


http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/documents/integrating_maritime_surveillance_en.pdf


http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/eda-factsheets/marsur-factsheet-v2_09102012_cs5_bleu


https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10316215/eos-recommendations-for-an-integrated-surveillance-of-the-eu-


http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011R1255


The Official Journal lists the regulation that establishes the programme to support the Integrated Maritime

Policy (IMP) and outlines the key governance requirements.

European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights at Europe’s Southern Sea

Borders, 2013:160, [accessed 2013-07-26] from: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fundamental-

rights-europes-southern-sea-borders-jul-13_en.pdf.

The report describes the human rights issues related to the irregular migration attempting to reach

Europe, and maritime border surveillance and disembarkation procedures, as well as EU policy, training

and Frontex coordinated operations (FRA 2013, 7). Chapters 1 to 5 review the fundamental rights

challenges that emerge with maritime border surveillance. The report analyses the practical obligations

that border management authorities have to safeguard, such as the right to life, and the need to treat

persons rescued or intercepted at sea in a dignified manner. It also reviews maritime surveillance systems

looking at potential interference with privacy rights (FRA 2013, 7).

Chapters 6-8 review procedures at the points of embarkation in the southern EU Member States affected

by sea arrivals. The report describes the humanitarian response and law enforcement actions that

immediately follow upon arrival. Chapter 9 reviews general issues related to fundamental rights training

and Chapter 10 describes EU solidarity measures, specifically EU funding and Frontex-coordinated

operations (FRA 2013, 7).

This report reviews the treatment of third-country nationals (irregular migrants) at the EU’s external

borders. The research reviews domestic, EU and international legal and policy frameworks that have been

complemented by primary data collection in five EU Member States (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta and

Spain).

European Union Legislation. Summaries of EU legislation: Military Staff of the European Union

(EUMS), Council Decision of 22 January 2001, Brussels, Belgium, 2001:3, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r000

06_en.htm#

The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is made up of military experts seconded from Member States to the

Council Secretariat and is the source of the EU’s military expertise. The EUMS provides an early warning

capability. It plans, assesses and makes recommendations regarding the concept of crisis management and

general military strategy.

Fantoni, Paolo, Captain. “Italian Navy’s Approach to an Integrated Interagency Maritime Surveillance,”

NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 4, Fall 2012:15:3-

5, [accessed 2013-06-25] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL4.pdf.

According to the author, serious security threats such as terrorism, piracy, and illegal immigration,

smuggling of weapons, drugs and human beings at sea have pressured all navies ‘to develop more robust

surveillance at sea capabilities.’ The author reviews the efforts made by the Italian Navy (Fantoni 2012,

3).

“In the Italian National dimension, Maritime Surveillance is achieved through a composite approach:

Exploitation of available merchant traffic data on the cooperation networks (such as Virtual-

Regional Maritime Traffic Centre [VRMTC] –TRMN [Trans-Regional Maritime Network])

Correlation of the internal data clusters with those available by other administrations and agencies

from systems like the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), the Long Range Identification and

http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fundamental-rights-europes-southern-sea-borders-jul-13_en.pdf


http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/foreign_and_security_policy/cfsp_and_esdp_implementation/r00006_en.htm




Tracking (LRIT) of the Coast Guard, the immigration control systems of the Italian Internal

Affairs Ministry, and satellite systems such as the COSMO-SkyMed

Radar surveillance

Data fusion with intelligence.”254

The Maritime Surveillance picture is updated 24/7 on a global scale. The author states that the Italian

Navy surveillance centre consists of three interconnected ‘building blocks,’ where each has a different

governance structure.

The Navy Surveillance Centre is the first block, which brings together all necessary data for

assessment of a situation with inputs from the Coastal Radar Network System and AIS.

The VRMTC, the second block of Italian Navy integrated maritime surveillance, enables the

exchange of key information on the merchant traffic in the Mediterranean and Black Seas by

more than 30 member countries.

The third building block is the System for Integrated Interagency Maritime Surveillance (SIIMS)

in the National Maritime Surveillance Centre (NMSC), which, through an interagency approach,

provides all administrations with a practical response to information requirements. SIIMS is

based on a net-centric structure aimed at collecting, fusing, and analyzing data from multiple

sources to build and share a common and comprehensive operational picture.

Feldt, Lutz, Roell, Peter, and Thiele, Ralph D. “Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive

Approach,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, No. 222, April

2013:25.

The authors focus on piracy, armed robbery and maritime terrorism in their study. The report begins with

principle interpretations on maritime security and the threat situation. The authors review the operational

requirements and maritime collaboration featuring Maritime Domain Awareness. In their conclusion, the

authors make recommendations for decision makers relating to a comprehensive approach to Maritime

Domain Security and Situational Awareness Systems (Feldt et al 2013, 21-23).

Some of the proposed recommendations include the following.

“Take a new look at the Maritime Laws governing the use of force on the high seas and within

the territorial coastal areas. These laws need to be taken into the 21st century and adopted to the

threats of today.

The Rules of Engagement of naval units tasked with protecting the trade routes need to be

coordinated and agreed on. Furthermore, a close look needs to be taken at the kind of naval

vessels, which might be required to combat piracy more cost effectively.

Shipping companies need to conform to the basic security requirements when operating in danger

areas and should at all times comply with due care for their crew and cargo. They will need to

invest in superior passive defense measures and adopt active measures, if required.”255

FRONTEX. Annual Risk Analysis 2013, European Agency for the Management of Operational

Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Warsaw, Poland, April

2013:80, [accessed 2013-05-31] from:

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf.

FRONTEX promotes, coordinates and develops European border management (Integrated Border

Management – IBM) in ways consistent with the EU fundamental rights charter. The agency was set up

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf


to reinforce and streamline cooperation between national border authorities.256

The authors identify that

the FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis (ARA) report, based on the monthly exchange of statistics between

Member States, concentrates on Frontex operational activities. These focus on irregular migration at the

external borders of the EU and the Schengen Associated Countries. The authors state that this monthly

data exchange is central to the concept of IBM, which should also cover security threats present at the

external borders (FRONTEX 2013, 8).

Masala, Carlo (Prof. Dr.) and Tsetsos, Konstantinos (M.A.). “The Maritime Dimension of the European

Union’s and Germany’s Security and Defence Policy in the 21st Century,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus

on Defense and International Security, Issue no. 229, May 2013:44, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=164132.

The authors focus on the EU’s and Germany’s maritime security environment by looking at the current

situation, as well as the future European Maritime Security Strategy (EMSS). In Germany, the Maritime

Safety and Security Centre (MSSC) responds to new security threats and serves as a coordination

platform for all responsible agencies involved in maritime security, where the Maritime Emergency

Reporting and Assessment Centre (MERAC) in Cuxhaven serves as the core communication centre. The

optimized network allows participating agencies to work closely together. The MERAC includes the

German Federal Police, the Central Command for Maritime Emergencies (CCME), the Federal Office for

Food and Agriculture, the Customs Office, the Water Police, the Federal Waterways and Shipping

Administration and the German Navy (within their mandate). The maritime security centre aims for more

effective cooperation of the participating agencies during deployment and to act as liaison with the

responsible agencies.

The Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (VRMTC) is a virtual network connecting the operational

centres of all navies involved in this initiative. Promoted by the Italian navy, and with the collaboration of

17 countries, it created a regional monitoring system for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Since

September 2006, the authors observe that the VRMTC has achieved a technical standard that permits

efficient operation using inexpensive hardware and software. In October 2006, during the 6th Seapower

Symposium, 17 countries signed on to the Operational Arrangement (OA), which covers the

Mediterranean Sea, including the Atlantic approaches, the Black Sea and the Northern Red Sea. These

include Portugal, Spain, France, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Italy, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus,

Malta, Jordan, Israel, Romania, the UK and the US, is also known as the ‘Wider Mediterranean

Community’ (WMC). Within two years, the WMC includes 23 members, with the progressive addition of

the navies of Germany, Bulgaria, Belgium, Georgia, the Netherlands and Senegal. The OA does not allow

for data exchange between the WMC and its Parent Fusion Centres.

Any future EMSS must work within the strategic framework of the 2003 ESS, and complement its

maritime goals (Masala and Tsetsos 2013, 28). Consequently, the strategic goals of an EMSS must be

compatible, flexible, and sustainable to meet the challenges of the 21st Century and provide maritime

security. Figure 3 in Appendix 6 outlines the international initiatives of maritime security.

Persson, Gudrun. Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS),

Swedish National Defence College, 2013:40, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/2013/Fusion%20Centre

s%20-%20Lessons%20Learned_ENG.pdf.

The author described and analyzed through a comparative study different countries’ experiences of fusion

centres (Persson 2013, 8). The analysis was used to identify ‘lessons learned’ from the establishment of

fusion centres were designed to collect information and intelligence from diverse sources to understand

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?id=164132

http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/2013/Fusion%20Centres%20-%20Lessons%20Learned_ENG.pdf



and anticipate potential threats (Persson 2013, 8). The author’s focus was national counterterrorism

centres and their effectiveness, while looking at the work towards the future (Persson 2013, 17-20).

Staff, Pasi Commander. “European Maritime Surveillance Networking – MARSUR,” NMIO Technical

Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April 2012:16:3-5, [accessed

2013-05-31] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL2.pdf.

The author describes the basis of the European-wide MARSUR (European Surveillance Networking) is

based on the best practices and lessons learned from SUCFIS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Finland

Sweden) and SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea), examples of regional cooperation. He

notes that MARSUR, the first effort to integrate sea surveillance at the European level, is a key

contributor of, and plays a role in maritime surveillance activities by the 15 Member States participating

in the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as in the security of the EU (Staff

2012, 4), as shown in Figure 4 of Appendix 7.

The MARSUR technology allows cooperation between all maritime-related agencies involved in the

initiative. The author observes that MARSUR networking is based on connecting each participating

Member State’s national maritime surveillance system using existing sensors so that the manual sharing

of information remains possible. This led to “a systems-of-systems solution through a type of proxy with

a sharing of the contact details of each participating Member State.”257

The author adds there are two ways to interconnect integrated systems for information exchange. “One

would be to develop a new independent system, and the other one to develop a federated type of solution

for existing systems.”258

MARSUR uses existing infrastructure through a ‘systems-of-systems’ solution,

reducing the barriers of entry for each participating Member State.259

As Europe develops new systems

and networks for improved maritime security and interoperability, the most challenging interface remains

the human interface. The author concludes that ‘shared knowledge equals results’ (Staff 2012, 5).

Thiele, Ralph D. “Building Maritime Security Situational Awareness,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on

Defense and International Security, Issue no. 182, April 2012:10, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:


The author states that the maritime domain is the global commons – international oceans that do not fall

under the jurisdiction of any nation. Thiele observes that the maritime security development presents the

international community with three principal challenges. These include lawlessness due to erosion of

trade and trust among nations, competition where the naval shipbuilding programs in Asia aim to acquire

the capacity to patrol and protect the sea lines of communications, and the key impact of climate change

that is the opening up the Arctic seaways (Thiele 2012, 4).

According to the author, the purpose of the MDA is to generate actionable knowledge for the maritime

domain (i.e., the collection, fusion and dissemination of intelligence and information drawn from armed

forces, government agencies, international coalition partners and forces, and commercial entities). MDA

consists of three key components: data, information and knowledge, which are integrated to create a

layered presentation of the global maritime environment. The author asserts that the key is the timely

‘fusing’ of maritime information, which comes from many sources of information, ranging from the open

source Automatic Identification System (AIS)260

and, commercially available databases such as Lloyds, to

comprehensive intelligence-fused pictures, representing national, and coalition interests.

He adds that many governmental, military and business organizations already contribute valuable inputs

into shared situational awareness. He stresses that no one source captures all of the maritime information

needed or currently available. The author concludes that the information exchange between government




agencies and with private industry, particularly sharing common databases, is the real power behind

maritime domain awareness centres.

Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre. Annual Report 2008: Wider Mediterranean Community,

2008:37, [accessed 2013-06-11] from:

http://www.marina.difesa.it/attivita/coopint/vrmtc/wider/Documents/V-

RMTC_WMC_ANNUAL_REPORT_2008.pdf.

The Annual Report maintains that the main features of the VRMTC are its flexibility, cost-effectiveness

and transparency. The VRMTC model flexibility permits each member to decide its level of participation

and amount of data disclosure (VRMTC 2008, 7). The VRMTC model transparency allows for

“egalitarian shareholding structures” and data distribution based on the will-to-share principle (VRMTC

2008, 9). Its cost-effectiveness offers a combination of low development and implementation costs and

effective savings by optimizing use of patrol assets (VRMTC 2008, 11).

The 2008 report stated that the trans-regional experiments confirmed an opportunity to pursue VRMTC

external growth using a federative approach, (i.e., open systems with an open architecture) (VRMTC

2008, 1). In 2008, the VRMTC WMC contributed to a ‘forward surveillance’ by outlining new

perspectives of the system’s use. This was used to support maritime situation awareness within areas

covered by multiple cooperating naval assets. This also confirmed that the VRMTC’s contribution to the

common picture with WMC Navies operating in peripheral areas of the wider Mediterranean region

(VRMTC 2008, 14).

The VRMTC WMC undertook trans-regional data sharing with the Brazilian Navy’s SISTRAM and with

the Singaporean Navy whose system (OASIS) has good interoperability with the VRMTC model.

SISTRAM and VRMTC exchanged over 7,000 contacts during the last phase of the trials.

Interoperability with the Singaporean Navy also had good outcomes, with over 10,000 contacts were

exchanged between OASIS and VRMTC (VRMTC 2008, 17).

8.4 New Zealand

Davies, Richard. “New Zealand National Maritime Coordination Centre,” NMIO Technical Bulletin

(National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April 2012:16:8-9, [accessed 2013-07-

304] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL2.pdf.

The author describes New Zealand’s (NZ) maritime area of interest, which covers about 7 billion square

kilometres, and makes up one of the largest EEZs globally, covering an extended continental shelf as well

as areas of the Pacific Ocean. NZ’s area of operations extends “from Ross Ice Shelf in the Antarctica to

the tropics, just south of the Equator.”261

The NZ National Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC) has two main roles: it coordinates maritime

taskings and develops the NZ Maritime Picture. The NMCC operates independently from the NZ

Customs Service, works in partnership with a number of agencies including NZ Customs Service,

Ministry of Fisheries, Maritime New Zealand, NZ Police, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, NZ

Defence Force, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Conservation (Davies 2012,

8).

The author explains that the NMCC determines which areas of interest present the highest risk to NZ, and

allocates surveillance resources to those areas. Residual resources are allocated to areas of lower risk,

thereby allowing tasking of more than one agency. “Surveillance resources include four 55 metre Inshore

http://www.marina.difesa.it/attivita/coopint/vrmtc/wider/Documents/V-RMTC_WMC_ANNUAL_REPORT_2008.pdf

http://www.marina.difesa.it/attivita/coopint/vrmtc/wider/Documents/V-RMTC_WMC_ANNUAL_REPORT_2008.pdf



Patrol Vessels, two 83 metre Offshore Patrol Vessels, which are owned and operated by the Royal New

Zealand Navy (RNZN), and six P3K-2 Orion aircraft operated by the Royal New Zealand Air Force

(RNZAF).”262

Using the AIS, the NMCC produces the NZ Maritime Picture, which is sent to participating

agencies for analysis and action using the Multi-agency Network that also provides e-mail and file

sharing functions (Davies 2012, 9).

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Maritime Patrol Review, Wellington, NZ, February

2001:44, [accessed 2013-06-28] from:

http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/maritime_patrol_review.pdf.

The report looks at NZ’s civil and military requirements for patrolling its EEZ. In particular, it focuses on

two issues previously defined by Cabinet in August 2000 following its decision not to proceed with the

upgrade of the avionics for the RNZAF’s long-range maritime aircraft (DPMC 2001, 1). It reviews NZ’s

civilian requirements for maritime patrol and examines whether a military maritime patrol capability

should be maintained.

Following a review of related issues, the report concludes that there is a need for NZ to establish an

independent national Maritime Coordination Centre (MCC) that combines information management and

operational activities relating to the civil security of NZ’s maritime areas (DPMC 2001, 33).

“The MCC would be responsible for providing a centralised maritime patrol capability to meet all civil

interests, involving both surveillance and response, in the following geographic areas:

NZ’s oceanic areas, including littoral waters, the NZEEZ, the legal continental shelf extension,

and the NZ Search and Rescue Area;

those areas of the South Pacific over which we have constitutional responsibilities or other

arrangements;

the Ross Dependency, and that sector of the Southern Ocean; and

some ocean areas beyond those (in order to cover Customs and Police needs).”263

Despite not having its own patrol resources, the MCC would, through contracts and service level

agreements, be given primary and guaranteed call on designated maritime patrol assets operated by

the RNZAF, the RNZN, and contractors. It would also have indirect access to other Crown vessels

(DPMC 2001, 33).

The report identifies the expectation that the MCC would liaise directly with the proposed National

Maritime Search and Rescue Centre (NMSRC). Intelligence and information would be freely exchanged

between the two centres. The latter would provide a national 24/7 service with the amalgamation of

Marine Duty Officers, Maritime Operations Centre (MOC), NRCC and NZ Police (maritime SAR)

functions (DPMC 2001, 17).

Mossop, Joanna. “Maritime Security in New Zealand,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy



The author explores the challenges to maritime security for New Zealand. This includes a review of some

of the main historical and contemporary developments, as well as the international and domestic legal

framework. The author also discusses the governmental responses to maritime security concerns and

considers whether NZ is effectively implementing its security measures to allow it to respond to global,

regional and local maritime security threats (Mossop 2010, 68-74).

http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/maritime_patrol_review.pdf


New Zealand Government. Defence Act 1990, Public Act 1990, No.28, Wellington, NZ, Reprint as at

1 July 2013:98, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0028/latest/DLM204973.html.

Section 9 of the NZ Defence Act describes the terms and conditions where military aid to assist civil

power (MACP) can occur. Section 10 identifies the powers of requisition to make use of the military,

including the approval requirements.

New Zealand Search and Rescue. Rescue Coordination Centre, (no date):10, [accessed 2013-07-12] from:

http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Publications-and-forms/Maritime-NZ-corporate-publications/Rescue-

Coordination-Centre-New-Zealand-information-leaflet.pdf.

The Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ) is a Crown entity and part of Maritime New

Zealand. The RCCNZ is located alongside the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC), which provides the

radio service for NZ’s coastal waters and the South Pacific. The RCCNZ coordinates major maritime,

aviation and land-based search and rescue operations in NZ on a 24/7 basis. The RCCNZ responds to

about 800 SAR incidents annually and covers a 30 million square kilometre (approx.) SAR region

extending from the mid-Tasman Sea to halfway to Chile and from the South Pole almost to the Equator.

The SAR officers working for RCCNZ are trained to international aviation and maritime SAR standards

and have a wide range of experience in all forms of SAR.

Office of the Controller and Auditor General. “Effectiveness of Arrangements for Coordinating Civilian

Maritime Patrols,” Performance Audit Report, Wellington, NZ, April 2010:58, [accessed 2013-06-04]

from: http://www.oag.govt.nz/2010/maritime-patrols/docs/maritime-patrols.pdf.

The performance audit examined the effectiveness of the coordination of maritime patrols by the National

Maritime Coordination Centre (NMCC), which coordinates access to aircraft and ships on behalf of NZ

government agencies (OAG 2010, 3). The NMCC, hosted by the NZ Customs Service, operates as a

whole-of-government approach due to the role many government agencies have in maritime patrols, and

coordinates maritime information. The OAG focused on the NMCC, and included all government

agencies that use maritime patrols and those that provide patrol aircraft and ships.

The OAG found that “the NMCC’s effectiveness in coordinating maritime patrols was still evolving and

should improve as new systems and patrol resources are introduced.”264

Although the NMCC had an

appropriate framework in place to support effective coordination of maritime patrols, the OAG identified

some areas requiring attention if the NMCC is to have clear strategic direction, increase its whole-of-

government coordination role and make effective use of it patrol resources. Figure 5 of Appendix 8

outlines the roles of the NMCC, the NZDF and the other core agencies (OAG 2010, 14).

Rahman, Chris. “Maritime Domain Awareness in Australia and New Zealand,” Maritime Security:

International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop,

Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge, 2010:277:202-223.

The author assesses the MDA in Australia and New Zealand by examining the concept as conceived by

the US and developed since the events of 9/11. The author also describes the MDA technologies and

information sources being used or under development, with a focus on the ship automatic identification

system (AIS) and satellite-based long-range identification and tracking (LRIT) of vessels. Rahman then

looks at the MDA arrangements of Australia and New Zealand.

The author concludes that there is a need for MDA to be considered an important part of national security

for both Australia and New Zealand. Although neither state has the global interests and responsibilities of

http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1990/0028/latest/DLM204973.html

http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Publications-and-forms/Maritime-NZ-corporate-publications/Rescue-Coordination-Centre-New-Zealand-information-leaflet.pdf


http://www.oag.govt.nz/2010/maritime-patrols/docs/maritime-patrols.pdf


the US, the author notes that Australia has contributed, proportionately, far greater resources for MDA

than New Zealand. The considerable frustration in Australia over the lack of partner contributions,

particularly in regional MDA networking, dims the prospects for Trans-Tasman MDA cooperation

(Rahman 2010, 223).

State Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

Performance Improvement Framework Formal Review: New Zealand Customs Service (Customs),

October 2012: 55, [accessed 2013-07-08] from: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/pif-customs-review-

oct12.PDF.

The October 2012 report of the performance review of the New Zealand Customs Service is based on the

questions: “What is the contribution that New Zealand needs from the New Zealand Customs Service and,

therefore, what is the performance challenge?”265

The report reviews the following challenges: the joint

border management system (JBMS) project delivery; increased collaboration and engagement; capability

and capacity; leadership and performance management; policy; performance measurement; and revenue.

The report identifies a future state of the New Zealand Customs Service in four years based on resolution

of previously identified challenges while following the business strategy in its Strategic Outlook to 2017

(SSC 2012,10).

8.5 Singapore

Beckman, Robert. “Singapore Strives to Enhance Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection in Its

Port and in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, 14(2), 2008-

2009:167-200.

The author examines Singapore’s efforts to enhance maritime security and to prevent ship-source

pollution in its port and waters by adopting and implementing the international requirements established

in the conventions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) (Beckman 2008-2009, 170-176).

The author reviews Singapore’s measures undertaken to enhance security in its port and surrounding

waters (Beckman 2008-2009, 176-180). Beckman observes how Singapore has worked with Indonesia

and Malaysia to improve safety, security, and environmental protection in the Straits of Malacca and

Singapore.

After 9/11, the author notes that there were several initiatives undertaken to heighten maritime security

beyond that of the IMO. In September 2002, Singapore joined the US Container Security Initiative (CSI),

the first CSI port in Asia (Beckman 2008-2009, 185).266

To further improve interagency coordination in

Singapore, the author highlights the Singapore government establishment of the Maritime Command and

Control Centre (Changi C2 Centre) in March 2007 to deal with maritime terrorism (Beckman 2008-2009,

186). “The Changi C2 Centre will house the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC),267

an

Information Fusion Centre,268

and a Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre.269,270

In effect Changi

C2 Centre enables Singapore to heighten its national and international cooperation on maritime security.

The author also considers additional cooperative measures to improve maritime security and minimize the

threat of ship-source pollution in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Beckman 2008-2009, 187).

Singapore has cooperated with Indonesia and Malaysia to improve maritime security using patrols of the

Malacca Straits and an information sharing arrangement with Indonesia. Singapore’s cooperation with

these two countries includes adopting a system of coordinated patrols and agreeing to host the ReCAAP

Information Sharing Centre (ReCAAP ISC) (Beckman 2008-2009, 200).

http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/pif-customs-review-oct12.PDF



Foster, Caroline E. “Counter-Terrorism and the Security of Shipping in South East Asia,” Maritime

Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand, Klein, Natalie,

Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge, 2010:277:138-154.

The author focuses on anti-counterterrorism initiatives to assure the security of shipping in Southeast

Asia. In 2004, the US drew attention to the possibility of an attack on shipping on Singapore, the world’s

leading container port (Foster 2010, 139). This was discussed by the US Pacific Command’s

(USPACOM) Strategy for Regional Maritime Security and led to the US-initiated Regional Maritime

Security Initiative (RMSI). Foster stresses that regional initiatives were key while highlighting that the

IMO work has been of fundamental importance (Foster 2010, 139-140). The author also draws attention

to efforts expended in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and those under the

auspices of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). In the latter, there are two groups that

concentrate on maritime security developments and include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the

ASEAN Plus Three (Foster 2010, 140).

