From Management to Negotiation: Technical and InstitutionalInnovations for Integrated Water Resource Managementin the Upper Comoe River Basin, Burkina Faso

Carla Roncoli Æ Paul Kirshen Æ Derek Etkin Æ Moussa Sanon ÆLeopold Some Æ Youssouf Dembele Æ Bienvenue J. Sanfo ÆJacqueline Zoungrana Æ Gerrit Hoogenboom

Received: 5 May 2008 / Accepted: 28 June 2009 / Published online: 26 August 2009

� Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2009

Abstract This study focuses on the potential role of

technical and institutional innovations for improving water

management in a multi-user context in Burkina Faso. We

focus on a system centered on three reservoirs that capture

the waters of the Upper Comoe River Basin and servicing a

diversity of users, including a sugar manufacturing com-

pany, a urban water supply utility, a farmer cooperative,

and other downstream users. Due to variable and declining

rainfall and expanding users’ needs, drastic fluctuations in

water supply and demand occur during each dry season. A

decision support tool was developed through participatory

research to enable users to assess the impact of alternative

release and diversion schedules on deficits faced by each

user. The tool is meant to be applied in the context of

consultative planning by a local user committee that has

been created by a new national integrated water manage-

ment policy. We contend that both solid science and good

governance are instrumental in realizing efficient and

equitable water management and adaptation to climate

variability and change. But, while modeling tools and

negotiation platforms may assist users in managing climate

risk, they also introduce additional uncertainties into the

deliberative process. It is therefore imperative to under-

stand how these technological and institutional innovations

frame water use issues and decisions to ensure that such

framing is consistent with the goals of integrated water

resource management.

Keywords Irrigated agriculture � Adaptive management �Climate variability and change � Decision support systems �Water policy � Participatory research � Burkina Faso

Introduction

Climate change is expected to exacerbate fluctuations in

water resource availability, and, therefore, competition and

conflict over water, particularly in dryland Africa (Boko

and others 2007; Kundzewicz and others 2007; Muller

2009). The spatial scales and temporal frames of climate

variability and change impacts challenge the ability of

decision makers to incorporate lessons derived from per-

sonal experience and empirical observation into adaptive

management solutions. Simulation modeling and other

decision support tools can enable decision makers to learn

and adapt by testing how different management alterna-

tives may perform in given climate and resource avail-

ability scenarios (Tsuji and others 1998; Hoogenboom

2000). But the ability of these tools to represent the

C. Roncoli (&) � G. Hoogenboom

Department of Biological and Agricultural Engineering,

University of Georgia, 1107 Experiment Street, Griffin,

Georgia 30223-1797, USA

e-mail: croncoli@uga.edu; carlaroncoli@yahoo.com

P. Kirshen

Battelle Memorial Institute, Lexington, MA 02421, USA

D. Etkin

Camp Dresser McKee (CDM), One Cambridge Place,

50 Hampshire Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA

M. Sanon � L. Some � Y. Dembele

Institut de l’Environnement et des Recherches Agricoles 01,

01 BP 7192, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

B. J. Sanfo

Direction de la Meteorologie, 01 BP 57601, Ouagadougou,

Burkina Faso

J. Zoungrana

Direction Generale des Ressources en Eau, 01 BP 7025,

Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

123

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

DOI 10.1007/s00267-009-9349-x

complexities of systems to be managed and of behavioral

responses to climate risk is limited. A growing body of

empirical research shows that socio-institutional factors

often interact with climatic and environmental conditions

in shaping adaptation options and choices (Shepherd and

others 2006; Eakin and others 2007; Broad and others

2007; Ramsey 2009). This recognition has led to increasing

efforts to implicate ‘‘users’’ in the development of decision

support tools in order to ensure that they produce realistic

and relevant information (Cabrera and others 2008; Breuer

and others 2008; Crane and others 2008). Previously an

exclusively scientific endeavor, modeling is now being

integrated with participatory approaches to facilitate sci-

entist-stakeholder dialogue and negotiated responses (Me-

inke and others 2001; Nelson and others 2002). Simulation

models are used in interactive settings not only to forecast

outcomes but also to elicit and explore implicit assump-

tions that participants have and that may affect their

awareness and evaluation of different options. Social

learning, based on experimentation, deliberation, reflec-

tion, and adjustment, has become a centerpiece of inte-

grated water resource management, replacing previous

‘‘command and control’’ systems (Lal and others 2001;

Pahl-Wostl and others 2007; Berkes 2009). Decision sup-

port tools can catalyze this process by fostering a shared

understanding of problems, solutions, and trade-offs and by

promoting transparency, thereby contributing to social

capital and consensus building (Hare and others 2006;

Mostert 2006; McCartney 2007; Garcia-Barrios and others

2008; Giupponi and others 2008; Kirshen and Cardwell

2008; Langsdale and others in press).

However, the experience of twenty years of participa-

tory research and development has shown that the ability of

social actors to engage in consultative processes varies a

great deal, based on differences in culture, language, edu-

cation, politics, and other social variables (Nelson and

Wright 1996; Guijt and Kaul Shah 1998; Peters 2000;

Brock and McGee 2002; Cornwall and Coelho 2007). As

for other forms of social participation, groups and indi-

viduals are unevenly equipped to use decision support tools

and to engage in ‘‘stakeholder interactions’’ centered on

them (Taddei 2005; Broad and others 2007; Lemos 2009;

Roncoli and others 2009). This is particularly the case

when those tools are based on scientific analyses and

computer applications, and even more so when stake-

holders include rural communities of developing countries.

It is now widely recognized that decision support systems

for adaptive management must incorporate institutional

mechanisms that provide all players with opportunities to

participate, to understand the options, express their opin-

ions, and influence the outcomes (Wester and others 2003;

Lemos and Farias de Oliveira 2005; Marcus 2007;

Brugnach and Pahl-Wostl 2008). Without such safeguards,

socially disadvantaged groups are likely to find their

interests disregarded or overruled by the most powerful

stakeholders.

Given its fluid nature and multiple functionalities water

is subject to overlapping claims by different groups (Roth

and others 2005; Orlove and Caton 2009; Whiteley and

others 2009). In rural African communities, water and other

natural resources are often managed according to common

property regimes or customary tenure systems, which have

varying degrees of formalization and recognition by the

totality of users and by external actors (Meinzen-Dick and

Bruns 2000; Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya 2005). Legal sys-

tems imposed by colonial administrations and post-colonial

states add another layer of complexity to this framework,

resulting in contradicting policies, overlapping jurisdic-

tions, inconsistent implementation, and erratic enforcement.

