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From Stadia to the Gezi Park: On ÇARŞI, Public Sphere and Political Agency of a Football Fan Group

Gulcin Balamir Coskun Assistant Professor in Political Science

Istanbul Kemerburgaz University, Istanbul Turkey

gulcin.coskun@kemerburgaz.edu.tr

Bezen Balamir Coskun (Corresponding author)

Associate Professor in International Relations Zirve University, Gaziantep

27260 Turkey +90 3422116666-6796

bezenbalamir@gmail.com

From Habermas to Fanblogs: Exploring the Public Sphere of European Football

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From Stadia to the Gezi Park: On ÇARŞI, Public Sphere and Political Agency of a

Football Fan Group

Gulcin Balamir Coskun

Assistant Professor in Political Science

Istanbul Kemerburgaz University, Istanbul

Turkey

gulcin.coskun@kemerburgaz.edu.tr

Bezen Balamir Coskun (Corresponding author)

Associate Professor in International Relations

Zirve University, Gaziantep

27260 Turkey

+90 3422116666-6796

bezenbalamir@gmail.com

Gülçin Balamir Coşkun had her MA degree from Université Paris 1-Panthéon-Sorbonne. She had

her PhD degree from the Istanbul University with her thesis on “The Analysis of Sovereignty

Concept in the Framework of European Constitutional Order” in 2007. She works as assistant

professor in Istanbul Kemerburgaz University. Her research areas are democratic theory, political

violence and the democratization of Turkish political system.

Bezen Balamir Coskun is an associate professor in international relations. She is teaching at Zirve

University, Gaziantep since 2009. She was received her PhD from Loughborough University, her

master degree from Aalborg University. Even though her area of expertise is international security

she is also interested in issues like social movements, public sphere and democratisation. In this

respect she has several articles, book chapters and policy reports.

From Stadia to the Gezi Park: On ÇARŞI, Public Sphere and Political Agency of a

Football Fan Group

Abstract

The paper analyzes the transformation of a football supporter group to an oppositional public

sphere. Here it is argued that the interlinkages between football and politics lead to the evolution of

stadia as spaces for political expression, which inevitably puts supporter groups into the midst of

political/ideological tensions. Here the authors discusses the case of ÇARŞI, Turkey’s one of the

most popular football support groups, as a public-political actor within the context of Habermas’

public sphere arguments. By engaging in protests inside and outside the stadia, ÇARŞI has

managed to organize people to exert their influence on the public debate.

Keywords: Habermas, public sphere, Carsi, Turkey, social movements, Gezi Park events

Introduction

As defined by Franklin Foer (2006) in his best seller book How Soccer Explains the World, football

is much more than a game. Positioning at the intersection of economics, politics and society,

football reflects the socio-political developments in a given society. Inevitably, football teams and

their supporter groups have become part of political and ideological struggles of their societies. The

ethnic rivalry between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid in Spain, the oligarchic effect of Berlusconi

on the rise of AC Milan in Italy, Red Star Belgrade supporters’ role in Balkan Wars of 1990s are

among the examples of this phenomenon (Foer 2006). Similarly, as the most recent developments

show, football teams and supporter groups are actively engaging in Turkish politics. Following FC

Barcelona’s motto of mas que un club (more than a club), football clubs and stadia in Turkey have

also transformed into public spheres within which people can express their political views.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the transformation of a football supporter group, ÇARŞI1, to an

oppositional public sphere. Here it is argued that the interlinkages between football and politics lead

to the evolution of stadia as spaces for political expression, which inevitably puts supporter groups

into the midst of political tensions. Here the authors will discuss the case of ÇARŞI, Turkey’s one

1 ÇARŞI is the supporter group of Beşiktaş Gymnastics Club (BJK), including the Beşiktaş football club. The group is

known for their social and political commentary, choreography, and chanting against racism, fasc ism, sexism and

ecological degradation. The catch-phrase of the group is ’Çarşı is against everything!’ The symbol of the group

resembles the symbol of anarchism.

of the most popular football support groups, as a public-political actor within the context of

Habermas’ public sphere arguments. By engaging in protests inside and outside the stadia, ÇARŞI

has managed to organize people to exert their influence on the public debate.

Habermas defines the public sphere as “. . . the virtual space where people can interact. . . . It's the

virtual space where the citizens of a country exchange ideas and discuss issues, in order to reach

agreement about 'matters of general interest” (Habermas 1997, p.105). By the public sphere he

means a realm of social life in which public opinion can be formed and individuals assemble to

form a public body. The public sphere provides platforms for citizens to behave as a public body

when they confer in an unrestricted fashion about matters of general interest. In a large public body

this kind of communication requires specific means for transmitting information and influencing

those who receive it. Moreover, the public is no longer made out of masses of individuals but of

organized people that institutionally exerting their influence on the public sphere and debate. Thus,

stadia and supporter organizations appear as perfect examples of public spheres.

