From Civil War to C i d Society? AM, NGOs and Hegemonic Co~~stniction in Mozambique

Alexander Costy

A thesis submitted in confomiity with the requirernents for the degree of Doctor ofPhilosophy

Graduate Department of Political Science University of Toronto

O copyright by Alexanda Costy 2000

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From Civil War to Civil Society? Aïd, NGOs and Hegemonic Construction in Mozambique PhD. Dissertation 25 October 2000 By Alexander Costy Deparûnent of Political Science University of Toronto

This dissertation examines the issue of inteniational humanitarian assistance in conflict

and post-conflict environments 60m the perspective of Grarnscian hegemonic analysis,

with a particular focus on the role of non-govertmental organisations (NGOs) in

hegemonic constniction. Using the post-conflict transition in Mozambique between 1992

and 1997 as a case example, the study highlights the central M o n ofNGOs in seeking

to build social consensus in support of peacetime political and economic power

arrangements that were consistent wiîh globai ordering priorities in the 1990s, and

discusses a number of practcal strategies employed to this end The study argues that

while the long-term impact ofNG0 efforts to wasolidate pacetune power structures in

Mozambique is as yet unclear, the f?nanciaYinstitutiod affüiations and programmatic

content of N o 0 actions in the country attest to their anerghg role as transnational

hegemonic agents.

The study is divided into three main sections. The f h t section discuses the growth of the

humanitarian NGO sector in the 1990s. and related patterns of institutional integration,

politicisation and empowerment. This is linked to conceptuai deveiopmeats smounding

the notion of civil society, and its incmsing policy devance to peacebdding and pst-

conflict reconshnrction programmes. The section then reviews maiastrram hteqmtations

of hegemony and civil society fiom the standpoint of intemational relations theory, and

points to the supexior empkical and dyticai relevance of the Gramscian approach. The

second, empincal section of the study provides a historicd review of Ihe dynamics of

hegemonic wostBiction in Moznmbique, detuluig in perticular the key efforts made to

re-order the state, economy and society in the years prior to and foilowing the formal

peace salement of 1992. nie largely supportive role of the NGO sector drirùig this

period is aaalysed in depth nie nnal section of the study offers a structurecl assessrnent

of the hegemonic role of NGOs in Mozambique nom the Gnunscian standpoint, and

looks ahead to appraise the evenaial hegemonic impiications of recent trends in

humanitarian policy. The study closes with a bnef discussion of prospects and potentid

roles for NGOs in Mozambique to fiditate more progressive forms of long-terni postwar

development

iii

This has been a very personal projecî, and my thanks must extend to the many people who, at ciiffereut points along the way, have had a strong personai enect on my choices and cnmmitments Speciai thaaLs to Robert Matthews for brinping me back nom far away, and to Bruce Jones and Beverly Neufeld for theù fnendship and support My sincere gratitude to the many friends in Mozambique who smoothed the way for me under often diflicult circumstances. 1 am much indebted, needless to say, to my parents for their patient understanding and active etlcoumgement And to Silvia, for the great and s d discoveries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1

Chapter 4. Cid Sodciy and Hqemo11ic Constrvcmion: h Intapreh~ve Framework ..-..-.- ..------. --.. kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk~kkkk...~k.k.kkkkkkkkk.kkkk.k.~.kkkk.kkkkk~.k.kkkkkkkkkkk.kkkkk~kk~kkkk~kpage 89. The State-Society Cornplex: A Fnmework fot Hegemonïc Coastniction Civil Society and Hegemony Contempofary HegemMilc Order Mech- Adors and Content.

SECTION 2

Chapîer 5. Ww und Pmce irr Mewatm&@ue.= H b v , fw&@ and Hi!gemonk Change. ............ ee~eeeeeeee~e.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee~eeeeeeeeeeee~e~eeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeee~eee~eeeeeeeeeeee.eee.-.e.pagt 114. The Portuguese Colonialism and Relations with Local Society Independence and the Bid for a Socialist Hegemony War and Change

Cbapîer 8, Hiqpttmy, AAid Pdicy orid F-rc R m p m ~ for C M Six&@ ..,-,~..-..,,amdllamdllamdllamdllamdllamdllamdll. page 222. A s d g the HegemOMc Fmctiom of the Humanitarian NGO Sectm Next Steps in Hegemonic Comtmaion: Fuîure Aïd Policy Applications C i d Society and Soci~Ecoaomic Change in Mozambique.

LIST OF TABLES

................................................................. . Figure 1: Functions Amiuted to C i d Society. page 36 ............................................... . Figure 2: ComparaaVe S m a m a y of Theoretical Accoullts psgc 106

Ta bk 1 : UN Consolidatecl A p p d Conttibutions Ch.mielicd through NOOs ................... page 184 . ...................... Tabk 2: The Top 20 NOOS: EstimaW Fimlag to Mozambique, 1199-% page 186 .

Tabk 3: The Fragmen&on of Aicl: Douar Parmers a d RopCa 1992-96 ...................ers... page 188 .

INTRODUCTION

This stuây was inspired by events in Motambique between 1992 and 1997, a

period marked by levels of extemal infervention not witnessed since the colonial era.

These interventions, f i c h where canied out in support of Mozambique's transition f?om

war to peece, contaùied two elements of interest to me. One was that although aid

interventions appeared on the surfàce, to be nawd by a straightforward logic of

humanitarian assistance aad post-war rewllsffucfio~, ttrey in fact allned to do much more

than meet human needs and development requirements. An implicit purpose was to bring

about fiuidamentai changes in attitudes, perceptions and behaviour in the country, both

within the state apparanis, and in the broader society. In a concrete sense, reiief and

reconstruction programmes during the period were implemented in a mamer that wodd

facilitate and consolidate brogder moves toward the 11'beraIisation of Mozambique's war-

tom political economy. The second element of interest was the central role that non-

governmental organisations (NGOs), as key provïders of humanitarian ai4 seemed to play

in this process of domestic re-ordering

The study addresses two maiin issues in tandem. First, it seeks to understand the nature, orientation and purposes of humanitanan assistance in the 1990s. It asks why

NGOs have emerged as organisations of choice for providing aid, and why civil society,

of which NGOs are leading members, has becorne a central fature of post-conflict

assistance. Secondy, the study seeks to understand the concrete hct ion of NGOs and

local associations in supporting international efforts to bnng about intemal change in

Mozambique. Drawing fiom both an analysis of international aid policy and fiom the

Mozambican transition itself, I make the case that hummitarian NGOs, intervening

through local civil society, have assumed an ordering jimction which is consistent with

requirements for stability and continuity in the contemporary global politicai economy. As

such, they can be understood as agents of hegemonic comtruction, in the sense intended

by political theorist and activist Antonio Gramsci.

The dissertation is divided up into tbree main sections addressing, respeftively,

conceptual concem, the histocïcal experieme of powemil outside interventions in

Mozambique, ad, finally, the insightr r a i d by the application of Gramscian hegemoaic

andysis. Chapter One opeas the discussion by examining the core trends in humanitarian

aid during the 1990s. 1 develop the basic analyticai problem of the gmwing involvement

of NGOs in delivering ai4 and of the increasiag strategic focus on civil socieîy in post-

confiict recovery. Arguing that NGOs have barnme an institutionally integrated feature of

officia1 global crisis-management stnrctures, and that they have becorne powerfûl politid

actors in posî-codict envirouments, 1 pose the "puzzle" of understanding humanitarian

NGOs as agents of world order h m the perspective of conventional internaiional

relations analysis. The context in *ch the research was conducted, and the methods used

to gather information on the Monmbican transition, are briefly reviewed 1 then move on

to introduce the key ojxxaiional terms which recur thematically throughout the study.

These include most notably the concept of "civil society" itself, as well as other important

operational tenns such as "peacebuilding", "wnflict prevention7' and "postanfiict

Chapter Two is intended to serve two purposes: one is to bring &ers up to date

on the literature, generated by d y s t s and practitioners of aid, on civil wars,

humanitarian intervention, and post-conflict recovery. A second and more important

purpose is to trace, in b r d luies, the connections between conflict, peace and

humanitarian analysis and growing policy preferences for implementing aid programmes through civil society in the 1990s. In order to do this, 1 analyse prevalent poticy

assumptions about the operational advantages of NGOs, and the strategic fimction of civil

society, in stabilising post-codlict enviroments politidy, economicaily and socially,

and in helping to define the dynamics and orientation of the longer-terni recovery process.

Based on a sample review of key international donors, 1 move on to show how, and the

degree to which, prevailing assumptions about civil society have impacted concretely

upon aid planning, programming and implementation 1 end the chapter by reviewing a

number of dissenting opinions which question the positive role of NGOs, and of civil

society more generally, in facilitating genuiw and d a b l e post-codict recovery.

In Chapter Three, 1 approach the issue of hegemony fiom the standpoint of

mainstream international relations theory- I present conventional interpretations of

hegemony as expressed by the realist school, and seek to demonstrate their insufficiency

in accounting for the actions of NGOs in post-conflict transitions. This weakness stems

fiom cure realist assucnptions, which approach hegemony in t a m s of a closeci, triaagular

relationship between power, poiitics and the state. As such, the ideutity ofNGOs as agents

of hegemonic power canwt be fully fecognisea Further, I argue that the liberal critique

of realist theory, M e more relevant to uaderstsading the new prominence of NGOs in

the intemationai sphere, and of "giobril civil societf' more generdly, does not address

adequately the issue ofintematiod power, and thus cannot sewe as a tool for hegemonic

analysis. Overall, I suggest that the tendency of realism and îi'beralism to distinguish

between, rather than thenegrate, state and societal spheres of intermtioaal anaiysis,

weakens their utility in understanding the concrete actions of NGOs in postanflict

settings. On this ôasis, 1 begin to wnStNct my case for using a Gramscian interpretation

of hegemony to understand the meaning and implications of NGO-channelled aid, and of

civil society promotion, in Mozambique.

Following closely from this, 1 present and develop the Gramscian concept of

hegemony in Chapter Four, and seek to demonstrate Ïts applicability to wntemporary

f o m of global ordering, and more specificaily to the political and economic stabilising

actions, and normative hctiom, of NGOs in post-conflict enviroments. 1 focus

attention on two elements of the Gramscian approach which 1 see as particularly useful in

addressing the realities of post-cunflict intervention The f5st is the idea of the "state-

society cornplex", which Gramscians present as their main fiamework of analysis. This

framework encourages us to recognise the organic linlcs and power relations. rather tban

distinctions, between state and society, or between public and private spheres of interest

Collapsing the state/society distinction allows us to consider NGOs more fully as potential

agents of global ordering. The second useful element is tbat "civil society" itself is

understood as a locus of social power, and as a terrain of political and ideologicai stmggle.

Civil society is where hegemonic consensus is built and contested, This contrasts with

maiostream, LCfhctioaal" projections of civil society, but more accurately accounts for the

increasing peference of external donors to intervene through civil society chaowls in

order to bring about desired internal changes in recipient countries. It accomts also for the

power which NGOs have exercised locaiiy in war-tom environments, and for their

ideological activities on the -und This cbspter coacludes by specimg the nature and

mechanisms of curr~nt hegemonic ordering in today's global context .

Chapter Five opens the empirical section of this study- 1 begin by povidhg a

histoncd background to Mozambique's post-war transition, and through this 1 seek to

meet two objectives simulîaxmusly. The first is to acquaint teaders with the history of

, international interventions in Mooimbique- The second is to demonstrate the relevance of

Gramscian insigbts in undntaading the importance of civil society in codtuting social

orders through which pliticai and econornic power is exercised, More specifically 1 look

at how systems of authority were built and wntested through civil socieîy in the colonial

and pst-independence periods, and during violent civil war of the late 1970's and 1980s.

In Chapter 6, 1 make the case that the structure of Mozambique's peacetime

political and economic order was already parthlly in place by the t h e the formai peace

agreement was si@ in 1992. In this sense, the UN peace operation which officialîy

launched the pst-war transition, and the unprecedented levels of humanitarian aid which

was mobilised to support it, serveci concretely to fàcilitate a process of internal re-

ordering of the Motambicaa state and socieiy that was aiready under way. 1 identify four

main re-ordehg processes, some elernents of which date back as far as 1984. These are:

macro-economic stabilisation and adjustment, privatisation, decentralisation, and

pluralisation. In each case, I seek to identify the contriiution of the NGO sector in

facilitating the ordering processes in question 1 find that while NGOs were mainly

reactive in the case of macro-economic policy, their role in other amas of internal re-

ordering was much more pro-active and direct In very few cases, moreover, did the NGO

sector as a whole mount any serious political or ideological challenges to the stnichiral

changes underway.

1 move on, in Chapter 7, to focus specifically on the status and actions of the

humanitarian NGO sector during the pst-conflict transition up to 1997. In order to

illustrate the extent of theu engagement with powerful external ordering institutions,

including the FIS, the UN and other mdtilateral and bilateral donors, 1 conduct a detailed

review of humenitanan hiading and co-ordination patterns during the pend. Likewise, in

order to show the wnsistency between humanitarian interventions and the processes of

structural re-ordering specified in Chapter 6, I briefly assess the effects of NGO projects

during the p e n d in decentralising, privatising and interuationalising the state and society

in Mozambique. 1 then move on to consider the ideological role of humanitarian NGOs in

dissemioatîng normative messages, and in seeking to pmmote new 0r~sSitiona1 a d

behaviourai @ces withui society, in such a niacmer as to create broder social support

for structural ipordering Four distinct but reiated stmtegies are identified and wnsidered

here: the selective tugeting of fimds to support local civil Society organisations wrnrnitted

to the normative and matenal underpinnings of the pmtwar order, the replication of

imported civil society models in local comrnunïties; attempts to incorporate

indigenoUS/traditional structures into the mPinstream of the peacetïme social or*,

and, finally, efforts to build normative co~lsensus in support of the postwar order,

particularly arnong educated urban classes and social leaders, through national seminars,

conference events and the media.

Chapter Eight, which makes up the final section of the dissertation, offm a

concluâïng assessrnent of the role of NGOs in Mouimbiqye's post-war transition, baseci

on five indicators ofbegemonic firaction aàapteâ h m Robert COX It then considers the

hegemonic implications of recent policy trends conceming the development of new, more

robust and integrated international Lctrategies for intervention in war-affêcted areas Finally, since civil society is understood as a terrain of both order and transformation, 1

conclude the dissertation by outlining same basic conditions and choices required for

Mozambican civil society, and global civil society more generally, to facilitate the

transition nom war to more meanin& progressive fomis of long-term national

development

CHAPTER ONE

NGOs aad Aid: Pasinn the Problem

In November 1995, the count~~ director of a prominent intemîtionai NGO based

in Maputo told me during an interview. Wational NGOs have a fimdamental role to play

in the democratisatïon of this country, and we support hem in this roie". She went on to

explain: T e don't support groups that submit proposais for standard hummitarian or

development projects [.. .] W e provide grants of S 1 0,000 to $25,000 to Mozarnbican NGOs

interested in contniuting to the democratïsation of s0ciety"l. At the t h e that this

discussion took place, the international NGO in

multimiiliondoilar programme fimded by a foreign

which was to promote civil society, democratisation 2

confiict reconstruction initiatives .

question was workuig within a

goverrunent agency, the purpose of

and good governance through pst-

Seven years have passed since the f o d ending of the 16-year civil war in

Mozambique. In that period, sigdicant intemational financial, human and matenal

resources have been directed to supporting that country's transition towards a lasting,

democratic peace. During the initial stage of the post-conflict transition between 1992 and

1994, international efforts were h m e d by a UN mrdinated humanitarian peace

operation This included the deployment of international peacekeeping forces, the

d i d g and demobilisation of the country's two warring parties, and the repatriation of

just under 2 million Mo~ambican refbgees in time for Mozambique's fkt-ever multiparty

elections. Since 1994, intemationai support for a second, more prolonged, rehabilitation

stage has f o c d on the longer-tenn nconstruction of Mozambique's infhstmcture and

institutional base. Throughout both stages, the postanflict pend bas been marked by

the presence of some 200 intemationai non-governmental organisations (NGOs). These

organisations have been the principal contractors and impiementing partners of

humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, and have becorne central actors in aid policy and

planning.

1

2 Interview, Country Director, AÊrican Arnerican riistitute. bhputo, 28 November 1995. USAID: "Assistance to Mozambique", Maputo, 1996.

6

As iliustrated in the interview shtements above, many internatiod NGOs have

so@t to play a significant d e , not just in the delivery of matenal assistance to acutely

distressed Mozambicans, but in combining humanitarian aid with measures to promote

reconciliation, and the (re) activation of a àymmic local civil -or within the COUQ~IY.

They have done so by using considerable amounts of fûnding to engage directly with local

communities in efforts to modd new forms ofpost-war identity and social interaction, and by serving as conduits for the establishment of new values and patterns of organisation

considered to be supportive of a peacetime political economy in the country- Democratic

piuralism, human rights, and individual private initiative have been among the key

nonnative messages which international NGOs have sought to transmit to Moambicau

communities as a corollary to humanitarian suppor~ The terrain of intervention has been

Mozambique's emergent civil society, a network of national NGOs and local associations

which has grown rapidly throughout the country since the end of the war, primarily as a

result of inteI118fiom1 fûnding support. Where local organisations previously existe&

international NGUs have actively sought partnerships with them. Where few signs of local

organisation were visible, international NGOs have worked to create new groups through

local funding and training programmes. By supporthg the emergence of new associational

groupings in Mozambique, and through them the projection of new modes of thinlsng

about and organising everyday life, international NGOs have becorne involveci in a

significant process of social restructuring The process is inevitably a political one, as it

changes public pefceptions, recasa individual and community objectives, and potentidy 3

alters the pre-existing relationship between Mozambican society and the state .

This combuiing of humanitariau assistance delivery with the transmission of new

normative and organisational models through local civil society is a relatively new

phenornenon in the realm of international aid It stands in open contrast to forms of

extemal aid intervention in earlier decades, which were defined by inter-govemmental

agreements and uncontested state control over the implementation of development

programmes, and which showed little concern with civil society issues. In these earlier

3 1 have discussed some core implications of the anergence of Mozambique's pst-war civil

society in "Donor Dollars and Mozambique's NGOs" in Souikair Af&m èkpud (July 1995). For a more recent disaission, set aiso David Soggc (cd) M i u e : P- oiir A i l ami the Cid &c&w (Oegstgeest: Gememschappelij k Overleg Med-ciering, 1997). These issues fiame my empirical discussion of NGOs in the pst-war rcconstniaion process in Chapta 7 of this mdy.

7

times, NGOs occupied an imcercaia position at the margins of the aid system. They

brought primarily material ai4 such as food. medicine or technical personnel, and

typically operated well wnhui governments' broader social programmhg fiamewok

Only in the 1980s with the civil wars in Central America, mca and Af'ghanistan, did

NGOs b e à to intertrene dïrectly through locally organiseci groups in areas beyond

govenunent control- The amount of fùnds at their disposal, and their status within the aid

sector, were still relatively minor in the Cold War conte-

This study seeks to understand the increasing prominence of civil society, and of

the NGOs that codai te it at local and global levels, as a factor in the contemporary aîd

equation. Looking at Mozambique's post-conflict m t i o n , it asb why NGOs have

becorne such important players, what dymmics in the global political eainomy have

raised the i m p o m of civil society organisations as agents of social and ecowmic

change, and what the implications are for countries which, W<e Mozambique, are seekiag

normalisation a f k years of disruptive civil war.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the core themes, wncepts and

approaches with which this study is con~ef~led, and to outline the anaiytical orientation

which 1 adopt in seeking to answer the questions raised above. The chspter moves through

three principal stages. 1 begin by suggesting that the nature and substance of NGO

humanitarian activIties in Mozambique are emblematic of deeper global trends which

became evident in the 1990s. These are, namely an increasing integration of the NGû

sector into the maktream of the global aid policy agenda; a rise in the direct and indirect

power of humanitarian NGOs over inmediate and longer-tenu post-conflict outcornes,

and a significant rise in the political content of theu activities. Drawing from the wrifings

of Robert Cox and other contributors to the ''critical school" of intematioual plitical

ecoaomy, 1 suggest that these trends in the development of the NGO sector have been

compatiie with uintedody-accepted principles" or guidelines for global govefnaclce.

As such, they rdect NGOs7 increasiag role in the praxss of global ordering through

civil society, or what criticai scholars would label hegemonic co11struction. I thus establish

the critical notion of hegemoay as my central conaphial tool for understanding recent

developments in the NOO sector, and the enhanad role that NGOs are playhg in pst-

conflict transitions like Mozambique. 1 argue, however, that in order to understand NGO

intementions in tbese terms, we must fbt move away fiom the limited, s t a t e d c

interpretatious of hegemony onered by mainstream international relatioas theory. My

discussion of the relative merits of mainStream and criticai understandings of hegemony

and civil society is presented here only briefly, since it is deweloped in later chaptem.

In a second stage, 1 present the tirne-he and research coatext in which this study

was initially inspirecl and undertaken in Maputo in 1995. 1 then coaclude the chapter by

clarifyùig key ternis and concep relating to civil society, humanitarian assistance, and

pst wnflict reconstruction, which have dominated the aid discourse of tbe 1990s and

which, by force of "discursive" circumstance, are employed throughout the study.

Underlyiner Trends in Humanhiau Aid in the 1990s

Mozambique sEaads as an early showcase of NGOs' increasing involvement in

political and econouiic reconstruction efforts over the pst decade, a pattern repiicated

elsewhere in M i c a and fûrther afield Several concrete factors account for this. First, the

demand for humanitarian SeMces increased with the proliferation of localised conflicts 4

and the occurrence of 34 post-confîict transitions in the 1990s . Second, with the

proportion of officia1 development assistance slated for humanitarian responses more than

doubling during the decade, the material b i s for supplying NGO services has p w n .

At a broder level, the nse both in demand and supply for NGO services in pst-

conflict transitions reflects recent stmctural changes in the globai politid economy. The

end of the cold war has removed important political and idwlogical barriers to

humanitarian intervention, while globalisation has prompted an increase in levels of 5

intemal and regional uisecurity . The concurrent retreat of public institutions from direct

4 One w e y put the number of violent political conflicts around the worid at over 120 in 1996-7,

see " PIOOM Survey of Current Armed Conflicts" in Alcx P. Schmidt, Vrolemf Chat? u d G J I I I (Milan: ISPAC, 1997), pp. 79-82, On past-conflict -OIS, set Alcira Kriemer et al. me W d d Bank's E q d ? ~ ? dth Pasl-CbnfEd RcronsîbnCaiOn. (Washington DC: The WorM Bank, 1 W8), p.9. - Marc hiffielâ, "Evaiuahg Confiict Resohttim C o n t a M o d a s and Methodology" Disausion paper presented to tbe Ch. Michelsen Institut% Bergen, Norway, 1997. (Included as Annex I to - Joaana Mar- et al. NGî% U GmjlW An Ewlrrdion of 1- Abbt [Bergen: CiMi., 19971 1-

social s e ~ c e provision unda the pe~urs of debt reduction, ecoM)IICUc adjustment and

global market integration, has boisterd the pttem toward c o ~ g - o u t public seMces

to private orgarÜsations6. National and infernationa1 NGOs have been net beneficiaries of

tbese recent globdtrends.

Local pwtumflict enviroaments ais0 favour the presence of non-govemmental

organisations. NGOs are seen to provide a relatively neutrd platform for the &iîvery of

humanitarian assistance which is -le to warring parties and outside powers aiike.

Lingering volatility and political tmcertainty make flexiile, cornmitted and 0th

courageous NGO initiatives a precious complement to heaviq more burraucratic bilateral or multilateral inîerventions. In addition, post-conflict transitions are usually

marked by the extreme weakness or breakdown of local government institutions, owing to

physical destruction, the lack of material, fiaencial and human resources, and endemic

mismanagement Faiiure to deliver services quickly and efficiently, in jmticular in former

rebel zones, wuld lead to renewd instability. The vacuum created by the absence of

public services in the context of mute social vulnerability creates powerfiil incentives for

extended NGO involvement.

Finally, the role of NGUs in post-conflict transitions has been greatly amplifiecl by

shifts in aid programming. Straightforward humanitarian assistance has, over the last

decade, given way to newer, more sophisticated and more wmplex aid packages involving

not only the delivery of goods and s e ~ k e s , but also b r d e r social, polit id and 7

economic objectives, with increasing prïority on intemal behavioiiral cbange . Growiag

emphasis on "bridging the gap between relief and developnent", which implies an

infusion of Long-term development planning into humanitarian aid delivery, has both

expanded the range of NGO activities and lengthened their operational t i m e h e s for 8

post-conflict intervention . Likewise, CCpeacebuilding", which involves external

6 See DutlIeld's discussion on "Welfàrc Safi?ty Nets and PubEc Sedm Decaf in Thomas Weiss

( e d . ) & W r i d y N ~ : r a s k s ) e n ' u g l r a 5 ~ ~ ~ v n w n b a n d ,skwike-- 7

g NG03 (Londom MacMillan, 1998). p p 145-7-

8 Duffielâ, op-cit, 1997, p. 79. Joanna Macrea, Mark Bradbury, Marc M e l d a al, "Codict, the Continuum and Chronic

Emergencies: A Critical Adys i s of the Scope fbr Linlting Reliet: Rehabilitation and Development Planning in Sudan" in iüsas&m .. . (Vd 21, No-3), 1997; Euopean Coumüssion,

. Linking Rdicf; RkhMWmn ciril- (Brussels: EC, 1996). 20

interventions that resch deep into local social, economic and political structures7 bas

becorne a standard aid objective, openhg aew and o h experimental spaces for NGO

action Finaliy, "confkt prevention" is currentiy making its way into mainstream aid policy, due in no snali measure to NGO lobôying and advocacy campeigns. Since the

logic of "preveation" advocates action before the outbreak of violence as well as afkr it, 9

the terrain for potentid NGO activities in conflict-prone areas is enlarged men further .

These developments reflect three deeper trends, which will lay the main analytical

focus of this reseacch- The nrst is that post-confïict humanitarian operatious, in

Mozambique and elsewhere, reflect an increasing i-n between govermnent

institutions and non-governrnental organisations7 at both operationaï and policy levels, and

within a broader global govmance hmework Throughout the 1990s. intemational

responses to cornplex hummitarian ernergencies have reîied heavily on NOOs for project 10

implemeniation, logistical support, information gathering and policy advice . Finencial

links between NGOs and bilateral aid agencies have gown substantially: NGOs have

increasingly corne tu rely on public h d s for their organisational sunrival and growth,

while many governments, including the major donors of aid, have tumed to the NGO

sector to channel up to 50 percent of their humanitarian assistaoce to post-conflict

transitions. Policy integration has also strengthened, with NGO' s increasingly contributhg

to official reports, programme assessments, global conferences and post-confiict

prografllllulng- In-country, increasingly wmplex postanflict recovery strategies are

designed and managed by donor/UN/NGO worhng groups and co-ordiaatïng 11

mechanisms, albeit with varying degrees of technical success and efficiency . By the

mid-1990s, Marc Duffield, a critical observer of the aid secfor' was suggesting that "we

9 Aiexander Costy and Stcf'an Gilbert, Con@ü# Ptr#riaio~ and the E w m p e a Uiri0n.- M m g

the . .. A-, I k d m u r i a andZndtdowi (London: intanational Alert/FEWER, 1998). L U

Antonion Doninii " The Buftaucracy and the Frœ Spirits: Stagnation and riun,Mition in the Relationship Betwcen the UN and NGOs" in Weiss and Gordenker (eds.), NGOs, tltc ClIV Md Global . . Gmirnrrrrrcc (Boutder: Lynne Runner, 1 996)- 1 1

Andrew Natsios, WGOs aad the UN Syacm in Complex Humanitarian Emergeaciesn in Weiss and Gordenker (cds.) op. cit., 19%. In Mozambique, the degrec to which co-ordination between officiai and non-govenmiental W g n ag-es has effiectiveiy takm place continues to be a matter of debate. Nevathtless, several formai CO-ordination arrangements werc set up during the 1992-97 period, wbae they hd bot bcfore, with the express purpose of srraigthening coherence in the formulation and execution of humanitarian progr%mmes. Ln-country examples include UNOHAC, LINK and the Wodd Bank's NGO Working Group. S i tbcn, axmhab . -

on practices have ban f M b institutionaiid under NGO/üN/Donor "common programming" h e w o r k s cumdy being experïmented in humanitanan e m q d e s .

11

are not f a fiom a UN/NGO conglomdon taking over the nmning of a coiîapsed 12

state" , and Bcmiett was fhther pointing out that the growing interaction between

officia1 and non-govemmentai activities bas led to an "iastitutionalisation" of the

international NGO community within the aid secf0iI3. Other obsewers bave suggeskd

tbat the level of integration of the NGO sectot into the maïmtmm of the aid agenâa is

such that NGOs have now corne to occupy a strategic position within d4.

A m n d trend, following logically fiom the nrst, is that new foms of

humanitarian intervention in post-conflict environments have opened the way for NGOs to

exercise unprecedend levels of poWd power, that is to say, influence over the

allocation of aid resources, the formulation of rehabilitation agendas, and the shaping of

pst-war social relaiions through direct intervention in the ecx>nomic sphere and civil

society. Two types of power are disthguished here: Direct power is most evident in the

field where NGOs, individually or collectively, exert considerable influence over local

public policy choices and spending prïoribes. This resuits primarily fiom the superior

technical capacity and himian capital of NGOs in local post-conflict environments, their

ability to mobilise, transport and manage resources quickly and efficiently, their access to

international b d i n g sources, and the size of theh expenditures relative to uidigenous

budgets-

in addition to direzt influence, the NGO community bas increasingiy acquired

what Susan Strange and others have termed Cc~tnictural power" in relation to local actors in

pst-codict transitions, as the result of its integration into conventional aid structures.

Structural power is more difncuit to gauge, as it does not relate to specific outputs and is

not temtorially or sectorally b o d It translates into the ability to infiuence not specific

events, persons or decisions, but general policy agendas, tbinkuig, discourse and

eventually, outcornes. As Strange notes, structural power '3s exercised whenever the

12 Marc Duffield, I ' n d NGOs and Ca* EhmgcIlcia: P-

A- (London: Royai Aathropological Institute, 1995). 13

Jon Bennetf %nt T d s in Relief Aid: Strucuûd Crisis and the Quest for New Consensusn in Bennat et d- Eds. Mé&mg N d : NGO C b d h d m in Ptocliu (London: Eartbscan, 1995) pp. xi-xii a d xx. 14 Thomas Weiss and Laon Gordmka "Pluralising GIobai Govemmœ: Analytical Approaches

and Dimensionsw in Weiss and Gordcnkcr (eds.) op- cit., 1996, p.32. Aiso see, Michacl Edwards,

choices open to o h are changeci..-If If.. .] options open to others are extenâed [or ifj tbcy

are narrowed [...] then it is IiLely thaï m r i t y bas been exercised stnicturaiiy in order to

produce that change" 15. Thus, the presaice of NGOs in intemationai policy fora, and on

the ground, hes influenced the way governments and multilateral bodies plan for jmst-

conflict reconstruction, and hes helpecl to reshape their policy options and funding

structures over time. For example, tecent peacebuilding strateses issued by the European

Commission, the OECD Development -stance Cornmittee and the British Depsrtment

for International Development, contain elaborate sets of guidelines and best practices

which rely heavily on the assumption of a strong NGO field presence. Policy options, Iike

civil society promotion, human nghts, local capacity-building, and gender-empowerment

are now open to donors that would have been difncult to consider in the absence of NGO 16

partnerships . CruciaIIy, the inclusion of such strategies hto the post-conflict agenda is

due in part to the committed activism and lobbying efforts of the NGO colll~~lutlity itself.

For M e l d , many changes in aid policy in the 1990s have been "synonymous with NGO

attempts to create a role for themselves by pushing foi 'fie re-orientation of aid towards 17

civil socieîy issues" .

A third discemable trend concems the pdidcal content of postadict activities

carried out by NGOs. These range nom the creation of new civil organisations to the

prescription of new models of production, trade and community association and the

exercise of traditionai authority. A crucial aspect of this work has consistecl in NGO

efforts to build social consaisus in support of peace settlements and their underlying

politicai economies, which benefit certain social groupings in the post-cotûiict setting, but

also contain the seeds of renewed instability among marginaliseâ, potentially hostile

groups. The consensus-building fimction of NGOs bas strong implications for the shaping

David Hulme and Tina Wallace WGOs in a Global Future: Marrying L o d Delivery to World- Wide Leveragen in Pirblic A~riisbioborr 1s

md&&kpmmf (Vol. 19), 1999, Susan Strange, Tllt Rcaaet of tke AWe: ï k LX#kùm t# &WT in îke Worul Ecolbollly

{Cam bridge: Cambridge University Rar. l9%), p. 9 1. 6

OECD/JkveIopment Assistance Cornmitta, 01- Paiiu unû lkudpmcril hsbmce on fke Tltrslidd of tk 2l" Ce-, Deveiopment & - o p d o n Guidelines Series (Faris: OECD, 1998); and European Commission, CollllllllljCdan fiom îke C o ~ n to IIE CUrncü orrd Parliomcnt OR t&e E k q w u ~ Union a d the Isswc qf ConjEœ i'n A/iica- -8, ConflLct hwedom d & m d (Bnisscis: EC, 1996); Deparrment for Intccnationd Development, Rdiq orr Cbnfdid Re&& arrd H- cCrartonce (London: D m , 1999). 17

Duffield, op-cit., 1997, pp. 87 and 94. 13

of local attindes towards longer-term âeveIopment choices, includuig the definition of

fûture political anâ -al roles of thC state". As we shall see in the case of Mozambique,

this work has bezn amieci out through an apperently neutral process of humanitarian 19

assistance .

These three trends openly cwtradict popdar images of NGO involvement in pst-

confiict aid effoits in several ways: They strongly suggest that NOOS are engaghg in

much more than just the straightîiocward delivery of services in response to acute

humanitarian neeâ Rather, they have acquired "maandates which reach beyond

humanitarianisrnP, becoming active agents o f social, economic and political change in

post-conflict societies. And perhaps pmadoxically, they belie the notion of NGOs as

'"nee-spiritsy' of the aid sector Although the intemational NGO community is notonously

varied, increasing fuading and policy links with official donors, and the overail weakeaitlg

of alternative philosophical approaches to aid in the f- of "intemtionally endorsed 21

objectivesy' , point towards a blinnng of distinctions between officiai and non-officiai

aid agendas in the 1990s.

The Puzzle

Given the apparent wntràdctions which they pose to our prevailing perceptions

about humanitarian NGOs and the work they c a q out, how can these three trends be

meaninghilly understood from en analytid standpoint? What do they mean? Why have

they taken place? Why in the 1990s? And what are their implications for the couutries and

populations most immediately affecteci? In the pages that follow, 1 argue that the

increasing integration of NGOs into official policy structures in the 1990~~ their growing

18 See Joamia Maea, "Pwity or Pokicai Engagement? issues in Food and Health Security

intenremions in Cornplex Eam-gcnciesw in Tliic JOYCllOl of Eunicirriraricin Adstawe (March 1998), p.7. The political content of NGO pst-conflia activities is comprehmsiveIy discussed in William Robinson, PIPuriobiiig iWyurc11p: GIddbdùm, US Iu&mm&m d Hegc~ly~y. (Cambridge: r n Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp.20 1-256. L 7

Peace and CO-building activities carriai out m Mozambique are more fiilly disaisseci in Chapter 7. 20

Hugo Siirn, 1 ' A Y , n ~ ' s E- rrirlL Civrl Wor irr î k 199th: A G W ol E d n g Tléaory a n d h m k ( ï2$i: CENDEP BriejhgPqw, Decentber 1997)- 21

Gardeniter aod Weiss, op. cit., 1996, p. 2 1. 14

political influence i n t e m a t i d y and in recipient countries7 and their concrete

involvemeat in post-conflict consensus-building ZICtivities, strongly indiate that the

h u m a n i t e NGO sector as a whole (despite operational and philosophical variations)

has progressively acquued a global suciai ordwmg h t i o n The work of Robert Cox on

internaiional organisations suggests that, to the extent that the NGO sector hc t ions to

organise* operationalise and legitirnate relations of power and authority within an existiag

order, it can be understood in terms of ltegemon2c coastnm&n.

The idea of hegemony is not new to intemationai affairs. As an analytïcal concept,

it is variably iinked to the co~lsolidation of political, eumomic and temitorid power,

imperial expansion, or bids for culturai assimilatiom In the pst, hegemonic o r d n have

been built and dtained, fiequently at a high human and materiai cost, on the

deployrnent of distant fleets and garrisons, lucrative trade monopolies and civilising

crusadesu. By contrast, hegemoaic construction is normally not associated with

contemporary humanitarian assistauce delivery, or efforts to secure peace in wardected

communities How then, can we theorise about the role of NGOs as agents of hegemonic

construction in contemporary post-codict situations? The question poses a p d e in three

related ways. Each of these is explored in M e r depth in Chapter 3, but is briefly

identifiai here:

First, by most theoretid accounts, the building of hegemonic orders is an

inherently political endeavour. Humanitarian action during the 1990~~ by contrast, has

been widely articulateci as a politicaily neutrd enterprise, and NGOs themselves have

aggressively marketed their image as apolitical organisations cesponding impartially to

urgent humanitarian needs. As Smillie and others have noted, even those NGOs with

strong rwts in old solidarity movements have distand themselves fiom their former

politicai commitments to assume the m a d e of humanitarian neutraîity Ath respect to

warring parties on the ground Politicai awareness, once the basis for action in support of

firm ideulogical objectives, is now incorporated into NGO project-cycle management,

logical fiameworks and "lessons leamed", and used pri rndy as a technical tool for

enhanciag the operationai eEdveoess in postu~nfliict envkonments, or f& responding

neutraiîty of NGOs today that makes them the organisations of choie for extemal

intemention in areas of mute political conflict.

Second, hegemony in internationai relations is generally unâerstood as inv01ving

the hierarchical, topdown exercise of international power, typically mediated by the use 24

or potential use of force - By contrast, the NGO sectory and the b d e r reah of civil

society which it is generally taken to represent, is rwted in the idea of volmta~~

participation by private individuais on a b i s of equality. The organisationai priuciple

most ofien attrïbibed to c i d society is fiee association, e ~ c h e d by multiple memberships and competing loyalties, and informed by individual preference- And since civil society is

govemed neither by the coercive c o d structures of the formal state system, nor by

the disciplinary mechanisms of the market, it is rarely wnsidered for its intemal power

relations. To the extent that power is sought and projected by the NGO wmmimity, it is

aimost exclusively of the "ernancipatory", bottom-up sort. In post-conflict environments.

this is clearly evident in NGOs7 much-affirmed refationship with the "gniss-roots", theu

insistence on local wmmmity participation, and their strong inchation towards self-help

initiatives. In this sense, using international aid to promote ccempowermeut" among the

poor and dispossessed in the face of a belligerent, incompetent or uacaring local political 25

leadership would appeary if anything, rather a cccounter-hegemonic" activity .

Third, and precisely because it iwolves politics and the exercise of power, the

pursuit of hegemony in international relations is =ody understood as an activity of

states, drawing upon their economic, material and human tesources in order to generate

22 See Robert Gilpin, We a d C%ange in Woiilil l W k s (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1981), partiailady Chapter 3 on "Growth a d Expansionn including his discussion on "The succession of hegemoniesn (p. 144). 23

Ian Smillie, ïlu Aikm Bcrrarar= Adawism Uu&t Finc - No~.Phrr/it ~lllLiSOCiOns and z&mudlo -. d - l l l~l l t (Ottawc~: IDRC, 199S), pp. 14749 cuid 168-71. L*

Hegemonic consauction is said to involve identifiable structural patterns. According to Gilpin, aspiring hegemons work to "change the rules govedng the internaîionai system, the diision of spheres of innuurr anci [tbc] iaematiod distribution of tcmtory" (op. cit., 198 1, p. 187). This point was raisai by Rode Lipschutz in " R#xnisbucting W d d Politics: The Emergcnce

of Giobal Civil Societyw in MrlCcnniwm (Vol. 2 1, NO.^), 1992. 16

suejcient poiitid pwer to achieve i n t e n d o d objectives consistemt with perceiveci 26

national interests -

The tendency of mainstream interpetations of hegemony to define it in terms of a

closeci, triangular ihkage between politics, power and the state limits the possir,ilitles of

understanding the role of NGOs intervening in post conflict counfnes in terms of

hegemonic constNCtion. As 1 argue in Chapter Four, such an understandiag fkst requks

us to adopt an alternative interpretation of hegemony which is l e s consaained by formai

distinctions between state and non-state actorsy by traditionai conceptions of what

constitutes the "politicai" in the intedonal spbere . and by conventional power analysis.

The alternative approach which 1 propose eddrrsses the issues of politics and pomr

through an altogether di£lhnt lens. Accordhg to this apprah, politicai authority is

exercised in a given sector of global activity and at a given tirne, not by the state itself, but

by domimint groups acting vafiably tluough the sta?.e, outside of it, or both Efforts by

dominant groups (or contenders) to b d 4 legitimw, exercise and reproduce relatiooships

of social and economic power over othersy are at the core of global politics and hegemonic

construction, and hegemony itself coasists in the institutionalisation of these relationships.

Changes in the way such efforts are h e c i out in the global sethg - for example, a progressive switch fiom direct coercive control by military or administrative measures, to

indirect coosensual authority in intemational a 5 h through global markets and civil

society- may indicate strategic shifts in the way social power is exercised by dominant

group. fluctuations in the balance of social and ~ n o m i c power among contendhg 27

groups, or changes in îheir composition .

The focus on sociai groups as a priacipal unit of analysis helps to transcend the

rigid conceptual distinctions between state and non-state spheres, and opens up the reaim

of political inquiry well beyond its traditionai, state-centered parameters. This epproach,

rwted originally in the writing of Antonio Gramsci, thus allows us to think of a wide

range of non-state forces and actors as "political", and as fhctors of hegemonic continuity

or change. Crucially for the topic at hami, the Gramscian approach ailows us to

conceptualise politicai power, and nipporting idemlogies, as something which rnay be

- - -

26

n See Chris Archer I- thganidons (Load011: Roiakdge, 1992). Robinson, op. cit., 1996. p.29.

17

deployed in the pivate as well as in the public sphere of social relations. Furthemore,

this analpis distinguishes between, ratber tban confiises, the two distinct notions of

"dominance" and %egemony". If direct dominance over nations or social groups is

achieved by coercive force, hegemony is built, by contrast, through a consensual

institutionalisation of identities, beliefk and nom of bebsviour, Civil Society, with its

multiplicity of voluntary associations and self-reguiating activity, constitutes the terrain

where hegemonic wnsensus is sought, obtauied and potentially contestecl.

By dissolving the traditional lidcages betwexm the state, coercive power and

political hegemony, Gramscian d y s i s helps us wncretely to understand the three trends

of NGO development in the 1990s. Moreover, by asLing critical questions about the role

of internationel organisations in global order, Cox provides us with a amber of concrete

guidelines, or indiCators, to gauge empirically the hegemonic quality of NGO

interventions in Mozambique: To what degree bas their presence in the country reflected

evolving socio-economic principles and patterns in the global order? To what extent have

they acted to project, legitimate or contest these patterns in their conseosus building

activities on the ground? How have they interacteci with dominant groups in

Mozambique's state and emergent civil society?

Another important advmtage of the Gramscia. cntical approach is that it explicitly

recognises that while theones can seek to ewain historical events, the converse -thet

events may explain theoretical choices- is aiso tme. It follows that theory-ased

explanations of international relations should not be taken at face value as scientific, but

must be understood in relation to the historical context within whch they are proposed,

and assesseci in terms of the interests they might serve. By recognking the social origuis

and historical purpose of theoretical knowledge, the Gnunscian appraach aliows us to

better examiize the social, material and ideological links between today's prevailing

conceptual approaches and current events. This added analytid dimension is central to

Chapter 2 of this study, in whicb 1 assess the ongins of current thinking about civil

society, conflict and peace as a fonn of "intellectual production", its growing duence,

and its effect on NGO humanitarian actions in the19907s,

A final advantage of aSs appoach is thpt it incorporates poiitical "praxis" as an

integral part of its interpretative fiamework By associating hegemonic coastniction with

concrete historical actors and intefesfs (dominant arsd subaltem social groups, matexhi

interests) rather than historicaiiy abseacted ona (the state, the national interest),

emphasis is squady placed on human agency as a factor of stnictural coatiauity or

change in international afhïrs. Currertt stnictines of global order are thus understood as

social pmducts, at the same tjme that human options for the construction of alternative

future orders emerge. The fidl exercise of these options was integral to Gramsci's original

analysis of hegemony. It is hoped that the current study may also, in this sense, be of some

practical relevance to those directly concemed with humanitarian affairs.

Having provided a brief summary of the core issues at hand and how 1 propose to

address them, I dedicate the remainder of thïs chapter, fht, to a discussion of the

research context and information-gathenng methods involved 1 then move on to cl- a

number of key terms and concepts in the humanitariau and NGO literature which recur

throughout this study.

This work stems primarily fiom direct obsewation of NGO activities in

Mozambque between January 1995 and May 1998. This period, which foliowed on the

heels of the United Nations' 24-month peace-support operation implemented in the 1992-

94 period, corresponds with whaî o h e r s have identined as the second pbase of 28

Mozambique's postwar transition . Having addressed the irnmediate taslrs of the pst-war

period, including refûgee r e m demobilisation and the organisation of the country's fïrst

"peace election" with substantial intemationai fiancial and logistical assistance,

Mozambicans now f d the challenges of longer-ta peace consolidation and economic

recovery. This second phase involves fùndamentai changes to impove "governance" on a

number of simuitaneous tracks, to be carrïed out in the context of ongoing political

uncertainty and ecoaomic penury: These included a fint time experiment with rnultiparty

democracy, the acceleration of macro-ewnomic refonas, administrative and political

decentralisation, the consolidation of a new national -y7 the resolution of longstanding

land-tenure and property issues, and the reform of existing judicial stnietuiPs and practices to stnagthen the d e oflaw d respect for human rightr.

On the social fiont, aid priorities centred on consolidating gains made by

intematiod emergency assistance that had been injected into Mozambique in the

immediate aRermath of the war- These involved the longer-term reintegration of war-

affected populations, +cularly in areas with important concentrations of returned

refùgees, internally displacsd, and former combatants. Support for incorne-generating

activities, for the reactivation of ~iefworks for service provision in pimary health

and education, mine-clearance7 and for hhsûucture rehabilitation, was emphasised.

Both the instittutio~~al reform and social rehabilitation processes reqriued

substantial public capitai investment which Mozambique, given its overwhelming debt-

burden (wbkh, in 1995 stood at five times the value of annual GDP), the absence of credit

and a near non-existat revenue base, was unable to sustsin on its own. Thus, despite what

many have described as the ''successfiil" conclusion of the UN operation, Mozambique

rernained largely dependent on outside assistance during the second phase of its transition.

The international donors present in the country continued to provide a crucial lifeline to

the new peace. Whiie macro-economic aid was provided primarily in the fom of new

bilaterai credits for structural adjustment support, assistance for new investments in the

social sectors was given in the form of grants. In 1996, for example, extemal gant aid

accounted for over 50% of the national health budget, This bilateral grant aià, as well as

some multilatefal fimding, was largely channelied through the NGO sector.

Despite the signing of the formal peace settlement in late 1992 and the subsequent

formation of a democraticaïly elected govemment, the international commwùty in 1995

continued to be collcerned about the fiagile politicai situation in the countrytry In particular,

the lingering issue of dual territorial administration in former rebel-mntrolled areas

continued to mise concern Moreover, despite UN disarmameut efforts in the Unmediate

aftermath of the war, weapons wntinued to circulate, and significant numbefs of weapons

were suspecteci of k i n g stockpileci in secret rurai locations in former rebel areas. In 1996,

28 UNRISD, W- T m AWittb h&ct.- M- F i d (Maputo, March 1997).

20

the threat of organised banditry dong main rural roadways continued to be d, and the

Organisation for Internaîiod Migration design& some 3WA of Mozambique's districts 29

as king "at risk" of renewed political violence or revolt . The issue of how to avoid

potential destabilisation by Momimbique's aeerly 100 000 demobilised troops remained a

high priority on the internationai agenda Throughout the period, political observers

sounded r e m signals of alarm about the continuhg fragùity of the new (former-rebe)

opposition party, particuiarly the menacing rifts which began to appear between pro-

peace leadership (now codortably established in the capital with parliamentary

salaries) and didected w~nmatlders and party followers Oeft behuid in remote rurai

districts fomerty under rebel coatrol). Donors thus remained concemed that "losers" of

the new peace might pose a threat to postconflict stability. Aid programmes were thus

targeted politidy, with a substantial emphasis on social recovery in the four provinces

lying on either sîde of the Zarnbezi valley which had constituted the rebel hearilaad during 30

26 years of war .

Political targeting of aid also took place in a different, thougti related manner, with

which this research is directly concerneci This involved the use of aid fiinds to support

social and behavioural change deep within the Mozambican political economy, in a

manner so as to strengthen local constituencies for the intemationaily brokered peace

settlement and the liberaidernocfatic formula on which it rested. This combinecl the

provision of material benefits (goods and services against humanitarian needs) with efforts

re-shape local organisational foms and create new peace-time identities on the basis of

new sets of values, for the most part fonndated outside of the countfy. Despite the demise

of mmcism in hlozambique, efforts to create an '%orno novo", continued in the pst-

conflict period with signincant extemal support31.

29 Organisation for International Migration, A m One Y-: TJLC StadlS of RQmkgnüÙ~n in

Motambiq~e .,A (ihputo, 1996). 3v

Alîhough rebel-comiled areas had expanded d d g the 1980's to include almost s q m c r of the national territory, areas of effective rebel "goverrrment" included the provinces of Soma, Manica, Tete and Zambezia Key donors, includùig Itdy, the EU, tbc United States and the United Kingdom concentratai major programmes in these areas durimg wbat was .generally called the period of transition "fhm relief to reùabiiiion". Most were justiftcd on technical or economic, zather than political gromds. 5 1

For an account of euriy efforts by Mozambique's rnarxist leadership to mould a "New M d with a modern s o c i d modei, set Tom Young and Maqpret Ha.& C Ù n j h d - k v k t h w MOzIIlnbjQue since I i (Lond011: Hurst & Co., 199n pp.54-74. This issue is taken up in Chapter 5.

n

In early 1995, in tedonal NGOs baseci in Maputo and the provincial capicapitais

were gearing up for a much anticipeted move f b m short-term relief to more nistained

rehabilitation activities, then king sigoalid by the wiading dom of the UN operaîicm.

Having experienoed two years of SUSf8jlled international generosity in support of the peace

pmcess, a sense of increasing hmding wmpetition was rapidly taking hold of NGO

managers due to the shortfa11 in donor resources tbat was expected to accompany the 'end

of the emergency" in the country. In the ment, the number of international NGOs in the

country did not s i g n i f i d y decline with the omet of the second phase of the tninsitioG2.

Mead, having been at the centre of emergency efforts in key areas of the country during

the 1992-94 period, the NGO sector was now strategically positioned to absorb much of

the rehabilibtion aid now entering the country. A new policy emphasis on institutional

reform, socio-economic recovery and "govemance", meant tbat new areas of intervention

would open to foreign and local hinaani~inan - .

organisations tbat had credibly established

themselves in Mozambique at the height of the crisis. NGO initiatives in these areas,

discussed in Chaptexs 5,6 and 7, constitute the ernpirical focus of this enqyiry-

Data and documentation for this research was gathered at different points during

the 1995-1998 period, and under varying cùcum~tatlces. A fint, exploratory trip was made to Maputo and Beira between Febniary and May 1995 during which prelimirÿlrv

information was coilected and initial contacts sought in the NGO cornmunity, the Foreign

Ministry's Institute for Intemational Anairs and at the Centre for Afncan Studies

(Eduardo Modane University). Relevant documentation was obtained primarily for the

purposes of familiarisation with the key issues and priorities of the post-conflict transition

agenda. Locally produced analyses during the period were rare an4 as a resuit, documents

were primarily of non-Mozambican origin This prelimhmy phase, during which 1

received invaluable logistical support (transport and acco~ll~llodation) fiom members of

the NGO community, also included my participation in a number of national or provincial

seminars on civil society, demffiratisation and human rigbts. This îïrst phase provided the

basis for the forma1 proposal on which this present dissertation is basA

32 A registry of NGOs kept by LINK, an NGO a x m i h t i n g body beadquartaed in Maputo,

indicates that dcspite some turnover, the number of i n t d o n a l NGOs worlûng in Mozambique between 1993 and 1996 remaineci constant a oves two bundred (LINK Forum, h@mwio das ONGs, Maputo, 1996).

22

f base two of the research was comhcted in November and December 1995, and

comprised two separate components: The f h t collsisted of a round of formal intewiews

with 37 d o n a l and international NGO managers end central and provincial govemment

officials in the cities of Maputo and Beira, as weli as informal meetings with members of

the academic community, local consultants d the national media The formai interviews

were structiired aromd a -onnaire designed to gauge both the nature and level of

NG0s7 politidy-oriented hvities in the country, and natioaaVprovincia1 managers'

own position on aid prïorities for peace consolidatioa A questionnaire for meetings with

government officials was designed but laîer abmdoned as too rigid to fâciiitate substantive

discussion- The second component consisteci of a five-week tour of the districts of Caia,

Chemba, Cheringoma and Gonngosa, and to various sub-posts therein, during which

meetings were organiseci with local govermnent officials, traditional authorities and

resident NGO project managers. Selection of these districts was based on tbeir political

importance as rebel sîrongholds drning the war, their continuing status as anas of residual

"dual administration" after the settlement, as well as their history of NGO

intervention. Maringue district, which had been a centre of political operations for the

rebel movement during the conûïct, was iacluded in the original selection, but later .

abandoneci due to ongoing political instability. Logisticai support for this tour of central

Mozambique's "divideci districts" was provided by international NGOs. A third, follow-

up trip was made in Septeder 1996. fmusiag maidy on interviews with bilateral donors,

United Nations officials and the Worid Bank.

Finally, the research was indirectly supported by separate work undertaken on

contract in 1996 and 1998. To the extent that thematic questions rejprdiag extemal (and

NGO) support for the peace process overlapped with my own dissertation enquiry, these

missions facilitated discussions with senior donor and govemment officials and provided

access to officia1 infoimation which, though publicly avdable, had been difncult to

identiQ beforehand The EC mission also provided access to NGO projects in Mutarare,

Milange and Dondo districts in cenbal Mozambique, aU of which shared similar histories

with those previously visited Several private insights relevant to this p p e r were

generated during these missions.

Primary documentary sources were gatkred in-country and consist m a d y of

institutional policy documents, budget statemeafs, strategy ppers and programme

evaluatious Iaadly made avaiiable to me diaing the interview process. Secoadary analysis

of the Mozambican transition and of humanitarian assistance is principally of foreign

origin. Some was available through the Centre for Anican Studies, the institutes of

Foreign Affairs ami Strategic Studies, and the Office for Public Information in Maputo.

The bdk of the bibliograpbic research was wnducted, however, at acackmic facilities

outside of Mozambique, or though direct contact with the authors-

Key Concetlts

The secondary litetahne used for this research covers a wide range of academic,

policy and ptactitioner materials which v e y seldom refer to one another. These are

systematically reviewed in the neld three chaprers of this paper. For the purposes of

clarity, however, it is helpfbl at this early stage to identify and establish the operational

meaning ofa number of key concepts which emerge fonn these varieci sources.

C M I &c&y is arguably among the most salient concepts in the aid literatltre of

the 1990s and & of critical importance to this study. It hss heavily influenced

international policy choices and strategies for post-conflict recoasmiction in mca and

elsewhere. The concept itseIfhas long been known to, and contesteci by, students of social

and political science. Iavariably, debates about civil society have centred around three

related questions: 1) mere is it.t i-e. its location as a collective sphere of activity, relative

to other spheres ( public and private); 2) Wltrrt i~ it? i.e. its organisational composition

and membership; and, 3) Wnot does k &? Le. its fiinction in te- of the social

outcornes it produces or is expected to produce. In terms of the first question, many in

the mainStream of social studies describe civil society as a space of independent

associational activity located outside of the h i I y sector but not directiy related to the 33

state, or in fàct antagonistic to it . Another widely held interpretation is that civil society

represents the social space that exists between the public and private spheres, that is to say

33 Lama Macdonald "Globalising Civil Society: Lnterpdng international NGOs in Central

Amend in MrUcrrrriwn~ (Vol. 23, No. 4), 1994, pp. 269-273. 24

between states and markets- Other Wnters, by con- have generally identined civil

society with market capitdism, in other words. the very social order of which states are a 34

historical expression . As discussed in Cbpter Four, Gramscian approaches identifj. an

organic relationship amoag dominant groups across state and societal spheres- Civil

society, while methodologically distinguisbed h m the state, is taken in realiîy to

constitute the wnseasual, non-regulatory appenmis of the "extended -te" or "state-

society cornplex".

In terms of its composition and membership, there appears to be general agreement

that civil Society is a voluntary associational sphere, made up of organisations which

independently represent the specific interests ofgroups within theîr broader social context-

NGOs, the media, professional associations, lobbies, trade unions, single issue social

movements, support groups, clubs and other sell-coastituted bodies are typically included

within civil society definitions The inclusion of political parties as civil society

organisations is somewhat more controversial- At the time be wrote, Gramsci explicitly

designated them as civil bodies with a capacity for mass educational, organisational and

motivational outreach, More recentiy, political parties have been excludd ficm

mainstram civil society dennitions because of their explicit political afEüations and 35

power-seeking agendas . Likewise, cornmon understandings of the term "civil" betray a

normative connotation that complicates the issue of membership, raising questions, for

example, about the status of organised crime, rebel groups d other predatory forms of

social organisation. Marxist analysis which identifies civil society with the private sphere 36

of markets, geaerally includes corporate entities as part of the overall definition .

From the fiinctional standpoint, maiastream interpretations refer to civil society as

a sphere of non-profit private d v i t y which is of public utility, in the sense that it

provides public goods to be shared ammg the community at large. The public goods

function may be material and distniiutive (in the case of local charïties and aîd NGOs).

34 Justin Rosenberg, TItc Ekyrirr of Civil A%w&p: A -ne of î k l b ü s î ï k w y of

Inlcriraao 35

' ml Rrlrainru (London: Verso, 1994). Sec Alison Van Rmy, "Civil Society: An Analytical Hat Stand?" in Van Rooy (cd.) CSuü

Su&g d the Aid Ibdusqp (London: Earthsc~, lm), pp. 7-27. 36

Ahbough Rosenberg does not d&e civil Society as such, it is implicitly quated with private corporate and commercial interests, in contrast to tbose of the state, throughout bis analysis.

25

Key fuuctions are, however, non-material: civil society organisations can provide a basis

for civic identity, channels for the non-violent advancement of competing interests and

the mediation of local disputes, as weil as support neîworks for local ecowmk production

and exchange. In addition, civil society groups are assurneci to be repmentative of the

gnw roots, to constitute organisational intermediaries between local populations and the

state, and therefore to call the M e r to account Gramscian amlysis, as 1 discuss in

Chapter Four, news the fûnction of civil Society in an altogether different light as the

locus of social consent and contestation, it serves an ultimately political hct ion of

creating, upholdhg or challenging the social power of dominant groups in society.

Perhaps most interestingly for our pirtposes, M e l d has observeci that even

though the theoretid b i s of civil society is unclear and contesteci, its operational

definition in the aid sector is in fact quite comte: "While there may be a problem in

theorising civil society, in @ce the situation is d e r . It is generally regarded as

synonymous with NGOs, especially local ~ ~ 0 s " ~ ' . The same point is made by Van Rooy

and Robinson, with Ian Smillie concurring that "an agreeable fit between NGOs and 38

current [donor] enthusiasms for civil society now prevails" . For these observers, the

implication for recipient wuutries in the midst of crisis or postcrisis transition is that civil

society is, in practice, what aid planners make of it. And indeed, for war-affected

populations in couutries like Mozambique, the theoretical Besignation of civil society

matters less than how the concept is b d e d

H u m a ~ r i o n Adhmce was, until the 199ûs, commonly associateci with the

delivery of aid on an emergency basis to populations unable to meet their basic needs

because of natural catastrophes or human crises. It was generally assumed that once such

crises came to an end, needs would again be met locally and delivery couid cease. In the

1990s, however, the original interpretation was critiqued on a number of counts: Firsf it

was increasingly recognised wahin the aid community that most humanitarian

emergencies were not isolated, discrete events, but rather surfâce manifestations of deeper

dynamics couched well within dysfiinctioual political economies. Humanitarian

37

38 M e l d , op. cit. 1997, p.85. Ian Smiilie, "NGOs and DcveIopmcnt Assistance: A Change in Mindset2" in Weiss (ed.), op.

cit., 1998, p. 185.

ernergencies were increasingiy umkstood as relating to a broader "nùlure of 39

development" to provide %onditions for political and eumomic security" . Under such

circumstances, the meze s8ving of lives tlirough humaaitarian relief was increasingly

considered as an hadequate nspoax to the problans at haud, M e the restoration of a

pre-crisis stam quo unte was no longer viewed as fwible or desirable.

Hugo Slim has recently argueci that the advent of war-relaîed "cornplex"

humanitarian emergencies is more an issue of designation than of empvical fàct. The

effects of war are inttinsical1y no more complex today than in the pst. The new

complelety Lies, iastead, in the manner in which &emaîioaDL responses to conflict are

now designed and implemented Their object is no longer limiteci to the savhg of lives,

but extended also to re-establish conditions for the defeire of human dignity, economic

reform and sustainable peace. As Francis Deng bas recently asserted, there is a growing

consensus that '?IR m e t important humanitarian objective is to end wars". This

consensus, Slim finther explains, lays down the ethical and practicai fomdations for a

"new interventionism", which seeks to be both more comprehensive and more penetrative 40

than traditional f o m of humanaarian engagement . This has led to a substantiat

rethinking of the humanitarian maridate, which is now expandeâ, operatiodly, to

ïnclude both Ife suving and life sust~ining activities b r d y defined- Post-confiict

humanitarian activities are now widely viewed by the donor wmmunity as a means to 4 1

pave the way for sub~eqllent pace-support and sustainable development efforts

Addressing the root cause of crises by strengthening the developmental and

peacebuilding content of extenial intewentions has opened a window for humanitarian

NGOs in post-conflict situations to bewme iavolved in longer-term activities and expand

into new, non-Me-saving areas of intervention, such as sustahble social and economic

recovery. Howwer, some obsewers now argue thaf as a result of tbïs blurring of

mandates, humanitarian organisations are entering into direct cornpetition with traditional

development agencies ad, more importantly, with recipient govenunents, both over

39 Macrae, Bradbury, hiffield, et al., op. cit., 1997, p. 225.

40 Süm, op. cit., 1997, p.4.

41 OECD/DAC, op. cit., 1998, pp. 44-53.

27

42 access to donor resources and in the formulation of chelopment priorities . Shi- aptly portrays the new wmplexity of NGO humanitarian actions in the following

Not only are NGOs growing in size and number, but they are also assumïng new roles and exerting greater influence than in the pst. Whereas NGOs traditionally limited their role to direct humanitarian relief and wnsciously denned thaî role as apolitid, the respome of NGOs today [...] is rndtîfàceted. NGOs now see the d c a l lioL between relief and àevelopment, and so attempt to build developmeatal elements in their relief programmes. As NGOs examine the root causes of humanicatian emergencies, they are forced to look at the political dimensions of wnflict and consider problems of reconciliaîion and post-conflict peacebdlding [...] In a growing number of cases, NGOs are assuming d e s usually nIled by governments or international organ.ktions [and] have increased the scale of their oprations in some

43 instances to becorne major forces in markets.. .

Reco~n/ReAtobilitoaroruiRebuiCl(ing. These tems have been used more or

less interchangeably by donors and agencies to descriBe aid interventions and objectives in

postanflict settings. Nonetheless, some nuances emerge: Whereas CC~nstnictiOn''

nonnally refers to the repair of damageci or destroyed infiastnicture in war-affecteci

corntries, 'khabilitation" encompasses wider social recovery, including the restoratioa of

economic systems (production, commerce and marketing), the strengthening of human

capacities and the restoraîion or refom of national institutions. "Rebuilding" appears as a 44

more generic term which may wver various foms of postconfiict assistance .

There is currently a general consensus within the aid commWUty that the

rehabilitation phase of post-conflict intervention should be made to serve as a strategic

link in the relief-to-development continuum, as weAi as in transitions h m war to peace.