Development interventions, such as dams and irrigation

schemes, have introduced further regulations and restric-

tions, increasing the ambiguities surrounding land and

water rights (van Koppen 2000; Faure 1996, 2003; Bethe-

mont and others 2003; Van der Schaaf 2006). Newly

established decentralized and pluralistic models of envi-

ronmental governance, based on partnerships of state, pri-

vate sector, and local communities, are opening up

opportunities for citizen participation, but also shifting

responsibilities without devolving authority and resources

(Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Wester and others 2003; Lemos

and Farias de Oliveira 2005; Lemos and Agrawal 2007;

Marcus and Onjala 2008). Coupled with the economic

insecurity and political instability experienced by many

African communities and with the uncertainties associated

with climate variability and change, these ambiguities

translate into increasing levels of livelihood vulnerability

and resource conflict (Larson and Ribot 2005).

The extensive research and operational efforts needed to

develop DSTs for climate adaptation and water resource

management must, therefore, be complemented by an

equally thorough analysis of the social and institutional

system in which such tools are to be introduced. This paper

aims to do so by examining the potential synergies of tech-

nical and institutional innovations for integrated water

resource management in a context characterized by a mul-

tiplicity of users and shifting policy frameworks. In partic-

ular, we explore the implications of interactive decision

support tool and participatory planning processes for effi-

ciency and equity of water use. After describing the back-

ground and the methodology for the study, we introduce a

decision support tool that has been developed by our project

and policy development that are affecting water manage-

ment in the study site. We then identify the main stakeholders

and elucidate their water demands, their institutional

linkages, and their specific position in the system. The dis-

cussion section examines how the innovations in question

696 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

123

articulate with local realities in framing stakeholders’

understanding of the decision situation, inquiring to what

extent such framing allows for more adaptive and equitable

management of water resources.

Research Setting

The study area is located in the Upper Comoe River Basin,

one of the few permanent rivers of Burkina Faso (Fig. 1).

The river originates in the Kenedougou Province and flows

through the Comoe Province before flowing southward to

cross Cote d’Ivoire and ending in the Gulf of Guinea. The

site was selected because prior research indicated that the

area is experiencing a significant decline in quantity and

quality of its water resources and growing social tensions

centered on water use (Painter and Sanou 1996).

The water management system in question comprises

three reservoirs that are used primarily for irrigation: Lobi,

Toussiana, and Moussoudougou, built respectively in 1976,

1982, and 1991 (Fig. 2). Moussoudougou is the largest

(with a total capacity of 38 million m3), while Lobi and

Toussiana hold about 6 million m3 each. Lobi, however, is

generally filled only to 4 million m3 because of the

weakened state of its infrastructure. The system captures

the waters of the Upper Comoe River Basin, feeding them

into a system of pipelines that operates entirely by gravity,

exploiting the natural slope in the territory (Fig. 3).

The infrastructure is owned and managed by the Societe

Sucriere de la Comoe (SOSUCO), a sugar company based

in Beregadougou, near the town of Banfora. SOSUCO

controls how much water is released from the reservoirs

and into the system. Water is released from the Moussou-

dougou and Lobi reservoirs to serve the SOSUCO sugar

cane fields and its sugar and industrial alcohol manufac-

turing facilities as well as the Office National de l’Eau et de

l’Assainissement (ONEA), a public utility that provides

piped water to the town of Banfora. A legally mandated

minimum flow for environmental services (debit sanitaire)

of 150 l/s is released into the Comoe after the main SO-

SUCO diversion; this streamflow also services an irrigated

perimeter managed by the Union des Cooperatives des

Exploitants de la Plaine Amenagee de Karfiguela (UCE-

PAK) and a rapidly growing number of irrigated plots

along the riverbanks. Water from the Toussiana reservoir

irrigates the eastern side of the SOSUCO plantation and

other farmers’ fields located downstream, and the return

flow being captured into the Yannon River, a tributary

which joins the Comoe south of Banfora. In addition to

reservoir releases, the Comoe receives water from a net-

work of seasonal streams and overflow from wetlands and

water bodies, such as the Karfiguela, Tengrela, and Le-

mouroudougou lakes.

The system’s water resources are replenished by annual

precipitation, most of which falls during a single rainy

season, from early May to late October. While the South-

west is the wettest part of the country (with a mean annual

rainfall of 1087 mm for the period between 1954 and

2007), the area is experiencing an overall decline in annual

rainfall and an increase in inter-annual variability, as is the

Fig. 1 Location of study area

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 697

123

rest of the Sudan-Sahel region (Boko and others 2007)

(Fig. 4). Climate variability and change, coupled with the

expansion in population, irrigated acreages, and other

water uses, has resulted in a mismatch between users’

needs and available water resources. This is exemplified in

Fig. 5, which compares dekadal (10-day) estimates of total

Fig. 3 Schematic of water

management system

Fig. 2 Study area, upper

Comoe river basin

698 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

123

reservoir inflows and precipitation volumes for an average

flow year (1974) with total basin demands for each deka-

dal.1 During the year rainfall and flows fluctuate in ways

that are not in synchrony with the demands, hence the need

for the reservoirs. The problem is aggravated by the inter-

annual variability in inflows, which range between 57.73

million m3 in the lowest rainfall year (1972) and 171

million m3 in the highest rainfall year (1966) in the

unregulated streamflow data series before construction of

the dams.

The major challenge for SOSUCO reservoir managers is

to release water during the course of the dry season without

knowing when the new rainy season will begin or what

amount of precipitation it will bring. Presently, operators

make management decisions conservatively to minimize

potential deficits later in the year. This means that down-

stream water shortages are experienced even after years of

good rainfall, as was the case in March and April 2007

when, despite above average precipitation (1,301 mm)

during the previous rainy season, the river bed downstream

from the Karfiguela diversion was completely dry. Enraged

farmers marched on the local government offices and the

Minister of Finance, a politician native to the area, had to

be dispatched to Banfora to assuage the protest. In

reporting these events, the national press referred to water

management in the Upper Comoe River Basin as a ‘‘real

problem,’’ highlighting a number of causal factors,

including infrastructural decay, environmental degradation,

and lack of predictive information to guide reservoir

management decisions (Ouattara 2007).

Research Methods

This study sought to address this knowledge gap by

developing a decision support tool (DST) to assess the

impacts of alternative water management decisions in

different climatic and hydrological conditions, including

precipitation, reservoir inflows, evaporation, and unregu-

lated flows into the river from streams (Fig. 6).

The DST consists of a model that simulates reservoir

releases and diversions for 10-day periods for an entire

year starting with a selected date. The tool allows users to

determine, by trial and error, when and how much water

needs to be released into the system and diverted to users

so that each user’s demands are met to an acceptable

degree. Standard scenarios for low, high, and average

rainfall years are built into the model, enabling users to

identify a water management schedule that best fits with

actual and anticipated climatic conditions. This will allow

users to minimize the risk of severe deficits at times when

crops are most vulnerable as well as devise ways of min-

imizing impacts of those deficits that cannot be prevented.

Fig. 4 Total annual

precipitation, Banfora station

(1954–2007)

1 Lacking historic gage data, historic reservoir inflows were

estimated from a gage downstream of the reservoir system at

Diabarakoko and factored by the respective drainage areas. Estimates

are only available for those years prior to construction of the

reservoirs, when streamflow was unaltered by reservoir operations.