By hosting thousands of people, modern stadia provides space for political and ideological

expression, in Habermas’ words, by setting “in motion a critical process of public communication

through the very organizations that mediatize it” (1991, p.232). Habermas states that “a critical

publicity brought to life within intraorganizational public spheres might lead to democratization of

the major institutions of civil society” (1991, p.232). However, he did not provide examples or

discuss the features of an oppositional public sphere. It is the aim of this paper to discuss the

development of a football supporter group, ÇARŞI, as a public-political actor that created an

oppositional public spheres from stadia to the streets. The political slogans and placards they carry

into stadia can be considered as the crucial part of a critical process of public communication. It is

believed that by being one of the leading figures of the anti-government Gezi Protests of 2013 in

Turkey, the political agency of ÇARŞI was affirmed.

To discuss the oppositional public sphere created by ÇARŞI, first the literature on football and

politics will be reviewed. Then, Habermas’ conceptualization of public sphere will be examined. Then,

to analyze the characteristics of the public sphere created by ÇARŞI, placards/slogans that were created

by ÇARŞI, ÇARŞI’s website, Forza Beşiktaş will be investigated. Besides the ÇARŞI’s own sources,

the discourse and image of the ÇARŞI constructed in social media platforms, particularly during Gezi

Protests, will be reviewed.

Football and Politics (or) Football in Politics?

Football has always been an interesting subject for social scientists. Particularly in political science

and sociology there exist a wide variety of studies dealing with the interlinks between football and

politics. Even there are journals specifically focuses on football (or soccer). Generally, the research

on football politics nexus clustered around four main themes: (1) football politics or politics of

football, (2) football and the construction of ethnic/national identities, (3) football as a tool for

peace and reconciliation and (4) football as a reflection of societal/political violence.

The studies on the football and politics deal with both national and international politics. The

colonial background of the football attracts particular attention. Paul Dimeo discusses football in

the context of colonialism, nationalism and communalism in Bengal. He underlies the power of

football both as an arena of inclusion and exclusion and as a site of resistance in India. According to

Dimeo, early organization of football in India under colonial regime excluded Indians. Only after

the British saw the merits of football to help Indians to improve themselves, they began

encouraging Bengalis to engage in playing football. Bengalis on the other hand, took the advantage

of the opportunity to play the colonizer’s game (Dimeo 2010). Football gave ‘barefoot Bengali

babus’ to battle with their ‘British bosses’ on equal terms, and proved that they are better than them.

The success of the team transformed Mohun Bagan Athletic Club from a football team into a

symbol of nationalist aspirations (Mookerjee 1987 as cited in Dimeo 2010). The Bengalis had found

their voice on the football field since football bonded disparate groups, and provided an example to

be matched in political life (Dimeo 2010). Similarly, Haggai Harif and Yair Galily argued that

football in Palestine was a litmus test for diagnosing the psychological climate of Jewish and British

relations between 1918-1948. In their article Harif and Galily place football in the political history

of the Jewish community in Palestine under the British rule. They state that as experienced in the

Jewish case “the achievements of sportsmen of national entities lacking formal sovereignty ... may

evoke pride and patriotism, thus accelerate the internal process of integration. Societies and

countries that do not have political, military and economic power, tend to emphasize the acquisition

of symbolic power as a substitute. In this respect, sport in general, football in particular can create

an illusion of equality (Harif and Galily 2003, p.41-42).

Not just in colonial states but in many non-colonized countries, the history of football has been

intertwined with politic both at domestic and international level. For instance, Houchang Chehabi

reviews the politics of football in Iran. Following Pickford’s analysis of football through military

metaphors, Chehabi explains the politics of football in Iran. According to Pickford “football is a

game each team works together to try and occupy as much of the ‘territory’ of the other as it can,

culminating in attempts symbolically to ‘conquer’ the other side’s stronghold by kicking the ball

into the goal” (Pickfors as quoted by Chehabi 2006, p.233). Thus, the field is a metaphor for the

competition between communities, cities and nations. Football resembles organic solidarity2 since

football values team work, solidarity, division of labour and collective planning. According to

Chehabi, the passion for football in Iran became a sign of dissent. Football was initially a deliberate

act to foster the spirit of cooperation among Iranians (Chehabi 2006).

In contrast with colonial and nationalist cases above, the case of Italy is considered as one of the

examples of the hybridization of sport and politics. Nicola Porro and Pippo Russo explain the rise

of Silvio Berlusconi, the founder and the leader of the Forza Italia Party as football politics. Porro

and Russo argue that Forza Italia movement is not simply a product of media power but it was “an

organizational paradigm transferred from the world of sport, namely the management of the AC

Milan football club, to the political arena” (Porro and Russo 2000, p.349).