In a policy statement issued in 19%, the European Commission designated

"rehabilitation" as a key element of international aid strategies in post-codlict transitions:

"Rehabilitation programmes are seen as progressively taking over fiom relief assistance to

stabilise the economic and social situation and facilitate the transition towards a medium

42 Macrae, op. cit., 199%.

43 Peter Shiras, ''Humaiatarian Emcrgencies and the Role of NGOs" in Whitman and Pocock (eds.)

A@ Rwadk T k C b - o d W h # U M N.liiorrs R " ' Assijtrucc &oncion: Macmillan, l996), pp, 1067, 44

Gilles Carbonnia, Pkrtmra RcbwïWdag a d akc EcanUmg: A A Rmùw of the Literrcftrm (War-Tm Socicties mjea Occasionai Papa No.2, Gen- UNNSD, Marcb 1998).

28

45 and long-term development strategy" . OECD guidelines qmciQ that rebbilitation

involves a wide range of actions h m s a h g Iivelihoods, repeiriag infiastnicture, to

building the basis for development by strengthening local capcities and "ownershipm, and

supporthg large-sale employment generation and cfedit schemes. The puideliaes add that rehabilitation actions should be "preventive", in the sense thst they should serve to support

46 nomisilisation in postanflict situations and avoid a retum to crises . There is thus a

strong convergence between expded definitions of humanitarian assistance and the meaning of rehabiiitation as adopted by key aid donors. The implications for NGOs

working in post-conflict envirorments are thus similar to those aiready noted above.

Petzcebddr'ng bas, since the early 1990s, increasingly W e d intemaiional aid

discussions relating to the subseance and rnodalities of post-conflict intervention and, in

this sense, has closely merged into humanitarian and rebabilitation assistance strategies.

Indeeà, rather than a single activity, peacebuilding is best considered an orgQljSfrr;g

formula or agenda, which aggregates a wide range of international strategies daigne4 in

the words of former UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, to "[rebuild] iastitutions and

infrastnctures of nations tom by civil war. ... to identie and support stnictwes which will

tend to strengthen peace and avoid the relapse into conflictu and "to address the deepest 47

causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and politicai oppressionn . A recent

consensus statement ammg OECD donors specifies inteniationally agreed peacebuilding

objectives as follows:

Peacebuilding [...] focuses on long-term support to, and establishment of, viable socio-economic. politicai and cuitural hthions capable of addressing the root causes of confiicts, as well as other initiatives aimed at creating the necessary conditions for sustained peace and stability. should also seek to promote the integration of competing or rnargmalised groups within mainstream society, through providing equitable access to political decision-making, social networks, ecoaomic

48 resources and information--.

45

46 EC, op.ciî, 1996, pp. iv and 9.

47 UECD/DAC, op-cit., 1998, p. 1 7.

48 Bouûos-Gtiali An Abrrr&r for P m , 11992. OECDDAC, op. cit., 1998, p. 17.

29

In addition to these speciGc aims, slnrckrd siWU@ has been specined as an

overaii strategic objective for peacebuilding actïvitîes pursued through huumitarim and

rehabilitation progtammes. This involves support for

the interdependent and muhially reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for the rule of law an.â human rights, sacial and ecotlomic development, supportecl by dynamic and representative political institutions capable of mamghg change and

49 resolving disputes wîthout resort to violent wnfiict .

At the UN level, the concept of "peace maintenance" bas recently been proposed in

an effort to mate a wmprehensive international fnunework within which to build d

maintain long-term peace in chronically waraffècted coimtrieses Under this heading, strong

emphasis is placed on close ~010rdinrrtion towards commoa objectives among

international and local actors, includïng govemments, UN agencies, regional security

bodies and NGOs. Within the proposed fiamework "the objectives of diplornatic

activities, humanitarian assistance, military forces and civilian components would not only

be co-ordinated but harmoni~ed)'~. While aot M y operationalised, elements of peace-

maintenance have been explored in war-affected countrïes with a strong international

presence, and the concept d l likely increasingly underpin fuhire pst-conflict

For NGOs, the inclusion of peacebuilding objectives into the intemational agenda

for post-confiict intewention has had s&stantial implications. Among other tbings, it has

provided grounds for combining straightfotward humanitarian and rehabilitation wrk,

such as relief distributions and infiastnicture repair, with the wider social, political and

economic tasks linked to the postwar context. Indeed, to the extent that peacebuilding

objectives draw attention to a more explicitly political fonn of intervention, they also

closely connect with prevalent views about the fùnction of civil society in postanflict

situations, as briefly discussed above. On this basis, NGOs have increasingly sought to

49

50 Ibid. See Jarat Chopra, "Introducing Peace Maintenan& in G I d W G-e (VoL4, No. 1).

1998, p. 7. .* 3 1

Elements of the "peace maintenancen formuia are inaeasingly apparent in the recent inteniationai intcfvtntioiis in Kosovo, East T i and Sicrra Leone.

lay new foundations for wmmUIUty organisation, and to reshape local ~la'ons in ways

that are thought to better support post-connfiict stability.

Confikt Ptevendon bas. siace the mid 1990~~ been de- with kreasing precision as a

logical coroilary to peacebuildiug and has, at the t h e of writing, gaiaed wide scccptance

within the aid community. Although the agceed definition formally refers to "actions

undertaken over the short-term to reduce manifest tensions and to prevent the outbreak or

recunem of violent conflict", conflict prevention poteibially irnplies important shifts in

humanitarian ~ y s i s , objectives, and practice. First, conflict prevention is premised on a

cyclical view of the evolution of humanitarian which b r i a m W y discomects

fiom prevailing liaear assumptions of the relief-tdevelopment continuum. Secondly,

and precisely because it is preventive, it predicates various forms of intemationel

intervention prior to the outbreak of open confïict, thus potentially forcing a fiiadaraental

rethinlong of current strategies and justifications for action, and raising important issues of

sovereignty and legitimatim Third, because it directly addrrsses the causes of codict,

conflict prevention requires increasingiy sophisticated levels of political analysis on the

part of humanitarian agencies present on the ground Tbis in tian stretches the parameters

of present operationai mandates an4 by raising the spectre of outright politicisaîion, 52

poterrtially transforms the substance of humsrnitarian work

Each of these key tems and concepts is discussed agak and fririher in depth, at

relevant points in this study. For the tïme king, two points emerge fiom the above

discussion. First, although they designate a variety of dimensions of p o s t 4 i c t

intervention, these key tem and concepts are strongly comecteà and cross- referentid.

Taken together, their converging objectives powemilly hint at the emergence of a single,

cornprehensive international agenda for post-conflict intervention: one which incorporates

short and long-term efforts to effixt political, ecowmic and social change, at both

behavioural and structural levels, into a broader process of building stability, or order.

Secondly, they help to identifjr the brogder policy context in which the NGO sector

currentiy operates. For NGOs workuig in post-conflict enviromnents Wre Mozambique,

52 Indeed, the line between political understandmg and politicisation is vague. Tbis issue is taken

up agah in Chapter 8 of study. For an overali review of conflict pfevenupfevenuon issues, sec Micbael S. Lund, "Preventing Violent Codicts: ProgCess aad Shoms" in Peta Cross (cd.), Corraibuthg tu Arrrain'nir A h (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998).

31

the implication is that muitiple opportunities have now opeaed up for new, more

penetrating, and more perwive forms of sociai intervention

O n Civil Society and Post-Wir Reconstruction: From Amalmis to Im~lementation

As noted in the previous chapter, the developent of a vibrant civil society was

widely accepted as in objective of post-confù'ct intervention in the 1990s. This has visibly

been the case in Mozambiquey where significant inteniational fuading. chamielleci through

international NGOs, has been directeci to support partnerships witb local civil groups and

build their management, programming and impIementation capacity. Civil society is also

central to the undersfanding of hegemony through which I propose to assess the role of

NGOs in Mozambique's. post-confiict transition betwee~l 1992 and 1997. According to

this r e g , civil society constimes the sphere of social relations where hegemony

(cmsensual power) is normally exercised and periodicalîy contesteci. It is the sphere in

which defining viewpoints and representatiom of the social world are generated, diffused

and chailengd If widely accepted, such ~presentations serve to shape the possibilities

and limits for identity-formation and &al interaction, and to fàcfatate popular

endorsement of prevailing social ordem. With this in muid, 1 hope to make it apparent in

the discussion which foflows that civil society bas a dual meaning: On one bd, it stands

as a concrete poiicy objective, something which is "out there" and needs to be

strengthened and developed as part of efforts to repair a social Wric d.sunaged by war. On

the other han& it is a medium for spreading ideas about what is acceptable social

behaMour in a ww, peacetime political economy. These two meanings are intimately

linked: The way civil society is developed as a matter of aid policy will affect the types of

ideas, social representations and codes of behaviour that will flow through it. To recall

M e l d ' s comment in the previous chapter, the denning issue, what ma- ultimately in

the tabula-rasa enviromnt of war's aftermath, is the way civil society is hnded.

The purpose of this chapter, then, is to examine how the civil society concept has

been used by the aid sector in its enorts to re-shape postanflict environments. In order

to do this 1 provide a survey of recent prescriptive literature and policy statements on civil

society and NGOs as they relate to humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction. The

material is organised into four clusters: The first covers wre discussions about how the

33

civil society concept Ms into the bmader aid pdicy agenda of the 1990s. Key issues

discussed here concem the assumed relatio11sbips between civil society on one hanâ, and

democratisation and markets* on the otber. A second cluster of literature reviewed here concems specincaily the relationship between civil society, wnfiict and peace. Hm 1

attempt to show how fecent trends in conflict and transitions d y s i s have affected policy

assumptions about the role of civil society in peacebuildllig and conflict prevention A

third cluster of literature mers the way in which the civil society concept hsF been

absorbed by various key agencies in the aid sectoi. Here I focus primarily on donor

agencies, and pause briefly to consider the approaches taken by USAID* whose strategies

for developing civil society appear among the most advanceci in tbe donor wmmunïty.

In the fourth cluster, 1 ddress some wre critiques that have been levelled agaïnst the civil

society concept by critical observers of the aid sector. At one level, the turn towards civil

society-based aid delivery is* contrary to prevailing assumptions, of doubtful advantage

fiom the standpoint of programme efféctiveness, and may yield undesired politicai

outcornes. At enother level, the very notion of civil society is questiod with regard to its

applicability to local social wntexts in mnflict-ndden Afncan wuntries.

Civil Societv and the Aid Agenda: Protective and Generative Functions

The notion of civil socie$y reached unprecedented levels of prominence in the

1990s under what aid analysts bave identifieci as a new "policy agenda" for global

govemance. With some variations7 the new agenda, which bas increasingly made itself

felt in aid policy planning and programming is seen as resting on a twin set of

prescriptive "piIlad', or economic and political models, for the management of global

affairs. Econorni~aIly~ Edwards and Hulme note that, "markets and private initiative are

seen as the most efficient mechanisrns for achieving economic growth and providing most 53

things to most people7* . Political&, the global extension of democratic pluralism is seen

as a key requïrement both to limit the powers of potentidly hostile states* and to d u c e

the intensity of interna1 or inteniatiod politid conflict to levels which do not

undermine the hdamental integrity of global markets.

The influence of these prescriptions in the 1990s is collcrefely reflected in the

advent of what Cerny has temed a "residuai sta?e", a primary -011 of *ch is to

"'maintain the confidence of the inteniatiod business ancl financiai community"? In the

West, the recoofiguration of the state dong these lines bas o c c d under the banners of

deregulation, privatisation, &ficit reâuction and dobal competitivenesss*. In the post-

communist and developing worlds, IMF and World Bank-sponsored state retreat has taken

the form ofeconomic adjustment and stabiiisaîion programmes implemented ôy weakened

and generaily aicidependent govenunents. Memwhile, plural democracy, at least in its

nominal form, bas spreaâ to doms of new corntries mder the sponsorship of regional

and inteniatiod bodies such as the UN, OSCE, OAS ànd OAU, supplantïng more

market-averse political systems, or seeking to end violent politid conflicts. On the

Afncan continent alone, the 1990's saw 24 corntries undergo W-time muitiparty 56

elections . As V i b Chand notes, "Democracy is mw perceived as the ody legitimate

fom of government" Because both markets and dernocoitic pliiralism raise impediments

to the potentially overbeariag power of governments, they contain a mutually reinforcing

logic. Ia this sense, international democracy promotion, in the form of advocacy, electoral

funding, monitoring and logidcal support for elections in tninsitioaai wuntries, strongly

refiects the economic orientations of the new policy agenda indeed, the very

management of national elections in oewly democratising wuntrïes has increasingiy been 57

placed in the han& of private organisations

Within this duai-logic political economy h e w o r k , civil society has been

attributed a number of "protective" and "generative" hctions, corresponding respectively

to the economic and politid dimensions of the policy agenda (see Fi- 1). Though

each is wntested, the majority of these attributions has now penetrated deep into the aid

53 Michael Edwards and David Hulme, N d ' OrgQIUSebiO~ P q f i e and

Accounlab.V: Bcpond #k Ma& lk&t (London: Esrthscan, 1996). p. 4. 54

Phillip Cmy, "Globaliuitim and Otha Stories: The Search for a New Paradigm for International Relationsn in lritcriroao 55

m d ~~ (Vol. LI, No. 4), 1996, p. 632. Coq op. at., 19%. p. 529,

56 Marc F. Plattner and Larry Diamond (eds.), J d 4 l k m a m q - EIrraion W e k

(Volumes 1 to 11 accessed on www.anorastm.~eiections~related.htm)_

57 Prominent among these are the Carter Cadre, The National Democratic Institutc and

Democracy Intcrua!ioaal (PIC.). See V i Chand "Dcrnocratisation h m the Outside In: NGOs and International Efforts to Promote Open Elections" in Weiss (cd.), op. ch., 1998, pp. 160-80.

35

policy miaQet a d appean, expliciily or hnplicitly. es an integral part of most post-

conflict aid progmmnhg

FIGURE 1: IWiWTiONS ATTRlBüTED TO CIVIL SOCIETY

Economic

Political

Econornic Fmctions of Civil Societv

The firsf protective M o n of civil society is cast in prhmily =momie terms:

It is widely recognised that there are large areas of global life where markets may fail to

fulfil their social fimction. Here, local and transnational networks of privately constituted

civil society organisations emerge as d e . market-oriented alternatives to state

intewentionism in the social sphere. It is in this sense of s o c i ~ n o m i c protection,

s e ~ c e delivery and the development of civic action-based coping strategies in the face of

econornic globalisation that Salamon and RiDjnd wrote about the emergence of a global

"third sectorn and the "global social economy " in the 1990s58. As Barnet and Cavanagh

remark about the potential dismptioos of globalisation, civil socieîy offers up the prospect

for new socio-economic selfhelp f o m ~ on a global scale :

More and more people who are bypassed by the new world or&r are crafting their own strategies for siirvival and development, and in the process spinning their own trarisnational webs to embrace and wnnect p g l e around the world [...] It is the only force we see that can break the global gridlock

58 SeeJ-Rifkind, TIicEtnd~Walr~T)c~adi~~~GlobolLabowrF~oridtrLc~~)qf

the Pa-Maiiikci Ers (New York: Rrtnam, 1995); Lesta Salamon, "The Rise of the Non-Profit Sector" in Foreign m i (Augusî), 1994, 59 As quoted in Macdonald, op. cit., 1994, p. 268.

36

Civil society is thus assumed to be able to introduce a measure of equity in the

highly polarid e c o d c worid generated by the forces of globalisatio~~, The precise

mechanisms of this w e k findon are unclear, but the emphasis is on the role of gras

mots organisations7 and w t states7 in pishuig tbugh demands for social justice on

behalf of under-privileged or marginalised constituen~ies~

It is also in this sense that DdEeld has referred to the advent of a global '%Ifare

safety net", mobilised and implemented by civil society actors in the face of what he d s

"public sector decay. The intemationai aid system of the 1990s7 he adds "is a projection

of the way the West is attempting to resolve its own intemal problems". Both internally

and intematioll~~lly, the focus is on shiffuig responsibility towards private o r ~ t i o n s in

"trying to contain the effêcts of poverty and -al exclusiony7 Donini adds almg the

same lines tbat, in tenns of sociwconomic protection, "non govemmental organisations

have taken over state-type fimctions, in areas Wre health and ducation, as well as [...] the 61

delivery of relief services" -

In their raîher upbeat analysis of the protective role of civil society in the

contemporary global political economy, Edwards et al. vividly portray the need for "new

foms of solidarity - or new 'social wntracts' between citizens of different polities and

new structures of authdty at différent levels of the world system":

Whatever else globalisation may be doing [...] all agree that there are increasing opportunities to work together across institutional boundafies in order to Muence the forces that underpin poverty and disaimination, finding partnersbips and synergy where few ensted before, and moulding not just a strong civil society, but a society that is just and civil in al1 that it does. Connontiag globalisation begins and ends at the g r a s roots level, where NGOs are already developiag a number of strategies to help poor people address the realities of thei. position in global markets and play a creative role in resaaping economic forcesnd2.

Alongside this protective firnction, civil society has been assumed to play an

equally important generative or supportuig W o n under the economic pillar of the new

60 Marc Duflïeld, "NGO Relief in War Zones: Towards an Analysis of the New Aid Paradigm" in

Weiss (ed.) Bcgonl UNsdwaûmdw (London: MacMiUan, 1998), pp- 139 and 1456. 6 1

Antonio Donhi, "Amating Humanitarianism in Peac6Maintcrimrcen in CbM Gowriirriice (Vol.4, No- 1), 1998, p. 70.

37

policy agenâa, in the sense tbat it helps to gewrate the conditions for market-based

development ad, by extension, the expansion of global markets. As already noted, one of

the ways tbat civil Society does this is by "sE8adiag in" for the state in hrger areas of

public responsibiiity and thus helping to aisure against rrgulatory encroachments by the

public sector over the @vate. A more positive "generative" firnction is that the

requirements for self-regdation and individual initiative, the sociai intenialisation of

which are considered necessary to the development and consolidation of civil society, are

identical to the requirements of a market econorny- C i d society, in this sense, socialises

people to the market, by promoting the acquisition of behaviod patterns and decision-

making preferences, and by supporting the fùnctionai social networks which are d e d in

order for markets to work more smoothly. In aid planning circles, civil society is thus

understood as the social corollary of the market, or alternatively, its praepuisite social

framework For countries which are switching toward market based models of

developnent for tbe first time (including many couutries recovering fkom civil wm),

international support for the forniaton of civïi society becomes a strate@ imperative. As

Van Rooy observes with some measure of circumspection:

In exporting models for liberalised economies, donors and others are aware tbat the necessary social pmequisites for a functoning market are rarely in place. How do you create econornic individuals in practice? How do you get people interested in opening markets and curbing govemments in the nrst place? One answer bas been to encornage

63 associational life .

To illustrate this poinf Van Rooy goes on to quote one European organisation

actively engaged in civil society/market promotion. Since this same agency is encountered

again in our review of the Moaimbican experience, it is worthwhile reproducing its

statement here- The agency makes the case that :

Interrnediary (civil society) institutions, settled between the state and the individual, play an important role: organisations of small-scale craAsrnen and smaliholders, chambers of commerce and industry, associations for environmental protection as well as self-help groups promothg the improvement of the socio-economic condition of women The creation, strengthening and fiirther development of such institutions

62

63 Edwards, Hulme a d Wallace, op. ch, 1999, pp. 1 18-1 20. Van Rooy, op. cit., 1998, p. 36.

38

of the so-called civil society is an essential precoquisite for the efficient end sustainable fhctioning of a market emmmYa-

Political Functions of Civil Sociw

Beyond saviag as a social "feed" into the market, civil Society is also assumed to

serve important political fimctions under the aew policy agenda. As in the economic

realm, these fimctions can be divided into protective and generative categories, although

in this case the distinctions are somewhat less clear. In protective tems, Dutneld has

commented tbat "[on] the basis of Western expexience, civil Society is seen as an

inherently stabilising force" imderpinning "human rights, p l d i s t government and the 65

market economy" . This stabilising W o n rests, in the k t hstmce on the effect of 66

civil society forces in de-politiczszng social relations , by recesting personal intetests in

private, individual and fhdional te=, and by pluralising existing political landscapes,

loyalties to the state and other wllective endeavours reflecting nationalistic, ethnic or

class motivations wbich are saa as potentially cdictual and threatening to market

stability. Citizenship, once a primary source of identity and mobilisation c o n f i n g

political rights and entitlements associated with one's adherence to a single d o n a l

system or project, is broken down in civil society to reflect "multiple crc~ss-cutting

loyalties", personalised interests anci, importantly, consumer preferences which find

global currency across national and institutional boundaries.

Through this process, old lines of divisive political cornpetition fade into a "one

worlà" scenario more consistent with the workings of global markets, in which politics is

no longer exclusively rnediated by govemments and internationai institutions, but

transnationally through the civil society itself, on the b i s of more issue-baseâ, localiseci

and parochial sources of identity and sector-specific solidarities claiming universal

impart As Lispshutz e x p h :

64

65 Statement by the Freidrich Ebert Foundation reprochiced h m Van Rooy, tbid., p. 38.

66 M e l d , op. cit., 1997, p. 85, Mike Poweil and David Seddoa, " NGOs and tbc Dcvclopment indusîry" in Rmbu ofA@cum

Poliricd Eco~omy (No. 71), 1997, p. 9. 39

nie spatial boundaries of global civil society are mirent, because its autonomy îkn the constructed boundaries of the state system also allows for the constmction of new politid spaces. T h e political spsces are deiineated by networks of economk, cuiturai and social relations, and they are king occupied by the conscious association of actors, in physicaliy separated l o c a t i o n s ~ link thgnselva together in networh for particular politicai and socid puposesV'.

To the extent that traditional politid identities like class, ethnicity or nationalism

do survive, they are âï fTbd by compaiag interests within the "level playing field" of

civil society, on par with merchants 8ssociations or chmch congregations, and thus effdvely lose their original political momentum. To clarik it is worth pumiing

Lipschutz a little fkhx on this point:

As the ideas and modes of production of liberalism have become the 'operathg system' in the West, the South and MW, in the East, identïfmtion with the nation- state as the primary social grouping bas begun to wither [..] In places where nationality does not map simply ont0 territoiy, or in social reabns where nationalism is often not a rrspectsble brns for identiîy, we see new foms of group identity king created, including some that are very cosmopoIitan [...] The new identities are part

68 and parcel ofthe emergence of global civil society.

The implication here is that as 014 statecentred and national-territorial based identities erode, so to does the potenM for violent conflict within and among societies.

Because the global civil society concept points toward the achievement of a

c'cosmojmlitan7' identiîy, it implicitly claims a fimction of politicai pacification This

conceptual clairn is ernpïricaliy uncertain, as it does not appear to have been bome out by

the proliferation of contlicts in the 1 9 9 0 ~ ~ during the very decade of civil society's global

expansion. Nonetheless, civil society advocates respond that where political wnflict and

instability continue to persist, it is because of a lack or wealmess of genrine civil society

structures in the e t e d areas. In such cases, Mary Kaldor has recently recommended, the

international community shodd seek actively to engage, support and work through

whatever "islands of civility" as can be located within mnes of ongoing turmoil (or if they

67 Lipschutq op. ck, 1992, p. 393.

68 Tbid., p. 415.

69 Mary Kddor, NC)O a d OIU Wgs= thgunhd Viïilcnor in a G W Em (Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1999), pp. 133-38. 40

Apart fiom its perceived stabilising mle, the key "generative" fimction most

commonly attriiuted to civil society relates back to the issue ofdemocraÉsation Polnical

observers have indeed mted the irony that the practice of "fiair and fiee electionsn bas

proliferated at an incrwsing pace a r o d the world precisely at a time when mature

democracies are experiencing fiindamental crises of legitimacy. This is rooted primarily in

what has becorne known as the c'democratic deficit", or lack of accountability,

transparency and democratic sensittivity by elected governments. As a dt, it is now

generally recogiused that party-political representation and periodic electoral cornpetition

are by themselves insufncient to ensure meanhgful democratic practice. Rather, they

pose the risk of monopolisation of govenunent policy by cornpethg interests witbh niling

political classes. In this wntext, civil society is offered up as a key ingredient for healthier

forms of democracy. Calls have multiplied for recent waves of demaaMisation to be

backed-up by support for bottom "societal instituîion-building". In his work on

international electord monitoring, Chand strongly emphasises this point, arguing that

strong civil society institutions, including "civic associations, ~ligious institutions and the

free press" are necessary to peacefûlly bring wide-mging social interests and clairns to

bear in the political realm, and thus to build or restore confidence in demcmatic

structure?. The point is taken up vividly by a leading British newspaper:

As [...] the power of the ~accountable ùicreases, so civil society emerges fkom the bottom, hmgry for global justice...It is led by non-govemmental groups which bypass the centre* idonn themselves ofthe issues and appeal directly to the grass roots. They are society's new moral and social watchdogs, filling the vacuum of ideas and energy

71 atthe centre .

Upon bRef wnsideration, these protective and generative political fiiactions of

civil society, of de-poiiticisation, on one han4 and enhanced democratic engagement, on

the other, appear as bdamentally paradoxical. And indeed, many have argued that

optimistic images of civil society "as the ultimate medicinal wmpomd, capable of curing

ills from ethtiic conflict to authoritarian regimes" have tended to run ahead of reality,

pointing rather to its potential or desired effécts than drawing soberly Grom analysis of

70

7 1 Chand, op. ut., 1998, p. 169. The Guardian, 20 November 1996, cited in Skfegh Stewart, "Happy Ever After in tbe Market

Place: Non Govemmeat Organjsations and tbe Uncivil Society" in Mew ofAEicer, Pdtlicol lkommy (No. 71), 1997, p. 11.

41

n complex historical processes . Hutchfiil and Schmik make this point with specific

reference to AGrica:

As criticism of governments has momteâ, many han turneù to the concept of civil society in an attempt to identij. possible sources of political renewal and democrstic potentiai in M i c a [..] Certainly there has been lÏttie attempt to understaad [...] the implications that this might have for dem~ccatisation and for the design of piiticai institutions. There is also a tendaicy in much of the new writing to empty civil society of h political and ideological content, prtraying it as virtuail~ homogenous and inspired by the same political project the installation of dernocra~~'~ .

Nevertheiess, despite these doubts, civil Society continues to rank highly among

those operational concepts that "are beloved of officiel agencies who reguire fûndable

answers to messy and complex problems" and as such, have strongly influenceci the

making of aid plicy in the 1990s? In concrete t a m s , the ongoing enthusiasm for civil

society continues to be ~ssociated with, and largely justify, shiAs in bilateral end

multiiaterai fimding patterns from traditional "gov-ent-to-government" trausfers to

more di- forms of assistance using mdtipleentry points, includiag the NGO sector.

Civil Societv and Peace

To an important extent, aid policy shifls towards civil society have been supported

by a growing body of comparative conflict analysis whicb, throughout the 1990s, has sought to understand aud address the causes and dynamics of contemporary civil wars.

Different streams of wdict analysis have empâasised different aspects of d i r e , such

as ethnicity, poverty, or the predominance of predatory elites as beiag of immediate

causal importance. Each stream has yielded contrasting conclusions about the priorities

which the intemationel community should follow in order to best engage in conflict-

affected corntries to limit the human effects of violence. But despite variations in focus,

there is wide coaseasus within the mainstream of connict analysis that civil wars share a

72 ibid., p. 16.

n Eboe Hutchtiil and Gerald Schmitz, -II and Rpuk l b t k @ d o n in A ~ Q

Ottawa: The North South Institute, 1992). p.8. C Michael Edwards and David Hulme "Tm Close to the P o w d l , Too Far fiom the Powerless?'

in Hulme and Edwards (eds.) NGOs, Md DoAors: Tm C h e fw G@i ï (London: MacMilldSave the Children, 1997), p. 276.

42

number of cornmon features, to which the stabilising fûnctions of civil society directly

respond These wmmoa features can be divided hto four o v e d caîeg~ries~ First, there

is a strong consensus that intenial wars are generatsd primarily (though not exclusively)

by "local factors" such as state formaiion, c011apse, dysfimctiod govermnent (wmption,

repression, clientelism), crises of legitimacy, revived local animosities, or the niilure of 75

local communities to rneet basic human needs . Secondly, chi1 conflic& are g e n d l y

descn'bed as arising fiom wmpeting "politicai" projects to control or deny the expression

of local identities, access to resources or, as the case may be, to manipulate local

institutions (for example securïty SeMces or le@ authorities) in support of cornpethg 76

political visions or programmes -

Thirdly, states are no longer seen as protagonists of wntemporary war. Rather, the

state's monopoly over the use of force bss dissoived, and today7s civil confiïcts are broad-

based, ccsocietal conflicts", with organisational and iâeological capities, as well as the

gun-power ta wage war, increasingiy wncentrated in the private han& of contending local

interests of various etbnïc, religious or separatist colourings. In this vein, John Burton and

others have explaineci that modern war results prùnanly fiom contending "societal values"

75 M e l d , among o t k q has mted the trend in coriflict resoluticm Merature to ascribe instab'iity

"not as a maifiinction of tbe international system, but as a problem within the domestic instihitions and social relations within tbe countrics conanicd" (op. cit., 1997, p- 82,). Sttong andytical emphasis on internal ratber than global W o n of war, can be found in William Zarhaa, (ed.) CorZapscdStcdcc: ï k & h f q m h n rinlRmkm&u o f l k # h e t e A ~ (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 1995); Krishna Kumar, (cd.) RciaiWng AjSb Civil WOIC: Clliliwl RoGa for Interncrtiond Assistarice (Boulder: Lynne Reinncr, 1997); Donald Rothchild, Mdnaging ï2hîc Co- ia A m fksuues orrd Inccrcaiiiis fa Gwpmdkm (Washington D.C.: Brodcings, 1997). In bis contr i ion to a receat volume on the 'iateniational dimensions of interna1 conflict" Stephen Stedman hrs sought to draw linkages behveen e x î d and domestic Mors of i n t d crises in Afnca in the post colonial period. Overwhelmin& in his analysiq the wrri~es of Afncan crises are identifid as intenial (with the exception of briefrefetences to the end of the Cold War and the rise of nao-liberalism), whereas extenial f a o n are d y s e d primarily as eflects (spill- over into neighbouring COUttteies, t m r w b d q refuge tïows, arms trading, and international responses). See Stcpben Stedman "Conflict and Coaciliation in Sub-Sabaran M c a " in Michael Brown (ed.) I ' a d Dimensions H I . Cbufüi# (Cambridge, Msss: Mïï Press, 1996), p. 23565. For example, Edward Amr 8sc~Ibes ptotracted d c t to the fiiilwc to meet people's polical

"needs" which he defines as "securiîy, &Mixtiw W w , saciai mcogm-tim of i-îy, and eflectie participtim in the processes tht detenninc conditions of scairity and identity, and other such dwelopmental reqkements" See Edward Azar, 'Rotmeteci I n t d n a l Conflicts: Ten Propositions" in E d w d Azar and John Burton (eds.) 2- Gq@f RQolim'ionr: d ~ T C & C (Boulder Lynn Reinner 1986). p. 29. (original emphasis).

43

aromd which local leaders may lay political c l ~ s and M y support to 77

violence, hquently in opposition to a central elite -

Finally, much ma- conflit3 analysis has typined modern

justifj, political

civil wars as a

generalised breakdom (temporary or chronic) of s o c i ~ n o m i c ratiomiity, whem

iosecurity, f i and dis-infotmatlon prevail over nonnal relations ammg iadividuals or

groups, and where "ancient haîreds" re-emerge to dissolve social harmony and trnm

nonnally peaceful, mutudy accommodating interests on theü heads. This particular image

of "confiict as perversion of reason or civility" bas been adopted by especiaiiy intluential

confiict analYsts78. Zarümm, for example, links cooflict to the extended breakdown of

Society as "generator of institutions of cohesion and maintenance7', M e for Francis Deng,

"conflict is in fàct a crisis which signifies the breakdom in the nomal patterns of 79

behaviouf' resulting in a "failme to regulate, reconcile or harmonise [..] differences

As Whitman notes, such representaîions of war are now dominant, and belong to

a "proliferation of writings concerning vast stretches of land and peoples engulfed in

chaotic and degradeci circumstances, which are asmaed to a variety of indigenous 80

deficiencies" . The mainstream image is neatiy illustrated, for example, in Hackett's recent

assessrnent of modem war,

Mead of wars between nation-states, conflict often appears as stniggles for power within States; pitting elite, ethnic and religious groups a . one another, often amid the breakdown of govemment [...] In threatening or unstable environments, people

n For Burton war is the resuh conteadihg "socid valuesff asouad &ch local leaders may lay

political claims, rally polical support and justify political violence, fkequently in opposition to an existing central elite. See John Burton, Rcsdv i~~g Dep-Raoiad Contic#: A H- (Lanham, M-D.: University Press of America, 1987), p. 23. Foiiowing Burton, Edward Azar specifies: "The most usefùl unit ofrinalysis in protrected sociai codict situations is the identity group - racial religious, ethnic, ailrurai,' and otbers. [Flor the purpo~es of dcscribing, explaining and predicting the dynarnics of a protniaed conflict Sitwtio~, the ide* group is more informative than the state ...What is of conam are the Societal needs of the indiiduaLn(Azar, op. cit., 1986 3 ;). 78

For a criticai review, see Duffield, op. cit, 1997, pp. 90-91 and 100-102; Mais Berdal and David Keen " Violena and Economic Ag& in Civil Wars: Som Policy Implications" in MrllennUlm (Vol- 26, No. 3), 1998, pp. 297-8. 79

Zartman, op. cit, 1995, p. 6.; Francis Deng, "Anatomy of Codicts in Atnca" in Rupesignhc et ai. ( e d s . ) l k m e a ~ m e n t a n d ~ c l i a i i : A n E n q ~ ~ t k ~ o f Ç o ~ U Po~r-Cobnid &Wes (Loridon: Macmillm, l9%), p.220. 80

Jim Whitman, "The PoIitical Limits of Humanitarian Assistance" in Whitman and Pocock (eds.), op. cit., 1996, p. 6.

44

search for securïty a d identity- making them vuinerable to local pwer elites. Lines of violent conflict are drawn dong group identity, wÏth f i m g shed at achieving collective rights in opposition to groups of cliffennt ethmcity, religion, race, class or geographic affiliation These wafiontations thrieaten each gn,up8s collective iâenîity, indeed their very survival, and lead to the breakdom of wiiatever degree of civil society exists. Deep-rooted, long-standing animosities breed high levels of violence and atrocity, and the resuiting psychological and cultural frrctors drive and sustain conflic?'.

Civil society strategies fespond directly to the peacebddiag concerns raisecl by

mainstream conflict aaalysis. If modern wnflict is indeed local, civil society's strong local

associational dimension positions it well to absorb and mediate claims, promote

reconciliation d support the development of self-help capacities among local 82

communities . If, as they are comrnody represented, modern conflicts are in fm caused

by aggressive political pmjects (state or non-siaie) to control ethnic, mligious, nationalist or

class identities, then civil society semes, as noted earlier, both to de-politicise and

m e n t political and ideological hegemonies by offixing a neuîrai, pluralist fbmework for

new f o m of social organisation and exchange. And h l l y , to the extent that civil conflict

corresponds to a collapse of social rationality, civil society can help to more this by

fos te~g , as Fowler suggests,

an awareness and harmony between various dimensions of individual and group identity, in order to build a 'cornplex psychological b i s ' from which individuals and groups c m

83 both assert their interests and recognise a mutual interest with others -

From this discussion, it becornes clear that the rationale for employing civil

society-based post-conflict intervention strategies is, to an important extent, supporteci by

the manner that conûicts are analysed, and by the prevailing images of civil war that this

analysis produces. This Muence bas been complernented more recently by a second body

of literature, which focuses more specifically on postcoaflict transitions. Though more

empiricaily grounded than the bulk of conflict analysis writings, and perhaps l e s

81 Ken Hackett, "The Role of International NGOs in Reventing Coaflict" in Cabill, KA& (ed.)

Slopping Wars !hq sleir= Awwdinc (New York Harper CoUins, 1996), pp. 269-7 1. 82

For Hackett, civil Society works "toward pcwc and d i c t prewntion by engaging local leaders and indiiduals working at community and intcmediary lcvels", as weU as encouraging "community leaders, womea and men, to ide- local capdies to build peace" @id., pp. 274- 5).

automatidy suggestive of ready blueprints for recovery, transitions literature has nonethelas similady fed into a mounting enthusiasrn for civil society-besed reconsûuction

in the 1990s. Altbough the nature and pace of individual postumfiict transitions vary h m

one specific context to amtber, this literahirr suggwts tbat transitid moments generally

sbare a nurnber of important defining fatures- These involve an identifiable interplay of

politicai, social and ecoaomic patterns of locai and national behaMour and adjustment

One common feature is the continuation of violence under circurnstances of acute

political umxtainty "where neither war nor peace pwail", marked by lingering nvalne~

and episodic, though usdly isolaîed o u t b d of conflict This is often associated with the

continuing prevalence of a "culture of violencen intierited fkom the war. More practidy,

rapid changes in the political climate, introduced by the peace itseIf' c m result in moves by

rival camps to seek to consolidate their CO-1 over territory and communities in a manner that will strengthen their position within the peacehe political economy. Likewise, in

societies where soci~le~~mmic entitlernents have increasingly accrued to combatants, the

rapid decommissioning of fighters may resdt in deep and potenMy destabilising crises of

social identity and economic statu$ among the rank and file of fighting while the

transformation of former fighting groups into peacehe politicai @es, a prominent

feature of negotiateà peace Settlements in the 1990s- may alienate a newly co-opted

political leadership £tom local military commauâers left behind in the bush. For many

unskïlled and largely uneducateâ "losers" of the peace, econamic incentives to resort to

violence prevail, leading to increased urban criminality and organised rural banditry-

Importantly, social and ecowmic coping strategies developed by local

communities during long years of war may work against integration into the peacetime

political economy. In nual areas, the prevalence of subsistence agriculture, encourageci by

widespread destruction of rurai transport and marketing systems, and the absence of

agricultural credit, work to reinforce the economic autonomy of local communities and their

ability to survive in isolated environments, while the absence of market cornpetition

enwurages the rise of informal monopolistidmonopsonistic p d c e s amoog those few

traders who do mauage to maintain commercial links with isolated areas of rural

production. More generally, post-conflict ecodes suffer fiom a lack of confidence on

the part of locd pivate aga&, militating agakt long-term productive investment and

rather fâvouring "quick tumovei' initiatives associa!ed with the rise of illicit paralie1

markets. The v r a i absence of locally available credit for investment, aod of le@

structures to cl- the temis of properîy aad land tenure, are compolwied by financial wping strategies tbat favour the holding of flexible rather than fixed assets which, in a

context of ongoing political mcaîa&y7 are perceived as vulnerable to damage. As

Carbonnier points out in his recent survey of postwar rebuilding:

[In] the case of contemporary posî-conflict couutries, macre-level insbbility added to the high level of criminaiity and political insecurity discourages the acquisition of visible assets and perpebmites the premium on üquidity that emerged during the war. Potential investors tend to keep tbeïr assets in iiquid fom despite the transition h m war to peace. ~]conomic agents are reluctant to iavest money where it is most

84 needed, i.e. in fïxed productive assets such as agricdturai i d k t m c t m .

Other influences cited in the transitions literature as potentially workiag against the

construction of a peacetmie political eçonomy include localised cultural wping practices

used to sustain wmmmal organisation in the midst of chronic legai, sociai and emnomic

insecinity, and the structural collapse of modern social services. These involve the

resurgence of tmdïtionai structures of authority covering wide areas of social interaction, - - such as the m o n of local cnminal justice7 the allocation of scarce resources and

land rights, the settlement of bride payments, the use of spiritual references in the practice

of medicine and agriculture, and the management of local disputes. Such practices,

intensified over lengthy periods of war, are generally entrenched in localised belief systems

which can Vary across regions within a single country. To the extent they serve to

consolidate conse~vative social power structures during war, re-emergent patterns of

traditional authority raise important issues relrting to ethnicity, human rights, gender, the

d e of law and social weIfare in the post-conflict period.

Finally, volatile and insecme postanflict settings are commonly fiamed by the

structurai weakness, or wliapse, of public sector institutions, as reflected in the severely

depleted judicial, financial, fiscal and administrative7 regdatory and delivery capacities of

--

Perspective" in JOYIllJ tfIIdanoaarcril 84

D c w C l i p m (VOLS, NO. 3,)- 1993, PQ- 328-9. Carbonnier op. ch., 1998, pp. 7 -8

47

the state. State wealmess is widely recognised to have p o w d politicai and economic

ramifications for the stable transition nom wu to peace- A key conceru for countries

having undergone long-tenn territorial division, as in the cases of Angola a d Mozambique,

is the de facto consolidation of a unined administrative juridiction ~CTOSS the national

territory and , through this, the univemal provision of public senrices, (health, education,

policing and justice) as means to strengthen local incentives for peacefbi transition as ml1

as to restore a sense of longcontested national idene, both of which are central to the

tegitimacy of the peace. Tbe urgent impkmentation of such stabiiking measures is,

however, severely wmplicated by a nmber offactofs, includïng the deficit in public sector

human capacities, social spemling constraints brought about by overwbelming debt

obligations and a viriually nokexistent tax base (or, to the extent that a base dws exist,

little effective capacity to identify and collect) and poliferahg corruption at all levels of

govemment.

The growing body of analysis in this field has oontriiuted usefiil insighîs into the

reactions, strategies and aspirations of indMduals, social groups, and even government

departments most directly affkcted by wnflict, and has 1 4 to a more intunate

understanding of the combined social, political and economic pressures which underlie and

challenge national traasitions fkom war to peace- The implicaîions for aid policy are wide-

ranging, as they suggest the need for an aggregate set of system-wide interventions, fkom

areas like macro-economic policy, law and administration, to localisai socid support

projects for rural communïties and vulnerable groups. While not specifïcally civil-society

orïented, insights produced by the comparative transitions literature have served to

reinforce the pdicy relevance of civil society models , *ch, once again, are widely

perceived by aid agencies to r a p d effectively to many transitional challenges, by

providing both a normative anci organbtionai platform for change. Civil society

promotion is believed to provide a comprehensive framework for promoting post-conflict

reconciliation among divided co~munities, and assisting in the social reintegration of

former wmbatants. Local associations are believed to pmvide both the organisationai and

normative foundations for moving beyond subsistence production into more integrated

foms of economic development, for bolstering local entrepremurjal initiative, and for

introducing new productive and incorne-generaîing technologies for use by war-affected

commUNties. Likewise, social services, sucb as water and sanitation, eduaition and primary

hedthcare are rendered more sustainable though organiseci local commimity parîi~ipation,

which serves also to promote a sense of local responsibility, sewhelp and u ~ ~ e r s h i p n .

Culturally, civil society models poteatially appropriate the most progressive7 or acceptable

aspects of traditionai authority, while pviding the normative grounds (human rights, gender principles) for convincingly de-legitimating discriminatory practices. These points

are ueatly summed in a recent pper by Prendergast and Plumb:

In most post-war situations, there are major &visions throughout impacted societies, manifested in ethnic, political, ecommic, social and politicai rifts. [P]sycho-social impacts that invariably d t fiom [...] conflict are often more h a r d than the physical damage wrought by the war itself, and econmiic and political mot causes of prior divisions mnain intact long &er the fighting has ceased 1.J Civil society organisations (CSOs) can enjoy a comparative advantage due to their proximity to local-level mors at the end of the implementation chah [...] In order for peace agreements between warring @es to succeed Myully, there needs to be concurrent bo t toup processes aimed at (re)constituting a social contract and healing societal divisions [..J CSOs cm have an impact h u g h engendering societai buy-m for a peace

8 agreement.

A key point to note for the present aiqujr is that both conflict analysis and the

transitions literature appear to have produced two overlapping types of prescriptïve reaction

on the part of the international aid community. The first recognises the acute volatility of

pst-conflict situations, and is concerned primarily with consolidating the gains of peace

and reducing the risks of new tension. The second acknowledges post-conflict transitions as

unique oppor~unities to bring about fiindamental stnictural and institutiona1 transformation

within affecteci societies. A salient example of this combineci attention to both risk and

opportunity is contained in a 1997 consensus statement by the OECD Development

Ministers, to the effect that:

Where organkd armed violence has w o d down it is important to move beyond saving lives to [...] help traru#onn a m e process into a sustainable peace in which the causes of conflict are diminished and incentives for peace are strengthend.-Post conflict situatons can provide speciai opportrmzties for political legal, economic and

a6 institutional refom to change past systems and struc turcs....

85 John Prendergmû and Emily Plumb, "Cil Society ~ s a t ï o n s and Peace Agreement

Irnplementationn Papcr cirailatd for the final maring on the Implcmcntation of Pace Agreements in Civil Wars. New York: IntaMbo 86

nal fcace Acadtmy, Junt 1999, p. 1. OECDDAC, op. cit., 1997, p. 7.

49

In the introduction to bis edited volume on the role of international assistance in

rebuilding war affécted societies, Krishna Kuniar Wrewise adopts an opportunistic

approach, noting that "the d o n of civil wars pfesents an un- opportunity for

these corntries to [...] ernbrace reforms that have been elusive in tbe past"? The underlying

implication of this Radiag by analysis and leaders of the aid community is fundamental:

Mass societal dislocati011~ aad iastitutional fragmentation resulting h m internai war,

together with widesjmad material scarcity and the breakdown of individual and collective

social identities, represent moments of exfreme national weabiess and vulnerability. White

these may pose threats to a m i e peace, they are also understood as strategic moments of

reduced national resistaace to change- Such moments can k profitably seized upon by aid

actors to put in place new institutional structrires a d generate new sets of sacial and economic relations which, in turn, fâcilitate forward movements toward the intemationally

endord objectives of "stnictiual stability" and good governtlllce88. Civil society

organisations, both international and local, are identified as providing an effkctive

organisational fiamework fur haosfomUng local social relations during these Cntical

transitional moments, and as normative conduits for the transmission of values supporting

consensus and legitimation. In this vein, and fiom the standpoint of collective psychology,

Nordstrom has suggested that war-tra- poverty and related collective experiences help

prompt affected societies 70 unctitiicaly borrow extant frameworks" of meaning, identity 89

and social organisation .

The identification by aid policy makers of pst-war transitions as a singular

opportunity for fiindameatally recomtituting social stnrctures and relations within countries,

and the increasing involvement of NGOs and other civil society channels in the delivery of

pst-conflict assistance, suggest how we rnight begin to consider post-confiict transitions

not only in t e m of a Iinear progression nom war to peaw , but as a purpose£id re-ordering

process in which civil socieîy plays a crucial organisational and nonns-gewrating role. In

his own analysis of extemal support for civil society in coimtries recovering from intemal

conflict or serious political uptieaval, Robinson takes the point M e r , suggesting that civil

87

88 Krishna Kumar uIntroduaion" in Kumar (cd.), op- ch., 1996, p- 1.

89 See defmitÏon of structurai stabdity provideci in C m 1.

Carolyn Nordstmm, "Tbe Dirty War. Civitian Experkccs of Confikt in Mozambique and Sri Lanka" in K. Rupesinghe (cd.), I d Ci@ücZ d Gbwmme (London: MacMillan, 1992), p. 38.

society-based aid strategies are outwardly W e d to broader patterns of hegemonic 90

construction in contemporiary international relations . And ïdeed, since war-tom societies

are weakened mitenaily and have reduced institdod scope to poduce new kmwledge of

their own, the pmspecb for building consensus arouad new normative aad organisational

m w o r k s are strong In this sense, we can begh to interpret postanflict transitions as

"hegemonic moments", in which civil society-based aid strategies play a constructive role.

The Donors

A numba of recent publications have documented the absorption and diaision of

the civil society idea within the aid wmmunîtyty ûverall, theü findings show that support

fiorn donor agencies has been variable, but uitimately consistent in terms of the o v e d

govemance objective of promoting civil society. In bis recent comparative assessmeat of

multilateral agencies' approach to civil society, Kendall Stiles credits the World Bank with

having gone furtbest in developing ûameworks and procedures for engaging and

promoting civil society organisations, and seMng as the original conduit for civil society-

based aid stmtegies into the broader aid cotlltilutüty. According to Stiles, the Bank's eady

recognition of the strategic importance of civil society corresponds to its original suppoc in

the fom of stmctural adjustment programmes* for the emergent "'new policy agenda" as fm back as the early 1980s- Since then, World Bank experts have increasingly worked to blend

the political and ecowmic dimensions of the classical liberal development model. This

original organisational conmitment, combined with

the Bank staff's general contemptuousness of incompetent and wrrupt developing country governments, bas made t easy for the Bank to bypass them in the name of civil society empwerment . This was one of the d t s , after dl, of structurai acijustment policies in the 1980s. which helped set the stage for the new mode19'.

Throughout the 1990s the Bank's engagement with civil society organisations

grew substantially through a number of chanwls, incluûing the development of

90 To make this argument, Robinson provides case d e s of the Philippines, Chile, Ni- and

Haiti (op. cit., 19%).

graut f d t i e s for NGO capacitty-building in developing counûies, the Global

Environmerd Facility (GEF), and througb specific emergency hmds designed for post-

conflict situations. The Bank's ceniral NGO Unit has recedy been complemented by the

deployment of civil Society experts to each of its country offices, in order to promote liaison

with local associations and provide training to sEaff on how to work with ~ ~ 0 s ' ~ . But

perhaps most telling are the Bank's own pubiisbed statistics on pattenrs of thancial support

for civil-society based organjsations in the developing world Global figures for 1997 show

th& NGOs @rimarily local ones based in rscipient counbies) accounted for 47% of the

Bank's total portfolio, compared to 2W in 1989 and under 5% a decade earlier. The

proportion of project fimds absorbed by l d civil societies in Afiica exceeded 60% of the

regional portfolio in 1997~). Paradoxidy, because the World Bank's orighal

constitutional mandate allows it to work only with sovereign bonowers, its engagement

with non-govemnental organisations is generally undertaken through national ministries or

through non-pogiamme budgets. In a policy paper on pst-war transitions, the head of the

recentlyconsbtuted Post Conflict Unit openly endorsed the Bank's increasing focus on civil

socie!y in terms both of economic reform and political stablisation:

Rebuilding social capital means a revitalisation of civil society, and revitalisation of civil society entails the promotion of l d associations, community participation and peer accountability- It reduces the level of individuai fm, enables the collective

94 censure of violence and promotes local securïty -

Importantly, the World Bank's reputation for rigorous social and economic

analysis, and its capacity to convîncingly portray civil Society in terms of its technical

strengths, bas been instrumentai in facilitating the adoption of the civil society approach

within the broader officia1 aid community- The Bank's sister agencies within the UN

system have each embraced the civil society approach in large masure by justiwng it in

tenns of its positive impact in meeting the technical needs covered by their respective

mandates. Thus the UNHCR, has identified civil society empowerment as a key element in

9 1 Kendall Stiles "Civil Society Empowerment and Muhilateral Dohors" in G W

LVo1.4, No. 2)- 1998, p. 204. Y 4

Ibid., p. 205. 93

Worid Bank, "Quamitative Surnmary of Bank-NGO Collaboration in FY97" (accessed on www.woridbanko@ssd). Y Nat CoUcta, a ai. lBe TrulriiLnjhm WI lo Pae. in SlrbScilkarin A m (Washington DC: The World Bank, 1996.) p. 3.

52

the successfbl reintegration of refigees and otber d i s p l d populations, d e the IL0 bas

shiftwi its onginai focus on labour unions to adopt a bmader civit society appmach in

empioyment generation, cteda provision aad in schemes to reinkgrate former combatants. Paraîlel approaches have been adopted by UNICEF and the UNDP. For its part, the

European Union bas rapidly expanded its contacts yith international and local NGOs

throughout the decade. By 1996, tbe European Commission and its Humanitantanan Oflice

@CHO) were ruaning 35 separate buâget Lines for NGO-1ed interventions iargeting civil

societies in the deweloping world, and had formalised their expmdï.ng civil society

parbershïps through the accreditation of three liaison cornmittees comprisïng, between 95

the- some 800 European and international NGOs - With few exceptions then, UN and

other multilateral agencies have activated ''civil society" by mainsoreaming the concept into

the exïsting policy discourse and by creatiag specid progrsimnies and fimding mechartisms

for civil society promotioa As illustrated in the recent OECD guidelines on deveIopment

aid, the absorption of the civil society appoach bas not been uaproblematic%.

Organisational cultures, the desire not to compromise longstanding relahouships with

national ministries, as weil as new levels of programming complexity i n c d by engaging

with civil society, are among the many practical obstacles tbat official aid agencies have

had to confront. Overali, however, Stiles' comparative analysis has found little evidence of

criticai resistance to the concept itseif or to its general application Not surprisingly, where 97

resistance bas emerged, it has originated primarily fkom recipient governments

The enthusiasm of multilateral bodies for civil society has been backed by strong

commitments among principal bilateral donors siüing on their governing boards. Not

surprisingly, the approach bas received particular support fiom wunaies with stmng civil

95 European Commission, D i g e of Commwlitp Rcsorriccr Awikibk fa Fimuncirrg tk Aciivirirs

of NGOs (Brussels: DGMI[, 1997); European Cornmunity Humanitanan Onice, A n d Jkpwi, 1996. At the central levd, European NGOs participate in EC aid policy disaission through three formaily accreditad umbrella organisations: tbe NGO Liaison Cornmittee, which focuses on emergency reiid EUROSTEP which conantratcs on long-team developrnent policy, and APRODEV, which is made up ofdeSSiod NGOs. (Set tOr exampk: "NGOs and Iasritutional Support: Report Grom the R d Table meeting of tbe EU-NGû Liaison Cornmittee and DGVIII of the European Commission", Bnissels: CLONG, May 1996) . At the field level, a tecent assessrnent of EU aid in four Aftican countries has h n d haî, kqucdy , planning and programming of relief oad development aid is strongîy NGedriven (Evaiuation of EC Rehabilitation Budget Lines ia Four Aâican Countries: Synthesis Report, Bnisstls: September 1 998). %

97 OECD/DAC, op. cit., 1998, pp. 40-43. Stiles, op. ck, 1998, p. 207.

53

society traditions of th& own, and different national historiai experiences account for

some variation in the way civil society is h u g h t forward as an organisationai model. Stiles

credits the Noràic govemments specifïcaily with having becked early moves towards more

"participatory" forms of aid intervention in the 1980s, mted in corpomtist /w~iat iod

models of inter-group and state-society barmiininp whüe the UK and US have pursued

more oompetition-based p l d i s t models. In France, Italy a d Germany, officiai

programmes for civil society support have had visible coDOeCfjons with national political

parties or solidarïty movements. As with the muitilated organisations, donor govemment

approaches to civil society promotion have thus differd Nonetheless, h m the Iaîe 1980s

onwards, bilateral aid agencies wmisteotly began to establish formai contact mmffii#ees,

interd policy uni@ or specialised budget lines linlang officia1 aid to civil society

organisations in the North and, to iui innesuig extent, dïrectly with groups and e~~ociations

in recipient corntries.

An overall inaxase in bilateral frmding to civil society organisations concretely

reflects this trend OECD data show that annuai aid cbannelled through NGOs more than

doubled from US S 2-4 billion in 1983-84 to some US $ 6 billion a decade later. Between

1990 and 1997, NGOs transferred over US $ 44 billion in officia1 and private h d s to

developing corntries, while the share of total ODA earmarked for local civil society

development in recipient corntries nedy doubled, nom 6.4% to 12.2 %, between 1996

and 1 9 9 8 ~ ~ .

USAID (United States Agency for Intemational Dwelopnent) provides the most

vivid example of a straîegic appioach to civil society promotion in the 1990s. According to

Harry Blair, USAD has developed and pursued a sophisticated, dual-strategy approach for

civil society dwelopment: Whae ovedl legal, political aml socioeconomic conditions in

a country pmvide an enabling environment for associational activity, direct assistance is

provideci to local non-govenimentd groups in a bid to build their organisationai,

managerial, operational and aûvocacy capacities so as to easure their dynamism and long-

term sustainabiüty. Where conditions are less advanced or uncertain, USAID pursues a

system-level strategy, aimed at creating en enabling environment and defining the ''rules

98 See OECD/DAC, Annual Co-opedon Reports ( 1995, 1999 and 2000). Amiex Tables 1 and

19. 54

of the game for ciMl society by worlring to impn>ve the conditions in which it can function 99

effectively" . USAID'S strategic objectives at this levcl of intervention include mobilising

local populations through civïc education programmes, providing incentives for marginai

groups to enter the nationid political anma and, at the same time,

building a cornplex net of groups with members havhg overlapping multiple affiliations in many organisations, thereby seMng to moderate the potentiaily destabilising e f f i of single memberships in exclusiv~~oups (especially those based on ethnic, religious, territorial, or economic cleavages) -

USAID support for le@ and administrative reform, political decentralisation,

more open parliamentary practices and the independence of national media nom the state

are equally a part of this overall strategy to create a f a v o d l e environment for civil society

development. These strategies clearly ~fiect tk 8ssumed politicai fimctions attnïuteâ to

civil society outiined above: they aim simultaneously to de-politicise efisting social

environments and, to the extent they are successful, wrîtes Blair, to "affect state policy, with

the ultimate result of firrthering sustainable demorracy within the host country% polity"lO1.

The strategy has also served to support liberal economic refonn in at least two fundamental

ways. Fùst, as suggested above with reference to the World Bank, the development of civil

society provides new platforms for economic engagement, situated outside of the state

sector and thus beyonci the pilrview of bureaucratie or clientelistic interests col~ll~lonly

associated with public ndministrations in war-ridden or under-developeâ coUIIfries.

Secondly, civil society itself is widely expcted to encourage the articulation of private

interests and c'pluralistic cornpetition" among them. By thus recasting local social relations, 102

a normative basis is laid for the introduction of market-based econornies -

USAID7s approach raises a fundamental pint about which an inmashg number

of analysts agree: This is tbat the growth of the civil society concept as a prominent

component of aid programming in the 1990s is wt merely representative of the adoption of

new strategies by dowrs but reflects, at a deeper level, a paradigrnatic shift that has afffeced

99 See Blair, "Donors, -miion and Civi) Socie~y: Relating Theory to Praaice" in

Edwards and Hulme (eds.), op. cit., 1997, p. 26. 100

101 ibid., p. 28 (bracLcts in the origuial). ibid., p. 30.

102 Ibid., p. 29.

the very pirposes of deve10pment aid Blair suggests that aid plamias have untii recently

addressed development issues fiom an %political" perspective, using moàels which

emphasised technology transfers and nivoured technical or bweaucratic appmaches to

delivery The civil society approach, by contmst, leads donors to te-shape local

environments in a manner tbrt addresses deeper, stnictiwl wncems such as "who wins? 103

who loses? what classes are in control?" - Wallace wnfirms this also to be the case within

the British aid community7 where emnomic development is no longer collsidered as tbe

prha ry purpose of bilateral assistance7 but has given way to new normative concer~~~ such

as "dignity, peace, muhial respect and tolerance7 spintual fkedorn [...]*. For M e l d , the

civil society approach is indicative of a b d e r move fkom the basic conception of

development aid as extemai resowce trcmsfw, prevaient up to the end of the cold war

period, to one of fimcislmental imemui behioural c h g e in recipient societies. Civil

socieîy has becorne a central feature of aid policy largely because the concept of

development itself:

bas been increasingly redehed as a series of measures which [...] are intended to change the bebaviour of institutîom and groups wi& the coullffies concemeci [..] Inequality, economic growth and resoure distn'bution are no longer the main issues within the new "human developaent" paradigm1y

Dissenting Analvses

Having discussed the key politicai and economic fimctions attn'iuted to civil

society and briefly outlïned the spreadïng use of the concept within the donor community, it

is worthwhile to briefly explore two practical critiques which bave been levelled against the

approach, both of which are especially relevant to post-mnûict situations. The nrst relates

to the role and nsponsibility of states in the public sphere, and to the capacity or desirability

of civil society to assume such responsibilities in their stead. A related critique concems

the applicability of the previiïling civil society concept to contemporary Anican wntexts.

particularly in those areas of the continent affectecî by chronic instabdity and war.

1 O3 Ibid., p- 27.

104 hifneld, op, cit., 1997, p. 80.

A majority of aid analysb in the 1990s have gewrally agreed witb the thesis tbat

ddevelopment, protracted h-au crisis and violent conf\ict are to a wosideiable

measure amibutable to the wllapse or corruption of state iastiMioas or their "capnue" by p o w d minority groups. In the Afncan context more specincaüy, it is welî recogoised

that chronic wdmsses in the delivery capacity, regdatory authmi@ and legitunacy of - -

post-colonial state -ans have been a source of recurcing socid and politid

instabiliîy in the continent, and thus an obstacle to meanin@ soci~ec~mmic developnemt

and gaod goverriance, However, if there is broad agreement that dysfimctional states are at

the source of the problem, important questions have been caised about the logic of using

civil Society to "bypiiss" them altogether- Efforts to generate desirable govermince

outcornes in direct collaboraîioa with local populations may reproduce, rather than begùi to

solve, the capacity and legitimacy Mcits curredy experienced by meny M c a n

governments, particularly wtiere cornplex ecommic and deanamtic reforms are king

pursueci simultaneously.

Drawing fiom £irst h d eXpenences in the field, some adysts strongty argue that

civil society-based aid interventions risk fiirther state erosion. ALready weak public

capacities in social sewice planning and delivery are weakened fiirther as NGOs and local

associations absorb ever greater &ares of international aid fimds to srlminister national

health, education and agricultural extension programmes, and as they attract growing

numbers of competent national persorne1 away nom the public -or. Decteasing capacity,

in turn, severs loyalties to the state, thus further weakening its political legitimacy, a

pattern also reinforceci by underlying "anti-government" messages inherent in the discourse

which h e s many NGO assistance programmes and civic education campaip. In one

extrerne instance, a Scandhavian NGO working with local groups in an Afncan country

was found to have entirely taken over the role of district-level govemrnent ktitutions. The

NGO's &ility to provide more seNices, and to perform better and more quickly than the

district government, resulted in an erosion of local loyalties towards public auth~rity'~~.

On the basis of his own survey of aid evaluations, Marcussen signals the risk of a vicious

circle in which âeclining loyalties towards public ausbority le& to increasing state

hostility, which in turn exacerbates the problem of state legitimacy:

105 Terje Tvedf N W s es a Cnund ui Lkmdkp- Aik- Tlér Namegh S' (Bergen:

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign AffW&valua!ion Report 3.95, 1995), pp. 57-64. 57

mhere are few examples where the strengthening of civil society bas a positive impact on the stab, its legitirnacy and general fiinctions. Rether, d e s seem to indicate tbat efforts to compensate for misshg state fbnctïons tend to erode the legitimacy of the state. are] examples f h n Easîern and Southcm Aûica w h e the population has been mobiliseâ to counteract state powery fostering M v e reactions fiom the

106

Mounting field evidence of this kind suggests tbat conceptual -es between

civil society and plitical stability, althougb heady iduencing aid policy tbroughout the

last decade, are not automatic in practice, and tbat efforts to work &&y with

commmities through exclusive cRil society channels may on the wntrary reproduce long-

standing tensions. A coroUaq concern which bas been raised in this - is the apparent

contradiction between efforts to Qmocratise recipient govemmeuts, on one han& and theu

alienation h m gms-mots consthencies as a result of direct international support for non- 107

govemmental initiatives (at the expense of public sector capacity building), on the other .

Although political neutrality, cost effectiveness and proximity to recipients, are

amoag the main technical arguments cited for greater NGO involvement, these arguments

are in practice highiy problemati~~ In particular, the neutrality argument has becorne

increasingly ditncult to wstah, as NGO humanitarian operaiions have either found

themselves absorbed by local wnfiict dyoamics in highly pditicised situations, or

politically wmpromised by donor governments upon whose h d i n g NGOs have

increasingly corne to depend Perhaps more fimdamentaIly, the neutd@ argument is made

less tenable by the very Logic of the "new intewentionism" discussed above: if, as Francis

Deng has tloted, " the most imporîant humanitarian objective is to end wars", then the

boundaxies between NGOs' humanitanan efforts and de fhcto political engagement 108

effectiveiy begins to erode .