Analogue years for hydrologic conditions therefore were selected

from the period between 1962 and 1976, corresponding to the

available unregulated watershed streamflow data.

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 699

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Because the DST examines the allocation of water among

users as well as use over time, it is also expected to

facilitate joint planning in the face of drought conditions

and/or changing demands.

In its effort to successfully respond to users’ needs, the

project embraced an iterative, interactive approach, based

on participatory research and direct involvement by users

in tool development. Two fieldwork periods were con-

ducted in January 2007 and in January 2009 to understand

the water management system, to identify user groups,

their water demands and decision processes, and to collect

the data necessary to feed the model. In total, 24 farmers

and 20 representatives of public agencies, non-govern-

mental organizations, and private sector enterprises, and an

environmental lawyer specializing in water policy were

interviewed. Focus group interviews (ranging in size

between 3 and 16 participants) were carried out with

members of 3 farmer cooperatives and other user groups

(riparian farmers, pastoralists, and fishermen). In addition

to these interviews, 4 consultative workshops with repre-

sentatives of user groups and other stakeholders were held.

These included a first meeting in the capital city, Ouaga-

dougou, in June 2007, to present the idea to technical

personnel; a workshop in Banfora in January 2008 to elicit

users’ feedback on a first draft of the tool; and 2 workshops

in Ouagadougou and in Banfora in January 2009 to intro-

duce a completed version of the DST, to solicit comments

for fine-tuning, and to train users in its operation. An

assessment of actual uses and impacts of the DST was not

feasible because the project’s limited scope, time frame,

and resources only covered tool development and because

the institutional framework in which the DST is to be used

Fig. 5 Total basin hydrologic

inputs for a typical year and

demand estimates

Fig. 6 Decision support tool

schematic

700 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

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was just emerging at the time of fieldwork, prompted by

new policy reforms described below.

Policy Context of Water Resource Use

The field assessment revealed that water resources in the

Upper Comoe River Basin are subject to a multitude of

uses and claims by a diverse set of users, with unequal

clout and degree of recognition by local stakeholders and

external actors. Relationships among these user groups and

their abilities to benefit from the proposed DST are shaped

by multiple factors, including the policy environment. Two

recent legislative initiatives are especially relevant to

access and use of natural resources, namely the decen-

tralization of local governance and the integrated water

resource management plan (Plan pour la Gestion Integree

des Ressources en Eau, known as PAGIRE), passed

respectively in 2001 and 2003 and are currently under

implementation (Garane 2007). The decentralization

establishes Rural Communes and elected Commune

Councils modeled upon the already existing Urban Com-

munes, entrusting them with some local government

functions. The PAGIRE mandates the creation of local

water management committees (Comites Locaux de l’Eau,

known as CLE) to bring together all participants in a water

management system in a consultative setting.

The territorial jurisdiction of the Upper Comoe River

Basin CLE covers one Urban Commune (Banfora) and four

Rural Communes (Beregadougou, Moussoudougou, Tous-

siana, and Samogohiri, the latter in the Kenedougou Prov-

ince where the Comoe originates). The President of the

Regional Council (which includes representatives of each

Commune in the Region) chairs the CLE, while the Vice

Presidency is covered by the Chambre Regionale d’Agri-

culture, an organization representing farmers’ interests at

regional level. The Mayors of the 5 Communes are charged

with the task of mobilizing CLE members for meetings and

activities. Besides the Mayors, the CLE membership

includes Regional Directors of line ministries, agricultural

and natural resource management projects, civil society

organizations (women’s groups, local NGOs), customary

and religious authorities, economic enterprises, and user

groups. The breadth and diversity of the CLE general

membership reflects the PAGIRE’s emphasis on participa-

tory approaches, but this inclusivity and involvement by

political leaders and government authorities limits the via-

bility of the CLE as a consultative body. At the time of

writing, the Upper Comoe CLE had been able to hold only

one general meeting, in early January 2009, with most of the

debate being centered on how to mobilize the necessary

resources for its functioning (according to the PAGIRE, the

CLE are supposed to be self-sustaining).

Most discussions and deliberations, in fact, take place

within a smaller Technical Committee, composed of 14

members, including the CLE leadership, the Mayors of

Banfora, Beregadougou, and Toussiana, the Ministries of

Agriculture, Environment, and Infrastructure, the main

users (SOSUCO, ONEA, and UCEPAK), and a few civil

society organizations, such as the Association Eau

Developpement et Environnement (AEDE), a local NGO

that specializes in water resource management issues (its

representative, a former SOSUCO engineer, serves as the

CLE’s Secretary). As its first activity, the Committee

prepared an assessment of users’ needs, finding demands

to exceed supplies by approximately 5 million m3, a

deficit corresponding to the amount of water needed to

grow 180 ha of rice, 450 ha of vegetables, or 570 ha of

sugar cane (AEDE 2008). The report does not propose

how to address this gap, but Committee members

expressed the hope that a widespread, prolonged rain (of

30–40 mm) over the reservoirs’ catchment and areas early

in the season and the contribution of from the Comoe

own source (estimated at an average of about 150 l/s)

may help reduce the deficit. The report also proposes a

reservoir release schedule, which was approved by gen-

eral acclamation during the January 2009 meeting.

However, it must be noted that the CLE is legally defined

as a mechanism for ‘‘consultation, mobilization, and

promotion’’ rather than as a decision-making body with

enforcement prerogatives. To what extent the CLE can

push for implementation of the agreed-upon schedule will

depend on its ability to ensure SOSUCO’s cooperation

and to raise the necessary resources for monitoring

operations. But the desire to be perceived as a good

corporate citizen and to avoid politically embarrassing

social mobilization, such as the events of April 2007,

could induce the company to comply, particularly in years

of abundant rainfall. Providing a platform for negotiation

and compromise among a multitude of users and needs is,

in fact, the CLE’s mandate.

Water Users of the Upper Comoe River Basin

In order to understand the interactions and implications of

these institutional and technical innovations for delibera-

tions and negotiations surrounding water use, it is essential to

identify each user group in terms of their position in the water

management system and in the related institutional context.

Societe Sucriere de la Comoe (SOSUCO)

SOSUCO was created with French capital in 1965 by a

land concession by the newly independent state of Haute

Volta (now called Burkina Faso), which enabled it to

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 701

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expropriate village land to establish its irrigated perimeters,

a loss that still troubles the relationship between the com-

pany and those communities. In the 1970s, the sharehold-

ing majority was transferred to the state, which financed

the construction of the reservoirs and infrastructure. SO-

SUCO operated as a parastatal until 1998, when, according

to the neoliberal policies embraced by the government,

which favor privatization, the company was put up for sale.