The second cluster of studies that deals with football and politics focuses on identity politics. As

Jeremy MacClancy argues “sports are vehicles of identity, providing people with a sense of

difference and a way of classifying themselves and others...” (1996, p.2). Soccer is one of the most

powerful of all sports in the formation of identities. In this sense football fandoom and identity

politics should be seen as being interlinked. Accordingly, Alan Bairner and Peter Shirlow (2000)

discuss the cases of Northern Ireland and Sweden. In Northern Ireland case they analyse the extent

to which soccer supporting in Northern Ireland plays its part in the construction of the political

identity of certain working-class Protestant men. According to Bairner and Shirlow, the case of AIK

-Sweden is also linked to ideas about the collective self and the other. While the Protestant Ireland’s

other is Catholics, the AIK’s other consists of immigrants, rural Swedes, Swedes from Gothenburg

and Malmö. In a similar vein Richard Mills’ study argues that how a football team, Velez Mostar, is

utilized to fulfill Tito’s request to guard brotherhood and unity in Yugoslavia, and subsequently the

multiethnic character of Bosnia and Hercegovina. They also underline that how this mission of

unity made the team a target for divisive ethnic nationalist groups during Bosnian civil war of 1992-

1995 (Mills 2010). Hasan Kosebalaban’s work on the role of Turkish media’s sport coverage during

World Cup 2002 also shows how the success of a national team reinforces patriotism and national

zeal even in a disintegrated society as Turkish society (Kosebalaban 2004). Last but not least, the

most cited case study linking football with identity politics is the Barcelona Football Club and

Catalonia. Football Club Barcelona has been closely tied to Catalonia throughout its history. Barça

functioned as an important vehicle for the expression of Catalan identity and Catalan national

2 Durkheim defines organic solidarity as social cohesion based upon the dependence individua ls have on each other in.

It comes from the interdependence that arises from specialization of work and the complementarities between people.

sentiments under Franco regime (See Shaw 1985; Kuper 1994; MacClancy 1996; Colome 1997;

Foer 2004). Even after the end of Franco regime Barça has continued to be involved in the

construction of identities in Spain (Shobe 2008). As all of these studies show football is not a mere

reflection of identity politics but is itself involved in the process of political identity construction.

The third and fourth clusters of analyses take the role of football from the opposite sides of conflict.

While a group of authors consider football as a source of violence and conflict (among all Scalia

2009; Spaaij and Vinas 2005; Brimson 2003; Walton 2001; Dunning et al. 2002), the other group

takes football as a tool of conflict resolution (among all Sugden 2006; Bubalo 2013; Dilanyan 2011;

Aras and Ozbay 2008).

All of these studies prove that there exist strong links between football and politics in a given

society. Here only a few of them were reviewed. Almost all the studies reviewed here point out the

significance of fandom in football and politics link. As spectators are as important as the teams in

football culture, the culture and sociology of fandom has particularly attracted academic attention.

Here it is argued that despite the number and variety of studies on the football and politics or

sociological analyses of fandom, there are a few studies analysing fan groups as political agents that

are able create public sphere. Within this context, a Turkish fan group, ÇARŞI, will be discussed as

a political actor that created a public sphere which is not just limited to the stadia.

Public Sphere, Stadiums and Fan Groups as Political Agents

Habermas and Public Sphere

The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere constitutes a reference book for those who

study on state / civil society relations as well as for researchers of democratic theory. In his

monumental book, Habermas offers an archeological analysis of bourgeois public sphere. For him,

the bourgeois public sphere is “a category that is typical of an epoch. It cannot be abstracted from

the unique developmental history of that ‘civil society’ (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) originating in the

European High Middle Ages; nor can it be transferred, ideal typically generalized, to any number of

historical situations that represent formally similar constellations” (Habermas 1991, p.xvii), and it

constitutes first example of a functioning public sphere. Through a socio-historical study of the

cases of Britain, France and Germany he attempted to elaborate the evolution of public sphere

between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries. Understanding the initial socioeconomic and

historical conditions and the corrosion of the public sphere can help clarifying “the possible

conditions for a functioning public sphere and hence for democracy today” (Postone 1996, p.165).

For this reason, it is necessary to underline some important points of his work.