Following a review of each member state of the ASEAN Plus Three’s reliance on maritime security, the

author concludes that the greatest concern in relation to “maritime security in Southeast Asia remains the

possibility of a major terrorist attack in the Singapore or Malacca Straits.”271

The author adds that both

Australia and New Zealand regard their contributions in the vicinity of the Malacca Strait as their

‘primary toolkit’ for dealing with maritime security in the region (Foster 2010, 154).

Hansen, Stefan Lieutenant Commander. “National and International Sharing: A New Zealand

Perspective,” Pointer Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces Supplement, April 2011:50:20-32,


http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/supplements/IFC/_jcr_content/imindefPar

s/0006/file.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf.

The author reviews NZ’s maritime information sharing practices and the associated challenges. He notes

that NZ has adopted a whole-of-government (WOG) approach for its maritime domain awareness and

maritime security to maximize its resources. Achieving this practice involved developing the structures

and modalities for cooperation, which must be subject to regular revision. He adds that the Royal New

Zealand Navy (RNZN) is part of that WOG effort through the provision of patrol vessels. The RNZN also

contributes to the National Maritime Coordination Centre’s international role by providing an officer at

the Information Fusion Centre (IFC) in Singapore.

The author considers that the lessons learned are instructive for the collaborative effort at the IFC. The

author maintains that although the IFC is a multinational centre, it can take note of lessons learned as it

strives towards the goal as a regional node for information sharing for strengthened maritime security.

The IFC is a Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN) purpose-built multi-national facility based at the

Command and Control (C2) Centre at the Changi Naval Base, and is unique in Southeast Asia. Hansen

signals that the IFC is well-positioned to become a regional node for handling maritime challenges and

information sharing. The IFC uses the Regional Maritime Information Exchange (ReMIX) Internet portal

to facilitate information sharing between Western Pacific Naval Symposium countries (Hansen 2011, 29).

He, Ruijie. “Coast Guards and Maritime Piracy: Sailing Past the Impediments to Cooperation in Asia,”

The Pacific Review, 22(5) December 2009:667-689.

Maritime piracy remains of international concern in in the Asia-Pacific region. The author asserts that

countries need to cooperate actively at both the regional and international levels to effectively eradicate

the problem. According to the author, the countries that possess sovereignty over the pirate-infested

waters lack the necessary law enforcement resources and require assistance from the resource-rich extra-

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/supplements/IFC/_jcr_content/imindefPars/0006/file.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf



regional countries (He 2009, 667). Traditionally, cooperation between such disparate countries has been

impeded by sovereignty sensitivities, as exemplified by Malaysia’s and Indonesia’s hostile responses to

the US’ RMSI in 2003. Given the potential tensions that could arise from naval cooperation, the author

outlines how the national coast guard agencies were used as an alternative to get around the political

sensitivities of international security cooperation (He 2009, 677).

“These paramilitary organizations have a lower political profile than their naval big brothers, and are

particularly useful for operating in maritime waters that are either politically sensitive or the subject of

overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction. The coast guard thus becomes useful in the Malacca Straits,

since the 200 nm exclusive economic zones, as provisioned by the 1982 United Nations Convention on

Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), leads to overlapping maritime claims in the narrow waterway.”272

The author notes that in 2002, coast guards from 14 Asian nations agreed to create a network to exchange

piracy information on a daily basis. At the Japan-hosted inaugural meeting of Heads of Asian Coast

Guard Agencies in 2004, all coast guard agencies in attendance unanimously adopted Japan’s Asian

Maritime Security Initiative (JAMSI) program. Spearheaded by the Japanese Coast Guard (JCG), coast

guards from various countries have made available training expertise, conducted joint exercises, hosted

low-publicity multilateral meetings, and even transferred security equipment across international borders

(He 2009, 679-685). Table 3 in Appendix 9 shows a summary of joint exercises, operations and patrols

that have taken place in Asia over the past two decades.

Hribernik, Miha. Countering Maritime Piracy and Robbery in Southeast Asia: The Role of the ReCAAP

Agreement, Briefing Paper 2013/2, European Institute for Asian Studies, March 2013:15, [accessed 2013-

06-05] from:

http://www.academia.edu/2779234/Countering_Maritime_Piracy_and_Robbery_in_Southeast_Asia_The

_Role_of_the_ReCAAP_Agreement.

The author notes that the surge in maritime piracy and robbery in Southeast Asia followed in the wake of

the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. This led to the signing of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on

Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) by sixteen countries in 2004.

The author presents three rationale supporting ReCAAP’s role. First, ReCAAP is one of the cornerstones

of the counter-piracy efforts in Southeast Asia. It has managed to decrease the number of attacks in the

region since its peak in 2000. The economic crisis of 2009 increased the number of piracy incidents,

situation appears to have been successfully stabilized in 2012 (Hribernik 2013, 6-7). Second, the ASEAN

Member States of Malaysia and Indonesia are not ReCAAP contracting parties their accession would

increase ReCAAP’s efficiency (Hribernik 2013, 8-10). Third, ReCAAP presents an ideal opportunity to

the EU and its Member States to increase its influence in the ASEAN region by participating in the

ReCAAP activities (Hribernik 2013, 10-11).

Lim, Irvin Lieutenant Commander. “Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose

Time Has Come?” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces: Pointer, 33(3), October 2007:126:13-26,


http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n3/feature2.html.

The author introduces the concept of Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness (CMDA) as a

mechanism for a more ‘watertight’ international MDA architecture but recognizes the benefits and

challenges involved (Lim 2007, 16). He observes that the convergence of technological developments

with heightened interest in operationalizing global maritime information-sharing represents an

opportunity for achieving CMDA. Lim describes one such convergence effort that is being made in

http://www.academia.edu/2779234/Countering_Maritime_Piracy_and_Robbery_in_Southeast_Asia_The_Role_of_the_ReCAAP_Agreement


http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/publications/pointer/journals/2007/v33n3/feature2.html


Southeast Asia by Singapore with the establishment of the Changi C2 Centre in March 2007, which has

the potential to develop into a strategic node for a global CMDA network.

“The Changi C2 Centre, a facility for multinational cooperation, built next to Changi Naval Base, is set to

house three functional centres, namely, the Singapore Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), the IFC and the

Multinational Operations and Exercises Centre (MOEC). Envisioned to be the one-stop maritime

information and response coordination centre, it will advance multi-agency cooperation and

interoperability amongst national maritime agencies, and enhance Singapore’s maritime security

capabilities. The Changi C2 Centre will also enable international cooperation and interoperability

between countries to promote maritime security in the region.”273

The author considers what an envisaged CMDA network could potentially look like, making use of

Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) established by regional fisheries management organizations that are

making use of the satellite-based Global Positioning System (GPS) (Lim 2007, 22). He suggests linking

this information with Automatic Identification System (AIS) nodes globally into a virtual maritime map.

Using the ‘state-of-the-art’ software allows shipping companies to track their fleets via the “most cost-

effective method of tracking vessels in real time.”274

The author indicates that the most practicable

approach would include international organizations (governmental and non-governmental) collaborating

with industry to shape system requirements and drive systems development.

Lim, Nicholas Lieutenant Commander. “The Information Fusion Centre – A Case for Information

Sharing to Enforce Security in the Maritime Domain,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces

Supplement: Pointer, April 2011:50:3-11, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:


s/0006/file.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf.

The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) is an example of information sharing in the Asia-Pacific region. The

author explores the operations of the IFC and proposes that it can be a viable model to link up regional

partners, with a vision of forming a global information sharing grid for maritime security (Lim 2011, 3).

Formally launched in April 2009, the IFC initiative was established at Singapore’s Changi C2 Centre by

the Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN). According to the author, the objective of the IFC is to strengthen

maritime security in the Asian region and beyond “by building a common coherent maritime situation

picture and acting as a maritime information hub for the region.”275

He notes that the key maritime

concerns in the Southeast Asia Region are similar and reflective of global maritime concerns, which are

highlighted in Table 4 of Appendix 10.

The IFC has two unique features. A unique part of the IFC initiative is the presence of International

Liaison Officers (ILOs), working as an integrated team with the RSN personnel on a daily basis. As of

April 2011, the ILOs were drawn from ten countries (Australia, France, India, Malaysia, Philippines,

Thailand, NZ, the UK, the US, and Vietnam). It is anticipated that more countries will deploy ILOs in the

future. Another unique IFC feature is the links that have been established both nationally and

internationally. The author emphasizes that the “cooperative security approach entails the WOG

commitment, regional collaboration as well as close links with the global maritime security.”276

Lim

notes that the Maritime Task Force from the RSN is the liaison agency to various other national

enforcement agencies under the Singapore Maritime Security Centre.277

The IFC is a 24/7 maritime information hub to its various regional partners. Its shared maritime situation

picture is collated from various information sources, both through its partners as well as through new

technologies such as the satellite Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Identification

Tracking System (LRIT), which provide early warning for the prevention of maritime incidents or crime.

The IFC uses various information sharing platforms to facilitate collaborative interactions with its




partners. These include the Malacca Strait Patrols Information System (MSP IS) for the four littoral

countries in the Malacca Strait and the Regional Maritime Info-sharing Exchange (ReMIX) for the 24

countries in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).

Ow, Gary Major. “Information Sharing: A Singapore Perspective,” Journal of the Singapore Armed

Forces Supplement: Pointer, April 2011:50:11-19, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:


s/0006/file.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf

The author explores the maritime security challenges faced by Singapore, using the WOG approach to

maritime security adopted by the RSN at the national level, and efforts made by the RSN to engage like-

minded partners at the international level to cooperate in the maritime security domain. The author

reviews the effect of having the Changi C2 Centre house the SMS C, the IFC and the MOEC as the

platform that enables interoperability and information sharing between like-minded partners and agencies.

ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report:

January – December 2011, 2011:115, [accessed 2013-06-05] from:

http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download

&EntryId=239&PortalId=0&TabId=78.

The author reported that three quarters of the 155 reported incidents involved underway vessels and took

place in the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. ReCAAP noted that the coastal

states and their maritime enforcement agencies have improved their surveillance, strengthened individual

efforts in policing their territorial waters, and improved cooperation and information sharing (ReCAAP

2011, 2).

The author noted that the ReCAAP ISC collaborated with the IFC to engage the tugboat/barge owners,

master and crew to share the robbers’ method of operation. This led to the promulgation of a set of

guidelines and advice to tugboat owners, master and crew.

Seng, RadmTay Kian. Safe and Secure Seas for All: Contributing to Maritime Security in the Region,

PowerPoint deck, 2008:29:7, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.navy.mi.th/navedu/acd/data_docu/yr_51/final_hno_presentation.pdf

The presentation reviews the different activities taking place at the Changi C2 Centre. It is the operational

nucleus of joint maritime security operations by international forces. The Centre houses the Singapore

Maritime Security Centre (SMSC), the Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC), and the

Information Fusion Centre (IFC) (Seng 2007, 28).

Singapore Government. Singapore Armed Forces Act, (Chapter 295), Act 7 of 1972, Revised Edition

2000:200, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Af7446be9-daef-4a09-

bb63-8e8da8b61f4c%20%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0;whole=yes

In the Singapore Armed Forces Act, Part XIIA, Aid to Civilian Authorities outlines the terms and

conditions for the provision of military aid to civilian power.

Vavro, Caroline. “Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,” Canadian Naval

Review, 4(1), Spring 2008: 45:13-17, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-




http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=239&PortalId=0&TabId=78



http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Af7446be9-daef-4a09-bb63-8e8da8b61f4c%20%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0;whole=yes





The author reviews the balance of power in the Malacca Strait, by looking at the role of the main players

of the ASEAN group (i.e., Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia) and their approach to the US, China, India

and Japan. Each country wants to play a larger role in security provision in the Malacca Strait beyond the

concerns of piracy, maritime terrorism and disruption of trade (Vavro 2008, 15). The author notes that the

response of the coastal states to threats in the strait not only “highlights their unease and distrust of each

other but also demonstrates their desired balance of power for the region.”278

The author concludes that in

the short to medium term, “littoral states will resist calls to increase meaningful cooperation which would

result in a perceived reduction in sovereignty.”279

Wei, Tan Guan. “Cooperation key in maintaining maritime security,” Cyber Pioneer, Ministry of Defence

of Government of Singapore Website, May 14, 2013:2, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2013/may/14may13

_news.html.

The author reports on maritime security events that took place at the Changi C2 Centre in Singapore,

highlighting the importance of information sharing and international cooperation.

8.6 United Kingdom-based Centres

Beard, David. Utility of NovaSAR for UK Maritime Surveillance Applications, PowerPoint prepared for

the Ministry of Defence, Dstl, 7 March 2013:30, [accessed 2013-07-31] from:

http://www.spaceconference.co.uk/links/14/Slides-Day2/David_Beard_DSTL_-

_DMC_and_NovaSAR_Conference_-_7th_March_2013.pdf.

The work was presented at a UK conference, and examined the principal UK needs for maritime safety,

security and defence applications.

Butcher, Louise. Ports Security, United Kingdom House of Commons Library, 8 June 2011:12, [accessed

2013-07-31] from: www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03106.pdf.

The author reviews security arrangement that have been put in place both in the UK and at the

international level to protect ports and shipping interests when in port. It also looks at the changes made

by the US Government to the scanning of ships in foreign ports (Butcher 2011, 1).

Feldt, Lutz. “The NATO and EU in the Asia-Pacific Century,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense

and International Security, Issue no. 192, June 2012:19, [accessed 2013-06-24] from:


The author discusses the security challenges the EU and NATO face. Given the rising importance of the

Asia-Pacific region, the author analyzes both organizations' activities in, relations to, and cooperation

with, other countries in the area. Lutz examines the similarities and differences between the organizations,

including their purposes, strategies and activities.

Unlike NATO, the EU has political weight. Through its European Security Strategy (ESS), it assesses the

challenges and threats to European security as less visible and less predictable. The author observes that

the EU has low military experience and profile, a status which is at odds with its interests, ambitions and

responsibilities (Lutz 2013, 11-14). Europe’s efforts to security are mostly based on trade and commercial

and environmental issues. The author concludes that EU and NATO should be complementary partners

and not competitors. Refer to Figure 5 of Appendix 11, a diagram showing how international

organizations work together for peace and security.

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2013/may/14may13_news.html


http://www.spaceconference.co.uk/links/14/Slides-Day2/David_Beard_DSTL_-_DMC_and_NovaSAR_Conference_-_7th_March_2013.pdf


http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03106.pdf



G4S Risk Management Limited. UK Marine Security Market Report, Report for the Canadian Trade

Commissioner Service, 8 March 2013:52, [accessed 2013-06-06] from:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/g

roups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf.

The report identifies the organizations and issues currently affecting the UK maritime domain and why

they may be of interest to Canadian companies.280

It notes drivers for technological change and emerging

technologies and their providers in the UK maritime security environment. The report also identifies a

number of challenges to UK maritime security, such as piracy in international waters and transnational

crime threats, such as human smuggling, terrorism and cybercrime.281

In addition, the report identifies that long range maritime surveillance is an issue of great concern to the

UK Government (UKG) due to an acknowledged capability gap. The report observes that this places

budgetary pressures on those agencies responsible for maritime security.282

The report also makes note of

certain specialized UK maritime stakeholders, such as the UK Maritime Rescue Coordination Centres

(MRCC), that are under the authority of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA).283

The report also notes that the NATO Shipping Centre (NSC), the key link between NATO naval forces

and the merchant shipping community, is part of the NATO Headquarters Northwood in the UK. The

NSC is permanently manned by NATO staff who provide advice related to shipping on risks to and

possible interference with maritime operations.284

NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt pirate

attacks in accordance with the UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), while protecting vessels and

increasing the general level of security in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa using its resources

from the NSC combined with its presence in those regions.285

Global Security.Org. Intelligence – Linked Operations Centers Europe (LOCE) website, updated 28 July

2011, [accessed 2013-07-22] from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/loce.htm.

The webpage provides an overview of the Linked Operations Centers Europe (LOCE) system used by

NATO’s Intelligence Fusion Centre (NIFC).

HFI DTC Consortium (HFI). Coordination between the Military and Civilian Organisations: Issues and

Solutions, BAE Systems 2009, Brunel University, UK, 19 May 2009:50, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.hfidtc.com/research/multi/multi-reports/phase-2/HFIDTC-2-3-1-4-3-coordination-issues-

solutions.pdf.

The authors recognize an increasing need for the military to work in tandem with civilian organizations,

such as law enforcement agencies, and other emergency services. They also note that “during previous

joint military civilian operations, a lack of coordination between agencies has been identified as a

significant problem affecting the efficiency of the activities undertaken.”286

Despite the majority of occasions where multi-agency responses achieved their overall goal, there often

were various issues that hindered coordination levels when the military attempts to work in parallel with

civilian organizations.287

Cultural issues to information sharing between agencies have led to

misunderstanding the information being communicated. Possible solutions include the establishment of

cognitive artefacts at the strategic coordination level that could consist of: the mission analysis record; a

list of available resources; an effects schematic; critical information requirements; a synchronization

matrix; and a record of actual events.288

Given the lack of understanding of the military capability on what they can and cannot do, the authors

recommend a series of more general guidelines for enhancing coordination between the military and

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http:/www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf


http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/loce.htm

http://www.hfidtc.com/research/multi/multi-reports/phase-2/HFIDTC-2-3-1-4-3-coordination-issues-solutions.pdf



civilian organizations.289

The authors concluded that given the increased necessity for the military to

assist civilian organizations, it is pertinent to address this incapability, both in terms of understanding why

it exists and generating guidance on how it can be solved.290

International Maritime Organization. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR),

IMO Website, (no date), [accessed 2013-07-08] from:

http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-on-maritime-

search-and-rescue-(sar).aspx.

The UN Convention is aimed at developing an international search and rescue (SAR) plan, to be prepared

whenever an accident occurs at sea. The rescue of persons in distress will be coordinated by a SAR

organization and when necessary, by cooperation between neighbouring SAR organizations.

International Maritime Organization. IMO activities to enhance maritime security, December 2003:15,


http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=17989&filename=IMOactivities.pdf.

Following adoption of the IMO Assembly resolution A.924 (22) (November 2001), the author listed a

number of IMO activities to enhance maritime security resulting in amendments to the International

Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as amended, and the new International Ship and

Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) (IMO 2003, 3). The author reviews each of these instruments.

Ministry of Defence. Defence Intelligence, published 12 December 2012:19, [accessed 2013-07-18] from:

https://www.gov.uk/defence-intelligence-services#defence-geospatial-intelligence-fusion-centre

Defence Intelligence (DI), an integral part of the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD), is the main provider

of strategic defence intelligence to the armed forces (MOD 2012, 1). DI is part of the UK’s central

intelligence machinery291

and contributes staff and resources to the Cabinet Office in support of the Joint

Intelligence Committee (JIC), the UK’s national intelligence committee.

The Joint Forces Intelligence Group’s (JFIG) mission is to deliver intelligence, information, services to

defence, other government departments and international partners supporting strategic to tactical decision-

making and action that support attainment of defence objectives (MOD 2012, 3). JFIG consists of five

separate organizations: the Defence Geographic Centre (DGC); the Defence HUMINT Organisation

(DHO); the Joint Aeronautical and Geospatial Organisation (JAGO); the Defence Geospatial Intelligence

Fusion Centre (DGIFC); and the Joint Service Signals Organisation (JSSO) (MOD 2012, 3). The report

reviews the functions of each of these groups.

Ministry of Defence. Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine

Publication 02 (2nd

Edition), published September 2007:317, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61965/defenceconrtibution

1.pdf.

In the UK, there is a distinction between the defence of the UK against military threats and UK civil

protection “as established in the statute by the Civil Contingencies Act 2004”292

and assisted through the

cross-Governmental Department and Inter-Agency Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) approach.

The report addresses the UK military operations that are undertaken within the UK, relying on close

civil/military cooperation. These activities include: “Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA),293

Military Operations (MO) in support of the standing strategic and overseas tasks and Military Home

Defence (MHD)294

of UK territory295

against an external military threat.”296

http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-on-maritime-search-and-rescue-(sar).aspx

http://www.imo.org/about/conventions/listofconventions/pages/international-convention-on-maritime-search-and-rescue-(sar).aspx

http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=17989&filename=IMOactivities.pdf





The report provides: “guidance on the nature, planning, Command and Control (C2) and conduct of

MACA and MO; an overview of Government policy regarding the management of emergencies and the

IEM system; an outline of the various civil agencies’ responsibilities, command arrangements and

capabilities; and details of the legal and constitutional basis for MACA provision and associated

procedures.”297

Mixon, Laurence M. Lt. Col. Requirements and Challenges Facing the NATO Intelligence Fusion

Center, A Research Report submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation

Requirements, 12 January 2007:30.

The author briefly examines the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) primary security functions

and key requirements for an effective Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC), which is established adjacent to

the US European Command’s Joint Analysis Centre298

(JAC). It explores the IFC organization, manning

and equipping to support NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in

Afghanistan. The author also outlines some of the challenges US and NATO allies face with the

establishing and operating the IFC. The author argues that NATO and US intelligence transformation

efforts must include frameworks for accessing intelligence from non-NATO states.

“NATO’s essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom

and security of all its members by political and military means. NATO recognizes that conflict and crisis

outside the Euro-Atlantic area can jeopardize its own security.” 299

Any IFC deployed by NATO must be capable of providing military intelligence production and analysis

at an operational level. The IFC must be a cooperative undertaking incorporating all of NATO’s 26

member nations and their respective intelligence services. The IFC must be capable of drawing

intelligence products, information and data from member states to support the collective analysis and

production effort. The IFC must build and maintain a combined intelligence database which includes

signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), human intelligence (HUMINT),

measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and all-source

products that are releasable to NATO members and partners.

The author indicates that the IFC support to NATO-ISAF operations in Afghanistan constitutes a major

test. Consequently, NATO is equipping the IFC to provide intelligence to support the ISAF operations.

The IFC evolves as the ISAF mission evolves. The development of the IFC’s capability to provide NATO

ground commanders and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) with IMINT and HUMINT and fused

intelligence products reaffirms its relevance (Mixon 2011, 21). The author argues that the IFC “must

establish and enforce formal, well-understood procedures, technical means and institutional methods for

sharing information and intelligence among NATO members.”300

Moreover, he notes that NATO will

need to invest efforts in training and vetting its personnel, as well as establish firewalls, encryption

devices and intrusion detection systems to protect the IFC data. The author concludes that “information

assurance and protection of the IFC from internal and external threats constitute a never-ending

challenge.”301

Moore, Sue K. Lieutenant Commander. “Is the Maritime Domain a Security Vulnerability to be Exploited

During London 2012 and Beyond?” Defence Studies, 11(4), Routledge, UK, December 2011:698-733.

The author examines how the security of the UK’s waters is undertaken. She looks at the nature and

credibility of the threats and describes the effectiveness of the security organization set up to protect the

UK’s maritime borders during the London Olympics of 2012 (Moore 2011, 702). The author also reviews

the UK’s process for government policy and supporting work regarding its domestic maritime interests.


The author assesses the future of maritime security following the London Olympic Games, taking stock of

the UK’s strengths and weaknesses.

As part of the preparations for the London Olympics, the author notes that the Cabinet Office decided to

improve the UK maritime security. A permanent ‘cross-Government’ senior official Maritime Security

Oversight Group (MSOG) was established and included representatives from all departments and

agencies involved in the maritime domain. This led to the creation of the multi-agency National Maritime

Information Centre (NMIC) to provide a single window of maritime situational awareness and having a

command and control function establishing a more responsive framework (Moore 2011, 714-715).

The NMIC’s location at Northwood benefits from existing military structures and security protocols for

information sharing. Ongoing work is to overcome the challenge of data sharing across other agencies,

both national and international, and the EU work is assisting the international component to build a better

understanding and maritime surveillance with the establishment of the Common Information Sharing

Environment (CISE) (Moore 2011, 723).

National Maritime Information Centre. Information Guide, Version 1.0, 2011:12, [accessed 2013-06-11]

from: http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-

booklet.pdf.

In 2011, the UK established the NMIC, an interagency government body based at the Northwood

Headquarters in Middlesex, UK. It brings together existing functions to improve the UK maritime

situational awareness and ensure that information was disseminated, analysed and acted upon in a

‘coordinated manner.’ The NMIC roles include monitoring of maritime activity in the UK region,

improving the UK’s understanding of maritime security and safety, providing a single contact for

maritime issues and learning from related maritime security and safety exercises (NMIC 2011, 3).