It was acquired by Industrial Promotion Services (IPS), an

investment firm controlled by the Aga Khan, the Pakistani

millionaire who is the spiritual leader of the Ismaili’ sect of

Shia Muslims. IPS has been heavily investing in African

enterprises as a way to promote economic development,

buying several former state enterprises in Burkina Faso,

including a cotton production and processing enterprise

(FasoCoton), a plastic manufacturing industry (FasoPlast),

and the national airline (Air Burkina). With a labor force of

2000 permanent staff and thousands of seasonal workers

(and an estimated indirect employment effect of 40,000),

SOSUCO is the second largest employer after the state in

Burkina Faso, one of the poorest countries in the world

where formal employment opportunities are few. The

company’s role as a major employer in the area, coupled

with the Aga Khan’s economic importance and his

authority as a world leader of Islam, in a country where

half of the population is Muslim, makes SOSUCO an

extremely powerful actor on both the local and the national

scene.

The Aga Khan’s particular investment philosophy and

commitment to development goals, rather than mere eco-

nomic profitability, has also enabled SOSUCO to stay

afloat despite severe financial problems that have plagued

the company. These problems are partly attributed to a

history of mismanagement when the company was a par-

astatal as well as to recent increases in the cost of petrol,

inputs, and other materials. In January–February 2008 the

situation became critical as a few powerful and politically

connected businessmen illegally imported and flooded the

market with cheaper sugar, leaving SOSUCO with a glut of

unsold stocks, even thought its total production of about

30,000 tons per year does not meet the national demand,

estimated at about 90,000 tons per year (Ouattara 2008).

This crisis led to mounting anxiety among employees about

the fate of the company and of their jobs, which erupted in

widespread demonstrations in Beregadougou in April 2008

(Traore 2009).

SOSUCO’s ability to thrive financially and expand

spatially is limited by plant capacity and land availability.

SOSUCO currently operates about 4000 ha of irrigated

fields, planted with sugar cane. The rest of the company’s

land holdings (about 6000 ha) are non-irrigable or non-

arable, including hills and rocky outcrops. Since growing

cane at a distance greater than 25 km from the plant would

not be profitable, SOSUCO has tried to convince farmers in

the surrounding areas to grow sugar cane on a contract

basis. But farmers have been reluctant, suspecting that the

company would eventually take over their land as it has

done in the past, though this option is no longer politically

feasible as Burkina Faso seeks to promote its image as a

democratic country in relation to the international

community.

Given these obstacles to expansion, improving agricul-

tural productivity is critical to SOSUCO’s economic via-

bility. This will require, among other things, attaining

greater efficiency in water management, as the company is

often unable to satisfy all of its irrigation demands, due to

insufficient supply in the water management system. To

cope with water shortages, irrigation managers may decide

to apply only 60% to 80% of the water requirements to

older (3–5 year), less productive sugar cane fields, which

results in lower yields. Productivity gains will partly

depend on technological improvements: most of the SO-

SUCO sugar cane fields are irrigated by central pivots,

which are estimated to have a 90% efficiency rate, but

about 600 ha are irrigated by sprinklers that have at least a

35% loss rate. The company is planning to replace the

latter with drip irrigation, although its high cost limits its

ability to expand the system to the entire perimeter.

Therefore, water resource management tools, such as those

introduced by this project, can contribute to SOSUCO’s

efforts to improve irrigation efficiency. This gain can make

more water available for the company to increase its own

productivity as well as to release to other users.

Office Nationale de l’Eau et de l’Assainissement

(ONEA)

ONEA is a state owned utility under the tutelage of the

Ministry of Agriculture, Water, and Fisheries, which

functions as a private enterprise under an agreement that

grants it management autonomy but requires it to be

financially solvent without state subsidy. The company

supplies piped water to urban consumers in Burkina Faso,

including the town of Banfora (population 63,300), while

the Ministry of Agriculture has the mandate of providing

water to rural populations. Urban use is metered and fees

are charged according to a graduated fee scale based on

consumption levels.

ONEA receives water from one of two pipelines that

capture water from the Moussoudougou and Lobi reser-

voirs (Fig. 3). SOSUCO currently provides ONEA with a

flow of 200 l/s, an amount that far exceeds ONEA’s annual

demand, estimated at 934,257 m3 (an average of 30 l/s) for

2008 (AEDE 2008). But needs are expected to increase in

the future due to the growth in urban population and the

planned expansion of piped water to Beregadougou, an

702 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

123

initiative promised by the Minister of Agriculture during a

recent electoral campaign visit. To prepare for expanded

demand, ONEA has recently installed a new pipeline with

350 l/s capacity.

Legally ONEA has priority in the water allocation from

the reservoirs, but in practice, ONEA’s water demands are

so small compared to those of SOSUCO that they are easily

met. Actually, since urban demand fluctuates seasonally,

ONEA does not always use all the water that it receives,

which occasionally causes pressure problems in the piping

network. Banfora residents do not usually suffer water

shortages, except for occasional interruptions in the water

flow when SOSUCO has to repair parts of the system. The

fact that the company’s managerial and professional staff

resides in company-owned housing in town also helps

ensure a reliable water supply to Banfora.

While there are no major conflicts between SOSUCO

and ONEA over water allocation, a major confrontation did

recently occur when ONEA tried to introduce a metering

system to measure and charge for water consumption at the

SOSUCO processing plant (which uses an estimated 2

million m3 per year), as it does for other industrial plants in

Banfora. The initiative was met with strong resistance by

SOSUCO, so much so that the regional government

authorities had to intervene and to convince ONEA to

desist from its plan.

The Karfiguela Farmer Union

UCEPAK, the largest organized group operating down-

stream of the SOSUCO system, is technically an umbrella

organization composed of 5 cooperatives. The initial 75 ha

were developed in 1975 with assistance from the govern-

ment of Taiwan, and expanded the following year to the

current perimeter of 350 ha by Chinese foreign aid.

UCEPAK includes 713 farmers from 7 villages which are

included, because of their proximity, within the Urban

Commune of Banfora. The irrigated perimeter extends over

the territory of the two dominant villages, Karfiguela and

Tengrela. The former claims the Presidency, being the

original site where the irrigated perimeter was established;

the latter has the most members and political clout as the

home village of two national politicians.

Most of the residents of the villages included in UCE-

PAK belong to the Karaboro and Goin ethnic groups,

which have inhabited the area since the 18th century

(Ouedraogo 1997). In this area women have traditionally

been involved in rice production in the wetlands, while

men cultivated upland fields. The development of irrigated

schemes by government and development projects, such as

the UCEPAK perimeter, deprived women of their land use

rights, as men took control of irrigated land (van Koppen

2000). In addition, women’s work burden increased,

because they are now obliged to work in men’s irrigated

plots, in addition to their own fields. Currently only 18% of

UCEPAK members are women: some of them obtained

plots through matrilineal inheritance, which is practiced

among the Karaboro, while others did so during the revo-

lutionary regime of Thomas Sankara in the mid-1980s,

which strongly promoted women’s emancipation.