Likewise, several field analysts contend tbat there is little wncrete evidence to

show that the NGO sector has contri%uted to the uxt-efféctiveness of humanitarian aid On

106 HeWk S. Uarawsen, "NGOs, the State and CM1 Society" in Rciricir, of AfncM &&id

Ecoworiry (No. 69), 1996, p. 419. t07

Stewart, op. cit., 1997, pp.22-23. 10%

Quoted in David Smock "EhuaaMtatian Assistance d C d i c t in f i c a " in Jmmd of Hwmaniictrion Aieirs (Jul y), 1997, p. 1 3.

58

the conbary, Macrae has wnsistently ernpbasised the COSfS, geogqhic reduudancy and

sectorai incoherence of @le1 delïvery systems bastüy established by the NGO sector in

many crisis situations In the same vein, others have pointeci to the rising costs of c<t

ordination poseû by tbe prolifèration. of humanhian NGOs in the field, costs *ch

effectively reduce the proportion of allocated funds that aoally reach recipient ,populations

Finally, the assertion that NGOs enjoy a comparative advantage in king more closely

connec%ed with 1- communities and mations bas been increasingly challemged in the

humanitarian context While paaicipatory neeâs-assessrnent meththodogies, quiring

coasultation with local communities in the preparation of individuai huraanitarian pmjects,

came into widespead use in the lWs , this does not appear in @ce to have generated

more c'demand-leân, socialiy sensitive forms of intervention. On the wntrary, as increasïng

numbers of NGOs have moved into mute crisis situations, their interventions appear to

have becorne more standardisecl 8cfoss signincantly dinereot social and cultural 109

contexts .

Alonpide debates about the technical advantages or weaknesses of NGU- implemented programmes, is the broader issue of the relevance of pwailing civil society

models in mca. In their recent study of political disorder in M c a , Chabai and Daloz

question whether prevailing rUnctionai'' concepts of civil society, as stabiliser,

demorratiser and market "feed", are in fact applicable to obsewed pattems of political

economy on the continent. In particular, they strongly argue that the much-documented quantitative growth of civil society organisations in Mca over the past decade in fact does

not amount to the emergence of a genuinely independent sphere of social or politid action,

but has corne about simply as a form of local adjment to m g aid fimding patterns.

They M e r suggest that ammg those best positioncd to obtain aid resources under the new

civil society fhmework are hose fomer public employees who, in the past, had ernployed

state resources to support private client networks. This would suggest that, far from

weakening ccistùig foms of oppressive authority in Anica and empowering wmmUILities at

the grass-rwts level, civil çociety-based aid strategies have simply shiffed the location of,

and language of access to, extenial resources which shore-up independent clusters of

personal power in recipient u>untries. Thus, rather than reforming dysfÙnctional patterns of

Afiican governancx, civil society strategies may well be absorbeci by them. Behavioural and

109 Edwards arad Hulme, op. cit., 1997, p. 278-9.

59

institutionai change may be more difncult to achieve tben mticipated. It is weii worth

quohg Chabai and Daloz on this point:

It would be naive to think that the advent of NGOs necessarily reflects a tmmition from the ponderous world of state buneaucracy to that of more flenbe 'civic associations' operating beyond the clutch of the state. in our Mew it is ratber the reflection of successfiil adaptation to the conditions laid by foreign donors on the part of local pditical actors who seek in this way to gain access to new resources. Indeed, NGOs are oflen nothing otha than new stmctines with which Anicans can se& to establish an uistnrmentally profitable position within the existùig system of neo-

110 patrimonialism -

More remnt policy statements provide evidence that officia1 attitudes towards civil

Society, if not actually waning as such, have becorne more sophisticated, @y as a result

of some of the critiques outluied above. Iacreasingly, the practical limitations posed by

civil society-based aid strategies have been recognised aad incorporated as lessons into

new p l d g cycles. This is evident in the increasingly detailed and sophisticated sets of

guidelines issued by donor agencies and the NGO community, which instruct field

managers about how best to identifL "appropriate" civil society partnem in recipient

wuntries (while guarding agakt potential "spoilers" posing as local NGOs), about how to

better tailor civil socieîy support packages to local realities, and on how to assess projects

in ternis of theu impact on -social and political relations in local commuaities. Much Wnting 111

on peacebuilding and wdict prevention is, at presemt, moving in this direction . Policy

refinements of this sort testify to a stronger sense of d i s m in using civil society

strategies. They do not, however, point to a weakening of policy corrrmjtments to civil

society so much as to efforts to strengthen the effectiveness of the strategies associated

with it-

In Mozambique between 1992 and 1997, these strategies were implemented at a

time when enthusiaun about civil society nui mcritically high in both official and non-

govenimental aid circles. Indeed, Mozambique itself was widely perceiveci as an

110 Partck Chabal and Jean Pascal Daloq A l W h DisarJa or Pbilia'ical Irrslrrlllcnl

(Mord: James Cumy, 1999), p. 22. 111

The OECDDAC guidelines (op. ch., 1998) provide a good example of this, as dots Prendergast et al. (op. ck, 1999). At the time of d n g , a numk of doaors and NGOs are currently co-ofdinating efforts to crcate a %oW to asstss the political impacts of tbeir projects in the field, much of which centre on the past or projectcd Sec& of aid imerventions on the development of civil societies locally.

60

intemaiional laboratory for testhg basic assumptiom about social and politicai

reconstitution through civil society. In the event, the country bas been billed as a rare

'success story" of international pegcebuilding, and much credit bas ban given to the

dynamism and responsiveness of Mozambican Society to the call for peace ai the beginning

of the decade- How c i d socieîy stratesies wem implemented in tbaî country's post war

transition, their fuaction and theu &kt%, make up the topic of the second section of this

study. Before moving on to this however, the chapters that follow focus on the ways in

which we can interpet tbe rise of the civil society i d q the new 4 t h and power of its

organisations, and its importance to postumflid fec0IlStNCtion from the standpoint of

international relaîions theory-

He~emonv and Internationai Relations TLeorv

At the outset of this study 1 identined three important trends in post-confiict

intewention The fkt of these is an increasing level of irilcgtadon between state and

interstate actors, on one haai, and privately wdtuted, non-governmental organisations,

on the other, in the processes of designing, planning and executing postanflict

interventions. Institutiod integration between these two sets of actors has been mediated

primarily by changing patterns in aid allacation, *ch bave consïstently fbvoiired NGOs

as fûnding chanaels, thus drawing them more closely hto the policy reaim. The second

trend, which stems partly fiom the fht, is a visible iacrease in the po(itica1 poma of

NGOs in the allocation of resources within connict-affecteci c o d e s , in their influence

over policy options about how to intervene, wfiere and when, and to decide which sections

of the recipient populations will benefit and uader what oprational conditions. Third, 1

noted the growing political content, or pd&&u&n of many NOO engagements in pst-

codict environments. This is reflected primarily in their shift away fkom traditional relief

and rehabilitation activities towards more substantive support for post-war re-orderiag and

consensus-building

h Chapter 2, 1 sought to illushate the point tbat, despite some notable criticism,

these trends have been articulated through, and justified by, a dominant discourse of civil

society, which many observers have associated with the rise ofa "new aid policy agenda"

that emphasises the need for intemal structural and behavioural transformation fàvouring

an enhanceci role for markets and private adMs in postumflict recovery. In turn, policies

compatible with the civil society discourse have been adopted by a multiplicity of aid

actors, have been justifieci in tems of it, and have been wncretely implemented on the

ground The stmng mutual coosistency between accepteci representations of civil society

and the subsequent direction of policy decisions points to the existence of a powerfid,

theory-generated "knowledge structure7', which serves ôoth to ddine problems associateci

with post-conflict transitions, and to set parameters for ident@ng and implementing

acceptable solutions b a d on fimctions oommonly attributed to civil society. 1 firrther

sought to emphasis that since post-con۔ict transitions are genedly marked by the

exceptional (if even temporary) weakness of local institutions (administrative,

political and culhirsl) and indigenous intellectmi capacity, local countervaïling influences

are unlikely to k activated at the tiim of intemutiom Transitions are thus widely

perceived as moments of opportilaity for reform. The wmbination of these empin'cal and

conceptual developments, 2 suggest, raises the question as to whether post-conflict

transitions cm be accurately mdmtmd as "hegemonic moments", within which non-

govemnental &ors have beunne central players in shaping and supporting new, peace-

time stniçtures through which social power is exercised.

With this brief summary in minà, 1 retum to the original question raised in Chapter

1: Can NGO h~manit~anism in post-wnfiict transitions be Uoderstood theoretically in

terms of hegemony? The answa to this m o n must begin with a discussion of the

meaning of hegemony and its application, as a concept, to intemtiooal reality. As 1

attempt to show in the theoretical Merature review tbaî follows, standard theoretical

approaches to international %egemony" do not sit wmfortably with the issues, coacep~s

and actoa that I have discussed to this point One reason for this is that wre concephial

assumptions adopted by theories of international hegemony for the purposes of analytical simplification wntrast starkly with the wmplex empirical realities of international

engagement in post-mnfïict transitions. The rich blend of social cultural, economic and

political forces which interact at various international, national and local levels of reality,

and which are potentially hegemonic in fa&, are not fùlly recognised as such in theory In

particular, three dominant assumptions lirnit the capacity of mainstream international

uieory to accomt for NGO humanitarian actions in hegemonic terms.

The first is the standard (and well noted) assumption tbat international politics

constitutes an autonomous sphere of global activity, *ch can be understood and

explaineci separately fiom intemationai economic, social and cultural processes. This leads

necessarily to a ''bracketing off of important economic and social interactions that are

potentially constitutive of hegemony. Generally, this bracketing is reflected in conceptual

distinctions between state and society, or more broadly between public and private

spheres, which are not borne out in reality. A second, related 8ssumption of mahtram theory is that international "politics" in general, and hegemony in particuiar, are

something that states do. Non-state actors such-as corporations, or, for our purpr>ses,

NGOs are w t t y p i d y asJi@ an inteniatid politicai identity as such, and are thus

consigned to a realm of fbndoI181 or technical interaction. Since hegernony is

theoretically undemood es a political process, non-state actors are normally excluded

nom the f h e w o r k of hegemonic analysis- Tbird, international relations theory is

dominateci by unhelpful adytical dkthdons, or tensions. between international and

domestic leveis of anaiysisy and between individual and stnrctural levels of causation

Since mainstream aaalysis approaches the issue of international begemony mainly fkom a

structural perspective, it must wnsequentiy downplay the role of gcoups and individuals as

fàctors in its emergence or dedine. Hegemony is thus abstracted nom the realm of h u m

process and becornes a-historical- Hegernonic conshzr~tion, as a conscious social activity

of structural change* cannot, as a result, be systemtically accountecl for.

What is needed, by contrast is a theoreticai approach to hegemoay tbat overcornes

dominant adyt ica i distinctions in order to account comprehensively for the many fkctors

and processes which underlie the empùicai and conceptual trends identified in the

chapters above. More specincally, an analytical mode1 of hegemony is required that

explicitly recognises the potential development of strong intemal lùikages between state

(public) and societal (private) domains of international interest and action. In order to find

an accurate reflection in reality, such a model would, moreover, need to acknowledge that

political action, indeed politics as such, need not necessarily be co&ed to the realm of

states, but equally pursued in the private spheres of civil society and the market. Likewise,

it would need to build on a notion of kgemmy as a process of active stmcturing of new

h e w o r k s of political authority and ratincation, new systerns of resource distriiution,

new patterns of identity formation and social interaction, that is based variably on

consensus-building, or "buy-in" strategies (post-conflict civic education programmes) as

well as coercive engagement (aid conditionality, as illustrateci at the beginning of Chapter

1). In sum, in orda not to lose sight of the cornplex, multi-sectory and multi-Ievel

processes wbch underpin NGO interventions in post-confüct settings, an ïnterpretative

model of hegemony is reqiiired which is both descriptively accurate and anaiyticaily

compeliing.

In this chapter and the next, I make the case for moving away from dominant

approaches to hegemony as articulateci by (neo) realist and 1i'bera.l stranâs of international

relations tbeory, on the grormds that they do not adequakly capture the cealities of post-

conflict transitions and, within them. of NGOcenhed strategies for remvery. 1 argue

instead for aâopting a political efwomy appoach which emr>urages the uncovering of

linkages where these might othenvise be conceaieâ, and which emphasises the role of

human ageacy and social process in the making and cbangiag of global structures. As

hinted already in previous sections of this peper, the Gramscian vision of hegemony offers

key advantages in this respect However, before mowig on into the theoretical Iiteratine

review, it is useful briefiy to consider, for later reference, some broader implications of

the theoretical discussion that follows,

The idea of c~owledge structures" (cited eafiier), identined by Stephen Gill as

sets of conceptual fiameworks for uderstmding social reality'127 is integral to the

perspective which 1 acbpt towards inteniational relations theory, a d provides two specïfic

insights. Fht , the notion of structured knowIeûge helps us to recognise, and to make explicit, thst tbeories of international relations, including whatever insights about

hegemony they yield, do not stand outside social reality, but are an integral part of it It

emphasises the built-in linkages between our knowledge of "what is out there"

(ontology/theory) and perceived options about "what to do" (methoâ010gy/praxis). As

Gill notes, Lnowledge structures help to "constitute and give identity" to institutional and

material forces in the international political economy aad;

W i t h such knowledge structures, theoretical perspectives serve to defhe the nature of problems within the 'kal worlâ" of the political economy. Thus either explicitly or implicitly, perspectives are central to the formation of policy alternatives facing govemments (locai, regional, national), intemational organisations, political parties, transnational corporatio~s, trade unions &d even churches'".

Importantly, knowledge structures are integral not only to the policy process, but

aiw to the formation of identities, values, patterns of social interaction, and what Rupert

112 Stephen Gili, "Knowledge, Politics and tk N C O - L i i Political Economy" in Richard Stubbs

and GeofEey Underhiil (eds.) Adirical Ecorrorng d the c)anbiry G M Ordn (London: MacMillan, 1994), p. 76. il3

ibid. 114

See Mark Rupert's tmmncnt of Gramsci's "coatested common se& in "Globalisation and Contested Common Sense in the United Statesn in Stcphen Gill und James Mittelman (eds.)

in point, dmwing fiom our own eariier discussion, is the materiabation of society"

simulîaneously as macephial image, pdiq strategy and ernpind re&y in maay post-

wnûict txausitioas of the 1990s. nie widespad aclaowiedgemeut of a viirant civil

society in intemational discourse, and its "known'' fimctional attn'butes with respect to

markets, democracy, coaflict and peace, bave visibly impacted upon aid policy in the

fom of increasing support for civii soeieîy organisations in the field Those recipient

communities, in Mozambique and elsewhere, which have come into contact with civil

society-oriented policies, may absorb the notion and, in various ways, come to inteipret

their own local reaiities in a different maimer than previously. To the e&nt that they alter

their behaviour sccordingly* mipient cammunities wntrriute to achulIising civil Society -

concepts in concrete terau, at the expense of other models of social organisation and

interaction Thus, the way in wâich udeR18tional social realities are perceived and

explained serves to inform and coosaain huma. action, end is thus intriasically part of the

intemationai social reaiity itself The main implication is that since they are comected,

"concepts cannot be abstracted from h i . appli~~tion~~*~ Thus, 60th ernpirical reality

and the structures of interpretation through which that r d t y is understd, must

constitute, in equal measure, the object of d y t i c a l inquiry.

A second, and related, guiâing insight associateci with the idea of knowledge

structures, is that it belies the notion of mitral explanation in the social sciences. Gi11

specifies that d e the pure sciences, social knowledge does not derive fiom the realrn of

natural laws, but is consciously built and struaured, as part of the historical social process

itself, to hune the intellectual parameters of histoncal necessity and possibility. In the

same vein, Cox has fhously remadceci thaî " theory is for sommne and for some Il6

purpose" . For both Cox and Gi11, prevailing ideas about intemationai relations, and the

policies they yield, derive fkom intellectmi preferences which, in tum, express existuig

'%ontigurations of production, umsumption and excbange structures of the gloM political Il7

economy" . nie implication here is this: Just as structures of knowledge are consciously

built to reflect and support existing socioexmornic configurations and practices in the

Innovaha and T111111gmmdim iri I k t e m œ k d A k d b (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 139-140. This notion is takea up again in Cbaptcr 4. 115

Co& op. cit, 1996, p. 125- I l 6

ibid., p. 87. I l ?

Gill op. cit., 1994, p. 76. 66

real wmId, they may also be challengeci with alterriative -gs that may generate altogether Merenî implications for practiœ, with the pot& e f f i ulhately, of

aitering the uIlbial configurations themselves The proasn of building inteqmtaîîve

h e w o r k s can thus be seen as located well withm the tarain of politid engagement,

and to the extent that such efforts are ernployed to iiphold exïsting codigunitions of social

power and dominances the struchlriag of knowledge assumes a hegemonic quplity. In a

strong sense, then, prevailing images of civil society, their translation into poIicyy and

their eftèctive transmission on the g r o d through NGO channels and in wnformity with

uînternati~nally accepted principles" of global govemaace, can be undexstood as

belonging to a bmader political project Likewisey alternative represenartikms, iike the one

inspired by the original wri- of Gramsci must be seen as part of an engogernent

politique. As Gramsci himseif observeci: 3 not science itself a politicai BCtivity [...] in as

rnuch as it transfonns men and makes tbem dinérent nom what they wae before?"'18-

The theoretical discussion that follows in this and the next cbapter must be considered in

this light

Hegemonv and International Theorv 1: The Realist Amroach

"Very often" writes Cox, " 'hegemony' is used to mean the dominance of one ,119

country over others, thereby tyhg the usage sîrktly to relationships among states - This image of hegemony is most explicitiy developed in realist theory, according to which

international relations is the story of autonomous, sovereign states competing to secure

the political and material conditions necwary for thei. own SuMval (self-help).

Cornpetition among states occurs in a wntext of perpetual insecurity marked by the

absence of higher regdatory mechanisms, a wntext that redis& have Wrened to a

Hobbeisan "state of nature'' and which Kenneth Waltz, most prominently, has theorised in 120

structural terms of anarchy . Within this anarchicai wntext, the outcome of interstate

cornpetition defines the distribution of power withïn the intergovernmentai systern. A

stable distribution, and consequent systemic order, arises either when a balence between

major powers is struck or when a single hegemony emerges fiom an overwhelming

concentration of power in one state. In the reaüst outlook. hegemony is therefore

118 Gramsci op- cit, 1973, p 244.

associated with the rbüity of dominant sb&s to project ovenuheIming political and

economic power over actuai or potential rivais-

In bis volume on WP and change in inteniasional politics, Robert Gilpin proGdes a

compreheasive account of hegemony nom the sûuctud standpoint of international

aaarchy. For Gilpin, hegemonic orders rise and fàU in succession within the broader

anarchic setting, where dominans states stniggle to d e f d their suprrmacy aPajnst rising challengers. The hegemonic or&r is stable as long as the distribuîion of power is tipped in

favour of dominant stafes- Where the power distn'bution changes, the costs borne by the

hegemon in mahtahïng the existing inteniatiod order rise, while the costs of

challenging it falL Rising maintenance costs therefore signal a distnïutionai shift and the

beginaittgs of hegemonic decliw. In order to offsa the costs of rirainte- and redipss

the power distriiution, hegemom engage in rent-eslaag, bwden-sbaring, territorial

expansion, preemptive strikes aga- challengers, or retrenchment Rarely, accordhg to

Gilpin, do âeclininp hegemons s u d in redressing a favourable power balsace over the long tem. The interaatonal system is thus periodicaliy reconfjgured to re£lect a new

power distribution, typically through war, resultbg in a new hierarchy of States7 a

redistriion of territories, new nila of htemtate conduct and new divisions of labour121.

Both traditional and more recent "stnicnnal" variants of reslism, explicitly posit

the primacy of both politics and states in the international arena According to tbis view,

private international arrangements, or a civil sphere, may develop only in the wntext of an

overarching poIitica2 hegemony. By providing political stability and military security

across the internaiional system, hegemoas faciltate the growth of econornic relations and

the development of political coloperation amoag States. Referring to two recent

hegemonies, Gilpin asserts "Pax Britamka and Pax Ameriranarana.ensured an international

system of relative peace and security-.- and created and dorced the d e s of a 11'beral 122

intemationai ecommic order" . Where hegemonic stability is absent, by cuntrast, the

constrain& of anarchy or "prpetual war by all against aii" prevail, and the likelihood for

I l 9 Cox, op. &, 1996, p- 135.

120 Kenneth Wafa Mon, rltc .!k~& rPird Wer ( New Y a k Columbia University Press, 1959),

pi! 59.

122 Robert Gilpin . op. cit-, 198 1, pp. 186-244. fiid., p. 144.

enhanced economic relations is low. This is because insecurïty and political rivalry

invariably lead states to link economic gain to geo-strategic positioning, and thecefore to

shy away from enabling or hilitsting jxivaîe commercial arrangements in which relative

gains may accrue disproportioa8tely to the economies of potentiaiIy rival states. As Waltz

succinctly notes: " States worty abwt a division of possible gains..mn a self-help system,

considerations of securïty subordinate e c o d c gain to political interest"'?

Thus, while realist thinking does admit the possibility of a non-governmental or

economic sphere in the international arena, such activity is defined and coostiSIUied by

existlng political pwer ~ g e m e n t s within the state system- Formal multilateral

rnechanisrns for reguiating private relations, such as the Bretton Woods institutions, are

expected to bear the mark of the exïsting power distriiution, and reflect the power-

maximising concems of the hegemonic state, ratber than those of private actors.

Conversely, Gilpin has argueci that serious disruptions to global xnarkets during the early

1970's (most notably the oil crisis) were triggered by a weakeaing of American

hegemonic status relative to the eariy post-war p e n d These events, he suggested at the

time, reflected "an erosion of the politicai base upon wûich the world economy has

re~ted"''~. Over long historical periods, realists expect hegemonies to succeed one

auother accordhg to identifiable cyclical patterns. Withui each of these, economic

activities are defined by, and may also sewe to strengthen, overarching frameworks of

political power. Realist images of hegemonic ascendancy, dominance and decline are

clearly rendered in Boswell and Sweaî's synopsis of "long cycle theory" which, for

descriptive pinposes, is worthwtiile quoting at length:

A hegemon emerges fiom war with a clear preponderance of [...] power ... Lesser states are unlikely to challenge the hegemon as long as it retains this concentration of power. This allows the hegemon to manage global traasactons, supplying order and stability to the global political and economic system by supportuig fke traâe and resisting wars that wodd upset its leadership. It iaitiaily tends to benefit most fiom free trade and stable political relations since it has the most dynamic economy. Yet it bears most of the military costs of maintahhg world order while d l other global traders benefif they free ride. With higher costs, a hegemon's nade advantage evenually dissipates , while its greater military needs main or escalate, leading to

I 23 Waltz, op. ck, 1979, pp. 107.

124 Robert Gilpin, "Thme Models of the Future" in Robat Art and Robat Jarvis (ads.)

Irrlaicctdional Pdiaics= EALviw Çoliccpa and Ibnes (New Yotk: Harpa Collins, 1992). p. 307.

69

debt Einancing or müita~~ spniding A solution to the challenges of wre cornpetitors and to many Ilitemal conflicts is to krease imperid political control over global temtory. But this also inmases global cm& and, moreover, shitts the hegawn's fimction firom maintrisiiag general global order to maintaining specific imperhl territorial order, de-legitimising its global lerrdership. As the memory of the last global war fides, cornpethg great powen likewise increasingly pursue individual national interests. De-concentraîion .LI of power follows, yïeleldg a a d of renewed rivalry and potentid global warLY .

International history is thus depicted in terms of hegemonic cycles, with leading

states providing upubIic goods" in the f o m of order and security, thereby offsetting the

constraints of anarchy and enabling a more fertile environment for awperation and 126

private economic exchange . Structural change in this othenvise static system, is

comparatively rare* as it must involve no less than a succession of hegemonies, mediated

by what Gilpin has t e d "hegemonic w a ~ w h i c h changes the system in accordance

with the ww international distri'butiion of powef"27.

Though psrsimonious, the realist appoach to hegemony contains a number of

weaknesses which have inspireci challenges both fiom ~ & b i n the d i a scnoal itseIf, and

from outside critics. For one thing., the thesis of violent, abrupt hegemonic change may

leave historians wondering how it might apply to the relatively peacefirl transfers of

hegemony - fiom Greece to Rome in the Meditemanean world, nom Rome to Byzantium,

nom Great Britain to the United States - which bave marked the passing of the ages, and

which appear to have been mediated at least as much by cultural identification and

economic Meritance over tirne, as by violent state rivalry- Frïendly challenges to this

approach have similarly been made by realist thinkers who concede tbat the emergence of

new agendas and forces in the international arena require a refinement of traditionai power

andysis. Brown notes that by the end of the 197û's, the relaxing of the cold war

confrontation, the rise of non-secirnty-related global issues to the top of many national

agendas and the diversification of interstate coalitions across new issue meas "could

lùndamentally alter the essence of world pditics, cbaoging the structure and ingredients of

12s Terry Boswell a d Mike Sweat " Hcgernony, Long Waves and Major Wars: A Timc-Sa?'es

Analysis of Systcmic DyMmics, 14961967" in Insanoaiorrol Smdks @uHW& ( No. 3 9 , 1991, pz. 129-30.

Geo- Underhill, "Concegnialising the Chnging Global Orda" in Stubbs and Unduhill (eds.), op. cit., 1994. p. 30. n

Gilpin, op. cit., 1981, p. 198- 70

128 power itself" . For states wishing to maintain or maximise power inteniatiody,

militarisied foreign poîicy shouid give way to more "Pragmaticn oonsideratioas In a wortd

of complex interdependence, the traditionai coercive diplomacy of hegemons wouid have

the effect ofdienaihg poteutid collaboratocs. Iiistead, he stresses;

In a system charactensed by multiple cross-cutting coalitions formed around a variety of issues, (staîes) with the most innuence are iiiely to be those which are major constructive participants in the widest variety of walitions and partnerships, since such

129 coimtnes would have the largest supply of usable political cumacy -

Keohane, a seIfdefhed "modified realist", bas wondered about the persistence of

the intemaîïonai jmst-war order in the context of a widely perceived decline in US. 130

hegemony . He concludes by reducing begemony to a permissive condition, rather than

a requirement, for a peacefûl inteniational order "Concentraieci power is not sufkient to

create a stable intemationai econornic order in which coloperation flourishes, and the

argument that begemony is necessary for cooperation [order] is both theoretically aad

empirically weak". Instead, he contends that "the cornmon interests of the leading

capitdist States7 bolstered by the effécts of international regintes (mostly created

during a period of Amencan hegemony) are strong enough to make sustained ceoperaiion 131

[orded possible" . For Keohane, interdependence and shared economic interests create a

fuactional demand for intemational ordering mecbaaisms in tk absence of a hegemon.

These "regimes" fwilitate the reciprocal adjustment of state policies to the common

benefit of d l , by providing information about policy intentions and values, fâcilitriting

transactions and loweriag their costs, and creating a necesSacy b i s of muhial

depeadability and reduced un~ertaintyl~~. Peaceful order, suggests Keohane, can thus be

preserved quite independently of the distri 'b~on of power.

128 S. Btowa "The Changing Essence of Powa" in Bennett et a l (eds) GM&m

RcolUm 1 - m 129

' T1LirJ U (Boulder Wesîvïew, 1982), p- 23. Ibid-, p- 26.

UO See Robert Keohane, Apa R-y: u d D C i s c d in the W H

Econumy (Prïnœton: Princeton University Press, 1984). . Ul

ibid., p. 43 132

%id, pp. 88-98. n

These cons*derations l d Kwhane domi an intmstiag path of enqujr into the

rearons for which states mi@ consent to the conîinuation of prevailing arrangements in

the absence of enfo~cement by a domhant pomr. Though he Ends his answer in the

"Lfuncti~nality" of inteniationai -ve regimes, this does open the door to issues of

legitimacy, endorsement and consensus aroUllLd existing internationai power arrangements.

In so douig, Kwhane potentially bioadeiis the field of hegemonic analysis beyond the

confines of struaiwl detemhisrn handed down by Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Robert

Gilpin and others Nonetheles, although Keohane skÜts the boundaries of realïst

andysis, he does mt cross tbnn He explicitly takes "the crude theory of hegemonic

stability" as his own anslytical starting pain?, and in the end, his discussion of

hegemony and the implications of hegemonic decluie for the wntinuity of a stable world

political ecowmy, ïs articulateA ovetwhelmingly in reaiist te-, name1y the centrality of

states in (p0st)hegemonic coostruction and the translation of national or giobal material,

financial and sbategic resources into political power. Finally, he does w t contest the

realist thesis of political hegemony as a precoadition for -etal stability, but simply

suggests reasons to believe thst it is a permissive, rather tban a d c i e n t or necwsry,

condition-

How would the realist analysis of hegemony account for the empiricai and

conceptual developments in the humanitarian field addressed in previous chapfers? How

would it, more specifically, address the d e of humanitanan - -

NGOs in postcodict re-

ordering? The realist application of hegemony yields useful insights as to the use and

projection of political power internatiodly, but does not consider adequately the issues at

band First, realists remain commitîed to the centrality of states and to the "prllnacy of

the poiitical" in their analysis of intemational aiffairs, as well as to the autonomy of

international politics nom other realms of interiaction These enduring wmmitments

hearken back to ontological principks laid down by one of the founders of the

cmtemporary realist school, who stated openly in 1956 tbat 'CIntellectuaüy, the political

realist maintaios the autonomy of the political sphere, just as the ecowmist, the lawyer

and the moralist maintain t b e i r ~ ' ' ~ ~ and was echoed aimost a m e r of a century later by

Waltz : " To be a a [intemationai] tbeory bas to sbow how intemational politics can be conceived as a domsin distinct fiorn the ecommic, social d other international

135 domains" . By prïvikging the state as the p h a r y unit of d y s i s in an autonomous

politicai sphere, reaiism must appmach hegemony h m a limiteù prspaive of

intemational politics understood as interaction between states. Little room is left

malytidly for any serious consideration of private actors in the building of hegemoaic

orders: Civil Society institutions, Iike markets, are relegated to a sepsrate, f h c t i o d

domain. Without an attributed political identity, private actors and processes cannot be

seen as comtitaive of hegemony, although they are passibly derivative of i t Realists

would thus be Iikely to tie recest NGO actions in post-conflict situations to the pvailing

global political power stnictrues of the 1990s. Such an assessrnent may be part of the

story, but would not accouut, for exampie, for the incmsing Mependent iduence of

NGOs ovcx the making of official aid policy. or their increasing p o m to deci&,

fiequently quite indepndently of state policy, over the matenal fate of whole

wmmdes in war-affected countxïes, a power which, for those most directiy concemed,

can be described as none other than p~litical'~. The rigid distinction between political and

non-political Ralms of anaiysis, while perhaps usefùl in making the case for an

autonomous acadernic discipline, is of little help in addressing such "real world" issues.

Second, despite some efforts to correct this, hegemony continues to be understood

by the core of the d i s t school as a primerily coercive project, rooted, as Kwhane has

pointed out, in a "basic force m&l" accordhg to which ccoutcomes reflect the tangible

capabilities of actors", and in which hegemonic succession is prduct of violent sûuggle.

Gilpin is most explicit about this when he asserts:

Throughout history, the primary meam of resolving disequilibium [..] has been war. ..a hegemonic war is the ultimate test of change in the relative standings of the powen in the existiag system. Every intemational system that the world bas known bas been a consequence of [...] realignments that have followed such hegemoaic stnigglesm.

135 Walb, op. cit., 1979, p. 79.

136

137 Sttange, op. cit., 1996. Gilpin, op. cit., 1981, pp. 197-8

Brown likewise depicts an &le inteniabionai environment as f d e ground for

coercive hegemoic wastniction, poinn'ng to the potential for :

strong temptations to resort to the drastic Hobbesian alternative: an SuIfhoriariaan law and order Jystem imposed on the worid by those with sunicient coercive power to

138 overwhelm all opponents .

Such realist images of politics as a perpehial conflit3 ammg seIf-interested States

are almost uaavoidably conducive to an analysis of hegemony in which coercive

behaviour gains central cumacy. Here again, this is only of utility in analyshg the

issues at hand Althougb hummitarian NGOs may and do engage in coercive foms of

action, most visibly through the imposition of aid conditioanlities on local authorities and

cornmunifies, theu growing political influence in local environmeuts is more closely

associateci with efforts to build consensus in support of peacetime social structures which

fiuiction accordhg to intenrationally accepted principles of govermutcece

Third, since the sphere of international politics is aaalyticaily bracketed off, not

just fiom other international spheres but also nom politics inside countries, realist

approaches have been particularty one-dimensionai on the issue of hegemony, and have in

general been unable to properly owsider potential domestic, or what we may cal1 "inter-

domestic" fàctors of global power such as p r i w individual and group interests workuig

within and across corntries,. This neglect of the domestic dimension of intemaîional

politics which derives fiom assumptions about the fuactional simüarity of States,

has dram well-bwn critiques fiom wahin the reaiist camp, notably Milner and

Keohane. While Milner d e s the generd point that there are important parallels to be

drawn between domestic and intemaiional politics (implying that an understanding of the

former can lead to a better uaderstanding of the laa,>139, Keohane is specifically

interest& in identifying incentives which would lead states to take on important

obligations associated with hegemonic leadership. In order to do this, he suggests tbat a

more "refined version of hegemonic stability theorf' would look more seriously at

domestic fkctorsTS Such a theory would 'hot assume that streagth automatically creates

138 B~OWO, OP. &, 1982, pp. 30-31.

139 See Heien Milner, "Intcnwionai Theones of Coopamion Among Nations: Streagths and

Wealaiesses" in WorldlW&s (Vol, 44), 1992, pp. 48û-95- 74

incentives to project one's power abruad. Domestic attitudes, politid structures and

decision-making proccsse~ are dso important". He coacedes howwer, that by expandùig

the field of enquiry to include domestic variables, the g e m d explariatory powr of the . 140

wre realist mode1 is comprorniseâ in fhour of case-specific understanduigs .

Domestic fktors, and those Links aad processes which comect them across

national jiirisdictions, are integral to the current analysis for at least two important

reasons, First, humanitarian NGOs which contribute to the formulation and execution of

aid policy are domestic actors, both in their countries of origin and in countries of

intervention. In home wuntries, they are weii known for building grass-rwts (ie. civil

society) constituencies in support of humanitaxian causes world-wide, for lobbying public

and private secton accordingly, for producing research fiequently in collaboration with

academic and 0 t h domestic iastitutions and, as noted, for advising govemments and

intemaîional organisations within the broader aid policy process. And as becomes

apparent Iater in this study, the intemationai and local NGO sector in Mozambique

became increasingly an influentiai force within the aatiouai political ecowmy, acting

among other things to open domestic poiitical, commercial and cultural qmces to more

interaction with the outside environment The second point, is perhaps more ~ e ~ e v i d e n t :

My underlying suggestion in this study is that post-conflict transitions can be understood as "hegemonic moments" precisely because of the characteristics of the domestic

environment (local institutional weakness across most sectors of actïvity) which defines

them.

A fourth important limitation of realist approaches to hegemony is that the latter is

defrned prirnarily in tems of material capabilities, as variably distniuted across the

international system and projected by dominant powen. "The theory of hegemonic

stability" writes Keohane, "Cde£ines hegemony as a pieponderance of material resources":

To be wnsidered hegemonic in the world political economy, a country must have access to crucial raw matenals, wntrol over major sources of capital, maintain large markets for irnports, and hold comparative advantages in [the production of] goods

140 Robert Keohane, U)fegcmony in the World Politid Economy" in Art and Jarvis (eds.), op. cit-,

1992, p. 257.

with high values addeci It mut be stronger, in these dimensions taken as a whole, than any otha

There can be little argument that access to material resources and contml over

modes of production in high yielding sectors, as well as the corollary military capability

necessary to ensure end protect such material preponderance7 are key ingradients of

international hegemony. However, in focusing primdy upon these aspects* and in

devoting much anaiytical effort to their measurement and to the issue of "fimgiiility"' of

national pwer capabilities, c o m ~ v e l y little attention is given over to potential non-

material fâctors of hegemony. The importance of discourse, beliefs, and collective

outlooks in creating a social birse for, and promoting consensus around, structures and

institutions of matentend control and distriiution, such as markets, public administrations

and cornpetitive multiparty-systems, is rareiy considereû Such elements7 which bear at

least as much as material control itself upon the shaping of social relations, appear to be

centrai to aid aimuig to a f k t behavioural change through civil society in wat-

afEected couatnes. Interestingly, Keohane does reserve some analyticai space for this non-

material dimension of hegemony in his critique of the 'WC force'" mode1 employed by

the core of realism, and in so doing refers to the potential contribution of Gramscian

international atJalysis "in which hegemony is disthguished fiom sheer dominance" :

Hegemons require deference in order to enable them to construct a structure of world capitalist order. It is too expensive, and perhaps self-defeating, to achieve this by force: f i er dl, the key distinction between hegemony and imperialism is that a hegemon, d i k e an empire, does not dominate societies tbrough a cumbersome administrative niperstructure, but rather supervises the relationships between politically independent societies through a combination of hierarchies of control and the operation of markets. Hegenony rests on the awmeness by elifes in secondory

1 42 States thal they are bertefiring..-

hdeed, fiom the Gramascian standpoint, we see in subsequent chapters that 143

building subjective awareness of benefit is a key ingredient of hegemonic construction ,

and in this sense Keohane's rernark, which seems to cross the boundaries of realîst

141

1 42 Ibid., pp. 2545.

143 %id., p. 264. (Emphasis added) Stephen Gill views t h e as central to tbe giobarl beganonic projcct. Sec his "Globdisation,

Market Civilisation and Disciplinary NmLiberalism" in ATrllcriniurn (Vo1.24, No. 3), 1995, pp. 403-1 1-

analysis, if only bnefly and with cautious -on, begins to shed new light on the civil

society work of humanitarian NGOs in pst wnfîict countries. At a deeper levei,

Keohane's staternemt Qes much more: t poinîs to the possibility of using socïai groups

(he refers to elites), ratôer than states, as imits of hegemonic analysis, and thus opeas up the dmr to aitemative frameworks for understandhg hegemony. Once outsi& the

"knowledge stnacture" generated by realism -itseIf the product of a national historid

wntext in which upholdiag US globai interests in the fâce of perceived decline dominated

the foreign policy agenda- it becornes possible to consider that the intemational

distribution of power &nong states is in fact perhaps only of secondary relevance to

hegemonic coostNction Of more concrete relevance may be an analysis of globai

structures of power distniuîion and autbority among social poups in and across state

boutldaries-

Hegemon~ and Intemationai Theorv II: The L ~ k r a l A~pr08ch

The core of the Li'beral critique of realist IR theory has sought to respond to a number of realism's analytical &ses by emphasising the existence of a complex,

dynamic and expanding civil sphere in international affairs which permeates the

conceptual and geographical ISts of sîatehood. Liberal politicai theory builds fiom the

assumption of the intrinsic value of individuals as the primary actors of international

affairs, in contrast to realism's states as principal ' b i t s of aoalysis" in intemationai

theory. In reality, there are important paraltels ôetween reaiïst and liberal models for

interpreting international afïàirs. Like realists' States, h i uni6 of analysis are assumed

to be fimctionally sunilar, in that all individuals are attriiuted a similar s e m e of economic

rationality and incentive, and can thus be expected to react in similar fashion to extemal

conditions. Structura.Uy, markets are constituted by the cumulative, if unintentional,

actions of self-interesbai individuals seeking to maximise their gains, in the same way thet

anarchy is shaped without specific intention by states seeking peredally7 on the b i s of national interest, to maamise power. It cornes as no surprise, then, that Waltz, in his

specification of the ordering priaciples of international political anarchy, bomwed heavily

nom liberal ecommic adysis: "intemationai political systems, like economic markets,

are formed the d o n of sewregarding unit^"*^. Likewise, once in place ôoth

market and anarchic stnictures assume dynamiccs of th& own which extend bachuards

again to coristrsin the choices a d actions of individual units- Both are attniuted the

quality of self-regdating systems, autonomous h m the pusposefiil individuai actions of

component d t s , with the exception of cases where stnichPPI influence (mon&ly,

hegemony) is dispportionstely concentrated (even in such instances, internai system

mechanisms -COIlflict/cornpetition- m o n over time to repair s t n i c h w l imbaîaaces). Once in place, then, both systems are liftecl out of the historical process and "mtudised",

anarchy in terms of a Hoôbesian state of nature of a "war of dl agaiast di", and markets in

te- of the ''natural propensity of individuals to truck, barrer and t~ade'''~~. Both images,

in other words, assume the amibutes of historicai necessity and inevitability

Altbough they lead maiastream dy t i ca l attention in very diffèrent directions

towaràs apparentiy diametrically opposed conclusions abwt how to manage international

&airs, reaiist and liberal analyses of inteniationai relations share another feature, *ch

is a common cornmitment to ngorous -cal distinctions between political and

economic, public and private, and state and mietal sphms. Li'beral theory does little in

fact to contest realist claims to the autonomy of the politicai realm and, within ît, to the

primacy of -tes, political power and coercive behaviour, Rather, it brackets off the

"poiitical" nom its own sphere of enqyiry. That both, apparently conûasting approaches

shouid structure their analysis in such similar fàshion is an important point, though it is

ofkn obscured by the debates in which both engage one another- And indeed, for some

observen, h'beralism and realism are complementary, two sides of the same analytical

coin; perhaps two aspects of the same structure of loiowledge settîng out to undexstand

overlapping sets of d i t y in international anairS. Underhill points out that the issue of

hegemony itself is w d e d in different teans but to the same effit: despite liberals'

aversion to power analysis, there is an implicit recognition that hegemonic powen

potentially pedorm a benign economic fimction (albeit outwards nom within the politicai

sphere), to the extent tbat they are "willing to bear the cost of providing the public g d

144 Kenneth Waltq "The Amarchic Stmcûm of Worid Politid in Art anâ Jan& (eds.) op. d,

1992, p. 12. 145

UnderhiIl, op. cit., 1994, p. 27.

of a h i market eco~nny"; whereas for realists " a hegemonic distniution [of power 146

is] the most propitious ground for the emagcoce of a h'beral market ecommy"

Nonetheles, the orientation and research agenda opened up by h i inquisr are

different nom those of reahn, reflecting different, if mt incompanile, sets of research

interests and jxioribes- Using the raîiod economic man as i ts point of departure, liberal

political theq has mounted a susEsiaed critique of realist assmnptioos. Liberalism

establishes jimctioml COI~S~I~SUS mediateci by private interests, as opposed to political

coercion, as the principal denoing feature of (nomal) relations among global actoa, thus

superimposing the logic of markets within a civil spbere over the lawlessnes of anarchy. In so doing, it directly challenges the validity of coie realist as~urn~ons about the

centrality of states, the currency of in- definecl in terms power

maximisation, and the ÜnmuîabMy of the anarchical intexnational environment,

assumptions which, in the presentday intedonai con- are thought to be too

inaccurate to be theoreticaily usefiil. And indeed, successive waves of li'beral intemationai

theory in the pst-war period have provided a 6nunework not ody for analyticaily

disengaghg from inter-state politics as the explanatory focus of international relations, but

an equally powerfùl set of intellectual tools for attacking, and progressively eroding, the

de facto preponderance of state agencies in regdating and miinaging the global political

econorny. The identification of "global civil society" both as focus of anaiysis and a

mncrete organisational alternative to global management by states, or "govemance

without govemment" is thus, not surprisingly, a direct product of liberal marketentrexi

values. The increasing auxptance of 11'beralism7s anti-*te critique in recent decades has

provided the theoreticai uadapnnings of the "new policy agerida" identified by aid

analysts in the 1990s (see Chapter 2).

Understanding the intimate relationsbip between ideas and political action, the

early liberal critiques thus had two iaterconnected aims. The first was to expose the

limitations of realist andysis in accounting for empirical intemational developments, and

thereby loosea the grip of realist thinking on foreign policy. The second was to provide a

prescriptive framewock for devising a new set of international institutionai arrangements,

the form of which would be determirmi by the fimctional requirements of private interests

and needs 14'. Thus, sÉarting early on in the post-war period with David Mitrany d the

Functioaalist SC- li'beral aailysis regarded power politics not ody as an incomplete

explanation of interstate relations, but as a wncrete historicai obstacle to peacetùl CO-

existence arnong peoples. L& to theh poww rivolries, states were seen as "imable to

guarantee such basic needs as security and the maximisation of weIfare, as evidenced by

the world wars and the depressi~n'"~. By c o q the opeaing of new spaces for settïng

in place functional economic and technical arrangements, or regimes, thas closely reflected

existing harmonies of prïvaîe economic interest, would encourage the mrdination of

national policies to fàcilitaîe M e r interaction among specific social and economic

sectors across national unitS. Eventually, the spill-over of fhctional soci~ec~nomic links

between sectors and countries would lead to the full integraîïon of trans-bomdaq

relations across an increasingly wide range of issue-areas, 4 aadnsequently to the de

face erosion of territorial borders ami national 10~alt ies~~~- Utimately, trans-societal

links, and tbe supra-national bodies designed to regdate them, would combine to press

residual state decision-making to adopt cooperaîive rather than wadrontatioaal policy

options: a recipe, according to fiuictionalist thinking, for a voluntary, ratios, working

peuce system- Functionalism contained both an explanatory and preswiptke donale for

the post-war cconomic uitegration of Western Europe, and as Paul Taylor's review of

functionalist theory shows, it also provided an early intellectual basis for the more

pronounced "societal' approach to international relations which later underpinned writings

in libed-dernomatic peace theory and, h m the mid-1980s especidy, preSCnptioas about

global civil society.

The principles of fimctiodism are that man can be weaned away fiom his loyalty to the nation state by the experience of fhitfid international coloperatioq that international organisation ... couid increase welfàre rem& beyond the level

147 Archer, op. cit., 1992, p. 90.

148 William O h n et al. Inianodiosrrl &&&m lka rrad N i (Landon: Harper CoUins, 1991),

p. 190. For a general swyey of the Liberal IR -ry, iiia aiso Arcber's discussion of "revisionist" approaches in international relations t b r y , with specific t t f m to intemationai organisations (op. cit., 1992: 87-10. îhek progression indudes David Mitniny's F m d i m , Ernst Haas' N e o ~ t i d i m , Kari Deutch's T-artal-, a d and 1 . approclch initiated by Keohane and Nye- For an example of the fiberni Perrce approach sa Mitrany's W;wrking Peuce Sgstem ( 1 966). I

For a discussion of finaional "spill+ver" sec David Mittany, IZe F n n d k d î h q p of P" ~ o a : St M n ' s h s s , 1975); and Jaap de Wilde, Soii#d Fmm tlbbbbn: 1- in the Fm Hw tf the T w e d d CcircYrp (Bmkdidd, W.: Dartmouth, 1991).

80

obtainable wittsin the stste... Indnriduals and groups cwld begin to leam the bene* of co-operation and wouid be uMeasiagly involved in an hmaiionai umperative ethos, cnrtuig interdependencies. pishuig for integration, undennining the moat important b i s of the stab lm.

Thm, the state is constrained both fiom within and fiom the outside; from below

by the intersecting, cross-border identities of interest among wnsumers, producecs. labour

organisations, municijml arithorities end special interest groups, frorn above by

muhilateral arrangements set in place by goveniments d e r pressure: the "Lilliputian"

ties of fwictionalism pin dowu the "Leviathan of confiictn. Seen fkom this perspective, the

instance of more or less institutionalised inteniationai regimes, such as the European

Common Market, fiir k m reflecting shifts in the international power distri'bution as the

reaiist reading rnight suggest, rather signais the strength of transnational societal pressures

for co-operation increasingly brought to bear upon embedded, reîreating stafes. and

translating "a feeling of solidarity wt between states, but between people and associations

of individualsu IS1. As Mitrany notes:

Each of us is in fact a "bundle of fimctional loyalties. so U t to build a world wmmuaity upon such a conception is merely to extend and consolidate fhctional

152 ties alço between societies and groups .

Building on these iâeas. more recent L~kral thinking has stressed the importance

of h o c r a c y in creathg inter-societal links. by emphasising the mutual compaîïbility of

interests of simila. liberal-democratic stnictures of domestic organkatio~~ According to

this view, fiinctional inter-sacietal ties, and attmding pressures for intersîate co-operation,

cannot be established under au circumstances: instead, they require domestic conditions

for the fke expression of societal interests and grievances. Such conditions, it is held, are

supplied most commonly by pluraiistic, democratic forms of national political

organisation.

150 Paui Taylor, (ed-) F r n d h a l Ù ~ ~ ~ * ud lh#h UI I n t e m d h d dtdhfions (London :

University of h n d m Prcss), 1975, pp- 8-13. 151

Archer, op. &., 1992, p. 91. 1 52

Mitrany, op- ck, 1975, p. 143. 81

Demaxacy contriiutes to & development of multiple socieîal wnstraints on tk

state h m within, which combine with the pressures of inteniabond economic

interdependence abmai to pi@ foreign policyY The domestic sources of intedonal

peace are attmiiuted to institutional, normative and raiional factors. Schweller suggests that

key democratic iostmbions, such as par& politics, the separation of powers and the

guarantee of civilian control over the military, create checks on state options for 153

aggressive foreign policy behaviour . From a normative standpoint, Russett contends

that democratic societies operate on the belief that disputes can be resolved peacddly, 154

and thus "resort to lethal force is umsidered iiIegitimate and u~~cessa ry" . Democratic

states allow spce for the pursuit of seWinterestS. The fjagmentation of national

politics uito a seamh by individuals for maxitnum prsonalnal benefits is not conducive to the 155

adoption of bdligerent poshnes by govef~llflents . Moreover iiiraldemocratic politics

are held by citizens to be non-zero-sum: it is commonly mderstood within democratic

societies that al1 may gain fkom accommodation, though perhaps unequslly, whems al1 156

may stand to lose fiom violent confrontation .

For Doyle, domestic sources of self-interested PaEifisrn are comp1emented

intemaîionally by "the interdependence of commerce and the international contacts of

state officialr..[which] create cross-cuîting transnational ties ihat serve as lobbies for

mutual accommodation" He ad&:

According to modem Ii'beral scholars, international financiers and transnational and trans-governeutai organisations mate interests in favour of accommodation Morwver, their variety has e d that no sin e d i c t s ~ n s an entire relationship d by setting offa spiral of reciprocafed retaiiation

The meeting of intenial and extenial riestraints on govemmentaI behaviour "oEers

the promise of a continuing pace among libcral states", and fonns the basis of liberal

153 Robert SchweUer, "Domestic Stnidwc and Ptcvenaiue Wac Are Dernocracies More Pacifie?"

in W d Polrcict (Vol-44), 1992, pp. 242-244. 1 54

Bruce ~ussa t , "Dernoaacy d Peace" in Russett (cd.) Cltoi#l Ùa Wdd m: &m!dgrrrip arrd Irrlaidcp#ilericc (New York: Frswnaa, 1 p 246. 155

Michael DoyIc, "Libcralism a d World Politics" in An#iurr Pbliticol Sciclia Rcuirrr, Vo1.80, NO.^), 1986, p. 1157. L

Russet, op. d, 1989, p. 247.

claims to an expading/expandab1e peace mne. Doyle wnciudes that "as the number of

liberal states uicrrases, it anaounces the possïbïlity of a global pace this si& of the grave

or worfd con pu es^"'? This Mew is bolstaed by ernpirical studies mggesthg over a

century's absence of war among liberel dernomatic states, as well as a relative adversity to

certain types of w a d h .

A newer, more assertive liberal view focusing on the ernergence of the 'global

civil society' is even more nmily located within the private, societal sphere. It advocsttes

the building of separate. we~-oriented global politics whicb, to tbe degree it mgnises

the relevance of the interstate system in its analysis of the worid's problems. strongiy 1 59

questions its legitllaaçy . This view is inspired by liberal conceptions of the domestic civil society . which is presented as a force generated in and of itseif, in spontaneous

response to the material and psychological needs of individuais d groups witbin

advanced industn'd countries. Here international non-governmental ~ r g ~ s a t i o n s are

perceived as direct, transnational extensions of the wmplex of plural imtitutiom which

have emerged within the core liberal dem~wratic ~untries~ As such, they transmit globdy

the organisational models, ethical values and strategies mderlying their posture of

resistance to excessive, unaccounted-for government regulation of private interests. and

stress the importance of grass-roots democratic organisation, wllective self-help,

individual and canmunity empowerment and political advocacy. Tme to their origins and

to what they have -me, NGOs inspire and ernbody the popuiar slogan think gIobuIiy.

act focally: a marriage of socidal spaces &ch narrows the m m for state action.

Different views within this more recent approaeh attnhte different roles to global

societal actors, as weil as varying degrees of tesistance to state institutions. Shaw vie-

civil society actors as working to guarantee accouutability and responsible management

within the state system (the ernergence of a global morality)160, while Sakamoto sees them 16 1

as components ofa project of c'global democratisation from below" . More radical still,

157 Doyle, op. et., 1986, p- 1161.

158 Ibid., p. 1 156.

159 Tmthy Shaw, Wobd Society d Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, fistoncal and

Political Limits of International Society" in Miaknrriwm (Vol 21, NO.^), 1992, pp. 43 1-4- 160

161 Ibid, MacDonald op, ck, 1994, pp. 274275.

Lipschutz considers the rise of baosnatiooat civil society as an doreseen by-product of

the state system itselt: a creature which, like Frankenstein's monster, fimis its mission in

the dernise of its creator- Indeed, though writing fiom well withui the liberal field of

analysis, Lipschutz borrows amply fiom Gnimscian concepts to explain the rise of civil

society in terms o fa smiggle waged Grom the globel gras mots agabut the hegemony of 162

States .

Despite close pinallels with the realist approach, s e v d variants of the likral

critique reviewed here depart substantially from the realist Mew by adophg an esseatially

societal and iadividiialistic appoach to the pobkm of world order and the matmgetneut of

global affairs. As noted, some variants fkom the post-war and d e r cold war periods, are

concemed more with reforming existing relations ammg states, while more recent versions pcacfically dismiss states as illegithate or of Little i~se in meeting human needs.

Al1 point towards a rkb, cornplex global societal sphere in which the state is embedded,

but which realists have characteristically ignorod Likewise, as a resuit of th& uwimon

adoption of self-inteIESted ecbnomic individuais as mits of analysis, they al1 share a

tendency to prescni "increased non-state activity in intemational relations as a way of

underpinning closer relations between States and societies, or undermining hostile attitudes

Evidently, it is to IIW intemational theory that we can most diredy trace

current humanitarian thinkllig about contemporary wars as "societal wnfîicts" and the

consequent centrality of civil society in their resolutioa Indeed, t is not surprising to find

that current prescriptions for both interna1 and extemal restructuriag in support of the

tesolution of contempomry wdicts should so ciosely reflect the fuactional elements of

Mitrany's early workingpeace system. In 1975, Mitrany wrote:

Intemal solutions are sought in a dialogue on new definitions of the state and nation, the creation of democratic institutions, constitutions and electoral processes which enable political cornpetition and cooperation ... The search is for a new compact between society and the state by promothg new fonns of co-operation througb civil

164 institutions and d t i o n s of civic organisations .

1 62 Lipschutz, op. a, 1992, pp, 407-1 8.

163 Archer, op. cit,, 1992, p. 88.

164 Mitrany, op. cit., 1975, p. 145.

The language a d prescriptive content of Mitrany's writings appear to flow almost M y

into the discourse of conflict d y s i s of the 1990~~ as reflected in a cent study on civil

conflicts by Adams and Bradbuy

Intèniatiody, soiutions are h._regional or global institutions for managing intemd conflict This involves dialogue on the limits of sovereignty and international codes of conduct for the pesenation of individual and p u p rights. The idea is to

165 transform the arena thugh and about wbich conflict can îake place" .

What do liberal insights have to offer in aédressing the three trends of integrat~on~

poIi~icisation and power. recailed at the outset of this chapîer? Unlike d i s m , Liberal

international theory provides a ready h e w o r k for explaining the rise of the

international NGO communifYs in the humanitarian sedor and elsewhere, in tem of a set

of sector-specific- fimctional responses to objective aeeds, local or globai, across issue

areas like health, poverty r e d d o a or human rights. Uniike realism, however,

liberalism's emphasis on fimctional interactions has left it poorly equipped with the

analytical tools necessary to theorise a b u t the causes, dynamics and implications of

political power. In particular, liberalism's projection of the private sphere as one of

hinctional relations poses at least two fiindamental anaiytical problems: Fust, it fails to

account for the political wnfiicts which, according to many historical obsemers, have

underpinneci the emergence of modern civil arrangements in the private spkre, not least

the market itself Here we are quickiy reminded, for example. of Karl Polanyi's account of

the violent social dislocations which, over the course of two centuries, atiended Britain's

transformation toward market-based iadustrialism, and of the political w d i c t s between 166

Crown and government that these changes generated . As Ellen Wood has noted, the

liberal representation of prirnarily wnsensual relations among a global collectivity of self-

interested groups and individu& obscures the salience of the potentially coercive

structures and relations which may prevail within the civil sphere itself? AS a re~ult, we

165 Mark Adams and Mark Bradbury, mmmdnmd

. . A- in C h j ü d ILS (Paper presented to tbe "Denlopmeat in ConfIict Worksbop" Md rrt tbc University of Binningbam, November 1994) , p. 12, 166

Karl Polanyî provides a reveaiiig wcamt of the politicai Connicts involvad in the sm@e to establish control ovcr land msoums fbr market gain in early modan England Sac Tltc Gmui T r Z U l S f ~ (Bostoa: &ecoa Press, 1944), pp. 3342- 167

Ellen Wood, "The Uses and Abuses of 'Civil Society' " in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (eds.), T1Cc Sb&& if@ïs&r (London: Merlin Press, lm), p. 73-

85

are left with a somewhat benign image of civil society that does mt consider M y how civil organisations mi@ reflw constÏMe, or othenvise fit into, exïsting global power

arrangemeuîs-

Secondly, and closely nlated to the fht point, h i theory does wt address the

issue of hegemony dïrectly within its own realm of analysis, but rather approaches

hegemony nom the perspective of a rigid dyt ical distinction beîween political and non-

politid realms of international activity. As sucb, Ii'beral theory is cbronically destined to

underestimate the actual or poteritid hegemonic cbsrsrcter of firnctional processes set in

motion by prïvaîe intendonal actors Ure NGOs Hegemmy and civil are made to

appear by 11-s as sepamte, if not whdy contradictory priicesses. "Hegemonies may

wax and wauew comments Doyle "but the liberal peace holdswl- Olson also notes about

the liberal position that

fimctionalism and imperiaIism in modern guise are, almost by definition, inwmpatii1e, since fimctional institutions are claimed to be participatory and

169 maximishg ofgeneral weLfhre, end thus uniikely vehicles for exploitation

To the extent that hegemony does enter into the liberai formula, it is externalisecf to

the political reaim, and the exercise of hegemoitic power assumes a merely fiinctional role

in sustaining the workings of the liberal political-economy. Wowever, as De Wilde

remarks about h i theory: "an important enrichment of fiinctionalism [would bel to 170

specie always for whom someîbing is fhctional and to whor pwpose" . This

enrichment, wbich wouid involve an d y s i s of the relationship between institutional

bction, economic interest and political power, does not seem to have occurred in the

academic progression fiom earlier fiuictionalist writings to the more recent work on global

civil society. Importantly, Underhi11 haç criticised realism for much the same reason,

although fiom the converse view that it "says wthîng about the content of relations among

states, and as such fails to explain why a particular state, hegemon or not, might prefer a

liberal as op@ to any other ~ r d d ' ~ .

168 Doyle, op. àt,, 1986, p. 1 157.

169

170 Olson, op. ch., 1991, p. 93.

171 J. De Wilde, op. ch., 1991, p. 142. UnderhiIl, op- ck, 1994, p- 3 1.

In sum realist and liberpl theoria offer explmatory 8ccouuts of htemational relations by sepsraEiag "statem nom "-etyn and "power" eom "consentn, as weU as

"political" fiom "ewmmic" and "publicn nOm "private" reaims of activity and eLlQUlly- Ln so doing each focuses on the structiires; actors and amibutes of its e v e reslm ancl, as

resuit, neither is prone ?O descnï'bing or expiainhg the underlying social connections

between the two. This keeps &st tbeory h m addressing the private, consennial or

societal dimensions of hegemony. At the same time, liberal theory is of Iimited use in

pointing to the begemonic nature of the civil Society. Taken together, realïsm and

liberalisn appear to tell two sides of the same story, but because they come at it nom

different directions, each excludes the other's anaiysis, and they do not render the story in

its cornplex entirety. As such, n e i k realist nor 1 1 k d international relations theory

properly address the key trends idenîified in this study in texms of hegemonic

construction.

In order to amive at an analytically d e d understanding of hegemony wbich can

account accurately for the convergence between state and societal realms, and which

recognises the political power potentially wielded by private international actors. it is

necessary to move a away fiom the dualist knowledge structures adopted te~pectively by

realist and liberal approaches to intemational relations. This would involve an approach

that creates analytical bridges, between politicel and econornic reaIms, intemal and

international levels of analysis, agency and structure- As Underhill &tes,

We need a link between the state, ecoaomic structure and broader notions of poljtics. The link is the self-interest of agents or actors, whether they be individuais, fonnal or idormal groups or the corporate economic entities ... We must begin developing an understanding of the ccstate-society complex" tbat is the [international political economy] by analysing the structure of the political economy as it becornes increasingly transnationalid In so doing, we begin to come to grips with the material self-interest of political economic agents, and of key social groups, at

1 72 domestic and international levels of analysis .

By recasting international relations in terrns of the material self-interest of

powerful political and economic groupinp. global social d i t i ons and international

172 Underhill, op. ck, 1994, p.35.

87

networks, rather than in temLs of the ~e~regulating (but muhially exclusive aad separately

operating) mecbaaisms of political aruvchy a d market rationality, an entirely dinerent

configuration 0fintenra;tional power emerges, and with it an image of hegemony that may

be b t h dytically w m p e b g and historically rcmted, and which may better capture the redities of NGO humanitanaaiSm - -

in postumflict transitio~~~. It is thus towards the

wusideration of hegemony as viewed through the Lens of a global "state-society cornplex" that 1 tum in the final chapter of this review section.

CHAPTER FOUR

Civil Societv and Hcnemoaic Cowtroction: An Inter~retîvt Fnmework

Thus far. 1 have sought througb preding chapters to make two general points

Fust, at the empincal levelI have identifiecl a number of key patterns of change in the

intemaiioaal aid sectoc The Ne and prolifecation of non-govemmental organisations,

their increasing influence over aid poficy agendas and the allocation of resources on the

groumi, and their politicisation in post-conaict environments, which is to say their

movement from the straightfocward delivery of material aid towards a more active role of

supporting internai institutional and bebavioural transformation in recipient coutries, The

form of humanitarian aid which cuniently prevails is a combination of, on one han4 the

provision of -aï Seryices aimed at ensming minimum stsndards of social equity, and

therefore social stability in acutely volatile situations and, on the d e r band, a growing

wmmitment by NoOs to shore-up public support for politidy negotiated post-conflict

power arrangements (peace setîiements). These patterns, 1 have suggesteâ, conespond to

NGOs' acquisition of a global ordering fiinction which some aid anaiysts have associated

with the objectives of the new policy agenda of market-based post-confïict tecovery and

development This agenda is widely shared among donors, and is reflected in the

increasing salience and use of civil society as an organisational and normative medium for

a change-orienteci form of aid dehery. 1 have suggested that cwrent humanitarian NGO

engagements in pos tad ic t recovery may be understood in terms of hegemonic

construction The objective in Seaion 2 of this study is to determine the degree to which

NGO engagements bave indeed comsponded with hegemonic hctions as emisaged, by

Gramsci, in Mozambique's post-war transition between 1992-97.

The second general point that 1 have tried to make is that mainStream ùItemationai

relations theory does not provide the conceptuai tools necessary to consider NGO

engagements fiom the standpoint of hegemonic construction. This is due in large measure

to the respective anaîytid coastraints experienced ôy h i and reaiist international

theory, most prominently the adoption of reductionist structures of knowledge whkh

discourage an integrated social and ideologicai anaiysis of power. While realism offen

valuable insights into the sigeincaace of power-ôased hegemonies in establishing and

consolidating inteniatid order, its analysis meIy extends beyond î& *te -or, and

thus has little to say aôout the potential coastitutive role of NGOs Conversely, although

liberal thebries emphisise the importance of nomstate actors in shaping internaîional

outcornes, their d y t i d emphasis on the macy of fünctional integraticm as a pathway

to global ordering leaves little scope for assessing the fundamental power relations beyond

the iaterstate s m More specifically, because civil society is typically not cast in ternis

of power relatmionships7 the hegemonic potential of NGOs is not of CO- ta li'beral

international theoty. Momver, since both realist and k r a l explanations are located

within mutually exclusive fields of theoretical enqujr, relatuig respectivvely to state and

society, the hisbrical-material wnnections betwem the two in the stmctmhg and exercise of power relations are not made.