Firstly, Habermas reminds us that the separation between the public and the private was blurred in

the Middles Ages. In that period, publicness was an attribute of rulers. The public authority was

defined by the representation. The King had this “representative publicity” and the private sphere

was resigned to this authority. The Kings were representing “their authority ‘before’ the people

rather than for the people” (Habermas 1991, p.232). The seventeenth century was a century of

change for this type of regimes. Habermas demonstrates how since the seventeenth century, the

private spheres becoming more autonomous and critical thus, constituted the bases for the

formation of a civil society independent from the rulers. In fact, during this period the state

experienced important transformations as well including its bureaucratic structure and its functions.

More importantly, in this century the state began to be defined “as an impersonal locus of authority”

(Calhoun 1996, p.8). A new kind of publicness was emerging vis-a-vis this new political authority.

On one hand, bourgeois was resisting against state intervention in their private space; on the other

hand, the individuals were coming together as public and engaging in debates over the general rules

(Habermas 1991, p.27).

Secondly, Habermas gives details of how and where these individuals were meeting and how did

social structures prepared ground for public sphere. These individuals were excluded from state

apparatus, but they were new powers of emerging market economy. It was the birth of bourgeois as

being: “owner of goods and persons and one human being among others, i.e., bourgeois and

hommes“ (Habermas 1991, p.55). It means that they were proprietors and masters of their houses as

well as they were subject of law (Michaud 1999, p.214). “Coffee houses” in London, “salons” in

Paris and “table societies” were places where these bourgeois started to discuss their “business”

first, then to debate different issues. In this process, the blue print technology and the development

of print media played an important role. Thanks to print media, local markets could find ways to get

informations about other producers and consumers, which helped enormously to the formation of a

national market. The daily or weekly journals were informing about prices, climate, production

levels or crop qualities. This process named by Benedict Anderson as “print capitalism” (Calhoun

1996, p.8) which also facilitated information exchange in different areas. The literal and political

issues had been inserted into these journals. The early novels were being circulated between

participants of these salons. While government news were creating a political awareness, novels

were modeling the private life of bourgeois. All of these enabled the transformation of literary

public sphere to a political sphere where “the public discussions concern objects connected with the

practice of the state” (Habermas 1991, p.232).

Although these meeting places were different in the size and participant compositions, they had

some common features which influenced on the development of the bourgeois public sphere

(Habermas 1991). Firstly, the participants of these coffee houses, salons and societies were, at least

in theory, were leaving their economic and social prestige outside and all had an equal status. The

second crucial feature was related to the argumentation process. The meaning of philosophical,

literary or aesthetic pieces was debated by rational communication methods. Any group had a

monopoly of interpretation. Thirdly, the emerging public was inclusive. It means that every person

as readers, listener, and spectators could participate and the issues discussed were accessible for

everyone. In fact, the public “at large” was extremely small because illiteracy problems were

widespread and the percentage of rural population was high. Nevertheless, the literary and artistic

public sphere were extremely helpful in consolidating rational-critical argumentation culture.

In fact, from this literary public sphere comes the third important point that we like to underline.

This rational-critical argumentation culture constitutes the intrinsic characteristic of the bourgeois

publicness. This rational-critical discourse about literature or art had direct reflections on political

debates. The political issues began to be critically discussed while the role of political daily press

was increasing. Civil society was engaged in critical political debates where the major issue was the

limitation of absolute monarchy (Habermas 1991). Thanks to printed press, the power and influence

of these political debates were extremely widespread. Public opinion was being formed and began

to influence the formal governmental apparatus. This was the climate before the French Revolution.

At the same time, a new and contradictory situation was rising from this bourgeois public sphere.

Everyone should have the right to be member of the “public.” How to define citizen and rights of

voting? This was the main issue for the European public sphere in the nineteenth century. The

bourgeois public sphere was based on the idea of openness to everyone and the struggle given

against absolute state ended with the victory of “public.” However, this newly emerging public was

different from the bourgeois.

From this point, Habermas analyzed the transformation of bourgeois public sphere. According to

him, the public was enlarged thanks to the electoral reform, and entered in a structural

transformation period. Habermas’ analysis needs to be overviewed for grasping the meaning of

today’s public sphere in mass welfare-state democracies. Firstly, as a result of the electoral reform,

the public was enlarged. The direct consequence of this enlargement was the diminution of social

and economic homogeneity of the public. In this context, growing social and economic inequalities

became an issue of conflict in the public sphere. The public sphere was not composed only by

bourgeois anymore. Secondly, as a result of this heterogenization, it was almost impossible to

define an objective general interest on this public sphere since different groups were acting and

debating there. “The functioning of the public sphere thus shifted from rational-critical debate to

negotiation” (Calhoun 1996, p.22). Interest groups and political parties emerged as active agents of

this new public sphere and asking for the development of social rights. In an enlarged public sphere,

institutionalization was needed, but formal institutions were based on hierarchical structures. Thus

it has been a new public sphere structure dominated by corporate actors. On the hand, economic

issues which had been stayed within the limits of private sphere have been moved on public sphere.