The Karfiguela plain lies downstream from the main

valve whereby SOSUCO controls the level of water in the

river. From the river, water is diverted to the primary canal

through a gate that is operated by a technician paid by

UCEPAK. This canal releases water into 4 secondary

canals, which divide the territory into 5 sectors (farmers in

each sector constitute a cooperative within UCEPAK).

Water is then distributed from secondary canals to 36 ter-

tiary and 170 quaternary canals. The perimeter is divided

into plots ranging in size between 0.25 ha and 0.75 ha and

allocated to 713 members, some of whom have multiple

plots inherited from relatives or acquired directly from

UCEPAK. Currently there is no more land available for

further allocation unless a member leaves or loses his/her

plot. UCEPAK can take plots away and reallocate them if

owners fail to cultivate them for two consecutive seasons,

refuse to participate in collective work, not properly

maintain the adjacent canals, or block the gates or canals to

divert water to their plots. Within the perimeter, plots differ

in terms of land quality and water accessibility, and this

variability affects the options available to each farmer.

Soils quality in different sectors varies, ranging between

sandy and loamy, which suit different crops. Most of the

plots along the Comoe River have sandy soils and are

typically planted with vegetables, while rice is always

grown in the low-lying areas. Some fields around the

Karfiguela lake are easily flooded and cannot be exploited

during the rainy season. Other plots barely receive any

water because of distance, elevation, or poor state of

infrastructure so that they can only be planted with maize

or cassava, which require less water. Having multiple plots

in different sectors and locations enables farmers to exploit

these variations to their benefit. Proximity to a road is also

an advantage, facilitating the marketing of produce. Of 11

members interviewed in January 2007, five had one plot,

four had two plots, and three had three plots with some

cultivating over 1 ha of irrigated land.

Farmers complain that the construction of the SOSUCO

reservoirs, particularly that of Moussoudougou, and the

deterioration of the irrigation infrastructure have greatly

reduced the availability of water in the system. To remedy

the problem, in the late 1990s, UCEPAK decided to restrict

the area cultivated each dry season, alternating irrigation

among sectors. According to the plan, one half of the

perimeter receives water during one dry season, and the

other half does so during the following dry season. During

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123

their ‘‘on’’ season, farmers receive water every other day

and grow rice, while the others get water once a week,

which, in some of the areas in the perimeter, is sufficient to

grow maize or vegetables. Of 11 farmers interviewed, over

half (54%) did so, while about one third (36.4%) left their

plots uncultivated. Farmers who are unable to grow any

crops during their ‘‘off’’ season engage in off-farm activi-

ties or work in the SOSUCO sugar cane fields.

During the rainy season, plots are only irrigated during

prolonged dry spells, and most farmers grow rice or

maize because vegetables are more susceptible to pests

and disease. Rice is preferred to maize because it obtains

better prices and is more productive per unit of land

(average rice yields are 3.5 tons/ha versus 2.5 tons/ha for

maize). Even though they are perishable, vegetables have

the advantage of providing farmers with small but fre-

quent revenues unlike income from rice or maize which is

realized all at once after harvest. Vegetables, however,

fetch low prices because the area produces more than the

urban market of Banfora can absorb and transport to

distant markets is costly. During the 2008 dry season,

65.6 % of the perimeter was planted with rice and 22.9%

with vegetables, while during the rainy season, it was

mostly (92.4%) planted with rice. Cumulative production

for 2008 was 1840 tons of rice, 1132 tons of vegetables,

88 tons of maize, 52 tons of cassava, 3.40 tons of peanut,

and 0.25 tons of cowpeas.

The water that reaches the Karfiguela diversion is part of

the water that flows from the Moussoudougou and Lobi

reservoirs and that is released into the Comoe River after

the SOSUCO main diversion. This flow, calculated at

150 l/s, is to serve all downstream users in addition to

maintaining the environmental services flow in the Comoe.

Often, however, the flow that reaches UCEPAK is con-

siderably diminished as riparian farmers upstream of the

Karfiguela diversion withdraw water for their own plots.

When water levels in the river are too low, UCEPAK has

been petitioning SOSUCO through the agricultural exten-

sion service to release more water into the river, and their

requests have been usually met, within limits set by the

available water supply and SOSUCO’s own needs. The

CLE (and the DST) are meant to replace this ad-hoc

approach with more systematic consensual planning.

Technical Committee’s need assessment for the 2009 sea-

son provides for the exploitation of the entire UCEPAK

perimeter and estimates water demand at 570 l/s in

December, 900 l/s in February, and about 700 l/s until

mid-April (for a total of 8,407,584 m3, compared to an

estimated 31,203,026 m3 needed by SOSUCO). For the

first time in years, UCEPAK farmers were able to increase

their dry season planting to about 220 ha (compared to an

average of 175 ha). But the farmers did not dare expanding

to the entire 350 ha perimeter, because of the uncertainty

that remained about the authority of the CLE’s deliberation

and SOSUCO’s willingness to release enough water.

Riparian Farmers

Besides the Karfiguela farmer union, other farmers culti-

vate the riverbanks of the Comoe by means of wells and

pumps. Some of them are organized into groups, but most

operate independently. Most riparian farmers are residents

of local communities, but they also include migrants

returning from Cote d’Ivoire as well as Banfora residents

with some income to invest. There is no land titling or land

market in rural areas, as traditional land tenure regimes still

prevail. According to the latter outsiders can obtain land

from the elders of local kin groups who have land under

their control by virtue of being descendants of the first

settlers in the area. Such transaction usually involves gifts

of small livestock and performance of some rituals and,

rarely, cash rent. But most land along the riverbanks and

around the lakes is now appropriated and it is difficult for

newcomers to obtain a plot.

Streambank plots range between 0.12 ha and 0.50 ha

and are mostly cultivated with vegetables during the dry

season and maize during the rainy season. Besides annual

crops, cassava, papaya, banana and mangoes are also

grown. Riparian farmers include a 55 ha French-owned

commercial banana plantation, which was established of

land leased from Tengrela landowners, and several smaller

plots of banana, which add up to a total estimated acreage

of 150 ha of banana along the Comoe. With about 2000

banana stands per hectare, and an average water require-

ment of five liters per application, this expansion of banana

cultivation is further exacerbating water shortages in the

system. As is the case with UCEPAK, riparian farmers use

part of the water that is released into the Comoe after the

main SOSUCO diversion to maintain the minimum envi-

ronmental services flow. But at times of water scarcity,

most of the water that reaches the Karfiguela diversion is

channeled into the irrigated perimeter, so that only water

that flows past the diversion is what leaks through the

deteriorating infrastructure. Occasionally conflicts arise

between UCEPAK and riparian farmers, particularly those

who cultivate the Comoe banks south of the Karfiguela

diversion and north of the confluence with the Yannon,

which replenishes the river flow. It was these farmers who

led the protests in April 2007, their anger being directed

equally toward both SOSUCO and UCEPAK.