The purpose of the p~eseat chapter is to present hegemony as an historical activity,

rather tban simply a cyclical outcorne of systemic power distri'butious. According to this

image, global political and nomative orders are wnsciously built to reflect the ethical

and material interests of dominant groups operating across the state/society divide,

intemally and internationally, and which can be identifieci at the various levels of

individual, state and structurai anaiysis. Cnicially, by accepting that hegemonic orders are

socially wnstnicted rather tban systemically determined, we also accept that they can be

socially contestai. Exiistng orders are thus open to adjustment nom wunter-hegemonic

pressure. Preconceived "strwhms of mcessity", like "anarchy" and 'me market", are

coilapsed and the prospect of building alternative orders enters the realrn of historïcal

possibility.

In order to present hegemony in these terms, this chapter moves througb a number

of stages: Fust, 1 provide an alternative conceptual mapping of international ordering,

drawing on the notion of the ustate-society cornplex" articuiaîed by Cox on the basis of

texts by G-ramsci, and subsequently employed in the analyses of Umlerhill, Robioson,

Gill and other "critical" theorists of international political economy. The state-society

complex is a se l f -~~f l~~ious ly imprecïse notion which enables a holistic approach to

international order, buî shies fiom producing generalisable explanatory models. As such,

the notional map which 1 attempt to provide is meant to serve as an interpretive guide for

understanding how international orders may be coastnicted, reprduced, contested and

altered in tbe context of prevding and wmtervailing socid f m . UnWre reaüst theones

of hegemonic stability and succession, no attempt is made heie to offér up a universal

exphnation of wntinuity and change in the ordering of inteniational afbüs. In a second

stage 1 draw fiam Gramsci aod Cox to peseat an altemate conception of hegemony as a

process of coasemual social warrtnidion by dominant groups, dose interests are raoted

in prevailing economic forces, and translatexi into the kmwledge of a given

petid. Here I focus specincally on the role of civil society as an institutional and

idedogicai tenain for hegemonic comtmction and contestation. 1 then move to a third

section, in which 1 seek to speci@ the patterns of hegemonic construction wbich are now

at work, and to identïfjr the underlying social forces, interests and pmtagonists of global

ordering over the last decade. In so doing, 1 provide a contexhial and theoretical backdrop

£rom which to examine the role of NGOs in Mozambique's post-conflict transition-

The State-Societv Com~lex: A Framework for Heaemonic Construction

Analytical dichotomies which distinguish between state and Society are especiaüy

unhelpful in understanding the wmplex dynamics of NGO engagement in post-conflict

situations. Generally, the rise of a "global" civil society over the pst two decades, in the

form of cross-national associations and social movements, bas led rnany l1heral observers

to proclaim t h states, and the inîemational public bodies they constitute, have ceaseâ to

play to a central role in the ordering of global an8irs. Civil society, it is held, is moving in

to fil1 the vacuum left behïnd by the retrenchment of the public sector. In this vein, several

aid observers have linked the growing prominence of NGOs to a broader pattern of

privatisation in international affiirsy citing specifically the growiag trend over the last

decade toward the 6'wntracting-out" of aid to civil society and private sector

organisations as reflecting a progressive sbfk nom state-based to market-based aid

This analysis, although not entirely inaccurate, nonetheless oversimplifies the

case. Indeed, in concrete terms, both the standard provision of welfare and the newer

peace-support wodc unàertaken by civil wciety groups in post-conflict ûansitions ove? the

last decade have been strongly supporteci by state funding under bilaterai or multilateral 174

arrangements . And while ïntenWîonal NGOs have visibly affected aid policy and

planning processes, they have done so by integrating tbemselves iato existing bilateral

and multilaîerai agenda-setting stn#:tures. including some of the bighest offices of the

United Nations and its @al agencies. Arguably, while a certain pattern of "contracthg 1 75

out" aid to privately constituted organisations is indoed on the increase . it is not

occurrïng independentiy of official state policy, but rather as resuit of shiffing policy

pferences among official donors who are, in turn, responding to increasing levels of

substantive poiicy input h m the non-govwmental sector. The case of Mozambique's

pst war transition, reported in the cbapters tbat follow, M y bears out the reality of these

processes at d o n a l and locai levels- What therefme emerges is wt, as recent 11'beral

analysis has suggested, a welcome weakening of the state under growing s o c i d pressure,

but a case of shifting policy options within an increasingly imified state/civil society

fiamework of Uiteniation.1 aid deiïvery-

In his writings, critical theorist Robert Cox has attempted to capture and understand s i d a ordering patterns in the wider wntext of the global political economy.

Historical developments in international organisation, production and exchange, he notes,

suggest that wntemporary states and societies are now so interpenetrad that "the

concepts have become purely analytical and only vaguely and imprecisely indicative of

distinct spheres of activit~? As a result, he concludes that any historically relevant

understanding of the contemporary global order must consider the inherent institutional

in

174 See fbr examplc, Stewart, "Happy Ever After in tbe Market Place" , op- cit, 1997. OfEcial financial support for tbe NGO sector increased significantly since tbe beglliaing of the

1990s. By 1991, World Bankankassistcd projads implementcd by NGOs in Atnca accounted for 55% of al1 bans and credits to Aûica in that year. By 1995 over 13% of total combineci OECD aid. flows to the developing worid were charineKed through the NGO sector (Maraissen, op- ut., 1996, p. 406). In No-, stltc financial support to NGOs grew h m U,S.S34 milfion in 1981 (just under 15% of t d b i l a i d aid) to U.S.S233 million in 1991 (26% oftotal) (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affàks, Evahiation Report 3-95, 1995) Appendix 1.w-S. M a r vaiues calculateci by author). Betweczl 1990 and 1992, British sid spending througb NGOs rose h m 4% to 7'96 of total ODA, Swedish spending rose h m 1% to 1496, while in Denmark the increase was h m 11% to 1% (Mar- op. cit., 1996, p. 409.). Between 1991 and 1994, the sbare of Swiss bilateral aid channeIIed through NGOs rose fiam some 13% to over 16% whilc in the Nabafands it increased h m 12% to 1% bctween 1993 and 1994 (OECD/DAC, Annuet Rcpori, 1995.). Weiss suggests that aôout oncqurter of US. deydoPrnent assistance (or just under $23 billion) was channelled throua NGOs in 1994, a figure tbat stands to be doubkd by the end of* deCrde ( 7 . a, 1 996, p. 442).

See, among othas, Donini, op. ck, 1998; M d d , op. ck , 1997- 92

Accordkg to this critical reading, date and society rnay differ ftom one anotber in

form and composition, but they are iatemally wnnected by an underlying social and

economic stnicture which reflects and also shapes the inte- of dominant groups during

a given historical period.

The notion of a ''transnational state-society cornplex" borrows heavüy from the

Gramscian wncept of the ertenrted -- Gramsci was wncemed not only to understand

the institutional connections between state and Society as a matter of andytkai cununosity,

but also to id-, as a basis for fuhae political action, the stmchms through which

dominant social interests, purposes a d power reiations were projected into society. His

extendd -te, as origïnally comived in the 1930's, is composed of what he identifies as

pI&d soddy, wcontaining those institutions which fiinction to edi@ and reproâuce

economic and political power relations tbrough official regdatory and coercive means-

These include the judiciary structures, public administration and police and militftry forces

of the state-proper. At the same time, Gramsci identified chdl sade@ as including those

institutions, outside of the formal state apparatus, which build political and ideological in

consensus around exïsting social power arrangements - Social order, which Gramsci

equates with the extended state, is thus uaderstood in tenns of both the direct dominance

of a coercive administrative/military apparatus and the nomative hegemony established

tbrough the medium of civil organisations. "In comte historical ternis" writes Cox,

Gramsci's conception of civil society included rtie church, the education systern, the

press, dl the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and 1 78

expectations consistent with the begemonic social ordern . For Gramsci* theq political

society (state proper) and civil society are distinguished ody for methodoIogicai purposes

of social analysis The distidon is mt attributed to reality itself, but conceptually

formulated to betîer c lare the "or&anicn comiections between the two.

176

In Cox, op. cit., 1996, p. 86. Antonio Gramsci, Sdaca'i;onsm tk nlijoir N- (Lonâon: Lawrence and Wishart,

1975). p.12.

93

The criticai w o n thus arises as to what in &ce these connections are, a d

how they work Gramscians argue that organic links between staie and society are

multiple, pervasive and historically contiogent, and for the most p r t must be specified

through empirid observation. At the seme tirne, two types of LinlcagP ôetween state and

societal sphens have k a given a geneml emphasis. The fim relates to m a t e d and political interesîs which bùld social groupr together across the two realms. A second

linkage occurs through mrelectdprodt#ition, and relaies more specjfically to the role of

intelieduals in generating consensus around public policy agendas. It is worthwhile to

pause b M y to consider each of these.

First, Gramscians are clear that state and civil society are super-stnictural

constructs built on the foundations of mderlying socioeconomic forces and relations; thaî

is to say, they are spberes of organisation which refiect evolving ecuaomic relations

of production and excbange. Specinc wnfigumtïons of economic relations produce

wncrete social identities and interests among diffèrent social groups whicb cut across the

notiod state-society divide- State and societal institutions, the reguiatoxy measures they

activate and the ideological discourse wàicb explains and legitimates them, are expected

to reflect the interests and identities of the most powexfid among these social groups. As

super-structures, state and society correspond respectively to the coercive and consemual

forces of the same underlying socioccoaomic order in which leading groups occupy and

seek to maintain a dominant position To illustratte the point fkom an international

perspective, Cox draws fiom the example of British supremacy in the 1 9 ~ century, which

he sees as drawn fkom a combination of sea power (state coercion} and the nom (societal

consensus) of liberal economics, specifieâ in tenns o f h aade, use ofthe gold standard,

and fkee movement of capital and pefsons, which gaineci widespread accepEance under the

spread of British idluence. The state-society wmplex of pax britannica was, in tum,

structurally based %th on the ascendatq of manufactufing capitalism in the

intemationai excbange economy [...] and on the social and ideological power [...] of the

class which drew its wealth h m manukming" 17'.

118

179 Cox, op. ch-,, 1996, p. 126. Ibid., pp. 103-105-

L&ewise, changes in the sociole~o~lodc process are scpecfed to p m p r changes in dominant group interests7 and wasqueutly in stak-society oon6gurations. Thus, the

3ntematiodisation of production", identifid by Cox as the con f e a ~ e of today's

global political economy, bas genaated a new set of dominant group identities and

interests on a global d e , embodied in what he calls the "transnatiod managerial class",

and projected ôoth through an "internationalïsed stste'' and a tnuisuationalised civil

society Here for Cox, the "state'' corresponds to international regulatory arraugements

(regimes) which fwilitate, reproduce and potect inîernationalised production processes

fiom comtemailing interests (including cornpethg interests of domestic capital, labour or

ethno-nationalist political groupings), d e global civil society wfresponds to the global

sphere of ideas in which normative support is sought among, or potentiaily contested by, 180

non-dorninant social caîegories . The formation of dominant global interest groups

which bring their power to ôear withui an integrated state society-complex was presaged

by Gramsci some 50 years before Cm. Altbough at his own time of writing Gramsci was

prïmarily concemed with the adysis of bow dominant social coalitions projected their

authority in a singie country7 he nonetheless recognised the tmmational quality of social

power structures:

The unity of the ruiing classes is realised through the State and their history is essentially the history of States or groups of States- But it would be wong to think that this unity is simply jwidical or politicai; the fimdamental unity, concretely, results nom the organic relations between political society and civil societylg1.

If a first set of lînkages between state and society can be identifiai at the level of

socioeconomic processes and the dominant group identities and interests which these

produce, *ch is to say at the level of structure, Gramcians have also emphasised

'intellectual" linkages in the process of policy-making, in other words at the level of

agency. In this vein, Gramsci huaself was preoccupied by the trianguiar Iuiks between

what he d e d the "intell-L strata7' of his the, the "wortd of production", and the

state scfminiscfminisûation. He noted that the historical passage b m an agriculturai to an industriaVtechnical economy was 8cc0mpanïed by a comesponding change in the social

180 Cox defines tbe intamatiodisation of produdion ss " the iategration of ttie production process

on a transnational d e , with diffkrent pbascs of a single proccss M g carried out in diffetem wunmes". As a result ofthis pcoccss, he adds, " it -mes inaeasingly relevant to think in terms of a globai class structmd"'(Ibid., pp. 109-1 1 1)-

profile, ongin and cornmitment of intellectuals engrging in the policy pax~s, which he

ultimately likened to rimCtioIIBnes" of the emerging politicai economy or, more

concntely as "deputies" of L dominluit sociai groups, exercising the subdtern fimctions

of generating consent (tbugh civil society) and eaforciag "discipline on those groups

who do not consent", through the legal ppparatus of the state. To the extent they were

linked, through &minant sochi groups, to the prevailiog organbtion of economic

production, exchange and distriion, Gramsci pointed to a number of "organic" ( i-e.

structurally Iùiked), knodedge based fiinctions:

at the highest level would be the creators of va"ous sciences, philwophy, art, etc.., at the l o w e the mobt humble administrators and divuigators of pnexisting, traditiod

182 accumulateci intellectuai 4 t h -

For his part, Cox has emphasised the key role of "organic inteliectuals", llocated

equally inside the f o n d state administration and beyond it, in undertaking policy-

relevant ccproblemsolving" analyses relatiag to critical issues in the management of globai

politicai and ecommic order. This type of intellechai activity îakes as its point of

departure, and as Ïts hmework for action, the exïsting set of global social instiaitioons and

power relations Tbe general purpose of organic intellectual production in this context " is

to rnake these institutions and relations work smoothly by dealing effecbvely with

particular sources of troublen without at the same tirne "tbe general pattern of iostitutions

and relationships being called into question7'* Cox notes ekewhere that recniitment into

the ranks of this intellectual strata is materidy linked to the core networks of the

statelsociety power stmctwe through research funding prospects, career opportunities,

and the aeed for professional g&ticationl?

A clear expression of the intellectual nexus that binds together the contemporary

staîe-society complex was recently provided by Robinson, under the rubric of the

"extended policy wmunity", made up of speciaiists,

1 SI

182 Gmmci, op. cit., 1975, p.52. Ibid., p. 12.

la See Cox' concise commeatsry on tbe 'sociology of thsorising (ioaers and grwpies)" (op. cit.,

1996, pp. 177-78).

operating out of policy pups, founclatio~~s, thintr tanks, university resesrch institutes and gwernment agencies' bringing long-range politicai considerations and issues wncerning social stabiMy to the attention of the dominant classes and their inner core in the coprate communityunity This gmup of private and public specialists, not limited to [...] f o d govemment stmctura [...] extends back into civil Society, goes well beyod specific elected adrniaistratio~~s~ spans the pamply of institutions in which power is exmiseâ, aad brings together the foxmal state -tus with the network of universities, think tanks, coprate groups... m e exteaded policy community] conducts the ongoing end regmerative pn>ce~ses of policy formation and impIeme-on over exteded pénodslm.

Van der Pijl has recently taken this iine of ttiuiking finther in his analysis of

international class formation by pointhg to the role of inteilectual networks, not just in

policy, but in actually sbaping a d reinforcing the identity of transnational dominant

groups by concretely &g to define their iaterests in the global politid economy in

contrast to those of other, m>n-domïamt groups. Drawing prirnarily fiom examples of

private intellectual networks wrking acracr state ate andietai spheres to promote the

economic tra&iormations of the 19& century (Freemasonry, the Milner Group, the

Rhodes Society) Van der Pijl çuggests that they have played a strong socialising

fiuiction, enabling the dominant social group " to disentangle itself fiom its original

communities or quasi-national cornm~nitïes~~ and bewme trans-nationally "co~ected into

(tentative) chains of control and directiod'lW Importantly, this represents a meeting point

between structure and agency: The state-society cornpiex is bound together by social

group interests resulting both from underiying ecowmic proceses, and due to a

policyhdentity formation process which e&ctively separates the perspectives of dominant

gmups fiom those of other groups.

In sum, by drawing fiom Gramsci's notion of the extended state, we are able to

recast international dations in terms of a @obiil state-society cornplex which is bound up

in historical processes of social and economic change, and given shape by coercion or

consent in a manner that refïects the interests of those social groups best positioned to

direct (and to gain by) these processes. This provides a wholly alternative frsmework for

analysing international order and the relations of power which underpin t Critically, it is

184

1s Robinson, op, cit, 1996, p. 28. Kees Van der Piji, 'TCMSLIlLtioaal Class Fonnation and State Formsn, in Gd1 and Mittleman

(eds.), op. cit., 1997, pp. 125-132. 97

a fiamework wbich enables us to analyse power outside of what is w a v e n t i d y defined as the "state!" spkre, and to begin to consider the role of leading civil society actors,

including traasnational NGOs, in the exercise ofpower and shsping ofworld ordersfS This

said, it needs to be emphasised that M e state-society complexes rdec t the power

structures put in piace by &minant social groups, the âomicmt position of these groups is

itself historicaily contingent, in the sense that s o c i c ~ ~ ~ m m k changes may cause leading

groups to lose their social power and be succeeded ôy O-, conteadiug groups. The abiiity of successive social groupings to achieve, mainialli and consolidate their leading

position in the state-society wntext is a tùnction of the direct power they are able to

exercise over others k u g h formal administrative, juridical and cœrcive mechmîsms. In

part, however, it is a W o n ofthe extent to which tbey are able to establish andproject

their own interests as identicai to t h e of other social aztegories through state-socieîy

networks, transoational d t i o n s , and proœsses (induding orgsnic intelledual output) of

legitimation and consent In Gramscian terms, this comsponds to the ability of leadïng or

aspiring social groups to exercise hegemony.

C i d Society and He~emonv

State and are organically linked but distinguished methodologically

according to their ordering hnction. In an analytical twist that challenges both realist and

liberal inteniatiod theory, the Gnuascian hegemony is lif€ed out of the realm of the

state-proper, which corresponds rather to t&e "fimction of direct dominance" by leading

groups, and insteed Grmly located in the sphere of civil society, understood by Gramsci as 1 86

the "ensemble of organisms commoniy called private" . In fact, fiom the Gramscian

standpoint, the orgaaisatiod aspect of civil society does not differ substantially fiom

mainstream repesentations. Both liberal and Gramscian -ves share a view of the

civil sphere as private and voluntarily constituted, and orgaaised through a multiplicity of

associations which serve to articulate and mobilise the interests of their members. One

notable difference in specification is apparent Gramsci is inciined to include political

parties as civil society organisations which, perhaps more than others, provide an instance

of organic linkage between civil and political society (the state proper) at the elite group

level (la classe dirigente), an inclusion which 11- deEinitions typicaily shy away hm.

This inclusion must stem h m Gramsci's own experieence of poiitical @es at a time

when they aot ody competed to influence gbnrnmeat policy, buî also engaged the social

sphere more dïrectly in seeking to educate and orgmike large sections of the popdation, 187

not lest through control of the pess . More importantly, the inclusion of parties

provides a meaningfûl c h h m the Gramscia. view of civil society as a terrain of

political action and, as such, of potentiai hegemonic comûycüon.

lndeed, where the Gramscian perspective differs fimdameentaily fiom h i

representations of civil socieîy is at the level of its j k t i o n withia the broader state-

society wmplex While civil society may hnctïon, as the l i b l s would have i to "foster

an awaremss of hamony ôetween various dimensions of UidMdual and group identity 188

[...] and recognise a mimial interest wi?h others" , it serves more fiuidamenta11y as a

field of ideological cornpetition amoog rival political projectsh where the legitimacy aad

ratification of dominant group interests are sought, and structurai power is exercised by

shaping collective images and popuiar discourse. Hegemonic stniggle is a stniggle to win

over the ''hearb and min&" of the majority in support of exïsting or ernerging power

arrangements. Hegemony is achieved when collective identity with dominant group

interests is entrenched by consensus over broad cross-sections of society, in other words,

when a ‘‘historie bloc" of interests extends across and perrneates state and society to the

extent that it "is eeough to ensure the confofmify of most people most of the time"'ag. In

this sense, intellectuai production, the stnictunng and d i h i o n of knowledge, and m a s public mobilisation through social professional and religious organisations, are key

generators of hegemony.

In this image of hegemony, the wnseasual aspect of social power in easuriag

general coafonnity prevails over the coercive. To the extent that broad consensus mund

existing power relations remains strong, estabIished social orders prevail peacefidy and

are maintained without the need for recourse to coercion: "Force", &tes Cox, 'Wl not

186 Gamsci, op. cit., 1975, p, 12.

187 ïndeed, Gramsci speculated as to whether tht madcdip of a news~aper may in tkt bave

constiMed an association of civil Society in its own ri* @id., pp. 264-8). 188

Alan Fowler, op. et., 1993, p. 32û-9. 189 Coq op. ciî., 1996, p. 127.

99

bave to be used to aisure the domhance of the strwg to the extent that the prevailing 190

power relations are recognised as legihaten . And to extent that social hegemony is

secure in civil -ety, it =operates

without sanction or wmpuisory obligations, but nevertbeles exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in tIie form of an evolution of customs, ways of

191 thinking and acting moraiity, etc...

In fact, coercion through the state apparatus is taken by Gramscian adysis to

signal a decline in the hegemonic power of the dominant social grouping. Gramsci

distinguishes between a £budarneutal crisis of legitimacy, on one haad, and an active

counter-hegemonic challenge on the other. These aeed not necessanly coincide, but both

cases lead to a movement by the dominant social group towards direct coetcive

domination througfr the state a~paratus- Since the use of coetcion to ensure conformity

and maintain the position of dominant groups implies high costs for the maintenance of

social consensus, it remzrins a measure of iast resort, and thus indiates an ùrstance of

hegemonic failure or cnsis, howwer momentary or chronic. Two separate passages nom

Gramsci descn'be instances of hegemonic breakdown and its impiïcations for the use of

coercion:

A more interventionist government will take the offensive more openly agaiast the oppositionists and organise perrnanentiy the impossibility of intemal disintegration - with controls of every kind, political, administrative, etc.- - [and the] reinforcement

1 92 of the hegemonic "positionsn of the dominant group ...

If the niling class has lost its consensus, Le. is no longer leadïng but only dominant, exercising coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have becorne detached fiom their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe wbat they

193 used to believe previously .

Interestingly, Gramsci speculated about a hypotheîical context of uncontested

hegemony, in which a dominant bloc of interests might e>qiand to occupy the entire space

of the civil sphere. He identifsied this context as one of "an ethicai society", in which "it

190 Cox, op. cit., 1996, p, 99.

191 Gramsci, op. cit., 1975, p. 242.

19.2

193 Ibid, pp. 238-9. Ibid., pp. 275-6.

is possible to imagine the coacive element of the date withenng away by degrees, as ever

more conspicwus elements of civil society make theù a-"- Such a context, he

eontended, wodd amount to a cormete merger of state with civil socieîy, in which the

regdatory hmctions of the foxxner would k subsumed by the self-regdation of the latter7 194

a Ttate wirhout a State" or, stated difkmttly, ciid sociew as the m e . Gramsci was

quick to note thai such a situation of uncontested hegemony be conceived of only in

theory, and on the basis of ungmunded assurnptions that "d men are cqually rational and

moral" and "capMe of accepting the law spontaneously, k l y , and not through coercion, 1 95

as imposed by another class" - And indeed given the v q real "hardening" of the

reguiatory and coercive elements of state institrraons in the early 1930s' any sufh SC-O

would have appeamd as highly improbable from Grasmci's own historical (prison cell)

vantage point Nonetbeles, the ide0 of state witbut a srnte represents an intriphg

forecast of the currently dominant discourse on civil society as "filling the vacuum left

behind by the staîe" and contemporacy effor~s to develop strategies for a global

govername without gmernment- To the extent that cliscourse of civil socieîy was widely

adopted in the 1990s and tninslated into conmete policy stnitegies by powemil national

and international agencies, it cm arjpably be understood in terms of hegemonic

constniction,

Thus far, my discussion of Gramscian hegemony and civil Society has dram

primarily fiom experiences ui domestic politics, and lacks a clear international expression.

How does the Gramscian notion of hegemony translate into intera8fjonal relations? One

reason for the absence of clear distinctions between domestic and interna~~onal levels of

enquiry in Gramsci's own thinking is tbat he appeats not to have cmsidered them

analyticaily relevant. And indeed, by concerning himself with the exercise of power by

social groups, as opposed to unitary mes, such distinctions dissolve, and a

transnationalist outlook of intemational a f h k emerges as a result. In a rare reference to

international relations as such, Gramsci establishes the logical wority of interna1 social

relations:

194 To clarifjr, this should be uaderstood as "an mtadd Statc 0.e. statc-society cornplex) without

a S t a î e - p p H (Ibid., pp. 262-3-). 195

Ibid., p. 263, 101

Do intemational relations precede or follow (logidy) h m fimdamenfal social relations? There can be no do& tbat they follow. Any organic innovation in the social stnichne {..J m d e s organically absolute and relative relations in the international field -

International relations as such are reproduced as an exteasion of local social

relations, and in this sense, changes in the diplomatic or military positions adopted by

States, and indeed even in balance-of-power regimes, can be attn'buted to changes in

social dations in a transnational conte* Since dominant social forces comect across

state-societies, power (in both its coercive and hegemonic aspects) is exercised in a similar

or paralle1 mamie+ within and across domestic social contexts- The potential for

international hegemony emerges through a transnational civil society of cross-bomdary

social relations, to the extent the latter reflect simïlar patterns of structural change

occurring in multiple national contexts. By focusing on social groups Gramsci effectively

collapses the distinction between foreign and national social forces, and enmeshes tbem in

a single process of hegemonic cuIIStNCtim:

Ow may conclude that o h the so-dled "foreigners Party" is not really the one which is so commonly termed, but -sely the most naitionalistic - which in reality represents not so much the vital forces of its own country, as that country's

197 subordination and economic enslavement to the hegemonic d o n s -

Cox has translatai Gramsci's notion of transnational hegemonic expansion into more

current language. He lürewise begins with domestic political economies, wbere dominant

groups consolidate a "historie bloc" of interests by "developing and sustaining mental

images, technologies and organisations" &ch fimction to reproduce the existing

structure of social relations and ensure general confomity CCmost of the tirne". A global

hegemony is thus "in its beginnings an ouîward expansion of the internal hegemony by a

dominant social class", and spreads outwards bansnationally as " the economic and social

institutions, the culture and the technology associated with [...] nation& begemony becorne

patterns for emulation Hegemony at the international level, Cox concludes:

1% %id-, p. 176,

1 97

198 Ibid., p. 176-7. This process of emulation, or absorption, is assocküed with Gramsci's concept of the "passive

rewohation", with which he r e h to the p q p s s k eutrenchment, among Eucopean societies of the 19* camiry, of political ccaaomy modcls inspirai by the poli<ial, inteUcctuai lad emnomic

102

.As thus not rnerely an order among states. It is an order within a world economy and with a dominant mode of production which peaetrPtes into all wuntries and links iato other sub-orduiate modcs of producfion, It is dso a compJex of international relationships which connect the social classes of the di&rrat counûies [...]World hegemony, fiatbermore, is scpessed in univerd noms, ïnsîiMicms and mechgaisms which lay down des of bebaviom for states (pper) and for those forces of civil society that act across national boundarïes, d e s which support the dominant mode of

- - 199 production .

The hegemony of domiriant groups, which is to say broad consensus around theu

dominant inteFPsts and values, is sought and globlly transmiw through the institutional

medium of civil Society. Yet, crucially, fiom the Gramscian perspective, civil society is

not reduced to a mere chaoael for hegemonic oontrol. Potentiaüy, it is a locus of

articulate, -c and conflictuai exchange among diverse sets of collective images and

stnictured representatiom of social reaiity- In the same way that civil society may serve to

project a single, dominant COLIS~L~SUS, it is also an arena where contrasting views on the

legitimacy of current power structures, on prevaiig codes of morality and utiliîy, and on

the validity of lmowledge are presented and contested, and wmpete to prevail over policy

choices and the public imagination Civil society is thus a platfonn for both order and

structural change. It is where political stniggle occurs. To make thk point, Gramsci drew a

vivid conceptuai paralle1 between military wnfiontation, on one band, and political or

ideological conflict among social groups, on the other- In both cases, he suggested,

challenges to existing order may be coaoated with an array of measures on the part of

the state (proper), including the &plopeut of forces aad disciplinary reguiations. The

coercive state may nonetheless repcesent the mere outer perimeter which, if breached,

reveals a resilient complex ofestablished social organisations, kthitionalised values and

identities, and accepted modes of behano~f- It is in this tenain of civil society that, for

Gramsci, hdamental hegemonic confrontations occur, and that stnictural change

becornes possible. In order for hegemony to be achieved or successfdly contested, the

"'trench systems and earthworksn of civil society must be occupied2? While this analogy

may seem somewbat stretctied, it mnetheless speaks duectly to recent writings on the

challenges posed by "collapsed States", to the issue (now fkquently raised) of the

leadership of tbe French Revolution, It is aqurlly asxhted, as Cox explains, with the notion of tru.!@omismo, mre widdy used on the Itahan political I d t aad graftcd by Cox into tbe transnational context See Cox, op.* 19%, p-137. 199 Coq ibid.

endurance of local -etal "copiug mechammis" d the emergence of fimctioning

political-economies (however un-civil they may be considered by ouîside oôservers)

during periods of civil war, and to many of the civil society response strategis cutteritly

being employed.

Having outlined the core Gramsian notions of the extended state, state society

complex, and of the hegemonic fùnction of civil socieîy, 1 must at îhis point address the

question of what advantages this perspective offers to my analysis of Mozambique's pst

wnflict transition. As noted at tbe be-g of this chapter, it does not offer parsimony,

nor the advantage of a general causal mode1 for explaimng or predicting international

outcornes. On the c o q , it suffers fiom the weakness of broadening the range of

en& in a conceivabiy inhite nurnber of directions. It requirw d y s t s to probe in

depth into fluid s0clSOClal processes and everyday relations of power amang individuals and

groups which act locdly or globally and, more chdenging dl, to s p i @ connections

between changing socio-eumomic structures, the interests of lead agents in the

international political ecowmy, and policy choices. By collapshg traditional d y t i c a l

dichotomies it proposes ambitiously, and perhaps impossibly, to approach the economic,

political, social and culturavideological dimensions of international relations as a single,

integrated complex. And because it asks about the social on'gins of international

relations rather tban modelling it, the Gramscian perspective raises the danger, fiom an

explanatory standpoint, ofchronically posing more questions than it provides answers.

Nevertheless, looking back in comprison to the analytical possibilities offered by

the maiastream of realist and Liberal international theory, the Gramscian perspective on

hegemony provides three conceptual advantages in addressing the issue of NGO

engagements in post conûict situations like Mozambique. First, the image of an integrated

state-society complex enables us to broaden the terrain of enquiry to include what are

traditionally designaiecl as non-state actors as subjects of political analysis. In so doing,

the enquiry can respond simultaneously to realist concems for understauding the àynamics

of contempomy global power, as well as to the increasing importance rightfiilly attniuted

by 1i'ber.l writers to the role of actors in shaping international events. Moreover,

the recasting of international relations Iiom an integrated state/society perspective appears

200 Gramscj op. ciî, 1975, p 235.

104

to account more acciirately for the empirïcal developments in the aid sector himghted

earlier in this study, which is to say the increasing use strategies whereby piblic f h d s are

appropriated by private o ~ o n s to deliver public g d and services in Situations of

extreme political and economic insecununtytY WMe aclQessing core thematic ConCeftlS of

international relations theory, therefore, the tbesociety h e w o r k has the added

advantage of being empuical1y more accwate aod thus more analytically compeI1iag.

Secondly, the Gramscian perspective allows us to view hegemony as a

transnational process of consemus-building, thus linking coase~lsus with power. Indeed, it

requires us to raise w o n s about the politid content of intermtiod COILS~L~~~~S,

cooperative regimes and the social power stmctum which they are meant to mstain or,

alternatively, to transfom. As a resuit, it becomes possible to engage in a power aaelysis

of co11sensus-building activities of NGOs in post-conflict situations, in otba words, to

begin to detamine what types of power relations are king upheld or aeated by what

might otherwïse appear as a fMctiod plocess of sociio-ecommic recovery, communïty

building, and post-conflict reconciliatiom Here again, the core concenis of both realist and

liberal intemational theory are e q d y ad&esed, while avoidïng the coercive and state-

centric amiiutes of hegemony imposed by the former, and the smctly hmctional,

apolitical and volmtary connotations of consensus imposed by the latter.

Finally, the fiinctions of civil society, about which realism says little and liberalism

would appear to have the h l word, are problematised on a number of wunts which,

given its current centrality to the way aid is organiseci and implemented, are of direct

relevance to my enquiry. Here again, Gramsci's interpretation raises three significant

points: Firsf unlike liberalism, the Grarnscian d n g does not adopt a priori the

position that transnational civil society, a d the agencies that cunstitute it, refiect tbe

interests of the global majority, but may M o n rather to support and reproduce existing

power structures r e f l d n g the minority interests of dominant social groups, primanly by

projecting majority and minority interests as if they were identical- Second, this apprich

ernphasises that prevailiag lines of active or latent political tension do not, as modem wnflict analysis suggests, necessarily elcist between state and societal forces, but among

transnational hietamhical social categories interacting across both realms at local and

global levels. This point refers back to tinkages within tbe state-society cornplex, but

emphasises that dynamics of cornpetition for political power are at work withn the

seemingly hctioaal civil sphere, as weli as wïthin the state. Thùd, civil Society k wt, as

the prevailing tMong cumntly suggests, a antinal locus of social hanaorÜsation, peaw

and stability, but potentidy also one of acide ideological conaict a d institutional

transformation Civil sotie stands , to d l the earlier military reference, as the social

trench system undet the terrain o f M e bdween social forces of order and change. Figure

2 below provides a summary commson of how realist, h i and Gnunscian

perspectives on hegemony account for the three trends of integration, powet acquisition

and politicisation that have &Ekcted civil society organisations in the aid sector over the

pastdecadeecade

FIGURE 2: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL ACCOUiYTS

Because of the advantages it offers, the Gramsian perspective on hegemony, will

constitute the theoretical basis of my anallysis of experiences before and during

Mozambican transition in the next section of this paper- Before moving on to that stage

however, it is necessary for the sake of cl-, and in order to follow through as far as

possible with the historicist commitment of the Grarnscian approacb, to provide some

contemporary empirïd content to the concephial discussion in which 1 have thus îar

engaged The remainder of this cbapter thus focuses on recent neo-Gramscian attempts to

specify the mechanisms, actors and processes of hegemonic order in the 1990s which together constitute the broader histoncal context in which Mozambique's transition bas

unfolded.

106

Conternpxarv Hewonic Order Mecbanisms, Acfas and Content

Reference was made in earlier cha@ers to the prevdence of certain policy

orientations in the aid sector of the 1990s. While these orientations soliciteci some measure of debate and evea dissent, they nonetheles apjmr to have been mutuaily ooherent and

widely acceptecl in official and non-governmental circles, to the extent of c ~ n s t i ~ n g

what some aid observers have dubbed "the new policy agenda". And as mted eariier, the

policy agenda of the 1990s has been seen as resting on two connected components. One

has involved a cbange in pragmaîk objectives, reflecting a away fiom traditional aid

delivery towards new fonns of support for institutional and behaviod change in

recipieut coutlfties. This shift has been observed in the iinking of foreign assistance to

national economic adjustment performance7 in active intemaîional support for legal and

administrative reform programmes7 and the poliferafion of programmes for localised

community-building, non-traditional enterpnse support, vuberable group empowerment,

and so on, A second compnent of the new aid agenda involves the increasing prominence

attributed to global markets, as opposed to states, in generating developmental outwrnes

Here again, this has been obsewed in concrete tenns: The encouragement of private

investrnent and joint ventures linking domestic and international capital, exchange and

interest rate stabilisation, the reduction of national traâe barners and the dismantling of

protective bilateral trsde arrangements (ail of which are reflected, for exampie in the

recent re-negotiation of the Lomé Convention between the European Commmity and

some 70 developing couafnes) are among the measures wherently imptemented in this

direction- As noted earlier, many aid experts have argued thaî the increasùig proportion of

officiai firnds channelled through the NGO sector is consistent with a market-oriented

development strategy, wtiile the presumed effect of market forces in "levelling"

confiichial pditical landscapes Mcewise underpins theïr strategic devance to post-conflict

recovery and peace-builâïng. For rnany, the strategic component of the new agenda hes

included active cultural and educational measures, from internationaily-sponsored

academic scholarships targeting practising or fbture civil service officials, business

workshops held in situ, to rnicro-credit projects enwuraging local fmers to switch fiom

subsistence to global vaiue-added cropping, the cumulative e f f i of which is to produce

marketaienteci outlooks and C'eco~mistic" decision pattierns. It is in this broad

combinaiion of -tic and sûategk efforts to mate what Oill, following Karl

Polanyi, has called a "market civilisationw that we can begin to trace the wntours of

As a matta of dyt ical priority, tracing hegemony in a fim instance to the

globalisetion of markets and ecodc poduction is consistent with Gramsci's llinlaige of

dominant group interests to the changing stnictures of politicai econcmyy If global

hegemony is indeed equivalent to a global projection of the minority interests of leading

social groups, then hegemony carmot be understd without first identifjing the

underlying materd pocesses to which these dominant interests are concretely connected,

It is helpful to d l at tbis point Cox's reference7 cited above, to the

"internationalisation of production" as the defining ffeatiirp of the contemporary global

political ecowmy. For Cox, intematioalised production (whereby different components

of a product are made at different IOC8fions of the pianet) , and more recently the

ascendency of international finance (whereby investment capital is sought and obtained in

global financial markets), creates new social structures, relations md group identities

which link up transnationally across boundaries7 an important e B i of which has been to

generate the creation of a global bloc of *tests in support of globally fiinctioning

productive a d financial systems. Under cunent patte- ofeconomic globalisation, Cox

has recently specified the emergence of an integrated global social structure in the

following te=:

At the top is a core wodcfiorce of highly skilled people bztegrated into the wobal] management process. These people take the decisiocis about what is produced and by whom. They carry on research and development; they maintain the productive apparatus; they staff the administrative hmeworks and propagate the idedogy of globalisation,

At a second level, this integraîed core is flaaked by a larger omber of supporthg workers whose numbers vary with the level of demancl for products. Their lesser level of skill makes them more essily disposable and replaceable. These are the precatious workers. They are located where business is o f f d the lowest' labour costs, the greatest f l ex i i ty in the use of labour, i-e. the least protection of workers' rights in jobs, and tbe weakest enviromental umtrols. These workers are segmented by ethnicity7 religion, gender and geography, and thus are not easiiy organised

201 Gill, op. cit., 1995, p. 399.

collectively to cmfhmt management m a united manner- Transnationat production has accenaisiod social fragmentation [...]

The third level comprises those pople who are exciided fkom intemational production. Thcy include the uaanployed and many mal1 low-technology enterprises in the ncber counbies, and a large number of the marginaiïsed population in pow

202 corntries .

Since these emerging socid shucnircs involve a hierarcbical (mequal) distn'bution

of tasks and maîerial rewards, speeinc group interests in the production process (those of

owners, managers and salaried workers) are mt Owxssanly identicai, but nonetheles

common enough to share a collective stake in upholding and reproducing intemationai

d e s , noms, proceduries and behaviod codes which faciltate wntinuity in the

production process. At the same tirne, the interests, loyalties and social identities of those

involved in the internatiooalised prohrtm pn>cess are decouplad fiom those who

remain outside it, that is to say those employed in isolatexi or localised production or those

who are not employed at dl. As the processes of global production penetrate new areas

and incorporate growing numbers of uidividuals, a global bloc of intelests expands as

localised affiliations, to nation, party or ethnic clan, pogressively d e .

This mapping of the emerging global social structure is consistent with the

findings of Stephen Gill who has focused on transnaiio~l cornpimies and banlang

instiîutions which constitute the organisational core of globalised finance and production

processes. GiI1 has been able to provide some initial quantitative information on dominant

core groups. According to studies conducted in the mid499OYs, some 37 000

transnational h s (compared to 7 000 in the early 1970s) controlled a full third of global

fixed assets, a percentage expeded to rise substaatislly over the decade. They accourrted

for between 20 and 40 percent of global production and trade, with much of the latter

occurring amongst &liaies on an inim-nmi basis. By 1992, one hundred of the top

transnational fim were regïstering global sales equivalent to a quarter of global GNP.

Multinationals dùactly employed an estimated 72 million people (of which 15 milLion in

the developing world), or some five percent of the global wwlborce, which "is well paid

un Robert Cox, "Cid Society at î k Tum of tbe M i l l d u m : Prospects for an Ahernstive World

Order" in Mc). efl-Sbrcacs (Vol 25), 1999, p. 9. 109

and tends to enjoy better worlong conditions tbm those in local fimis" and forming part

of a modern, traasaatioonai uhistoricai blocm with its "nucleus -

wmprising elements of the G-7 state apparatuses and transaational capital (in m a n u f i g , finance and services) and assoc- privileged worlrm and smaller fhms (e-p small and middle s k d businesses Linked as contractors or suppliers, import-export bus&, and service companies, such as stockholders, accountants. coIISUitancïes~ educatiod entqmzeucs architects and desi->'O3

Likewise for Cox, this nucleus of intaffts incldes %ose who manage the

intemaîionally-oriented sectors withh cornaies, the finance mmistq officiais, local

managers of enterprises linked to inteniational production systems"201 ad, importantly,

integrated segments of international labour movements. Gi11 points to the fiirtber

expansion of wre interests iato broader global society tbrough processes of

cornmodification, w~l~umer transaction d techadogical advance, increasingiy sçcepted 205

as means of "self-acnialisatim" in the gIobal political econamy -

Within this c0ntex-t of globai socid restructuring, Cox , Gill and Robinson have

specified broad mechanism of hegemonic constmction- Cox in particular points to the

creaîion of intemationai organisations and regimes as rtie process through which the

institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed" and, as noted in Chapter 1,

identifies five dimensions of international organisation which reflect their potential

hegemonic role:

Among the features of international m ~ s a î i o n which express its hegemonic role are the following: (1) the institutions ernkdy d e s wbich facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are thcmselves the product of hegemonic world order, (3) They ideologically legitimate the norms of world order, (4) they co-opt the élites f?om peripheral corntries; and (5) they absorb cornter-hegemonic ideas206.

Matching each of these fatures to current international @ce wodd be a matîer

of empincsl research over a bmad range of global sectors ami issue areas, and is beyond

203 Ml, op. cit., 1995, pp. 4o01401.

201 Cox, op. cit, 1996, pp. 1 11-2

20s GiU, op. ck, 1995, p. 40 1-

the scope of tbis study. However, in generaJ terms, Gramschm bave iddfied various

international Uistitutions and public reguiatory bodies, such as the UN, the World Tmde

Organkation, the Trilaberal CommisSion, the Commission on Global Govermance, and

International Fiaancial Institutions, as perforrning the regdatory and normative fimctions

nom within the realm of "political society" or sta&qxoper, which have sought to

facilitate and maiisge the expuion of- global markts in the post World War II

period. In the aid sector, we might SpeCiflcalIy add such speciakd institutions, fimQ or

programmes as the OECD Development Assistance Cornmittee, the World Bank, the

Paris Club of donors and creditorrs, the Lomé system, ECHO, the UN humanitarian

zigencies and, increasingly, military organisations linked with humanidan operatons.

Each of these arrangements is nomis-creatiag, and al1 have contributeci, albeit with

varying degrees of policy coherence, to the focmulation and implementation of a more

market-oriented policy agenda tban had ken the case in eariier decades. Moreover, an

Unmeose body of officisi and semi+fficial studies on democratic development,

community empowermeat, peaoebuilding and conflict pievention, and "principled"

humanitarian programming, testifies plainly to a discourse of legitimation. This has been

developed with the assistance of intemal and extemai expertise h m a wide array of

interconnected official and private research locations, and appears to be wmprehensive,

cornplex and flexible enough to engage and potentially absorb an int?nite range of

alternative models, as well as manage technical or phibsophical adjustments to the agenda

as dictated by evolving needs or ul~ns-learned"2m. Despite its apparent varïety, the

bulk of this work maintains and seeks to resolve contradictions withïn, rather than

systematicaiiy challenge, the core strategic vision of the new policy agenda: the

prominence of markets as a vehicle of global developent, and the attendant

subordination of other foms of orgaaisation or practice-

206 C q op. ut., 1996, pp. 137-38,

207 in the specific case of post-oonfüa transitions, stu& generaîed by the World Bank's Post

Conflict Unit are prominent examples of agenda-sustainhg reseatcb acbvity. Otber examples h m both official and nomofficial sources iaclude rcscacb Conducfed by the Lcssons LRarned Unit of the UN WEce for the Co+dhîiou of Humanimian AfEn; the War-Tm Societits Initiative conducted by the UN Rescarch Insiïtute fOr Social Dtvelopment; tbe Humanitarianism and War Project suppmtcd by the Watson Institute for International Studies (Brown University), the Carnegie Foudation's project aa "Pmmüïng Deadly C d i d " , the International Peace Academy's commissioned research on 'The Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars" the work of the Brusseis-haseci Conflid Prevention Nctwork which links the European Commission to research institutes and University firaihies, and the CIaiibril Ghmwace publicatioos of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, to name just a fèw encuuntered during this tcscatcb dort-

111

Stephen Gili, although not directly addressiug Cox's discussion on the hegemonic

fiuiction of international ~rga~sations, wndheless bleds Coxian insights into his own

conception of a %ew constitutionalism". Gill d e m i this as a wmativdregdatory

a w o r k which has been gdxxhg shape, under different forms a d at a variable pace in

diverse issue areas, policy domains, and le@ jurisdictions, but consistent in terms of

co~ecting, by d e or regdation, sepamte geographical and thematic components of

global govemance into the overriding prionties of the new policy agenda. Citing specific

examples of provisions in the Màastricht and NAFTA treaties, Gill spares few invectives

in o u t k g this process of global constitutionai formation, and 1 quote him here at some

Disciplinary neo-ll'beralism is institutiorialid et tbe mac~o-level of power in the quasi-legal m g of the state end international politicai forms: the "new constitutionalism". N e w constitutionalism is a macro-political dimension of the process whereby the nature and pupose ofthe public sphere [...]bas been redefïned in a more privatisai and cornmodifieci way, with its ecomrnic criteria defïned in a more globalised and abstmct h m e of derence. N e w constitutioNilist proposais are often hplicit rather than explicit. ne ver the les^^ they emphasise market efficiency, discipline and confidencey economic policy credibility and consistency, and limitations on democratic decision-making processes. Roposals imply or mandate the insulation of k 9 aspects of the ecommy nom the influence of politiciens or the mas of citizens by imposing, internally and extemally, binding wnstraints on the conduct of fiscal, monetary, bade and investmet policies [-..] Central to the new constitutionalism is the imposition of discipline on public institutions, partly to prevent national interference with the property rights a d entry and exit options of the holders of mobile capital with regard to patkular jurisdictions20a.

If Cox and Gill apjxar concerned primarily with the normative and regulatory

functions of international public arrangements corresponding to wbat Gramsci would have

dehed in texms of a globally d e s c i n g "political Societyn (or state proper), Susan

Strange has focussed more on concentrations of politicai power within civil society in her

survey of consultancy fïrms, mafia circuits, private cartels and otber global networks for

which there are as yet wmparatively few official regulatory fnuneworks. Her hdings on

the inte-ons between state and society actors, in particdar on the growing

complacency of the former in the fhce of the increasing innuence of the latter, are

208 Gia op. cit,, 1995, pp. 412-3.

consistent with the gemrP1 a s d o n s made by Gd? From a perspective much closer to

the coacerns ofthis curent study, Robuison has sweyed the d e of aokgovemwaEpl

organisations of civil society in working, ~ n a t i o d l y and across the statesociety

cornplex, to extend the reach of hegemonic mechanisias deeper udo the social fabnc of

developing corntries receiving extenial assistance. Fn his in-depth case studies of the

Philippines, Nicarqua, Chile and Ehïti, Robinson provides cornplhg evidence that the

increasing use of civil society es a channe1 for change~rieated assistance reflects comte

efforts by US and transnational corporate interests, o p e d g in those wunties, to replace coercive, me-&ven "social wntrol fiom above" with a more consensual form of "social

control from klow for the purpose of meipging change and reform so as to prevent

elernental challenges to the social order". This strategy of hegemonic extension, Robinson

suggests, helps to explain why outside interventions "do mt target governments per se, but

groups in civil society itseif - ha& unions, political parties, tbe mass media, peesant 2 10

associations, womai's, youth, ami other mass organisations" .

The organisations cited by here by Robinson embociy the "trench systems and

earthworks" of an increasingly internationalised, or globd state-society cornplen They

represent the normative and organisational te- tbrough which dominant or ascendant

global interests have acted in the 1990s to c011solidate social power through consensuai

hegemony. In post-codict situations, where domestic institutions are particularly weak,

humanitarian NGOs locked into interdependent financiai and policy relatiomhips with

internationalised government authorities, have becorne protagonists of this process. As 1

attempt to show in my discussion of the Mozambique expenence, international NGOs

have actively reached down Uao local wmmunities to engage grass mots movements, or

to stimulate their emagence where they do not yet exist, in an effort (more or l e s CO-

ordinateci but generally coherent) to wnnect them more directly with the structures,

processes and dominant interests of the contemporacy global order.

209 Strange, op. cit., 1996,

2 10 Robinson, op, cit., 1996, p. 69.

CHAPTER FWE

War and Pace ia Moumbiaue: Ebhrv. Soc- and Hcntmonic Channe

In the previous section, the wnccptual gnnmd was laid for an analysis of NGO

interventions in post-conflict reconstnrction in Mommbique by invoking the notion of

hegemony. Thwretically, this involved a departure h m the dominant, realist usage of

hegemony towards a dif5ei.eat udemtanding, based on a (neo)Gnunscian approach which

emphasises interest--bgsed power relations ammg sxia i groups within the context of a

globalising state-society cornplex, and which posits civil society itself as the key tenain

for building hegemonic power. The justification for this move was made on coocephia2

empiricai and pol i t id grounds ConceptuaUy, the Gramscian notion of hegemony directly

addresses the issue of inteniational order and tbe con.figilrations of power which make it

up, while eliminatiug artificial boundaries between politid and economic, state and non-

state, and local and global spheres of inferest and action which have limited the devance

and utility of maiastream approaches to intermîional relations. In turn, this removal of

conceptual "brackets" wmmits analysts to render a more detailed, comprehensive and

redistic historical account of the social and poiiticaî forces (actors, structures aud

processes) which mderpin existing orders and power configurations- In other words, by

doing away with abstrad disciplinary distinctions, the Gramcian apjiroach requires that

theoretical understandings be more solidly comected with empirical observation Indeed,

Gramsci's own understanding of hegemonic power was not acbieved through a priori

theoretical modelling, but by directly observing the politid, social and economic changes

of his time. Finaily, Gramscians do not adopt the m a d e of scientific wutrality, buî

explicitly mgnise the ptential for theoretid enquiry to brhg about political change.

By demonstratug linkages ôetween theoretical analysis and political and iciedogical

iiiterests or projects, Giamscian scholarship not only weakens assumptions about social-

scientific objectivity, buî also legitimises the use of historical interpretaîions as a basis for

political action For enquiries, like this one, which are concemed as much by

understanding "wh.t is" as well as outlining strategies for 3vhat Illjght be", the

recognition of tkory as a political endeavour is equally a rekhing and useful point of

deparîure.

At a more collCTefe level of empirical enquiry. the appnmch also provides

observers with @c tods for examining the hegem@c quelity of existing institutions

and agents withm îbe global political txonomy. As mted in the prewious chapter. Cox has outlined the hegemonic d e of internatid organisations in terms of five fimctiuns which

provide indicative Pde1ines for empkical enquiq in the field1'. At his time of wurithg

Cox was coacerned primanly with analysing the hegemoaic d e of international public

organisations (the Bretton Woods regimes* the OECD, and UN special agencies). Cox

found these organisations to perform both regulatory and normative fùnctions in the gloôal

social and economic arena tbughout the Cold War perïod However. if if d

interstate orpanisations stood as the dominant fàctors of order in world a f h h up until the

late 1970s, Cox's indications about how ta gauge the hegemonîc fimctions of iniernational

agencies need wt k Limited to the state sectorr With the growth of a powerhil non-

govemental Ud sector beginning in the 1980~~ and particularly in light of thek

inrreasing integration into official aid processes and the growing political importance of

their work throughout the 1990Ys, it bas become historïcally salient to extend Cox's

discussion across the broader state-society cornplex, and to apply it more dïrectiy to the

workings ofagencies forrnally located outside of the state sphere, that is to say global civil

society as sucb,

Cox's specincation of the five hegemonic fhctions of international 0rgani~o11

raises a corresponding number of questions which am appmpriately fiame empirical

discussions in the speci6c case of the role of humanrtanan . -

NGOs in post-conflict

Mozambique: They provide a basis, fht, for considering the degree to which NGOs

operating in the post-codict transition embody the new policy agenda and facilitate its

expansion uito the Mozambican context. Secondly, they raise questions as to the degree

to which international and local NGOs have worked to legitim-se the normative (e.g pro-

market) basis of the new policy - most notably with regard to their work in local

civil society support, democfafisation and comiaunity empowement, but w l e s

importantly in technical areas of s e ~ c e provision, credit, agrïcultural pmdrntion and

incorne-generaîion Moreover. Cox points us towards important questions about the

interactions between the h u m a n i t h NGO sector and local ledets, caâres of the

nationaî, provincial and district administrations and traditio~mi auîhorities, specifically the

degree to wbich such relationships have brought 0ationa.l leaders closer to the core of

material interests and normative values *ch defi= the new policy agenda F W y ,

Cox's point about the absorption of cornter-hegemdc ideas focuses mon on the roîe

of NGOs in creating dynarnics for a sust.iaed poiiticai consecisus mund the terms and

hdamental tenets of the peace dement ,

1 attempt to show tbughout tbis section thst, despite a visMe variation among

several individual NGOs in operatiorial style, programming approach and normative

background, the aggregate work of the No0 sector in Mozambique baween 1992 and

1997 has largely conespondad to the fiinctions specified by C a In so doing, 1 give

particular attention to how these fimctions have been inte&ratwl hto postaonict

humanitarian activiîies d mtlcrefely &ed out on the g r o d Their e!?ècts, in tems of

bringiag about desired behavioural and normative change, are much more difficult to

gauge, but are nonetheless at least in part determined by concrete developments in

Mozambique's peacetime politicai economy.

This first chapter of Section II begins with a historical review of intemational

engagements in Mozambique, beginning with the early colonial period, following througb

to eariy independence and the post-independence struggle between the M . s t regïme and

the externally backed rebeI movement wbich set the stage, ultimateiy, for peace in 1992.

The review has two purposes: the first and more straightforward one is to place the

Mozambican post-war transition -together with the massive extenial intervention, and the

work of non-govemmenîal groups which chanictensed it- in historicd wntext A second

purpose is to take the opportunity of applying, albeit perbaps in a prelirninary mamer,

some insights of Gramscian hegemonic analysis to earlier stages of Mozambican history

so as to highlight important historicaî patterns of hegemonic construction in Mozambique

prior to the cunent postwar transition, some of which we might find reflected in the

cucrent transition itself. In so doing, I hope to historicise the d o n of hegemony itself;

that is to say, point to the evolving combinations of local/international iaterests, inter-

group relations, and normative hmeworLs underpinning hegemonic auihonty tbrough

211 These are taken up again in Chapter 8 of this study-

116

successive time By putting hegemoic consûuction itself into historical

perspective, 1 emphasise it as a recurring ffeatrne of the country's natioaal developmeat

The consecutive phases of Mozambican history which 1 review are thus d y s e d

in terms of the succesive hegemonic and counter-hegemonic currents d n g through the - -

respective statesociety complexes of theu tirne- Tbroughouî the review, 1 try to maintnin

an emphasis on the political importance of civil society forces, on thei. evolving historical

forms, and on their d e in sbaping successive hege&c and counter-hegernonic

processes in the country. In this chapter, three broad historical periods are defined as a prelude to the postwar transition of the 1990s: the colonial era Spanmng h m the late 1 6 ~

century to 1974; the period of the F r e h o pmject, from its origios as an anti-colonial

movement in the eariy 1960s to its consolidation os a vanguard party-state some twenty

years later, aad the Renamo war hm its origins in neighbourîng Rhodesia to its

resolution in 1992.

The Portum~se Colonialism and Relations with Local Society

Portugal's fïrst exploratory wntacts with Settlements on the central and northeni

coast of modem Mozambique belonged to a broader movement of Iberian mercantile

expansion in the early 1 8 century- It followed a dual ecowmic drive associated, on one

hand, with a desire to secure wntrol over a portion of the lucrative Indian Ocean spice

routes and, on the other, with the ''coa~sEado1'' expeditions financed at thaî time as part

of gold exploration campeigns in South Amenca and the f i c a n continent These

initiatives, toge* with the establishment of militariscd trading stations in Asia and the

Pacinc, laid the basis for a p o w d maritirne trading empire that would witbsread serious

extemal challenges for over two centunes and ultimately iead to Portuguese bids for

territorial occupation of signincant portions of Soutbem AEnca. At their mival, the

Portuguese found a dynamic regional ecommy akeady in place, wnsisting primarily of

coastal commerce in f d , cloth, gold, ivory and slaves, and which linked the immediate

Mozambican intenor witb the broadec Indian Oceen trading system. Commercial

networks dong the East Afncan CO& e>daided fiom Mozambique mrthwards, across the

Hom to the Gulf of Oman, and WR generaiiy wntrolled by powexfûl Modem or Swahili

trading houses with established connections, through the locai chieftaiacies, into African

society. Over successive decades, these would be subjected to Portuguese mercantile

interests through a combination of ecowmic integration, armed intimidation and religious

d i d m h t i o n . Rogiessive inoorparatim mto the Portuguese spbere of control would

involve few fimiamentai changes in existing trading pa#erns, and Moslem traduig

communities wouid remain central to the colonial ecowmy of the Mozambican toast

Apart perhaps some -or shipping teclm010gy, Pomiguese colonial contacts are

said to have brou@ little that was new to the ancieut maritime trading system of the

region, but rattier SOU@ to control casting routes ami practices to the benefÏt of the 212

emerging empire .

Existuig structures of politid jiirisdiction in the region of Monunbique were

highly hgmented at the eady stages of Pomiguese preseace- Among the coastal communities, political author@ accrueâ to pminent Moslem trading fimilies by Mirue

of their wealtb and private control of shipping, their relations with local kingdoms (which

ensureci security for trading caravans venturïng into the markets of the interior) and their

pofessed ancestral links with powerfùi W o n s within the Arab world to the North, By

and large, authority within and among the trading commh-es on the coast did aot rest on

permanent military organisation, and was, as a result, notable for its lack of clefences

against extemal threats213. Structures of Anican political ardhority among the herding

communities of the interior were lilrewise highiy deceatralised nie prominent African

'%tates" of the time, including the Wied Monomatapa "kingdom", did not project their

authonty outwards tbrough centralid admllUstrative, military or normative institutions.

Rather, centrd power depended on accepCod claims to spiritual authority and on

recognition (tribute) by complex and cbanging subdivisions of localiseci chiefly

jwisdi&ons and lineages which exercised d . control over the daily life of their

respective peoples, and many of which stood ia equai spiritual or ancestral standing to the

senior kings themselves. As such, the Afncan "states'' encountered by the Portuguese

were unstable, subject to intemal violence a d a chronic threat of collapse. Newitt offers a

description bsscd on açcormts by early Parhiguese cbroniclers:

The essential chacteristic segmentary. [C]hiettaincies

of these polities was that they were decentralised and were subdivided into smaiier units and wards which in

212

213 Rosenberg, op ck 1994, p. 96. Ibid., p. 97.

tum were decentralid to the level of the village wfüch was d e d by tbc head of the lineage. The subcheiftaim:ies were îkquently of long standhg and as îhey and the viiiage heads hed important fhctions in the agridtiwl Mie of the people, it was tbeir influence that tended to be fek most stroagly. The subchieftaincies were also strongly connected to the spint mediums Who claimed to speak with spirits of dead chi& and whose influence &as decisive in political affairs: WJ m o k h i e s were a lsnd of o v d e graffed onto these -sting instinitions with which they tned to form ties in various complex ways. In time of war or civil M e , [these] states would rapidly break dom inio their bmponent subchieftaiacies whose ders either asserted-their independence or transferred their pyment to some other paramount chieZ14.

It was in this very fluid wntext of multiple centres of power and overlapjing

authority that the Portquese crown sought to carve out political a d economic position

for itself in the eariy decades of colonisation OffickUy, this was Qne tbrough the office

of the Captaincy- a form of maritime govemorship wnfmed by the crown on a fked-

term basis. Portugal's physical authority was established through the (relaîively

unobstmcted) wostniction aad garrisoauig of fortified warebvses at strrdegic port

Settlements dong the Mozambican coastline, and by the (occssionally O-) official

expeditions into the interior for the purposes of diplomacy and commercial exploration In

the period prior to the establishment of Portuguese land sealements, Captains of

Mozambique were responsible primanly for the management and security of goods traded

and transported in the name of the crown monopoly, and rdained immediate jurisdictioa

over m e s , caravans, shipping and individuals of Pomiguese ongin or possession Oaly

later, with the gradual rise in settler production alongside trade and the emergence of

more permanent Portuguese communities in-land fiom the coast, would several

administrative sub-captaincies be established with territorial jjurisdiction. In the first

century of contact with the south- Afncan toast, then, the Poctuguese govemment did

not seek to establish overarching formal authority in the region. m e r , it wove itself into

an existing web of local political power clusters and commercial networks.

Under successive Captaincies, the Portuguese administration would evenhially be

extended and strengthened as it fearned to dominate regional trade a d to Cake strategic

advantage of intemai divisions among the local Afrcan monarchies and Ah-Portuguese

landlords. However, an important hsight which emerges h m Newitt's detailed history of

214 Malyn Newiti, A K i ? o f M - e la do^ Himû and Co., 1997). p. 43.

119

the colonial experience in Mozambique is thst coaciete Poiuiguese -on of the

regional political ecommy dependeci perhaps les on official colonhi action than on

informal, yet powPrful and âefining, sodcliil links thet rapidiy emerged aaâ entreached

thernselves over time. Two dimensions of early Portuguese engagement in the region

particularly bear out this point They are interrstuig h m the perspective of "state-society

cornplex" adysis, and speak diredy to Gramscian suggestions about how hegemoaies

are constructed

First, Newitt notes that fiom the outset, ample provision was made by the central

authorities ui Po- fm the private accumulation of weaW by coloaial officers wbkh

manageci the flow of commercial goods uader the state mowpoly. Whïle profiteering by

public saiaried officials at the expense of the royal mompo1y was wnsidered iliegal in

theory, in practice the state could & little to control the private trading activities of its

out-posted personnel and quickly realised the necessity of acmmmodating public and

private interests. In time, a division of profits was speciEied and legaily sanction& and the

opportunity for private gain by ranking Portuguese officials in situ came to act both as a

key incentive to mallrtain loyalty to the Po- trading system, and as an engine for

the expansion and consolidation of Portuguese control over inland and eoastal trading

activi bes.

Captaincies, in particular, were potentially lucrative positions and, as the extractive

wealth of the Mozambicaa interior be.came apparent, the Mozambique captaincy was

increasingly coveted by prominent members of Portugal's ding class. Appointments

could be highly cornpetitive, and ofte; involved advance cash payments to the crown by

cornpeting candidates. Over tirne, appointments increasingly assumeci a contracnial

chamcter, with the rights and obligations of public and private parties specified in detail.