As conflicts between employers and workers could not be limited within the private sphere, modern

state entered in this game as legislators and controller. Meanwhile state transferred some tasks of

public administration to enterprises and semi-official agencies. “The public element of public

interest fused with the private element of contractual formulations under private law to the extent

that along with the concentration of capital and intervention a new sphere emerged from the

reciprocal permeation of the state by society and of society by the state” (Habermas 1991, p.151). It

was the end of net division between the private and the public. The family seems to be only private

realm while state interventionism has also been debated in this domain.

The enlargement of public sphere had another negative effect, which was a decrease of critical

discourse in the public sphere. In contrary, public opinion became a threatening factor. Tension

between majority and minorities became more visible. What is became important is to manipulate

and convince the majority. Manipulative publicness has substituted rational-critical publicness and

mass media has played an important role in this process (Michaud 1999). During the twentieth

century, public relations have emerged as a new area of manipulating public opinion.3 Public sphere

has transformed to a passive and apolitical space where the absence of cultural and critical

discourse sharing was impressive. From this point of view, “the world fashioned by the mass media

is a public sphere in appearance only” (Habermas 1991, p.171).

In spite of this diminution of critical capacity, Habermas did not give up the idea of having a public

sphere where a deliberative democracy takes root. In mass welfare state democracies, it is not

possible to reconstruct the bourgeois public sphere of eighteenth century since socio-economic

structures and technologic infrastructure have enormously changed. In mass media societies,

political parties, corporate bodies or group leaders transmit their message by using different

communication channels. It creates an asymmetrical situation between message and opinion

emitters and receivers because the latter cannot criticize or its critics cannot reach to the emitters.

On the other hand, all of these messages are largely under political surveillance. Hence, it is

3 Habermas develops these ideas more in detail in the Legitimation Crisis.

necessary to build up a new rationalization process by three ways. Firstly, as corporate bodies are

agents of public spheres, their structure must be based on a rational-critical communication

channels. It means that internal democratization of political parties or non-governmental

organizations are crucial. Secondly, the mutual dialogue and control of rival organizations must be

established. Thirdly, the same dialogue and control must be created between civil society and state

institutions (Habermas 1991, p.236).

Fan Groups with their as Political Agency Capacity to Create Public Sphere

During 1980s and early 1990s, academic literature on fandom was exclusively focus its attention to

“hooligan problem” (See Turner 1990). Only after late 1990s the literature began to include wider

issues such as fans’ identity. Hence, the literature on fandom scatters around sociological

interpretations of fandom and fan culture (among all see Vrcan 2002; Back et al. 1999; Brown

2002). For example, in their comprehensive book on football fans, Fanatics! Power, Identity and

Freedom in Football, Adam Brown and his colleagues (2002) analyse the complex and shifting

identities associated with football and their impact on fandom. Throughout the book the authors

focus on issues of power in football, racism, football identities and the space for fandom.

Particularly analyses of fan groups and their group identities as well as how do they express the

particular identity has become a popular subject among scholars.

In his study on fandom, Giulinotti (2002) describes 4 ideal types of spectator identity: supporters,

followers, fans and flaneurs. He discusses a trend that moves away from the supporter model with

its traditional identification with local clubs toward the more detached consumer-oriented

identification of the flaneur. The commercialization and commodification of football has triggered

the diversification in the social categories of fandom: on the one end of the spectrum we have the

fans who see football as a popular entertainment, on the other end we have fans who see football as

a mean to express their political agency. In this sense, we have been observing clashing processes

of commercialization and politicization of football by the fans of football clubs. As stated by

Bayraktar, football has the potential for the reproduction of sovereignty by authority but at the same

time it has anti-systemic potential of opposition. Football helps opposers by providing

“communicational apparatus to propagandize and popularize their dissident ideology” (Çoban 2008,

59). Particularly in authoritarian contexts football stadia can be sites for expressing dissatisfaction

with the regime. As pointed out by Daniel Kunzler, “football is a medium to execute power and to

resist power” (quoted by Kuhn 2011, 32). Not just inside stadia that provide spaces for collective

political presence but also other spaces, including digital/social media platforms and fanzines,

created by fan groups may become oppositional public spheres. As a result, the analysis of the

politicized fan groups as political agents and the oppositional public sphere they created inside and

outside stadia requires close attention of political scientists. Here the oppositional public sphere

created by football fan groups and the prospects of becoming political agents for football fan groups

will be discussed around the ÇARŞI case in Turkey.