Riparian farmers are often accused of exploiting land and

water resources illegally (sometimes referred to as

‘‘pirates’’) and are blamed for the water shortages in the

system by the other user groups and by government agen-

cies. Yet their activities have been strongly encouraged by

government policies and development interventions that

704 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

123

center on small scale irrigation as a means of achieving food

security and economic growth. A number of projects, such

as the Projet d’Appui au Developpement Local (PADL), and

organizations, such as the Association des Professionnels de

l’Irrigation Privee et des Activites Connexes (APIPAC),

provide farmers in the area with training, incentives, ser-

vices, and credit. As a result, riparian farming has expanded

dramatically in the last five years, and there are an estimated

200 motor pumps extracting water from the river down-

stream from the Karfiguela plain. The total acreage planted

along the river is estimated at 893.5 ha, requiring approxi-

mately 9.5 million m3 to irrigate crops during the dry season,

starting in January and ending in April (AEDE 2008). While

promoted by national agricultural policies, small scale irri-

gation along the Comoe is at odds with the government’s

environmental policies which seek to protect stream banks

from erosion. Even though the 1996 Reforme Agraire et

Fonciere (RAF) mandates a 100 meter buffer between cul-

tivated areas and streams, the clause is rarely respected or

enforced (Sanou 2003).

Pastoralists

Farmers in the Upper Comoe River Basin own oxen for

plowing, which are generally kept in enclosed corrals near

the farmer’s homestead for the entire year, and also invest

earnings in livestock, which are tended by Fulani agro-

pastoralists. Most of them have been in the area for dec-

ades, inhabiting Fulani ‘‘camps’’ at the outskirts of villages.

They maintain patron-client relationships with farmers,

through whom they obtain fields to supplement their pas-

toral livelihood with crop production. Some of these local

agro-pastoralists leave the area during the dry season to

seek pasture and water elsewhere (some crossing the border

into Ghana or Cote d’Ivoire) to return in April-May, when

the new rains start. Transhumant pastoralists from the

Sahelian zone cross the province on their way to wetter

areas in the South, but they rarely linger in the province to

avoid conflicts with local farmers. Even so, damage to rice

nurseries and vegetable plots by vagrant cattle are frequent

occurrences reported by farmers and the region has been a

theater of violent confrontations between farmers and

pastoralists (Ouedraogo 1997; Hagberg 2001, 2003).

Access to water for animals is an enormous problem for

livestock husbandry in the area. There are no reservoirs that

are specifically for livestock, and among the SOSUCO

reservoirs, only Toussiana can be reached by animals (but

access is being restricted because continuous passage

damages the earth dam). The situation is particularly serious

on the western side of the Comoe, where there are fewer

water bodies. On the other hand, the lakes, ponds, and

streams that exist on the eastern side of the river, cannot be

accessed because they are entirely enclosed by rice and

vegetable plots and by mango and cashew groves. The

erosion of stream banks, accelerated by riparian cultivation,

creates hazards for animals, which can get injured or trapped

as they try to reach water. The area also hosts some large

herds of elephants, which sometimes descend on water

points to bathe, stirring up mud and making the shores

slippery and the water unsuitable for drinking by livestock.

But, given that elephants are protected by wildlife conser-

vation policies, herders have no recourse against them.

The expansion of cultivated areas has affected pasture

availability, depriving pastoralists of access to wetlands

that still support grass at the end of the dry season. Fur-

thermore, crop fields have taken over the old cattle corri-

dors so that pastoralists have no choice but to cross planted

areas to get to water and pastures, risking accusations of

trespassing and damaging crops. Conflicts between pasto-

ralists and farmers are particularly severe in some villages

where passage is impeded by steep cliffs and sugar cane

fields. To protect its fields, the company has also employed

members of Benkadi, an association of hunters, who are

traditionally responsible for defending the natural envi-

ronment, cultural values, and social order. However, the

group, which was composed of Karaboro farmers and

animated by anti-Fulani sentiments, eventually grew into

an armed militia and was disbanded by the government

(Hagberg 2004, 2006).

Pastoralists have used their own organizations, such as

the local chapter of the national Federation des Eleveurs du

Burkina (FEB), to protect their interests. As with Benkadi,

these organizations officially represent the livestock ‘‘sec-

tor’’, but are actually constituted along (Fulani) ethnic lines

and have been actively defending Fulani pastoralists in

conflict situations, such as in the assessment of crop

damages from trespassing livestock (Hagberg 2003). Pas-

toralists are often not represented in these disputes,

whereas farmers are always represented by agents of the

Ministry of Agriculture, who conduct the damage assess-

ments. Fulani leaders also note that the Ministry of Animal

Resources, which has far less resources and leverage than

the Ministry of Agriculture (Gning 2005), has difficulties in

securing support from the central government and from

foreign projects for the construction of more watering

points for livestock in an area that is perceived as charac-

terized by better climate conditions and agricultural

potential compared to the rest of the country. The newly

established Rural Communes are expected to develop

Water Development Plans, including digging new wells

and boreholes to serve the expanding human and animal

population. But pastoralists do not expect their interests to

be better served in a context of decentralized governance

given that elected Councils are dominated by farmers and

the Fulani are not considered ‘‘residents’’ of their com-

munities, even if they have lived in them for decades.

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123

Pastoralists have not been included in prior watershed

management and streambank restoration efforts (Sanou

2003) and they fear that the establishment of Rural Com-

munes may lead to new regulations and restrictions on herd

movements and access to natural resources across Com-

munes’ boundaries.

Fishermen

Fishing in the river and the lakes has always been a source of

livelihoods for households in the Upper Comoe River Basin,

particularly for residents of villages, such as Lemourou-

dougou, who lost their land and were forced to relocate

when SOSUCO established its sugar cane plantation. At the

same time, changes in quantity and quality of the water

resources in the Upper Comoe River Basin are negatively

affecting fishing revenues. The river has no longer enough

water for fish to thrive; fishing is now limited to the wetlands

and the lakes. But even there, fish supplies are shrinking

because there is less water for habitats and because lower

rainfall means less runoff to replenish nutrients. Market

sellers and restaurant owners in Banfora complain that the

variety and size of the fish has declined over the last several

years, and some popular species, such as the capitaine (Nile

perch), are becoming less common. People in the area also

voice concerns about pollution from the agro-chemicals

leaching from the SOSUCO cane fields into water sources

(Painter and Sanou 1996), although Lemouroudougou fish-

ermen equally point to the Karfiguela rice fields as a source

of water contamination. Other environmental changes are

also making fishing more laborious: in the last several years,

an invasive weed, locally known as ngolo has proliferated in

the Lemouroudougou lake, providing fish with hiding places

and hindering the maneuvering of pirogues and nettings.

According to the PAGIRE fishing is restricted to resi-

dents of the communities in which the water bodies they

are located. Fishermen associations have been formed to

control access and enforce regulations, such as minimum

fish size and use of approved equipment. The Wramba

association in the village of Moussoudougou obtained the

first of such concessions in the country in 2001. The

agreement between the association and the Ministry of

Environment (which had oversight over fisheries) was

established as an experiment for the transfer of jurisdiction

over natural resources to local communities as mandated

by the new decentralization policy (Bonnal and Rossi

2006). Similar arrangements were eventually established

with other fishermen associations, including those manag-

ing the Lemouroudougou and Tengrela lakes.