As a nom, office-holders of the captaincy wouid ensure, sometimes at their own private

expense, the maintenance and security of crom facilities in Molambique (watehouses,

caravans, garissons, ships) and a steady flow of imxwe into the crown treasury- In

exchange, Captains could expect a wide margin of freedom to @mise the profitability

of their appointment Since as a matter of colonial policy Captains were appointed for a limited the-year period, the incentive to d i s e quick nhims was strong. In their bid to

expand and intens* economic activity as rapidly as possible within tk Limited time-

h e of tbeir tenure, the Mozambique Cepteuis oRea nlieaced official commercial and

military expeditions into the interior trom their own tesources (as a matter of private

investment)' and engaged in pivate dipiomocy with the Aûican Iangdoms- Salarieci state

officiais of the cspaincy (&tors, clerks, surgeons, officer~)~ were in iàct more

fkquently mpted into the private employ of the Captain hiruse& if not belonging

outright to his extended M y network. What was in theory a colonial bufeaucfacy thus

rapidly assumed the workings, in fcct, of a private network of seigneurial households. As

Newitt remarks, ecowmic and military 8Ctivities under the Captahs' own commercial

monopolies could f a exceed those of the crown in monetary value, and would have "a 215

decisive i d uence... on the developnent of Mozambique itself' . Admittedly, the

developrnental implications of a system tbat favoiired chronic short-term profit-seeking,

buttressed by feverish, often violent extractionism and pice speculatioa were not ideal. Pnvatised captaincies opewd the doors to a particularly violent ami aratic fom of

colonial authority' and wouid eveatually pmduce disastrous results for fuhire generations

of Mozambicams. From a perspective of staîe-society analysis, however, the worlrings of

the Pomiguese captaincy system are highly revealing in tems of the overlap (organic

links) of publidprivate iuterests and actions which underpinned early colonial expansion

in the region

A second interesting dimension of eary colonisation which emerges fkom Newitt's

narrative, perhaps with much more fâr-reaching implications than the capiaincy system,

was the degree and ease with which the rank and file of Portuguese soldiers and civil

servants were able to inte- into local society. Açcording to Newitt, disaffecteci

employees of the colonial administration were prone routinely to abandon the h h

conditions of their pst and, oAen with the help of pilfered state cesources (notably

weapons), to set off independently to seek their own fortune in the Anican hinterland

These individuals fused into the regional political economy7 carved their way into local

commercial networks and prominent M c a n chieffaiacies (thmugh marriage), ultimately

emerging as important independent suppliers and brokers to the colonial trading system.

The d i f i i o n and reproduction ofttiis social pattern resulted in the tapid emergence of a

powerfil % i d society", a local social strata through which the Portuguese became

21s See Newitt's in-depth discussion of the captaincy of Sofala and Mozambique, Ibid., pp. 107-

119.

in

stnictures. Over t h e , this autonomous a d ïncreasingly Ani-sed social strata would

become, eiîher by force of anns or by agreement mth local b g s and Modem traders, a central locus of iadependent social oad poütical power in tbe region, increasingly WU-

positioned to determine the organisation of production and commerce, and to fiinction as a

crucial inte* in relations between officiai mm authon@ a d local potentates and

their groups In the course of some four centuries, and at différent social be l s ,

successive generabons of the AfbPoituguese "mixed-society" engendered the

coalescence of an integrated societal fabric that would eventually wnstitute the political,

commercial and normative basis of Portuguese colm.ïal hegemony in the region-

Interestuigly for us, Newitt emphasises that at its origins, this "Meztiço" or Wuzungo"

society began as a movement offiee ussuciution among diverse sets of aaors operathg

within the political econorny. It developed in a maaner whoUy mdependent of official

regdatory frameworh or dispensations of authority, and yet would become a definhg

factor of the shape and scope of formal o o l o d power and policy-making. Because of its

importance in supporting the Gramscian notion of hegemony as potentiaily originating

within civil society, 1 teke the opportunity to quote generously h m Newitt on this point

(Muzungo [mixed] society) encouraged the upstart and the eoirepreneur. It was a society where people who were outcasts either fkom the f o d world of donial society or fiom the equally f o m l world of Afncan chiefly Lineages could make their way. A Portuguese deserter or an eded cmvict wuld be an influentid member of Afro-Portuguese society, while Afncan slaves or refigees fiom war or famine who were uprooted h m theit own societies could establish a position for themselves in the private annies or trading caravans of the Afro-Portuguese. In this way, the Muzungos fonned a parauel establishment *ch challengecl the formal authority of Pomiguese officialdom and of tradtiod A6ican chieAaincy. They were the local instrument of expanding mercantile capitalism but they were also one of the instruments by which Afica for so long resisted the economic domination of the ouiside world They [...] were also the agents through which conquest and domination were eventually achieved They were one of the pathways whereby Porhguese language and culture were transmitted to the popuiation, but they were also at the heart of the d o d i s t rnovement that sought the end of Portuguese nile in the mid-twentieth centW2l6.

In retmspecf the ''wtitraCtingi)utn of captaincies as a nix enterprise-based means

of establishing and mahtaining officia1 administmtive authority and military power speaks

directly to Gramsciatu insights on tbe "saended staîen disciissed in Chapter 4: It

highlights the historicaï coincidence of stite and private "blocs" of materhl inteRst which

wouid underpin the crown's exercise of aidhority in the region Likewise, the advenî of an

independent, multiculturai Mo-Portuguese strata as an iadepemlent power base helps to

illustrate the Gramscian point thmit large concentrations of active or residual political

pwer ultimately Rsted with extended netwotks of leading "civil society" groups. And

indeed, Newitî's discussion shows tbat, much Mce in more contemporary forms of civil

society, MeztiçoMuzu~lgo networks organised or compteci on the basis of agreed clan,

spirituavrnystical or commercial noms, and were in tbis sense both largely self-

regulating and mutuaîiy depedmt in te- of 4 t h and security- For as long as this civil

society remained internaiiy bgmented and politically wmpetitive, iosecurity tended to

prevail, and prospects for establishiog centralised authority ova social relations

(production, trade, marriage and politics) remained weak To the exteaf bwevec, that

these civil society networks independentty desced to acquire a core organising fùnctiion

in trade, production, social contracts (Iabour recnritment and marnage), territonal control

and religious belief, or to p it more succinctly, once they actually began to constitute the

local politicai emmrny and ib e x t d relations, the %encbes and earthworks" of

Portuguese colonial hegemony began to be laid out The resulting social order, while not

whoUy peacefiil and fhr fiom equitable, was nonetheless enduring and, nom an

international relations perspective, &&nt to resist extemal challenges mtil well into

the 19' cenhny.

In this respect, two additionai features of colonial experience help to iilustratte the

central role of non-state forces in constituting Portuguese power in Mozambique. One

relates to the outgrowth of a landeci gentry from the original Muzungo society briefly

described above, a deveïopment which reflects a shift fiom a primarily tracle-based

economy (go14 ivory, slaves and d e ) to one in which local production (cotton, tea,

sugar) became increasingly prominent In light of the inability of the Mozambique

captaincy to establish pre-eminent military or administrative control in tbe region, the

extensive Mo-Portuguese landholdings, or paros, which emerged fiom the 1p century

onwards initially dong the banks of the Zamabesi river, rapidly consolidated into

important family-based power centres. If Newitt's account is accurafe, individuai patos

developed into quasi-sovereign (and in m e cases fortdiecl) politicai economies in their

own right InteraaUyy prazo O- and their retahms received tn'bute fiom .local

chieftaincies anci exefcised legal jurisdiction over large populations. They operated their

own locally recruited (ad 0 t h extremely iepressive) tax collection and police

establishmentsy and r a i d tbeir own indepemht labour and miMary forces. On the

surface, prnu>s exhi'bited an exterapi behaviour which contemporaty realists would be

quick to associate with that of autonomous "state unitsn in a classical international system,

engaging variably in wsrfjrre or alliance-building with Afiican chieAaincies, tbe

captaincy, each other or evea with competing colonial powen. In reality, the

ccinternational relations" of the prazos reflected deeper interactions embedded in extended

family identities and in changing pettems of produCDive aad wtnmerclerclal activity which

generated harmonies or clashes of interest among the land-owning elite. Po-

authorities were long at odds to establish official aidhority over these powemil. private

polities. In practice, if official colonial power was more or less stable in the fortifieâ

wastal towns, successive captaincies found themselves dependent on p r u z 0 - 0 ~ ~ ~ to

maintain or expand the colonial systern in the interiof: Crown officials fiequently had to

obtaùi their co-operation to secure trade routes, fight off threateniag wariords, put d o m

recurring popular revolts, coUect colonial taxes and protect religious missions.

At the same time, however, the official colonial regUne had a number of benefits to

offer. Despite the corniderable scope of theu independent power, many among the ruiing

elite of the Mo-Portuguese pams almg the Zambesi valley were keen to obtain officiai

recognition, which potentially cooferred a number of additional privileges, including

supply contracts for the crown mowpoly, legai recognition of land tenure, some wst-

sharing of public SeMces (security, justice and administration, transport and

communications), and the increased authority and prestige wderred by officia1 title,

often usefid in W g with local chie- and rivais. Incfeasingly, thou@ not in an even

or consistent pattern, relations betwcai the crown and the m h o l d e r s beaune cemented

by a confluence of interestsy as landlords of the pivate estates entered into the public

domain, and began to serve in an administrative or exesutive capacity within the growing

number of sub-captaincies which developed in the 18& and 19& centuries. The result, over

time, was a coalescence of public and private power, p i e d by leading factons of the

local politicai econorny, Afîicaaised to diffèrent &grees and which, despite recurring

internai differences, shared a cummon interest in the material beaefits of maintainhg Be

framework of the colonial mercantile system- It is in this context that Gramsci would have

identifiai the emergence of a hegemonic uhist~ric bloc", or consensus, underpinning the

colonial order. As New& goes on to discuss, howwer, this consensus would begh to

weaken (and the histone bloc to m e n t ) h the 19* century onwards: Firsf as a result

of increasing extaoal (British) pressure on Portugal's central ove- administration to

radically adjust coloniai policy on slavery and trade liiralisation (the latter leading to the

granting of substantial land concessions to non-Pomiguese Companiesj; secondly, h m

confusion in colonial policy sutrounding the fa11 of the Monarchy and the failed republican experimeat in Portugal, the rise of the SPlizar regime which led to

mprecedented levels of central administratîve control and militarktïon of the colonial

system; and finally, with the le- military wup in Lisbon and the hand-over of power to pro-independence forces in Maputo-

But before moving onto the wxt phase of Mozambique's pre-transition history, it

is revealing to consider one 1st bistoncal dimension iilusûating the importance of civil

society forces in generating politid influence for an official regime increasingly under

threat This relates to the period of the "scrsmble for Afncam, embodied by a flinry of

inter-colonial ûeaty-making in the late lgm cetltury and, in 1884, by the opening of the

Berlin conference- From a civil society perspective, this period of international relations is

al1 the more interesting, as it is conventionally associated with f o d alliance systems and

great-power diplomacy of the time- The "scramble" reflected a renewed European interest

in Africa for the nrst tirne since the successf'ul b d g of the global slave trade some

decades earlier. Since, unlike with slavery, this interest focused on Afncass fixed minerd

resources and otber raw materials, temmtorial wntrol became a more relevant wncem tban

before, prompting a wave of cornmissioned expeditions to map the locations of mineral

wealth and also dari@ geographicaüy those colonial zones of influence aiready in place.

The reports genemted by these expeditions became instrumentai in negotiating officia1

0

Aithougô NeWitt does not analyse this c~~sten î iy , be provides some evidence to suggest that the liberalisation of the colonial economy under intaMtiona1 pressure (entaihg a graduai, albeit in the end incomplcte, dismantlig of prdecteâ mcrcarttile amugements in trade between Mozambique and Portugal), gcncratcd new divisions witbia tbe ccommic dite, bctwacn tbost tid to protected colonial markets on one band, and those, oa the atba band, which lïnkd into export oriented production commanding high amüngs on inîumtiod markas, This would resemble the types of structurai societal divisions identifieci by Cox as underpinning "inteniaticmai ciass focrrmtimn in the morc receat coatext of the gioôdisrtioa of produaion: ie, a breakdown and reconfiguration of dominant gnntps and, ~~ hegemonic social forces.

12s

territorial ciaims at Berlin, and thus ultimateiy in deteiminiag the distriion of colonial

and post-colod sovereigutïes on the continent Of iataest ben is thet among the key

acton in this pocess were the Europeaa geographiad societies, most pmmiaently the

Royal Geographical Society, which alongsrgsr& the prhite expeditim of the charterd

wmpanies, yielded much of the information which would later k a m e relevant to the

Berlin negotiations The societies, *ch were employed also by Portuguese, Ge- and

Italian govemments, were made up of mate mernberships of University scholars and

knowledgeable amateurs, repfesenting in this sense p t 0 t y j . x ~ of non-governmental

group, with varyuig professional and fuiancial connections to the state: an orjpuisttional

form which in the late 2om century would becorne such a promirent part of intemetonal

engagements in Furthemore, the work of the geographicai societies did not stop at

technical research for official policy and diplornatic negotiation Individual members of

expeditions typically puMished their persona1 accounts with wide circulation in home

literary markets, fiequently romanticising the continent, emphising the need to revitalise

the European civilising mission, and demonising the actions of rivai wloniai powem In

this wncrete sense, the geogrephical societigsres served an important normative W o n at

home in creating consensus among the (literate, enhnchised) European middle classes for

the historicai necessity of s h e d European imperialism in ~ f n c a ~ ~ ' . The c-t work of

modem NGOs in targeting modem middle classes for "developmeat educationY', within

the broader international aid fnunework. are nat eatirely dissimilar to these eariier

activities-

Other civil society forces had a more or less direct bearing on the influence exerted

by Portugal during tht Berlin Conference p iod Although for histoncal reasons religious

missions had not been a prominent feature of Porhiguese wlonialism in earlier periods,

missionary activity in the region of Mozambique intensified in the latter half of the lgm

century, particulariy in the soutbem regions which were imder expansionary threat from

the recentlyanstituted Republic of South Ani= Although the majonty of missions were

Rotestant, they nonetheles fbndoned to spread

language, and provided a number of essential

colonial administration and belped to delhate

the basics of Lusophone culture and

public -ces which

the outer boundaries supporteci the

of Portuguese

217 N- op. ciî., 1995, pp. 3 17-SS.

218 influence in the region . In the same way, the establishment in tbe 1870s of a dynamic

network of Scoaish reiigious missions wrth of the Zambesi Valley, in the region of Lake

Niassa and the Shire d which had historically wme under Portuguese influence,

provided (clearly dongside corporate pressures) a basis for British claims to what later

became British Nyasaiand and modem-day Mdawi.

Finally, a word mmt be added about the historicd importame of the iadependent

Portuguese trading networùsJ which for ceannies had infiltrateci the continent b m both

the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coastlines. Successive geographical expeditions made by

the British, French and Germans deep into the Afncan interior in the late 1800s were

Surpnsed, and prhaps alamai, to find dyaamic elements of Mo-Portugwse culture at

local fkh and dong d e n t continental trade routes. Such &dence of "@or discovezy"

by Mo-Pomiguese traders histoncal1y rOOfed into the local politicai econornies of Centrai

fia, formed the besis of Portuguese claims to sovereignty over large areas of the Iowa

Congo ( t empody rpcognised in a bilateral treaty with Britaia in 1884). LiLewise, it was

on the evidence of centuries-old Ah-Portuguese commercial and social networks that

Portugal made claims to vast expsases of territory linking Mozambique with Angola,

incorporating parts of presentday ZimbabweJ Zambia and the Congo. However, although

these claims were recognised in general te- in bilataal treaties with France and 219

Germany, they wrre later rejected by the pre-eminent Colonial Oflice In Britain . The

wide web of independent networks which had been woven over centuries by the "upstarts

and entrepreneurs' of Portuguese colonialism did not, in the end, withstand the

overwhelming force of British imperialism and the charter companies which constituted i t

They did not reward Po- with the vast portions of Centrai and Southeni Afiica which

it claimed in the late 1 9 ~ century. Yet given Portugal's reduced status as minor colonial

power by the tirne of the scwnble for Afinca, they do appear to bave provided a strong

argument for Portuguese claims, and ninicient internaîional bargaining power to ensure

the continuity of Portugal's presence in Soutbem Afiica at a the of intensifieci extemal

cornpetition and rapid economic change.

218 Ne* notes tbat by 1930, thse werc dmost 800 sepamte M g n missions worlàng in

Mozambique, represeating a revealing pradent to the hundreds of NGOs which rc-popilated tbe country over baifa ceatury later, and gnnlig some substance to specuiations about theu role in its 're-colonisationn (Ibid, p. 436.)- 2 19

Ibid., pp. 330143- 127

Inde~endence and tbe Bid for a Socialist Heeemony

When, afta over a decade of fighting against the colonial regime, the Frelimo

movement took e M v e power in Mozambique in late 1974, its initial choiœ of a

centrally planned, socialist path towards soci~ec~nomic development was motivated by a

combiaation of bistoncal circumstances which shaped both objective needs and policy

preferences of the perid It would be tempting, as is often done, to attempt to neatly

categonse these ~ s t a a c e s in terms of extemal and internal fktors. However. tbe new

regime f o d itself st tbe hehn of a countxy whicb, since the tum of the centwy. had

becorne almost entirely prmeated by the forces of regional economic development thaî

de@ any easy sepmation of domestic and f d g n factors. Two underfying features of the

politicai economy can nonetheless be identifled: One was the central role played by

emnomic forces outside the cantrol of government in determining the level of national

revenue in the country, leadbg a situation of advanced extemal dependence and

vulnerability which would remain a pmanent fature of the Moaunbican experience.

The second was a lack of viable naîionai structures strong enough to support a sustainable

social and economic development in a nuuiner tbat might be relevant to the majority of

Mozambicans, a feature deriving fiom the essentially (regionally) fhgrnented, extractive,

coercive and racially segregated nature of colonial econornic activities in previous

decades.

Although Portuguese sovereignty over Mozambique had been reco@sed s i w e the

time of the Berlin Conference, an htegmùitegreted territorial administration in the country did not take form until well into the 20' century- F m the 1890's onwards vast sections of

the national temtory were parcelled out uILder concession to charkred companies of

majority foreign (mainly British, but also French and Belgian) orniership. Between the-

the Mozambique, Zambezia and Niassa Companies and their sut>coneessions occupied

roughly a third of the couibry until the early 1940s. Like the prazos before them, these

lands and theù redent populations e f f ive ly stood oidîde the realm of colonial

administration, a d in conmete ternis were subject to a form of "corporate de", including

vimially independent systems of law a d order, defence, public administration,

employment and welfâre. Moreover, while the thesouthem region of the country remaineci under efféctive state authonty, labour recruitment concessions were awarded to large

128

South M c a u minmg compania as of 1913, giving tbem definitive influence over the

economic w e l h a d development of local popuiatioas. The charter compaaies uguably

had contradictory effects. both positive and debilitathg on the development of the

Mozambican W. On the o œ hami, they serveci to consolidate colonial d e by politidy

and militarily pacifjhg vast regions of the country @articddy in the Centre and North),

by developing tnmspoct and commmicaîions where none &ad existed

before, and by helping to consolidate an administrative epparahis (policing and taxation)

which would be incorporated mto the national administration d h g the last years

colonialism. In addition, the companies did much to chart Mozambique's course of

economic developnent, by linking domestic agrïcuitural production to European and

international markets (sugar becoming a principal export) and large sections of domestic

wage labour to the Soutb Afncan mingig induptry, botb pattems wbich the Poriuguese

authorities would follow up until iadependence in 1974. It was also under these

concessions that the Mozambican railways systems were built and port kilities

modemised, creathg a system of overland links scnss Mozambique which, by connecting Uiland production centres in South Afnca, Rhodesia and Nyasaland with

maritime outlets on the cmst, beuune cenaal to the commercial viability of the region*'.

The legacy left behind by corporate rule in Mommbique in 1941, and generally

maintaineci by Salazar's colonial regime until the late 196ûs, was one of a hinctioning

intercolonial political economy binding much of the Southem Afncan region together

On the other hanci, these stnictures had not been designed to support movements

towards independent national political and economic developwnt Large-de

agicultural production, which tbe chuter cornmes and Iater Portuguese concessions

developed under closed systems of artificial profitability (based on forcefblly extracmi

labour and on the availability of guaranteed colonial markets) centred on a limited number

of export commodities and did üttle to brcm&n the agïïcultural base of a largely rural

society. Likewïse, industriai development remaiaed minmial, centring primsrily on

export-drivea light industry in textiles and food pocessing The railways, roads and ports

which had been built ostensibly to modernise Mozambique's transportation W r , in fàct

did so accordhg to a regional rather than national logic, by wnnectiag the coast witb the

interior at various strategic points but Ieaving North-South links seriously rnderdeveloped. -

220 Ibid., pp. 361-78.

129

The effect of this was to isolate vast portions of the country fiom its adtninistrative centre

in the south, a reality which W d have strong W v e impiidons both for the

development of a post-Mepemhx identity, and for the govemment's capncity to

connectwithnualsocietydaddressinsrirgenciesinlateryears~

By the late 1960's most colonial revenue flowed iiom extemal sources; fkom

concession payments, fees for the exprt of Mombican labour to the mines and

plantations of South f i c a and otkr British and Portugwse coloaies, nom railway transit

fees and sugar exports Mozambique's local (Mm) social dhstmcture was lefi highly

underdeveloped, even by colonial standards at the tiw. RÏvate enferpnferpnse, including the

wide network of rurai markets whicb spanned across the territory, rernained

ovenvhetmingiy under the control of European d tmacks- Reliance an forced

labour, and the imposition of a ngid colonial policy of social strsttifldon which severely

limitecl access to edwatïon and f o d employment, preclisded serious efforts to develop

local human remUrces. Public administration, h m the highest offices to the most menial

tasks, as well as technical or private sector management positions were highly

concentrated in the co1on.s small strata of whites or arpimiledo A A mjority of

Mozambicans not bound by contract to the plantation or mining economies remaiwd . -

marginal to formal economic and m t i v e sectors, survivuig on subsistence

agriculture and UiformaI seasonal labour'".

This combination of extemal ecommic dependence and weak social infiastnicture lefi the Mozambican economy highly vulnerable to political developments at the time of

forma1 independence in 1975. Portugal's unexpectedly swift and unconditional handaes

of power to the Frelimo movement in late 1974 caused widespread panic among the mainly white mident professional and merchant classes, despite tbe relatively low level of

violence involved. By 1976, Wh of the white population had fied the country, îaking

with them the bulk of its skilled labour force, professional class and enîmpreaeurïal sector- Businesses and fiums were abandod and tens of thousands were put out of wok

Private investment grew scarce while industry, constroction and tourism came to a vimnil

221 Margareâ Hall and Tom Young rcport thst out of 8 tdal population of 8 2 million at tbe time of

independence, 220 000 whites (ofwhich some 150,000 Porhiguae), Asians and mestiços, togediter with some 300,000 "ass imildm blacks constitutcd tbe corc of Mozambique's t-cai,

standstill. R d tnde networks camedûg town and country dissolved, and public - . admintstration and social seMces around the country ceased to W o n as merchants and

222 civil servants todE flight . On the exterd h n t too, revenues fiom prior econanic

From the outset then, at least as much by short-tenn contingency as by long-term socialist

design, the policy cbices of the new Fnlimo leadership rrsponded to the spectre of

irnpending national economic and administrative collapse. Ironically, immediate

extended govemment intervention and centralid planning Land, social services and key ind&es were nationaiised, and thousmâs of Frelimo party mem- for the most part

unqualifieci, were deployed 8cfoss the temtory to take up local admuustra . * tive positions

vacated by the Portuguese. Himdreds of abandoneci sbops, famis and nmis were piaced

under public management in a bid to keep the ecommy fimctioning Young and Hall note

that this did not occur without some Level of moral unease:

With the coilape ofthe Portuguese, Frei& found itself baviug to fan out into, try to administer, and eveatually win over, whole areas of the country hitherto regardeci as enemy terrain, with a social and economic organisation at the semce of the colonial

224 exploiters" -

At another b e l , Frelimo's early socialist options must be seen as part of the

broder pichne of Southem Afiïcan l i i o n during the Cold War and apartheid periods.

In Mozambique, as elsewhere in Afkica, dst-leninist orientations lent themelves

generously to the values and objectives of d o n a l ii'beratioa, anti-imperielism and

managerial and entrepreneurial class. They also note thai, at the t h e of independence only 12 black students were enrolied in univers@-level programmes (op. cit., 1997, pp 3-1 1). 222

Hall and Young, op. &, 1997, p- 5û. Alsa sa Htns Abrsbamsson Scirimg clic P o i n r . n l P n r a l Q a m i r a ~ d W o i U O C r l a , ~ ( b r ~ M ~ ~ ~ : Pardigu Papers, 1997). p. 208. 223

Abrahamsson, op. àt, 1997, p 209. NeWitt notes h m offid records thaî the number of Mozarnbicans mmitcd by Sou& Aûican minimg compaaics fil1 h m 113,000 in 1975 to 32,000 in the fbilowing year, decting a ngid daenontion in the politid relaîions betwccn the two corntries as a rcsult of Frelimo's d o n to power- The Souîh Afncart govcmment was tond to reQce as amch as possi'ble iw depeadence on Uotunbicui labour and port ûdilities in light of Freiimo's W e -st rbaoric- For its part, Frdimo rnoved qukkly to dose dom several recniithg Strtions loated inside Mozambique, which iî pactived to be syrnbolic ofiabour p~ploitation unda the akmhl orda (N- op. Ca, 1995. p. 498) .

Young and Ha& op- tir-, 1997. p. 55. 131

majority rule- It had pmvided the idedogicai mdeqhmhgs of @la -stance agahst

a Portuguese colonial regime closely coaaected with South Afkican apartheid and,

through NATO membership7 with Washington and iîs allies. It also gave Frelimo an

appealing rhetorid platform for bids to mobilise rural papulaîions in support of a new

modernisation agenda But perhaps most sign&antiy, it gave Mozambique the blueprint

for a concrete, lowterm expriment in social and ecor~xnic development which

contrssted staikly with recent donial experïences7 and whkh o f f i a seemingly viable

alternative to the colonial don-buiiding policies so barshly imposed in much of the

The successes and Mures of Frelimo policy diiring i r first decade of power have

been the subject of a wide, primarily retrospective debate, which has offen been based on

simplifïed and ideologically determinec! positions. Tbat Freluno's core pmject for an

ernancipatory fom of social development mted in m s t principals7 and guided by a

single partylstate vanguard leadership ultimately d e d in fidure is geaerally beyond

question Historical analysis bas, however7 been deeply divided as to tbe causes of tbis

failure and subsequent changes of direction, On the one hanci, critics have generally seen it

as a failure of âomestic policy, pointhg to the ULlSUitabiiity of Frelimo's overall central

planning principles, its specfic schemes for collectivised d developent, and the

overbearing presence of the state in the economy7 in bringing about desired deve10pmeatal

outcornes. On the 0 t h hand, observe= identifjing more closely with the Frelimo project

have generally sought to explain its fdure in ternis of extemal f8ctors- xmtably the

sustained political and economïc destabilisation policies implementd by the apartheid

Rhodesian and South e c a n regimes- Looking at the Frelimo p e n d h m the

perspective of Gramscian d y s i s , we can fhd elements of truth on either side of this

debate. It is poss~'ble to argue that, ultimaiely, a combination of domestic and external

factors serve to explain Frelimo's appareat failure' ôy the early 1980s, to establish an

ideological basis for sociaüst hegemony in Mozambique: in other words, its inability to

establish the raquisite systern of normative "treaches and earihworlrs7 within Mozambican

society which would have served to justifL its policy orientations, absorb potenbal

ideological challenges and serve as ultimate societal defence against extenial aggression.

Despite its severe problems of manpower and administrative capcity, the new

leadership mowd quickly to establish effdve wntd of the state appcuahis, and to

e x p d the scope of state involvement into a b r d range of sectors And t was through

the state that Frelimo was able to record early successes in a nimiber of areas, notably in

education and healthcarem, and to initiate progressive -al programmes coveriug

women, youth a d labourIif Importantlys the oew regime also established a metanne of local democracy where wne baâ existecl before, d l i n g mage level assemblies to express

grievances and to interact directly with the party structures. in 1979, the party leadership

produced a sttategic plan to bring about the radical strucîurai transformation of

Mozambique over ten years, based on the sockW-on of @cultural production, 227

accelerated industriaiisation and the creation of a modem worlaorce . The plan

recognised that on both economic and levels, any meanlligful move towards

national developwai would bave to involve, at its wre, a modernisation of rural society-

This wouid involve, on one hand, ~ e m p o ~ g " peasants through IiteraEy training and

other fonns of basic education ad, on the aiher, their encouragement into ratioaalised

systems of production, through a re-orgmidon of village life and the institution of

coiledive state h s . But Frelimo was ultimately unable to estabiish the napisite de-

of ideological consensus, within much of Mozambican nual society, to facilitate the

implementation of its modernisation prot;ipnmme. As Newitt comments, from the outset "

[mlany Mozambicaas were udkmüiar with the new rulers who took power h m the

Pomiguese, a d Frelimo was relatively UIlfamiliar with much of the co- it was to 228

rule" . In a very real sense, Frelimo would fail where the colonial regime, supported by

the mediating eff- of the Afro-Portugwse middle strata, had succeeded in the pst, in

integrating itselfas dominant force in Mozambique's rural politicai economy. n e r e are a

number to reasons to account for this hegemonic fkilure-

One was thet the Frelimo movement, despite its success in gaining some local

support in the North of the country during the initial yeam of its stniggle against the

Portuguese, was fâr h m what might be considenxi an CCindig~us" force with concrete

mots in the local comrnunity. On the contrary, Frelimo was at

226

227 Joseph Han lo~ M i c.05 d)c Sa!s? (Lmd011: Jamcs Currcy,

228 Young and Hall, op., ck, 1997, p, %- Ne* op- ck, 1995, p. 541.

133

its origins a party of

1991). p ~ . 9-10.

intellectuals, i n f l d perhaps more by btemational cune~lts of socid theory thsn by

the cornplex realities of village-level civil society. Its eady opedons were or&anised fiom University pnnises ab& and the movement's nnt leader, Eduardo Moadlsne,

arnong Mozambique's few aarrdiUd aca&m.ics, was a UN official basai in New York.

From the outset, the movement attracted strong support h m Western nr#rlemic c h l e ~ , a

"distinguished bettery of intellectual niepower" that was to innuence party policy in

fûndamental ways. As Newitt notes, by the t h e it reached power in the mib1970s

Frelimo had a predetennined course of action in mind, but teiatively M e in the way of

links to the grass mots ofthe county

The intellechial orientation of the par& was to be of fiindamentai signifiauice [...] When it took power in 1975, Frelimo was already armed with a range of policies and an analysis of the task to be done which reflected the mlutionary ideologies of the 1960s [...] But Freiimo had d y been able to organise at ail euctemively in only three of the country's nine provinces, and it to& power without any formal perty organisation in most of the country [.-.] The influence of intellectds in the prty appears to have encoma@ the adoption of policies rooted in theory rather üiaa in a sound knowledge of the country a d the people?

Subseqyent ef5orts by Frelimo to establish closer contacts with rural society,

through the establishment of thousands of party cells, the organisation of village-level

"dynamising groups" and the establishment of mass organisations, met et best with rnixed

results. Although the common objectives of these initiatives were to mobilise

Mozambican society both ideologically (in support of the pacty project for socialist

development) and jxactically (to mise Ievels of production, education and so on), local

reactions were often re~erved, not least because the initiatives served more as conduits for

tmnsmitting the theoretid influence of the paay's i n t e l l m leadership, rather than as a

genuine channel of interaction between state, party and society. And because of the

middle-bureawratic style they came to embody, as well as the politicid in-fighting in

which their cadres increasingiy began to engage, these highly sûmtwed organisations

may well have ultimately served to b a e r the party leadership h m local reahty, so that

the "party increasingly distaaced itseIf fiom ordinsry people and ceased gemùmly to

iisten to whaî they and their traditional leaders had to sa?. In the y- immediately

229

230 Ibid, pp. 541-43. Ibid

following indepadeace, the ''dyaamishg groups" in @dar were noted for their demagogic style and the disniptive effcft of their inierfkrenœ in local soarl nlations and

23 1 production systems . Another important Wtor which discoiwged stronger connections

between the regime and the grus roots of society was tk perceived imbalaace of the

etbnic and regioiial composition of tbe prty leadership, who were mainiy h m the South

and included s e v d members of mixed and European ongk This wodd bave aegatïve

implications for the party's position particularly in the centre of the country, where the

armed resisîance wodd Later find its strongest social support. Here again, however, the

paity's sarong theoretical cornmitment to ethnic equality in the new society effectively

prevented it h m resolving issues ofethnk and tenitorid representatio~

p ] y amibuthg ethnic differeoce to the evil of dividoand-rule policies of the Portuguese, and substituting a cias anaiysis of social and economic problerns, Frelimo allowed ethnic teIISi- to be buried out of ~ i g h t ~ ~ ~ .

This last point about ethnicity also highlights in a more general way the grudging

relations entertained by Frelimo cadres with the traditional h c a n auîhorities, who were

viewed with extreme suspicion, buî pehaps not haccurafeIy, at al1 levels of the party

rnembership as having facilitateà colonial nile by the Portuguese- The traditional

structures of rurai society were not analysed in terms of their historicai potential for

translatiug centnil authority ïnto the social &ric7 but were instead rejected outrïght on

ideological grounds. In rejecting them, ~relirno perhaps c o d y was sîriking out at

forces of "obscuranjisrn" and past oppression, yet it fâiled to capitalise on theû potential

for hegemonic construction, a potential which had been p v e n to good effect over previous centuries by Afio~Portuguese society.

Frelimo's ambitious efforts to modernise Mozambique according to socialist

guidelines were undennineci also by specific enors in policy. The rapid centralisation and

bureaucratisaiion of wide areas of economic Iife, reflecting Frelimo's strong suspicion of

the private sector, hd a number of debilitatuig effects- The n a i i ~ ~ s a t i o n of subsîmtiai

portions of the country's busuiess sector al1 but guelled dependent commercial and

fiaancial activities which in the pst had pnmd to be a key integrative feattne (if not an

23 1 Young and Hall, op- cit. 1997, p. 53-

232 Newitt, op. cit., 1995, p. 544.

egalitarian one) of rwal s o d tifes wmmïüing t instead to a generally inefficient, o h 233

inept or disinterested public management . An inherent bias towards the mode1 of state

organisexi agicultiiral pmdiiction meant ha î disproportionate levels of public imrestment

were directeci towards the rapid (arpeaSnre and ultimately arisustainable) mechanisath of

a lirnited n u m k of state hmrs, at the expense of potentially more productBre and socially

rewarding (and potentially cheaper) support for fdy-sector agriculture. Lilcewise, the

iocreasing use of coercion to Implement the party's programmes for collectivised

agiculanai production, g e n d y agaimt the wishes of the local m7 translated in

practice into a policy of forced resettîernent which serveci to firrtber drain the socialist

project of its plinlincal legitimacylin

Given Mozambique's colonial legaqr' it was ideologidiy unacceptable for

Frelimo to seek to rwt the state in exïsting social stnictures. Rather than atternpting to

consolidate ardhority by permeaîiug forms of civil Society (traditionai authorities, famify

production networks) already in place, Frelimo apparently opted to seek to restructure it

outright. As a result, while Frelimo was able to d e by direct dominance through the state

apparatus. it largely Eai1ed (outside of urban centres) to p r o d e consemual hegemonic

leadership. By the early 1 9 8 0 ~ ~ what some have dubbed the "hardening of the Frelimo

state" had reached its apogee, and social resenûnent, parbcufarly arnong the peasantry,

increased, laying fertile gound for a new round of cNil war- Fmm the Grarnscian

perspective, then, the new regîme's ultimate inability to consolidate power over the longer

term may be understood in tenns of a fàiled bid to win the ''hearts and mincis" of the

majority of Mozarnbicans: a Mure of Frelimo to colonise the trenches and earthworks of

civil society. In this sense, it lacked the organk quality that Portuguese wbnial authority

had been able to achieve in previous times.

War and Chanae

Armed incursions into Mozambican territory begm soon after independence, in

response to Frelimo's decision to implement full UN traàe sanctions and shelter guerrilla

233 By 1981, the swe accmaed fbr 65% of dl industrial autpit, 85% of e~nsport and

communications, 90% of constnictioa ud Wh pcrccat of tnde ( Sa Young snd Hall, op. cit., 1997, p. 95).

136

opposition agakt the Ian Smith government of Rhodesia During this initial period of

fighting, the MNR (Mozambique National Raistance - later to be lrnown by ifs

Portuguese acronym Renamo) stageâ kqueat retakîory attacks on mainly civilian targets

fiom across the Rhodesian border, supporteci by Rhodesian military iotelligence a d a

loose alliance of Frelimo dissidents and Po- exiles, When, in 1980, the

independence ofZimbabwe was proclaimed un&r new black majority leadership, Remno

bases were t r a n s f d to locations in South Anica, fkom which the rnovernent began to

prosecute a long, destnictive war agakt the Frelimo state, in keeping with Pretoria's

'Uotai strategf' agaiost regiod threats to the apartheid regime. Throughout the following

decade, the destabilisation campaign was based on attacks agakt -an populations,

economic targets and vital transport, wuununications and energy links- Reaamo's military

organisation gcew h m some several ciozen men to almost 10 0, prtly as a result of

forced recruitment, and by the mid-1980s it had extended its control over vast areas of the

centre and south of Mozambique with sustained South Afn~i i l l support2u.

As with Frelimo, the issue of Reaamo's "'rOOfedIKSs", or social base, within

Mozambican rural society during the civil war bas been a matter of debaie, and often

ideologically charged historical interpretations- Anthropological analysis has documented

how Renamo succeeded in coostnicting solid aliiaiices with local traditional power 235

structures and secdg popilar support in certain regions of the country - For many of

the war's d y s t s , this rootednes bas helped to explain the survival and longevity of the

resistance movement, even under extremeely adverse political and environmental

conditions (such as sustained drought during the 1980s and, towards the end of the decade,

dwindling external svgport), as well as its ability to wIlStitute an itccepted political and

administrative authority in areas firmly under its military control. At the same t h e , given

Renamo's noted lack of a coherent ideology and its fiequent use of extreme forms of

coercion against local populations as a means of ensuring civil discipline md miiitary

rec~tment, its success in building a consens4 local social base in d areas bas

remained somewhat of a puzzle- There is much evidence to show thaî, as the war

proceeded though the I980s, local loyalties towards R e m o were boosted by popular

dissatisfhction, particulariy in the central prwioc# with the iacreasingly coercive rural

policies coaceived by disEaat Frelimo ceatral plnnmts or, in any case, by their iaability to

capture the consensus of the m-

Although R e m o was able to capitalise on peasmts opposition to forced

%llagisationn, most agree that its relationslips with local d society was both highly - *

cornplex and regiody -able: One facror imdcrpnnuig this relatiotlship was Renamo's

early recognition of the importance of traditional local authorities, and their co-opîatiion,

through a variable mixture of coercive and co«>nsaisual anaagements, of locally accepted

stmchaes through which Renamo authonty could be transmiüed, and thrwgh which

some measure of public support (meaniog, concretely, the supply of locally produced food

and labour to Renamo forces) could be mobiliseci This appears to have been the case

parti-cularly in Central Mozambique, where Remmo's co~ections witb l d autborities

were buîtressed also by ethnic afihities, and where the politics of etbaicity, huwever

discreet or buried, served also to shore up disatisfdon with Frelimo's generally anti-

ethnic political orientations- Elsewhere, the quality of relations with local authoxities

during the heigbt of the civil war in mid-1980s appears to have been imiersely

proporthate with the level of violence used by Renamo against local populations. In

Zambezia, where local authority structures had strong and relatively stable historical rwts,

Renamo appears to have opted for a policy of accommodation, and violence against

civilians was relatively less pronound By coutrast, in Soutbem regions where local

structures of authority had historidy beea disrupted by economic paaenis of migratory

labour to South Afnca and later by Frelimo's collectivisation programmes, Renamo

appears not to have secureâ voluntary suppoa h m cesident populations. Authority in 236

these areas was exercised on the basis of fear of extreme foms of violence . Juergensen, who canducted extensive interviews in the Unmediate post-war period, notes that relative

local loyalties toward either of the two warrïng parties were susceptible to perceptual

changes over time, which in tum depended on the actions of each party and the message it was able to project locally. Ln one district of Tete province, where he focused his research,

Juergensen found that:

236 For an Ovennew ofresearch conducted into rdrtioris betwan Raiama and local authorities and

nual civilians, sa Minter, op. ck, 1994, pp. 205-217, 138

During the war, as Renamo became stronger anà FreIimo more reactioapry, more and more people begm ta embrace the reôel's "democraticn PIatform, which hinged on r e d l i s h i n g the cultural noms of local t raQ-n 'd des and customary arrangements th wem abolished diniag Frelimo's Uarxist phase- The reaiity that Renamo controlled most of Angonia anci tbe strcmg sentiment for a "mdsation" of cultural life made negotiations with Reiiamo a necessity...m Angonia] there were multiple instruments and foms of military-political powa (Freiimo, Renamo7 officers, soldiers, chie&); but the most profaund resistance was aimed at those respo~l~l'ble for d i s m g cultural Iife anci forced migration In this regard, the extrane exercise of power tmckfjred on Frelimo; the We-worlds that were clamoureâ for harkened to traditionai social organisationm.

As it turas out, the district referred to in Juergensen's sady was located adjacent to the border with Malawi, an area in wbïch local populations possessed the option of

moving voluntdy to refiigee camps some distance away to seek international protection

Under these circumstances, Renamo is likely to have made substantial efforts to

accommodate the demands of local chie& in a bid to prevent depopulation, which would

have eroded the rnovement's own social and ecodc base. As such, the study reveals a

localised experience, some findings of which been contesteci by other research elsewbere

in the countrytry Likewise, GefEay7s conclusion that for rurai youth in the northem district

of Erati (Nampula) "joining the war had the character of a reassertion of political initiative

by the people against Frelimo a d its village-state apparatus" is wntmsted by the

emphasis which other observers have piaced on the wiâespread use of violent forced- 238

recruitment tactics by Renamo in many parts of the country .

Such contrasting findiogs illustrate the centrai point that, in the highly hgmented

patchwork environment of war-tom Mozambique in the 1980s, it is dinrcult to come to

any firm conclusions about the actual extent of Reaarno's social base, or mtedness in

rural society. This likely Vaneci h m one area to the ne* determineci by botb the general

and localised dyhgmics of the war. Overail bowever, it is d e to say that thughout the

conflict, and in- d'ter it, Renamo's 8uthon'ty remained strongest and most stable in

those areas¶ such as the in the central provinces of the country, where it fomd favourable

237 Olaf Juergenscn l'üe CI& N i Corn to PIic Himdaud

Rtxorisbwctibir in M i e (U IDRC Putcebuilding and RkoMNoi oa Programme Initiative Working Papa No. 5 1998), p- 1 1. Published on wwwidxca .

-al and politid space and where- as a r e d f the use of coercive meam of control was relatively less salient to the maintenance of power. These wae traditionai societal spaces

wtiich for economicY politicai or ideological regsons. had been left umiocupied by the Frelimo project.

Having said this, it is worthwhile redling Saul's recent comment that "it has now

becorne fhshionnable to seek the prUicipd rwts of Mozambique's war in the weaknesses, 239

even malignsncy of Frehno's own pmject" . His point, and that of many othea, is that

increasing analytical focus (especially in the 1990s) on Renamo as a fom of domestic

social movernent, and increasing attention to nuanceci questions about its ab* to caphue

and project the interests or values of rural has threatewd to lead historicaf analyns

away fiom the ceahal issue of Renamo's foreign ongins, its heavy extemal operational 240

dependence, and the limited stop of its shategic autonomy . For Minter' Renamo was,

at its inception, wholly "incorporated within the Rhodesian and then South N c a n

military structure", and R-0 operations were "subordinated to defading the white 24 1

regime's security" agaimt perceived regional threats . For the South Afkican regime, this

meant using Renamo to cause as much immediate damage as possi'ble, within a broaàer

strategy of repelling the anti-apartheid sûuggIe supported by Frelimo, while damaging the

credibility and ideologid appeal of its SOCjalist project t. the war later moved on to

assume a localised chamcter c m in no way be taken ta d e c t a weakening of links

between Renarno and its extenial sponsors, and may on the ccmtrary be taken as a sign of

- -

238 Christian GdEay, ciid in Michi Eh@ Tlu ThmWtmEon, Wm lo PaPrcc= R&h, JWihd

S ' and tke Aw# hmss 1 . in MkatUqyc, 1992-95. (University of London, PhD D i o o , 1999), -ter 3, p. 30. 239

John Saul "Inside fiom the Outside? The Roots of Mozambique's UdCml War" in Tasier Ali and Robert Mauhews (eds.), CWI WOCS U A/iica. W orrd Rsolwaion (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's -... Univasity Press, 1999)' p. i28. L W

Saui's comment aiso m e s to empimise the firct that in revicwing Mozambique's civil war, analyticai chices about the relative weigbt of intaail versus e x t d -ors are ciifficuit to disentangle h m adysts' pol i id positions, In&& ahhough tbe uIcreasing foais on the intenial causes a d dynamics of d i a nuy have been in keepii with the prevailing orientations of "conflict andysis" in the 1990s (as notai in Cba~tcr 2 above), such a focus is bound to reflect an implicit polirticai message in the case of Mozambique: B n d y stated, an emphasis on internai causes lays the ground fot a oompreb«isive aitique of tbt sociaiisî expbment in Mozambique, and points directly to tbe ncad for subsiantial inwaol dorm, Ao emphasis on the extanal on'gins of the war, by contras& sepamtes the socialist projas fiPm the conflict itseE and to some extcnt serves to exoaerate FreIimo ofsome ofthe pdicy or adminimative arors committd -a. Lq 1

The organisation of Reuamo's cxtauaI su- f h n its arigins to the eve of the peace agreement, are discussed is dkusaed in both its regicd and coid war dimension by Minîer (op- cit, 1994, pp, 134-140; pp. 155-59; and pp, 185-99.)-

140

the ioCreaang mphiddcm of nderaal -doon strategies over time. Ami iodeed,

though Renamo did succecd in creating a certain base of local s i a l support in many

areas of the Mozambican countqside towards the end of the 1980s, the o r m o n

continued to depend on South M c a n and, later dl, Malawiao, nrsten-al backing up mtil

1992. In the end, Reaamo would never fiee itself enough fiom the wider regional

geopolitid objectives of its extemal spoiison to poperly bemme a genuine national

movement with an identifiable political or economic p r o g p m w . This lack of a genuhe

and coherent platform muid be cofimed by the movement's difliculty in shaping its

own identity as it uderwent a M o n fian a fightllig force to political party in the

immediate afterrnath of the war. Despite its continued extemal dependeace, Renamo did

nonetheless succeed in carving out what Ebata bas cailed an enduring "political space" for

itself in Mouimbique:

Although initially an externdy spmsored surrogale force, over 16 years of war Remo's survivai opened up political spce for b own participation and excercise of power, challenging the socialist principles of the government and b m i n g the only

242 alternative to Frelim0.--

Looking at Mozambique's civil war fiom a Giamscian W v e of hegemonic

constnrction, ît becomes possible to interpret it in ternis of the absence, or non-formation,

of a "hisîorîc b l d ' of interests which would have sewed, on one band, as an organic

cernent for the post-independence state-society complex and, on the d e r hand, to

transmit or replicate the material and ideological interests of the ww leadhg group into

the broder society as a basis for the wmemual exercise of power. While the Frelimo

regime was able to create such a bloc among certain sections of Mozambican society

(public emptoyees, the intelectual classes, urban women and youth, and some

(rnodemised) sections of labour), its relative neglect of the niral fàmdy sector and its

chronic suspicion of inQpeaQnt ecommic actïvity ( b m individual production to

unregulated rural commerce), combined witb its increasingly coercive policy style to

alienate vast sections of the population The pessures of a gathering, extemally sponsored

civil war likely compounded the dynamics of dienation, lûndering any subsequent efforts

to expand the hegemonic bloc and thus preventing a new state-socie$y complex fiom

taking shape outside irrban centres-

- - -

242 Ebata, op. cit., 1999, Cbapta 3, p- 36-

At the ssme time, Renamo's appmt?y more effective -on of nnai Wety

through traditid autbority sûwtmes camiot be Mderstood in terms of a "muntier-

hegemonic stmgg!en as such, for at least two reasom: One is that no eff-e Frelïmo

hegemony (in the Gramdan sense of Maseasimil de) had yet been consolidated by the

time Renamo begm expandïng its opemîi~ns in the Mozambique countryside. Second, to

the extent tbat cornter-hegemony implies a coherent alternative political project in its own

right, Renamo appears not to have possessed the requisjte programmatic cbaraEteristics.

Rather, the success of Renamo, and of its fareign patrons was to have acted as a "countervailug force" which stopped short the post-mdependence bid for socialist

hegemony. However* in doing so, Renamo aiso succeeded in opening the space for a

broader, Ïntematiomlised hegemonic movement, the dynamics of which would becorne

increasingly apparent as the civil conmct wore o n Indeed, as Ebata goes on to add, if one

effect of the war was to enable Renamo to came out a permanent political space for itself

in the national arena;

On the other han& the war's legacy on political space Mozambique] also revolved aromd the penetration and pervasivenes of foreign influence through NGOs, donors and financiai institutions ... the externalisaîion of authority which began with the war

243 wilL continue far into the fùture .

Indeed, perbaps the greatest impact of the civil war was to nIrmtionaIise

Mozambique's post independence political ecunomy (including key elements of the state

and society), that is to say, to connect Mozambique hîo the global political economy

much dong the lines envisageci by Cox in bis discussion of the C'intemationalised state".

The continueci pressure of Renamo's destabilisation and the onse$ of drought in the mid-

1980s led the govemment to launch a succession of exteml and internai policy reviews.

On the exterd fiont, Mozamôique began diplmatic discussions with South Afiica

culminating in the 19û4 Nkomati Accord, which aùaed to curtail each country's

intedierence in the ùaemal political aff8irs of the other. In the event, although

Mozambique effectiveiy ended its support for ANC activities in the RSA, South Afncan

backing for R e m o actions in Soldheni and Central Mozambique continued and intensifid The accord di4 however, send a strong international signal that Frelimo was

243 ibid, pp. 36-7.

142

not closed to a diplornatic solution to tbe wer, d the implementation of its part of the

deal showed tbat t was pepmed to take seriously its extemai CornmitmentS.

Mozambique's Uiteniatiorial profile ouisicle of the socialkt bloc Unpved as a resulf and

emergency appeals for himianidan aid to combaî the effècts of drought and renewed

South Afncan dedabilisrtion f o d increasingly sympathetic ears Ul the West Muhilateral

and bilaterai food aid, including h m the United States, began to enter the country in

growing quantities, marking the begimuags of what would becorne a long and increasingiy 244

unequal relationship with the western aid commuai@ -

Yet despite the influx of new ad., ecodc deciïne continueci throughout the

decade- By the latcer 1980s, formai economic indicators showcd an increasingly bleak

picture. GDP fell by 8% each year between 1981 and 1985, and the volume of basic

agricultural products marketed in 1986 arnocmted to a quarter of the 1980 level. Industrial

produdon fell dramatically. The value of exports dropped from US S 281 million in 1981

to only US $79 million in 1986, and paymeats arrears in 1986 reached U S S 5ûû million, 245

an amount rougldy equivaient to half of the wuntry's GDP for that year . In order to

tnake up for increasing budgetary shortfalls and maintain expenditures, the govemment

was obliged to seek international credits, and its total foreign debt rose tkom zen, in 1982

to alrnost US $3 billion h 1985~~. This rapidly deterioraihg situation prompted Frelimo

to begin negotiating for IMF and World Bank membership and, under increasing pressure

fiom these institutio to draw up plans for national ecommic refonn. In 1987, Frelimo

launched its Programna de Reabilitaçao Ecommica (PM, the f h t structural adjustment

programme ever to be ùnplerneafed by any country during wartime. This 1ed to a first

round of price h'beralisation, deficit reductions, privatisations and currency devaluations-

As Hall and Young explain, these and related interna1 reforms extended deep into the

country's system of public administration, and stnick at the kart of the socialkt mode1 of

developrnent Subsidies to strategic secton of the ecommy were cut in a bid to make them

more cornpetitive, rent controls which linked rents to incorne-levels were replaced by new

244

245 Abrahamsson, op. cit, 1997, p. 217. Young and )Eall, op. at, 1997, p. 1%; Won, op- cit, 1991, pp 267-8.

246 David Pl- "Aid Dcbt and the Eed of Sovereignty Mozambique and Its Domn in ?k

J d of M A A@Üm &&es (VOL 3 1, No. 3), 1993, p. 4 10. 143

systems baseâ on pperty d u e , and public sector employment gmmnûxs were ~ifted~~'.

Together, these masures marked the beginning of Frelimo's @cal retreat fiom ïts

socialist experiment, and Mozambique's eimy into the post cold-war gldd pditical

economy.

Many obsemers, and a significant nmnber among the top Mopimbican leadership,

saw this deparnne nom pevious developent modeis as an inevitable choie, to Mt

economic decline ami set the country back on course towards socio-economic

modernisation. As suc4 ec0110rn.i~ and institutional reforms were publicly presented as

unavoidable and as beloagiag to a Mozambican initiative designed SpeCincaUy to adQess

Mozambican @lems For others, it signalled the opeoing of a new era of unprecedented

international w o n of Mozambique's political, social and eumomic -011s and

their force€ui -ocmation in line mth liberal ecommic doctrine248. For Young aud Hall, nsing aid flows, the PRE and subsepuent refom measmes, irnplemented under

intense pressure fiom the Internabonai Financial Institutions and donor collsortia, entailed

nothing l es than a

massive subordination of the Mozambican sîate[...] the wholesaie hand-over of the ewmmy to international agencies, a pnnvss e V [-..] by the parlous circumstances of much of the Mommbican population" -

Perhaps among the most vocal exponents of this view is David Pl& whose 1993

study of the eEects of aid leave no doubt about the unprecedented power that international

forces had gaïned in post-independence Mozambique. For Pb&, destabilisation,

economic crisis, aid dependence d consequent acceptance of extemai policy

conditionalities amomted to a process of "recolonisation", key featurPs of which were

not entirely distinct fkom the country's pindependence expience, and which nom the

standpoint of ideology, structures of kwwledge and the cooptation of leading local

groups, contains several characteristics of hegemonic coostniction reiating closely to the

substance and orientation of the new policy agendp discussed in the previprevious section:

247

248 Young and Hall, op. ck, 1997, pp. 1 S 7 . Proponcnts of tbis view include Young (1995); Young and Hdi (1997); Hanlon (1991, 1996);

and Abrahanwon (1995, 1996, 1997) 9moirg &. Sce below for hl1 bib1iograpbica.i information 219

Hall and Young, op. at, 1997, pp. 198-9. 144

The policy changes prescn'bed by the principal donors ami to accelerate the integtation of Mozambique mto the global market, and to ûmsfhn the daaestic ecowmy to this end..The West's policy prescriptions impty Qamaîic social conse<~ueaces, mCluding the execababion of social inequplities, the -sement of l d and expatriate élites, and the subversion of prevailing politid acraagements. mhe country's subordinate status is currently rooted mt in discredited ideologies of racial superiority, imperid destiny, or Christian mission, but in the precepts of moQm economic orth&xyxy Dominion is exerci& mt by the agents of colonial power, but by the te~h~cal ly sophisticated and poiitically disintefested ecommists of the IMF, the World Bank and the bilateral aid agemcies, whose prescriptions are detemineci not by parochial national inapests but by ecommic anaiysis. Resisting the power of the major donors is consequently difficult, because Mozambique's subordination is portrayed as a nahiral wnsequence of gloûal economic hends ratber than an imposi-tion by a

250 specific colonial power -

The role of intanational NGOs in this pocess of intematioaalisation of

Mozambique's political economy bas received little attention, and it is to this issue that we

focus our attention in the chapters that foilow. However, it is worthwhile wting at this

point that, while a Iimited number of politidiy sympathetic foreign orgmkations had brought material and techical support to the Frelimo project sime the mid-l970s, it was

this period of "hand-over to foreign agencies" after 1986 tbat witnessed the nrSt

significant waves of international humanbh NGOs entering Mozambique. to assume

responsibility for an expanding range of public welfàre fimctiom. Larger NGOs, such as

CARE and World Vision, began to acquire country programme budgets which exceeded

those of idhidual governxnent deparbaents. Indeeâ, by 1990, CARE haâ virhially

replaced Mozambique's National Department for Revention in tbe country-wide

coordination of ernergency relief distmibutïons From a total presnice of Iess than 15

international NGOs, mostly church and union-related solidarity groups, pesent in the

wunûy in 1980, the nimiber rose to some 100 in 1990. The incrtasiag prominence of

emergency NGOs during this period of 11- re-ordering was not incidental. Rather, it

wincided closely with the structural refom objectives, includiog lower public investment

and a smder role for the state, supporteci by the FIS and western aid donors. in an

interview wnducted by Abrahamsson in 1992, the USAID's head of mission in Mozambique stated for the record tbaî bis country's aid was not intended to build up

government capacity in Mozsmbique to coimteract emergencies "Quite the opposite. the

2U) Plank, op. cit., 1993, pp. 428-9.

faster such attempts eroâe, the easier it will be for private iaterests and non-govemmentaî W B ' organisations to assume responsiiility far the distniution of emergency aid . This

statement strikiagiy clarifies the increasingiy strong complementarity between

humanitarian aid and i n ~ ~ o n a l blueprints for h i refona hm the mid-1980s

onwards.

in this chapter, which opened the anpirical Secfion of my study, 1 begm witb a brief methodologid discussion on how i Gramsciaa conception of hegemony might be

applied as a h e w o r k for historical analysis. It higblighted in pmtïcuiar a number of

political fùnctims that forces or organi-sations of cM1 society potentially cany out in hegemonic constNCtion, L then pr- with a histoncai review of Mozambique's

colonial and post-colonial expenences, with two specific purposcs in minci: One was to

provide readers with a basic background to Mozambique's post-war transition, and thus

f i d y place the letter withui a long historical legacy of externe1 intemention The second

purpose was to apply Gfatllscian analysis to Vanous defining episodeJ dong the way, in

and effort to tease out the historical role of civil society in fhcilitatiag, or blocking, efforts

at hegemonic constniction, This role bas V8ned, as lndeed have the historical forms of

authority, political economy and civil society hl£ The aaalysis nonetheles shows that

its historical reievance to hegemony is indeed substantial, and that many of the civil

society processes occurrbg in Mozambique in the 1990s. while in many ways unique to

the times, are not eatirely without pfecedent

2s 1 Abrahamsson, op. cit, 1997, p. 217.

1%

The Structures of Pace

In the puevious chapter, I sou@ to idem* the role of civil society forces in

building or blocking the coastruction of hegemonic orden at diffacnt junctures of

Mozambican history- Whereas the nature and longevïty of Pomigal's colonial hegemony,

and indeed the shape of the modern Mozambicm state itrelf, appear to bave owed much to

the anergence and integrative effect of Afk-Portuguese society and other private forces in

cemeating together a cobennt (though evolving) state-society cornplex, the absence of

such links in the pst-independence @od arguably weakened and contrinited to the

defeat of Frelimo's bid for a socialist hegemony in the country- Moreover, M e the

Renamo raistance did not in &seIf constiMe a uw~r -kgemonic" movemenf the

protracteci civil conflict that it sustained mnetheless did generate a countervaihg force to

the Frelimo pject, 1 e - g open a wide tract of contested social space within

Mozambican socieîy for a new, intemationlised hegemonic bid, this thne reflecting what

Young has called libaaiisn's c4project-to-be-realised" in Mozambique, "its thrust, its 252

yeamings, its intense desire to dominate people and wmmunities" . This process, which

Abrahamsson has identified with the extension of the CcWashington to

Mozambique, bears the marks of the "new policy agenda? Its implementation was

reflected in a number of policy shifts undertaken by the Mozambican leadership fiom tbe

mid-1980s onwards, as weil as by moves to ceconfigure the bdamental structure of the

suite and its relations with Mozambican Society- By the tum of the decade, Young writes:

The preamble to the new (1990) constitution was completely rewrïtten ...m n a variety of new statutes and regulatiom, Mozambique has been rcqiiirad to rcstrucnne the state in ways which give certain rights to cïtizens against if withdraw it fkom many activities, and create new forms of representaîion within the state [...] The economic changes forced on the country have also been concemed with reforming the role of the state and the creation of marketdprivate economic forces: both of these are to be carried out in line with ''inteniational standards". Thus, by 1994, though the Great Powers oontinued to k generous with aid, the detail of their shaping of economic policy included insistence on the introduction of the VAT, the decontroiiing of al1 prices, direct constrain& on subsidies to public enterprises, the complete restructuring of the banlring system and the compursOry sale of state companies according to a

2sZ Tom Young *A Projet% to be Rcaüsad: Giobal Liberalism and Coatcmporary Afiica" in

M i i n i w m (Vol. 24, NO.^), 1995. pp. 528..

strict tirnetable. Despite the [woc14] BanL's emphasis on the technical nature of the economic reforms, there are stmng parailels between these changes a d those in the political realm; in psrticular the relati&p *Ci between state and the 'market' on one haad and state and "civil society" on the otherUi..

The generai piirpose of this chapa is to clarify two central points relatuig to

Mozambique's transition from war to peace The first is that although implementation of

the general pesa agreement (Acordo Geral da Paz or GPA) o c c d formdy under

overail UN supeMsion between 1992 and 1994, the underlying structure of

Mozambique's peacehe political ecwomy hsd already begun to take shape under

increasing intefnilfionaI pressure h m the mid-198ûs. The key political provisions of the

UN-supervised GPA, and international strategies for the deiivery of humanitarian

assistance in support of Ï t (UICludkg notabLy the socio-economic reintegration of ex-

combatants and disphad popuiations, the transfodon of former anneci resistance Uao

a iegitimate political party, the holding of cornpetitive elections) served to consolidate

movements towruds liberal economic adjustnient already underway. This is an important

point, since the bulk of analysis of the Mozambican transition has tended to examine the

economic (strucbwl acijustment) and political (GPA) processes separately or, at best, as

parallel transitionsW. Such d y s i s has tended to obscure, ratber than clarify, the

concrete links existing between the ecowmic structure of the p i c e and the foms of political society ( m e ) and civil society pursueci with international (including

253

-- - Ibid-, pp. 538-39- n 4

In fict, fiequent dhnccs are made to the dual trsisition in Mozambique: on one haad fiom war to peace, and on tbe otber, b m a centralisad wmmand cconomy to a market ecommy (somt mention is also made of the transition fiom W i s m to deummy). Ahhough these processes are rccognised as intertwiaed, tbat bas in pnrcti-ce ken comparatively Iittle analysis of the concrete intenidons bctween the two. This dyt ical separation clearly mirrors the disciplinary distinction b c c n politicai and acaaomic realms disaissed in Chapter 3 with respect to mainstream intaaationai thaory (sic Realism anci Li'beralism). Sa, amaag othas: Stephai Chan and Moises VeMncio (eds.), Wor rud &uce ih Motarnbiqwc (Lmndoril MhcMiflan, 1998); Richard Synge, Moranebique- U V PnTPwccrLcrpin6 U Adhm 1-91 (Washington: United States Instihite of Peacc, 1997); Chris Alden "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique" in TIic Jmmaf qf M ' AEifan (Vol, 33. No. l.), 1995. These writings can be contrssted for example, with annuai cormtry rc~orts isswd by the International F i i a l Institutions and somt UN agaicies which are c o d prharily with aoonodc trends and tradmonally shy away fiom anaiysis of politicai issues. By comtast, vrhiable politicai-cco~>iny contributions which & to comied the struaural d . and GPA ptocesses include: Joseph Hanlon, Pwcc W m Aqfjt= Hoir, tk lAa7 B k d s R&dMng I n M m q w c . (London: James Currey, 1996); Almhmmq op. cit., 1997; and Susan wllct, 'Ostriches, Wise Old Elephants and Econowc Reconstnidion in Mozambique" in I m h m d h m d Pœcalsepirig (VOL 2. No. l), 1995.

148

humanitarian) assistance; in otber words, the links tbaî bind together the emerging

peacehe state-society cornplex.