: The Portrait of a Fan Group as a Political Agent in a DIY Oppositional Public Sphere

In Turkey the use of stadia as a platform for political expression is not something entirely attributed

to ÇARŞI. Anti-PKK slogans and ultra-nationalist placards of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP)

during the football matches were very common throughout the 1980s and 1990s (See Bora 1993

and Duran 1993). However, it was ÇARŞI which transformed the football fandom into political

agency and established an oppositional public sphere in Turkey.

Members of ÇARŞI form the core of the Beşiktaş Football Club’s fans. Before the matches they

gather in the precinct of Beşiktas, they eat and drink together around high street of Beşiktaş, then

walk to stadium with flares, chanting political slogans, and carry banners bearing the anarchist .

ÇARŞI was founded in 1980 to institutionalize the support for Beşiktaş Football Club (BJK).

ÇARŞI is distinguished itself from the other football fan groups with the use of iconography and

leftist ideology. The founders of the group was dominated by activists who had resentment towards

the military rule and the following neo-liberal period. Particularly during the military rule ÇARŞI

provided a unique public forum where opposition express their political stand. Eventually, the leftist

proletariat identity of the BJK also provided opportunities for ÇARŞI group’s embrace in anarchist

and socialist philosophy and iconography. Taking from the moral values of the proletariat identity

such as solidarity and the idea of collectiveness formed the basic principles of the group. The

construction of the image of ÇARŞI as a opposition group find its match in BJK which is

considered as an anti-establishment club compared with the mainstream clubs of Istanbul. As Alen

Markaryan who is one of the leaders of the group, defines, ÇARŞI is “a shelter for those who felt

victimized, marginalized, and disaffected by the Sunni Muslim, neo-liberal orthodoxy in Turkey”

(quoted by McManus 2013, 7). ÇARŞI provides platforms for group members to socialize not just

inside the stadia and to have their say in areas other than football.

Starting as a small group of supporters, now with the inclusion of followers, fans, flaneurs and

sympathizers ÇARŞI has transformed into an agent of public sphere. Not just by opposing the state

but also opposing the other public agents who are in favour of neo-liberal and capitalist policies in

Turkey, ÇARŞI has emerged as a distinct agent in public sphere. ÇARŞI has become visible outside

the Beşiktaş neighbourhood and stadium thanks to their political slogans during the football

matches. By covering a great variety of social and political sensitive issues ÇARŞI has managed to

rise the publicness of the group. Particularly, the increase in the media coverage of ÇARŞI has

encouraged the group to make more critical statements and expressed their opinions on several

political and social issues (McManus 2013).

“Nuclear free Turkey”

“Don’t forget Chernobyl, protect Akkuyu for nuclear free Mersin”

“No to racism”

“Being racist is something much worse than supporting Fenerbahçe”

“No to child porn”

“We are all Muhsin Ertugrul4, we are against the destruction of public theatre halls”

“No to tanks no to war”

As quoted by McManus some sports program producers in mainstream media “cannot wait to see

what ÇARŞI will do next time” (2013, 10). Besides the media attention the group leaders have been

invited for talks, seminars, TV programs and public appearances like celebrities. Alen Markaryan,

for instance, visited 20-25 cities in a year to represent ÇARŞI in different platforms (McManus

2013). The documentaries such as Istanbul United and Asi Ruh and movies with a screenplay

centered around ÇARŞI have reinforced the ÇARŞI saga in the eyes of Turkish public.

ÇARŞI has also presented itself as a group with ecological concerns. The issues such as the

government’s insistence on building hydroelectric energy centers as well as dams and allowing the

mining firms to search gold in the expense of the destruction of environment were the ones severely

criticized by ÇARŞI.

“To stop warming write Global send 1903”

“We are all ozone layer”

“Let Hasankeyf5 as it is, do not let Hasankeyf flooded”

“Ferhat drilled the mountains for his love to Şirin, not for cyanide”

4 The founder of the state founded public theatre halls in Turkey

5 The city and its archeological sites are at risk of being flooded with the completion of the Ilısu Dam

Besides the political declarations through banners and slogans, ÇARŞI has also emerged as a group

quickly organized for humanitarian causes. For example ÇARŞI managed to collect 1903 (the year

that Beşiktaş Sports Club established) unit blood to be donated to Turkish Red Crescent.

“ÇARŞI is also against the shortage of blood in Red Crescent’s reserves”

“We are against everything but blood donation”

Similarly, just after the Van earthquake ÇARŞI organized a campaign to collect humanitarian aid in

less than one week. After the match Beşiktaş supporters undressed and throw their scarves, jackets

and shirts to the field to send Van, whose people horribly affected by earthquake.