Regulation of fisheries, and of water management in

general, is complicated by institutional ambiguities that

stem from the recent restructuring of the relevant govern-

ment agencies. In 2002 the Direction des Ressources en

Eau (which oversees water) and the Direction des Res-

sources Halieutiques (which regulates fisheries) were

moved from the Ministry of Environment to the politically

prominent Ministry of Agriculture. The shift was ratio-

nalized in terms of increased emphasis on the role of irri-

gation in agricultural development, but it divorced water

issues from other natural resource management concerns.

This split makes it difficult to coordinate agricultural pol-

icies that support irrigation with environmental policies

that promote conservation of forests, wetlands, and stream

banks. In the current division of ministerial responsibilities,

the only water management mandate left to the Ministry of

Environment is the enforcement of environmental regula-

tions. But its capacity to do so is curtailed by shortage of

field staff and lack of resources, since revenues from

fishing licenses now accrue to the Ministry of Agriculture.

The latter, on the other hand, does not always have the

necessary staff and data at the local level to effectively

regulate the sector. These inconsistencies have allowed

some violators to continue their illegal practices undis-

turbed. The restructuring also causes difficulties for water

quality monitoring and biodiversity conservation efforts,

since databases are now scattered across ministries.

Discussion and Conclusion

The Upper Comoe River Basin water management system

offers a unique opportunity to examine the potential role of a

DST in a multi-user context and its articulation with a

changing policy environment. The creation of the CLE is

welcomed by many people in Banfora and surrounding areas

as a promising development that will contribute to better co-

management and release tensions surrounding water use.

There are signs of progress in this direction, such as SO-

SUCO’s willingness to increase UCEPAK’s allocation

during the 2009 dry season (which, however, was a time of

plentiful water supplies following a good rainy season). This

is a significant improvement over a status quo in which

SOSUCO made most management decisions, with other

users having little knowledge or influence over the deci-

sions, beyond petitions through the agricultural extension

service. This primacy was rationalized by the company’s

responsibility for operation and maintenance of the infra-

structure. Nonetheless, the latter was built by the state on

territory belonging to local communities and, according to

the 1996 Reforme Agraire et Fonciere (RAF), water is

legally owned by the state on behalf of its citizenship. In

addition, in lamenting the declining supply of water and

their loss of control over it, residents of villages along the

river invoke the customary tenure principle which entrusts

jurisdiction over natural resources to the first settlers,

pointing out that SOSUCO ‘‘found them’’ in the area.

706 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

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The state was instrumental in transferring rights over

land and water resources from these local communities to

private enterprise. This move might have been partly

motivated by the prospect of development benefits, which,

however, have largely eluded rural populations. The CLE

represents an attempt to redress some of these imbalances

by providing a mechanism for negotiated water manage-

ment, but, as in other sites where implementation of the

PAGIRE is more advanced, the process in the Upper

Comoe River Basin remains orchestrated by the state. For

example, the composition and organization of the CLE is

determined by a decree of the regional government

authority (the Governor) and its Technical Committee is

largely composed of local government elected officials and

technical services personnel in addition to the main users,

some of which (ONEA and UCEPAK) are formally under

the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture. State approval

is also essential to sanctioning the role of the user associ-

ations and civil society organizations that make up the CLE

membership at large.

Despite the official representation of the CLE as fully

inclusive of all users in the system, there are different

gradients of participation, based on degrees of social

recognition of each group and of the legitimacy and pri-

ority of its claims. For example, one FEB representative

is included in the membership at large, but not in the

Technical Committee, to represent all pastoralists. This

fails to account for the diversity of interests in the sector

and to provide direct access to information and influence

in deliberations. Likewise, fishermen have just one rep-

resentative in the general assembly. Even among farmers,

there are differences: UCEPAK has greater clout by virtue

of its institutional history, territorial claims, numerous

membership, links with the Ministry of Agriculture, and

participation in the Technical Committee, while riparian

farmers are represented by individual villagers (rather

than by a officially recognized organizations) and only as

members of the general assembly. In fact, in the course of

focus groups, other users complained that discussions

during the CLE meetings tend to be monopolized by

exchanges between UCEPAK and SOSUCO and framed

in ways that favor the interests of organized, irrigated

farmers over those of other users in the Upper Comoe

River Basin.

This is not only due to an agricultural bias within the

CLE leadership and membership, but also to the fact that

the decision process is largely expressed in terms of

quantities of water released and allocated within the sys-

tem, a perspective that foregrounds the needs of agriculture

and obscures others’ understandings of water resource

management. For example, in developing the release

schedule for the upcoming year, the Technical Committee

adjusted their amount for the environmental services flow

requirement by 5% to cover for unplanned needs, including

those of pastoralists (AEDE 2008). But the main problem

faced by pastoralists is not amounts of water but access to

water and how it fits within the overall landscape in which

herds must move daily as well as seasonally, including

access to grazing areas and migration routes. Likewise, for

fishermen, concerns over water quality, species habitat, and

ecosystem stability are as crucial as issues of water scar-

city. Furthermore, downstream communities, whose very

origins and livelihoods are bound to the presence of the

river, need a reliable source of water for household use. But

this supply is increasingly threatened by upstream extrac-

tions and diversions, which in turn are encouraged by

contrasting national policies.

These changes have consequences that go beyond utility

considerations, as certain water bodies, such as Lemou-

roudougou and Tengrela lakes and the Karfiguela water-

falls are invested with profound cultural and spiritual

meanings. The latter are embedded in mysticism, envel-

oped by secrecy, and impervious to scrutiny by outsiders,

their investigation requiring long-term ethnographic field-

work, which was beyond the scope of this study. But, it is

safe to assume that fluctuations in water quantity and

quality, and the relative alteration of water bodies and

biodiversity have had momentous implications for local

lifeways and cultural identities. These landscape transfor-

mations compound a sense of ‘‘loss of place’’ for com-

munities that suffered relocations and expropriations of

their territories for the creation of the SOSUCO perimeter,

experiences that continue to affect their relationship with

the company and with the state.

By emphasizing reservoir releases as the primary deci-

sion arena and quantitative parameters as the salient

information base, the CLE agenda overlooks how water

resources fit within landscape interactions, livelihood

strategies, and knowledge systems at the local level. It also

favors a narrowly technical perspective, over a consider-

ation of the synergies and conflicts between water man-

agement decisions and agricultural and development

policies (some of which are put into practice by some of the

line ministries in the CLE’s Technical Committee). This

approach belies PAGIRE’s vision of ‘‘integrated’’ water

resource management and reaffirms the managerial domi-

nance of SOSUCO. The latter is further reinforced by

public discourses that shape common understandings of the

water management issues in the Upper Comoe River Basin.