The Maritime Security Oversight Group (MSOG), chaired by the Home Office oversees progress on all

maritime security work streams, including any policy development in response to risks and issues in the

maritime security domain. The creation of the MSOG and NMIC are intended to lead a strategic and more

coordinated approach on UK maritime issues. The NMIC Stakeholders Board is an interagency working

group that oversees future plans for NMIC development and reports its progress to the MSOG. The Board

contributes progress against the NMIC Business Plan, showing the contribution to, and traceability from,

the Maritime Security Programme (NMIC 2011, 7).

NATO MARCOM website. Maritime Command (MARCOM) Role, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/HQ%20MARCOM's%20role%20in%20NATO%20Operations.aspx

The website describes the NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) role relating to its maritime security

activities. It helps to protect vital sea lines of communication and maintain the freedom of navigation.

Surveillance, patrolling and the sharing of information, for instance, all contribute to supporting law

enforcement, preventing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and countering potential terrorist or

illegal activities.

This approach involves working with other international partners and ensuring an ongoing modernization

of NATO’s maritime capabilities. More importantly, it will ensure that the Alliance is prepared to

confront all possible, including asymmetrical, threats, and answer the security challenges of the 21st

century.302

http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-booklet.pdf




North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Alliance Maritime Strategy, Annex 1 (C-M(2011)0023, NATO

Unclassified, 18-03-2011:9, [accessed 2013-06-11] from:

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-

strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf.

“The Alliance Maritime Strategy identifies four roles of NATO’s maritime forces: deterrence and

collective defence; crisis management; cooperative security-outreach through partnerships, dialogue and

cooperation; and maritime security.”303

The report concludes that NATO has extensive experience in

performing these roles in the increasingly complex security environment, noting that any activities of the

Alliance would be conducted in accordance with international law, including any applicable treaties and

customary law, and any relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Website, (no date), [accessed 2013-06-11] from:

http://web.ifc.bices.org/about.htm

The NATO website provides an overview of the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre (IFC).

Palmer, Neil. Improving the UK Maritime Security and Maritime Domain Awareness, The IET Maritime

Surveillance from Space Seminar, PowerPoint deck, Ministry of Defence, 11 December 2012:26.

The author provides an overview of the National Maritime Information Centre, looking at its rationale, its

challenges and how it plans to overcome them.

Young, H. Kimberlie, Commander. “Information Sharing in the NATO Maritime Environment,”

Maritime Security Conference 2011: Proceedings, 2011:61-76, [accessed 2013-07-11] from:

http://www.coecsw.org/Proceedings/newmaterial/CDR%20Young%20cjos%20coe%20kiel%20paper.pdf.

The author describes the maritime situational awareness (MSA) concept as reviewed in a Legal Study

(study) that examined the legal and policy constraints on maritime information sharing (Young 2011, 61).

The study also focuses on information required for an effective MSA, including how it is generated,

controlled, used and distributed (Young 2011, 62). Based on responses from NATO member states, the

study concluded that information sharing issues fell into three categories: legal; policy; and classification

(Young 2011 70-72). The author observes that the study is a first step towards identifying impediments

that prevent NATO member states from sharing information with NATO the organization (Young 2011,

73-76).

United Kingdom Government. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and

Strategic Review, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October

2010:75, [accessed 2013-07-31] from:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/g

roups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf.

The report indicates that in this Strategic Defence and Security Review, it is the first time that the UK

government (UKG) has made decisions on its defence, security, intelligence, resilience, development and

foreign affairs capabilities at the same time (UKG 2010, 11). The review sets targets for the UK national

security capabilities needed by 2020, and charts a course for getting there (UKG 2010, 11).

United Kingdom House of Commons. Future Maritime Surveillance: Government Response to the

Committee’s Fifth Report of Session 2012-13, Defence Committee, Report HC827,12 December 2012:13,


http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/827/827.pdf.

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf



http://www.coecsw.org/Proceedings/newmaterial/CDR%20Young%20cjos%20coe%20kiel%20paper.pdf



http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/827/827.pdf


The UK Government (UKG) response reviews the findings of the House of Commons Defence

Committee’s inquiry into ‘Future Maritime Surveillance’ initially published on September 12, 2012

(UKHC 2012, 2). The inquiry examined the current and future contribution of the Ministry of Defence

and the UK Armed Forces to the provision of maritime surveillance capabilities, noting the UKG’s

cancellation of a technology-based project. The Committee also followed the UKG’s evidence on the

importance of military capabilities such as Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and

Reconnaissance (ISTAR), and supports inclusion of ISTAR in the proposed work plan.

The House of Commons Defence Committee indicated its intention to maintain an enduring interest in

Maritime Surveillance, and anticipates an update of ongoing activities in the Summer of 2013, when Air

ISTAR Optimisation Study’s (AIOS) initial findings are to be ready and a further update when the AIOS

has finished its work (UKHC 2012, 2).

United Kingdom Marine and Coastguard Agency. Search and Rescue Framework for the United

Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Southampton, UK, April 2008:61, [accessed 2013-07-

11] from:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121107103953/http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/uksar.pdf.

The report first describes the background, scope and responsibilities of the UK search and rescue and its

related strategic and operational management (UKMCA 2008, 3). It outlines the authorities and

organizations that provide the search and rescue function within the UK SAR region.

The SAR in the UK involves several government departments and agencies, the emergency services and

other organizations, such as charities and voluntary organizations. The civil aeronautical and maritime

SAR is the responsibility of the Department for Transport (DfT) (UKMCA 2008, 10). The coordination of

land-based and inland waters SAR rests with the Police Service. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency

(MCA) provides the response and coordination for maritime SAR, counter pollution and salvage

(UKMCA 2008, 11). The Ministry of Defence (MOD) provides SAR facilities for military operations,

exercises and training within the UK. Occasionally, by agreement, MOD exercises responsibility for the

coordination of civil aeronautical SAR on behalf of DfT (UKMCA 2008, 11).

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121107103953/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/mca/uksar.pdf


8.7 United States

American Civil Liberties Union. What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? ACLU Washington Legislative

Office, Washington, D.C., December 2007:27, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:

http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) report reviews fusion centre institutions that are based in

most states, in certain major cities and regionally in the US. Although originally created to improve the

sharing of counterterrorism intelligence among the different state, local and federal law enforcement

agencies, the purpose of the centres has expanded to assess ‘all crimes and all hazards.’ The ACLU

report contends that the “types of information they seek for analysis has also broadened over time to

include not just criminal intelligence, but public and private sector data, and participation in these centers

has grown to include not just law enforcement, but other government entities, the military and even select

members of the private sector.”304

The ACLU report questions whether data fusion is an effective means of preventing terrorism and

whether funding the development of these centres is an effective investment of public safety resources.

The ACLU report also notes that all levels of government are increasing their investment in fusion centres

without assessing whether they serve a necessary purpose. The ACLU report contends that fusion centres

should be planned in a public forum that identifies implications for privacy, etc. The ACLU report

stresses the need for establishing sufficient checks and balances to prevent abuse (ACLU 2007, 3).

The report identifies “potential problems [that] fusion centres present to the privacy and civil liberties of

American citizens. These include the following.

Ambiguous Lines of Authority. The participation of multiple jurisdictions in fusion centers

allows the authorities to manipulate differences in federal, state and local laws to maximize

information collection while evading accountability and oversight through the practice of “policy

shopping.”

Private Sector Participation. Fusion centers are incorporating private-sector corporations into the

intelligence process, breaking down the arm’s length relationship that protects the privacy of

innocent Americans who are employees or customers of these companies, and increasing the risk

of a data breach.

Military Participation. Fusion centers are involving military personnel in law enforcement

activities in troubling ways.

Data Fusion = Data Mining. Federal fusion center guidelines encourage whole sale data

collection and manipulation processes that threaten privacy.

Excessive Secrecy. Fusion centers are hobbled by excessive secrecy, which limits public

oversight, impairs their ability to acquire essential information and impedes their ability to fulfill

their stated mission, bringing their ultimate value into doubt.”305

Bjelopera, Jerome. Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report

Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress,

R40901, December 28, 2011:22, [accessed 2013-07-17] from:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf.

The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission)

identified breakdowns in information sharing and the failure to fuse pertinent intelligence (i.e.,

‘connecting the dots’) as key factors in the failure to prevent the attacks (Bjelopera 2011,1). Since then,

http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf


the US Congress mandated the creation of an information-sharing environment (ISE) under the

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) that would provide and facilitate the means

of sharing terrorism information among all appropriate government entities and the private sector using

policy guidelines and technologies (Bjelopera 2011, 1-2). In addition, the states and major urban areas

established intelligence fusion centres to collect, analyse, and disseminate information to law

enforcement, homeland security, public safety, and terrorism (Bjelopera 2011, 1-2).

The report describes the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) Initiative (NSI), the rationale

for the sharing of terrorism-related SARs, and how the NSI seeks to achieve this objective. It examines

the privacy and civil liberties issues associated with this initiative, and identifies other oversight issues

for consideration by US Congress (Bjelopera 2011, 1).

Brice-O’Hara, Sally, Vice Commandant, Vice Admiral. “Coast Guard Intelligence – as Unique as the

Coast Guard Itself,” Coast Guard Outlook 2012, 2012:186:26-31, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.nxtbook.com/faircount/USCG/USCG12/index.php?startid=26#/186.

The author describes the US Coast Guard organization, focusing primarily on USCG intelligence groups

and programs (Brice-O’Hara 2012, 26). “Coast Guard intelligence personnel are embedded at all levels

of the organization (strategic, operational and tactical).”306

The USCG intelligence activities are managed

by: the Coast Guard Investigative Services (CGIS), the Coast Guard Counterintelligence Service

(CGCIS), the Coast Guard Cryptologic Group (CGCG), the Coast Guard Cyber Program, the Intelligence

Coordination Center (ICC), Area Intelligence Staff, Field Intelligence Staff, and the Pacific and Atlantic

Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) (Brice-O’Hara 2012, 26-27).

The author positions the USCG at the intersection between homeland security and national defence.

Brice-O’Hara highlights the fact that the USCG is both a federal law enforcement agency and a member

of the national intelligence community. As such, the USCG bridges between these groups (Brice-O’Hara

2012, 31). Due to the USCG’s unique access, focus and expertise across the maritime domain, Brice-

O’Hara contends that the USCG supports both USCG missions and national security objectives (Brice-

O’Hara 2012, 31).

Buchalter, Alice R. Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department of Defense in

Support of Homeland Defense, A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress

under an Interagency Agreement with the Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves,

February 2007:26, [accessed 2013-07-17] from: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_Milit-

Support-Civil-Authorities.pdf.

The author sets out the statutes, Executive Branch documents, regulations and the Department of Defense

(DOD) internal directives that define Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA). In the aftermath of

9/11, more emphasis has been placed on the MSCA function in the context of homeland security. Finally,

the author evaluates the criteria for the provision of MSCA, and assesses how DOD compares this

function with its mission to fight wars.

Campion, Francis J. Commander. Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness: Supporting the National

Strategy for Maritime Security, Strategy Research Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 15,

2008: 28, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478411.

The author reviews the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) by presenting a model for

Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness (SMDA) to enhance US maritime security by linking the national

and global maritime domains using the capabilities of the US Armed Forces and multinational partners

http://www.nxtbook.com/faircount/USCG/USCG12/index.php?startid=26#/186

http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_Milit-Support-Civil-Authorities.pdf


http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478411


(Campion 2008, 1). Campion concludes that the NSMS provides overarching guidance (Campion 2008,

25).

Caswell, Kenneth L. Jr. Lt. Establishment of the National Maritime Intelligence Center: Understanding

the Foundations of Trust to Support a Collaborative Environment in Homeland Security, Submitted in

partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, Naval

Postgraduate School, March 2010:64, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518529.pdf.

The author examines the question: “Can the NMIC design and create a culture of trust and collaboration

that collectively draws input from analyst, collector, and customer to effectively support maritime domain

awareness intelligence support regarding homeland security?”307

Caswell states that a culture of

collaboration involves ‘maximizing time, talent and tools to create value based on the collective efforts’

of those involved in the intelligence community. The author notes that for the NMIC to create a trusted

collaborative environment, it requires the structural foundations and doctrine to support a culture shift

within the intelligence community (IC), as shown in Figure 6 of Appendix 12 (Caswell 2010, 22).

Since the ISE is an IC-wide initiative, the author notes that this required a complete culture change from

the way the IC has traditionally viewed intelligence and how it conducted business (Caswell 2010, 24).

Caswell highlights how the MDA Concept of Operations weighs trust as a critical element in the overall

success of MDA, which is structured around enterprising hubs (refer to Figure 7 of Appendix 13). The

author notes that since the NMIC serves as the national hub for maritime intelligence, one variable that is

critical to the NMIC’s success is “whether they are able to identify and communicate with the maritime

community as a whole” (Caswell 2010, 56). He adds that an aggressive outreach initiative is needed for

identifying the needs and requirements within the maritime community to understand the releasability

issues and the procedures needed for communications and building a trust relationship (Caswell 2010,

56). The author recommends the NMIC should focus on creating other avenues of information sharing

with the maritime community to create an environment of trust.308

Cilluffo, Frank J., Clark, Joseph R., Downing, Michael P. and Squires, Keith D. Counterterrorism

Intelligence: Fusion Center Perspectives, Research Brief Volume 2, No. 1, George Washington

University Homeland Security Policy Institute, June 2012:35, [accessed 2013-06-18] from:

https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/HSPI%20Counterterrorism%20Intelligence%20-

%20Fusion%20Center%20Perspectives%206-26-12.pdf.

A decade after the 9/11 event, Cilluffo et al. noted that the US continues to face blended threats.

Meeting these challenges requires the State and local fusion centres to act more as hubs than as

disseminators of information. To determine whether the fusion centres are fulfilling their potential, the

Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) surveyed the fusion centres in January and February 2012.

Through a partnership with the National Fusion Center Association (NFCA), an invitation was extended

to each individual working at an existing operational fusion centre.

Seventy-one individuals participated in the survey, representing a small sample size. A majority of the

respondents reported that they disseminate information from local, state and federal authorities on a

regular basis. However, the results of HSPI’s survey indicated that the there is a lack of analytical ability

within the fusion centres to conduct regional threat assessments. Sixty-eight percent of the respondents

came from law enforcement. In counterterrorism, both the perspective of law enforcement and that of the

analyst are vital. The authors observe that fusion centres have too much of the law enforcement

perspective and not enough of the analyst. This is “despite the fact that both the Fusion Center Guidelines

and Baseline Capabilities Supplement from DHS and the DOJ stress the importance of such.”309

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518529.pdf

https://cchs.gwu.edu/sites/cchs.gwu.edu/files/downloads/HSPI%20Counterterrorism%20Intelligence%20-%20Fusion%20Center%20Perspectives%206-26-12.pdf



According to the authors, two key factors are preventing the fusion centres from fulfilling their mandate:

1) the general homogeneous administrative and professional background of those working in the fusion

centres; and 2) the lack of investment in the analytical skills of those working in the centres (Cilluffo et al.

2012, 29). Based on their survey results, the authors recommend: 1) increased investments in the

analytical and critical thinking skills; and 2) investments in the professional incentive structures of the

fusion centres (Cilluffo et al. 2012, 31). The authors add that such investments should be built “on

existing successful efforts within the intelligence and law enforcement communities such as the

Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG). ITACG works to support the

development of analysts by connecting them with other analysts in the intelligence community and with

their counterparts in law enforcement.”310

Cincotta, Thomas. “Intelligence Fusion Centers: A De-Centralized National Intelligence Agency,” Public

Eye, Winter 2009/Spring 2010:10, [accessed 2013-06-19] from:

http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n4/intelligence-fusion-centers.html.

The author notes that despite the continuum of official assurance that fusion centres only focus on illegal

incidents, increasingly, there have been abuse incidents that show how police forces can blur the

distinction between activists and terrorists, and between immigrants and violent extremists (Cincotta

2009-10, 1). Cincotta notes that the network of fusion centers “constitutes a nascent de facto national

intelligence agency, whose decentralized structure diminishes transparency and accountability.”311

The

author also states that since the network of fusion centres “operate[s] under the auspices of state police

or even large local police forces” the guidelines under The Privacy Act of 1974 limit information-sharing

by federal agencies (Cincotta 2009-10, 1).

Although originally seen as an antiterrorism initiative to improve information-sharing and collection at

the local level, fusion centres have moved towards an ‘all-crimes’, ‘all-hazards’ policy to be of use in all

emergencies.

Cunningham, Joseph. “Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness with the Single Integrated Lookout List

(SILO),” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 1,

January 2012:16:8, [accessed 2013-06-24] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO%20Quarterly.pdf.

As part of the 2005 National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS), the Global Maritime Intelligence

Integration (GMII) Plan called for the creation of a single-integrated lookout (SILO) list of all vessels of

domestic and global intelligence interest. SILO allows the sharing of Vessel of Interest (VOI) information

between US government agencies, its allies and Coalition Partners (NMIO 2012, 8).

SILO establishes a multinational, multi-security domain aggregated list of VOIs to Intelligence or

Operations Centres globally. SILO is part of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)’s Sea Port multi-

domain collection database, which allows VOI information to be shared across six secure computer

networks. This network sharing gives 48 Nations access (refer to Figure 8 of Appendix 14) to this data

while allowing data owners to control what data is shared and with which network.

Doyle, Charles and Elsea, Jennifer K. The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the

Military to Execute Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R42659,

August 16, 2012:66, [accessed 2013-06-19] from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf.

The US Constitution permits Congress to authorize the use of the militia “to execute the Laws of the

Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions,” guaranteeing the states protection against invasion or

usurpation of their form of government, and at the request of the state legislature, against “domestic

violence.” The Posse Comitatus Act outlaws the willful use of any part of the Army or Air Force to

http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n4/intelligence-fusion-centers.html


http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf


execute the law unless expressly authorized by the US Constitution or an act of Congress (Doyle and

Elsea 2012, 1).

Express statutory exceptions includes legislation that allows the President to use military force to

suppress insurrection or to enforce federal authority,312

and laws that permit the Department of Defense to

provide federal, state and local police with appropriate information, equipment, and personnel.313

The

courts have held that the Posse Comitatus Act is violated when (1) civilian law enforcement officials

make “direct active use” of military investigators; or (2) the use of the military “pervades the activities”

of the civilian officials; or (3) the military is used so as to subject “citizens to the exercise of military

power which was regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature.” The Act is not violated when the

Armed Forces conduct activities for a military purpose.314

The law enforcement functions of the Coast Guard have been expressly authorized by act of Congress and

consequently cannot be said to be contrary to the Act (Doyle and Elsea 2012, 57).315

The Act has been

applied to the National Guard when it is in federal service, to civilian employees of the Armed Forces,

and to off-duty military personnel (Doyle and Elsea 2012, 58).316

The authors provide a historical analysis of the use of the Armed Forces to execute domestic law and of

the Posse Comitatus Act in this report. The authors then outline the current application of the Act as well

as its statutory exceptions, and review the consequences of its violation.

Feldkamp, James, Commander. “Maritime Domain Integration,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National

Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 3, Summer 2012:16:6-7, [accessed 2013-07-04] from:

http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL3.pdf.

The author reviews the maritime domain integration approach established by the US to ensure the sharing

of information on a global scale and looks specifically at the role of the Maritime Domain Integration

Branch in the National Maritime Intelligence-Information Office (NMIO) (Feldkamp 2012, 6).

“Since the safety and security of the maritime commons is vital to sustaining the global environment and

the world economy, the US has created an information sharing environment to achieve Maritime Domain

Awareness (MDA). Knowing that no country or agency has the authority or sufficient knowledge to

achieve effective MDA single-handedly, the US recognizes that this process can only be achieved through

collaboration, cooperation, and information sharing amongst international partners, governments, and

interagency.”317

The NMIO tasked the Maritime Domain (MD) Integration Branch to act as the conduit for MDA outreach

to remove barriers to information sharing between USG agencies, domestic partners, and the international

community (Feldkamp 2012, 6). Feldkamp indicates that the MD Integration Branch also serves as the

secretariat for the NMIO Interagency Advisory Group (NIAG).

The author identifies the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS) as a key tool used by

the Branch to improve global maritime safety and security. MSSIS combines the Automatic

Identification System (AIS) data from participating nations into a single database through secure Internet-

based servers (Feldkamp 2012, 7). Using the AIS, which is a system mandated by IMO regulation, more

than 69 countries participate in MSSIS, giving participating nations unprecedented access to global

shipping information.318

Hylton, Hilary. “Fusion Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information?” Time, March 09, 2009:3,

[accessed 2013-06-12] from: http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html.


http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1883101,00.html


The author draws attention to one of the lessons of the tragedy of September 2011: that law enforcement

agencies at all levels of government must do a “better job of sharing information with each other in order

prevent terror plots.”319

The author notes that NGOs, such as the American Civil Liberties Union

(ACLU), are advocating restriction of the fusion centre’s access to data, particularly in New Mexico,

where opponents are seeking to have government surveillance become a costly offence. Legislation was

introduced in Santa Fe to prohibit any New Mexico law enforcement agency from collecting information

about any religious, political and social associations of New Mexico’s private citizens.

The author quotes the ACLU’s report on the centres: “The lack of proper legal limits on the new fusion

centers not only threatens to undermine fundamental American values, but also threatens to turn them into

wasteful and misdirected bureaucracies that, like our federal security agencies before 9/11, won't succeed

in their ultimate mission of stopping terrorism and other crime.”320

Although there are federal and state

privacy laws governing the centres, the DHS’s report submitted that the multi-governmental nature of the

centres allows the employees to pick and choose a policy that suits their needs.

The author notes that there is a network of about “60 fusion centers nationwide, with some focusing

exclusively on criminal activity, others on both criminal and terrorist threats, and some on specific acts,

such as human smuggling, gang activity, online predators or drug trafficking.”321

Hylton indicates that

groups like the ACLU have sued law enforcement agencies in the past to expose domestic spying, but

individuals have little recourse due to the lack of legal remedies.

Kenyon, Henry. “CWID Publishes 2010 Interoperability Trial Results,” Signal Online, November 12,

2010:1, [accessed 2013-07-08] from: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=2010/11/12/9293.

The Coalition Warrior Interoperability Division (CWID) has released its 2010 report, and lists the top 11

performing technologies.

Kime, Patricia. “Maritime ‘Fusion’ Centers Expand Coast Guard Intelligence Capabilities,” Navy League

of the United States, May 2004:5, [accessed 2013-07-12] from:

http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/may_04_16.php.

The US Coast Guard was included into the US Intelligence Community under the 2002 Fiscal

Intelligence Act. Since 2002, the number of active duty USCG personnel working on intelligence has

doubled (Kime 2004, 1). Since September 2003, the USCG has inaugurated two Maritime Intelligence

Fusion Centres (MIFCs) that provide 24/7 monitoring over maritime traffic and developments. “These

centres monitor areas of interest, track events, follow vessels of interest, provide analysis and evaluate

trends.”322

The MIFC Atlantic or (MIFC LANT) is located in Dam Neck, VA, and has 75 personnel, military and

civilian, who provide direct intelligence to Atlantic Area commanders (Kime 2004, 2). The Maritime

Intelligence Fusion Center in the Pacific area is located in Alameda, CA. Each fusion centre provides

information to operational units, and works in collaboration with the USCG Intelligence Coordination

Center (ICC) at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC) in Suitland, MD. The ICC is co-

located with the US Navy and other agencies; and is responsible for producing and disseminating

intelligence with a Coast Guard perspective to support US operations (Kime 2004, 3).

Maryland Federal Facilities People. National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), Fact sheet, last

updated June 2009:1, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.choosemaryland.org/factsstats/Documents/Military%20Facilities/NMIC.pdf.

The fact sheet describes the tenants of the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).

http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=2010/11/12/9293

http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/may_04_16.php

http://www.choosemaryland.org/factsstats/Documents/Military%20Facilities/NMIC.pdf


National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office website. (No date) National Maritime Intelligence-

Integration Office (NMIO), [accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/index.htm.