The second poid wbkh 1 seek to develop in this chapa is ttiat the build-up of an

increasiagly powemil internaiional NGO presemz in Mozambique, which starteâ with the

economic policy sbi& ofthe mid4980s a d reacbed its apogee during the GPA and post-

GPA periods, was not merely coincidental. Tbe humanhian NGO build-up did wt occur

merely as a respome to the pressing humanifPnpn needs brought on by war, drought and

economic coliapseUapse Tndeed, such assistance mi@ well have (and indeed had in previous

periods) been delivaed through other chanaels and with only marginal NGO involvement,

Rather, the NGO build-up is ooosidered by s e v e d obsetvecs to be organically Linked to

the liberalisation of the Mozambican politicai ecommyY Economica11y7 the i n t e ~ o d

NGO community serveci increasingly to cimmiscribe the role of the *te7 and indeed according to some obsewers, w e a i c d iîs capcity to intemene effectively in the public

realtn, by providing an alternative channe1 for &ce delivety and w e l h provision,

equaily in response to inimediaîe humanirena. needs and in tcmis of addressing the

potentiaily destnrtive longer-ferm social effects of stmctud economic adjustment

Politically, the international NGO presence served as a wncrete organkational model for

the (re)configuration and (re)activation of a modern cM1 society in Mozambique which would serve a number of supportive hctions, such as coamunity-level peace-building

(expanding grass mots coastituencies fâvourable to the peace), civic and human rights

education, electoral support, the social and economic integration of vulwrable groups,

and the absorption of traditional authorïties into the peacetime political econornY? As

such, humanitarian NGOs bave responded at least as much to the local requirements of

liberalisation in Mozambique as to humanitarian concem. In Grarascian terms, then, the

humanitarian No0 sector has served to provide the consensual correlate to the public

regulatory, legal aisd administraîive restructuring ~derpinaiog the new peace-tirne state-

society complex And seen fiom this perrpective, we begin to undentand the significa~ce

of their presence in tenus of the hegemonic fimctons identifieci by Cox (see Chapter 5).

In the pages that follow, 1 saL to p r o d e historical support for each of these

points by reviewing in more detd, first, the architechue of the l i h d peace as t begm to

take shape f b m the mib198ûs onwards: in other words, the struchnes and pocesses of

politicai and economic reform wbich uoderpinaed the fonnai peace traosition (1992-94)

and later efforts to secure post-conflict cecovery (1995-97). The key focus here is on

structural changes in the Mozambican state, economy and society, and where possible, the

effkct of the gn,wing NGO sector in facilitating these changes through the provision of

humanitarian aid and other measmes- Secondly, I seek to map out the respective roles oc

and midual relationships W n , tbc main actors of the transitional period following the

signing of the GPA in 1992, most promiaently relations among the NGO sector, the Ers,

the UN peace-support opmation (UNOMOZ and the specialised agencies), key elements

of the donor community, and the Mozambican state and society. In so Qing, two

dimensions of the pst-war transition are highlighted: nrSt, the prominence of the NGO

sector within the broader aid wmmunity based inside Mozambique, ~flecting the tbree

global trends (No0 integrati-on, po-r and pditicisation) discussed in cbapter one of tôis

study and; second, the convergence of an inteniabonalised stak-society complex in the

WUtlffy-

The signing of Mozambiqye's G e n d Peace Accord in 1992 resulted fiom a

combination of propitious international, regional and national trends. At the international

level the end of the --West wnfiontation weakened the cold war logic &ch bad Mled the civil war during the 1980s. Regiondy, the dissolution of the apartheid regime

in South f i c a signalled an end to âirect extenial destabilisation, and opened the

prospect of enhanced ecommic and politicai oooperation across Southem Afnca h i d e

Mozambique, the economic toll of tbe fightiag., compounded by increasing govemment

debt, rural impoverishment and chronic drought, had rendered coritiaued war-making

unsustainable on either side of the conflict. The peace equally resulted fkom a protracteci,

and at times disconnected series of negotiating initiatives dating as far back as the eariy

1980s, when Frelimo began to make p r e m contacts with local Renamo elements

operating inside the wuntq and, more to the point, with thar South Afiiuui sponsors As

noted, an early round of ta&s resulted in the signing of the Nkomati Accord, which although abortive, publiciy signalled Frelimo's desire to sue for peace, and probably over

the longer term alsa served to galvanise international pressure against ongoing Soutb

M c a n aggnsion. As war mntinued to rage thugti the 1980$ initiatives to maintain

open chaanels of contact betwan the d g parties and press for renewed dialogue were

taken up by leaders of Mozambique's Pmîdmt and CathoIic chufches- Despite numemus

setbacks, the churcàes successfully positiomd thernselves by the late 1980s to facilitate increasingly regular contacts with R e m o and, lster, direct &gs between officiais

on either side of the conflict The role of the churches in mobiiising the resources

necessary to enable continued dialogue, and in moving the agenda forward during the

darkest months of the war, has been seen as crucial by d y s t s of the peace pracess. The

Catholic church of S o m which enjoyed prkileged relations with the Renamo

leadership, prwed to be d a 1 in securing and m a i n t d g R e m o psrticipation in the

peace talks in the latîer 1980s, a fact later reflected in the central position occupied by the 256

ltalian church dirrihg the Rome negotiations .

By 1990, several players had entered what was still technically an informa1 but

increasingly officialised, peace process. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Daniel Arap

Moi of Kenya fhcilitated preliminary peace discussions and added a measure mgional

weight to the process, while South M c a and the United States, supported by a growiag

chorus of humanitarian organisations and (jas visibly perhaps) COIporate interests,

brought increasing pressure to bear upon botb to agree to conditions for fomal 257

negotiations . In J d y of that year, Renamo and Frelimo met for the fïrst the in Rome,

launchhg the beginning of official talks d shifbing the focus of negotiations squateiy

into the internafional realm, with the American, Italian, and subsequently also the

Portuguese, French and British goveniments playing an increasingly prominent mediating

role. The General Peace Agreement was negotiated over the subsequent 24 months, aod

covered a remarkably extensive range of issues in minute detail. Its six main protocols

related not only to immediate military disengagement and mrrtual political recognition, but

2 s For a specifïc anaiysis of the role of the Chutches, sec Alcx Vines and Ken Wilson, CAiwnrâes

4 A d t â e P m x ~ i n M ~ u e ( C o n E e r e n c c P . p e r ~ a t U n i n r s i t y o f L e e d s , September 1993) and Aiex V~ies No lkmxmcy Mollcp: ïZe Rmd lo Rmce ü Motrirnbîque (Ladon: CIIR Btiefing Paper, April 1994)- For more gcncral revicws of tbe peace talks, see Moises Ventanci0 and Stepben Chan, " Roman Tatksn in C h and V e d (ads.), op cit., 1998; Chris Aldcn- and Mark Simpson, " Mozambique: A Delicatt Peace" in Tltc Javiirsl of Mbdèm A m Sw&s (Vol, 31, No. 1). 1993; and John Sad, op. cit., 1999. 2.57

Sad, op. ut., 1999, pp. 135- 6; Smn Barna his highlightai the role of inmisnitarian NGOs, in partidar the ICRC, in using humanitarian atgumerds (gons-border sccess) to pusb the péacc taiks forward d e r 1988, See 'Wumanitarian Assistaacc as a Factor În tbe Mozambican Peice Negotiations: 1990-2" in Chan and Venancio (cds.), op. cit-, 1998, pp- 1 17-24 1.

151

also to press fieeûoms, the role d status of political parties d the soci-c re-

integration of demobilised soldiers It included a M l e d schedule of the modalities and

timing of the coUrdLy's fint multiperty elections, and and accomperiied by a joint

declaration settuig agreed priaciples for the of hummitarian assistance in the

inmediate post-war pend Final agreemeat was reached by 4 October 1992, initiaiiy, for

a 12-month transitional peace plan to be implemented under United Nations supervision

Thus, at the rrquest of the Mozmbican govermnent, the United Nations Operation

in Mozambique (CNOMOZ) unis authorid by the Security Courd and lmched in late

1992 with a wide-ranging mandate to monitor the cease-fire, oversee d e m ~ b i l i ~ o n ,

wnduct mine-cleamce and assist in the pr-on and execirtion of the elections, anâ

co-ordinate humanitaria assistance- To ths & end despite r e c h g logistical d

Rriminisûatïve delays, UNOMOZ eventually deployed over 10 000 troops, civilian police

and military a d electoral observas. at a cost of some US S 1 miliion per day. Its

humanitaïan mit, mendeted to encourage the resettlement of refbgees and the

reintegration of demobilised soIdiers in time for the elections, colordinated successive

humanitarian appeals for the p e r d covering the operation amounting to approxïmaîely

US S 1 billion, sizeable proportions of which was channelled through iatemational

~ ~ 0 s ~ ' ~ . In the event, UNOMOZ was obliged to extend its operation for a second

twelve-month period as a result of cumulative delays, due on one hand to logistical aad

administrative problems experienced dining the early month of intervention, and to

recurring delaying tactics by the former warriag parties over issues of demobilisation and

disarmament Despite these problems, and despite cornplaints by some donors and several

NGOs conceniuig interna1 mismanagement, UNOMOZ is widely credited with succeeding

in its overall mission of overseeing the war-to-peace transition and failitatuig a first

round of democdc elections in October 1994, almost precisely two years after the 259

signing of the peace agreement -

Z 8 The fiaanciai relatioriship betweai NGOs and the UN bu- office in Motambique is

discussed in filier Wl in Cbpter 7. 259

For an indcpîh usessrnent ofthe UNOMOZ mission, sec Richard Synge, op. cit., 1997; and Chris Alden, op. ch., 1995.

152

The New Political Economv Architecture

As noteci above' the geagal stnictme of the peace in Mozambique in the 1990s has been determined by several fkctors and movements which both prece&d and surromdeci

the formal peace pocess. This political economy wntext is cornplex, involving visible

shifts in public policy a d intense interactions ammg extenial and intenial forces and

agendas, and peaetrPting deeply into most sectocs of Mozambican life. It is beyod the

scope of tbis chapter to engage in any elaborate 8ssessments about the wisdom of the

social and economic pdicy decisions taken during the latter 1980's under IF1 Melage, or

to seek to predict their long-term developmental implications. The intention mther is to

relate the broad contours of these changes, examine their effect on social relations inside

Mozambique and, to the extent possibl~6q offer some preliminary conclusions about the

role of the N o 0 community in relation to the Gramsci811 notion of hegemonic

construction In this respect, 1 limit my analysis to examining th= key pocesses, or

ccpillars" on which the stmcüm of Mozambique's peace-time political economy is based,

and whch the 1992 GPA serveci po1iticd.i~ to consolidate and legitimise. These are

relatively simdtaneous and intemmected processes and their enmeration here is not

meant to convey any order of priority: the first pillar is the process of economic

adjustment fomally entered into by the Frelirno in 1987 with hnplementation of its

Programa de Reabiütaçao Ecowmica (PRE) and followed up in 1990 with an ostensibly

more socially sensitive PRES (Programa de Reabilitaçao Economica e Social); in d e r

words, Mozambique's IMF and World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjutment

Programmes. A second, closely related pillar concerm public sector refonn, paaicularly

the processes of privatisation (formally mderway since 1989) and political and

administrative decentralisation, which have impacted substantialiy on the role of the state*

and on relations of authority betweem the state, market actors and elements of civil society

The third pillar, similady related to the first two, consists of progressive mova toward

political pluralisation in the country, which provideci an enabling environment aecessary

for both the coastniction of a cornpetitive electoral system, rapid emergence of a

"modem', western-type associational sphere' or civil society. As we sM1 see, in d l three

260 1 am obliged to pruceed with some caution on this point: whaeas the actions of humutmm

. - NGOs in supportiag tbe objectives of the UN pers-support opaatiOn (1992-94) bave been relatively weU documcritd md analysed, kmwledge about theïr tehtionship to dezper (structurai)

cases the proases in -on involveci not ody concrete policy measmes, but also

radical changes in officiai a d notl-officid dismurse about the nature and orientation of

the country's naîional developnent T b discourse was based on the adoption and

dissemination into Mozambican society of new developmental votabularies and, later*

novel ways of dysing options for post~conflict fecovery- Policy measures were thus

accampanied by idCologid change and the crestion, supported by official and non- official research and anaiysis efforts inauntry and abroad, of new " e ~ b h g * ~ kaowledge

stnictures.

Mozambique's entry into IMF and World Bank membership ia 1985/4 and itr

subsequent implementaîion of the PRE were intiated under circumsfatlces of multiple

duress. As aoted earlier, the combination ofdrought, destabilisation and severe declines in

internal production and trade had lef€ Mozambique with some of the grimmest socio-

economic indicators in the world In particular, shoctfâlls in agrïcultural production and

the severing of many rurai-udmn l inh as a result of Reaamo's advances meaat that

Mozambique had to inCreese its reliame on imporb in order to meet iirbao food

requirernents and to counter fimine in drought-stncken areas- Rising imports led to a

growing belance ofpayments deficit, forcing the Frelimo govemment to seek international

financing, primarily fiom the West Against this interd economic background, several

external pressures combineci30 duce Mozambican leverage in negotiating for Western

credit and aid One source of pressure was a steady dedine in economic coloperation with

Frelimo's traditional socialist bloc supporters, itseif a reflection of broader international 26 1

changes underway . In addition, regional pressures increased sharply as a direct result of

intensified destabilisation efforts by Soutb Afiica in the wake of the Nkomati Accords,

which translated intenially into an expmsion and intensification of Renamo operations

across the country. Finaliy, strong pressure was brought to bear on the Frelimo regime by

potentiai donors (particuiarly the United States) and the IFIs t h e m s e h in order to oblige

Mozambique to accept assistance in exchange for i n t e d refom commîtmenîs. Joseph

Hanlon reports two revealing e p i h of "dowr strikes* during the 1980s, in which the

donor community declined or delayed the provision of food aid in response to emergency

processes of change (e-g. ecOIlOtmc adjushicnr and admiaistrotive mtom) is tir less comprehensive, 26 l

Hanlon, (op. cit., 1W1, p. 269) reporw a steady âaaease of socialkt bloc ODA h m 1984 onwiuds.

154

appeals by Mozambique in order to secure its application for IFI membership and, later, the implementation of the PRE In the wenf IFI membnhip won Moziambique its first

World Bank credÏt in 1985, and there was a substsntial jump in Urternati0na.i assistance

(including food aid) oncc the tams of the PRE were agrced in 1986-7? -ers have

tended to 1- sources of extend pressure in fivour of stnictural adijustment in the IFIs

themselves and psriicularly the World Bank which, through its leadllig role in annuai Taris Group" donor meethgs, hes been able to link bilaterai aid to the adjustment

agenda. However* Abrahamsson has acgued that M F a d World Bank involvernent in

Mozambique in the 1980s was, h m the outset, also caliited to "provide resources for

implanenting the US 'constmctke engagement' policy", a State Department strategy for

containhg commwsm aml s e c d g a cornpliant regional pemx settlement in Southem 263

Afiica using a mixture of rnilitary pressure aad economic inducement . He points out the

irony that Mozambique's applidons for IFI membership, despite king made uader

gathering extenral prrssure, would have been rejecteû on the punds of its insufticient

credit rating and its chronic political and social insîabiliity. htead, the applications were

accepîeù, and IF1 involvement in Mozambique initiated, "only f i e r considemûle political

pressure from the United States" on the iMF and World ~ a n k ' ~ ~ . Given this complex web

of intenial, regional and international pditical and economic pressures, Abrahamsson

expresses M e surprise that

mnitial conagtual gaps between the govemment of Mozambique and the Bretton Woods institutions regardhg the role of the state, the economic impact of destabilisation, the dimension of the monetary supply and the pacing of required &-

265 valuations, were soon bridged following stardard Bretton Woods interpretations -

Economic Adiustment

A central f- of Mozambique's PRE was the impllementation of a macre

economic stabilisation policy based on standard IMF 8nti-inflation strategies involving

262 W o n , op. &, 1996, pp. 16-1 7.

263 Ham Abrabamsson. "The Intanational Political Eamomv of Struaural Adiusîmcntr The Case

stringent fiscal d monetary controls- Luwer inflation. according to the Fundys

stabilisation mode4 wouid produce several positive e f f i on the couatry's war-tom

economy, inc1udiag hi@ GDP growth, the stimulation of intemal markets, and a better

currency stability which would allow tbe country to better adQess the baiance4f-

payments issue. Accordingly, the Mozambican cuneacy was devalued substantially

against the dollar in 1987, and in the eiisuing period subsidies to state enterprises were

reduced while govemment pice controls on agrjcultural and other mmmodities were

lifted to stimulate madce&d output In totai, the provision of public credit to the

productive sectors of the ecommy (most prominentiy for agriculture, industry and intemal

trade) was redriced by 66% in the f ie yeais aRer 1990, on the assiimption tbat private 266

sector investment wodd move in to nII the gap . Public spending in the key social

sectors of hesW and education dropped abmptly as a proportion of the total state budgec

respectively from P! and 17% in 1986 to 4% and 10.96 in 1988~~'. Although spending in

these sectors was alloweù to rise in nibsequent years, it wss kept below 1980-81 levels

untii weil into the mid-i990s, despite increasing demographic prrssures and the fhct that 268

these combineci sectors accounted for some mthirds of the public sector worlc force .

The m a ~ ~ l e ~ ~ n o m i c impact of tbese and other related adjusfment measures

continue to be the subject of debnte, not least because tbey yielded contradictory results:

while GDP growth rose to an annual average of roughly 6% in the years 198694, inflation

nonetheless continued to rise and exchange rates to deteri0mtex9. Likewise, although the

value of exports grew steadily, imports grew Wer, examhthg the balance of payments

266

-*- Hanloo, op. c i t , 19%, pp- 5760- LOI

Merle Bowen, "Moaunbique d the Politics of Ecoawiic Recovery" in Z k F ï & k Fomm F o l . ,.?. 15, No. 1)- 1991, p- 50- um

UNDP 1994-95 Aiinial Report " Develop~~W Mombiqutn -0: J ~ n e 19%), p. 14. The report spcciûes tbat in 1987, the first y of impl«nentm*on of tbe PRE, beahb spending reached a low of 2.5% of the totai budget expcnditurc. AItbough this was aihwed to rise steadily in subsequeat yems, it ody began to mach 1980 speading kveis agaiu in 1995. Likewise the educrtion e x p d m e s show a p q x m h d incraue relative to the t d budget. Gains in these s e d q ho-, ~ a m to be offkt whcn measmd as a proportion of annuai GDP lyy thU point see AbJumnoi5 op. ciî., 1997, p. 229) -

Europeen Community Pre-St- Doaiment, (Maputo: 1997), p 1. (mimeo by EU Dckgation Ecoaornic Advisor); UNDP, op, cit, 1996, pp. 4-12.

156

problem and increasing the

wntradicti011~ mein in geaernl

need for Qctaarl fhmcial -rtm. What these

tenus, and how they reflect upan the country's II~~CTO-

economic performance relative to stnictiaal djustment targets set by the Eh, is beyond

the cornpetence of this chaptcr- However, two points of iataest are worth mting one is

that whatever o v d growth of the ecowmy was registaed dmiag the perïod was M y

linked the irïcreasîng influx of inteniatiod a i4 which by 1990-91 accounted for w les

than 70% of Mozambique's GDP~". Likewise, the iricreasing trade imbalance has been

directly associatecl with growth in domestic àemand for impoiæd consumer goods îÙeIIed

by a rapidly swelluig expatriate aid community after 1987, a pattern compounded between

1992-94 with the deployment of several thousand highly paid UN military and civilian

personnel. Indeed, both net aid £hm and the number of foreign aid petsonne1 in

Mozambique rose sharpiy in the years immediaîely following PRE implementaîion to

become the dominant force in the country's political ecormmy. To illustrate this point, net

ODA to Mozambique neraly Qubled h m USS355 million in 1985 to USS700 miilion in

1987, the year the stnictural adjusîment was initiated, and rose fùrther to almost 1.2 billion

by 1993~'~. At the same t h e , Wiilett notes that between 1989 and 1990 "no less than 26

United Nations agencies were operative in Mozambique in addition to 6 nomUnited

Nations rnultilateral agencies, 44 bilateral donors and 243 non-governmentd agencies

from 23 ~ountries''~~~ These points aIready begin to illustrate the extent to which the

intemational aid presence has, &om the outset, been intriasically W e d Mozarnbiqw's

structural adjustment initiatives.

Taken together, adjustment meisures aRer 1987 had two key effects which are

direcly relevant to our analysis of the role of civil society in supporthg Mou~bique's

moves to implement tbe li'beralisaîion agenda: The nrst was that the adverse social effects

of structural adjustment iitself, in the context of ongoing war and drought, worked to

270 While the value of exports rose h m US$ 103 ,million to US$ 150 million bewecn 1988 and

1994, imports grcw ûom USS 633 to USS869 miIli011 The trade mibalance tinis grew by over US$ 260 million during t h paiod, reflecîhg a cwtinued weakness in d e t e d domestic production, and reiated importance of imports in covering Mozambique's food rcquirements (Sec UNDP, op. d, 1996, p. 10). ni 272

Plank, op. cit- 1993, p, 41 2- Hanlori, op. ck, 1996, p. 16; OECDiDAC: WlDA Receipts a d Selccted lndicators h r

Developuig Countries and Territoriesn, 1999. 273

Willett, op. ck, 1995, p. 40- 157

inmase overall humanitarian d and by extension the demanci for social mSerYlces:

Indeed, the 1987 de-valmtions abruptiy Iowred the value of moaey against marketai

commoditiesY and in pmticuiar agakt Uaports on which Mozambique was becoming

increasingly depedmt. Likewise the reduction of subsidised production and price

controls acted to push up the price of l d l y produced goods in urban areas- As a resuit,

average annual pria kreases by 1989 were ranghg between 40% and 5%. Overall

purchasing pwer demead, pmti~ularly sharply for Mozsmbicans on fixe& fornial sector

incornes. According to one report "Between 1989 and 1992, reaI average salaries fell by

eighteea percent and tbe official minimum wage, the principal source of incorne for 50

percent of Mozambican workers' famïlïesy lost 24 percent of its aiready low buying 274

powei' . As a result, the report ad&, o v d e c o d c growth (in GDP) translatexi into

an i n m i n g mai-distn'bution of 4 t h in urban centres with potentiaüy desrsibilising

effects:

Under c-t policies [..] a rise in weaith for a small strata of Mozambique's social elite has taken place agamst a general deterioration in the living standards of much of the country's d a n population. resulting increase in unemployment and the deteriorathg buying power of the rnajorîty of Mozambicans have occurred within a b e w o r k of increasin ~ p e t t y wnuption, violent crime and the potenth1 for signincant social turmoil .

The effects of structmd adljustment in rural areas after 1988 likewise appeared to

complicate the efforts of d wmmunities to cope with the aiready harsh realities of

drought and armed wnfiict, and dso to adversely afEkct exïsthg cornmerciai links

between town and country. In piueicular, new Mce uncertauiaes resultuig k m the lifting

of govenunent price controls added to existing physical and climatic insecurities, and thus M e r weakened incentives for fiinners to genenite and market sucplus production.

Farmers' terms of trade deterioraîed, and tbe removai of subsidies to the state fkrm sector

aiused the o v d l number of d wage eanwrs to de~luse~'~. Based on a rural case-sîudy

. .

15. 275

Ibid., p. 13. 276

"Tcrms of tradcn fbr rumi firmcrs is m d in tams of a fixai basket of basic (housebold or consumer) commdiities that CM be obwpned in exchange f ir (or through the sale of ) a certain category and quansity of local ptodua (e-g. 10 Kg of malle). A detaioratim of terms of tradc signals a relative im-shment of h a a s , and rafuccs tbeir inantive to produce surpluses for

conducted in the third year of implementation, Bowen -ates a number of adverse social consequmces with the PRE:

Marketed agridtural production for 1990 sbowed a decline of 20 per anf the fht time that an increase had not ken recordeci since 1985. Although the war and climatic faors 8ccomted for some of this decline, the peassmtry's terms of trade have declkâ since 1986, and consequedy they have r e d d theV mark& output In fact the majority of those living in the wmtrysîde have not benefited h the PRE [.-.] only a tiny strata of d - s c a k "prognssive" M e r s have profited from increased market access and an impved supply of gmds. In areas fomierly domhted by large agro-industrial state enterprises [...]structural adjmûnent policies have intensifiecl pressures on the rural poorpoor Witb 00 access to fertile plots in the irrigation seheme, and inoperative rain-fed fields due to climatic and security conditions, himmeds of peasant households w longer have a reguiar wage inumie, mainly because state enferpriferprises have reduœd substantidy - the number of workm in

Against the backbp of a measumbly deteriorating socl*al situation, the second

general effect of adjustment measures ooncems the increasing iaability of the state to

guanintee the provision of a minimum level of social services. Declining state capacity to

meet n e e b resufted from piessure by the iFIs to either diminish overall public expenditure

or, at any rate, to redirect it towards prionty growîh sectors in the economyY These

pressures directly affkcted the govemment's capacity to spend new monies to improve or

expand eistuig s e ~ c e s , to take on new staff in the nice of an uicreasingly tangiile crisis

or to raise public sector salaries to reflect inflation, in a manner that would provide

incentives for raising the @ty of services. "The dimim'shing ability of the state to

provide even the most basic social services and a d k t y net", wrïtes Willett, 'eroded the

well-king of individuals" She reports that while per capita incorne registered at ody US S

80 in 1991, diseases spread rapidly as a result of collapsing v e n t i v e healthcare systems,

with often fatal effeçts for vuinerable groups such as children, womec and those 278

displaced by war .

the market. Hanlou reports that to obtam a blanicet in 1982, a fârmer needed to prociuce 32 Kg, of maüe. In 1993 the blanket was King excbanged for 100 Kg. of mabz w o n , op. cit, 1996, pp. 154-6). Liiewise, Abnbhmsson and Nisson bave rcportad t h t in orda to buy a used sbirt in a nuai market in 19û9, a fàrmer hbd to produce 18 Kg. of mùze. To obtain the same shirt in 1995, hdshe would v i r e 30 Kg. of maizc- Sec Abraharmrson snd Nikon, ï3e W d - C~I)SCIISYS e M i m e (Gatbcnburg: Pardi- l996), pp- 59-60, - LI J

Merle Bowen, "Beyoncl Reform: Mjusûncnt and Politicai Powcr in Contcmpomy Mozambiquen in J d tfAkJarr REi#n JbrrOia (Vol, 30 , No, 2), 1992, pp. 264-5. 278

Wdlett, op. ut., 1995, pp. 40-1- 159

Uitimritely, this combination of gn,wing demaad (social and humanitariam wed)

and reduced supply (state provision). would serve to open up a space for imreasing

foreign assistanasupporteci social a d hianiniauian interventions t h u g h civil çociety

channels, with the number of international NGOs reaching nearly 200 by 1991n9. By

1992, the year the formal peaoe agrPewnt was signed, the NGO sector had becorne

çolidly entrenched in the national ecommy, wîth collective aid coatniutioas registering as

a visible proportion of GDP (see Table 2, Ch. I), and with NGUs having successfully become operational in a wide range of social and humanitarian planning, fiinding and

direct implementation iictivities. Aithough this pattern reached its most inteasive phase

during the post-amflict recoLlStfUCtion efforts in the period afkr 1W2, a sdid basis for a prominent role for civil society organisations in the peace-time politicai ecommy had

been established as a resdt of the structural adjustment programme.

Crucially, increasing civil society involvement in tbe social sectors did not occrn

simply as a consequence of stnichiral adljustmest. Rather. it is positively associateci with

the progressive weakening of state capacity, and with the opening up of new spaces for

non-govemmental activity, anci thus can be understood as senruig concretely to push the

structural edjwtment agenda forward in a number of ways. It is by now widely recognised

that in the case of aid-dependeat Mozambique, the channelling of external assistance

through NGOs, though justifid in temis of their superior professionalism, speed and

fleniility, belonged to a delikraîe donor strategy of "bypassingn the state and workiog

more directly with recipient populations in the fâce of Iunaed resistance by a national

governent which had littie choice but to complym. Within this implicit strategic

framework, NGOs took over a substantial portion of date fiuictiom in planning and

implementation, particuiarly in the Secfors of h e m education and disaster response, and

particulariy in m l localities where public service systems were &est Enthusiastic

NGO responses, in this sense, served to divert aid resources away from the state into a

paralle1 deiivery system, and M e r erode the state's capacity to intervene in response to

2-79

280 Hanlon, op. cit., 1991, p. 207. Young and Hall, op. cit., 1997, p 227-; E)onini op. ch, 19%. p. 65. Hanlon provides pe-

the most illustrative example of bow this stmtegy was pursuai: In 1989 the Mozambique government isiPued an «naeency appeal to domns whicb included some U S S 4 million to rcpaif health posts, supply medicina and awrt traiwport In the ment, QnoB met only threc qwrters of this request, but wcnt on to diocatc US $16 million to NGO projacts that the government lui

growing societal needs- In so doing, they c o n t r i i neither to the existing gap

between state mi society discussed in the Chapter 5, nor to restore the Iegitunacy of

govemment policies in dre k e of rapidly declining overall living saindardse Moreover,

by hgmenting existing national heaith, educabion and rurai developent programmes

into several himdred individual (often competing and at any rate under ccwrdinated) aid

planning, not to mention supervise activïties and analyse results, was considerab1y

NGOs in the country worked powerfully, almg witb stnrtural adjustment me8sutes7 to

weaken the state's capacity to retain scarce human capid witbin the public stctor and to orient it, instead, towards employment in the non-governrnental sector. The %ahdrain"

experienced by the Mozambican goveniment aAer 1987 stemmed f?om ad-intlationary

policies which hatj tbe e f f i t of reducing the real iacomes and pwchasing power of the

country's skiiled professionai class, causing pn,fessionals to cope by adopting iacome-

geoerating strategies in the private and infornial sectors- Cornmenting on the situation at

Mouimbique's Eduardo Mondane University in 1992, Bowen remarked tbat "Structural

adjustment has meant that scholars have to £ind some khd of additional work merely to 282

survive" . This drain on public sector human resources was reinforced by the

disproportïonate incentives which tbe generous programme budgets of NOOs and aid

agencies were able to offer. Senior public officiais, reported Piank in 1993, received

mt asked for. Hanion identifies the EU "as the biggest source of un-nquested projeds" fbr that year. (op. Ot, 199 1, p. 2 16). 81

OfEcial goveniment scatements to this &éct, CO-ng the heaith scctor, are rcproducui a d discussed in Oxfam UKII, op. d, 1995, pp.41-44, Haolon reports thaî by 1992, there wcrc no less then 60 NGOs woricing in the health sectoc &ne, each preriumably with its own donor rquirements and i n t d organismîïorial wnccnis (sec Joseph Hanlon, 7ts h IMF that Runs Mommbique" in David Sogge, op. cit., 1997, pp. 28-29). AIso sa Bowen, op. cit-, 1992, pp- 265 and 268. Many observers of the perioâ, most vocally W o n , bave reporteci that wbile central ministties and provincial d-onttes experienœû demeashg control over sectoral planning and i m p l e m e ~ o n activities, goveniment giergics were inaersingiy collsumed in aîtanpts to "managen the logisticai and -on demamis of a ûurgeomng aid community, including multiplying NGO requests for tax-fk imports of equipment, for hoWin& office space, line- ministry accreditation d so on, Tbe govanment's sedord analysis capacity was wcakened, fbr example by the fact that while many NGOs provided regulrt operatiod reports to th& respective donors and head offices, reporting of t e c ~ c a î âata to devant h e âqmiments of tbe govemment was of lower prïority, oftcn suff'~'ering h m delays or inaccuracia. By 1995, this had promptai the Ministry of Planning to set up its own NGO m o r u t ~ Mit, with an initial Terms of Refennce to determine concr~~ly whicb NGOs were active in the country, the sectors in which tbey were involved and the districts in which they were locaîed (herYiew, Dr. Ricardo Tepa. Senior Researcher, NGO Unit, Ministry of Plauning and Finance, M i p t o Febniary f 9%). 282

Bowen, op- ch., 1992, p. 268. 161

salaries of about US S 3 0 per month but could hop for up to 30 Oùna as much by

working as aid consultants, a a saluye which a governrneat uada strict spending

restrictions could no? begin to match? The situation just prior to the peace agreement

was plaidy, anci mth irony, rrndered by Hanlon:

NGOs are increasingly hiring Mozambican staff and even local field directors, as part of an apperrntly praiseworthy localisation policy. But every secretary or manager hired by an NGO is one lost [to] the state- NGOs strip people out of the state apparahis, which weakens the !date, which fiinber justifies No0 claims tbat the state m o t help its own people, and that NGOs must be there to help the poor?

An important effect of tbis drain towards the NGO sector was not ody to attract

vitai human resources away h m die public sector, but also to contriaute concretely to the

formation of a new professionai ca!egory ouîsïde of it; a category defjned by privatised

professional relations, a cornpetitive ouîlook with regard to international contracts and

hding, an understanding of international NGO programming preferenceç, operaîional

modes and work ethics, and a standard of living which o E d a comparaîively high level

of protection aga- increasing levels of social insecunty, if not a substaatd

improvement over former public sedor employment The erosion of state capacity was

thus dùectly linked to the paralle1 Qvelojment of a privatiseci, and relatively

intemationalised non-govemmental professional class, based primarily in the capital and

major provincial centres, involved in the implementation of social and humanitarian

programmes, and iacreasiagly d i r a t e c i to the requirernents of aid delivexy. This group

which, as d i s c d below, also expaded ouîwards kto the growing domestic NGO

sector, would represeut an important social force in the emerging state-society cornplex,

one upon which intemationai straîegies for post conflict-reconstruction and peace-building

would heavi1y rely.

Privatisation

Like the fiscal and mon- measures ouuined above,

centrai in denniag the architecture of the Mozambcan pearz,

privatisation has been

botb in terms of the

shuctunng of a new peacetime ~ t s t e ~ e t y compla and in terms of its social a d

political effects- The involvemeut of the official international aid community in

privatisation, pwticuiariy the IFIs and some domc groups, ùas been stn,ng and direct The

specinc contriiution of the inignatonal NGO sedor to prÏvatisaîicm is l e s consistently

apparent, but can be defined dong a spectnmi of positions m n g k m support, through

a fonn of passive acceptaace, to ef5orts to mitigate its adverse social consequerres. In the

late 1980s and early 1990% most NGO responses to privatisation were notable for theV

lack of critical discussion or ahmaîïve pqpmming-

As noted earlieq natidisation of the private -al, agriculîurai and @a&

sectors immediately following independence was detennined at least as much by histoncal

coatingency and the need to avert total ecoaomic collapse as it was by the ideoiogical

motivations of the Frelimo regUne. By the early 1980s the Frelimo government had on its

own initiative sought to de-natiouaiise assets and.e~~'x)urage a more active role for private

investors. Howaier pians and mechanisms for the l a r g e d e privatisation of the err>nomy

were laid out concurrently with the implementation of the PRE, and begm to function in

1989, at which time, 300 nmis, amomting to half of al1 enterprises in the country, were 2l35

under state ownership By 1994, some 390 state companies and Company sub-units had

been wholly or privatised By 1997, the number of privatisai state assets mched

1248, generating over US S 200 million in additional revenues to the statem. Apart from

reducing the direct role of the state in the fimctioning of the economy, privatisation has

had at least thme implications of relevame to our d y s i s of the peacetime state-society

cornplex

The nrst is that privatisation bas substantially reinforced the process of

"intemationalisationn of the Mozambican political economy, by strengthening the position

of international capital in the country, despite the existeme of explict legislative measures

284

28s Won, op. cit, 1991, p- 21 1. Anne Pitcher "Recmdng Cdoniaiisrn or Reconstnidjng the Sme? Privatisation a d Politics

in Mozambiquen in I d A m SQuCa, (Vol, 22, No. 4), 1996, pp. 44. 2116

Unidade Tecnica para a das Empeses 0, "Privatisation in Mozambique, 1998: Consolidating îbc Gainsn (Maputo: Mùiistry of Pluiniag and Finance, Information Bulletin No. S/March 1998). Thc bulletin mes that Wgn direct imstment (FDI) to Mozambique amouuted to US S 1 biltion at the end of 1997, cornparad to 287 million in aatior\al d i i uivestment (NDI).

163

to ensure a balanced distriiutii betmai foreigo anci domestic imrestment opportunities.

Officiai records indicaîe that a aumerical majorÏty of privatised assets have been sold off

to Mozambican investors. In d i t y , the biggest and economicaiiy most influentid

concems, representing 62% of the vaîue of by 1994 and 7% by 1997, have

been conceded to international companies and cwsortia Qminated primady by South 287

MW Portuguese9 British a d American intaests - Moreovery several prïvaîïsed

wmpsnies classified as Mozambican in féct represent majority foreign interests fronted by

minority Mozambican shareholders and, at any ratey proportionately few Monimbicans of

Afncan descent (non-European and non-Asian) have found tbemselves in a position to 2.88

participate in, or e t fiorn, the privatisation process . Revealingiy, the irnplicit bias

against potential Mouimbican investon in the distn'bution of new investment

opportunities emerged as a direct result of shuctural adjustment impemtives. As Hanlon

and others have pointsd out, the ad-inflationary policies supporteci by the IFIs

considerabIy r e d d the amount of credit wbich govemment badcs codd make availaMe

to the d l and medium-SM business sector most IiLely to amact Ld (including

Afirican) interestmg. Furthermore, the the, which were tbemselves slated for

privatisation by the early 1 9 9 0 ~ ~ were strongly encouraged to rationalise their lendùig

criteria, and coasequently became "duclant to give credit to small and medium sucd

firms where uationals are collcentrated because they feel that these etrferpnses are not 290

financially sound" . Intemational investment gcoups, by contrast, have retained the

strategic advantage of access to intemational capital markets, and have therefore been able

to participate in privatisation 9nd thereby peaetrate the economy- at a level and pece with

which local conterparts have been unable to corn*.

By itself, the comparative weight of foreign investment, r d & by the growing

gap in the value of domestic vernis foreign ownenhip of Mozambican assets, suggests the

extent of international (as opposeü to local) leverage to shape and direct the economic

developmeut of the countryunfry This underscores the role of privatisation in

287 Pitcher, op. cit., 1996, pp- 9-11; UTRE, op. ck, 1998, p. 4.

288 Hadon, op- cit., 1996, p. 78.

2 s W o n points out that thnnighout the period of pnvab'sation, locdly available sources of crsdit

were Virhially inaccessible to the mjority o f p o t d Mozambican investors (op. cit., 1996, pp. 7 and 58-9.)- 290

Pitcher, op. cit., 1996, p. 15.

"internatidsing" the domestic political ecommy. Howewr, other more qiialitative

aspects of the process are also importaut in this respect <hie is that foceign investment is

overwhelmingly concentrated in the siiategic sectors of the Mozambican ecommy,

notably in minerals and eœrgy but also in traaspott and communication^, toinism and

export-oriented agiculturai production In 1997, negotiations were undewy for two

extradive mega-projeas (gas and imn ore) involving a US S 2.2 billion bid led by a single

US çorporation, Likewise, a US S 750 million project for c d extraction, involving South

Afncan and Australian investon, was under consideration, as was a US $ 800 million 291

tourism project submitted by another American group . In the agicultural sector,

privatisation has involvecl the granting of large expanses of territory, and mowpoly

power, in the centre and north of the country, as the exemples of Lonhro in Cab0 Delgado

and the 1996 Boer land wIW'RSSions in Niassa provinces illustrate, Likewïse, investments -

in toUnsm, also dominated by foreign concans, have imrolved the transfer of large tracts

of coastal areas and natural resourœs to foreigu private management. As Sogge points out

in the case of one international toiirist operator, 'kanagernent of virtuaily the entire

coastline fiom Intiaca Island to the South Afncan border has been awarded to a US.

businessman with designs for a tourism empire'7z92. The statement is ernblematic of the

increasing concentration of innuence by iriteniational interests over sttategic Secfors ükely

to determine the economic modernisation anâ regional integration of the country, over 293

entire regions, and over the livelihood prospects of those residing within them .

Another significaat aspect of privatisation is tbat no less than 82% of the foreign

direct investment which it aîtmcted to Mozambique between 1989 and 1997 has been

concentrated in the single province of Maputo at the extrane South of the countryZW.

There are several historicai reasons to explain tbis: Much of colonial industry attractive to

foreign investment had been built up in the South fiom the beginning of the ce-,

Maputo port is able to handle the highest volume of maritime ûaffic in the country; and

several rail links comect the province to nearby suppliers ami markets in South Afiica At

the same time, Pitcher's study of privatisation patterns suggests that the proportionately

291 UTRE, op. ut-, 1998, p. 4. Togetbcr. these t h W g n imcstmeat bids, still pmding at the

end of 1997, amountad to almost fbur times tht value of tocri FDI sincc 1990. 292

293 David Soggt, "Decermalisationn ia Sogge (ed.), op. ut, 19i7, p. 92. Harilon, op. cit.., 19%, pp -3.

high flow of investment to Mkputo is also related to tbe Idon tbae of key state

m e s , politid groupings, and other "Uuidef' ~ i s i o ~ ~ . ~ g clusters with material

comections to the privatisation process- Indced, with the launchhg of the privathtion

programme in 1989, the F r e h o Partly leadership withdrew on the

participation by party members in the priva& sector. It further decreed tbat they could

accumulate capital, and that there would be no k t to the number of workers a j h y

member w d d employ privately. Furthermore, aithou& party and state officials were

required to report private eamings to the Deparûnents of PLanning a d Finance, the latter

wodd not be requiped to disclose them publiciy- The practicai effixt of these rneasures

was to reluise well-positi~ned officials, mamgers of public enterpnses, and political

leaders corn their exclusive obligations to the state and to connect them organicaiiy into

the liberalisation process by way of -rial iucentive. In the event, sitting and former

cabinet ministers, senior public officials and ranlOng miiïtary staff have been able to use * -

the influence of executive or administrative office in order to acquire signifiauit s h a ~ s in

privatised companies, board memberships, and lucrative land ooncessions for themselves,

and to strengthen clientelistic networks with lower rankiag officialdom and fornier

political opponents. "One thing is certain", remarks Pitcher about the increasing

wnfiation of public and private inte- in the 1990s, 'Trelimo members are becoming

part of the elite they are cfeafingZgs

The implications of this process, in terms of confijcts of interest and lack of public

tramparency, are sigaïficantt In two recent studies on the political and institutional aspects

of liberaiisation in Mozambique, Giabam Harrison has argued that macrwxonomic

adjustment and privatisation have combined to produce a powerfid enabling environment

for institutionalised corruption at al1 levels of public administration, Moreover, he suggests that the turbulent socic+emnomic changes in the late 1980s and 19909,

combined with "an increasingly assertive discourse which proclaimed the benefits of

private enterprise" have provided hi& and low ranking officials aiike with positive

-- --

294 UTRE, op. cit-, 1998, p. 4.

29s Pitcher, op. ut., 1996, p- 13. Pitcher reports that prkaîïsed land concessions have been granted

at al1 levels of tbe public savice, ïnclucfing to proMncial govanors and local admi ' Hanion reports h t private concessions h v e dso becn made to prominent fi,- m c m m rebel opposition and their relatives (op. cit, 1996, pp. 79-80), whïie other reports have suggested the same for members of ranking fàmïlies of the Mapito politid establishment (e.g Machel, Mondlane).

166

2% material and normative incentives to engage in corrupt @ces - Irnportandy,

although cornipion in Mozambique was initielly a €mus of vocal donor criticism and a

potential target for punitive aid conditioaalities, it became iacieasingly acceptable to

donors in the 1990s as a form of ^oppommity cost" for ongoing liberalkation For the

IFIs in particuIar, Hanison notes that "the fi@ agaht wmiption has to be b a l a n d

against political expediency, especidy the d to maincain a niirly stable and minimally

cornpliant governing elite? Rigomus anti-corniption measutes, he wncludes, would 297

likely undermine implementation of strwtud adjustment in the country . Corruption, Hamison warns, '%as become a key wmponent of Mozambique's democratic politics, and

it has led to a salient erosion in the legitimacy of the state and the political elite more

generallyn2*.

As noted earlier, the role of NGOs in Mozambque7s privatisation efforts bas been indirect, with the intemational NGO m r accompanying the prpiocess rather than

contnauting in aay significant way to policy debates about the modalities of implications

of its implementation. Indeed, on this point, the collective NGO voice has fiom the outset

been muted, with agencies having contriiuted Little in the way of coasmictive criticism

and appearing to operate fiom imide the accepted hmework Yet if @cal NGO

. contributions to a process driven primarily by powemil financial institutions, international

private consortia, and an emerging, politically wnnected national establishment have

indeed been induect, they are no less meaningful to our analysis of their hegemonic

support fimctions. At least two forms of contri'bution c m be identified with respect to

privatisation: one is non-programmatic, and bas primady to do with the cultural or

ideological "enablement' of privatisation in a wuntry where relatively little privaîe

enterprise had existed before. The second stems fiom practical efforts to hamess aid

programma @th prior to the peace and during post-confiict reconstruction) to the over-

296 Graham Harrison, "Corrupîion as 'Boundary Polis*: The State, Democratisation, and

Mozambique's Unstable Libemiisationn in I B H Wakl (Vol. 20, No. 3), 1999a, p. 542. Part of his suggestion hcre is that, c0nuPt;on has emerged as a more or l e s legitimate coping strategy in the liberalising pst-waa emriromneut 297

Graham Hsrrison, "Clean-Upq Conditidity & Ad-: Why institutions Matter in Mozambique" in Rnrc# tftfiicor, RdXcuf ïbnonqp (No. 8 l), 199%. p. 328. 298

Harrison, op. cit., 19994 p. 547. Along with sevaal other authofs, Harrison contrasts this currcnt situation to tbe eariy Frelimo period, during which a "sease of common purpose" among the leadership, and the absence of adual phwte opporhinity9 made private gain fiom public office a "remote possi'bility" at best (p. 540).

167

riding logic of privatisation Both are discussed ni more detail below and again in Chapter

7, but deserve some mention herie-

First, in tenas of "enablerneafn~ several o h e r s of the Mozambicau transition

have identifieci NGOs as =privaîe aid age~~ies" a d as vehicles for the "pivatidon" of

humanitarian and social services in the country. Such depictions are captured by Donini in

a 1 W6 papa reviewing the UN-led peace operation:

The policies, with a particular emphask on privaîisation and the market, were set by the donor consortium and implementation was d e l i i l y placed in the hmQ of the myriad NGOs Govemment entities were bypessed [...] replaced by @vate companies, includiag compmies noai industriaiid countries- Relief agencies, and especially NGOs, some with larger programmes than the largest bilaterd donors became the chief pmviders of public welfm and an important source of employment. Health care outside the capital and tk main cities became 12marely an NGO mompoly. The same applies to a lessr extent to other social -ces -

Referaces to social senrice privatisation are not entirely accurate, since signincant

proportions of NGO projects are firnded by public aid sources, and also because h i c

services in Mouulibique (public M t h and education) have never been fomally

privatised Nonetheless, in the specific context of Mozambique, the concept of s e ~ c e

privatisation through NGO-chamelled aid carries a particular resonance in at last two

senses: First, in thaî NGO-adrninistered aid represented -for the fïrst time since

independence- an objective move away fiom (indeed, loss of control over) public

management of the plsinning and operatioal routines of &ce delivery. This reflected a

symbolic as well as concrete "retreat" of the state in the face of an anay of organisations

which, however publicly minded, were nonetheles privately constituted Although not

quantifiable, this process has likely had a significant bearing on changing public

perceptions of the state, the non-state secfors and their respective social finictions.

Secondly, the modalities of NGO project implementation encouraged the developrnent of

a form of cornpetitive market in the delivery of social services. The growing presence of

NGOs, in a context of fked donor resources and local supplies of skïlled labour, served to

activate an increasingly dyaamic supply-and-demand logic arnong an array of local actoa

by the begimung of the 199th- Tbese included wIlSUltants, spialised research groups,

aational NGOs, transport contracto~~, ciarracy traders, and local supply cornpanies-

At the level of individual NGO programmes, there are several documented

instances of operational support for the logic of privatisation, although ironically such

actions often came in respoose to gaps or social injustices inherent in the

overail jxïvatisation p r a n s itself. One example of this is a local NGO worlring to protect

fmily land rights in agricuitural areas threatened by collcessions to large agro-businesses

or influentid members of the state leadership- Although the general issue of collective

land tenure and omership in Mozambique bas yet to be resolved, one rneasure of

protection adopted by the NGO bas been to raise private property awareness among local

cornmunifies, and to encourage agricuitural workers to apply for private land titles- Such

measures are both imderstandable and laudable, given the importance of land security to

rural livelihoods and the increasing tbreats of dispossession, and as such the NGO in

question has amaaad the support of international donors, NGOs aud other spot\sors.

Nonetheless the sErategy of f d y land protection operates M y within the logic of

privatisation and reproduces it at a micro ievel. Efforts by other inteniattioml NGOs have

ken aimed at creating incorne-generating opportunities for individuals and groups by

subsidising capital investments and providing training for business and marketing s l a 1 1 ~ ~ ~ .

On some occasions NGOs have been successfiil in supporting the start-up of sustainable

rnicro-enterprises. Likewise, a growing number of international NGOs have initiatecl

independent d t systems targeting those sectors of potential investment (micro-

enterprise) largely bypassed by the privatisation process (despite some govemment

objections that credit provision should be nationally co-orctinated, and inter~&ingly,

despite IMF objections that microaedit schemes are potentialIy inflationary). In several

instances NGO schemes have evolved into more wmplex f o m of independent banlàng

service for savings and loans in support of private enterprise, with varying degrees of

MO As in one example of an inaernatianil NGO ptoject aiming to start-up a commercial enterprise

with local f i s b e n , which eaded with the bendciary group esublishing a de f k t o monopoly on fishing rigbts and marketing prices in the area. Aaother errampk involves an international NGO creating a commumty-moairged inoome gaierating programme benefiting under-ptiVileged children, which ultimately resultcd in bencfickics' induaion into a d e ficto child-labour production system. (Sec P b II Country Report, Mozambique: Evaluation o f the Implementation of the Budget Lines B7-3210 " As&mce to Rchabilïtation Programmes in Southern Mca" and 874410 "RthabiliUtion in AU Developing Couritries, ACP Sectionn Financial Years 1994-1 997 (Bnisstls: Europcan Commission DG MI[, 1998, pp. 65-84.).

169

301 success . ln all of tbese cases, NGO hterventions hve helpsd to introduce, legïtimjse,

encourage, or at least obtain acceptance for the prÙNip1es of private enteqxk-

Another component of the peace-tirne architecture, launched somewhat later than

the economic adjustment a d privatisation programmes but no less relaîed to the overall

liberalisation agenda, has been the de-centralisation of public administration and the

strengthening of local governmeat Like stnrtiwl adjustment and related meastues, this

public sector reform initiative has as a key aim the curtailment of central -te authority, in

this case over local decision making processes relating to political representation, local

revenue, and resource ~l location~. The move toward arlministrative decentralisation bas

been justifjied on a number of cuunts, iacluding better govenunent accountability, higher

sensitivity towards lacai needs, end higher bureaucratîc efficiency and flexiity.

Moreover, political decentralisation, in the form of locally elected municipal or district

wuncils, has been promoted as a means ta ensure stronger cornmunity participation in the

policy process, ami as a way to open local political space to representation by cornpeting

local interests,

Afcording to govermnent p h , âecentralisation would devolve several bctions

on local administrations, uicluding public utilities, policing, commercial licettsing,

housing primary education and Mthcare, a d other pubiic seservices, which would be financecl on the basis of local taxation It would also involve the election of over 533 local

councils across the country with the mandate to consult wmunïties and advise

301 Fion de Vletter "Money h r Notbing a d tbe Kits arc Fe: A Critical Look at the Evolution of

Cmdh Policy and the Role of tbe Infbnnal Sector" m Sogge (cd.), op. cit, 1997, pp. 163-175. . .

302 The relationship between d-on and kgemonic consbuaion under the 11- policy agenda is perbsps not as straightforward as it is in the cases of ecomrnic reform, privatisati on pluralisatioq and warrants a brkf point of cl9rification. Insofkr as it disperses power to local decision centres, dcamralisation is relevant to ainait kgemonic patterns in at least two important ways: F i by involving local-levcl decision-maicers more 611y in the gov«nance process, d e c e n t r a f i increases the aumbcr of sîakeholdcrs within existing power stmam, thus potentially expanclhg the ôcgcmonic bioc of iataests witbin the statesociety cornplen Secondly, to the ment that deœntdisatioa rephces unified centnl authorïty with a kger number of (comparativcly weaka) localisai power centres (fkagmentatîon), it p o t d d l y aeates a more favourable opâ-abng enviroamem for b a - b a s a d initiatins.

170

including the creaiioa o f a goverurnent task force for this pirpose in 1992. the passage o f a

1994 rnuliicipaiities law, and a subsequenî Grst round of elections in 22 designated

loçalities a r o d the country, have been strongly supportai by the IFIs, the donor community, and the NGO sectorr In facf the issue has figured so promineatiy in

intemational poa-feconstnrction stratesies, that one observer has likened t to a form of

aid wnditionality, mting: "In Paris the gwemment will be subjecteâ to an u i w : 303

Municipdize or there won't be any money" . At the same time, decentralisation

remains a highly sensitive political issue, ngarded on one band with circumspedon by a

nilmg Frelimo regime dose power is solidly entreacbed in thc central state apperatus,

and warmly embraced, on the 0 t h band, by the Renamo opposition Party as a mecbanism

to formalise its position in areas, especially d districts in the centre of tbe country7 301

where it enjoys strong politicai support . And indeed, some observers have speculated

that internationai support for decentralisation reflects, amoag otber objectives, " a wish to

tilt the balance of power toward R e m o and 'power-sbaring' between the two mes7 305

and to circumvent Frelimo power over aid flows* -

The potential benefits of decentralisaiion, in terms of dernoccatic accountability

and responsiveness to local ne&, are indeed real and wuld contribute sigdïcantly to the

quality of the peacethe politicai economy. However, several observers have pointed out

practical risks and warned against the potentially undesirable conse~uences of an

accelerated decentraiisation pocess. The point has been argued tbat plans for

decentralishg authority are premafwe given many still unresolved legacies of war, state

M3 Quoted in Sogge, op. ck, 1997, pp. 99-100- R e f i is to tbe anwal meeting of tbe "Pans

Clubn of donors, at which Mozambique negotiates the terms of intemational financiai assistance based on a presenîation of its auauai budget. Sogge identifies the World Bank, the United States, Italy, Sweden, Norway, Finlad d the EU, as weii the ONDP and the UNCDF as strongiy s p o n i n g the dcccnmli~ytion effbrt, and as dircauig country ptogramme sttatcgies to this effm ---

National eledonl resuhs in 1994 showad O-ng support h r Renamo in several districts of Sofâla, Manica, Tete and Zambesia provinces, but wcrc not rcflectcd in subquent goverment nominations to administrative positions in those areas (On this issue, see UNIUSD, Ww TorirSoudKsPtoj i ;ad=IidoAirU"(Maputo:Inst ia i tefor~nai and Secunty Studies, 19%); also see, Brazao Maaila (ai), MaFiirrdrquc O -Elcigaa,PoiniaPeicre D C s G n ~ (Mapito: Inter-Afih Group. 1995), pp. 473-99. In Feality, opinion within the govemment is diided betwan those who view * .

as an d o n of the sitate's administrative cobaence, and those, on the o t k band, wbo sa it as an opporauiity to devolve fiscal responsïbility (iiability) away fbm the centrai dminïJtration (raîucing costs for the central gtvemment)-

Sogge, op. cit., p. 99. in

weakness, and anite resource scarcity- First, critics have pointcd to the disparity between

increasing local respoosibilities for public goods management and the chronically low

local human resource base prevalent outsi& the main urban centres. One pteatial &éct

of this could be to produce gaps between local expectations and concrete results, wbich could in turn bave adverse political implications (de-1egitimisaition of local authorities,

political polarisation), piuticularly in resource-poor areas Second, observers bave

wondered about the financial viabifity of newly empowered local authorities, given a tax

base whiçh is extremely restricted or difficult to access, and indeed virtually non-existent

in the poorer regions of the countryuntry Third, political economists have raised the issue of

potential "'resourcecapture" by local elites benefiting h weakened central authority,

and the potential formation of new local p w e r clustea of variable legaiity and political

design. Fiaally, and at a more germa1 levei, some have questioned the democratic value

of decentralisation in the context of a higbly intedonalised and aid dependent stateM6.

In theory, administrative and politid decentralisation would serve to open up

new spaces for the development of civil socie~, at local levels. in @cular, it is expected

that the creation of empowered lacal government decision-making centres would prompt

the formation of collective or spcial interests and stimulate commmities to organise and

compete around tbem- At the same the, the retreat of local authorities fiom direct

regulation of economic and other social relations wouid ensure that Local civil society

formation wouid be a relatively genuine and spontaneous process. Given these widely-

held consideratioos, it is mt surprising tliat the NGO sector has welcomed recent moves

towards decentralisation As professeci members of civil society, many NGOs have viewed

themselves as positive contn'butors to the process* if not an actual reflection of if and

increasingly fiom the early 199ûs, NGO countq strategy statements began to incorporate 307

decentdisation as a long-tem strategic objective -

In restlity, bwever* the NGO sector has interpreted the concept loosely, with individual organisations adapting it to theu own methodologid framewortcs for local

Mb For an overview of the these and other contrasting positions, sa Sogge, op. cit., 1997, pp. 93-

103, 307

-CWS, Conœrn, Care IntaDational, World Rdief; MaLiSv, AMOREPESO, Afncae, National Democmtic Iastitute, Save the Children Fund, Oxfkm UK/I, ARO, Advcntist Agency for Development and Rehabilitation Mapito. 1995-19%.

172

w~ll~llMity engagement Thus, for mmy NGOs, âecentraljsatïon bas been used rather superficially as an endorsement for exkting strategies to bypass public authority stnictures

altogether and to U ~ ~ r k directiy with the poorest". Relatively féw organisatons have

decentralised tbeir own operations in orda to d e c t the empowenaent of local

authorities, and fewn stiU have provided direct h i a i or technid training support to

local administrative shuctiires or social se~ces. Notable exceptions bave ban identifid

by Sogge, coosisting mainly of a s m d p u p of mainly British and Scandinavian N O S

who have adopted strategies to wodt closely with goveroment authorities at provincial and - -

local levels in developing improved admmstmtive and planning systems- In one case, an

international NGO initiatecl a five-year programme, in close coilaboration wïth local

authorities in selected rural amas, to support cwmdination among local officia1s7 private 308

sector interests and commmky groups in settimg local development pdicy -

If one explmation for NGO endorsement of decentraii~~on efforts lies in the hc t

that the very concept itself dovetads with civil society âevelopment, NOOS in

Mozambique appear also to have practical~e8isons for strongly supportiug the process. In

a context in which the state sector remains weak fkom a variety of perspectives

(professional capacity, service delivery, local financial resources), decentralisation

acceIerates the transfer of political power away fiom the state by breekiag it up into local

units. Further dis-aggregation of centralised authority over the management of specific

social sectors would concretely translate into increased leverage for non-state actors to

determine the course and orientation of local development processesOceSSeS Indeed, a

disproportionate balance of power favouring international NGOs over local administrative

authorities has been verified throughout much of the 1990s- stemmhg p r i d y nom the

non-govemmental sector's overwhelming hancial power in peripheral anas. With

individual annual budgets of US $200,000 and up, even modest NGO pmjects have been

able to mobilise human and material resources ai a level and pace fat in excess of local

governments. Though they are bound to respect g e d sectord guidelines and to Mfil

basic project requïrments es negotiateâ with central authorities, NGOs in practice have

enjoyed a wide margin of discretion in decicihg the modalities and timing of their local

interventions. And although aid resources are f o d y allocated to public sector budgets,

their management has rrmained ovemvbelmingiy in the han& of NGO personnel.

3û8 Sogge op. cit, 1W7, pp. 100-106.

173

Furthermore, givea the emphesis thst many NGOs have placed on tbe visibility of thev

own operatiom (flags, emblems, work doms), local tesidents have beea made weii

aware of the distinction between govemment and n o ~ g o v e r n m d activities, and ofthe

status of NGOs as important providers of wages, medicines or food rations. In mpny areas 309

where NOOs oprate, local aidhorities are seen to have little to offi by commson - Unless specinc measmes were taken to the wntrary, successive phses of decenasation

in Mozambique could reMorce a pattern whereby powahil civil socieîy elemenîs might

dominate local political economies and poky processes.

A final pillar of the cbanging state-society architecture which would later be endorseci by

the general peaœ process and fodly implemented as part of the post-war transition was

political p1UtaliSLlfion The onset of formal poüticai pluraiism dates to the passage of the

new Mozambican constitution in 1990. However, changes in the nation's politicai

climate had increasingly becorne apparent, for several reasons, as early as 1987. The

unexpeaed death ofFrelimo founding member and first President of Mozambique Samora

Machel had caused key changes to the prty, including the appointment of Joachim

Chissano, previously foreign affairs minister and well e x p e d to the global political and

economic changes of the latter 1980s , to the presidency. This was followed by cabine?

changes designed to "Africanise" the upper reaches of the politicai leadership, a measure

that was seen et the time as moving some way towarâs democratising the pady structure

as a whole. Other early sigm of liberalkation included an opening of the govemment

towards church activities in the country, including those of the Catholic Church which had

hitherto been marginalised by the socialist project as an embIem of the former colonial

power structure. Previously confiscated church property was retumed, and in 1988 church

organisations were allowed access to publication and distribution kilities.

Also in 1988, Mozambique ratifieci the Afîican Charter on Human Rights, and

began consultations with church groups on the codification of religious ffeedoms. As

already noted, party officiais were authorised to engage in pivate ecommic actMties

1987, and in the same year the party's mass organisations were enwuraged to engage

M9 Alexander Casty, " Wb0 Govercw? NGOs in Rural Mozambique" in Tltc A h t h m

174

independent revenue-generahg and recniinnent activities (a measiap which squared well

also with pressures to cut public speadiag under stnicarwl adjustment)- Also during the

late 19809, Hall rad Young note the gndual withdrawai of o v d y sociplist vocabulary

fiom key p t y staMes and poby documents7 including references to klass relaîions' and notions of soci~le~~nomic 'vanguard'. These were replaced by a new official language

and tone which "insok as they shared a wmmon theme, this was fke association,

inctuding a whoily new emphasis on citizen's nghts, minority groups and decenûalîdon 3 10

of govemment fimctions" -

The text of the 1990 constitution reflected a move towards a fiuidamentaïly h'beral understanding of the state, and a disengagement of its functions h m wre socialist

objectives wnceming soc i~ec~nomic exploitation, popular demaxacy7 cultural

advancement and politicai and eco-c independence- I n s t d the new text contauied

key references to individual civil and human rights, neodotns d the recognition of a

p l d i t y of cultural groups and traditions within society. In particulat, the new

constitution contained explkit provisions entrenchiog the pincipals of association and

political cornpetition, which, on one han4 paved the way for the formation and

legalisation of political parties in advance of the 1994 eleztions an4 on the ather, for the

rapid expansion of civil associations in the ruah urban centres of the country. In theory,

the new constitutional provisions also legitimised, for the first time since independence,

the presence oftraditional authonties as an integral component of Mozambican society.

Associations had not been aitogether absent fiom Mozambique during the Frelimo

period. A restricted number of professional and cultural organisations had enjoyed official

recognitioq with pariy support directed primsrily at mass organisations and trade unions.

By and large, however, civil groups were dependent upon, if not diredy tied to, the state

or party apparatus, with hale independent space in which to operate. In this respect, the

new constitution s t d as a significant openhg However, the spectacular growth of the

domestic civil -or a f k 1990 owes at least as much to the large presence of

international humanitarian NGOs as it did to constitutionai reform Indeed, if during 1980s

foreign NGOs had been required legally to work well within the admim'rhative and

-

f$m (Vol. 11, No. 4). 1996. Young and Hall, op. cit., 1997, pp, 201-205 (this quote: p. 202).

175

planning fiameworks of the state, by 1990 tbey wne able to engage directly with groups

outside of the state sphere- At the srme the, NGO progcammhg reqinmeents

increasingly emphasised the desirability of ideatifying and implementing projeas in

partnership with local organisations- This emphasis was motivated by the wish to

maiomise local participation and strengthen local organisational capcities an4 et least in

q u a i measwe, by the availability of generous donor incentives to provide aid through 311

non-state chsnnels . As a Isult of this combination of h r s , an acoelerated and highly

cornpetitive NGO partnership "race" developed, in which existuig local NGOs were

courted intemely by eager international counterparts, and several new ones were created .

for the purposes of pmject implemen~iti*oo- The number of registered local NGOs

multiplieci tmfod, to some 300 in the period 1991-SM312. Many ernerged as purpose-buiit

humanitarian or social service organkations, while others wiîh non-operatioaal

(representational or issue-based) mandates soon became "pject-muif in a bid to attract

international NGO W n g By 1994, there had thus emrged an intermediate

organisational layer of international assistance, I d pnrpllel to the state, working

primarily nom urban centres and over and increasing range of humanitarien and social

sectors.