“We are sending sun to Van”

“Van you won’t be shiver anymore, ÇARŞI is here”

By utilizing the power of the certain group of BJK supporters, ÇARŞI has created a place for itself

within the general public sphere. The group focus on the educational and transformative power of

the ÇARŞI. As pointed out by McManus “the sentiments driving their actions—the search for the

right slogan, the right organization to support, the “right thing” to do—are more ethical than

ideological” hence, the politics of ÇARŞI operates as a set of ethics and moral principles

(McManus 2013, 12).

As 18th century European bourgeoisie raised the publicness of the public sphere they created with the

help of printed media, today digital media provides opportunities for the publicness of public sphere

created by certain groups. ÇARŞI has also followed this logic and exploited the advances of digital

technologies. With an official website, forzabesiktas, several fanzines such as Pence, Moda Kartalları,

Irlandalilar, Siyah Beyaz Gurubu, UNIBJK, and Ladies of Besiktas, as well as social media accounts on

Facebook, Twitter and Youtube, ÇARŞI virtually diversified its supporter group base and embrace the

supporters, fans, followers and sympathizers from all over the world. ÇARŞI’s ethical not ideological

stand has turned out to be a catch all platforms for public. Hence, the publicness of ÇARŞI has stretched

and accommodated people from different social strata and opinions.

Concluding Remarks: ÇARŞI is Against Everything

To read Habermas’ public sphere theorization and to overview ÇARŞI’s actions at the same time

reveals interesting intersection points.

Firstly, it is suitable to make an explanation of the meaning of ÇARŞI. The name of Beşiktaş Football

Club comes from the neighborhood Beşiktaş which is of the most historical neighborhood of Istanbul.

Like in all neighborhoods established when there were not big malls, Beşiktaş had coffee houses, tea

gardens which used to offer people spaces to come together and talk about everything. In time, some of

these tea gardens have transformed into car parkings or shopping malls. Nevertheless, the fish bazaar

and some restaurants at the center of Beşiktaş have protected their place in this neighborhood. The name

of fan group ÇARŞI comes from this place because this is the place where all supporters come together

before the games. In fact, this is the name existing by himself. In this meaning, the similarity with the

Habermasian bourgeois public space is intense. Like the bourgeois meeting in the coffee houses in

London, it is a fan group gathering before the games and sometimes weekdays around a table at the

center of Beşiktaş. First of all, their agenda are composed by matches of Beşiktaş, transfer policies of

the club and problems of club management. Nevertherless, even they do not have a special interest in

the politics, people coming together begin to talk about socio-economic situations and political

problems.

Aforementioned, the foundation of ÇARŞI dated back in early 1980s the period that the political agenda

of the country was heavily ideological. Consequently, class homogeneity of the bourgeois was absent in

the Beşiktaş. Regular gatherings of ÇARŞI before the games remind us coffee houses or saloons of 18th

century. Moreover, like in bourgeois public sphere where participation was depending on literal or

aesthetic maturity, the publicness of ÇARŞI requires having concerns about Beşiktaş. Özgür Ergün, an

active participant of ÇARŞI members, summarizes this situation with the following phrases:

This is a rare place which has remained as a traditional neighborhood. It is connected to its

roots. Here, people from different point of views, from different life styles are living in

democratic consensus. In this diversity ̧ people live in a harmony. We have an upper

identity which is to be a supporter of Beşiktaş. We say that what is important is the interests

of Beşiktaş. Consequently, the reflex of ÇARŞI appears as an opposition group (Kasapoglu

2013, p.1).

In the last sentence of this citation, we can observe the second common element with the bourgeois

publicness. This is critical discourse of ÇARŞI. The motto of ÇARŞI clearly summarizes the situation:

ÇARŞI is against everything. In this sense, by being against everything and questioning the status quo

ÇARŞI’s performance can be considered as civil disobedience (Dikici, 2009).

As one of ÇARŞI members states “ÇARŞI’s motto is misunderstood. Actually ÇARŞI is behind

anything rightful...” (quoted in the documentary ÇARŞI’s Walk). Another ÇARŞI member pointed out

the widespread injustices, violence, ecological degradation and human rights violations around them

and stated that “there are lots of wrongdoings and injustices around us that’s why we are perceived as

against everything” (quoted in the documentary ÇARŞI’s Walk).

As we can see from the examples given above, there is a discourse against all of dominant powers.

Separately from the relations between politics and football, which we have analyzed previously, we can

underline the fact that ÇARŞI has begun by criticizing the club and its policies, but the group has

continued to spread their critical discourse in other areas of politics and society. Consequently, there is a

common point with the bourgeois publicness. The bourgeois developed their rational-critical discourse

by the way of literal critics. In the same way, ÇARŞI group has directed their critical tradition to the

political arena. Stadiums have constituted spaces where ÇARŞI goes into action by slogans, cheers or

banners. If we consider how masses are interested in football, these actions have great influences on

public.