The National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office (NMIO) was established to advance USG

collaboration and efforts as outlined in the 9/11 Commission Report and the Intelligence Reform and

Terrorism Prevention Act. The NMIO is the unified maritime voice of the US Intelligence Community

(IC). It operates as an IC ‘service of common concern’ to integrate and streamline intelligence support,

providing a WOG solution to maritime information sharing challenges.323

NMIO neither collects nor produces intelligence. It enables information sharing by creating enabling

structures and cultures to set the conditions for maritime partners to share data. NMIO enhances

international relationships and promotes the integration of US allies, international and private sector

partners into an improved global maritime security framework to advance common security interests in

the Maritime Domain. NMIO also enhances the integration of US federal, state, local and tribal

authorities, leveraging the resources and capabilities of government, international partners and the private

sector. Its goal is to enable maritime stakeholders to proactively identify, locate, and track threats to the

interests of the US and its global partners.

NMIO is focused on a very broad, interagency government, commercial, and foreign clients. Its task is to

facilitate collaboration and information sharing. NMIO is a collegial organization that identifies common

concerns and issues and finds the most efficient and cost-effective solutions that helps the greatest

number of clients. According to NMIO’s Director, “NMIO is mostly about homeland security,

counterterrorism and counter-proliferation [of weapons of mass destruction, illegal firearms and

narcotics] are its main focus.”324

“Some of NMIO’s accomplishments include: coordinating nationally unified maritime intelligence

through a Maritime Intelligence Council; developing and building participation in the Single Integrated

Look-Out (SILO) list for vessels of domestic and international interest; joint development with the US

Maritime Administration (MARAD) of a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Information Portal.”325

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), website, no

date, [accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/rcc.html.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) website highlights the role of the Rescue

Coordination Centers (RCCs) in the US, noting that they are operated by the US Coast Guard and the US

Air Force.

Newbill, Raymond R. III, Major. Intelligence Sharing, Fusion Centers, and Homeland Security, Graduate

Research Paper, Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Cyber

Warfare, Air Force Institute of Technology, June 2008:54, [accessed 2013-06-14] from:

http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=698221.

The author states that as a result of the 9/11 Report’s findings, intelligence fusion centres are being

established nationally and are an effective intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination tool for

collaboration and information exchange among the private sector, and all levels of government including

the military (Newbill 2008, 46). US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the National Guard, and

DHS are improving their collaboration on a national level by participating in exercises such as Cyber

Storm I and II. Although the results of those exercises indicate communication problems still exist,

progress has been made (Newbill 2008, 19-22).

http://nmio.ise.gov/index.htm

http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/rcc.html

http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=698221


The author highlights that several legal and privacy issues emerge when sharing domestic intelligence

with military officials due to the US Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. These legal difficulties can be solved

by US Congress with amendments to or enactments of new laws. The author also outlines some of the

legal and privacy concerns related to the rise of fusion centres. He notes that there is a need to balance

national security with the protection of civil liberties.

As identified in the 9/11 Report, terrorists tend to live and work in communities during their planning of

an attack and may have routine encounters with state and local law enforcement officials prior to the

event, as with September 11th hijackers (Newbill 2008, 47). The author concludes that “achieving true

Homeland Security may be as simple as first achieving Hometown Security.”326

Rollins, John. Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, US Congressional Research Service

Report for Congress, RL34070, January 18, 2008:92, [accessed 2013-06-30] from:

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf.

The author indicates that the events of 9/11 were the primary catalyst for the establishment of national

network of intelligence-information327

fusion centres328

across the country (Rollins 2008, 1). The author’s

methodology for this report includes a review of literature related to state and regional fusion centres,

primary source interviews with the majority of state fusion centre leaders, its operational directors, and

stakeholders within the federal government, including Intelligence Community (IC) organizations, DHS

and GAO officials.

Rollins identifies that the DHS ‘value proposition of fusion centres’ is the integration of various forms of

intelligence and information, including that obtained from the federal government, state, local and tribal

government, as well as the private sector, to provide a more accurate view of the risks, which can be

translated into protective action (Rollins 2008, 5-9). The author states that the key influencers of the

fusion centre concept are based on the Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) model, and the view that the High

Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Centre improves coordination.

The overwhelming majority of the centres are state-created entities largely financed and operated by the

state police or state division of investigation within its law enforcement agency (Rollins 2008, 19-20). In

2007, fusion centres tended to rely on policy memoranda signed by leaders of the state offices of

homeland security or law enforcement agencies, and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between

agencies involved in the centre (Rollins 2008, 20). The author notes that due to the broad nature of federal

guidelines on the subject, fusion centres have different roles and responsibilities: some are solely

counterterrorism focused, while others have a broader mission; some are all-crimes focused and others are

all-hazards or prevention-oriented, while others have a response and/or recovery role (Rollins 2008, 21).

The author identifies more than 30 options for congressional consideration to clarify and potentially

enhance the federal government’s relationship with fusion centres.

The White House. National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, December 2012:16,


http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf.

The National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding (NSISS) was released by the White

House in December 2012. The NSISS shows how the federal government will share and safeguard

information responsibly to improve national security and protect the safety of US citizens. The NSISS

argues that national security depends on the ability to share the right information, with the right people, at

the right time (NSISS 2012, 3).

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34070.pdf

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf


Based on the 2010 National Security Strategy, “the NSISS provides guidance for more effective

integration and implementation of policies, processes, standards, and technologies to promote secure and

responsible national information sharing.”329

Thomas, George (Guy). “Collaboration in Space: The Silver Bullet for Global Maritime Awareness?”

Canadian Naval Review, 8(2), Summer 2012:45:14-18, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol8num2/vol8num2art4.pdf.

The author reviews the types of mechanisms used to create global maritime security by looking towards

space-based systems (Thomas 2012, 14). Thomas considers possible collaboration in space by creating a

global space partnership (GSP) that initially focused on the maritime domain. The author states that

“increased awareness starts with better ocean and coastal surveillance.”330

He notes that the piracy is on

the increase and certain attacks from sea, such as that in Mumbai, India in November 2008, underline the

need for better maritime awareness. Thomas reviews existing practices and notes that the international

communities in “both the maritime and space segments already cooperate with each other in many

ways,”331

which could set the process towards establishing a GSP.

Thornlow, Christopher C. Fusing Intelligence with Law Enforcement Information: An Analytic

Imperative, Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in

Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense) from the Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005:59,

[accessed 2013-07-17] from: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=452984.

In the aftermath of 9/11, two major shortcomings were revealed, namely that the US military and the

DOD were unable to respond quickly to and defend against the threat posed by foreign terrorists to the

US, and the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities were unable to fuse and analyse foreign

threat intelligence with domestic law enforcement information in a timely fashion to provide the

indications and adequate warnings of such an attack (Thornlow 2005, 1). The author states that DOD’s

response was the creation of the US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), as a means of responding in

a war fighting capacity or in support of civil affairs within continental US if required to do so.

The author reviews the challenges faced by the USNORTHCOM J2 counterterrorism analysts as they try

to produce products that are ‘accurate, timely, and relevant’ using all available sources, including law

enforcement information (Thornlow 2005, 3).

United States Coast Guard. National Search and Rescue Committee, USCG Office of Search and Rescue

website, (no date), [accessed 2013-07-31] from: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/NSARC.asp.

The website refers to the National Search and Rescue Committee (NSARC) in the USCG Office of

Search and Rescue.

United States Department of Homeland Security. Privacy Impact Assessment for the Interagency

Operations Center (IOC) WatchKeeper, DHS/USCG/PIA-020, January 4, 2013:22, [accessed 2013-07-

03] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_uscg_WatchKeeper_20130

104.pdf.

In accordance with the Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFE Port) Act of 2006 (46 US Code,

Section 70107A), DHS has established the IOCs for security in the nation’s 35 most critical ports. The

WatchKeeper system was developed to improve tactical decision-making, situational awareness,

operations monitoring and processing, and joint planning in a coordinated interagency environment. It



http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/NSARC.asp

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_uscg_watchkeeper_20130104.pdf



provides a functioning and shared operational picture, shared mission tasking, and shared response

information to all users within the IOC, partner federal agencies, and local port partners.


Washington, D.C., June 2013:93, [accessed 2013-08-08] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2012%20National%20Network%20of%20Fusion%20

Centers%20Final%20Report.pdf

This report summarizes and characterizes the capabilities and performance of the National Network based

on the results of the 2012 Assessment. The report uses aggregated data from the assessment to describe

the capability and performance achievements of the network (DHS 2012, vi). The report outlines ongoing

efforts by the National Network stakeholders to implement an outcome-based performance management

framework to better understand the value and impact of the National Network in supporting national

information sharing and homeland security outcomes.

Each of the 77 fusion centres completed the 2012 Assessment, which produced scores of 38.4 to 100,

with 9 fusion centres achieving scores of 100 (DHS 2012, vii). The national average was 88.4, which

represents an increase of 11.6 points from the 2011 Assessment. Results from the 2012 Assessment

indicate that the National Network achieved the requisite threshold for each of the attributes associated

with the ‘emerging stage,’ which includes establishing systems, mechanisms, and processes needed to

implement their plans, policies, and standard operating procedures, as well to execute the fusion process

(DHS 2012, ix).


Washington, D.C., May 2012:75, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2011-national-network-fusion-centers-final-report.pdf.

This report is the first of an annual assessment process intended to capture data on the capability of fusion

centers to achieve the critical operational capabilities (COC) and enabling capabilities (EC) for a more

robust capability across the National Network (DHS 2012, 43). The 2011 assessment and the ‘Fusion

Center Performance Program’ provide insight into the National Network’s capabilities, and represent

DHS’ on-going commitment to set-up and implement performance management processes to measure the

progress implementing its mandate.

“The 2011 Assessment also highlighted areas where federal support is required, consistent with the idea

that developing the National Network is a responsibility shared by the state and local governments that

own and operate fusion centers.”332

Each of the seventy-two fusion centres completed the online self-

assessment component of the 2011 Assessment. This allowed DHS to collect data to measure how each

fusion centre contributes to the National Network, and how each centre has progressed in achieving key

operating capabilities.

United States Department of Homeland Security. Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations:

Progress Report 2012, Washington, D.C., 2012:18, [accessed 2013-06-26] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/opa/highlights-of-our-progress-implementing-9-11-

commission-recommendations-progress-report-2011.pdf.

The Annual Progress Report reviewed progress made since 9/11. This report reviewed the status of six

recommendations and associated actions. These include: building the homeland security enterprise;

preventing terrorist travel and improving passenger screening; strengthening surface transportation



http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2011-national-network-fusion-centers-final-report.pdf

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/opa/highlights-of-our-progress-implementing-9-11-commission-recommendations-progress-report-2011.pdf

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/opa/highlights-of-our-progress-implementing-9-11-commission-recommendations-progress-report-2011.pdf


security; strengthening global supply chain security; detecting and preventing biological, radiological, and

nuclear threats; and protecting critical infrastructure.

United States Department of Homeland Security. Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations:

Progress Report 2011, Washington, D.C., 2011:69, [accessed 2013-06-26] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf.

Although the initial report was released in July 2004, an annual progress report takes stock of progress

made in addressing the key recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. In recognition of the tenth

anniversary of 9/11, “this report describes how DHS has addressed specific 9/11 Commission

recommendations over the past ten years, making America stronger and more resilient.”333

The five key recommendations reviewed are: expanding information sharing; enhancing screening for

explosives; protecting cyber networks and critical physical infrastructure; bolstering the security of US

borders and identification documents; and ensuring robust privacy and civil rights and civil liberties

safeguards.334

Although DHS has made progress in implementing these key recommendations,

challenges remain. For example, many states are unable to meet the congressionally mandated REAL ID

requirements.335

United States Department of Homeland Security. Interaction with State and Local Fusion Centers:

Concept of Operations, Washington, D.C., December 2008:47, [accessed 2013-07-31] from:

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/conops.pdf.

The report seeks to establish a framework for a comprehensive, coordinated and consistent approach for

DHS to outreach to State and Local Fusion Centres (DHS 2008, 3). The report outlines DHS processes

relating to their support including intelligence and operational information flows and interactions,

deployment of staff, component integration, and identification of state and local fusion centre

requirements, technical assistance and training (DHS 2008, 16-28). In addition, those state and local

fusion centres that comply with this approach are required to report to DHS in addition to either their state

or local requirements, and observe federal privacy and civil liberties’ requirements (DHS 2008, 29-30).

United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. Relationships Between

Fusion Centers and Emergency Operations Centers, OIG-12-15, Washington, D.C., December 2011:40,

[accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-15_Dec11.pdf.

The report from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reviews the role that fusion centres and

emergency operations centres (EOC) have in linking state and local on-the-ground information with the

strategies and responses of the federal government. The OIG report recognizes the importance of these

relationships working together effectively and the need to establish policies and protocols that coordinate

and share relevant information and intelligence during daily operations and emergencies (OIG 2011, 22).

These centres’ efforts are improved when there is better interaction and information sharing. The OIG

report notes that some fusion centres are all-crimes-oriented and do not consider the EOCs as partners in

their operations. Many EOC officials do not see a need for, or know how to coordinate effectively with

fusion centres that they view as law enforcement entities (OIG 2011, 10). The OIG report recommends

that these officials would benefit from building stronger mutual relationships (OIG 2011, 18, 25).

The OIG report observes that officials at the visited centres were not always aware of each other’s roles,

capabilities, and information needs. In some areas, these officials had limited or no interaction, which

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dhs/conops.pdf

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-15_Dec11.pdf


could hinder a response to natural or man-made disasters. Officials at these centres were not always aware

of, and did not always utilize, federal guidance developed to address coordination and information sharing

efforts, such as that provided in the Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 502 (OIG 2011, 23). The OIG

report notes that the classification of information impedes effective information sharing between the

fusion centres and EOCs. The OIG report observes that such classification challenges also exist at the

federal level and with state law enforcement agency practices (OIG 2011, 28).

United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. DHS’ Efforts to Coordinate

and Enhance its Support and Information Sharing with Fusion Centers, OIG-12-10, Washington, D.C.,

November 2011:54, [accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-

10_Nov11.pdf.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report reviews DHS’ efforts to coordinate activities and

improve information sharing efforts among federal, state, local, and tribal government agencies and the

private sector as required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended. DHS established fusion

centres nationally to promote greater information sharing and collaboration among its stakeholders and

improve its counterterrorism efforts. The OIG report defines a fusion centre as “a collaboration of two or

more agencies to receive, gather, analyze, and disseminate information intending to detect, prevent,

investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity.”336

DHS designated its Office of Intelligence and

Analysis (I&A) using the State and Local Program Office (SLPO) to be responsible for coordinating

federal support to fusion centres.

As of July 2009, I&A acknowledged DHS’ inability to coordinate a department-wide approach to support

and interact with the National Network of Fusion Centres.

“OIG assessed DHS’ efforts to coordinate and improve its support to fusion centers as part of the Fiscal

Year 2011 Annual Performance Plan. OIG reviewed whether: (1) the State and Local Program Office

satisfies the intent of DHS’ recommitment to the State, Local, and Regional Fusion Center Initiative; (2)

planned State and Local Program Office efforts will ensure coordinated support of DHS and its

components to provide needed information and resources to fusion centers; and (3) any functional or

organizational challenges exist within DHS that hinder its successful support to fusion centers.”337

Although SLPO efforts to develop a department-wide fusion centre support strategy are ongoing,

improvements are needed to address remaining challenges. The OIG report identified a number of areas

where improvements are needed in field deployments and DHS portfolio agency support. Challenges

include having field offices seek guidance from component headquarters offices; leveraging the FBI’s

Fusion Centre Engagement Strategy, in Figure 9 of Appendix 15; improving the intelligence officer

selection process and training; and providing more precision regarding their roles and responsibilities, and

performance expectations (OIG 2011, 28-35).

The OIG report concludes that improvements are needed to improve SLPO field deployments and the

DHS component support. The OIG report stresses the need for DHS, state and local stakeholders to

establish a ‘National Network of Fusion Centres’ capable of gathering, receiving, analyzing, and

disseminating relevant information. These centres must be capable of providing relevant situational

awareness and strategic analytical products to DHS. The OIG report stressed that DHS portfolio agencies

and other federal agencies need to understand how their mandates align with those of the fusion centres

(OIG 2011, 38).

United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. Information Sharing with

Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain, OIG-11-04, Washington,

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-10_Nov11.pdf



D.C., October 2010:34, [accessed 2013-06-14] from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-

04_Oct10.pdf.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) report reviews DHS’ strategy, processes, and activities for

facilitating information sharing with fusion centres, and the extent to which information technology

systems support information sharing between DHS and these centres.

According to the OIG report, the fusion centre personnel indicated that information sharing had improved

over time and the information received from DHS met their needs through the assignment of some of

their intelligence officers to the centres (OIG 2010, 13). As a result of improved information sharing,

fusion centres have successfully collaborated with DHS during multiple large-scale events and maintained

situational awareness after attempted terrorist attacks or other incidents (OIG 2010, 13-15). However,

DHS portfolio agency collaboration in the information sharing process needs improvement, and some

intelligence products could better meet state and local needs (OIG 2010, 13-16).

The OIG report notes that the DHS information technology systems do not fully support information

sharing between DHS and state and local fusion centres. It further notes that fusion centre personnel are

relying on e-mail to undertake situational awareness and intelligence sharing instead of using the DHS

information sharing systems (OIG 2010, 19-20). The OIG report also states that fusion centre personnel

identified challenges with limited system content and use, given the existence of too many federal

systems without sufficient training on how to make use of them (OIG 2010, 19).

United States Department of Homeland Security. National Security Presidential Directive NSPD

41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive HSPD 13, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2004: 9,

[accessed 2013-06-24] from: http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf.

The directive establishes US security policy, guidelines and implementation actions to improve US

national security and homeland security by protecting US maritime interests (HSPD 2004, 1). It directs

the coordination of the US maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a consistent national

effort involving all entities. The directive also establishes a Maritime Security Policy Coordinating

Committee for the coordination of interagency maritime security policy.

The directive also identifies areas for inclusion in a National Strategy for maritime security including:

maritime domain awareness (MDA); global maritime intelligence integration; domestic outreach;

coordination of international efforts and international outreach; maritime threat response; maritime

infrastructure recovery; maritime transportation system security; and maritime commerce security (HSPD

2004, 5-8).

United States Department of Justice. Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and

Intelligence in a New Era, Executive Summary, Washington, D.C., 2008:7.

In 2004-05, the states and major urban centres established fusion centres using various local, state and

federal funds (DOJ 2008, 2). At that time, there were not any standards or guidelines available to help

with interoperability and communication issues with other fusion centres at the state, regional and federal

levels. This led to the creation of silos of information rather than an integrated information sharing

network (DOJ 2008, 2). In response, the DOJ and DHS established fusion centre guidelines.

The development of fusion centre guidelines was separated into three phases – law enforcement

intelligence, public safety, and the private sector. These guidelines may be used for homeland security

efforts, as well as all crimes. The guidelines were created to ensure that fusion centres are established and

http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-04_Oct10.pdf


http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf


operated consistently, leading to improved coordination of efforts, strengthened partnerships, and

improved crime-fighting and antiterrorism capabilities (DOJ 2008, 3).

United States Government Accountability Office. Information Sharing: Agencies Could Better

Coordinate to Reduce Overlap in Field-based Activities, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-13-

471, Washington, D.C., April 2013:66, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:

http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653527.pdf.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews five types of field-based information-sharing

entities that are supported by the federal government: the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs); Field

Intelligence Groups (FIGs); Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISSs) centres; State and major

urban area fusion centres; and High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTAs) Investigative Support

Centres. Each entity has a distinct mandate, roles and responsibilities.

In this review, the “GAO identified 91 instances of overlap and in some analytical activities, such as

producing intelligence reports, and 32 instances of overlap in investigative support activities, such as

identifying links between criminal organizations.”338

Some entities conducted overlapping analytical

investigative support activities and services in selected urban areas (GAO 2013, 17). Although this may

lead to benefits, such as validating information for clients, it may also lead to inefficiencies, such as

burdening clients with redundant information.

The GAO observed that RISS centres and HIDTAs operated duplicative deconfliction systems (i.e.,

systems that aim to ensure law enforcement officers are not conducting enforcement actions at the same

time in the same place or investigating the same target, which could pose risks to the officer’s safety and

leads to inefficiencies). Due to a lack of interoperability between the entities’ systems, the law

enforcement agencies need to enter the same information into multiple systems to determine whether their

investigations are conflicting with other agencies or not (GAO 2013, 29-32).

Although the Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) recognized the importance of working together and sharing

information, they did not hold the entities accountable for coordination and have not assessed such

mechanisms for reducing potential overlap and duplication of efforts (GAO 2013, 33). Officials in eight

selected urban areas identified two practices that improved coordination and reduced overlap and

duplication by: (1) including partners on governance boards for the entities; and (2) physically or virtually

co-locating of entities in that area.

United States Government Accountability Office. Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use

and Management of Interagency Operations Centers, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-12-202,

Washington, D.C., February 2012:52, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:


The GAO found that the DHS and the Coast Guard (USCG) did not meet the SAFE Port Act’s

requirement that Interagency Operations Centres (IOC) be established at high priority ports by October

2009. Although the USCG proposed to establish IOCs at all 35 of its sectors, the IOCs have yet to

achieve full operating capability (GAO 2012, 15). The USCG is responsible for establishing IOCs in

response to provisions of the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006. IOCs are to

share maritime information with the USCG’s port partners (other agencies and organizations with which

it coordinates).

The USCG continues its efforts to establish IOCs at 35 locations to meet the SAFE Port Act, IOC

requirement and share MDA information with its port partners. The GAO identified three factors that may




prevent the IOCs from meeting its purpose of improving information-sharing and enhancing MDA across

federal, state, and local port partners. First, the delays and a lack of interagency participation in

developing the IOC concept prevent the USCG from meeting its timelines. Second, most port partners are

not using WatchKeeper—the USCG information-sharing tool designed to assist coordination between the

Coast Guard and its port partners. Third, the poor management of the IOC acquisition project increases

the program’s risk exposure. Without getting port partners’ participation and feedback on the

WatchKeeper information-sharing system could result in establishing a system that does not meet

anyone’s needs or expectations.

“Without improvements in the involvement of other federal, state and local agencies, the use of

WatchKeeper by port partners, and the management of the acquisition, the Coast Guard may not achieve

its goals of interagency maritime integration and cooperation, and the IOCs and WatchKeeper might only

serve the Coast Guard as opposed to the interagency concept intended by Congress.”339

United States Government Accountability Office. Data Mining: DHS Needs to Improve Executive

Oversight of Systems Supporting Counterterrorism, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-11-742,

Washington, D.C., September 2011:70, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:


The “GAO was asked to (1) assess DHS policies for evaluating the effectiveness and privacy protections

of data-mining systems used for counterterrorism, (2) assess DHS agencies’ efforts to evaluate the

effectiveness and privacy protections of their data-mining systems, and (3) describe the challenges facing

DHS in implementing an effective evaluation framework. To do so, the GAO developed a systematic

evaluation framework based on recommendations and best practices outlined by the National Research

Council, industry practices, and prior GAO reports. The GAO compared its evaluation framework to

DHS’s and policies of three component agencies and to six systems’ practices, and interviewed agency

officials about gaps in their evaluations and challenges.”340

Although DHS and three of its component agencies, namely the US Customs and Border Protection

(CBP), the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the US Citizenship and Immigration

Services (USCIS), have established policies covering most of the systematic evaluation framework policy

elements, the GAO found that these policies were not comprehensive (GAO 2011,15). For example,

DHS policies did not fully allow for executive review and transparency nor do the component agencies’

policies require evaluating the system’s effectiveness (GAO 2011, 17). The GAO notes that DHS and its

component agencies risk developing and acquiring systems that are not effectively supporting their

missions or adequately providing protection of privacy-related information.

According to the GAO, DHS’ key challenges lie with implementing framework systems that are effective

and provide privacy protection. This will involve reviewing and overseeing systems when they are in

operation, stabilizing and implementing acquisition policies throughout the department, and ensuring that

privacy-sensitive systems have up-to-date privacy reviews. The GAO concludes that until DHS addresses

these challenges, it will be limited in its ability to confirm that its systems have been adequately reviewed,

and are operating as intended, with the appropriate individual privacy protections and have effective

public oversight (GAO 2011, 32).

United States Government Accountability Office. Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define How it

Plans to Meet Its State and Local Mission and Improve Performance Accountability, Report to the

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, GAO-11-223, Washington,

D.C., December 2010:52, [accessed 2013-06-17] from: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11223.pdf.