The experiences of local NGOs during the post-confïict transition, and the

implications of their rapid growth for the constitution of a "civil society" in Mozambique,

have been the subject of debates which are taken up in Mer ddail in the next chapter.

However, it is worth noting at this point the high level of cornpetition for international

sponsorship which took place among the newly emerging nationaï organisations,

reflecting their nearly total dependence on extemal fimding For the majority of

Mozambique's NOS, financiai survival or organisational growth wodd depend

primarily on their ability to tap into the local %id market", and to maximise their

opportunities within it by understanding and adopting the logic of intedonal aid

priorities and fonnulating project proposais 8ccordingly. In a very concrete sense, thea, a

defining fature of domestic civil society formation has been the absorption and R-

311 As 1 disarss in f % t k detail in C m e r 7, several &mars activatecl budgets, dedicated

exclusively for civil -or development, h m which tbeir mspedvt NGOs d d dmw. In addition, severai bumuutanan . .

budget lines contained explicit clauses requiring i m d d NGOs to enlist Id NGO partners tbr pmject implemmmïom 312

LïNK "Dkctorio das ONGs Nacionais", Mapito: 1996 (daMbase). 176

transmission by local NGOs of intenrstionaii policy objectives for Mozambiqye- For

Young and Hall, as ml1 as other obsecrers, the intetaational sponsorship of local NGOs is

a strategy entirely compxti%le wÏth paiallel moves in the e c o d c ami state sectors to

imglement the stmchd djustment ag&

Western powers and Uiterests are involved in [channellingl tbeir aid through NGOs in order to avoid working through the Mozambican govemment, an orientation that dovetails with ideological pmclivities of many NGOs themselves. Many Western NOOS. ofien encouraged by th& home govcmments, are setting up Mozambican equivalents with which they deal duectly (a sort of civil society strate gy...) Aid is king delï'berately directed to assist in the construction of new social p u p s

3 13 committed to the market economy -

In this chapter, 1 have sought to document the pillars of a changing political

economy which have detemiined the nature and orieniation of the peace and post-conflict

recovery in Mozambique. By the tirne of the signing of the peace agreement in October

1992, the iùndamental faihnes of the pst-war order, namely a signifiant r e m of the

state and an enhanced m o n for private activity in national developnt, were already

well in place, although several wealaiesses and social inconsistencies bad becorne

apparent, The nnel tsd of the peace agreement r a i d no challenge to tbe viability or

social desirability of economic processes set in motion in the l e t 1980s, and explicitly

confi& the primacy of political refotms compatible with them (pluralkation, fkedorn

of association, W o m of infodonf14- The implementaîion of key peace agreement

provisions under UN supe~sion would be carried out within the logical îiamework of

these structural changes, and indeed ceidorce them: In particular, intermtionally-fllnded

programmes for the soci(~ec0nom.i~ reintegratioc of Mozambique's three million refbgees

and i n t e d y displaced persom, and of some 100,000 former combatants, provideci wide-

ranging opportunities for direct involvement by civil society organisations while

circummibiag tbe role of central planning in the social sectors, gMng increasing priority

to private enterprise initiatives at the community level, and Witating the move towards

a decenûalised delivery of services. Likewise

multiparty elections, eventually held in late 1994,

wide ranging fesponsibilities for civic education,

GPA provisions for the holding of

endowed the CM] Society sector with

press fkedoms and electoral support

3 13 HaLi and Young. op. cit., 1997, p. 227.

(including in some cases NGO financial sipport to party campigns) wbich, in previous

times, might have been strongly inûuenced by the state/party apparatus-

But before moving on to the pwt-war period, it is mcessary to take stock of the

preceding discussion and b M y assess the uaderlying architecture of the peace h m the

standpoint of (neo)4c8mscian hegemonic analysis. In the fkt instance,

reforrns unâer the structural adjustment agenda (namely mm>mic stabilisation,

privatisation, decentralisation) and the rapid opening of civil and political spaces, have

c a w d importaut shifts in the Mance of authority and legitirnacy between state and

society, and between public and private secfors in Mozambique. This can be understood in

tems of a (re)configuraîion, imder deh'berate international supervision, of the

Mozambican staîe-society complex, according to wbich an increaSug sharing of power

and politicai ardhonty hes taken place. This is i l l d for example, in the growing, and

in some instances monopolistic, dominance of international private investment over entire

sectors of the 8conomy (energy, minaals7 tomisn) and vast areas of national terrïtory. It is

equally illustrated in the rapid take-over of "quasi-private", non-govemmental ageacies of

important social delivery fimctions. Arguably, although these processes have been

accompanied by a growing awarrwss of the conceptual distinctions between state and

Society (relative to an earlier p e n d in which state, party and society were wnceptuaily

confiated), the two spheres have in @ce mained inseparable, providing instead a

increasingly and coherent political economy hmework for 11'beralisation.

The emerging state-society complex exhibits, or is underpinned by, two features

which figure pominentiy in the writings of Gramsci and Con The fmt relates to the

"internationalisation of the s t - (state-society complex)", and the second the formation

and graduai expansion of a hegemonic bloc of interests which fimcton to support

emerging structures of -social power and political authority. The two are intïmately

connected. The internatïonaiisation of the Mozambican state atn be gauged fiom a

number of perspectives. At the most general level of observation, the nature and direction

of its reconfiguration since the mid-1980s strongly coheres witb what can be understood

as a unified global process of 11'beralisaîion At ewthg level, internatjonslisation has ken

3 14 See "Generai Peace Agreement fbr Mozambique" m C h and Vanancio (eds.), op. at., 1998,

Appendix 1. 178

directly attn'buted to the -on of tbe Mozambican deasiobmaliog process by

powerhil international forces, most visibly the intedonal financial instihrtions, donor

agencies and aon-gwemmental oqphîions, a d by international capital, Such

petration, coverhg vsst areas of micro-policy and reacbing well iato the &tails and

modalities of secforal pmgmnming, bas resulted in the '%ollowingout" of indepeadent

nationai authority and the vittuai disappeuaace, accordhg to many local and ouîsde

observers, of sovereign sîatebood- Sogge makes this point raîher concisely, and hints at

some important implications for democracy in the country:

While political leaders may perhaps be rewarded or pmisbed at tbe polls every five years, their attention neverthees tends to be nxed l e s on constituents ut home than on funding authorities a b r d - With investment in public goods dependent on programmes paid for, and o h often by foreign donors, the state has ôecome intemationaiid Only afkr financial parameters are fht set in Paris amoag un- elected officials is the national budget d i d in Maputo among the nation's elected leaders. Issues of natiod importance are handled fht via satellite-assisted wmmunication between Maprit0 and Washington D.C. before tbey are circulaîed to a broad public in Mozambique. Among the issues over which parLiament has wmpfete control is the setbng of national holidays?

At a more fiindamental level, the emergence of an internationalised state-society

cornplex in Mozambique is coLznecfed with the formation and centrai positionhg of a

domuiant intemationalised c h , increasingly conaected acn>ss staîe-society boumhies,

and linked by material incentives to a cornmon intenst in supporthg stntctures of

authoày which, in tum, are designed to intensify econornic intedons between domestic

and international spheres. The development and sbeady expansion of this hegemonic bloc

is illustrated by the increasing iàcility with *ch ranking officials have interacted with

in tedonal financial institutions in negotiating successive phases of structural

adjustment and privatisation, and in tbe increasing adoption of liberal discourse in the

policy statements issued by central planning offices. More concretely, it is reflected in the

rapidly growing involvement of the state leadership in private ventures tkquently

involving powcmil intemaîiod pmtners, and at lower levels of the social hierarchy, in

the signifiant move of slcilled professional classes from the public sxtor to

i n t e d o n a l i d employment, either with donor agencies, NGOs, or the outwardly

orienteû business coimnunityty The fÙrtber expansion of tbe hegemonic bloc of mterests

has taken place with the operatioI18jidon of a markedly inteniatjdsed aid system, and

more directly tbrough the activation of local NGOs *ch, given theu own dependence

on extenial fiwling, are inherenîiy ouîward-laking and posesed of broadly intemationai

perspectives on political erAnomy. AQnittediy the -011 of a common bloc of

international interests within the of Mozambican society has been inconsistent

and diffused, having encountered practicai ,obstacles both fiom disaffected public officiais at lower echelons of the state who stand to "lose-outn h m the reconEiguration of the st&e

society cornplex, and h m sections of society (peasaat movements, traditional authorities)

whose material position remains to be clarined.

Ami& these historical processes of state-society (re)configuration,

internationalisation and interest bloc formation, the international NGO sector as a whole

has rigorously not played a countervailing role. Rather, it bas îended to perfom bath

protective and generatnte functoos, by responding to the social and humanitarian

wnsequences oflibeialisation, by facilitating the withdrawal of the state h m increasingly

wide areas of public responsibi1ity, and by pluralising, decerrtralising and

intedonalising Mozambique's domestic political economy both fiom outside and h m

within_ The modalities and strategies employed by NGOs in cmyhg out these fûnctioas

are discussed in the chapfer below-

315 Soggq op. cit, 1997, p. 43 (empbasis in tbc cwigd) .

180

CaAPTER SEVEN

NGOs. Humrinitarian Aid. and Peacebuildian in Mozuabiaue

In the pevious ciiapter, 1 sought to outhe the architecture of the peacetime

political economy in Mozambique, that is to say the basic s x i o e m o m i c and materid

structures and conditions supporting an emerging, intematiodised state-society cornplen

In so doing, a number of conbribuiions by the inteCL18tioiial NGO sector were identifid

use international humadarian aid to Mozambique since 1987 constituted ody one of

several ftlctors of stmctud change, the role of NGOs must be kept in proper perspective.

Nonetheless, the discussion illustrated that NGOs fulfilled important protective and

generating firactions in support of broader efforts to achieve accelerated liberal economic

and political rdorm in the country. This positive role, and the visible lack of serious

countervailing efforts, can be explaind, first, in tems of the strong programmatic

incentives provided by the dowr community, to which the NGO sector has been

rnateriaiiy linked and, second, by the fact that liberalisation objectives dovetail with

NGOs' own interests for "civil-sociay"- based govemance-

Having thus outlined the basic stnictures of the peace, the present chapter focuses

on the workings of NGOs in what Gramsci would identifjr as the "super-structures" of

pst-war tec~~~truction: that is to say the "political society" or the sta& proper and its

administrative and regdatory hdions , on one band; aad "civil s o c i w , the terrain in

which, drning moments of hegemonic construction, normative and ideological consensus

is sought on the part of dominant interests as a means to legitimate the exercise of authority, on the other hand Accorâingly, the chepter is M d e d into two main sections,

each wvering a respective Fomponent of the post-weir state-society configuration with

316 Young aad Hall, op. cit, 1997, p. 225.

181

which NGOs have engagd In the fïrst section, it centres on NGO relationships with other

institutionai acton operating tbe hmework of the ùitematioaalised astate proper",

i-e. UN bodies, the IFIs programmes, the donor agencies, and the Mozambican govemment. In the second section, the focus moves towards NGO work in the civil

sphere. In particuiar, it examines a numba of core strategies ernployed by international

NGOs to promote the emergence of a d o n a l civil -ety in accordauce with h'beral

associational and operational models, and to buiM local wnse~~us in support of the 317

peacetime social order -

NGO Institutional Relations 1: Humanitarian Aid flows.

As a "super-structuren in the Gramscian sense, the sîate-society complex reflects

patterns of continuity (stability) or c h g e in the way relations of production, exchange

and allocation are organised materially and socially. Arguably, wfiat has been attempted in

Mozambique since 1987 has been a shifi in the organisation of national productive,

commercial and allocative systerns towards greater wnsistency witb those that have corne

to prevail at the global levei. Given Mozambique's low GDP, its cbronic balance of

payments deficit and its limited autonomous spending power, intemafional aid flows have

represented a signifiaint portion of the material b i s for this structural readering Not

surprisingly then, the configuration of the postconflict state-society wrnplex in

Mozambique, and the power exercised througb it, are substantially a product of the way

aid itself is organised and spent. With the peace in 1992, an unprecedented volume of aid

began to be channelled through the ElGO community, making it a central wmponent of

the transition, a key nexus between the official aid system and Mozambican socieîy, and a

locus of power in its own nght Irdeed, the hancial Iuiks of the NGO sector provide a clear measure both of the expansion of their activities in the country, and of their

institutionai integraîion into official aid policy and irnplementation mechanisms.

317 Of direct devance to this discussion are the three poEterns ofchange affm%ïng the global NGO

commuaity which were i d d d in Section I, armely NGO integraticm into formai global aid structures, and within tbcm, an increarae in k i r pwer (struuurai and direct) oova the aid agenda and aid outcornes, and an i . in rhepoliriazicwrterd oftheirwork

182

As such, NGO finruicial relationslips wammt some discussion here. However, âue to

wide variations atmmg both donors a d NGOs in the quality and consistency of financial

reporthg uiy such discussion is necessariy restricted. For pirposes of chri@, then, 1

limit my analysis to those parts of the aid prowss for which access~ible information has

been reasonably well aggregated. 1 draw in particular upon three sources: One is the . -

aggregate financul summaries covering the UN Consolidateci Hmmmtanm Apped for

Mozambique, the proceeds of which were used between 1992 and 1995 to support the UN

Peace Operation. The EU Delegation7s finaacial reports provide a second relativeiy

coosolidated source which helps to map out the linlrages ofa uide range of NGOs. This

source is of good iIlustrative value, given îbat the Europeaa Commission had, by 1995, becorne the second largest multiiateral donor to Mozambque after the IFIs, and by far the

largest source of NGO project funding. A third diable source is fouml in a 1996

assesment of NoFwegian assistance to the peace processOCeSS Where mailable, other data on

bilateral aid are provided. Although these sources tàll well short of w v e ~ g the complex

array of budgetary channels to which NGOs in Mozambique have had access, they are

nonetheless suggestive of broader fiinding patterns. At the same t h e , they provide a

sample of key domr categories, namely, the UN system, a non-UN multilateral, and a

bilateral donor.

Without question, the UN Peace Support Operation bas been the most prominent

of the many international aid programmes implemented in Mozambique. The overall cost

of the operation, which included both pliticai and rnilitary componeats as well as

humanitarian aid, bas been estùnated at some US $ 2 billion over 24 months3?

Successive annual humanitarian appeals in support of the UN operation amomted to just

over US f 1 billion (for the years 1991-2 through the end of 1994). Table 1 shows the

extent to which international NOOs weze involved in this process, chmnelling an average

of slightly more than one third of UN appeal fiuids during the period, with a peak of

almost 40% in îhe1993-4 hancial year (more than the proportion cürected through eithec

bilateral or mu1 tilateral agencies).

The daîa also reveal the rate of gmwth in the total value of fMds chameIJed

through the ElGO sector: an incnsse of î7% nom 1991-92 to 1992-93, anà then Pgain of

113% in the foiiowiag year. Inirrestingly, UN firiSncial summaries also show that while

official contn'butions chamvlled t h u g h the NGO sector under the UN programme

substantia1ly, fiom 8.3% to 1.3% of the total fiuids- ImportantIy, the reporteci data relate

only to direct pg- finaacing through the NGO sector- They may exclude food aid

delivered in bd, and do not account for NGO sub-contracting agreements, for example by individual UN or bilateral agencies. As such they provide a conservative estimate.

Table 1. UN Consolidaad Appal Contributions Channeüeù throagh NGOs, May1991- Deamber 1994 (US doüars)*.

The breadth of N O activities within this budgetary hmework is also clearly revealed by a sector-specific breakdown of NGOdirected spending- According to Barnes,

NGO's distniuted 80% of food aid in 1994 against 60% in 1992, and by the 1993-94

financiai @od, NGOs absorbed no l e s than 64% of fimds directed towards heaith, 57%

of fun& for water, 67% of iùnds for the educational sector, 46% of agriculture and 79% of

fun& expendexi on mdti-sector rurai rehabilitation projects319. Likewise, available

statistics covering itldiMduaI UN agency programmes fùnded by the appeal confïnn the

central position of the international NGO sector. For example, 75% of mhabiliîation

project items managed by the UN-DHA uader a US $3 1 million trust fund arrangement

h e e n 1992 and 1997 were implemeuted directiy by 33 N O S (accounting for 42% of

Period Total UN Appeal HA disbrinsd

3 19 Sam B- NGOs in Pboccikaepl,g Zkù R& irr M-. Papa presented

to the Nmth Anrnial Maring of the Academic Councii on the Uakd Nations Systmn (Turin: Iune 1 9%) pp. 6-7 (mimeo).

184

1991-92 170,275.92

T d 1991-94 l,û!5û,û2Oy446

lm-93 3 15,410,279

1993-94 564 f 34346

total fini&), campiaed to O* FA ty gov-ent d e p r t s n e ~ f ~ ~ ~ . similarb, 47 NOOS

were responsible for implementing over 70./; of "quick irnpPcr pojectr uadei a -ive

US $ 150 million r e m rese#lement programme coordhaîed by the UNHCR between

1992 and 19%~~'. A mid-term revïew of the progranme's -th compcment conducted in 322

1995 fond that participation by govemment agencies was marginal .

These trends were reinforced, over a somewhat longer mod, by the spendiag

patterns of the European Union which, with the completion and mtMRwal of the UN

operation in 1994, became the gmatest single source of grant fundùg for post-cunflict

rehabilitaîion in Mozambique. Financial summaries for the period between 1992 and 1998

reveal that international NGOs absorbed no less than 85% of the apjxoximaîely US $150

million invested by the European Commission fkom several "rehabilitation" budget lines

covering health, sanitation, education, food securily, environmental protection, refiigee 323

resettlemenî, human rights, mine clearance and integrated niral developmeat - Moreover, a breakdom by category of EU executing partaers shows that bding for a

total of 228 rehabilitation projects between 1992 and 1997 was cbannelled through 103

different intemational NGOs, 33 national NGOs and tbree 3 UN agencies, with only five

Bilateral programmes h d e d by individual Qnor countries have Orewise served

to reinforce the position of the NGO sector in the post-conflict transition, although

specific details on the way aid £Ûn& were stnictured a d disbursed are not wmistent1y

available. The sbare of Norwegian assistance cbannelled through the NGO sector rose

steadily fiom 8.6Y0 in 1991 to 18.6% 1995, and 70% of al1 projects tùnded between 1992

and 1995 under the heading "Norwegian assistance specifdly for the peace process",

320 A sizeabte proportion of hnds f h d l y awarded to the gmemmaû unda this programnie were

in fact managcd by or sukmntracted to NGOs at the request of donors. For example, a US S 3,l million skills dcvelopment programme for demobilisal sotdiers, hnnally p l a d under joint implementaîion by the Govefnment d tbe ILO, was in kcî implemenîed by intenrational (mainly Italian) N W . See UNDP, DR( T i Furd Sèltarsrkk qfsclkuca (Maplito, 1 9%). 321

Barnes, op. cit, 19%, p. 9; UNCHR, RehMhgct W w T a i i A b ù è l y : A m @ & UNWCRRa'rtlcbirpaorr 322

Phpgmme faMotudiGuRcrrnraa(MaPit0:Julyl~).

323 üNHCR: ''Review of the UNHCR R e i i o n Progrpmaie in Mozambiquew, Maputo, 1995. EuropeanCOmmWSion (DG VIQlAPT Corisuh, E- efd)rRrléabrbi;aborr

.. . ia M i i q u q R d d@mî (Loadon/Bnissels: August 1999), p. 18.

PtiDbrrrirmC

were channeiled c k d y through the N o 0 sector and private consultants, with the balance through the UN system. None of the listai pojects were implemented thiough existuig

325 government agencies . For its part, USAlD is reporteü to bave disbursed US S 80

million to intemationai and nationai NGOs for relief and rehabilitation pmjects between

1990 and 1 9 % ~ ~ ~ . Not su@singiy, one major effect of inteniaticmai aid disbursement

patterns was an inmasing concentration of weaith, and correspondingiy of potential

decision-making influence particdarly at local levels, into the hands of the intematiod

NGO community working in Mozambique. Accurate overall figures on NGO budgets for

the pst-war transition are notoriously difncult to gather and consolidete, as financiai

reports are made publicly available at the discretion of the organkîions themselves.

Nonetheles some estimates have been attempted

Tabk 2. The Top 20 NGOs: Estimatcd Faidiig to Mommbipue, 1991-% (in thousand US doll.m).*

ual T d s Tap IO 1 û4.764 69,152 74,761 1 151 19 55,425 14.841 1 t-1 LNQ~ 10 NG<). 1 13,690 7.309 S 359 6.776 12.400 5,691 1 b u a l T ~ s T o p Z O 1 4 76,461 ûûf20 121,895 67.82S 205321 -1 ozam am bique GDP 1 )1,433,000 1,î85,m0 1,467,000 1,462,000 1 JM,ûûû 2,135,N

*Preparcd by arnba- Scii~ccs: UNDP, op. cit. 1996; OECD, op. ch 1999; EU Rehabrlit.aLn Obsse 1997; Sosgc, o p c h 1997 (Appendix IV); frdavicws (World VuMn, Cam hmutbd, A d a i Ai4 L u î k a n W d Fcda;ition, Oxf' rJKn) Maputo, Jauumy a d Novcmbcr lm. Note: Basai ai avulablt infdoh dv, spms do nor nidicate zen, values, but id ofdata ( p a h d d y fœ 19%). Sœœ hgi~cs may dkt -le camtmg duc to -g atfangcmcnts amoog the rigcrrcics Iislcd

324 European Commissian, op .a, 199%. p. 36.

325 CMyMinistry of Foteign AfF9irs, op. cït, 1996, p. 138, and supplcmmtary annex by Armindo

Miranda, "Strdistical Anrlysis ofNorWegian A s b n œ to Mozambique, 199û-1995. 326

Barnes, op. ck, 1996, p. 9- 186

Based on its own information, the NGO monitoring unit of Mozambique's

Ministry of Foreign Afniirs bas estimated that some US $200 million in i n t e d o c d

assistance enterai Mozambique tbrough the NGO sector each year baween 1990 and

1993~~'- Tliis appears largely consistent with budgetary toformation g k n in Table 2,

which indicates that a toîai of US S 460 miilion in aid fuads was hadeci by the twenty

largest NGO groups operaîïng in Moaimbique between 1991 and 1996, with individual

contn'butions among the top ten NGO groups easily exceeding US S 10 million, and in one 328

notable case, reachïng some $ US 90 million in a single year . At th& peak in 1994, the

combiwd finmcial contriions of the 20 largest NGO gmups were such as to represent

over 8% of Mozambique's GDP.

NGO Institutional Relations II: Humanitarian Aïd Co-ordination

If intemational disbursement patterns d t e d in the concentration of significant

amounts of aid hmding in the NGO sector, they appear to have had an opposite efléct on

existing nationai delivery systems. pmtïcdarly in the areas of healtb, education and nirai

recovery. The issue of sectoral Yiagnentaiion', or what M e l d bas calleci the

"projectization of aid" has already been alluded to in the previous chapter, but it is

nonetheless usefiil to provide some examples illustratng the degree of project

proliferaton in Mozambique during the first f ie y e a . of pst-war transition. Here again ,

aggregate donor records an revealing if not aiways consistent: UN-DHA Trust Fund

financial tables show that 56 p r o j e , ranging fiom food support to the reconstruction of

rural heaith posts and mine clearance, were implemented by 33 NGOs between 1992 and

1996. Likewise, Norwegian assistance to the peace process was provided under 147

separate disbursements, while under one single European Commission rehabilitation

budget line, 112 separate projects w a e implemented by no less than 72 different NGOs

between 1994 and 1997. Taken together, the 15 members of the European Union finaaced

a combined number of694 individual pojects across dl sectors in 19%-97, with the most

numerous cluster directed at tbe education sector (72 projects), followed by agriculture

(69), health (67) a d sanitation (37). Hower, by far the largest nimiber of individual

327 Interview, Carlos Sufiiantes,. Director, Unit tOr NGOs, MiMstry of Foreign Affairs and

CoopeFation, Maputo, Novembcr 1996. 328

NGO 'Groups' indiCateci in Table 2 incl* the subsidiuy umts of the iarge transnational organisations (e.g Oxfkm UK/I, Oxfim USA, Oxfim Canada and so on)-

187

projects associd with a single sid pognname was the refiigee resettiement initiative

undertaken by the UNHCR: Betweeu 1992 and 1996, aearly n f t y NGOs participüed in

the implementation of 1,571 different relief and iehabilitation pjects, including 161

projects in Wth, 306 in etbation, 956 in water and sanitation and 101 in road

rehabilitation.

Tabk 3. The Fragmentation of Aid: Donor Partaers and Pmjecb 1-96 (Reported direct fundine, sdcctcd donors)*

As note& criticai observers of the post-war transition have argued that such levels

of "de-~~ncentmtion" acted to d e n the potential for a coordinated response to pressing

human ne&. and indeed it muid seem difficdt to disagree. The sheer number of projects

and organisations invohred in any givm rehabilitation sector made implementation

acwrding to cornmon national standards or planning guidelines a virtual impossibility and

overall impact evaluation exceedingly ditficuit Programme hgmentation effdvely left

a wide margin for iadividual NGOs to manage their projects iadividually, ofien independently of (compaîively weak) local authorities and witb only periodic

supervision by domr governments or agem:ies. The resulting "discomects" and

inefficiencies have been widely documente& one 1995 study of four rural districts

targeted simultaneously by several intemahional NGOs pointed to the visible absence of

coordination and information exchange among them, to the assumption of cornpetitive

postures with respect to l o d govwment âepartment~~ and to the rapid emergence of

"private" NGO systems in health, education and agricultural extension, fkquentiy

overkpping and of questionable long-texm sistainebilit~~~~. L&ewise in a 1995 intemal

report on the resettlement programme, NGOs and the UNHCR were strongly cntiqued for

having producd excessive healtb sector "duplications" (tw many health posts) in targeted

districts, while not intervening at al2 in adjoiniag districts wâere populations were

severely under-med The report concluded tbat such diwons had o c c d because of

tafgeting biases related to the agencies' prog-e mrndate, *ch empbasid refbgees

but ignorecl longer--tem national health p l h g g ~ i d e l i a e s ~ ~ ~ Another revealing

illustraîion is wdained in a 1997 EU rebabilitntion pgmmme IiSSeSSment. The shdy

found tbat NGOs m e y e d bad continued to carry out expensive @ut more visible)

physical teconsnuction activities despite repeated governent @s for a greater

proportion of funds to be invested in iiISaÉUtioaal technid capacity building? As a

result, personnel hainuig remained hsdicient whik reeinring government costs for

maintainhg new buildings after poject completion rose ~onsiderably~ The irony of new

schoohouses without quslined teachers became MU-known to local W o n

deparûnents in several districts.

No0 operational co-ardinaton rem- problematic tbroughout the 1992-1997

perioà for reambs r a i d below. Norietheles, the men ta t ion of aid was recognised

early on as posing a serious challenge to the quaiity and efficiency of p o s t ~ i c t

reconstNction programmes, p m p î h g a number of wrdination efforts. At the local

level, ad hoc coordination amoag NGOs working in proximity to one d e r occrirred in

some instances in order to address s h e d logistical wncems, for example in the use of 332

transport and communiÇ8tions fdlites . At the national level, both f o n d and informal

collaborative networks emerged eitkr in response to a perceived need for better

information-shariag on specific sector or issue-related activities, or, more fiequently, as a

fonn of NGO "clustering" arouad specinc f ' g programmes, as in the case of the

UNCHR. Two prominent examples of voluntary co-ordiuation among NGOs in the pst

war period stand out. One is the LINK NGO €0- a membecship organisation initially

created under the UN operation and later sustained by intemationai fimdùig, which since

1992 has sought to provide seMces to international NGOs in the fonn of legai,

administrative and project&vetopment su* LINK has also developed a cedised

329 Simeao Lopes, Bicrr Rcrcliirro d m us 1- RwrPis (Maputo: USAID, April 1995),

~ 8 . C-174-18 (h). UNHCR, op, ciî, 1995.

33 1 European Commission, op.&, 1997, pp. 40 ud 73; Inttrvicw, Country D i o r ,

MOLISV/Movimondo, Uspito. May 199%. 332

IntetYiews, ActionAid, Save the Children, O x f b üK/ï, Briâish High Commission, Majmto,

databank on NGO operations md the country, published idormaîion briefi a d news

bulletins for the NGO wmmunïty , and organisai scminarr or sector-specific meetings to

address cornmon issues. A similar organisston, KULIMA, also emerged early in the post-

war period with iateniational financial support, in orda to provide simüar services to

national organisatons. Both bodies have been able to provide meatüngful support,

jmîicularly to smailer local NGOs with few resolaces of theu own, and to new 8mvai.s

from abroad seekuig to îiurdï&se themselves with the aid policy enviromnent in the

country. Their membership has grown steadily, and in the case of LINK Forum, has

included several of the top 20 internationai NGOs operaîïng in Mozambique as well as a 333

number of donors holding "observer status" . Since 1995, both have sought to expand

their national coverage by opening up regional offices outside of the national capital3u.

For several observeers and resident NGO staff, the organisational growth of both bodies,

but partï~ularly of LINK, has been taken as emblematic of the rapid growth and

dynamism of civil society in Mozambique. For others, it appeared rather as an

institutionai reflection of the increasingly ovemiding power of international NGOs in the 335

domestic civil environment .

However, &spite their impressive p w t h (especially in the case of LINK),

voluntary NGO co-ordination structures generaily had Iittle impact in mitigating the

hgmentary e f f i of humaruîanan - - aid flows on s e ~ c e delivery Co-ordinated strategic

planning or policy development within tbe NGO sector during the 1992-97 period

remained wealc Several muons c m be identifid to expiain this: One is the sheer growth

in the number of LINK's membership, and ofthe NGO community more generdly, in the

years irnmediately foliowing the peace agreement The prolifemtion of new agencies, each

with its own mission, operational priorities, fimding affiliations and tecbnical

specialisation, not only wmplicated LINK's internai w-ordination efforts in tenns of

- - pp - - - -- - -

province. This may however aot be representative, as all thme wcrc of the same national origin, and finded fiom similar sources- 333 LINK membership grew rapidly h m 35 in 1993 to 103 intenÈationa1 and 35 nationai NGOs in

19% (WNK, D i i r i o das ONGs Dmhse, 19%)- 334

The LXNK Forum obtaïnd fiinding for regionai inforrrmtion services under the Ewpean Commission's "Decentraljsed Co-operaiion'' budget line (EC, op. cit, 1997, p. 22). 335

Interviews, Comiîado Espanol para la A- a los Retirgiedos; Norwegian Retiigee Council, LLNK, KULIMA, JMaputo, May 1995. Also sa, Jon Bemiett "Mozambique: Post War Reconstruction and t& L W NGO Forum'' Bemiert (ed) Mid'Ag N-: N W Gmdhlh in A&n (London: Earthscaq 1995), pp. 66-86.

190

logistics and tbematic suhance, but also worked against attempts to impose cohenace on

the brader aid environment Within a rapidly changing ckmographic context, new

divisions became visible, for exampie ôetween LINK members and nonmembers, and

between LINK and KULIMA, Emergent national NGOs, uoable to keep pace with the

new initiatives of a powerful aid hierarchy, increasingly criticid the LlBK Jtcucnae for

its technical bias, its dominance by internaiionai NGOs and for the priotity it gave to

deaîings with Qnors, the UN system and the "inteniational agendar, as such3?

Furthemore, significant concentrations of firnding among a h a n a of large international

NGOs, most pominently the giaat World Vision, worked to d e n incentives for

engaging in meaningfiil cmxdination, and rather created new ~09rdinaîion clusters attracting local partner organisations. Not sqrisingly, as LINK membersip grew h m

1993 to 1996, it gradually shifted away fkom its original emphasis on colordination

towards providhg NGO information and seminar services-

The weakness of strategic colordination in aid delivery is also attriiutable to a

relative marginalisation of government departments bom existing co-ordinaîion

mechanisms, and to the fhiIure ofthe govemment to take a lead in this respect. Given its

size and plurality, it would of course be inaccurate to suggest that the NGO community

adopted a wmon position aga- govemment c0i)rdination efforts. On the contrary,

NGO relations with government institutions varied signincantly across issue areas, and

dialogue with district authorities dependeci to a great extent on the q d i t y of contacts

between individual NGOs and local govemment Ovedl, however, NGOs

perceived few distinctions baweeo govemment coarchation eff~rts and what they saw as

the state's intruisic drive to regulate and coatrol their activities, and thus compromise their 337

attempts to work "directiy witb people" - Standard justifications for NOOS' gened

reluctance to engage more closely with government bodies included theu inefficient

336 Noticic~s, 10 May 1995; Bennett, op. &, p. 85. L M attcmpted to restore the

internationaYnaîiod balance in its membersbip by adopting a policy "indigeaisaion". Charactcristically, bowtva, this led b bcw divisioas betwecn ''internationalised" a d "non- internationaiid" local NGOs @tteMews; L m Progtesso, ADEMO, AVEL, MBEU, AMODEG, Maputo, Uay 1995-0aober L9%)- --.- 33 1

Notable exceptions encamîered during the field research period inchde Save the Childm (UK), which has historically provided iiwtihitid and techmcai support to govenunent, parti*cularly in the beaitb -or, and continueû to do rn in tbe pst-war paiod; Skillshare Afiica, a British organisation worlang in the d development since tbe e d y pst-mdepcndem;e pcriod; and ARO, a Scandinavian fOrma "solidarity gniupn wïth close historical connections to Frelimo (Interviews, Maputo and Beira, Novcniber 1995).

191

bureaucracy, a perceived (ad arguabiy r d ) inCresse in comqtion, their la& of coacem

for community w d k , and a lingering perceptioa of the govemment's political b k

against the delïvery of services in areas fonnedy uisder R e m o cootrd Other reasons included severai NGOs' own inberent drive to achieve and advertise their own successes

autonomously, as well as the blunt fact that many NGOs (especially the wealthier ones)

worked independently of govenunent simply because they c d d . For theu pars

government ofncials et aU levels have mCflticised the NGO community for failing to consult

for wasMg aid rnonies through project duplication or over-concentrated investment, for

imposing their own des of engagement and, in some districts, for ia ter fe~g in local 338

politics . The general sense of powerkssness and fiutration within govemmmt

departments towards the NGO sxtor in late 1995 was candidly wnveyeâ in a statem-

by a ranking centrd mhktry official:

One of the problems in working constnictively with NGOs is that there are confisions between levels of authority within the govemment itself. This has given the No0 community leverage in playing one department agaïnst d e r , or in going above the head of officiais in one ministry by appealing to those in another. Often arnong NGOs political preferences weigh more heady than the technical interests of the beneficiary. We ofkm accept unwiilingly, and this provides a negative example to NGUs on how govemrnent operates. They inforni one anotber on how to build a bridge over our heads- And they build i t We o h end up as bystanders. That is ofken our position Organisations working in the area of social welfare in some places usually do so witbout coasulting They ody wme to us when they have a problem [...] We end up acceptùig what is offered instead of nothing- We have to accept that NGOs use their economic power in order to impose certain programmes on us. Our hgility dictates thaî we accept In the middle of al1 of this there are some

339 organisations with &ch we cm work well .

UndesQndabIy, a generaiised mutual suspicion and the perception of power

imbalauces in the aid system did not facilitate joint-planning or strategic co-ordination

among NGOs and government agencies. The relatiooship behueen L m and government

ministries remained strained and at tims cornpetitive, even over relatively straightforwafd

338 interviews: Provincial Diredot of Phming, Sofâûa Province, Beira, November 1995: Acîing

District Adminisaator, Ciorongosa District; and Director of Heahh, Cbcmba Disbict, December 1995. 339

Interview, Chicf of Dcgartmcnt, Micy and -on, Ministry of Social Wei- Maputo, November 1995-

192

issues such as iaformation-sharinguO. Moreover, as Bennett points out, govemment

attempts at NGO coardination, beyond kuig viewed with ambivalence or suspicion by

many within the NGO sector, were fiirther confuJed by the poliferation ofco-ordlliating

bodies in severai différent parts of the goverment stnrhut. InsufEcient commUILiC8tion

among these bodies, caused primarily by a lack of resources ami wmpounded by

uncertainties ova Iiaes of autbority at central and regional levels, ultimately weakened

efforts to address the problem of aid fragmentation- As a result:

Intemationai NGOs enjoyed a quasi-autormmous role in several provinces. In Tete and Zambezia, for instance, districts were 'carved up' by a h a n a of prominent NGOs resulting in a degree of surrogacy and substitution of the goverment's de. In creatïng maes of primary influence these NGOs cut across their naditional sectord specialisations to become 'jacks of ail tmle~'~~'.

Finaliy, NGO co-ordination remained weak, and the fhgmentation of humanitarian

seMces strong, because the intemaiional fimdiag structure i~self lacked an overall CO-

ordination mechankm or strategic policy/implementation fkamework Despite the efforts

of the UN Oflcice for Humanitariau Assistamx Ckwtdination dirrllig the 1992-4 periodu2,

and of LINK after that, the CO-ordination of humanitarian and rehabilitation aid suffered chronically eom a natural tendency of both national and intermionai NGOs to gravitate

towards individual donor programmes a d budget lines. Bilateral progammes generally

reflected the sectoral and geographical priorities (and according to some, the commercial

and foreign policy interests) of donor countries, which did not cdme strategicaily even

where they might be expected to so30. Moreover, individual budget lines a m d which

340 LINK's rapidy expding NGO daatmse was mt denlopcd io coilaboration witb the

govemment's centrai NGO oolordinsrion unit, evar though the latta had reportedly expressed an interest in collaboraticm. In tbe e v a the govemmcnt NGO unit set out ta develop its own dambase on NGO countCywide acMîies in 1995. Ahhough the niuaial beneh wouM have been obvious, information sbaring betwecn the two units did not ocarr, anci an apparentîy cornpetitin dynamic set in (Interviews, Phiiip Uachon, Dbrse Technician, LINK; Ricardo Tepa, Senior Researcher, NGO Uaif Diraamaie of finance and Pianning CMaputo, November 1995). 34 1

Bennett, op. cit,, 2995, p. 74. 342

Accordii to Synge, UNOHAC dom to crwndinated humaMtsrian aid wbere hamped, among o t k thi- by the highiy policiseci o p a a h d environment which prevsilcd in the immediate postcoonflict by thc compaitive Nsh among NGOs to reach areas previously closed by the war, and by dispites intanril to the UN systcm on tbe dative priori@ of emergency versus developmeat plamhg (op cit. 1997, pp. 69-90). 343

European Commission, op. cit., 1997, p. 18, 'ïhe rcport notes about humanitanan and rehabilitation aid that "Generdly the level of joint-pmgmmme CbOtClllWiOn is low. The division of Iabour [...] appears more incidemal than tbe m d t of bmad strategÏc c o d o n . L.ead donors

i93

NGOs "clustered" each contained their own, idiosyncrstic administrative protocols and

requirernents, designed in home countries and typically adverse to the demands of inter-

agency co-ordinatiom The dustering tedency was reinfocced also by increasing NGO

cornpetition for iÙnds, while programmatic divergence ammg donors appared to incrase with the transition 60m ïelief to development? Finally, the @lem ofco-orrdination was

compounded by NGOs' increasing use offuadiag diversification strategies, whereby NGO

country programmes became affiliated with several domm sirnultaneously, and ultmiately

dependent on none for their operatioal suzvivai-

To the extent that NGO colo~dination did occur, this proved most effktive on non- operatioaal issues where identities of interest couid be forged Typically, such - ordination efforts did not reflect any measure of strategic aid plaaning, but rether focused

on single issues. One instance of this was the anti-personnel mine campign, which ârew

support flom a wide cfoss-section of international and national NGOs h m 1996 onwards.

On this issue, the NGO sector was able to obtain the support of govertment and several

donors, and to establish Monunbique both pmctically and symboIïcally as a reference

point in a global carnpaign effort &ch, in the auhuna of 1998, culminated in the signing

of an intematioaal treaty on laad mines. Likewise, a strong Maput&ased NGO coalition

led by Oxfam UK/I emerged in 1995 to campaign on the issue of debt-forgiveness.

Among other things the campaign has involveci i~ovative efforts to infom the local

media and the population at large about the impact of foreign debt on the pst-war 344

rewvery process . Economic research generaîed through this effort bas contriiuted to

international debates on debt-elimimtion for least developed countcies like Mozambique.

From the standpoint of our analysis of the pst-war state-society cornplex, one

notable instance of effective issue-based coordination is particularly revealing. This

occurred in 19954, when the govenunent of Mouimbique proposed a legislative bill that

would have substantially aitered the fiscal s t a t u of NGOs and proMded a clearer legal

h e w o r k for govenunent supeMsion of NGO operations in the country. Among the

-- - - -.- - - --

are designaîed as such bccausc of the size of the programmes, rather than tk i r leadership role in the planning and aïlocation of intemstional aid". Evcn amoiig tk fittetn mernbers of the European Union, whicb sham cornmon Bnissels-basai aid Mlities, the report continues that in Mozambique: "m potential for aw&mîmn

- - among EU Mernber States is not maxiniid [..-] 5 senseofgraipidcnâityae~mmonpqpmun*icpirposchaserneqd". Interviews and seminar sessions, Odàm UWYProgresso, Maputo, Odober 1996.

194

specific provisions of the legislation were reqiniwents for NGOs to report reguiarly on

project activities to relevant Line ministries, to ensure technid kaowledge tramfers during

project implementation, to hvour the employmenî of local staff and, as exteraal

organisations, to appiy for aad periodidy renew formol co~~pers~tion agreements with 345

national authorities . In the ment, the iaternatid NGO sector momted a strong,

centrally coordinated challenge to the cirai!€ bid? In so dohg it was supporteci by the

World Ba& itseif committed to the development of an "enabling environment for civil

society". Over a period of several months, the Bank held a series of meetings to easurr a

closely co-ordinated NGO discussion on strategies to address the proposed measure. To

M e r buttress the NGO position, the Bank also hued an international consulting fjrm to

provide reco~nmedations to the central govefnment on how to render the bill more

acceptable to the NGO co~lltll~ity~~~ The text of the legislation was ultimasely revised

under considerable NGO and Wodd Bank pressure.

Overail then, during the trarsition period and mcuiarly after the withdrawal of

the UNOMOZ opetation and its humanitarian component, strategic ~<~)rdination of aid remaùled weak despite a general recognition of the consequeoces of excessive

fragmentation. Formal co-ordination mecbanisms, whether supporteci by goveniment,

donors or memberrs of the NGO sector itseIf7 appeami unable to withstand countervailing

pressures of cornpetition, idiosyncratic funding structures, organisational identity, or

ouîright suspicion L e s formal CO-ordination networks reflected a pattern of "clustering?'

around generous finidhg sources managed by individual agencies or programme offices,

and thus, like aid projects themselves, were susceptiile to proliferation, further

subdivision, and duplication of efforts. A pattern of "projectisation" continued to prevad

with the end of the emergency and the aid community's collective shift towards longer-

terni development objectives, thus Iaying oa a lasting fhmework for a "diffused" and 348

decentralisxi process of national postconfIict recovery .

345 Ministry of Foreign and C w o n "DraA Da;ra on tbe AdVities of NGOs in the

Republic of Mozambique", Maputo, 1995, (public& cirailaial mimm). 346

347 LINK, "Draft Responst to the New NGO Law" Mtpito, Odobcr 1996 (cirailateci mimeo). Interview, Aniωo Bila, NGO Liaison Oflficcr, Wodd Bank Country Delegation, Maprto,

october 19%; A I Cynthia Oliveirq W d scnL Mbdbique M i A@mî (Msputo: World Bank/ Intemational Cenîre fM Non-Pm& Law, hiuirch 19% ). 348

It needs to be noted thst tbe above disaission on aid allocation Md cc.tordinaion docs not cover the totality of intedonal assistance during the poza-conflict transition Due to a lack of

19s

The pttems descnî above are sigaificant in mcbtadng the coatriiution of

post-codict, NOO-based hmanitarirn assistance in furibn aâvancing the process of

l i i i s a t ion underway since the mid 1980s. In Gramscian terms they illustrate the d e of

aid in detennining the shape of, and relations of power within, Mozambique's pst-war

state society-complex In this respecf several important dynamics were supporteci

simdtaneously by the aid process. First, and prhaps most obviously, the aid channeIlhg

patterns illustrated in Table 1 provide concrete evideace of signüicant intemaîional

support for the inmeashg involvement of privately-managed c Ï d society organisations in

key sectors of public weifàre provision Although Table 1 relates primarily to the

international NGO sector, the subconeacting of w e b services to local N G O s also

increased durhg the period as part a concerted international effort to enhance local non-

govemmentai planning and delivery capacities, thus serving to entraich the civil star as

a permanent featwe of long-term social deve1opment

Secondly, the impressive iocrease of official (UN appeai) human.itm*an aid charmeued through NGOs during the first tbree years of the transition, appears to bave

wnesponded with a substandal dedine in the reported level of independentïy-sourced

NGO contn'butions (Table I).~~. This is indicative of the degree of institutional

aggregate data, humuiitarian c~ncributiolls f?om coLlf.eSsiona1 organisations and ctnirch groups have not been considered. Likewise, the value and channelling stmchm of aid flows h m non- OECD c o d e s , in Asia, the Arab world, and otber devcloping umnomics (South-South transf'ers) are dScuit to ascertain, NondbeIess, tbese fiadings on aid channelling and co- ordination, particulsrly as they d e r to the broada iMtiatives of the UN, the EC and LïNK, - - capture a wide cross-section of bumanitanan and rcbabilitotion activities in the country, inciuding most major o f f i d donors and weU ovcr bdf of the internatioaal NGOs working in Molambique over a fiveyear period. in addition, it should be kept in minci that humanitarian and rehabiiitation activities stricfu semu accoiurtd for a rdativdy d portion - 10 % appximate1y- of mai official overseas dcnlopmcnt assistamx (ODA) tnasfccs to Mozambique baween 1992 and 1997, the buUc of which was diected at W f - p a y m m t s , stnictural adjushnent support, and debt- seMcing programmes as well as investment support in strategic econornic sectors P A C , op. cit-, 1999; MUiistry of Finance and Planning "Finaciamerno Extemo em 1996, Por Tipo de Ajuda em Milhoes de Doiarcs Americanos" (Maputo, 1999, p. l)]. This does not, bowever, downgrade the importance of humanitarian aid as a &or of in tbe transition, Fht, ahhougb it rcprcsents only about a tenth of aU aid flows to the mmtq âuring the pefiod, ibndimg for humsnitarian and rehabilitation activities has accountd fOr tbe near totaüty of gnnt Icid to Mozambique (as opposed to concessioaary iding), on wbich tbe goverment hs baen overwhehingly dependent for new investments in the social sectors. Seconâly, h m a more qualitative staadpoint, humanitarian and rehabilitation aaivitics bave involvd direct intmctions with local populations, authorjties, and forms of social orgauisatiort and dec i s iomdng , and in this sense can be understood as baving had a sbong "socially penetrative" ded on the amtry. 344 -7-

independenî com'butioas mfér to tùnds raiscd by NGOs indepdcntly of govanmeut or multilateral aid programmes, fbr example througb prblic or corporatc fbdmising.

1%

integration of the NGO sector into official aid stnictines. And ni Light of the near total dependence of l o d civil socieîy o r ~ o n s on d k c t fimding support h m their

international comteputs thughout al1 stages of the transition, this pmcess of international institutionai absorption has penebiiied Msibly into Mozambique's post-war

societal fabrc'? Taken toge*, the simultaneous dynamics of No0 expansion into the

social sectors and tbeir w o n into official intemational fuoding stmctms iiiustrate

the material rok of humanitmian aid funds in amenting together an internationalisecl

state-mciety cornplex in post-war Mozambique.

Third, the sigdicant mmmtmïon of fimds illustrateci ôy the size of NGO budgets

(Table 2), matched by the overwbelmuig sectord prominence achieved by the NGO

wmmunity in food ai4 health, education, agricuitural rreovery, rural recoastniction and

other sectors, helps to quanti@ the decline in direct public sector intervention, and in

govemment influence over the routine amnagement of key areas of ecommic anâ social

development Tbis was most dinaly felt at the local level, where authorities received no

more than 5% of avdable public sector resources and where, according to Bennett, "NGO

resources invariably ex& wbat the govemment could muster [...]. Vütuaily their ody

source of fimds for local proje!cts [...] were ~ ~ 0 s " ~ ~ ' . In this se-, humanitarian aid bas

contniuted directiy to the acceleration of a shiA. already underway, in the exercise of

economic and social power, and thus uîtimateiy of politicai authority, away h m the state

and towards an increasïngiy intedonaüsed non-gove~nmental sphere.

Finaily, although the excessive fîagmentatim of aid caused by NGO channelling

raiseci a number of technical challenges (in terms of efficiency and coherence), ib

underlying effect was to reinforce the decentralisation of decision-making authority by

substituthg an existing structure of centralised power with, at best, a muitiplicity of CO-

ordination systems of varying strength and with more or les consistent interaction Tbe

process is partïally aitnï'butabIe to the design of dowr and multilaterd agency

programmes, but its concrete realisation couid not have occurred without the active

response of large nimibers of NGOs. Indeed, although the hazards of ofentation werp

350 This is discussed in fidm detail below. On tbe efil.cts of l o d NGO depedeaa on

international aid, sa Costy, op. &, 1995. 351

Bennett, op cit, 1995, p. 7 1, 147

well r e c ~ ~ s e d and somtgnes voiced by many NGO staff7 tôey were apparently

outweighed by perceived short-tenn opportunities for organisationai expansion, and by

the cornpetitive pressures inherent in a f k h g stnicture whicb, teuingly, was never

seriousfy challengecl by the NGO sector-

As such, the underlying patterns generated by NGO delivery were largely

consistent with 11'beralisrtion objectives. Politidy, the aid explosion of the 1990s "served

to secure the collapse ofFrelimo7s socislist programmes7". The presenœ and behaviour of

a large NGO contingent served to reinforce ongoiug processes of privatisation,

decent~alisatior~, internationalisation aad generalised state retreat- As such, Bennet&

concludes, the No0 sector assumed the hmaion of an "mcreasingly independent 'Trojan 352

Horse' for donors interest in the country as a whole'" -

NGO Peacebuildiw and the "Earthworks" of the Post-War Transition

To this point, the present chaper has been concemed with NG0s7 relations with

institutional actors of the transition which, taken together, mconespond to what Gramsci

would have descni as "the state propei'. The reminder of the chapter focuses on the

proactive role of several NGOs in "peacebuilding" through local civil society

development As 1 discuss below, peacebdding actiMties of NGOs in Mopimbique

reflect a rnixhne of protedive a d generative b d i 0 1 1 ~ alluded to in Chapter 2. NGO

peacebuilding bas been protective in the sense that efforts have sought to defend the new

peace against political and social instability in the immediate tenn by providing

humanitarian senrices, aisd by numiring ami strengthening local associasional life in a

manner so as fke the attitudes and loyaities of ordinary Mozambicans fkom the

organisational and ideological grip of the former warring organisations- It has been

generorive in a longer-terni sense that Young has already refened to: the creation of a

local associationai dynamic geared to the workings of a market-based political ecowmy;

the encouragement, as Dutfield suggests, of "intemal behavioural change"; and the

fhcilitation, to recail Rendergasf of a "societal buy-in" in support of the political a d

economic structures of the peace setuement. In Onmiscian tems, intemational NGO

peacebuilding in its various fonns represents an attempt by the intentationai community to

-

352 Both quotes from Bemiett, op. cit., 1995, pp. 69 and 70-

enter the "nrencbes and eaithworks" of the Mozambican state-society complex, and therein

to generate a "bobtom-icp" mamentun for pst-war order cunsisteat with the orderîng

priorities of the ûenerai Peace Agreement and successive stmctud adju~nneuî

programmes. By seeking to generate and expend a collective "peace idaest" within

Mozambican society, intemationai NGOs have engaged dirrctly in efforts to consolidate a

historic social bloc suppoituig existiog stnrdiires ofpolitical and economic power.

Clearly because of their qualitative overlap, macrete distinctions between the

protective and generative dimensions of civil society-based peacebuilding are difncult to

make, and indeed no attempc is made hne to do so. Iastead, this didon proposes to

identify and revïew the principal civil society-based peacebdding stmtegtës pursued by

the international NGO commuaity durhg the 1992-97 period The fïrst is a strategy of

direct support for local cid-Society developeat It involves the use of special fimdïng

facilities by both international NGOs and donors to organise local NGOs, b d d theu

capacities and orient their programmatic development, A second stnitegy relates to w h t

might be temed 'kivil society replicationn through the provision of basic humanitarian

assistance in nnal amas. This is di~ting~shsble nom the fbt, in the sense tbat it does not

involve dedicated fimding, but raîher ~ipplements normal aid activities. A t k d strategy

relates to the attempted integration of existing societal structures, includiag potentidy

resistant ones, into the architecture of post-war civil society. A final strategy relates to the

encouragement of a "thematic co~l~ensus", pimanly arnoag elements of the dan-based

professional classes, wM.Rniing the connection between peace, dernoaacy, private

enterprise, and the fbnctions of civil society itself 'ïhe @cal boudaries between each

of these strategïes are of course b l d since actual interventions have at times involved

variable combinations of the four. Moreover, it shouid be kept in minci diat whde a

signifiant number of ~ o ~ l NGOs have eagaged in the promotion of civil society

in some form, not dl have Qne so wnsistently or "strategically", and not al1 have done so

consciously as part of the b r d e r "peacebuilding" or "'ordering" rationale outlùred in the

paragraph above. N O ' spific reasons for promoting local organisations have varied,

from a genuine desire to enbance the q d i t y of postwar development, to more explicit

concems for keeping the peace-

Purpore-Oriented Support Programma: With the signing of the peace in 1992, and

perhaps sometïme before, a large number of internationai aid actors began to implement

programmes for whet was b w n as " mîituiioebuilding" ' in the non-governmental sector-

Specific f h b g mechanisns were established for this purpose, involving either a

channelling of resources to local organisations through international NGO intemediaries

or, increasingly with the passing of tirne, through direct dowr fimding to local N a . In

some instances, programme objectives were explicit and cesource ûansfen signiticaat In

the case of USAID, allocations of $23.3 million, $25.5 million and $28.6 million were

made respectively for the years 1993, 1994 and 1995 to a Democratic Initiatives Project

for "dem~cfacy and goveniance activjtiesw including "civil society development, legal

refom" and "improving understandings of the role of traditional autho*tiesds. Likewise

Uspin, established a Private Voluntsry Organisation (PVO) Support Programme, worth

some $ 80 miIIion betweai 1990 and 1996 and extended thereafter to 2001, specifically

aimed at 'cmultiplying and broadening the opportunities for invo1vement by Mozambicaas 354

at al1 levels in emnomic, social and political development activities" . Under this

scheme, some 15 international (mainly US) NGOs engsged with associations end community groups primarily in rural areas. Similarly, the European Union Delegation in

1996 included "strengthening of the role of civil sociiety organisations within the

transition" as one of the three pillars of its country assistance strategy, and âirect funding

to local organisations under the European Commimmission Rebabilitaîion Programme more

than tripled between 1994 and 1997~". Of the îwelve European Union couritries with

bilateral programmes in Mozambique during the period, nine operatecl specific budget

lines for local NGOs or for international NGOs wishing to encourage associational 356

development and apacity-building . The World Ba& as noted, has openly stated its

policy conmitment to civil society development in Mozambique since at least 1995.

Although internal regulaîions prevent it fiom fiuiding local NGOs directly, the Bank's

353 USIUD, "Assistmce to Mozambique" Mapito, 19%; Interview, Director, Dcmoaatc

Initiatives Pmject, USAID, Maputo, ûctobcr 19%- 354

h u i s Helling, PVOir and L a d 1- U, A i d Dc i i i dap~~~~f i l= 1-g sbrdcgicsfm ~ a n d E ~ ~ A ~ D n i g n ~ f o r P V O ~ I I P C i D j e c t $Maputo: USAI., 1994) p.1; B.meg op Qt, 1996, p. 9. 55 EC, op. cit., 1998, p. 20. The overall average of direct iimding to 1 4 NGOs s t d at 15% for

the perïod 1992-98 (EC, op. cit, 1999, p- 18.); Iatervicw, NGO Unit CoincüMtor, European Union Delegation, Maputo, Odober 1996. 3% EU Compendium of l)oaon. op- cit, 1997, Table D-

m

Mozambique offiœ set op an NGO liaison unit in 1995 to provide advisory suppoit, end

initiateci a programme through the ministries of foreign Pnairs and finance, to build public 357

servants' -ty to work more closely with the local NGO community - Likewise, 22

out of a sample of 26 internatid NGOs intervieweci during 1995-96 reporteci

implernenting small gmt programmes, or reserving some -on of their general budgets, to support local NGO development.

Alongside the broader infiux of humanitarian aid, such programmes, thou@

typically not imrolving large sums of money, providd a direct material basis, and

stimulus, for the mpid growth of local associationsflS As wted in Chapter 5, the demography of organisecl civil society, especially in urban centres, expa~ded tenfold in

the p e r d between 1990 and late 1996, c o v e ~ g a wide range of professional, cultural and

service orientecl eEtivitiesy as well as in human nghts, environmental protection and

advocacy support for wlnemble g r o ~ ~ s ~ ~ . Lïkewise, independent media organisations,

local consultancies, and in some imtances emerging political parties bave received direct

foreign NGO assistance.

International peacebuildïng through local civil socieîy promotion was not limited

merely to hancial sponsorshipP It also involveci pro-active capacity-building programmes

aimed at ensuring the sustainability of 1 0 d organisations, their entrenchment as a sector

in the national political economy, and their autonomy fhm the state secfor. Civil society

programmes have thus variably included a wide m y of support services to local NGOs,

such as seminars on financial management and programme development, field-training in

participatory ne& identification and assessrnent methodologies, advisory support on

project design, logîcal mimework anal* fiuid-raising and advocacy. Although

necessarily adapted to the local learning needs in Mozambique, the training materials used

for capaçity-building activities have appeared in several cases to be h e d in accordance

with imported couceptual models concerning the organkation and W o n of civil society

357 interview, op. at,, NGO Liaison Mcer, W d Bank Country Delegatiion, Ihpwo, Oaoba

2 9%. 358

LINK Directorio, 19%. 201

actors in pst-war transitions, o h cihg examples of positive civil Society contnitioas

in other war-tom Afncan corntries and fr~tba afields9.

Moreoveri in providing such support, a number of ioternstionai NOOS have

directed theu funduig seldvely, to encourage the developrnent of spxific organisational

orientations and values. One Irish group, for example, has sought to direct b local civil

society fimdiag specincally to local organisations involved in pst-conflict r e c o ~ a i i o a ,

interested in incorporating new conflict resolution methodologies into theu oagoing

project activities, or more generally committed to ensuring broder local participation in 360

the transitransition process . A German organisation, by con= has provideci financiai,

administrative and legai support to local co-operatives interested in devebping private

enterprise-based incomegeneration actïvities in tnrget communïties, while a Norwegian

NGO has provideci fiinding and technical assistance7 as well as adMsory support, to local 36 1

organisations in the development of strategies for human rights advocacy .

Especially noteworthy for its straîegk approach to local civil socieîy development

is one US NGO, cited at the ver- beginaiag of tbis study- This group bas hplemented a

dual-pronged programme involvïng not only the selective hding of local NGOs, but also

the provision of technical assistance to tbe state for civil society development. Betwee~l

1995 and 1997, the civil socieîy component of the programme routinely vetted local

organisations for their demoashated commiîment to civic plufalism and democratisation.

"A project is eligi'ble", its director explained, "if it is designed to include comunity

participation as a main component". She couîinued:

We have to remember thai NGOs and associational movements in this country are a relatively novel phenornenon, so that they still have to deal with questions of identiw, towards themselves, towards the govemment, towards the populations and towards the donors. [In this context] we are tcying to add precisely an element of democracy- This

359 Afncan Arnerican Lnstinae, "Advoacia: Que Papd Para as ONGs Locaisn and MmMaçao e

Avaliaçao de Projetos: Um Mamal para as ONGs Locais" Training Seminar Materials, Maputo, 1995 and 1%; National D e d c Institute, "Mamai de R e f i n c i a Para Formadores de Educaçao Civica" Maputo: ND& 19%. 360

361 In tbew, Country Represmtative, Trocairc. uhpito, November 1995- Interviews, Diractor, Fmdrich Ebert Fouadation, Maputo, Noverriber 1995; Countty D i o r ,

Norwegian Refiigee Couacil, hbputo, Novembcr 1996. 202

is the basic utility of our grants [...] the grmts are essentially to finance activities 362

which contri'buîe to democracyOcracy

Simultaneously, the government component of the prognunme has workeâ fiom

w i t b the Minktcy of State Administiaa * - -on On produce and disseminaie educatiod

materiais [J and pcovide training to government and party officialsn at local, provincial

and central levels c o d g the potential coatniution of civil anci tradtiond society 363

organisations in s u p p o ~ g the process of decentralisation and democratisation .

Moreover, in addition to working both within the govemment and with emergent civil

society organkaiïons, the programme in question has also engageci closely in the refonn of

natiod trade-union movements previously assac id with the Frelimo state- Fundïng in

this direction was aUocated specificaiiy for such activities as leackshïp training, union 364

organising and the development of enhaaced strategies for Cdlective bargaining .

Although no compehensive anaiysis on the resuits of such activities is available,

the power and discretion exercised by iirtemtiod NGOs in the seldve a i i d o n of

local programrning fiwis has had a visiôle intlunice over local NGû development

Between 1992 and 19%, direct support programmes became an important factor ia

determining which, and to what degree, nationai groups wouid prosper and expmd

organisatiodly withùi the ûansitional context. Overall, and quite understandably in a

cornpetitive and resource-poor operating environment, the respo~l~e of national NGO was

to seek to aiign their discourse, programmatic o r i d o n and organkational management

in such a manner as to raise fimding opptmïties and expand ''partnership" networks with

their internaiional wunterpartSunterpartS Those which did so sucœssfdly were rewarded, leading to the formation of a prominent sub-pup of "intematiodsed" local NGOs and

associations, m d y utbari-based but with expading operations also in the comqside,

and increasingly conversant in the language of "civil society", 'bpluraiisation" and

'cdecentralisaîion" and "peaceôuilding". By contrast, those national pups which were

unable quickly to asimiiate or re-align tkir organisatonai priorities, were iess exposed to

362 Interview, Natioaai Rogmmme Director, M c a n Amaican Iiistitute, Maputo, November

1995.

new o p p o ~ t i e s openeû up by the direct fbding -eses One case in point da t e s

to the O m the mass organisation for womn established under state tuîehge in the early

pst-independence p e n d When in 1992 the OMM disassociated itselffkom the mgime as

a result of budgeWy cut-backs stemmhg fkom stnichwl odjusbnent, the organisation was

quickly targeted by international NGOs intersied in working with Mozambicaa women

Its subsîantial membemhip, b 10- practid eXpenence in eddressing women's

issues, and its extensive territorial netwoil provided the OMM w*th a considerable

comparative advantage over otber, l e s estabIished gender-onented NGOs &ch emerged

in the pst-war p r i d Partnerships with intemational organisations developed rapidly in

the perîod up to 1995. In tbat year, however, the OMM membership voted to re-establish

its previous illstitutional hk with the Frelimo Party- FoUowing this, international NGO

funding for the organidon declined visibly, despite the fkt t h . many inteniatioml

partners contiaued to Mew the OMM as a viable channe1 to address outstanding women's

issues in the country. The OMM has since had to contend with a significant reductioa in

hdraising opportunities- One hkmationai NGO director aptly wted the more general

predicament of Mozambique's m a s organisations wïtb respect ta aiddïven civil society

support programmes, stating that "the state is no longer able to help them oiit..because of

their historical association, they have not been able to enter 365

circuit" -

Another example of a national organisation expen-encïng

into the NGO fiuiding

difficulties in obtaiaing

international fùnding during 1995-96 was AMODEG, an association representing the

interests of demobilised soldiers. Among other things- the group was reputecl for speaking

out vocally and consistently against the ''peace dividend", pointing in pertidar to the

failure of the govertunent and aid agencies to create opportunitics for ex-combatants to re-

integrate into the peacetime economy. Due to its strong critical l k , and perhaps to the

diaculties involved in re4ucating bardened fighters to tbe values of pluralism and

democracy, international NGOs were generally apprehensive about supporthg AMODEG

in the first years of the pace, even though it represented one of the most sociaily

vulnerable groups in the couatry. Instead many international NGOs sought to work

local group (mted in Cbapter 6) iiivolved in the privatisation of land in the fàmily-sector,

was receiving support hm at 1- 5 infernabonal NGOs and one dowr agency in

l996?