For example, local officials, agencies’ reports, and the

media tend to depict downstream farmers (including

UCEPAK) in terms of lack of coordination, inadequate

production practices, poor maintenance of infrastructure,

and abusive water withdrawals, blaming them for the

occasional water shortages (Ouattara 2007). Similarly, in

their official remarks at the onset of the project workshops,

Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711 707

123

local authorities, commended to DST for its ability to curb

‘‘irrational’’ water use. This view implicitly validates the

established arrangement whereby SOSUCO is entrusted

with the responsibility over the water management system,

while downstream farmers and communities are reduced to

being receivers of a resource that, prior to the construction

of the reservoirs and establishment of the SOSUCO

perimeter, was openly accessed and only subject only to

the ebbs and flows of nature.

Like the CLE, the DST developed by this project intends

to provide a planning mechanism that seeks to promote

more efficient water resource management and more

equitable water distribution among multiple users. It does

so by enabling users to objectively represent and analyze

water demands, supplies, and uses in different climatic and

hydrological conditions. This will allow them to develop a

consensual release schedule by reallocating water

throughout the dry season and among diverse users. As

with the CLE, the tool’s core variables are the amounts of

water released from each reservoir and diverted to each

user. The DST fully models the impacts of alternative

management decisions for the three main users (SOSUCO,

UCEPAK, and ONEA), but also computes the needs of

downstream users (riparian farmers, pastoralists, etc.) into

environmental services flow, in ways that mirrors the

CLE’s way of addressing this issue. By providing a visual

schematic of the system, the tool will facilitate compre-

hension and communication among users, some of whom

remain unfamiliar with the spatial and structural layout of

the system (in recognition of the importance of a shared

experiential understanding of the water management sys-

tem one of the first organized CLE activities was a

reconnaissance visit to the reservoirs and infrastructure).

Public access to advance information about the release and

diversion schedule will also facilitate drought preparedness

among UCEPAK and downstream farmers, who have been

so far uninformed about the timing and amounts of water

coming their way.

The DST was envisioned to be operated in a consultative

setting, ideally during the CLE meetings, and therefore

much effort has been devoted to making it relatively easy

to understand and operate even by users without strong

background in modeling, engineering, statistics, or com-

puter technology. In line with the PAGIRE’s mandate and

the CLE’s inclusive scope, the project shifted its DST

design from a prescriptive to an exploratory approach,

moving from a more complex stochastic, multi-stage, lin-

ear programming optimization model, which requires a

higher level of expertise of operate (Etkin and others

2008), to a simpler simulation tool that allows lay users to

learn hands-on and to adjust their decisions by trial and

error. By virtue of its greater flexibility, the simulation tool

makes it possible for users to propose modifications to the

status quo. For example, while the tool’s starting configu-

ration establishes the given order of priority in reservoir

releases (from Lobi, to Moussoudougou, to Toussiana) and

in user diversions (starting with ONEA, then SOSUCO,

then UCEPAK, to end with the downstream users’ needs

and the environmental services flow), the sequence can be

manually rearranged by users. In addition, the set of initial

reservoir parameters can be customized to examine the

implications of prospected interventions, such as rumors

circulating at the time of writing about a plan by the

Millennium Challenge Account to raise the Toussiana dam.

Most of all, the simulation tool’s simplicity promotes

greater transparency, an important feature in consultative

negotiations, particularly where there are substantial dif-

ferences in technical ability and a history of mistrust

among users. Its more intuitive, user-friendly interface

enables less experienced users to acquire capacity and

confidence in applying DSTs to water resource manage-

ment decisions.

Despite the DST’s accessibility and versatility, it still

requires management by one of the institutions or user

groups for periodic updating of its datasets. The identifi-

cation of which institution is better suited to do so has

been subject of debate. Even though SOSUCO may be in

the best position to operate the model on the CLE’s

behalf, given that it has access to the essential data and

technical expertise, the company demurred taking up such

role to avoid being accused of biasing the process to its

own advantage. Yet, the model’s operation will still

depend on data that is collected by SOSUCO, which may

not be provided if the company perceives it to be used in

ways that do not fit its interests. More likely candidates

are the Ministry of Agriculture and/or the national agri-

cultural research institute (which is under the Ministry of

Higher Education and Scientific Research). The former

participates in the CLE and has official linkages with

ONEA and with UCEPAK and other producers groups;

the latter has a research station in Banfora, but is not

involved in the CLE and does not do research for SO-

SUCO, which has its own research unit. As public

agencies with technical competences and a development-

oriented mandate, both institutions have legitimacy

among users, but their respective abilities to act as tool

managers and conflict mediators may hinge on whether

their different degrees of involvement with the CLE and

with users are perceived as ensuring impartiality or less-

ening accountability.

Both the CLE being established by the PAGIRE and the

DST being introduced by the project are still at an incep-

tion stage: an evaluation of their impacts will require a few

more years of closely monitoring their performance and the

dynamics they set in motion, a follow up that the project is

committed to. This paper provides a head start on this

708 Environmental Management (2009) 44:695–711

123

process by highlighting the centrality of social processes

and institutions in shaping the playing field of water

resource decisions in the Upper Comoe River Basin. It

contends that sound science and good governance are

needed to address current conflicts over scarce resources

and future challenges of climate change. However, it

should not be assumed that the provision of improved

information and negotiation platforms will necessarily

resolve all uncertainties. Rather, the probabilities inherent

in simulation and forecasting tools may amplify the

uncertainties linked to climate (in fact, the predictive

accuracy of the DST was among the questions most often

raised during the workshops). The DST’s trial and error

approach facilitates adaptive learning but may also foster

indecision and delay action. Uncertainties are also inherent

in a process of negotiation among users with diverging

priorities and different understandings of water issues.

Additional ambiguities are introduced by discordant poli-

cies and regulatory regimes. The precarious financial via-

bility of SOSUCO and the associated potential for social

unrest introduces yet another layer of insecurity. The

introduction of technical and institutional innovations must

therefore be grounded in an in-depth analysis how such

tools interact with a context defined by these multiple

uncertainties. To do this water resource management

approaches need to go beyond mere calculations of supply

and demand and catalyze a discussion on the entitlements,

investments, responsibilities, and accountabilities of all

stakeholders, including scientists and policy-makers.

Acknowledgments The authors acknowledge helpful input by Kate

Dunbar, Carrie Furman, Richard Marcus, Don Nelson, Joel Paz, Ben

Orlove, Michael Paolisso, and Renzo Taddei; and also the construc-

tive comments of three anonymous reviewers. We thank Joel Paz,

Latosha Clark, Patrick Florence and Michael Gove for help with the

images. We are grateful to Thomas Painter and Saıdou Sanou who did

the preliminary study on which this project was subsequently built.

This study was supported by a grant from the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration’s Sectoral Applications Research Pro-

gram as a continuation of the Climate Forecasting and Agricultural

Resources (CFAR) Project.

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