The GAO found that I&A initiatives are underway to improve its intelligence products to State and local

fusion centres. However, strengthening these initiatives could help to make sure that I&A intelligence


http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11223.pdf


products are useful and respond to State and local needs (GAO 2010, 11). Although I&A has taken steps

to identify State and local information needs, the GAO indicated that using performance measures for

completing products would hold I&A accountable in assisting the States and local partners, and would

support future product development (GAO 2010,13). I&A has also deployed personnel to fusion centres

and provided other services341

to State and local partners (GAO 2010, 19).

I&A provided products and support to a variety of State and local information requests using a 24-hour

support mechanism called the Single Point of Service (SPS).

“Through the Single Point of Service, I&A has consolidated and standardized its tracking of state and

local client queries and communication using a single term—State and Local Support Request—which

includes requests for information, production, administrative tasks, analysis, and various support

functions.”342

I&A has also developed key performance indicators and measures to track the performance aspects of

service, such as the timeliness of responses and percentage of responses completed (refer to Table 5 in

Appendix 16 and Table 6 in Appendix 17 for details). The GAO concluded that I&A should commit to

plans and time frames for developing its outcome-based performance measures to gauge the results and

impacts of the State and local fusion centres’ information-sharing, and how such efforts have affected

homeland security to establish DHS’s accountability for funding provided (GAO 2010, 33).

United States Government. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005:27, [accessed

2013-07-15] from: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456414.

Following the events of 9/11, the US Government (USG) issued the national maritime security strategy as

its platform to combat the evolving threats of terrorism (USG 2005, 4-5). The strategy aligns all federal

government maritime security programs and initiatives into a comprehensive national effort involving

federal, state, local and private sector entities (USG 2005, 25). The National Strategy for Maritime

Security and its eight supporting plans present a national effort to promote global economic stability and

protect legitimate actions while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the maritime domain (USG 2005,

26).

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint

Publication 2-01, Washington, D.C., 05 January 2012:281, [accessed 2013-07-31] from:

http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2_01.pdf.

The report provides a framework for joint and national intelligence products, services and support to joint

military operations (USJCS 2012, i). It describes the organization of the various communities involved

and their support mechanisms. It provides information on the fundamentals observed for intelligence

planning, collection and dissemination, and how intelligence supports joint and multinational operations

(USJCS 2012, i).

United States Northern Command. About USNORTHCOM, no date, [accessed 2013-07-17] from:

http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx.

The website describes the mission for the US Northern Command and its subordinate commands.

United States Senate. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority

and Minority Staff Report, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent

Subcommittee of Investigations, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2012:153, [accessed 2013-06-12] from:

www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=49139e81-1dd7-4788-a3bb.


http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2_01.pdf

http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx

http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=49139e81-1dd7-4788-a3bb


The Senate Subcommittee (Subcommittee) investigation found that DHS-assigned employees to the

fusion centres forwarded ‘intelligence’ of uneven quality, rarely related to counterterrorism, and

occasionally taken from already-published open sources (US Senate 2012, 1). Moreover, the

Subcommittee investigation also found the DHS officials’ public claims about the fusion centres were not

often accurate. In fact, the Subcommittee determined that DHS officials overstated the fusion centres

success stories.

Since 2003, more than 70 state and local fusion centres have been supported in part with federal funds,

and were created to strengthen the US intelligence capabilities in relation to terrorist activities. DHS’

support for and involvement with these centres has, since the beginning, focussed on their ability to

strengthen federal counterterrorism efforts (US Senate 2012, 1). The Subcommittee discovered that a

2010 assessment of state and local fusion centers conducted at DHS’ request found widespread

deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities. This report was not

shared with Congress nor did DHS discuss its findings publicly. “When the Subcommittee requested the

assessment as part of its investigation, DHS at first denied it existed, then disputed whether it could be

shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy.”343

The Subcommittee reviewed how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of

DHS, disseminated hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to support state and local fusion centers.

DHS was unable to provide an accurate total of how much was granted to states and cities to support

these fusion centres, instead DHS provided an estimate of the total expenditure from 2003 to 2011,

estimates which ranged from USD 289 million to USD 1.4 billion.

The Subcommittee investigation determined that DHS’s involvement with fusion centres did not produce

the results anticipated by statute, White House strategies or DHS’ own 2006 plan. Specifically, the fusion

centres have not yielded timely counterterrorism intelligence that could be used by the federal intelligence

community (US Senate 2012, 8). The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS did not establish

the appropriate policies, training, personnel or practices in place to receive information from state and

local fusion centres and make it available to federal agencies (US Senate 2012, 8).

The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS did not provide funding oversight of how state and local

agencies spent grant funds that DHS intended to support fusion centres; it did not confirm that the grants

that DHS made to fusion centre projects were effective, nor did it attempt to determine whether the

product of its efforts and spending were equal with the amount of its investment (US Senate 2012, 8).

Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from April 1, 2009 to

April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no reporting which uncovered a terrorist

threat, nor could it identify a contribution that such fusion centre reporting made to disrupt an active

terrorist plot (US Senate 2012, 8). In fact, many centres did not consider counterterrorism an explicit part

of their mandate or were not concerned with doing counterterrorism work (US Senate 2012, 8).

Instead, the Subcommittee investigation determined that these fusion centres were providing local

services in other fields, such as traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster and recovery

efforts. Those aspects were not examined by the Subcommittee and it confined its work to examining the

value of federal support for and involvement in the state and local fusion centres regarding the

counterterrorism objectives established by legislation, the White House strategy, DHS policies and its

assessments (US Senate 2012, 9).

United States Senate. Summary of Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Committee

on Governmental Affairs, Senator Susan M. Collins, Chairman, Washington, D.C., December 6, 2004:26,

[accessed 2013-06-12] from: http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/s2845-summ.pdf.

http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_rpt/s2845-summ.pdf


The summary document issued by the US Senate identifies the key elements included in the Intelligence

Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, US Code, Public Law 108-458. Relevant sections

include: Section 1016 that establishes the requirement to set up an Information Sharing Environment

(ISE); and Subtitle B, Sections 1021 to 1023 inclusive that require establishment of a National

Counterterrorism Center (s. 1021), National Counterproliferation Center (s. 1022), and National

Intelligence Centers (s. 1023).


9.0 Appendices

Appendix 1: Proposed Databases and Keywords for Annotated Bibliography

English databases

1. Academic Search Primer

2. eBook Collection (EBSCO host)

3. Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery Reference Center

4. Business Source Elite

5. National Criminal Justice Reference Abstract Database (NCJRS)

6. Regional Business News

7. Theses Canada

8. Hein on-line

English keywords

Search 1: (fusion centres) OR (information centres) OR (intelligence centres) OR (marine security) OR

(maritime security) AND (Australia OR New Zealand OR NZ OR Singapore OR United Kingdom OR

UK OR United States OR US OR Association of South East Asian Nations OR ASEAN OR European

Union OR EU)

Search 2: (roles) OR (responsibilities) OR (governance) AND (Australia OR New Zealand OR NZ OR

Singapore OR United Kingdom OR UK OR United States OR US OR Association of South East Asian

Nations OR ASEAN OR European Union OR EU)

Search 3: (effectiveness) OR (culture of prevention) OR (performance metrics) AND (fusion centres)


Appendix 2: Australia: Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction344

Figure 1: Australia’s Maritime Jurisdiction


Appendix 3: EU: Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)23

Table 1: European Union: Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)

MARSUR at a glance:

It is a 17 Member States, plus Norway, network enabling the exchange of maritime surveillance information

between participating States.

It aims at improving the common Recognized Maritime Picture by linking up existing (military) maritime net-

works and systems, fostering the exchange of data, information and knowledge; the network allows primarily

the exchange of operational maritime data (vessel tracks, ship position reports and identification data); however,

in theory, it would be possible to exchange any type of data over the network.

It was launched in 2006; the demonstration phase started at the end of 2010 in order to prove the value of this

integrated network.

The implementation is planned to start at the beginning of 2012 in order to have the network fully operational

by 2014.

MARSUR in practice:

The 15 initial participating Member States are: Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Finland, Greece, France, Ire-

land, Italy, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and UK. Bulgaria, Latvia and Norway joined

this community in October 2012 by signing the Technical Arrangement “Live phase”.

The MARSUR network has been designed in collaboration with EU agencies such as: EUMS (EU Military

Staff), DG MARE (Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs & Fisheries), FRONTEX, EUSC (EU Satellite

Centre), DG ENTR (Directorate-General for Enterprise & Industry), JRC (Joint Research Centre), DG HOME

(Directorate-General for Home Affairs), etc.

The system was developed by the military community with the aim of improving decision making for and dur-

ing CSDP military operations. However the approach used by the MARSUR network is not specific for the

military context, allowing the network to be leveraged to other user communities.

23European Defence Agency. Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR), Fact sheet, October 10, 2012: 2, [accessed 2013-

06-04] from: http://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/eda-factsheets/marsur-factsheet-v2_09102012_cs5_bleu.



Table 1: European Union: Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)

Landscape, architecture and capabilities

National Nodes (MEXS) serves as a national hub and gateway to the network. National systems are connected to the National Node

via API interfaces. Services can be both distributed and central.


Appendix 4: EU: Common Information Sharing Environment User Communities24

Table 2: European Union: Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) User Communities

Members of the CISE

(User Communities)

CISE Monitoring and Support Functions

1. Maritime safety

(including SAR),

maritime security and

prevention of pollution

caused by ships

Monitoring of compliance with regulations on the safety and prevention of

pollution caused by ships [construction, equipment, crew/passengers, cargo];

support of enforcement operations

Monitoring of compliance with regulations on the safety of navigation (vessel

traffic safety); support of enforcement operations

Monitoring of compliance with regulations on the security of ships; support of

enforcement operations

Supporting safe and efficient flow of vessel traffic; vessel traffic management

Early warning/identification of ships/persons in distress; support of response

operations [search and rescue, salvage, place of refuge]

Early warning/identification of threats/acts of piracy or armed robbery; support

of response operations

24European Commission Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Integrating Maritime Surveillance, Communication from

the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Draft Roadmap towards establishing the Common

Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the EU maritime domain, COM(2010) 584 final,

2010:24:23, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:

http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/integrated_maritime_surveillance/documents/integrating_maritime_survei

llance_en.pdf.




Table 2: European Union: Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) User Communities

Members of the CISE

(User Communities)

CISE Monitoring and Support Functions

2. Fisheries control Monitoring of compliance with regulation on fisheries; support of enforcement

operations

Early warning/identification of illegal fisheries or fish landings; support of

response operations

3. Marine pollution

preparedness and

response; Marine

environment

Monitoring of compliance with regulations on the protection of the marine

environment; support of enforcement operations

Early warning/identification of incidents/accidents that may have an

environmental impact; support of pollution response operations

4. Customs Monitoring of compliance with customs regulations on the import, export and

movement of goods; support of response operations

Early warning/identification of criminal trafficking of goods [narcotics, weapons,

etc.]; support of response operations

5. Border control Monitoring of compliance with regulations on immigration and border crossing;

support of enforcement operations

Early warning/identification of cases of illegal migration or trafficking in human

beings; support of response operations

6. General law

enforcement

Monitoring of compliance with applicable legislation in sea areas, where there is

policing competence and support to enforcement and/or response operations

7. Defence Monitoring in support of general defence tasks, such as:

Exercising national sovereignty at sea;

Combating terrorism and other hostile activities outside the EU;

Other Common Security and Defence Policy tasks, as defined in

Articles 42 and 43 TEU.


Appendix 5: EU: Link between CISE and EUROSUR25

Figure 2: Link between the CISE in the Integrated Maritime Surveillance and the EUROSUR of the EU Border Surveillance.

INTEGRATED MARITIME POLICY

Marine data

and

knowledge

Maritime

spatial

planning

Blue growth

INTEGRATED

MARITIME

SURVEILLANCE

CISE

Main EU

Institutions

dealing

with the

IMS

EU Initiatives

on Maritime

Surveillance

Data from seas as

a global system

connected by shifting winds,

seasonal currents and migrating

species

Planning

and

regulating all human

uses of the sea, while

protecting

marine ecosystems

*Identify and tackle

challenges (economic,

environmental, & social)

affecting all sectors of maritime economy. *Highlight synergies between sectoral policies. *Study

interactions between the

different activities and their potential impact on the

marine environment

and biodiversity

*Identify activities with high growth

potential in the long term and support them.

Maritime Safety; Maritime Security;

prevention of

pollution caused by ships.

DG MOVE,

EMSA

VTIMIS,

SAFESEANET

Fisheries control

DG MARE,

DG ENV.

VMS

Marine pollution preparedness and

response; Marine

environment

DG MARE

GMES

Customs

DG TAXUD

Border control

DG HOME,

FRONTEX

EUROSUR

INTEGRATED BORDER

MANAGEMENT

General law

enforcement

EUROPOL

EUROSUR

EUROSU

R

Maritime EU Border Surveillance

Smart Borders

Land

Defence EEAS, EDA

MARSUR

Notes: Row 1: DG MOVE: Directorate-General for Mobility & Transport; EMSA: European Maritime Safety Agency; VTMIS: Vessel Traffic Monitoring &

Information Systems; SAFESEANET: Safe Sea Network

Row 2: DG MARE: Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs & Fisheries; DG ENV: Directorate-General for Environment; VMS: Vessel Monitoring System

Row 3: DG MARE; GMES: Global Monitoring for Environment & Security

Row 4: DG TAXUD: Directorate-General for Taxation & Customs Union Row 5: DG HOME: Directorate-General for Home Affairs; FRONTEX: European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External

Borders of the Member States of the European Union; EUROSUR: European External Border Surveillance System

Row 6: EUROPOL: European Police Service; EUROSUR Row 7: EEAS: European External Action Service; EDA: European Defence Agency; MARSUR: European Maritime Surveillance

25European Organisation for Security. EOS Recommendations for an Integrated Surveillance of the EU Maritime

Domain, June 2012:72:13, [accessed 2013-06-25] from: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10316215/eos-

recommendations-for-an-integrated-surveillance-of-the-eu-.




Appendix 6: EU: Overview of International Initiatives of Maritime Security26

Figure 3: Overview of International Initiatives in Maritime Security

The national and international measures proposed here in the area of maritime monitoring, information gathering and

situational awareness (VRMTC [Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre], TRMN [Trans-Regional Maritime Network],

SUCBAS [Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea], MARSUR [European Maritime Surveillance], RMP [Recognized

Maritime Picture], MDA [Maritime Domain Awareness], MSSIS [Maritime Safety and Security Information System]) and

the improvement of maritime security and cooperation (CDP [Capability Development Plan], Maritime Mine Counter

Measures, EPN [European Patrol Network], Global Maritime Partnership) make clear the complexity and redundancy of

national, regional and international goals in the deployment of maritime security. Current programs and measures such as

VRMTC and MSSIS are based on ad hoc-initiatives, are not coordinated with each other, and contrary to their intentions,

neither compatible nor complementary. These are not systems that operate on the basis of interoperability. They are

confronted with cultural and legal barriers that work against a common situational awareness.

26Masala, C. (Prof. Dr.) and Tsetsos, K. (M.A.). “The Maritime Dimension of the European Union’s and Germany’s

Security and Defence Policy in the 21st Century,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International

Security, May 2013:44:27, [accessed 2013-06-10] from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-

Library/Publications/Detail/?id=164132.




Appendix 7: EU: European Maritime Surveillance Networking - MARSUR27

Figure 4: European Maritime Surveillance Networking – MARSUR The European–wide MARSUR is the first project to integrate sea surveillance at the European level, and it an excellent forum for

cooperation. European MARSUR is a key contributor or, and plays a significant role in maritime surveillance activities by

European Nations, the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), as well as in the safety and security of the EU.

As of April 2012, 15 European countries have signed the agreement. The technology in MARSUR allows not just the

cooperation between navies, but also with all maritime-related agencies that wish to join the initiative. MARSUR does not

require new and expensive systems. EU Member States envisaged the MARSUR networking in a regional, non-centralized

approach by connecting their Maritime Surveillance Systems with their existing sensors and having the manual sharing of

information. The latter was achieved in a system-of-systems solution through a type of proxy with a sharing of the contact details

of each participating member state. Notes:

SUCBAS refers to Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic Sea

SUCFIS refers to Sea Surveillance Cooperation Finland Sweden

27Staff, P. Commander. “European Maritime Surveillance Networking – MARSUR,” NMIO Technical Bulletin

(National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April 2012:16:3-5:3-4, [accessed 2013-05-31] from:




Appendix 8: NZ: Roles of the National Maritime Coordination Centre and the Core Agencies28

Figure 5: Roles of the National Maritime Coordination Centre, the New Zealand Defence Force, and

Other Core Agencies

Agency Roles

National Maritime

Coordination Centre

Coordinates civilian maritime patrols.

Collates and provides information on the maritime domain.

New Zealand Defence

Force29

Provides patrol ships and aircraft.

Decides how patrol time (aerial patrol hours or sea days) is allocated for civilian

maritime patrols.

Contributes to regional and global security using maritime patrols.

New Zealand Customs

Service

Uses maritime patrols to detect and gather information on customs infringements

and risks, and to provide deterrence.

Provides information on maritime patrol needs.

Can provide vessels for maritime patrols, largely for coastal purposes

(inshore/harbours).

Host agency for the National Maritime Coordination Centre.

Ministry of Fisheries Uses maritime patrols to gather information on fishing activities.


Department of Conservation Uses maritime patrols to re-supply its bases on remote islands for enforcement

28Office of the Controller and Auditor General. “Effectiveness of Arrangements for Coordinating Civilian Maritime

Patrols,” Performance Audit Report, Wellington, NZ, April 2010:58:14, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:

http://www.oag.govt.nz/2010/maritime-patrols/docs/maritime-patrols.pdf. 29

Royal New Zealand Air Force and Royal New Zealand Navy



Figure 5: Roles of the National Maritime Coordination Centre, the New Zealand Defence Force, and

Other Core Agencies

Agency Roles

activity in marine reserves, and for conservation programmes covering sea birds and

marine mammal species.


Can provide vessels for maritime patrols, largely for coastal purposes

(inshore/harbours).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

and Trade

Uses maritime patrols to fulfill regional obligations for Pacific region patrols in the

Southern Ocean for foreign policy and resource protection interests.


New Zealand Police Uses maritime patrols to support search and rescue operations, and for occasional

police operations.


Can provide vessels for maritime patrols, mostly for coastal purposes

(inshore/harbours).

Maritime New Zealand Uses maritime patrols in fulfilling responsibilities for marine environmental

protection, maritime safety, maritime security, and search and rescue.



Appendix 9: Singapore: Joint Exercises and Patrols Held by Military and Paramilitary Organizations in Asia30

Table 3: Joint exercises and patrols held by military and paramilitary organizations in Asia

Date Countries Involved Cooperation Type Military/Paramilitary

organization involved

Cooperation amongst coastal states

From Jan 1991 Malaysia, Indonesia Regular coordinated patrols Navy

From Aug 1992 Indonesia, Singapore Regular coordinated patrols Navy, Marine, Police

From Jul 1998 Thailand, Cambodia Joint patrols Navy

From Jun 1999 Thailand, Vietnam Joint patrols Navy

From Aug 2001 Malaysia, Philippines Joint patrols Navy

Oct 2001 Singapore, Indonesia Joint drill Navy

Nov 2001 Malaysia, Indonesia Bi-annual joint exercise Navy

May 2002 Malaysia, Philippines Joint exercise Navy

Sept 2002 Malaysia, Indonesia Joint exercise Police

Oct 2003 Malaysia, Philippines Joint exercise Navy

30He, R. “Coast Guards and Maritime Piracy: Sailing Past the Impediments to Cooperation in Asia,” The Pacific

Review, 22(5) December 2009:667-689.





From Jul 2004 Singapore, Indonesia,

Malaysia

Coordinated patrols Navy

Oct 2004 Indonesia, Malaysia Joint exercise Navy

May 2005 Malaysia, Indonesia Joint exercise Navy

Jul 2005 Malaysia, Philippines Joint exercise Navy

Sept 2005 Malaysia, Indonesia Joint patrol Police

Aug 2007 Malaysia, Indonesia Joint exercise Marine police

Cooperation between extra-regional state and coastal state

Aug 2000 India, Vietnam Joint exercise Navy

Nov 2000 Japan, Malaysia Joint exercise Coast Guard

Jul 2001 Japan, Singapore Joint drill Coast Guard

Jul 2001 Japan, Brunei Joint drill Coast Guard, Police

Aug 2001 Japan, Thailand Joint mission Coast Guard

Oct 2001 Japan, Philippines Joint mission Coast Guard

Mar 2002 Japan, Indonesia Joint exercise Coast Guard

Aug 2002 Japan, Brunei Joint exercise Coast Guard, Police

Sept 2002 India, Indonesia Coordinated patrols Navy

Mar 2003 Japan, Philippines Joint exercise Coast Guard





Oct 2003 India, Thailand Joint patrol Navy

Dec 2003 Japan, Singapore Joint exercise Coast Guard

Feb 2004 Japan, Thailand Joint drill Coast Guard

Mar 2005 India, Singapore Joint exercise Navy

May 2005 India, Thailand Joint patrols Navy

Aug 2005 Japan, Brunei Joint exercise Coast Guard

Nov 2005 India, Philippines Joint exercise Coast Guard

Jan 2006 Japan, Philippines Joint exercise Coast Guard

Mar 2006 France, Brunei Joint exercise Navy

Mar 2006 USA, Indonesia Joint exercise Navy

June 2006 India, Thailand Joint exercise Navy

Aug 2006 USA, Philippines Joint exercise Navy

Aug 2006 Singapore, South Korea Joint exercise Coast Guard

Jan 2007 Japan, Malaysia,

Thailand

Joint exercise Coast Guard

June 2007 USA, Philippines Joint exercise Navy

Sept 2007 India, Indonesia 3 weeks coordinated patrol Navy

Sept 2007 USA, Australia, Japan,

Singapore, India

Joint exercise Navy





Cooperation amongst extra-regional states

Aug 2000 India, France Joint exercise Navy

From Nov 2000 Japan, India Annual joint exercise Coast Guard

May 2001 Japan, India, Russia Joint drill Coast Guard, Federal

Border Service

Aug 2003 Russia, USA, China,

Japan, South Korea,

North Korea

Joint exercise Navy

Nov 2003 India, China Joint exercise Navy

Nov 2004 Japan, India Joint exercise Coast Guard


Appendix 10: Singapore: Key Maritime Concerns in Southeast Asia31

Table 4: Key Maritime Concerns in Southeast Asia

Countries Key Concerns

Brunei32

maritime terrorism piracy maritime boundaries protection of

offshore industry

Cambodia maritime terrorism piracy maritime boundaries drug & human

smuggling

Indonesia maritime boundaries illegal fishing smuggling marine pollution

Malaysia drug, human &

cigarette smuggling

illegal fishing

Myanmar maritime boundaries drug & arms

trafficking

human smuggling illegal fishing

Philippines oil smuggling human trafficking piracy & sea robbery marine pollution

Singapore maritime terrorism sea lanes security piracy & sea robbery human smuggling

Thailand

human smuggling illegal fishing piracy & sea robbery maritime terrorism

31Lim, N. Lieutenant Commander. “The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) – A Case for Information Sharing to

Enforce Security in the Maritime Domain,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces Supplement: Pointer, April

2011:50:3-11:4, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/content/imindef/publications/pointer/supplements/IFC/_jcr_content/imindefPars/0006/file

.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf. 32

Ministry of Defence, Brunei Darussalam. “Defending the Nation’s Sovereignty,” Brunei Darussalam Defence

White Paper 2011, 2011:45,[accessed 2013-06-04] from: http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Brunei_ENG_2011.pdf.



http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/Brunei_ENG_2011.pdf


Appendix 11: UK-based Centres: Working Together for Peace and Security33

Figure 5: Working Together for Peace and Security

Notes:

UN refers to the United Nations

OSCE refers to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

CoE refers to the Council of Europe

NATO refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

EU refers to the European Union

33Feldt, L. “The NATO and EU in the Asia-Pacific Century,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and

International Security, June 2012:19:5, [accessed 2013-06-24] from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-





Appendix 12: US: Information Sharing Environment34

Figure 6: From 2009 Annual Report to US Congress, Information Sharing Environment (ISE)

The ISE framework is built around four functional areas—creating a culture of sharing; reducing barriers to sharing;

improving sharing practices; and institutionalizing sharing.

34Caswell, K.L. Jr. Lt. Establishment of the National Maritime Intelligence Center: Understanding the Foundations

of Trust to Support a Collaborative Environment in Homeland Security, Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2010:64:23,

[accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518529.pdf.