On the other hand, since the funeral ceremony of Hrant Dink in 23 January 2007, ÇARŞI has begun to

be an active actor during mass protests. With violent events of May 1st (2013) and Gezi Resistance

Movement during the summer of 2013, ÇARŞI has become more visible as a social and political actor.

Again we can make a conjectural comparison. The politicization of the bourgeois publicness took place

against absolutist regimes. The authoritarian tendencies of political power in Turkey especially after

2007 elections have pushed critical discourse of ÇARŞI on political arena.

The last common point with the bourgeois publicness is that ÇARŞI uses different mass

communications channels in the best way. In this context, as we underlined above, ÇARŞI virtually

diversified its supporter group base and used these social media accounts for spreading its critical

discourse as well as organizing protests and public events. During the Gezi protests forzabesiktas was

one of the crucial communication platforms for ÇARŞI group:

They are destroying the park to pedestrianize Taksim and build a shopping mall. I cannot

understand why they are doing this. There are activists around here to stop the destruction

but they need help. Cagdas Sezgin @forzabesiktas, 30 May 2013

It is now beyond the park and trees. The extend of police violence against peaceful

protestors is unbearable. İlker Yaldız @forzabesiktas, 31 May 2013

This resistance is above politics it is about being human. Ayhan Aytac @forzabesiktas, 31

May 2013

They were waiting for ÇARŞI to come. This was not a protest organized by a particular

group, people gathered here randomly. ÇARŞI was their hope. Everybody was reacting but

they were waiting for ÇARŞI to come and deal with it. Hakan Tufekci @forzabesiktas, 1

June 2013

The most interesting point of the analysis of ÇARŞI group in the light of Habermas’ eminent work is

the following. It is possible that this football fan group practice offers a hope for overcoming two

problems of publicness in mass-media welfare states. First problem was about the hierarchical structure

of organizations taking actions in public sphere in mass-welfare states. In this sense, ÇARŞI group

offers a model of organization dominated by horizontal relations where internal critical discourse

continues to be vivid. In the interview, three members of ÇARŞI underline the absence of hierarchical

structure. Cem Yakışkan, one of the founders of ÇARŞI explains how they reacted in the beginning of

Gezi events with these phrases: “We reacted as normal human beings when we saw images of police

violence on TV. We said “Let’s go” on social media, on Facebook. When we gathered at Beşiktaş çarşı

we were 300-400. Then we started to walk. When we arrived in Harbiye, we were 5000” (Kasapoglu

2013, p.1). In this context, as this example has illustrated, social media presented an opportunity to

organize without a hierarchical organization.

The second problem emphasized by Habermas was the absence of dialogue between different

organizations on public sphere. During the Gezi resistance, the fan groups of three big football clubs

established a positive dialogue, which had been conceived almost impossible before. In fact, the Gezi

resistance has been an interesting case since it gathered very different political groups, fan groups and

NGO on the same platform. The integrative factor was certainly state violence and oppression. It is

possible to observe the formation of a publicness, even it was temporary. The continuity of this

publicness will be an important factor for having a more deliberative democracy as envisaged by

Habermas. Nevertheless, it is necessary to highlight that a healthy dialogue with state structure is a sine

qua non of this publicness. Turkey is really far away from this point of dialogue.

The review of their critical discourse and their readiness to organize protests and social events shows us

that ÇARŞI is not just a football fan group but it is political. However, the group does not have any

intention or will to act as a political agent, instead they are content to establish an oppositional public

sphere.

ÇARŞI’s widespread publicness and its potential for political agency is regarded as a threat by the

ruling party. Particularly, after the group’s active participation in Gezi Protests in 2013 the ruling elite

convinced about the oppositional political agency of ÇARŞI. In August 2013, with a governmental

decree the political slogans and banners inside the stadiums were banned. It was obvious that the ban

particularly targeted ÇARŞI. Despite the ban, ÇARŞI has continued to chant political slogans and show

their anarchic banners during the matches, which are censored by broadcasting TV channel. Thanks to

ÇARŞI, the ruling elite in Turkey has realized the significance of stadiums as public spheres, thus

stadiums have increasingly become popular public spaces for the JDP’s social and political gatherings.

The Turkish government’s banning access to certain social media channels including Twitter and

Youtube have reflected the government’s aim to destroy all attempts of publicness, which is a very

alarming situation for Turkish democracy.

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Documentaries and Movies Asi Ruh (2008) http://www.sinemalar.com/film/18688/asi-ruh

Benimle Oynar mısın? (2013) http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3132928/ Çarşı’nın Yürüyüşü (2009) https://www.facebook.com/video/video.php?v=314483284513

Istanbul United (2013) http://www.istanbulunitedthemovie.com/