Appendix 13: US: Enterprising Hub Structure35

Figure 7: From the National Concept of Operations to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, Enterprising Hub

Structure

The Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Concept of Operations weighs trust as a critical element in the overall

success of MDA: Effective Intelligence and information sharing is critical to understanding the maritime domain

and improving safety and security of the US. For information sharing to succeed, there must be trust – in

information providers, the users of information, policymakers, and most importantly of the public. Each of these

must believe that information is being shared appropriately, consistent with law and in a manner protective of

privacy and civil liberties. The MDA Concept of Operations is structured around identifying key ‘Enterprising

Hubs’ to assume responsibility for certain functional areas.







Appendix 14: US: Single Integrated Look-Out List (SILO)36

Figure 8: Single Integrated Look-Out (SILO)

NATO refers to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

CMFP refers to Combined Maritime Forces Pacific

CMFC refers to Combined Maritime Forces Central Command

Commonwealth refers to the Commonwealth of Nations

36Cunningham, J. “Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness with the Single Integrated Lookout List (SILO),” NMIO

Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 1, January 2012:16:8, [accessed

2013-06-24] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO%20Quarterly.pdf.



Appendix 15: US: FBI Engagement Levels at Fusion Centres37

Figure 9: DHS’ Efforts to Coordinate and Enhance Its Support and Information Sharing With Fusion Centres

To standardize its approach to interacting with fusion centres, the FBI Fusion Center Integration Unit (FCIU) first

evaluated its field offices’ engagement with fusion centres. The evaluation included engagement with fusion centres

that were not currently designated, but with which a partnership was mutually beneficial. The FCIU defined three

levels of fusion center engagement: Liaison, Basic, and Enhanced. Figure 8 shows these engagement levels, which

describe increasing interaction and support.

37United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. DHS’ Efforts to Coordinate and

Enhance its Support and Information Sharing with Fusion Centers, OIG-12-10, Washington, D.C., November

2011:54:34, [accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_12-10_Nov11.pdf.



Appendix 16: US: Categories of State and Local Support Requests38

Table 5: Categories of State and Local Support Requests (SLSRs) that are received and tracked by the

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

SLSR Category Description

Administrative Includes technical support, information assistance, contact

information, and requests pertaining to procedural tasks.

Further Dissemination Requests to actively increase exposure and visibility for a specific

product within the intelligence community and state and local

communities. These include postings to multimedia web pages and

community forums, requests for internal distribution, dissemination to

DHS Components or the intelligence community, foreign disclosure,

translation and classification changes.

Intelligence Production Intelligence requests for assessments that require intensive analytical

support, intelligence collaboration, or intelligence community or DHS

Component input. These SLSRs include detailed trend analysis,

production, or any joint intelligence product.

Homeland Intelligence Report Production

A separate and recognizable category that denotes production,

nomination, and review of Homeland Intelligence Reports.

Name Trace Requests involve searching one or more databases for information on

a specific person or persons. Name traces include searches on law

enforcement and intelligence databases.

Watch Intelligence Includes intelligence or law enforcement requests for immediate

requirements for products or information of intelligence value. This

category includes intelligence evaluation, information requests, and

fusion.

Suspicious Activity Report Evaluation

These SLSRs require distribution, clarification, or fusion of

information pertaining to suspicious or potentially suspicious

activities.*

Suspicious Activity Report Analysis Requests, spurred by a suspicious activity, that indicate a need for, or

are best supported through, analysis or assessment. This category

38United States Government Accountability Office. Information Sharing: DHS Could Better Define How it Plans to

Meet Its State and Local Mission and Improve Performance Accountability, Report to Congressional Requesters,

GAO-11-223, Washington, D.C., December 2010:52:38, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11223.pdf.



Table 5: Categories of State and Local Support Requests (SLSRs) that are received and tracked by the

Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)

SLSR Category Description

reflects requests that require an analytical effort by DHS, its

Components, or other members of the intelligence community. This

category includes Suspicious Activity Report trend analysis,

predictive analysis, or impact assessment.

Notes: *A suspicious activity is any person or group collecting intelligence or conducting preoperational planning related to

terrorism, criminal, or other illicit activity. These activities include surveillance, photography of facilities, site breaches or

physical intrusions, cyber attacks, and the examination of security.

• DHS refers to the Department of Homeland Security

• I&A refers to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis

• SLSRs refers to the State and Local Support Requests


Appendix 17: US: Key Performance Indicators and Metrics for the Single Point of Service39

Table 6: Measures, Goals, Key Performance Indicators, and Metrics for Single Point of Service

Measure Goal Key Performance Indicator Metrics

Accessibility/Availability To provide States and local

customers with a single,

efficient point of entry for

information requests,

communication, and

feedback.

Increase/Decrease in the number

of requests submitted through the

SPS

Quarterly

comparisons of

SLSR submission

Geographic Expansion Submissions by

State

Submission by

Fusion Centre

Speed of SLSR

acceptance/acknowledgement by

the SPS

Acceptance rate

Timeliness To provide timely and

optimally useful analysis

for State and local

customers.

Length of time taken to complete

a SLSR

Production

timelines

Number of closed SLSRs are at

least 80 percent of the total

number submitted

Completion ratio

Pertinence To ensure that the SPS can

connect State and local

customers with the DHS or

intelligence community

element that can provide

customers a complete and

Requests routed to organizations

that have the expertise and

resources to address the SLSR

Distribution of

SLSRs

Status of open

SLSRs







Table 6: Measures, Goals, Key Performance Indicators, and Metrics for Single Point of Service

Measure Goal Key Performance Indicator Metrics

relevant product

Depth and Precision To respond with sufficient

detail and exactness to best

inform the different needs

of State and local customers

State and local customers seek

intelligence support through the

SPS.

SLSR requests by

category and State

SLSR

identification

Notes:

SPS refers to Single Point of Service

SLSR refers to States and Local Support Requests

DHS refers to the Department of Homeland Security


Appendix 18: US: Maritime Domain Awareness40

The Maritime Domain Awareness Overview (MDA) functions on many levels. It ranges from the local to

regional to global maritime situational awareness (MSA) with different layers of situational and sensor

awareness. Each level of MSA involves: management; collection; fusion and analysis; and net-centric

dissemination. Each layer also has its own level of strategic, operational and tactical approaches (i.e., the

strategic MDA (Global trust confidence), the Operational MDA (Regional & Interagency Info Sharing)

and Tactical MDA (Near & Real Time Exchanges)).

40Salchert, K. Captain. Allied Information Exchange Workshop on Maritime Security, Quantico, VA,

Unclassified, 25 April 2013:11:9, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:

https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Entities/DHSCMREACT/Informatio/Salchert_N/file/_WFS/Salchert_N

ORAD%20Brief%20for%20Quantico%2025%20Apr%202013.pdf.

https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Entities/DHSCMREACT/Informatio/Salchert_N/file/_WFS/Salchert_NORAD%20Brief%20for%20Quantico%2025%20Apr%202013.pdf

https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/Entities/DHSCMREACT/Informatio/Salchert_N/file/_WFS/Salchert_NORAD%20Brief%20for%20Quantico%2025%20Apr%202013.pdf


Appendix 19: Discussion: General Country Comparison

Table 7: Discussion: General Country Comparison of Maritime Security Regimes41

Country Australia European

Union

New

Zealand

Singapore United

Kingdom United States Canada

Program

authority

- EUROSUR

Regulation345

Cabinet

approval (Dec

2006)346

- UK Government

directed the

Cabinet Office to

create a National

Maritime

Information

Centre

(NMIC)347

National Maritime

Intelligence-

Integration Office

(NMIO), the USCG

fusion centres (i.e.,

ICC and MIFCs),

and the National

Counter-terrorism

Center are the

National Security

Act of 1947, the

Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism

Prevention Act of

2004, Title 10 and

Title 50, US Code,

and Executive

Order 12333 of

1981.348

Approval (April

2004)

Mandate &

authority to

collect, share &

analyze

information

BPC

(AQIS349,

Customs,350

AFMA,351

AMSA,352

ADF353)

EU Integrated

Maritime

Policy

Regulation

1255/2011,354

EUROSUR

NMCC

(NZDF,355

NZCS,356

NZF357)

SMSC (RSN,358

Maritime & Port

Authority

Singapore,359

Police Coast

Guard360)

NMIC (MCA,361

SOCA,362

UKBF,363

MoD,364

MMO365)

Interagency

Operations Centres

(IOCs) are

“authorized to

collect information

from the Security

and Accountability

for Every Port

(SAFE Port) Act of

2006 (46 US Code

Section 70107A),

which authorizes

DND, RCMP,

CBSA, TC,

C&P, CCG:

various acts,

policies, and

regulations

41All regimes are being compared on the national or regional level as is the case of the EU.




Union

New

Zealand

Singapore United


the Coast Guard

WatchKeeper

system to collect the

required

information.

Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism

Prevention Act of

2004, Title 10 and

Title 50, US Code,

and Executive

Order 12333 of

1981.366

Governance

-accountability

Minister for

Customs and

Border

Protection and

Minister of

Defence367

Article 13 of

EU IMP

Regulation

requires EU

Commission

(Home Affairs)

to report to EU

Parliament368

Comptroller

Customs369

Minister of

Defence370

Minister for

Home Office371

NMIO: Secretary of

Defense (Navy,

Marine Corps);

Secretary of

Homeland Defense

(Coast Guard)

IOCs: Secretary of

Homeland

Defense372

-

-roles &

responsibilities

Border

Protection

Command

(multi-agency

task force)373

EU Integrated

Maritime

Policy

Regulation

1255/2011374

Cabinet

approval (Dec

2006)375

Minister of

Defence376

Government

directed the

Cabinet Office to

create a NMIC377

Defined in program

authority statutes,

policies, rules,

regulations, and

executive orders

Defined in the

2004 National

Security Policy

and in the

Concept of

Operations

-transparency - Article 13 of

EU IMP

Regulation

requires EU

Commission

(Home Affairs)

to report to EU

Parliament378

Safeguard in

EUROSUR

Reports

through the

Comptroller

Customs

(annual

report)380

- - Audited by the

Office of Inspector

General (Defense

and Homeland

Security). Only

non-sensitive audits

are publicly

available, such as

GAO audit on

IOCs.

-




Union

New

Zealand

Singapore United


Regulation379

Information

Sharing

-platform used

Australian

Maritime

Information

System381

Common

Information

Sharing

Environment

(CISE)382 and

MARSUR

Exchange

system

(MEXS)383

Multi-agency

Network –

Restricted

(MAN-R)384

Regional

Maritime

Information

Exchange

(ReMIX)

Internet portal385

& ACCESS

system.386

MARSUR

Exchange system

(MEXS),

Maritime Event

Tracking &

Information

System

(METIS)387

Information Sharing

Environment

(ISE),388 Combined

Enterprise Regional

Information

Exchange

(CENTRIX), and

National

Information

Exchange Model

(NIEM).

DND/CF-hosted

database known

as the National

Maritime Picture

(NMP)

-efficiency of

information

flow

BPC & liaison

with home

agencies389

- - - - NMIO role to

ensure efficient

flow of information

-

Legal

-mandates

Linked to

BPC task

force & home

agency

mandate(s)390

EU Integrated

Maritime

Policy

Regulation

1255/2011391 in

addition to

Member State

legislation

Cabinet

approval (Dec

2006)392

- Government

directed the

Cabinet Office to

create a NMIC393

National Maritime

Intelligence-

Integration Office

(NMIO), the USCG

fusion centres (i.e.,

ICC and MIFCs),

and the National

Counter-terrorism

Center are the

National Security

Act of 1947, the

Intelligence Reform

and Terrorism

Prevention Act of

2004, Title 10 and

Title 50, US Code,

and Executive

Order 12333 of

1981.394

Linked to partner

mandates

-database

management

- - - - - - -




Union

New

Zealand

Singapore United


Performance

management

Reports

through the

Minister of

Customs

(non-sensitive

info not

publicly

available)

Not available in

Open Source

Reports

through the

Comptroller

Customs

(publicly

annual report

contains non-

sensitive

info)395

Not available in

Open Source

Service Level

Agreements

(SLAs) outline

NMIC’s role and

its expectations

of suppliers,

customers and

stakeholders.396

Outcomes not

available in Open

Source.

Not available in

Open Source

Program

Evaluations not

available in Open

Source

Military aid to

civil power

Section

51CA397

Article 3 of

Council

Decision

2005/395/

CFSP398

Part 1

(Sections 9-

10)399

Articles 201A-

201I400

Section 2

Emergency

Powers Act

(EPA) and the

Civil

Contingencies

Act (CCA)401

Posse Comitatus

Act402

Section 273.6

National Defence

Act

Data/Info

standards

IMO, ICAO IMO, ICAO,

EU

(EUROSUR

Regulation)403

IMO, ICAO IMO, ICAO IMO, ICAO, EU,

NATO

IMO, ICAO, NATO IMO, ICAO,

NATO

Inter-

Organizational

relationships

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

APEC,

ASEAN-

ARF, WPSN,

Cth of

Nations

NATO,

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

APEC,

ASEAN-ARF

WPSN

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

APEC,

ASEAN-

ARF, WPSN,

Cth of

Nations

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

APEC, ASEAN-

ARF, WPSN,

Cth of Nations

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

NATO, EU,

ASEAN-ARF,

WPSN,

Cth of Nations

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

NATO,

APEC,

ASEAN-ARF,

WPSN

UN-IMO,

UN-ICAO,

APEC, NATO,

ASEAN-ARF,

WPSN,

Cth of Nations


10.0 Endnotes

1United States Government. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005:27:1, [accessed 2013-07-

15] from: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456414.

2Feldkamp, J., Cdr. “Maritime Domain Integration,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-

Integration Office), Volume 3, Summer 2012:16:6-7:6, [accessed 2013-07-04] from:


3United States Department of Homeland Security. National Security Presidential Directive NSPD 41/Homeland

Security Presidential Directive HSPD 13, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2004: 9:2, [accessed 2013-06-24] from:

http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf.

4Hammerstrøm K, Wade A, and AMK Jørgenson. (2010). “Searching for studies: A guide to information retrieval

for Campbell Systematic Reviews,” Campbell Systematic Reviews 2010: Supplement 1, DOI: 10.4073/csrs.2010.1.

5United States Department of Justice. Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information and



https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf.

6The IMO’s main tasks are to develop and maintain a comprehensive regulatory framework for shipping. Its remit

includes safety, environmental concerns, legal matters, technical cooperation, maritime security, and ‘promoting the

efficiency of shipping,’ pursuant to IMO Resolution A.1011 (26), adopted 26 November 2009, Strategic Plan for the

Organization.

7The ISPS Code is the international equivalent to the US Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, US Code,

Public Law 107-295, November 25, 2002.

8Centrelink Australia is the government agency that provides access to social programs such as welfare, old age

pensions, etc.

9Australian Crime Commission. Australian Crime Commission Annual Report 2011-12, Commonwealth of

Australia, 2012:278:24, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:

https://www.crimecommission.gov.au/sites/default/files/ACC_AR_2011-2012.pdf

10Australian Border Protection Command. Australian Maritime Information Fusion Centre, ABPC Website, last


11Border Protection Command (BPC) was established by the Australian Government in March 2005 to coordinate

national awareness and response efforts to protect Australia’s interests in the Australian Maritime Domain (AMD).

BPC is a multi-agency taskforce which uses assets assigned from Australian Customs and Border Protection Service

and the Department of Defence to conduct civil maritime operations. BPC is not established under a specific statute.

Assets assigned to BPC conduct law enforcement activities on behalf of other Australian Government agencies

exercising powers under the Customs Act, Migration Act, and Fisheries Management Act. BPC is a primary

government law enforcement organization in the AMD.



http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd41.pdf





12The Australian Headquarters Joint Task Force 639 (hqjtf639) coordinates Operation RESOLUTE, which is the

Australian Defence Force (ADF) contribution to the whole of government approach to protect Australia’s borders

and offshore maritime interests. Commander Border Protection Command is also Commander Joint Task Force

639. The task force has operational control of the Armidale Class Patrol Boats, AP-3C aircraft and land elements

assigned to border protection duties. The Deputy Commander JTF639, based in HQJTF639 in Darwin, is

responsible for routine day-to-day operations, command and control of JTF639 on behalf of Commander Border

Protection Command. This includes synchronising Operation RESOLUTE assets with Customs and Border

Protection assets to meet BPC’s operational requirements. As such HQJTF639 issues tactical level operational,

administrative orders and instructions as required. Cited in: Australian Border Protection Command. Headquarter

Joint Task Force 639 (hqjtf639), ABPC Website, updated July 8, 2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from:

http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5785.asp.

13The BPC intelligence centre processes and analyzes information and intelligence relating to offshore maritime

areas, focusing on the following civil maritime security threats: illegal exploitation of natural resources; illegal

activity in protected areas; unauthorized maritime arrivals; prohibited imports/exports; maritime terrorism; piracy,

robbery or violence at sea; compromise to bio-security; and marine pollution. Analysts coordinate their collection,

analysis, and dissemination of information, while conducting risk assessments that inform plans for surveillance and

response missions based on strategic and tactical needs. Cited in: Australian Border Protection Command. Border

Protection Command Intelligence Centre, ABPC Website, updated July 8, 2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from:

http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5782.asp.

14Barkley, H. “Australian Border Protection Command,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-

Integration Office), Volume 1, January 2012:16:4-5:4, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:


15Persson, G. Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National

Defence College, 2013:40:32, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.fhs.se/Documents/Externwebben/forskning/centrumbildningar/CATS/2013/Fusion%20Centres%20-

%20Lessons%20Learned_ENG.pdf.

16European Commission. Eurostat: Statistics in focus, 47/2009:12:1, [accessed 2013-07-04] from:

http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5281405/KS-SF-09-047-EN.PDF/121dae7c-a53c-464a-baca-

a314e652f4e7.



Security, Issue no. 229, May 2013:44:4, [accessed 2013-06-10] from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-


18

Masala, C. (Prof. Dr.) and Tsetsos, K. (M.A.). “The Maritime Dimension of the European Union’s and Germany’s
















19Belgian Standing Committee (ed.). Fusion Centres Throughout Europe: All Source Threat Assessments in the

Fight Against Terrorism, Belgium Standing Intelligence Agencies Review Committee, Intersentia, Brussels,

2010:220:213.

20Commission of the European Communities. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,

the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An Integrated

Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM(2007), Brussels, 10.10.2007:16:5, [accessed 2013-07-04] from:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0575:FIN:EN:PDF.

21Staff, P. Cdr. “European Maritime Surveillance Networking – MARSUR,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National

Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April 2012:16:4-5:4, [accessed 2013-05-31] from:




23Beckh, J. “Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) Networking in the European Union,” European Security and

Defence, 2011:67-69:68, [accessed 2013-06-04] from: https://beckh.wordpress.com/2011/12/26/maritime-

surveillance-marsur-networking-in-the-european-union/.



25Thörnqvist, J. Rear Admiral. The Swedish Armed Forces’ view of the Baltic Sea as a safe sea, Powerpoint

presentation, (no date):41, [accessed 2013-07-08] from:

http://www.bmsp.se/media/298934/jan%20t%C3%B6rnqvist,%20swedish%20navy.pdf.

26The VRMTC, name ‘Operational Arrangement’ (OA) was established on October 12, 2006, during the 6

th

Seapower Symposium. Seventeen countries signed it: Portugal, Spain, France, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro,

Albania, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Jordan, Israel, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States. Since

then, Germany, Bulgaria, Belgium, Georgia, the Netherlands and Senegal have joined. These last four members

signed the Note of Accession (NOA) to the OA of the VRMTC WMC during the 7th

Venice Symposium.





28Kenyon, H. “CWID Publishes 2010 Interoperability Trial Results,” Signal Online, November 12, 2010:1,

[accessed 2013-07-08] from: http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=2010/11/12/9293.

29Under EU regulation SEC(2011)1536 final, SEC(2011) 1537 final, and SEC(2011) 1538 final, each Member State

is required to establish a EUROSUR national coordination centre.







http://www.bmsp.se/media/298934/jan%20t%C3%B6rnqvist,%20swedish%20navy.pdf



http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=2010/11/12/9293


30The MSSC (Maritime Safety and Security Centre) is composed of the: Agency for Agriculture and Food; Central

Command for Maritime Emergencies; Customs; Federal Police; Point of Contact; Waterways Police Coordinating

Centre; and Waterways and Shipping Administration.







2010:220:77.




2010:24:15-21, [accessed 2013-06-10] from:


llance_en.pdf.



2010:220:215.

35The AIS was originally designed for collision avoidance and safety of navigation but has been increasingly used as

a primary ship-tracking system.

36Thomas, G. “Collaboration in Space: The Silver Bullet for Global Maritime Awareness?” Canadian Naval Review,

8(2), Summer 2012:45:14-18, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-


37Mossop, J. “Maritime Security in New Zealand,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives

from Australia and New Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge,

2010:277:54-75:54.

38Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Maritime Patrol Review, Wellington, NZ, February 2001:44:1,

[accessed 2013-06-28] from: http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/maritime_patrol_review.pdf.



2010:277:54-75:68.














2010:277:54-75:68.

42State Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Performance

Improvement Framework Formal Review: New Zealand Customs Service (Customs), October 2012: 55:25,

[accessed 2013-07-08] from: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/pif-customs-review-oct12.PDF.



2010:277:54-75:70.



2010:277:54-75:72.



2010:277:54-75:72.

46Maritime New Zealand. “The maritime radio service for New Zealand,” Website, (no date), [accessed 2013-07-12]

from: http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Commercial/Shipping-safety/Maritime-radio/

47Maritime New Zealand. “The maritime radio service for New Zealand,” Website, (no date), [accessed 2013-07-12]

from: http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Commercial/Shipping-safety/Maritime-radio/

48New Zealand Search and Rescue. Rescue Coordination Centre, (no date):10:2-3, [accessed 2013-07-12] from:

http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Publications-and-forms/Maritime-NZ-corporate-publications/Rescue-Coordination-

Centre-New-Zealand-information-leaflet.pdf.

49New Zealand Search and Rescue. Rescue Coordination Centre, (no date):10:3, [accessed 2013-07-12] from:



50New Zealand Search and Rescue. Rescue Coordination Centre, (no date):10:3, [accessed 2013-07-12] from:







52Seng, R.T.K. Safe and Secure Seas for All: Contributing to Maritime Security in the Region, PowerPoint deck,

2008:29:7, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.navy.mi.th/navedu/acd/data_docu/yr_51/final_hno_presentation.pdf.


http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Commercial/Shipping-safety/Maritime-radio/

http://www.maritimenz.govt.nz/Commercial/Shipping-safety/Maritime-radio/











53Vavro, C. “Piracy, Terrorism and the Balance of Power in the Malacca Strait,” Canadian Naval Review, 4(1),

Spring 2008:46:13-17, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-


54Beckman, R. “Singapore Strives to Enhance Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection in its Port and in the

Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, 14(2), 2008-2009:167-200:182.

55ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report: January –

December 2011, 2011:115:113-114, [accessed 2013-06-05] from:

http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=

239&PortalId=0&TabId=78.

56ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. Website, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.recaap.org/.

57Lim, I. Lt. Cdr. “Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” Journal of the

Singapore Armed Forces: Pointer, 33(3), October 2007:126:13-26:12, [accessed 2013-06-05] from:




59Lim, I. Lt. Cdr. “Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” Journal of the



60Hansen, S. Lt. Cdr. “National and International Sharing: A New Zealand Perspective,” Pointer Journal of the

Singapore Armed Forces Supplement, April 2011:50:20-32:29, [accessed 2013-06-03] from:


.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf.

61Full member countries of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium include Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada,

Chile, China, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, South Korea,

Singapore, Russia, Thailand, Tonga, the United States and Vietnam. Observer status countries include Bangladesh,

India, Mexico and Peru.

62The Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) was established in 1971 between Australia, Malaysia, New

Zealand, Singapore and the United Kingdom. The FPDA has evolved from air defence capability to one that

incorporates combined and joint training and activities.

63The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) workshop was initiated during the 9

th International Sea Power

Symposium (ISS) in November 1987. The aim of the ISS was to create a platform whereby chiefs of navies globally

could meet regularly and discuss common issues, while improving cooperation among participating countries. The

WPNS is based on the ISS-premise, providing a platform for chiefs of navies of western pacific countries can meet

and discuss issues. Member countries take turns hosting symposia and workshops.





http://www.recaap.org/






64Wei, Tan Guan. “Cooperation key in maintaining maritime security,” Cyber Pioneer, Ministry of Defence of

Government of Singapore Website, May 14, 2013:2, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2013/may/14may13_news.html.

65G4S Risk Management Limited. UK Marine Security Market Report, Report for the Canadian Trade

Commissioner Service, 8 March 2013:52:8, [accessed 2013-06-06] from:

http://adians.ca/download/9f40e26fa9b2a018c6c73fcda50989e2/UK%20Maritime%20Security%20Study%20-

%202013%2003.PDF.




%202013%2003.PDF.

67UK Department for Transport. “Brief overview of the UK National Maritime Security Programme,” Website, last

updated: 18 May 2008, [accessed 2013-07-11] from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/brief-overview-

of-the-uk-national-maritime-security-programme.




%202013%2003.PDF.

69United Kingdom Government. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Strategic

Review, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010:75:55, [accessed

2013-07-31] from:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_

digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf.

70United Kingdom Marine and Coastguard Agency. Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Southampton, UK, April 2008:61:11, [accessed 2013-07-11] from:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121107103953/http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/uksar.pdf.




%202013%2003.PDF.

72Ministry of Defence. Defence Intelligence, published 12 December 2012:19:16, [accessed 2013-07-18] from:

https://www.gov.uk/defence-intelligence-services#defence-geospatial-intelligence-fusion-centre.






http://adians.ca/download/9f40e26fa9b2a018c6c73fcda50989e2/UK%20Maritime%20Security%20Study%20-%202013%2003.PDF




https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/brief-overview-of-the-uk-national-maritime-security-programme

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/brief-overview-of-the-uk-national-maritime-security-programme





http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121107103953/http:/www.dft.gov.uk/mca/uksar.pdf







74National Maritime Information Centre. Information Guide, Version 1.0, 2011:12:3, [accessed 2013-06-11] from:

http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-booklet.pdf.




%20Lessons%20Learned_ENG.pdf

76During the Lisbon Summit in November 2012, NATO heads of state collectively agreed that the NATO Command

Structure, the sum of all the Alliance’s tactical, operational and strategic headquarters, needed to be rearranged to

ensure it is fully adapted to the challenges. It was decided that NATO would have a single maritime command, HQ

MARCOM, concentrating all maritime responsibilities. This was finalized on December 1, 2012.

77Mixon, L. M. Lt. Col. Requirements and Challenges Facing the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, A Research

Report submitted to the Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements, 12 January 2007:30:21.

78NATO MARCOM website. Maritime Command (MARCOM) Role, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.mc.nato.int/about/Pages/HQ%20MARCOM's%20role%20in%20NATO%20Operations.aspx.




%202013%2003.PDF.




%202013%2003.PDF.

81Campion, F.J. Cdr. Strategic Maritime Domain Awareness: Supporting the National Strategy for Maritime

Security, Strategy Research Project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic

Studies Degree, US Army War College, Carlisle, PA, March 15, 2008: 28:23-25, [accessed 2013-07-09] from:

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478411.

82United States Department of Homeland Security. Privacy Impact Assessment for the Interagency Operations

Center (IOC) WatchKeeper, DHS/USCG/PIA-020, January 4, 2013:22:2, [accessed 2013-07-03] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_uscg_watchkeeper_20130104.pdf.

83National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), website, no date,

[accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/rcc.html.

84Newbill, R.R. III, Major. Intelligence Sharing, Fusion Centers, and Homeland Security, Graduate Research Paper,

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Cyber Warfare, Air Force Institute of

Technology, June 2008:54:10-14, [accessed 2013-06-14] from: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=698221.









http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA478411







Technology, June 2008:54:24, [accessed 2013-06-14] from: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=698221.

86Cunningham, J. “Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness with the Single Integrated Lookout List (SILO),” NMIO

Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 1, January 2012:16:8, [accessed

2013-06-24] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO%20Quarterly.pdf.

87Maryland Federal Facilities People. National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC), Fact sheet, last updated June

2009:1, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:

http://www.choosemaryland.org/factsstats/Documents/Military%20Facilities/NMIC.pdf.









90Under the 2002 Fiscal Intelligence Act, the Coast Guard was inducted into the US Intelligence Community, it

became one of the 14 foreign intelligence agencies and organizations that report to the Director of Central

Intelligence.

91In September 2003, the USCG has inaugurated two facilities referred to as ‘maritime intelligence fusion centres’

that provide 24/7 watch over maritime traffic and developments. These MIFCs monitor areas of interest, track

events, follow vessels of interest, provide analysis and evaluate trends.

92Brice-O’Hara, S., V. Cdt, Vice Admiral. “Coast Guard Intelligence – as Unique as the Coast Guard Itself,” Coast

Guard Outlook 2012, 2012:186:26-31:26, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:


93Kime, P. “Maritime ‘Fusion’ Centers Expand Coast Guard Intelligence Capabilities,” Navy League of the United

States, May 2004:5:2, [accessed 2013-07-12] from: http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/may_04_16.php.



95A critical port is a port that the US Coast Guard has determined as critical or a key component of the US maritime

transportation infrastructure.

96The IOC project is the acquisition project established to design, develop, and deploy an information management

system (WatchKeeper) to support the functions of the maritime IOC.



http://www.choosemaryland.org/factsstats/Documents/Military%20Facilities/NMIC.pdf







97The IOC program is responsible for establishing Maritime IOCs for DHS. The IOC program acts on behalf of the

Commandant of the Coast Guard, to establish the capabilities management process to deliver and sustain the tools,

in terms of policy, technology and personnel training, required to allow IOCs to be successful in improving

Interagency Operational Planning, Integrated Vessel Targeting, and Operations Monitoring functions for the

maritime domain.

98The Integrated Targeting Team (ITT) consists of representatives from agencies involved in screening vessel

arrivals and other perceived threats.

99The Interagency Operations Planning Team consists of representatives from IOC member agencies with authority

to commit agency resources to missions.

100Operations Monitoring consists of IOC Members monitoring operations from dispatch or ‘virtual’ IOC watch

floor.

101United States Department of Homeland Security. Privacy Impact Assessment for the Interagency Operations

Center (IOC) WatchKeeper, DHS/USCG/PIA-020, January 4, 2013:22:2, [accessed 2013-07-03] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy_pia_uscg_watchkeeper_20130104.pdf.

102The Cospas-Sarsat (C/S) System provides a distress alert and location data for search and rescue (SAR), using

spacecraft and ground facilities to detect and locate the signals of Cospas-Sarsat distress radio beacons operating on

406 MHz. Signals from radio beacons are transmitted to low-earth orbiting (LEO) or geo-stationary (GEO) orbiting

satellites. These signals are then relayed to earth ground stations called Local User Terminals (LUTs) and eventually

to Mission Control Centers (MCCs). As the centre for Cospas-Sarsat operations in the US, the USMCC collects and

processes data from national LUTs and foreign MCCs. The USMCC then distributes the alert data to national the

Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), SAR Points of Contact (SPOCs) and foreign MCCs.

103National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Rescue Coordination Centers (RCCs), website, no date,

[accessed 2013-06-13] from: http://www.sarsat.noaa.gov/rcc.html.

104United States Government. The 9/11 Commission Report 2004, Washington, D.C., 2004:585:403, Cited in:

Persson, G. Fusion Centres – Lessons Learned, Center for Asymmetric Threat Studies (CATS), Swedish National








106American Civil Liberties Union. What’s Wrong with Fusion Centers? ACLU Washington Legislative Office,

Washington, D.C., December 2007:27:6, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:










107Rollins, J. Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, US Congressional Research Service Report for

Congress, RL34070, January 18, 2008:92:21, [accessed 2012-11-30] from:




2010:220:215.







111United States Northern Command. About USNORTHCOM, no date, [accessed 2013-07-17] from:

http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx.

112Buchalter, A.R. Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department of Defense in Support of

Homeland Defense, A Report Prepared by the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress under an Interagency

Agreement with the Commission on the National Guard and the Reserves, February 2007:26:2, [accessed 2013-07-

17] from: http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/CNGR_Milit-Support-Civil-Authorities.pdf.

113United States Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan Brochure, [accessed 2013-07-17] from:

http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Brochure.pdf

114Doyle, C. and Elsea, J.K. The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: The Use of the Military to Execute

Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R42659, August 16, 2012:66:1, [accessed 2013-

06-19] from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf.

115USNORTHCOM Subordinate Commands include: Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region; Joint Task

Force Alaska; Joint Task Force Civil Support; Joint Task Force North; Army North; Air Force North; US Fleet

Forces Command; US Marine Forces Northern Command; and US Special Operations Command, North

(Provisional Command).

116Thiele, R.D. “Building Maritime Security Situational Awareness,” ISPSW Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and

International Security, Issue no. 182, April 2012:10, [accessed 2013-06-10] from: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-


117Although the United Kingdom is a member state of the EU, it is reviewed separately as it has taken a different

approach to its external border management, including its maritime security. It has adopted certain EU measures

while establishing a number of its own approaches.

118The White House. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005:27:13, [accessed 2013-06-13]

from: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=456414




http://www.northcom.mil/AboutUSNORTHCOM.aspx


http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_Brochure.pdf






119The ICAO develops aviation security policies and measures at the international level. It manages the

Aeronautical Message Handling System, defines an International Standard Atmosphere, manages identification

codes for airlines, airfields, aircraft and call signs, and provides standards for machine-readable passports.

120Scott, S.V. “Whose Security is it and how much of it do we want: The US Influence on the International Law

against Maritime Terrorism,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and

New Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge, 2010:277:76-93:82.

121The IMO Assembly resolution A.924(22) (November 2001) called for a review of the existing international legal

and technical measures to prevent and suppress terrorist acts against ships at sea and in port, and to improve security

aboard and ashore.

122International Maritime Organization. IMO activities to enhance maritime security, December 2003:15:3,


http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=17989&filename=IMOactivities.pdf.

123Australian Border Protection Command. Border Protection Command (about us), BPC Website, updated July 8,

2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from: http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5599.asp



http://www.oag.govt.nz/2010/maritime-patrols/docs/maritime-patrols.pdf.



126Lim, I. Lt Cdr. “Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” Journal of the

Singapore Armed Forces: Pointer, 33(3), October 2007:126:13-26, [accessed 2013-06-05] from:




128United Kingdom Government. Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Strategic

Review, Presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister by Command of Her Majesty, October 2010:75:55, [accessed

2013-07-31] from:

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20121015000000/http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_

digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_191634.pdf.

129United Kingdom Marine and Coastguard Agency. Search and Rescue Framework for the United Kingdom of

Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Southampton, UK, April 2008:61:11, [accessed 2013-07-11] from:

http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/uksar.pdf.

130United States Coast Guard. National Search and Rescue Committee, USCG Office of Search and Rescue, (no

date), [accessed 2013-07-31] from: http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/NSARC.asp.







http://www.dft.gov.uk/mca/uksar.pdf

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg534/NSARC.asp


131European Parliament and Council of the European Union. “Regulation (EU) No. 1255/2011 of the European

Parliament and of the Council: establishing a Programme to support the further development of an Integrated

Maritime Policy,” Official Journal of the European Union, 30 November 2011:10, [accessed 2013-07-29] from:

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011R1255.

132North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Website, (no date), [accessed 2013-06-11] from:


133Bateman, S. “Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches,” Security Challenges, 3(3),August 2007:109-129:116,

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2010:277:54-75:72.

135Hansen, S. Lt. Cdr. “National and International Sharing: A New Zealand Perspective,” Pointer Journal of the




136Ow, G. Major. “Information Sharing: A Singapore Perspective,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces

Supplement: Pointer, April 2011:50:11-19:16, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:



137Beard, D. Utility of NovaSAR for UK Maritime Surveillance Applications, Powerpoint prepared for the Ministry

of Defence, Dstl, 7 March 2013:30:14, [accessed 2013-07-31] from:

http://www.spaceconference.co.uk/links/14/Slides-Day2/David_Beard_DSTL_-

_DMC_and_NovaSAR_Conference_-_7th_March_2013.pdf.

138IMO-Global Integrated Shipping Information System (GISIS) are publically available resources offered by IMO.

Content is organized into topics such as Maritime Security, Piracy and Armed Robbery, and Radio

Communications, and Search and Rescue, [accessed 2013-07-31] from: https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx.

139Palmer, N. Improving the UK Maritime Security and Maritime Domain Awareness, The IET Maritime

Surveillance from Space Seminar, PowerPoint deck, Ministry of Defence, 11 December 2012:26:8,20.

140Bjelopera, J. Terrorism Information Sharing and the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Report Initiative:

Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R40901,

December 28, 2011:22:1, [accessed 2013-07-17] from: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R40901.pdf.

141US Code, Public Law 108-458, December 14, 2004, Section1016(b), 118 Statute, 3665.













https://gisis.imo.org/Public/Default.aspx





144NIEM is not a standard, database, software, or the actual exchange of information. It provides a community of

users, tools, common terminology, governance, methodologies, and support that enables the creation of standards.

As a result, organizations can ‘speak the same language’ to quickly and efficiently exchange meaningful data.

NIEM is currently sponsored by DOJ, DHS and the Department of Health and Human Services.

145Lim, I. Lt. Cdr. “Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” Journal of

the Singapore Armed Forces: Pointer, 33(3), October 2007:126:13-26:18, [accessed 2013-06-05] from:


146These systems include SafeSeaNet, CleanseaNet, EU LRIT Data Centre operated by the European Maritime

Safety Agency (EMSA).


the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards the integration of

maritime surveillance: A common information sharing environment for the EU maritime domain, COM(2009),

Brussels, 15.10.2009:12:3, [accessed 2013-07-04] from: http://eur-





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150Mixon, L.M. Lt. Col. Requirements and Challenges Facing the NATO Intelligence Fusion Center, A Research


151C4I systems refer to command, control, communications, computers and intelligence systems.

152Global Security.Org. Intelligence – Linked Operations Center Europe (LOCE) website, updated 28 July 2011,

[accessed 2013-07-22] from: http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/loce.htm

153Hribernik, M. Countering Maritime Piracy and Robbery in Southeast Asia: The Role of the ReCAAP Agreement,

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http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/systems/loce.htm




154United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. Information Sharing with Fusion

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155United States Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General. Information Sharing with Fusion

Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain, OIG-11-04, Washington, D.C.,

October 2010:34:19, [accessed 2013-06-14] from: http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-04_Oct10.pdf.

156United States Government. The National Strategy for Maritime Security, September 2005:27:1, [accessed 2013-

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158The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) GAO conducts a wide range of financial and performance

audits and program evaluations. Its reviews take a professional and objective look at the business of government

and the missions of government, covering everything from the challenges of an aging population and the demands of

the information age to emerging national security threats and the complexities of globalization. GAO is committed

to government reform--to helping government agencies become organizations that are results oriented and

accountable to the public. By examining federal programs and operations, GAO helps ensure that the government is

answerable to the American people. The agency's work reflects integrity because it is professional, objective, fact-

based, non-partisan, and non-ideological. GAO strives for reliability by providing high-quality information that is

timely, accurate, useful, clear, and candid. GAO relies on a workforce of highly trained professionals who hold

degrees in many academic disciplines, such as accounting, law, engineering, public and business administration,

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159European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights at Europe’s Southern Sea Borders,

2013:160:61, [accessed 2013-07-26] from: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fundamental-rights-europes-

southern-sea-borders-jul-13_en.pdf.


2013:160:61-62, [accessed 2013-07-26] from: http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fundamental-rights-europes-














http://www.gao.gov/about/history/articles/working-for-good-government/08-gaohistory_present.html








163United States Senate. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority and

Minority Staff Report, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee of

Investigations, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2012:153:8, [accessed 2013-06-12] from:

www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=49139e81-1dd7-4788-a3bb.


Intelligence in a New Era, Executive Summary, Washington, D.C., 2008:7:2.


Washington, D.C., May 2012:75:43:1, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:





https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_executive_summary.pdf.

167Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and Sharing Information

and Intelligence in a New Era, US Department of Justice, August 2006:104:11, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf.

168Australian Government. Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006, Canberra, ACT,

No. 3, 2006:49, [accessed 2013-08-12] from: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006A00003/Download.

169New Zealand Government. Defence Act 1990, Public Act 1990, No.28, Wellington, NZ, Reprint as at 1 July

2013:98, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:


170Singapore Government. Singapore Armed Forces Act, (Chapter 295), Act 7 of 1972, Revised Edition 2000:200,


http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Af7446be9-daef-4a09-bb63-

8e8da8b61f4c%20%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0;whole=yes

171Ministry of Defence. Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience, Joint Doctrine Publication

02 (2nd

Edition), published September 2007:317, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61965/defenceconrtibution1.pdf.


Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R42659, August 16, 2012:66, [accessed 2013-


173European Union Legislation. Summaries of EU legislation: Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS),

Council Decision of 22 January 2001, Brussels, Belgium, 2001:3, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:


#




http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf










174ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Annual Report: January

– December 2011, 2011:115:113-114, [accessed 2013-06-05] from:

http://www.recaap.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?Command=Core_Download&EntryId=

239&PortalId=0&TabId=78.



176Canada’s strategic position has also tended to make it a complacent ally that Australians have not considered

worth pursuing vigorously as a close security partner, beyond their shared membership in quadripartite (United

States, United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada) and other U.S.-led fora. Cited in: Book Review: Blaxland, John.

Strategic Cousins: Australian and Canadian Expeditionary Forces and the British and American Empires,

Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006:388:275, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no4/22-book4-livre4-eng.asp.

177The EU step-wise process is based on the best practices and lessons learned from two regional cooperation efforts

of the SUCFIS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Finland Sweden) and SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Cooperation Baltic

Sea). By using existing infrastructure through a ‘systems-of-systems’ solution, MARSUR reduces the barrier to

entry for each participant. The technology behind the automated MARSUR is the MARSUR Exchange System

(MEXS), a logic handling unit that offers interfaces both to the national systems and to the MEXS network. It also

provides adaptations for mapping the interface. The MEXS communication can be adapted to the chosen transport

mechanism. This is important when operating at low bandwidths. This approach releases the MEXS protocol from

the network implementation and makes it possible to use almost any transport protocol and bandwidth (for example

in wire, fibre, radio and satellite networks). Cited in: Staff, P.Cmdr. “European Maritime Surveillance Networking

– MARSUR,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April

2012:16:4-5:5, [accessed 2013-05-31] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL2.pdf.

178The US security arrangements with Canada include the Beyond the Border initiative outlines a vision for

perimeter security and economic competitiveness whereby the US and Canada work in partnerships within, at, and

away from our borders to achieve enhanced security and accelerate the legitimate flow of people, goods, and

services between our two countries. The US has established several successful joint law enforcement programs with

Canada such as the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET), Border Enforcement Security Taskforces

(BEST), and the ShipRider Integrated Cross Border Maritime Law Enforcement program. Senior management

engages in these efforts through fora such as the Cross Border Crime Forum (CBCF), which is chaired by the US

Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security with their Canadian Ministers of Justice and Public

Safety. As part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan, U.S. and Canadian officials are enhancing cross-border law

enforcement radio interoperability and building on the successes of programs such as IBET, BEST, and ShipRider to

develop the next generation of integrated cross-border law enforcement.

179The IMSWG members consist of Transport Canada, the Canadian Coast Guard (Department of Fisheries), the

Department of National Defence, and Public Safety Canada (including the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA),

and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)).

180Government of Canada. Marine Security Operations Centre (East) Awareness Brief, Marine Security Operations

Centres Project, PowerPoint, July 2013:42:3.




http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo9/no4/22-book4-livre4-eng.asp



181Peer, D. (ed.). Closing the Gap: Enhance Maritime Security Cooperation and Awareness, Maritime Security

Occasional Paper No. 16, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, 2012:94:17,

[accessed 2013-07-26] from: http://maritimesecurityconference.org/read_ahead/Closing%20the%20Gap.pdf.



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184Ibid, p.19.

185Ibid, p.19.

186Ibid, p.19.

187Defined ownership refers to the originator of the data and information. If an external agency chooses to add

additional information to refine or update the original report, the originating party should be entrusted to be

informed as to why their data/information was modified.









2010:220:210.



2010:220:210.

192Markle Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Mobilizing Information to Prevent Terrorism:

Accelerating Development of a Trusted Information Sharing Environment, July 13, 2006:2:1, [accessed 2013-06-18]

from: http://www.markle.org/news-events/media-releases/markle-task-force-national-security-information-age-

releases-third-report.









http://www.markle.org/news-events/media-releases/markle-task-force-national-security-information-age-releases-third-report

http://www.markle.org/news-events/media-releases/markle-task-force-national-security-information-age-releases-third-report





2010:220:210.



2010:220:210.



2010:220:210.

197Bateman, S. “Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches,” Security Challenges, 3(3),August 2007:109-129:116,




2010:277:54-75:72.

199Ow, G. Major. “Information Sharing: A Singapore Perspective,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces

Supplement: Pointer, April 2011:50:11-19:16, [accessed 2013-06-04] from:


.res/MINDEF_Pointer%20IFC%20Supplement%20FINAL.pdf












203Government of Canada. Marine Security Operations Centre (East) Awareness Brief, Marine Security Operations

Centres Project, PowerPoint, July 2013:42:3.













205International Maritime Organization. IMO activities to enhance maritime security, December 2003:15, [accessed

2013-07-08] from: http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=17989&filename=IMOactivities.pdf.

206Recognizing the need to prevent emerging terrorism in the air, ICAO took the action to introduce legislation and

implement strategies to counter this threat. Senior government representatives from 154 countries endorsed a new

strategy to improve airline security. The system was implemented by national governments and ICAO, which then

assumed the responsibility for follow-up programs to help rectify deficiencies identified through regular audits.










210Ibid, p.34.








Occasional Paper No. 16, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS, 2012:94:25-26,


214Ibid., p.26

215United States Office of Management and Budget. OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the

E-Government Act of 2002, M-03-22, September 26,2003, cited in: United States Government Accountability

Office. Data Mining: DHS Needs to Improve Executive Oversight of Systems Supporting Counterterrorism, Report

to Congressional Requesters, GAO-11-742, Washington, D.C., September 2011:70:0, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:


216The E-Government Act requires agencies, if practicable, to make privacy impact assessment publicly available

through agency Web sites, by publication in the Federal Register, or by other means, Public Law 107-347, Section

208(b)(1)(B)(iii).










217As noted earlier, DHS identified three pattern-based data mining systems. These include Data Analysis and

Research for Trade Transparency System (DARTTS), Automated Targeting System (ATS), and the Freight

Assessment System, which does not focus on personal information.

218FISMA, Title III, E-Government Act of 2002, Public Law 107-347 (December 17, 2002), 44 US Code Section

3541, et seq.

219US Public Law No. 107-296, Section 222 (November 25, 2002).

220The Act describes a ‘record’ as any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is

maintained by an agency and contains his or her name or another personal identifier. It also defines ‘system of

records’ as a group of records under the control of any agency from which information is retrieved by the name of

the individual or other individual identifier.

221The partnership involves the Australian Crime Commission, the Australian Customs and Border Protection

Service, the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the Australian

Taxation Office, the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, the Clean Energy Regulator, the

Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the

Department of Human Services, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship, the Department of Sustainability,

Environment, Water, Population and Communities, the national intelligence community, and state and territory law

enforcement agencies.

222Australian Crime Commission. Australian Crime Commission Annual Report 2011-12, Commonwealth of

Australia, 2012:278:24, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:


223Barkley, H. “Australian Border Protection Command,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-

Integration Office), Volume 1, January 2012:16:4-5:4, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:


224Klein, N., Mossop, J., and Rothwell, D.R. “Australia, New Zealand and Maritime Security,” Maritime Security:

International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and

Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge, 2010:277:1-21:5.

225For example, the Australian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which encompasses the continental mainland and

adjacent offshore islands and territories, is a total of 8,148,250 km2, which should be compared with a total land area

of 7,692,024 km2, [accessed 2013-06-28] from: www.ga.gov.au. The New Zealand EEZ, at 4,053,000 km

2, is

approximately fifteen times the size of its land area (270,500 km2); New Zealand Government, Department of Prime

Minister and Cabinet, Maritime Patrol Review, Wellington, NZ: Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet,

February 2001:44, [accessed 2013-06-28] from:

http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/publications/maritime_patrol_review.pdf.

226Klein, N., Mossop, J., and Rothwell, D.R. “Australia, New Zealand and Maritime Security,” Maritime Security:





http://www.ga.gov.au/



227While information sharing obligations arise in relation to marine scientific research and as part of obligations to

cooperate in the conservation and management of living marine resources, only those obligations most related to

maritime security are considered in this paper.

228Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988, 1678

UNTS 221 [hereinafter 1988 SUA Convention]; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful

Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1 November, 14 October 2005, [2005] ATNIF 30 [hereinafter

2005 SUA Protocol].

229IMO Resolution MAC.202(81), Adoption of Amendments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life

at Sea, 1974, as Amended, Chapter V, ‘Regulation 19-1, Long-range Identification and Tracking of Ships

Resolution’, 19 May 2006, IMO Doc. MSC 81/25/Add.1, Annex 2, p.2.

230International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 [hereinafter SOLAS

Convention].

231Rahman, C. The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy, Papers in

Australian Maritime Affairs No. 24, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT,

2008:78:3, [accessed 2013-07-26] from: http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA24.pdf.

232Rahman, C. The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications for the Royal Australian Navy, Papers in

Australian Maritime Affairs No. 24, Sea Power Centre – Australia, Department of Defence, Canberra, ACT,

2008:78:57, [accessed 2013-07-26] from: http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/PIAMA24.pdf.

233Rothwell, D.R. “Maritime Security in the Twenty-First Century: Contemporary and Anticipated Challenges for

Australia and New Zealand,” Maritime Security: International Law and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New

Zealand, Klein, Natalie, Mossop, Joanna, and Rothwell, Donald R. editors, Routledge, 2010:277:1-242:259:258.

234The NSMS is part of a system of interlocking national, homeland and maritime security strategies including the

National Security Strategy of the United States, the National Strategy on Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction,

the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Defense Strategy of the United States. The NSMS

places heavy emphasis on the US economy and its interconnectedness with the global economy; hence the need for

international cooperation. An underlying theme of the NSMS is that security must be achieved without impeding

free trade and markets because a strong world economy in itself enhances US national security.

235Aikins, G. “Network-Centric Operations and Interdepartmental Marine Security,” Canadian Naval Review, 1(3),

Fall 2005:44:20-23:20, [accessed 2013-06-26] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-

content/uploads/public/vol1num3/vol1num3art5.pdf






content/uploads/public/vol1num3/vol1num3art5.pdf













239Department of National Defence Canada. Evaluation of the NATO Contribution Program, 1258-184 (Chief

Review Services), March 2011:113:49, [accessed 2013-06-12] from: http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-

rapports/pdf/2011/P0924-eng.pdf.

240Department of National Defence Canada. Evaluation of the NATO Contribution Program, 1258-184 (Chief

Review Services), March 2011:113:50, [accessed 2013-06-12] from: http://www.crs-csex.forces.gc.ca/reports-

rapports/pdf/2011/P0924-eng.pdf.

241Haydon, P. and Middlemiss, D. “A Conversation with Rear-Admiral Dan McNeil,” Canadian Naval Review, 1(2),

Summer 2005:44:15-21:15, [accessed 2013-06-26] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-










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245Kinney, L. “Canada’s Marine Security,” Canadian Naval Review, 4(4), Winter 2009:44:15-19:15, [accessed

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249Treaty on the European Union, C83, Article 4.2 states “The Union shall respect the equality of Member States

before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and

constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions,

including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.

In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”





















250European Commission. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council: Establishing

the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), COM(2011) 873 Final, Brussels,12.12.2011:43:2,

[accessed 2013-07-04] from: http://eur-


251The first EU User Community includes: Maritime Safety (within the scope of relevant IMO conventions in

particular, SOLAS, STCW and COLREG conventions and related EU legislation) and includes Search and Rescue,

Maritime Security (within the scope of SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Regulation 725/2004 and Directive 2005/65/EC.

According to Article 2 of Regulation 725/2004: ‘maritime security’ means the combination of preventive measures

intended to protect shipping and port facilities against threats of intentional unlawful acts) and prevention of

pollution caused by ships (MARPOL 73/78 Convention and related EU legislation). The second group includes

Fisheries control. The third group of users is marine pollution preparedness and response; marine environment. The

fourth group includes Customs which focuses on the control of goods. The fifth group is Border Control which

focuses on the prevention of illegal immigration and cross-border crime at EU external borders. The sixth group is

involved in general law enforcement that focuses on the prevention of illegal immigration and cross-border crime at

EU external borders. The seventh (final) group is defence which is involved in civilian and military cooperation.

252EOS, the European Organisation for Security, is registered as a limited liability cooperative company under

Belgian Law with equal shareholder Members and run not-for-profit. As of 2013, EOS represents the interests and

expertise of 42 Members involved in security providing technology solutions and services from 13 different

countries of the European Economic Area (EEA), representing more than 65% of the European Security Market and

2 million European employees. EOS is one of the voices in the public – private dialogue with European and

Member States Institutions on security issues.

253European Organisation for Security. EOS Recommendations for an Integrated Surveillance of the EU Maritime

Domain, June 2012:72:7, [accessed 2013-06-25] from: https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/10316215/eos-

recommendations-for-an-integrated-surveillance-of-the-eu-.

254Fantoni, P. Cpt. “Italian Navy’s Approach to an Integrated Interagency Maritime Surveillance,” NMIO Technical

Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 4, Fall 2012:15:3-5:3, [accessed 2013-06-25]

from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL4.pdf.

255Feldt, L., Roell, P., and Thiele, R.D. “Maritime Security – Perspectives for a Comprehensive Approach,” ISPSW

Strategy Series: Focus on Defense and International Security, No. 222, April 2013:25:22.

256Frontex has several operational areas which are defined in legislation. These areas are joint operations, training,

risk analysis, research, providing a rapid response capability, assisting Member States in joint return operations,

information systems and information sharing environment. While fulfilling its mandate, Frontex liaises closely with

other EU partners such as Europol, EASO, Eurojust, FRA or CEPOL and with customs authorities in order to

promote overall cohesion. It also works closely with the border-control authorities of non-EU/Schengen countries

— mainly those countries identified as a source or transit route of irregular migration — in line with general EU

external relations policy. Cited in: FRONTEX. Annual Risk Analysis 2013, European Agency for the Management

of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, Warsaw, Poland,

April 2013:80:8, [accessed 2013-05-31] from:

http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf.






http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf








259The technology behind the automated MARSUR is the MARSUR Exchange System (MEXS), a logic handling

unit that offers interfaces both to the national systems and to the MEXS network. It also provides adaptations for

mapping the interface. The MEXS communication can be adapted to the chosen transport mechanism. This is

important when operating at low bandwidths. This approach releases the MEXS protocol from the network

implementation and makes it possible to use almost any transport protocol and bandwidth (for example in wire,

fibre, radio and satellite networks). Cited in: Staff, P.Cmdr. “European Maritime Surveillance Networking –

MARSUR,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April

2012:16:4-5:5, [accessed 2013-05-31] from: http://nmio.ise.gov/docs/NMIO_QuarterlyVOL2.pdf.

260The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system used on ships and by Vessel traffic

services (VTS) for identifying and locating vessels by electronically exchanging data with other nearby ships and

AIS Base stations.

261Davies, R. “New Zealand National Maritime Coordination Centre,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime

Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April 2012:16:8-9:8, [accessed 2013-07-304] from:


262Davies, R. “New Zealand National Maritime Coordination Centre,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime

Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 2, April 2012:16:8-9:8, [accessed 2013-07-304] from:







265State Services Commission, the Treasury and the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Performance

Improvement Framework Formal Review: New Zealand Customs Service (Customs), October 2012: 55:5, [accessed

2013-07-08] from: http://www.ssc.govt.nz/sites/all/files/pif-customs-review-oct12.PDF.

266The CSI arrangement involves placing a small team of US customs inspectors in Singapore to work with

Singapore authorities to pre-screen and target high-risk cargo containers bound for the US.

267The SMSC will bring together elements from key domestic maritime agencies, such as the Republic of Singapore

Navy, the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore, and the Police Coast Guard under one roof. The SMSC will










plan its maritime security operations from a common room known as the Inter-Agency Co-ordination Centre in the

event of maritime incidents or crises.

268The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) will facilitate proactive sharing and fusion of information to enable analysis,

planning, and coordination of maritime responses in a more collaborative and networked manner. It will house the

necessary computer networks to fuse, analyse, and disseminate information shared by participating militaries and

agencies. The IFC will also enable international cooperation and interoperability with other States in order to

promote maritime security in the region.

269The Multinational Operations and Exercise Centre (MOEC) will support the planning and conduct of bilateral and

multilateral exercises or operations. It will also function as a Maritime Security Centre for the conduct of regional

maritime security operations, or as a regional Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Centre.



271Foster, C.E. “Counter-Terrorism and the Security of Shipping in South East Asia,” Maritime Security:



272He, R. “Coast Guards and Maritime Piracy: Sailing Past the Impediments to Cooperation in Asia,” The Pacific

Review, 22(5) December 2009:667-689:677.







275Lim, N. Lt. Cdr. “The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) – A Case for Information Sharing to Enforce Security in

the Maritime Domain,” Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces Supplement: Pointer, April 2011:50:3-11:6,




276Lim, N. Lt Cdr. “The Information Fusion Centre (IFC) – A Case for Information Sharing to Enforce Security in





277These include the Maritime & Port Authority of Singapore, Police Coast Guard, Immigration & Checkpoints

Authority and Singapore Customs.









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281

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%202013%2003.PDF.




%202013%2003.PDF.




%202013%2003.PDF.




%202013%2003.PDF.

286HFI DTC Consortium. Coordination between the Military and Civilian Organisations: Issues and Solutions, BAE

Systems 2009, Brunel University, UK, 19 May 2009:50:1, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:

http://www.hfidtc.com/research/multi/multi-reports/phase-2/HFIDTC-2-3-1-4-3-coordination-issues-solutions.pdf.
































291DI is part of the central intelligence machinery including the UK Government Communications Headquarters

(GCHQ), the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Security Service.


02 (2nd

Edition), published September 2007:317:v, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:


293With the exception of Military Aid to the Civil Power in Northern Ireland.

294MHD is dormant UK operation; details are included to reflect its close association with both MACA and the

Standing Home Commitment (SHC) military tasks.

295Her Majesty’s Government has defence responsibilities for the Isle of Man and Channel Islands, although, as

British Crown dependencies, they are not technically part of the UK.


02 (2nd

Edition), published September 2007:317:v, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:



02 (2nd

Edition), published September 2007:317:vi, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:


298The JAC has the mission to analyze, process and produce fused intelligence information for the US and NATO,

supporting mission planning and operations by the US, Allied and NATO commanders during peace, crisis and war.
















303North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Alliance Maritime Strategy, Annex 1 (C-M(2011)0023, NATO Unclassified,

18-03-2011:9:1-2, [accessed 2013-06-11] from:

http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2011_03/20110318_alliance_maritime-strategy_CM_2011_23.pdf.


Washington, D.C., December 2007:27:3, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:



Washington, D.C., December 2007:27:3-5, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:


306Brice-O’Hara, S., V. Cdt., Vice Admiral. “Coast Guard Intelligence – as Unique as the Coast Guard Itself,” Coast

Guard Outlook 2012, 2012:186:26-31:26, [accessed 2013-07-15] from:






308The mindset of write-for-release is a concept that has been recommended numerous times following the attacks

on September 11, 2001. Writing for release to your interagency partners creates avenues for collaboration and

allows partners to interact, inform, and share information in a timely fashion. This in turn ensures all partners

maintain shared situational awareness and have access to all relevant threat information. While this is only one

avenue to explore for information sharing, it offers key insights into the thought process of identifying with the

stakeholders to establish trust and understand their needs and capabilities. Today’s interagency environment requires

engagement at all levels, both multilevel and multifarious. Establishing a trusted interagency collaborative

environment in today’s threat environment will ultimately be the deciding factor of intelligence relevance or failure.

309Cilluffo, F.J., Clark, J.R., Downing, M.P. and Squires, K.D. Counterterrorism Intelligence: Fusion Center

Perspectives, Research Brief Volume 2, No. 1, George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute,

June 2012:35:29, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:



310Cilluffo, F.J., Clark, J.R., Downing, M.P. and Squires, K.D. Counterterrorism Intelligence: Fusion Center

Perspectives, Research Brief Volume 2, No. 1, George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute,















311Cincotta, T. “Intelligence Fusion Centers: A De-Centralized National Intelligence Agency,” Public Eye, Winter

2009/Spring 2010:10:1, [accessed 2013-06-19] from: http://www.publiceye.org/magazine/v24n4/intelligence-

fusion-centers.html.

31210 US Code, Sections 331-335.

31310 US Code Sections 371-382.

314The language of the Act mentions only the Army and the Air Force, but it is applicable to the Navy and Marines

by virtue of administrative action and commands of other laws.

315The Coast Guard was formed by merging two civilian agencies, the Revenue Cutter Service and the Lifesaving

Service. Although created and used for law enforcement purposes, the cutter service had already been used as part

of the US military forces by the time the Posse Comitatus Act was enacted. Refer to 46 Statute 316 (1878), directing

the Secretary of the Treasury to issue three months extra pay to those who had engaged in the US military service

during the war with Mexico and listing the cutter service as one source of possibly qualifying service.

316There is little commentary or case law to resolve questions concerning the coverage of the National Guard, the

Civil Air Patrol, civilian employees of the Armed Forces, or regular members of the Armed Forces while off duty.

The Posse Comitatus Act predates the National Guard in name only, since the Guard ‘is the modern Militia reserved

to the States by Article 1, Section 8, clauses 15, 16 of the Constitution,’ and has become “an organized force,

capable of being assimilated with ease into the regular military establishment of the US.” Refer to Maryland v.

United States, 381 US 41, 46 (1965).

317Feldkamp, J. Cdr. “Maritime Domain Integration,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime Intelligence-

Integration Office), Volume 3, Summer 2012:16:6-7:6, [accessed 2013-07-04] from:


318The MSSIS is a non-classified Internet-based program that provides an inexpensive network for maritime

information sharing on vessel activities and various other features that are useful in issues ranging from improving

the flow of commerce, to detecting anomalies in the maritime domain, to hurricane preparedness, to responding to a

crisis (such as the earthquake in Haiti).

319Hylton, H. “Fusion Centers: Giving Cops Too Much Information?” Time, March 09, 2009:3:1,
















323NMIO’s interagency staff is from 31 federal agencies including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of the Navy (DN), the Department of State (State), and

the Department of Justice (DOJ).

324Department of the Navy’s Information Technology Magazine. “Rear Admiral Samuel J. Cox”, CHIPS Magazine,

January-March 2013:6:1, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:

http://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=4350.

325National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office. National Office for Maritime Intelligence Integration

Announces New Name to Better Reflect Mission, Press Release, 23 January 2012, [accessed 2013-06-13] from:

https://fas.org/irp/news/2012/01/nmio.pdf.




327Intelligence is information to which value has been added through analysis and is collected in response to the

needs of policymakers. At the most generic level, there are two types of intelligence: raw and finished. Raw

intelligence is that which has not been vetted, verified and validated. Finished intelligence, which includes

information of unknown credibility, has been through an analytical process which has resulted in conclusions and

judgments being made. As opposed to evidence, which is generally gathered in support of a prosecution, intelligence

is gathered to inform policymakers and those individuals responsible for taking actions, including national security,

law enforcement and public safety officials. While intelligence may occasionally be introduced into legal

proceedings, generally it is not.

328The Fusion Center Guidelines define a fusion center as “a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that

provide resources, expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing their ability to detect,

prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.” Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and

Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era, August 2006, available from:

http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf [accessed 2013-06-18], p. 2. Some apply

this definition broadly to include any multi-jurisdictional anti-crime or response effort that may utilize intelligence

and/or information, to include federally-owned and operated collaborative efforts, like FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task

Forces (JTTFs) or High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA). The authors, however, limit their discussion of

fusion centers to those 40+ largely state and regional entities created to enhance the ability of the jurisdiction to

prevent, mitigate, and in some cases, respond and recover, from man-made threats, attacks, and natural disasters.

329The White House. National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding, December 2012:16, [accessed

2013-07-16] from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf.

330Thomas, G. “Collaboration in Space: The Silver Bullet for Global Maritime Awareness?” Canadian Naval

Review, 8(2), Summer 2012:45:14-18:18, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-


http://www.doncio.navy.mil/CHIPS/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=4350

https://fas.org/irp/news/2012/01/nmio.pdf


http://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf

http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf




331Thomas, G. “Collaboration in Space: The Silver Bullet for Global Maritime Awareness?” Canadian Naval

Review, 8(2), Summer 2012:45:14-18:14, [accessed 2013-07-09] from: http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-



Washington, D.C., May 2012:75:43, [accessed 2013-06-17] from:


333United States Department of Homeland Security. Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress

Report 2011, Washington, D.C., 2011:69:3, [accessed 2013-06-26] from:


334United States Department of Homeland Security. Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress

Report 2011, Washington, D.C., 2011:69:3-6, [accessed 2013-06-26] from:


335DHS continues to work closely with the States to facilitate REAL ID implementation with a number of states

making progress towards meeting REAL ID requirements. The Driver’s License Security Grant Program (DLSGP)

helps states and territories improve security of state-issued driver‘s licenses and identification cards in order to

reduce fraud, enhance the reliability and accuracy of personal identification documents and prevent terrorism. DHS

has awarded over $180 million in DLSGP grants to states and territories since fiscal year 2006 for information

technology and facility infrastructure upgrades, document security enhancements, equipment upgrades, and

reengineering of business practices. These enhancements have enabled states to make progress toward achieving

compliance with many aspects of the REAL ID regulation. Cited from: United States Department of Homeland

Security. Implementing 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Progress Report 2011, Washington, D.C.,

2011:69:55-66, [accessed 2013-06-26] from: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-

report-progress-2011.pdf.







338United States Government Accountability Office. Information Sharing: Agencies Could Better Coordinate to

Reduce Overlap in Field-based Activities, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-13-471, Washington, D.C.,

April 2013:66:0, [accessed 2013-06-10] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653527.pdf.

339United States Government Accountability Office. Maritime Security: Coast Guard Needs to Improve Use and

Management of Interagency Operations Centers, Report to Congressional Requesters, GAO-12-202, Washington,

D.C., February 2012:52:39, [accessed 2013-06-10] from: http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588476.pdf.

















341Other services provided by I&A include: facilitation fusion centre access to classified and sensitive information;

and provision of analytic and other training to state and local officials.





343United States Senate. Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers, Majority and

Minority Staff Report, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee of

Investigations, Washington, D.C., October 3, 2012:153:2, [accessed 2013-06-12] from:

www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=49139e81-1dd7-4788-a3bb

344Barkley, H. “Australian Border Protection Command,” NMIO Technical Bulletin (National Maritime

Intelligence-Integration Office), Volume 1, January 2012:16:4-5:5, [accessed 2013-05-30] from:


345Council of the European Union. Council and the European Parliament reach a provisional agreement on the

EUROSUR system, Press Release, Brussels, 14 June 2013:2, [accessed 2013-07-22] from:






Surveillance from Space Seminar, PowerPoint deck, Ministry of Defence, 11 December 2012:26.:3

348United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, Joint

Publication 2-01, Washington, D.C., 05 January 2012:281:A1-A2, [accessed 2013-07-31] from:


349Australian Quarantine & Inspection Service (AQIS): Quarantine Act; Export Control Act; and Imported Food

Control Act.

350Customs and Border Protection: Customs Act; Migration Act; and Narcotics Act.

351Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA): Fisheries Administration Act and Fisheries Management

Act.

352Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA): Australian Maritime Safety Authority Act; Protection of the Sea

(Powers of Intervention) Act; Protection of the Sea (Prevention of Pollution from Ships) Act.









353Australian Defence Force (ADF): Defence Act and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation)

Act.





355New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF): Defence Act.

356New Zealand Customs Service (NZCS): Arms Act; Aviation Crimes Act; Chemical Weapons (Prohibition) Act;

Crimes Act; Criminal Proceeds (Recovery) Act; Customs and Excise Act; Dumping and Countervailing Duties Act;

Food Act; Goods and Services Act; Immigration Act; Imports & Exports (Restrictions) Act; Maritime Security Act;

Maritime Transport Act; Passport Act; Search and Surveillance Act; Tariff Act; Temporary Safeguard Authorities

Act; Terrorism Suppression Act; Trade in Endangered Species Act; and United Nations Act (only key acts are

listed).

357New Zealand Fisheries (NZF): New Zealand Fisheries Act.

358Republic of Singapore Navy (RSN): Singapore Armed Forces Act.

359Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore: Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore Act.

360Police Coast Guard: Police Force Act and Registration of Criminals Act.

361Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA): Harbour, Docks and Piers Clauses Act; Coastguard Act; Harbours Act;

Hovercraft Act; Protection of Wrecks Act; Dangerous Vessels Act; Protection of Military Remains Act; Pilotage

Act; The Merchant Shipping Act; Aviation and Maritime Security Act; Carriage of Goods by Sea Act; The

Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act; Marine Safety Act; Railway & Transport Safety Act; and Merchant

Shipping (Pollution) Act.

362Serious and Organized Crime Agency (SOCA): Serious Organised Crime and Police Act; Serious Crime Act;

Proceeds of Crime Act; Extradition Act; Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act; Customs and Excise

Management Act; Freedom of Information Act; Human Rights Act; Police and Criminal Evidence Act; and

Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act.

363United Kingdom Border Force (UKBF): Immigration Act; Asylum and Immigration Act; and Nationality and

Immigration Act.

364Ministry of Defence (MoD): Armed Forces Act; Emergency Powers Act; Civil Contingencies Act; and Late

Payment of Commercial Debts (Interest) Act.

365Marine Management Organisation (MMO): Marine and Coastal Access Act; Conservation of Seals Act; Wildlife

and Countryside Act; Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulation; and Offshore Marine Conservation (Natural

Habitat) Regulations.






367Australian Border Protection Command. Border Protection Command (about us), BPC Website, updated July 8,

2011: [accessed 2013-07-03] from: http://www.bpc.gov.au/site/page5599.asp.













371United Kingdom House of Commons. Future Maritime Surveillance: Government Response to the Committee’s

Fifth Report of Session 2012-13, Defence Committee, Report HC827,12 December 2012:13:12, [accessed 2013-07-

11] from: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/827/827.pdf

372US Code, Public Law 108-458.

373Australian Border Protection Command. Guide to Australian Maritime Security Arrangements (GAMSA),

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http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmdfence/827/827.pdf








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380New Zealand Custom Service. New Zealand Customs Service Annual Report 2011-2012, For the year ended


http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/Documents/AR20112012.pdf.

381Bateman, S. “Securing Australia’s Maritime Approaches,” Security Challenges, 3(3), August 2007:109-129:116,












2010:277:54-75:68.

385Hansen, S. Lt Cdr. “National and International Sharing: A New Zealand Perspective,” Pointer Journal of the




386Lim, I. Lt Cdr. “Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness – An Idea Whose Time Has Come?” Journal of the




Surveillance from Space Seminar, PowerPoint deck, Ministry of Defence, 11 December 2012:26:8, 20.





http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/Documents/AR20112012.pdf
























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395New Zealand Custom Service. New Zealand Customs Service Annual Report 2011-2012, For the year ended


http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/Documents/AR20112012.pdf.

396National Maritime Information Centre. Information Guide, Version 1.0, 2011:12:6, [accessed 2013-06-11] from:

http://www.nautinstlondon.co.uk/nautinstlondon/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/NMIC-information-booklet.pdf.

397Australian Government. Defence Legislation Amendment (Aid to Civilian Authorities) Act 2006, Canberra, ACT,

No. 3, 2006:49, [accessed 2013-08-12] from: http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006A00003/Download.

398European Union Legislation. Summaries of EU legislation: Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS),

Council Decision of 22 January 2001, Brussels, Belgium, 2001:3, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:


399New Zealand Government. Defence Act 1990, Public Act 1990, No.28, Wellington, NZ, Reprint as at 1 July

2013:98, [accessed 2013-08-12] from:


400Singapore Government. Singapore Armed Forces Act, (Chapter 295), Act 7 of 1972, Revised Edition 2000:200,


http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/search/display/view.w3p;page=0;query=DocId%3Af7446be9-daef-4a09-bb63-

8e8da8b61f4c%20%20Status%3Ainforce%20Depth%3A0;rec=0;whole=yes






http://www.customs.govt.nz/news/resources/corporate/Documents/AR20112012.pdf









02 (2nd




Civilian Law, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, R42659, August 16, 2012:66, [accessed 2013-









Fusion Centres in Selected Countries, 2013:

Documents

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