The longer-term implicaîions of this form of influence for the âevelopment of an

organiseô civil Society in Mozambique were stii unclear towards the end of the 1990s.

Many within the local NGO cornmuni@ itself have pohted out that by privileging a smail

strata of "internationalised" local organisations with easy access to the "firnding circuitn,

internati01181 domm d NGO programmes have (inadvertentiy?) contriiuted to the

creation of a highiy biecarchical civil society dructwe in Mozambique, thus working

against stated objectives of democratisation, geniline plmalisation and decentralisation. In this vein, Hanlon has suggested tbat if one risk posed by international NGOs has been to

excessively marginalise the state h m the realm of public respomibility, a second danger

is that they may well also be bypassing tbc vibrant m a s of genuine c d society forces in

the country w w naerghg at the grass rmts level:

At the local level, there are now t h o d of co-ops , peasant associations, savings clubs, sports clubs and otber groups, all with their own agendas and al1 expecting donors to respond to their priorities. In the short term, this clearIy &es things difficult for i n t e d o n a l NGOs and other donors who are anxious to get quick results [...] The temptation is to set up a new group that will respond to donor demands, or to use one of the dozens of new local 'NGOs' that have spnmg up in Maputo to s e ~ c e foreign NGOS?

Others have mggestecl that e x t e r d programmes to support civil society have

mntriiuteà to make aspiring national organisations excessively reliant on intexnational

sponsorship, resdting in a loss of autonorny, and in k t in a level of srnietal dependence

on extemai aid perallel to that experienced by the state. "At this stage", wrote one

observer in 1998, ' 9 5 % of I d NGO fiinding is international. Therefore they are

366 intewiew, Dnedor, Aswdqao Mopmbicam para os Desmobilisados de Guma (AM0DEG)-

Maputo, Novembcr 1995; htaview, Country Direcâor, TFocane, Maputo Novembeq 1995; Igerview, Director, Movimato LibeMoac e Sviluppo, Maputo, J u u u y 1996.

L.INK, Directorio dm ONGs Nacionais 1996); EC Rdmbilitation NGû Unit Dbase, 1994- 97. 368

Hadon, op. &, 1996, p. 146. 20!5

grappling with foreign fmidmg bodies' mens of proposal wnting, the

approprjateness of given pjects and mporting methodology"? Among other thiags, the

overridiag need of local NGOs to secure intemationel f h h g in order to survive

inevitably encourages them to ~bengthcn tfiar COIM~C~~OIIS with in-onai donors at the

expense of local communities.

Lack of analysis on such issues suggests the need for fiirtber research with a critical eye to immediate and poteutid long-term impacts. Wbaî is clear nom the

discussion above, bowwer, is that hteniatioaal support programmes for civil society

development have been intiended to bring about intenial organisational and behaviotltal change in Mozambican wciety. Intemational NGOs have not only suppoRed the

emergence of a post-war civil society an:hitecaue, but have also sou* to influence the

programme objectives of local NGOs, the values tbey espouse, and the vOC8bdaries they

use. The M c substance of these programmes, includiag specific orientations in

favour of plurelisation, -0% compeîÏtive private initiative and ardonomy nom

the state, is gemeraliy consistent with broader structural economic a d social reform

measures undertaken prior to and during the transition. A 1996 assessrneut of challenges

faced by the US programme discussed above ù particularly mdid in this respect:

mhere is no single. fodproof recipe for the elusive task of developing the values, attitudes anâ behaMour necessary...Thus the many donor-supported projects and programmes aimed at fostering d e m d c practices are important experirnents with lessons to offer about social and political change3'*.

C M ~ soeiety repücatioa stntegics in nwl areas are closely related to the activities

outlined above. Yet they differ operatioaally in two important ways. Fint, they do m t

necessarily involve specific fbding mechankm for organisational devetopment and

capacity-building, but are typically embedded in main- humanitarian or rehabilitaîion progamming. Second, since humanitarian prognunmes are implernented

primarily in localised a d ofkm isolaîed contexts, civil society-trased peacebuildïng efforts

tend not to concentrate on single organisations, but rather target entire cornmunities. In

this sense, civil society replication efforts assume a more holistic chamcter, involving the

369 Kate Simpson, Qp&4W&g in a Y-? MOI ~ J B M i ( M o d University,

A u d a : Graduate DissaCatioa in Dcvelopment Studicg 1998). Section4.3.

2u

active encouragement of local associati~nism end commimity-wide seKhe1p initiatives

designed to teconfigure the stnichue of l d i d e d e s and social relations in a mamer

consistent with the nquirements of peaxthe stability. NGOs have mutiaely spoasared

the creation of Id civil Society groups in tbeir project sites to comanage project-reiated

inputs (new water wells, storage houses, livestock s~hooihouses)~ or existing local

resources (soii, fofestty, fish stocks). The involvement of wmtnunity groups is understood

to encourage a sense of cdlective "ownership~ in the local development process, at the

same thne tbat group organisation itseif is WIClerstooâ as a fom of concrete

"empowement" for local residents. Specincaiiy in the more heaviiy war-affected areas of

Mozambique, the peacebuilding a d w d i c t prwention rationaie for pomoting civil

society has been to encourage i n t e d o n ami ~00-on around fimctiod, daily issues

facing the wmmdty as a whole, thus eventually caucellllig out previous war-time

identities. It this respect, replication strategies closely follow the peacebuilding

prescriptions of confiict experts like Maynard, to the e f f i that:

International support for the -val of indigemus, non-segregated [...] organisations both promotes [post-conflict] integration and revitalises the democratic process.. [and a&] vitality to the peacebuiiding process through fonnal inpuî, insisteme on peacefbl relations and acceptane of a rnultifbxm society [...] Peace cornmittees, credit incentives and radio programmes suggested for encoumghg crossconflict interaction would contniute substantiaüy to reinte--on, fêir dialogue3 mutual respect, and renewal of joint prticipation in commmity We. The strongest improvement [.-. J might be rebuilding tôe cornmunity decision-makhg capacity that bas been devastateci in the fighting- minternational organisations can take adxmtage of the pending issues to help lay the foundation for the decision-making process. thereby contnbuting to

37 1 reintegration and democratic dialogue -

Jhdeed, it is in these terms that a mid-term review of a British NGO livestock

rehabilitation project in war-tom Mutarare district recently expressecl its fiadings, noting

that the intervention:

... contributes significantly to reeonciiiation The provision of inputs is given regardles of political afnliation and the [..-] processes anâ structures created have, pirposely, involved traditional leaders (which tended to support RENAMO) and FRELIMO leaders. They are leaming to work togetber by implementing joint activities (e-p

370

371 W- op, cit, 1996, p. 1. Kimberly Maynard, "Rebuilding Communit)c Psychological Healing, Reunegration aixi

Reconciiiation at tht Grassroots Level" in in Kumar, K. (cd.) op. cit-, 1997, pp. 216-7 and 221. (brackets added).

207

sprayiag of animals, seledon of recïpient fimilies) aad the definïng of consistent criteria for beneficiary identification which have heiped to avoid pressures [...] by local

372 politicians .

In many cases replidon initiasives begin by umsultùig witb lacal commuuities in

advance of project implementation in order to identi& and discuss prospects for local

group formation and collective management of pmject fes0urcesUfCeS Beyotui this however,

the formulas and details of civil society replication may vary wnsiderably h m one

international NGO to amther, according mehdological preferences and specific

programme objectives Since no systematic analysis on replication prectices in

Mormmbique has been cacried out, it is not apjn-opriate to attempt any broad

generalisations. Nonetheles, a number of examples taken fiom war-affècted districts in

the centre of the country are iiiustrative. In the case of one 1997 intervention in the peri-

urban district of Dondo (situated dong the Beira commdor), an Austrian NGO dMded its

US $ 1.2 million c o m m e development programme into 10 separate project

components coveriag a range of sectors h m vocationai training and income generation,

to comrnunity information SerYices and political advocacy. Each of these components was

handed over to the management of a respective commundy group or association

established for the purpose, on the expectation that this wodd seme simultaneously to

build local group capacity and stimulate inter-group relations and synergies within the 373

community as a whole . In another case7 a British NGO implementing a rebabilitatioa

project in Maaica Province in 1996 reported talong this stmtegy a step finthet, by

encouraging the formation of a canpetitke form of pluralisn at the lofal level, in orâer to

show how single-issue politics can be pursueci without resort to violent political confiïct

The NGO's country director explained its replication strategy in explicit tenns:

We are inkrested in supporting the formation of any groups who share our vision and adopt our methodology. This is part of our 'kplcation sfrategy? ... The main social a h of our projects is to create local interest grozps whereby community members cea gather to identie ami aiticdate their autommous interests. Tbey will therefore be able to lobby local govemmeats about their CO-ms (empbssis added) 374.

EC, op. cit., 1998; p. 68-70; Interview, Programme Manager, Awtrian North-South Instiaite, &ira, May 1998. 3 f4

interview, Natiouai Fietd Director, CONCERN, with rekcnce to rebabilitation projects in Manica province (Maputo, Odobcr 19%).

In another notable case (Mïlange district). no less tban 500 local peasaat associations were

created between 1994 and 1996 uider a single wmmunity rehabilitaiion pmject

implemented by a I)utch NOO, in addition to 140 village health cornmitkes and 50 water 375

management committees . Finally, a Swedish NGO rehabïhtation programme in the

heavily war-affécted district of Gorongosa reported d g a specinc brand of procivil

Society "mnditionaliîy". not ody to encourage the p w t h of aew organkatïonal forms in

the area, but also to infiunice the behaviour of local govemmem accordingly: " m e bave

been supporting the creation of local groups and associations across dl sectors, and we

finance those district govellunent initiatives which propose joint programming wirh these

assoc ia t io l i~~~~~~. This last example helps to illustrate the substaatial level of local

political involvement which replication actMties cm potentially imply, as weU as the

influence over social relations which international NGOs are potentially able to marshal

at local levels.

In reality, lesser foms of 4CCOllLijtionality" in support of NGO replication

strategies have been used rather widely: Althougb local civil society development

theoretidly rests on the idea of voizurfq engagement, in practice NGOs oflen find themselves resorting to carrot-and-stick practices. For example, the provision of snall

amounts of credit and other material incentives have routïnely been used to encourage the 377

formation of I d associations . Confessional NGOs are Ikewise known to bave tinked

f d distribution to religious membership and worship.

Importantly also, some NGUs bave sought to support civil society development by

prornoting market-baçed dis@i%ution systems for essential items? The use of market-

375 EC, op. cit., lm, pp- 65-7; interviews, Pro- Manager, ZOA Reîùgee Ca= Milange,

"y 1998, aad EU N b e z i a Technical Assistant, Qudimanc, May, 1998. IntefYiew, Rojest C<wudiaator, M d Baniq with ref.ermce to child healtb, education and

social weltàre -cds in Goroogosa disîrict- (G~CODBOSB, January 1996). (emphasis added) *- > I I

Interview witb Pmgmnme Coordinator, Food for the Huagry h m n a h d , witb refèrence to emergency and a g r b b d extension acti*es in Maringue, Marromai and Buzï districts (Be'ua, 27 Septanber, 1995); Interview with Country Director, AFRICARE, with refircnce to postwar rehabilitation in perÎphaal nei- of the cÏty of Beira (Maputo, Oaoba 1996). 378

Interview, Comüy Director, Poprlatiou Services LniCtllllticmai, with rekenœ to plans for setting up and promdng rural commacial mhworks in support of family planning and Aids prevention programmes (Mspito, Novemk 1995) Iritervicw with Director, CARE International, with reference to p h to imroduœ and market water pumps in nrral districts: "If the peasants

209

bsed approaches to humanitrrian assistance delivery is pwticularly salient in tbat it

concretely reflects the assumption that 'civil r e ~ o n s ' mthin and emong communities in

post-codict situations are et~coutageâ by increesed couunend ttansactions. Forhmately,

despite strong concephial linlrsges betweeo market and civil -ety developnent, the

majority ofNGOs reroained reluctant to engage in the StnigûtEocward umacketïngn ofaid

inputs. Indeed, at a practicai ievei, market efnciencies were not iihiy to be mar<imised in

a war-tom situation cbamcterised by nllned and the absence of safeguards

against predatory d e t khaviour- Less pactically but perbaps just as importmtly,

critical observers within the NGO wmmunity have openly wondered if NGOs "should be 379

in the business of doing business" , or k hvolved in "openhg markets in the midst of 380

humanitarian crisisn . Nevertheles, it is Wrely that in the passage fiom relief to longer-

term developnenî, NGO strategies for civil Society replication, peacebdding, and local

market promotion will iaçreasingly overlap

As with the direct fimding programmes discussed earIier, little effort has been

made to asses the social and political impect of civil society replication stnitegies

employed by NGOs in the field The degree of social embeddedness, fuactionility atui the

longer-term swtabability of extenially supported replication is unclear, as are the local

political implications of establishing new, damiliar organisational forms in situations of

recent politicai adversity and continuing resource scarcity- Yet if its cumulative impacts

continue to be insufiïciently understood, the derlying aims of civil society replication in

rurai areas are more cleady identîf!iable- First, the creation of hundreds of I d

associations through operational humanitarian and rehabilitation pmjects, coupied with

attempts to stimulate mvel forms of intaaction between newly created groupings (for

example huictional coilaboration or pludistic cornpetition) concretely reflects a

cornmitmenî withùi the international aid wmmunity to reach deep dom into the local

societal fabric in order to effect fhdamentai changes in existing organisational, relational

and identity patterns.

accept it, we are gubg to seil it ammercially" (Maputo, Octokr 1996). Likcwise, Wodd Vision has supporteci an exteasive nmkting system fbr basic W oommodi in Zamôezia's Momunbala district (riitdew, EC Technical Assistanî, Quelimane, May 1998)- 379

interview, c d Director, ACTION NORD-SUD, with mikence to rehabilit.tioa programmes io Inhrimbane province. Maputo, Nov. 1 995.

Seconci, peacebuilding tbugh cM7 Society replication m t s a conscious

attempt on the part of extemal organisations to evacuate e W g local relaiionships of

their former political coatent, and in a highiy controllcd mnmm to create new

"fiinctional* spoices, and wittün them iastitutionaiir new sets of "ratidseci" social Expliciy or implicitly, humanitarian aid has been used by international NGOs

engaging in peacebddiug as a material platfonn for atfempting to dissolve former

political loyalties, once a source of division d violnice, and to supplant them with a new

sense of collective "ownersbipn Ui the peseetime political economy. Tbrough civil society

replication in the cunflict-affected districts, the intent bas been to transfonn participants of

war into ustakehol&rsn ofthe peace and ofthe underlyïng i i i l stnictures that support it

Socl&ai Incoiporotion: The promotioa of civil society in Mozambique, either through

individually-targeted fimding for local NGOs or through more diffused fonns of

replication, has of course w t occumd in a societal vacuum. Despite the severe social

disruptions p r o d d by the civil war and the resulting weakness of domestic iastitutions,

systems of social organisation in the country, particuldy at local levels, did not altogether

collapse. On tbe conûary, one eiologicsl study published in 1991 suggested that an

important effect of the wademergency economy was to (re)activate spontaneous or deeply

embedded organisational systems to cope wah resource scarcity and ensure some measure

of social sîability in the &dst of generalised uisec~rity~~~. In a postanflict period still

marked by acute war-related stress and the prospect of ongoing bardqûip under structural

adjustment, these 'discrete' and somewhat fluid civil soçieîy instiMions have been

recognised for their importance as local coping mechanisms, but also for the potential

coimtervailing force which they could exacise, consciously or otknwïse, against the

consolidation of peacetime stabitity. Accordingly, civil sociefy-based peacebuilding

programmes have sought to engage these pervasive yet loosely snru~tured social forces,

and to the extent possLble integraie them into the institrrtional iandscape of pst-war civil

society. In their capacity both as fiinding bodies ami facilitators, several international

NGOs have been at the forefiont of these effotts.

Embedded s0clSOClal forces and Ccwmmm*tïes of intere~t'~, more or l e s articulate,

dynamic and organisai, c l d y pervade al1 levels a d sectors of Mozambican Society.

Among these, Sogges and others bave identifid two for their pmtïcular salience either in

supporting or potentially "spoilùig" pmpcts for post-wsr stability and longer-tem

national development One is the extensive associationai rietwork of "traditional

authoritu", which is of particular importance in rural society. The other coasists of what is

commonly lraown as the "informai sectoi' or "popuiar economyn, a dynamic a d semi-

criminalised market system which in the post-codict period bas expanded in tuban

centres and along the country's rural transport corridors7 operating substannally beyond

the purview of formal state reguiatio?.

The relationsbip between traditional authority and formal political order in

Mozambique has been discussed in Chapter 5. 1 streçsad how indigenous power structures

were an essential actor of extemal rule during the doaial period, boih in terms of its

strengths and weakness. Later* under the Frelimo regime, traditional authonties were -

marginaliseci fiom the formal exercise of power and idaologically de-legitimised as

c'obscurantisY' , pro-colonial or anti-progressive. Many have amibuted the uitimate failure

of the Frelimo regime to connect with d society partly to its unwïllingness to recognise

traditional leadrrship networks as tactors of stability or potential change. L~kewise,

observea have associated the success and Longevity of the Renamo movement to h

propensity to mate alliances with local traditionai leaders and to respect local cultural

noms. Given its political importance, the challenge of rehabilitaîing and iacorporatmg

traditional society into the maiosneam of the post-war transition has feceived significant

attention fiom international sponsors of the peace-

The NGO sector bas wntn'buted to this in two main ways. First, in the context of

their humanitarian and rebabüitation programmes in rival areas* NGOs bave actively

engaged with local traditional leaders in project design and implementation, for example

in participatory needs 8SSeSSments and the beneficiary selection, and other fonns of

routine management and decision-makhg (e-g. where to loaite wells, which workers to

employ and so on)- The wncrete efféct of tbis has been to incorporate traditional power

structures into the bmader aid proces, and in effèct to reactivate tbeir political

382 David Sogee, "Ilie Civil Sacto?' in S o m (cd-) op. ck, 1997, pp. 45-50.

212

and legitimacy by enhancing the influence of traditional community leaâers mer the 383

ailocation and management of resomces .

A seconci form of NGO engagement with traditional authorities bas been to

sponsor thematic reservch aad coasultaioa on theu broader role within the pst-war

transition In 1996, two promineut research hitiaîives were undertaken in the context of a

wider national de- on decentratidon, with h d h g nom f&gu NGOs and in

working collaboration with local academics and private Both initiatives

were conducted on the basis of broad consultations with po1iticai leaders, 1egal and

political specialists, donors, and members of traditional authority h m across the country.

One of the two served as the research plattom for a high profile natiod conference on

traditional authorhies and deceatralisation held in 1996, at which traditional leaders fiom

across the cormtry wete present Among other things, the stuûies emphasised a strong

historical and sociological 'compatibility' bnween traditional community life, on one

hanci, and more recent forms civil society, on the other, perticularly in respect to pldistic

diversity, local empowennent and commuuity welfâre. Through these UUtiaîïves, local

traditional values and lineage-basexi identities were given historical prominence and

credited with the material and social well-king of rural communities. As such, tradÏtional

authorities were assigneci a reuewed importance in the post-war transitional wntext The

studies, which were fonnally considerd by the govenunent in the coma of plans for

decentralisation, mafkd a decisive tumaround in public discourse on the issue of

traditional authorities, and reflected, in this sense, a form of ideological 'rehabilitation*.

Importantly also, the studies strongly emphasised the historical and socio10gical

antagonisms between traditional identities and centralid authority, with implicit or

explicit reference to the Frelimo state. In one published report, the ascendance of a

383 This form of eqageamt witb traditiouai Society was perceived as particularly important by

NGOs operating in the so-called "divided distrias* and rebeldominated areas of Mozambique's central regions. It was seen as an indispensable mcans for ensuring a messun of community participation in aid projects, and, iadirectiy, of allocating aid in a maaiier that did not prejudice the position of Renuno in politically volstile areas. (htewïews and site visits: Abubaw Selmangy, Joumaiist, Diario de Moçambique, BeY., Novemba 1995; Food fOr the Hungry, Beira, October 1995; CUAMM, Beira, 1995; AISPO, Chemba and Chcringonia DisîrÏcts, December 1995. 384-- - - -

The h t d d NGOs Uivotved in these imtanœs were the M c a n Amcrican Instinite, which conducted research through the Minisby of Statc Administdon using USAID fiinds under its Decentralisatiodïraditionai Authority @TA) programme, and the Friedrich Foudation, woricing through the Centre tDt Strategic and Isternational Sadies, a local ademic Ulstiaition

213

centralised Frelimo state (and by implication its socialist intervention programmes) is

directly associateci with tbe violation of original sociqmlitical spaces d l to

The practice, proper to tbe state, of super-imposing wbat it considered to be 'national' institutions, in mrny cases in contradiction to the sociocultiaal universe of m i c m societies stil i &stïng in localidcultiwl spaces, conferreci upon the wntù'cî its

38s social dimension -

Locai community models represent the multiple foms of d e m d c practice tbat are part of local political systems, of pocesses used for conflict riesolution and social peace based in rituals for the legitimisation of power and recOIlciliaîion among individuais, groups and commuuïties [...] On this basis, we must consida the argument that the Mozambican State was ofhm a mere bystander miring the most difficuit periods of social crisis. The SUrYjvaI strategies of individu& d local communities werr on ~ o c ~ l resources ami centrai on lotai miai networks3?

Such atîacks on tbe state, as being inconsistent with Afncan cultural identities and

social practices, are mt -hg. Thougb they contain strong elements of truth, they

also must be underStOOd in terms of efforts to disseminate essential noms, reflecting the

fundamental anti-state bias of the new policy agada of the 1990s- in the Mozambican

context, attacks against the state fkom a traditional "revivalisîn perspective has a partidar

local resonance, given the Frelimo's histone aversion to the ethnic dimensions of national

identity (the party's early insistence on class analysis), as well as the disruptive effkcts of

the state's socio-economic policies (collective production, "viliagisation") on traditional

social systems.

For its psrt, the infocmal market sector (which operates primarily on petty trade in

food produce, small imported household goods, and used clothing), has attnicted the

attention of ecowmists because of its -ngly central place in tbe national GDP and

its importance in pwtumflict economic recovery. Indeed, since 1992, idormal markets

have accounted for an increasing sbare of commerce, labour and family incorne arnong

385 Jose Magode and Angela Khan "O Estado Unhario e A Questao Nm-onal : Uma Reflexao

sobre O Cas0 Moçambicanon in h4ago& (al)- Moparibilwe EaiicidiidcF, N- e O

Esth& (Maputo: FEFKEEI, 19961 p. 100. (translrtd h m the Portugiuese) 386

Irea Baptista Lund'i "Expressoes de Rocessos de Descnvotvimento de Diferenîes Sistemas de Organisaçao Sacial: O Conceito de Democracia c a Estmûna de Resoluçao de Conflitos em Communidades Afianas coin R e f i a s a Casos de Moçambiqut" in Magode, (ed.) op- cit., 1996, p. 1167. (tnaslated nOm the Portupsc)-

214

socially aberabte group. iaclridiag, imporainîiy, demobilisecl soldiers7 at the same time that o p p ~ h t i e ~ within the f o d 8COMUky CO- uoder the ptess- of shuchinl

adjutment, ecmomic stabilisation and priVBfiS8fion As such, ecomrnists, government

officiais, donors and others have -sed tbe infoxmal market system, i f somewhat by

dehult, not only as a %ct of îife" in the post-war ecoM)ItLy. but a h as a fiinctional

safeguard agaimt economic and social insamit);. and by extension politid instability3*.

As a result, informal markets have been allowed to thnve and e x p a d and, in some

instances, have becorne semi-fonnalised and subject to forms of officia1 conbol and 388

taxation .

However, the growth of informa1 markets hes dm rai-sed concems about the status

of the economy itsclf, and about thnr potentially adverse wtl~eqllences for the transition:

First, the informal -or atfracts large nmbers of people primady because sbrt-up

iavestments are minimal and returns are fhst and reasoaably certain. For critical observers.

this merely reflects the problem of the sewcïty of l od iy available credit due to inflation

control policies sponsorad by the FIS. More importantly, because the iafomal sector

hinges pNnarily on M e in mail go& (many of whïch are importeci). it is seen as

detracting potentiai local invesûnent nOm productive sectors (in agiculture and

manufacturing) which, because they require longer-tenn wmmitments. are comparatively

less attractive to those seeking short-term inwme relief. F W y , informal markets are

recognised as clearing mechanimis for stolen g d , narcotics and small weapon~~ as well

as a sphere of social exploitation and ofncial corruption .

Engagement by iatemaîional NGOs with the informal sector has been l e s

consistent than with traditional Society, arguably because its fluid interna1 dynamics and

comections to illicit trade make it a less easily understooâ, and perhaps les ethically

attractive, sphere of intervention. Idormai markets were nonetheless stimulateci during

the earlier phases of the transition as a result of NGO relief distributions (food and

clothing)? Laier. witb the fonnal endllig of the emergency in 1994-5, some NGOs

387

388 Hanlon, op. ch., 1996, pp. 68-75.

lea DeVletter,op. ch., 1997, p. 155. 2-z

During the emergcncy pbase wbcn large quratib'es of commodities wcre distn'buted for âct, they were ofka sold by tecipients in infi.Kmal markets as a mans of supplemeatùig incorne, rather than behg coasumd

began to release supplies tbn,ugh local markets in an effort to phase out the practice of

free distri'bution More recentiy, hawever, NGO eqpgements with informai markets have

grown as theu value in sustain@ local livelihoods over the mid-term has been

incorne-generation compomnts geared specifically towarâs informal market activity.

carpets and hsndicrab7 as well as agriculanal production (seasanal horticulture, honey,

sdower oil, small livestock) are typically bought and sold through iaformal marketing

neh~orîcs~~ .

More directly still, a number of NGOs have initiated projects to provide direct

financial senrices to informai traders in order to stimulate market growth. By way of

example, one intenianord NGO pmvided some 3500 short term loans (appropsiate to

trade but not production timehnes) to tnden in the markets of Chokwe district between

1993 and 19%- Ba& on its success, the NGO t k e a f k expanded its credit services to

the more dynemic informal markets of the provincial capital. Likewk, a Germa.

organisation provided over 2200 credits to idormal traders mder an urban micro-

enterprise scheme between 1994 and 1996 in addition to smali-business training support,

while also in 19% an intemational Mennonite NGO opened an office inside a major

informa1 market in the national capital, in order to provide direct financial -ces. In dl,

some twenty aid organisations were reported to be engaging directly in informal market

support semices in 1997. One effct of this bas been to convey a meanire of legitimacy to

activities hitherto regarded as Plausiily also, as NGO engagements with the

informal sector poliferate, positive incentives and "wnciitionalities" tied to small laaos

will serve to attract traders away fiom the more illicit sources of infomal incorne

generation and towards the legitimate mairistream of market activity- Such a process of

integration will be inherently "stabilising" and fiirther support the entrenchment of the

peacetime political economy. The process also reflectr increasing intemctions between

intedonal NGOs and the maricet economy in Mozambique; ïnkractïons which are

likely to intensify particdarly if national NGOs and associations begin to follow suite.

390 Iaternatiod NGOs promothg such activities k t w e n 1995 and 1998 inchide the Austn*an

North Sordh LnstiMe, Worid Vision, Ibis Dmbmw, 391

.nd Zoa Retiiga Care. DeVlata, op- ck, 1997, pp- 64-69.

Zi6

C o m e m w s k M ~ : A final strategy for civil -ety promotion identified hem involves

measures to build a normative COI~SI~SUS about the stnicture of the peace itselK Nomative

transmission t h u g h NGOs bas been a pavssive element of humanitarian aid delivay in

Mozambique, d has been pominent in each of the tlme strategia alrrady d i s c d

Nonnative consensus in support of the pace has, bowever, also been sought by NGOs

through snuctured and piirposedesigned initiatives, such as aews disseminatid* and

conferencing. These efforts have principaiiy targeted Mozambique's national and local social leaders and a cornmon objective bas been to disseminate new idees in a marner as

to set the tone for national debates on broad issues of 'govemmce" and deveiopment,

while legitimising the concept ofcivil society itdf-

Since 1991-92, in tedonal NGOs have sponsored several large seminais to

stimulate discussion about the potential fimctious of civil society, its definition,

organisation, parameters, its relations to the state and to the population at large, a d about

its conceptual and practical links to peace, democracy, development, decentralisation,

participation and tradiaonai authority. Typically, NGO-or@sed s e m h of this kind

have carried titles highly indicative of theü thematic content and orientation Exsunpks

encountered during field visits include "Strengthening Civil Society and Community ,393

Devetopment . "CM1 Society and the State: Spaces for Codict and ~ollaboratiod"'~,

"Faces of Mozambican Socim The Development of National ~ ~ 0 s " ~ ~ ~ and "Civil

Society and C i d Rights in ~ozsmbique"~%. in order to convey ùitellectual and political

credibility, s e m h have usually involved calls for papers by prominent national

academics or consultants, and have sought to convene a wide cross-section of interesfs

fkom Mozambique's opinion-making class, including jomalists, professionals, religious

372 LIMC, op- cit-, 19%.

393 Held in Maputo in 1992, and fùnded jointly by a wamrtiwi of intemational NGOs inciudiig

the Cornmunity Dcvdopmat Foundation, the Nortb -!South Development Initiative, the Syergos Institute, and Gîobsl PlrinaS. 394

Held in Maputo in Oaobcr 1995, W e d by raembcrs of the LLMC NGO Forum (author in gpd-9.

Held in Maputo in Mar& 1995, b d a î by the Nethalaads-basad E d w h Mondlanc Foundation (author in estendaNe). 3%

Held in &ira in Sepembcr 1995, W e d by the Ganirto Friadrich Ebut Foundation- (autbor in mendance)

n7

leaders, businesmen, union repnsentatives, pditicd psS members, traditional

authorities, and repesentatives of Ieniliing uaîïoarl NGOs and social O-sations.

The internai dynamics of these seninars are reveaüng: altbough many discussions

are stimulatecl by a variety of opinions and positions on key issues, they have tended

nonetheless to trke place within highly environmeats and to be thematidy

oriented by pre-formulated hmdouts contaimag discussion "tools" such as workmg

definitions and "key words". Participants are strongly encoiwged to fiad cornmon g r o d

on complex issues within a relatively strict tirne-firame, and working-pups are urgeâ to

produce general coosemus stakments in time for closhg plenarjes. Atter completion,

NGO sponsors have n o d l y ensured the publication a d dissemination of semiaar

documents, related discussion papers and concluding statements, to a wider audience of

civil society stakeholders as weIl as to donors, relevant ministries and the press. In tbe

early months of the post-war transition, seminar discussions largely conveyed a positive,

and at times celebratory perspective on civil society aad the anendant role of NGOs in

addressing the many challenges faced by Mozambican society. Frequently also, this has included a recasting, in dattering te=, of the hisîorical role of the state in national

development, and a corresponding emphasis on private entrepreneurid initiative as a basis

for meeting social and developmeutai needs.

Little critical perspective appears to have filtered through such initiatives,

reflecting perhaps a genuine willingness to absorb and expriment with novel concepts

within a new climate of political opemiess a d rapid s o c i ~ n o m i c change. Few of the

conference-related activities during the period appear to have r a i d any serious

challenges against the e l e m e d stnictures or processes of the peace. Rather, the

prevailing sense of vitality and optimism surrounding the civil society concept is aptly

registered below, in a sample of many NGO-fùnded seminar statements produced during

the period:

NGOs have an irnpoitant role in creating new forms and methods of solidarity and adaptation, in the balanced evolution of cultural etbical and civic values, a d in the

397 defence of under-privileged and vulnerable groups -

397 Op. cit., fhtnote 80 (seminar immxïpb),

218

In civil socîety, groups, wwperatives, NOOs, associations, unions, religions and youth groups which consthte the dyarmic part of society are d1ed upon to express with energy the innovative and changhg impulses of Society' and together take on a role in the de- and promotion of the values of hatmony and solidarity3*-

With pluralism, there is no need to corne to blows to say we don't agree. AN we have 399

to do is work well, follow tbe process and intervene through discussion

Consensus-building efforts bave also been Uadercaken by intemational NGOs at

local levels in both urban and rurai districts, aiîhough documentation is less &y

availabie. Similar to the more formal seminars describecl above, these have involved the

gathering of local leaciers and opinion maken, includuig goverrunent officiels, local party

members, traditional leaders and representatives of socio-ecommic groups (women,

producers, traders)- Cleariy' tbe level of discourse at village "discussion gn,upy' sessions

have not mtched the degree of sophisticated discussion encountered at the larger

meetings descni ï above- Instead, efforts have beem made to adapt core conseasus

concepts to concrete local realities and cultural refereIICeS4O0. But the uncîerIying thematic

content has been simïlar, as has the emphasis on the absorption of new concepts of social

interaction and orgmisatio~~. Znterestingly, in the case of one NGO working in the

muhilingual context of Mozambique's rural society, "special attention is given to

developing a vOC8buiary, in these flocal] laaguages, for key concepts such as 401

decenîxalisation, demnocracy and comunify participation" .

The wncrete impact of NGO efforts to replicate thetnselves l d y , to incorporate

local social forces into the maiastream o f post-war civil society, and to build a b r d -

based consensus in support of the peace, remaùrs unclear. In the cities of Maputo and

Beira, and to a lesser extent in some of the district capiîais of the central provinces visited

between 1995 and 1998, there was a tangi'ble sense amwg local socio-profkonal,

cultural and small-business leaders of belonging to a new civil sphere that had not been

open to them in previous times, and of the central importance of this sphere to the peace-

Likewise, inside the state itselc discussions with public officiais revealed an awareness of

398

399 Op. cit-, footaate 82 (scmiaar trsasCnpts). KULIMA, Scminatio sobre a Edwaçao Civicq hdd in B e i December 1994 (seminar

F~pts). For example, ND1 MMual de Refirencia, op. ck, 1996.

a new "civil h t o f as something that might coatri- to, but also eventually

constrain, theu administrative and decisi0~1-maCàng mutines- And certaïniy, as 1 have reportai elsewhere7 there bas ken a teadaicy among some new cnban 8~~0~ia t ioos~

which hive absorbed the normative and organisationai phüosophies of their intemational

partners, to embark on "civilising missions" in more ternote and ''backdn nuai areas of

If there are some positive indidom that the civil society idea, and its professeci

lïnkages to peace and private fieedoms, has made inroads among elements of

Mombique's urban elite, the kvel of nomatin or ideo1ogid "abSomon" by the grass

mots of rurai society is much more difncult to ascertain. Severai simple but fimdamental

questions emerge: Have aaditional cbiefb kgun to iden- themselves, and their networks

of authority, as belongùig to a broader civil spbae of multipie, cross-cutting relations? Do

subsistence famiers or petty nual traders underrt.nd themselves as agents or stakeboïders

w i i b a rapidly changhg post-war politid economy? To what degree have such groups

altered their behsviour accordingly, in what way, and with what outcomes? Annuering

such questions wouid requïre a systematic -tathe aaalysis of changing local beliefs,

practices and identity pattems which, to my biowledge was not d l y available chring

the period rmder -ew- Quite Wrely, however, a grass-mots absorption of new ideas

about civil society, and indeed the very credl'bility of these ideas* will heavily depend on

the occurrence7 pace, and level of material development in the country. For indivïduals

coping on a daily basis with poverty and resource scarcity, the emnomic rewards of

adopting new nomative and organisational approaches will a d to Ise tangible and

consistent. More broadly, the transmission of new noms will ldcely be facilitatecl by the

recovery of transport and communications systems, in a manner as to intemi@

commercial and cultural links a d human mobility between iirban centres and rural areas.

Arguably, it wodd also involve raising h i c welfâre standards, notably literacy and

numeracy rates. Indeed, civil society may well reveal itsdf to be a product of, rather than a

recipe for, successfid post-war development.

401 West, op. cit., 1996, p. 8.

402 Costy, op. cit., 1996, p- 20.

If the c o ~ n c e s of civil socieîy promotion in Mozambique are still, as yet,

uncertain, its implications for t&is study are maetheless -nt, Memationai NGOs in

Mozambique engaged in ooacerted efforts during the 1992-97 perïod to bnng about

internai social and behaviourai change in a situaîioa of domestic institutional uncertainty

and VUlnerabiMy . They did so within the b r d r fiamework of bilateral and multilateral

donor programmes for post-conûict recoIlStfUCtiou, and on the bask of official fuadiag

directed, ostensibly, towards meeting humenitSnan needs. And in doiag so, NGOs

benefited from an elevated position of sociocconomic power, deriving nom theu

superior technid and organisational cspacities and their authority to tsrget f h d s

selectively at certain local groups aad aot others. hst as impartantS, tbey also appared

to possess a measure of morai power, in the sense that they embodied the very n o m , and

mastered the very disoourse, ofthe organkaîionai a d behaviod appr04iches *ch they

were seeking to transmit, Finally, the political con?eut and orientation of NGO efforts to

promote civil society appeaced highly consistent with the prioritïes andobjectives of the

aew policy agenda

A final, comprehensive assessrnent of the hegemonic role of the intemational NGO

sector in Mozambque's transition from war to peace is provided in the wxt chapter.

Before addressing this, however, it is perhaps appropriate to close this discussion on civil

society promotion with a comment nom Gramsci, recordeci in 1932, relating to hegemonic

constniction:

Cultural pdicy will above all be wgative, a cn-tique of the pst; it wiîl be aimed at erasing nom the memory and at destroying. The hes of construction will as yet be 'broad lines', sketches, which might be changeci at al1 times, so as to be consistent with the new stnraure as it is f o d

a 3 op, &, 1975, pp. 263-4.

Henemonv, Aid Poücv .ad Future ProaDccQ for Civil Society

In the -ou section, 1 sought to bighlight the historical role of civil society

forces in generaîing Nstainiag or challenging political and economic ordm in

Mozambique. The discussion has yielded important historicai padels. First, civil

society is not absûact but bisiondy embedded. Prominent societal forces assumed

distinct historïcal codiguratio~~~ in each of the pheses discussed Their evolution appears

to have been closely associateci with relations of production, exchange and auîhority: The

emergence of a n i . AfbPortuguese society was ctosely comwcted with Portugal's

early integration into local tmd.ing ndworks, M e the nse of powedid, quasi-sovereign

societal entities under the prao and cocporate concession systems reflezts a historicai

transition &om trade to cultural settlement as a primary econornic activity. Most

recentiy, the emergence of a post-conflict %vil society" (dong with elemeats of an

increasiagly dymmic (informal) commercial sector and a resurgent traditional society) is

reflective of fiindamental changes occurring under structural adjustment, and of the

growing weight of intemational aid in the local political econorny-

Second, and in connection with the nrst point, the *te-society complex has

evolved over time. Each histockal period reveals distinct sets of "organic" wmections

ôetween public and private inîerestsi &ch, in tum, have contniuteâ to define the shape

of its respective state-society complex We may recall for example. the Uitegrated mix of

public and private incentives -reflected in the office of the Mozambique captaincy or in

the relations between the crown and the private iandholdings- which affêcted the

expansion of officiai colonial authority along îhe trade routes of the fi- interior and

dhately helped to detennine the territorial and ecowmic stanis of modem Mozambique

within the Southem Afncan region By the ssme token, the appiueat iacompabiility, or

"cdisco~ect" between public anâ private intecesfs within the post-~~lonial state-society

mmplex is widely associateci witb the failure of the Frelimo project and the chirability of

armed resistance against it. Presently in the postwar perid, emerging harmonies of

economic and political intaest among 1eaâing groups within both state and non-state 222

spheres appears to herald tbe of a readered, inkrmtioaalised state-Society

coufiguration, ahhough the pocess is stili ongoing

Third and perbaps most dent to this d y s i s , the historid record indicaies that,

con- to prevailing perspectives of the 1990~~ u~ivil society" has been a terrain of

wnflict as well as peace, a sphere in which the potential for order or pro- instability

resides in equal measure- To d l Ne* prominent elements of Mo-Portqpese

Society7 and the Linded dynasties which later evolved nom if frequently eagaged in

cornpetitive stniggles for private regioaal supremacy, and in so Qing variably supjmrtd

or resisted advauœs ôy the colonial adminisûatioe To an important extent, the m g e and

degree of colonial power refleded evolving patterus of societd confkoatation and

conflicting positions of intereJt In more recent times, the rapid re-opening of civil spaces

and the re-activation of civil society Iikewise led to hi& levels of positiod rivaSr,

resource cornpetition, and the emergence of power hierarchies among new or resurgent

societai groups. These patterns appear to support Robert Cox's tecent d o n that "Civil

society is itselfa field of power relations; and forces in civil society relate, in support or 404

opposition, to powen in state and marketn . And indeed, the policy premium placed by

international donors and NGOs on the development of an organkationally "modelled" and

normatively "guideci" civil sector in Mozambique implicitly attests to the recognition of

the potential for societai conflict, and the importance of civil Society forces in building the

pst-war order and guarding against renewed instability.

These parellels are important in as much as they enable us, fïrst, to recognise the

historical centraIity of civil society in hegernonic construction in terms of its generative

and protective fimctiom as well as its potential countervailing effects; and secondlyndly. to

better understaad (histoncally) the hegemonic fimctions of international NGOs in the pst-

wdict transitiom With this in miad, the c-t, concluding chapter of this study bas

three distinct paposes. The first purpose is to look back over previous chapters, take stock

of the issues and evidence presenteû, aod assess more systematically the interventions of

NGOs between 1992 and 1997 in terms of hegemoaic conStNction. The second prrposc is

to project forward, albeit somewbat tentatively, ancl look at current and prospective treoQ

in humanitarian policy-making, liLewise from the standpoint of Gramscian d y s i s .

Finally, 1 move on to consider the prospects for civil society organisations to becane

engaged in promoting meaningfiil socio-economic change' as opposed to m l y

promoting peace, in Mozambique and other war-affecfed couutries.

Assessino the Hee~noaic Fundoas of the Humanitan'an NGO Sector

Having outîineâ the ttuust of Gramscian hegemonic analysis and M g provided

an historical account of NGO interventions in post-war Mozambique, I now tum to a more

systemaîic assessment of tûeïr hegemonic fimctions. As noteci, the Gramscian approach

offers no fixed nrmiework for testing or vaijdatïon at a purely theoretical level, as the

positivist tradition might warrant. Rather, it is explicitly and seIfkonsciousIy an

interpretive approach, and tbe vaiidity of (na0)Oramscian statements on hegemonic order

and construction is, in the end, a matter of empincd enqujr and idonneci historical

interpretation. The of identifjrïng the contours, content and material b i s of

global hegemonic order in tbe 1990s was taken up in Chaper 4. The issue of the

protective and grnerative (4 potentiaiiy countervaïling) fimctions of civil society

organisations with respect to existing social orders has been discussed at various points

throughout the study- These need wt be invoked again at this juncture. htead, I propose

to structure this concluding andysis around the five hegemonic "fesinires" of international

organisatÏon enurnerateci by Robert Cox in 1981 and reproduced in Chapter 4. This is

useful particulariy as it provides a convenient and analytïcally coherent fnimework to

organise and çummarise relevant insights drawn fiom the empirïcal discussion in the

previous section Though mginally alluding to the activities of intemationaï public

regimes, the five hegemonic dimensions of intedonal organisation identi6ed by Cox

may be applied equally to the non-governmental sector- Indeed Cox's own insistence on

the maîerïal and ideological imity of the hegemonic state-society comp1ex suggests the

anaiytical necessity of &hg so, a l e the -d growth of the global NGO sector in the

1990s suggests that not doing so would w w be inappropriate.

404 Cox, op- et-, 1999, p. 25.

224

As d i s d in Ch;ipters 3 and 4, hegemonic or& are penasive, diffiise, and

embedded socialiy. Such orders coniain seYs of h i c Wes" which wastiade and reguiate

international en-, and which m o n uitkately to upbold and reproduce

existiag relations of power- Bot. realist and Gramscian readings of inteniati-onal relaîioas

would agree on this point, ahhough the former school has connned its mlysis prllnacily

to the actions of States. Arguably, deteetuig with certainty the fimdamental des of

hegemonic order is more problematic thm identifLmg the speeific rrgimes, institutions

anci practices which express them. Such ruies are l d at the nexus of theory and

practice. They evolve as a resuit of dialogue between prevailing interests, policy-

decisions, and public accepbmce; they inform and are iaformed by international actioe

Rules are o k n not codified or f o d l y recognised until well after they have corne into

eff- For the purposes of this discussioa, three interlockhg patterns of rulechange are

highlighted which, in combination, can be &OOd as Mderpmùag the "ordering"

p~ciples of evolving international khaviour in the 1990s. They are of general devance

to contemporary intemational relations, and at the same time relate directly to NGO-

based humaaitan'an interventions.

The &-st anâ most pervasive pattern relates to the evolution of the sovereignty

concept, that is, to its progressive weakening as an organising principle of international

relations. As noted earlier, the weakening of sovereignty is in part a result of the

observable assertion of non-state actors d networks at the global level, the integraîion

of regional market systems 8 ~ ~ 0 ~ s sovereign territories, and the increasingly fiequeat

challenges mouhtad aga- states by locaiised, sub-sovereign forces. At the same time,

the erosion of sovereignty as a core international nile bas been given wncrete effect by an

expanding consensus concerniug the reduced status of the intemational public sphere and the pnmacy of private ~e~regulation in a context of economic globglisatioa In the 1990s,

this was reflected in the initiation of national policies and international agmments airned

at redenning the role and legal obligations of goveCIIa[1ents7 and in the tbnist towards new

rights-based "govemance" regimes which raise the legal profile of corporate and private

individuais m s s a wide range of global issue areas- This pattern has involved, among

other things, domestic legislaiive or le@ mmeasures to Limit sovereiga control over

transnational economic activities, international treaties which concretely limit sovereign

authority or bmd sovereign a9thOrities into sqmmîional decision-making mechanians,

Secody, the relative weakening of the sovereignty d e in the 1990s has been attended, and in a certain measme dnven by, the rise of what might be called m- sovereign" pinciples. These have been exjxesed in various temis, ranging fhxn re-

definitions of global " ~ e ~ ~ ~ i t y " to encompss environmental and human umsidemîions,

the emergïng imperatives of "global co11~1~)ns" maiiegement, and d l s for a more

"cosmopolitan" ajqmmch which wodd hvolve measures tn c~&mocrotise" wodd 406

politics . The latter expression in particdar has involved an emphasis on Stipngthening

human rights and h u m a n h b pruiciples, as opposed to the sovereiguty principle, as

primary sources for deteminhg the rules and priorities of international enjpgement 407

(public and private) . This new emphasis has cecently made its appearance in

international policy discussions covering a broad range of global activities, fiom (sociaily

sustainable) resource extraction, to (fk) trade, to (smart) sanctions, with a visiile iduence on officia1 and non-governmental thinking. It has underpiMeci recent effo- to

implement "principled" foreign policy strategies which would link diplornatic and military

405 Kaldor, op. at., 1999, pp- 70-76- A notable example of this trend was the proposed

Multilaterai Agreement on hmtmaî of 1997-98 which, in its initial form, wodd have severely r-cted tbe authority of signatory go-, ova private cofpofations. It was expected thaî this agreement wuuld over time enter, cyaUasîantiaily, into force also among non- signatories, and thus assume the characta ofan internatid nonn or de. See JeaiEClaudt Lefort and Jean-Pierre Page m b l c jeu autour de l'AMI" in Le M i -ne, Oaobrc 1998; Christian de Brie, "Comment l'AMI tbî mise en picccsn in Le M d Di'IPlomtriqu, DuxxnDaaniba 1998; Christian de Brie "L'AMI m e a u va arriver" in Le M d -e, &y 1999- Likewisc, the mie of the European Court of Justice in curtailing tbe autborÏty of sovctcign legislation and nationai constitutional provisions over corporate eaities has been analysed in depth in Mattiii W. d et "Europe be&m the Court: A Political Thmy of Legai inîegra!ionn in Infernaibnal OrganbaSm (Vol- 47, No. l), 1993; and in Weiler, I. K. "A Quiet Revoiutiow The European Court of J d e and its Intcrloaitorsn in C h p m d k Polrticvl Jbrdis (Januaay), 1994. 406

See, for example, David Hel& "Demoaacy a d G l o b . l i n in Glbbal Gmwmmce (VOL 3, No. 3. ), 1997, pp. 25 1-68; aad Linda Bisbai "Sovercisnty and Minority Rigbts: hmdaîïons and Implicationsn in Gloibal Goamamce (VoL4, Elo. 2). 1998 , pp. 176-1 8 1. 407

Kaldor makes it quÏte clear that a new sa of sccept4d d e s and staadards of hmati~nal behaviour, rdlcaing a project for cos1110poütau govenrance, has ban on the asc«rdaat ovcr the past decade, This project "breaks with the assumption of temtorïdly-political cntities [and] derives fiom a hmmnist-univdst outlook which crosses tbe globavlocal divide". What is lacking still she concludes, are not tbe underiyïng d e s of a oosmopoütan order, but conaere mechanisms '30 enswe impkmemation of b s c des, partiailady as regards buman rigbîs and humanitarian law" (op. cit-, 1999, pp. 147-8).

226

engagements with stronger humanitarizm, human ngbg aad genda standardsa- Perhaps

most c o ~ c u o i s l y , official desigmtïons of NATO's extaisive bornbing mpoiign

agaimt Yugoslavia in the sjxing of 1999 as a "hwnanhh actionn (combined with the

operation's expiicit b m h of Article 2 (7) of the UN Chaarr uph01ding the d e of

sovereignty) testify to the currency of new "des" for maaaging global order in the post

And indeed, a third, datecl, normative developtneat has been the increased

saliency of the doctrine of "droit d'ingérencen7 an invocation of the right to intervene in

the domestic a f h k of sovereign states, mtably wbere humanitarian rn-ses or human

rights abuses have been identifted, or where national states are deemed to be 'fsiüng' in

the fulnlment of their interna1 securïty and social semice functions. The progressive move

models testifies to the growing scope and acceptability of increasingly intrusive foms of 410

foreign intervention in the 1990s , while the implementation of internationally CO-

ordinsted "strategic hmeworks" for incountry humanitarian programming, and r-

ails for the use of gl-y integrated "recovery fbcdities" to deal with the challenges of 41 1

postumflict rewustruction reflet the growhg sophistication of foreign interventions -

Together, these nile-changes have m e d , with increasiog force over the past

decade, to redefhe the temis of intemational engagement ammg states and non-state

408 See, for example, Thomas Weiss, "Principles, PoIitics and Humanitarian Action* in E;rrLscs orrd

IrrlrrirotiOriol AHSES (No- 13), 1999. M y aerii bombhgs in Iraq since late 1998 bave been characterised as "perfOnaing vital humanitarian ta&'' See John Pilger, "Squeezed To Deathn in

4Msrch 2000- 109

&ln Sec Noam Cbomsky, "L'OTAN, maitre du moud&' in Le Mo& Dipro-C, Mky 19!99. 7."

See Tortya hn@d, "Lhings FaIl Apm: Sme Fsihne and the Politics of Interventionn in InlaMao 41 1

rirJ &&w (NO. l), 1999, pp. 33-57. - - -

A "strategic fhmework" fOr t) '- 'an assisiance ddivcry is currently being implemurted

by the United Nations OBlice for Humanitarian Colordiaation on a pilot basis with support ûom key Western donors. Main objectives inchde enbanced opaational synagy among bilaîmai, muküated and NGO pqpmmes, as wtll ben- mate& cohcreocc betwecn humaniurian, diplornatic, military and economic interventions in support of mohrtion and post-cotlflict recovery. For a case shidy synopsis sec KcoMlbd Von Brabant and Toay KillicL "The Limits aad Scope for tfie Use of Developrnent Assistuice Incentives and Disincentives for Lnaucncing Conûict Situations. Case Snrdy: A f j j s t a n n (Puis: OECDDAC, lm), pp. 27-32. For a broder disaission on f o m of intcgmted rcspoiwt curren!ly bchg considaed, see Sbepard Forman, et ai. ''RdcoVCTiIIg fkom Codict: S m fbr an Internrtional Responsen in Pafpingfa Esscrriirils, Policy Paper No. 2 (New York NYU Centre for Intcrnrtional Co-operation), Febniary 2000.

227

actors, and to condition contemporary understandngs a d policy parameters of global

ordering. Crucially, they repesent a shift away h m ww iargely outdated concerns about

the collective rights a d obligations of towards a newer form of "govemance"

informeci by a finidamedauy liberal imlerstanding of global order: Indeeâ, the sustained

de-legitimation of state sovereignty a d the notion of rights-based intervention, which

have gained hreasing cwrency in the 1990s. are deeply rooted in Iiberalism's elemental

conceni for the primacy of individwi fieedoms and rights agaimt states. Concephially and

pragmaticaily, these basic de-changes fit squanly within li'berai bluepints for reducing

states' responsïbility in the intemationai public sphere, while at the same time reinforcing

the leverage of global plsnners to intervene in countna where states, due to excessive central control, corruption or eoliapse, have fhiled to guarantee the security and fieedorn

of private actors. And indeed. at the level of public discourse, the new d e s of

internaiional engagement have been ovefwhelmingiy expmsed in the wre libaal 4 12

language of "tolemnce, mulîicdhnalism, civility and democracyn . In this sense, such

decbanges, and the modes of international ordering which tbey have engeaéered ammg governments and non-governmentd actors, cannot be wnsidered separately h m the

emergence and operationalisation of a Liberal " policy agenda", as duded to in the

writings of Hall and Young, Edwards and Hulme and Duffield (see Cbapter 2)- And to the

extent that the d e s in question have encouraged international social and political relations

which support the li'beralisation of global economic production and exchange processes,

they can be understood as hegemonic in the original Gramscian and C o d sense.

The intemational NGO sector does not as such formally "ernbody" basic

intemationa! rules in the manner of international public organisations or regimes: NGOs

are privately constituted, and situateci outside the realm of international public law413.

Nonetheless, NGOs have increasingly begun to interact with formal international d e

structures and with the regimes, institutions and pmctices associated with them, both

through consultation and action. Powemil g l w NGO groupings, such as the 160-

member American Corncil for Voluntary International Action (Inter-Action) have

codified theû own sets of pincipies, codes of wnduct and best-practices guidelines which

412

413 Kaldor, op. cit, 1999, p, 148. Arguably, this is tbe sense in which Cox origïnaily conœivcd of in-onal organisations as

satisfjing this first criteri. ofhtg«nony. 22a

Humanitarian NGOs, private founciations and research -ans have played a practical

role in a number of ways, both in seeking to lùnit the sovereignty of sEstes and to pmtect

rights and humaa welfare at the individuai level: SpeciGc activin'es have included the

establishment of global human nghts ÿvatchn neîworks; the development (with varying

degrees of sucoess) of analythd instnimeats for d y warning against humanitarian

emergencies; an inmasing engagement, independentIy or with donor spo~lsorship, in

ccbest-practices'y research for impved foreign intervention in contlict and post-confiict

situations. NGOs have widely publicised conflicts and appiied increasingiy sophisticated

media tactics to mobilise rapid international responses. Fre~uently, they have mountd

vociferous attacks on states in terms of thei. loas or 'Yorfeiting" of sovereign priMleges

due to human rights abuses, cormption or fùlure to meet basic aeads. And with increasing

freqyency throughout the 199û's, the NGO sector has participted ( o h in force) in, and

tbereby helped to legitimate the hummitarian claims of, inteniatiod military 415

interventions seeking to restore order to politically ustable regions -

Although many of tôese NGO activities have imiolved concrete aiticisms of

specific humanitarian intervention policies, they have broadly cohered with global rule-

changes, particularly since the end of the wld war, towards more 11'beral interpretations of

state sovereignty, intervention, and inchidual rightsy which in turn have facilitated, albeit

perhaps unevenly and with varying degrees of success, a geographical extension of

li'beralism around the world It is in this sense that the pluraJity of humanitarian voices,

critical recommendations, and policy premiptions emanating from diverse and seemingly

discrepant quarters of the international NGO sector in the 1990s me understood as fiameci

within a unified historical process whereby ri~manita~anism is king iacreasingiy CO-

4 14 inter-Action statements and N W guidelines on huamitafian assiJiance in wnflict-affécted

areas ( a h adoped by otbcr Uncmational NGO coaiitions) can be obtained at www, iriteractionorg , 415

The d e of NGOs in "pIckagingn h i g n intaventions according to interaationrl humanitarian principles in the 19909 is discussed by Whitman in T h e Political Limits of Humanitarian Emergenciesn in Whitman and Pocock (eds.), op. ck, 19%. pp.3-13. In the same vohunc, Sbiras briefly outlines the growhg intemuions bawsen the NGO 'iector and military forces in the 1990s (op. cit., 1996, pp, 1 6 1 17). Tht aiticai d e of NGOs in attrrclting statcs on the human rights fiont is disarssed by Felice Gacr in "Rcdity Check: Human Rights NGOs C&nt Gcwmunents at the UN" in Weiss and Gordenka (eds.), op- ck, 1996, pp. 5 1-65.

229

opted by the domirisnt neo-li'beral agenda, which now uses humanitarian assistance as

part of a wider policy [...] to produce h i dcmocracies nom --tom societie~"~'~.

The expience in Mozambique in the period just prior ta anà foUowing 1992

suggests that humanitarian NGO activities served to project the basic international d e -

changes noted above into the domestic sphere. As discussed in Chapters 6 and 7,

unprecedented limitations on nationai sovereigety occurred as the state and economy

themselves became increasingly (re-) htemationalised under the weight of humanitarian

intervention. In the immediate post-conflict period, de fecto planning authority for short-

term hummitarian responses as weiI as the long-term poiitical and economic re-

organisation of the country (l~kralisation, democratisation, decentralisation) increasingly

shifted fiom local decision-- centres to outsi& agencies and institutions, while the

routine management and provision of key public services passed on to NGOs. Likewise,

we have seen tbat the principle of rights-based droit d'ingérence was appiied by large

nurnbers of internationai agencies and non-govermnemal groups, albeit not always with

explicit referme: While the 1992-94 UNOMOZ operation itself was implemented on the

invitation d the Mozambcan govemment according to provisions of the General Peace Agreement, individual NGOs fiequently invoked the rights of vulnerable groups

(retuniing refûgees and the internaily displaced) or altefLLafively, the imperrative of

"working directly" with local comrnunities, ni order to intervene and to manage aid

projects independentiy. Signincant quantities of aid were thus delivered without

consultation or supe~sion by, and at times even without the kmwledge of relevant

national planning authorities. in the sensitive area of "civic education", some foreign

NûOs were reported to have wnducted political research and training on electoral

practices among remote communities, despite national regdations restricting such 417

activities to registered Mouimbican organisations . And indeed, the NGO cornmunity's

c lah to a more permanent form of &oit d'ingérence (invoked weii a&r the official end

of the humanitarian crisis), was clearly reflected in the challenge mounted (and ôacked by

the World Bank) agaiast the Mozambican govemment's proposed NGO legislation in

1996.

416 Hugo Slim, op. cit. 1997, p. 4-

417 Intemiew, -01, N a t i d Dmocmtic Irwtitute hr IntaMtional A£ûürs, Usputo, Odober

19%; interview, Carlos Suffiantes, Diredor, ~nit'~or NGOS, Ministry of Foreign Aflkh and Co- operation, Maputo, November 1996.

230

NGOs] uamtkmwhs t k p m k t o f u n k mdor&F

The second kgemonic feetr~e of int-od organktioa identified by Cox

relates the rapid growtb of the h ~ m ~ t a r i a n N o 0 commMity to the emergeace of new

global power configurations in 1990s. This point is perhaps more streightforward than the

previous one, as it refers to some of the more tangible aspects of wntemporary

internationai re1aîions It recalls my discussion, in Chapters 1 and 4, of key îrends in

global political economy which have afEêcted NGOs since the closing of the Cold War.

One bas been the pmgressive dispersal of authonty over the management of g l W public

goods, and over the welnue of increasing numbers of people. This disprsal, operated through policies of deregdation, decennalisation and market hiberalkation, has invoIved

the increasing engagement in global affairs of severd types of non-state organjsatïons

The second noted trend hes been a constriction of global power stnictures, involving a

continuing concentration of wealth and authority (public and private) among a r e social

categories of the world political ecormmy, anâ the attendant political and ecommic dis-

empowement of large portions of the global population Tbird, the globalibalisation of

production systems and ongoing market liberalisation, emphasised in the writings of

Robert Cox, have exposed economidy marginal areas to new levels of social

vulnerability and political rkk4I8 -

In this context of what one academic publication has r e f d to as the 'globalisation of -4 19

liberalism , the international NGO sector has encoumered an important organisational

space for growth and an imreasing demand for the provision of global services in key

areas of public coacern And it is against this broad backdrop of sociwconomic

restructuring thaî humanitarian NGOs have undergone the three related processes outiined

at the begi-g of this study: Fïrst, tbeir progressive rnove away Born the radical margïns

of global social discourse and action, and their htegration udo the operational and

analyticai core of the establïshed aid system; secunâ, their historically unprecedented

accumulation of pwer, measurable not only in financial terms, but also in terms their

influence on the aid policy agenda, and their direct authority over people in socio-

418 Cox, op. ciî, 1999, pp. 3-4.

economically depssed aresis; a d thid, the visible politicisaîion of their w o e reflected

in the protective and generative roles thy bave assumed in post~conflict settings. As

prominent agents of civil society, NGOs have h m e both produas and sbapers of global

order. Collectively, they have becorne integral compoaen*i of the emerging stzite-society

complex. Cox has reœntiy observeci in this vein that:

[Sltates and corporate interests influeace the development of tbis ciirrent vasion of civil society towards making it an agency for stabilising the social ami political Jtatus quo. State subsidies to non-govermnental organisations (NGOs) incline the latter's objectives towards confonnity with established order, d edmce the legitimacy of

420 the prevailing order -

Mozambique represents a microcosm in which tbese global processes have

unfolded at an aceelerated pace- In the space of a few years, a full range of policy

measures have been deployed under close international guidance in order to bring about

the I i i s a t i o n of the Mozambican political ecoaomy, includllig privatisation, market.

liberalisation, deceatnilisation and democratisation Although these processes are still

underway, their hansformatioml cesults are readily apparent (as discussed, for example, in

the reduction of overall govenunent expenditures, and in the rapidly nsing levels of

private direct investment), and Mozambique, for the tirne king at Least, is regarded as one

of the few "successes" of Afncan politicai and economic refonn of the 1990s. NGOs

began to make theh appearance with the onset of structural adjustment in the late 1980s, at

the M i e tbat liberal prescriptions for global ordering ficst began to be apptied in the

country. Their increase in numbers, and local economic and political power, p d e d

apace with liberalisation, as the state progressively receded and the pressure of

humanitarian needs becarne acute. Likewise, we have seen that in Mozambique, parallel

to developments at the international level, the emergence of local civil society

organisations, prompted as it was by foreign agencies, could not have ocamed without

signincant concessions of political space by a once totalistic Frelimo govenunent And

needless to say, these orgaaisatons have a strong stalce in the continuing liberaikation of

the country, as well as in wntinuing Bid flows.

419 The London Scbool ofEoonomics Department of Internationai Relations publisbed a spccial

issue of Millennium under this title in Winta 1995 (Vol. 24. No. 3). 420

CO& op. &, 1999, p, 11. 232

By 1997, few of the international NGOs which had arrived in tbe country at the height of the 1992-94 emergeney, lmd wound up operati~ns~ Ins td , they effkcted a programmatic tmusition, nnt h m reliefto rehabilitation activities, and then staying on to

engage in longer-term belopment w o k T'bey have becorne, in this sense* pemianent

features of Mozambique's likriïsed and intemationalised political economy landscape

[state-society cornplex]. Indeed, when, at the time of wciting, a second emergency struck

Mozambique, many of the same international NGOs were on hsnd to absorb a signinca~t

proportion of hUm8Iiif8tim aid flows, white &ers which had depiart4 quickly rehimed

One issue that received little comment diiting the floods of February/March 2000, was the

continuing inability of the staïe, af?er 8 yean of national recoastnrction and over a decade

of h i reform, to deal eSxtïvely witb the situaîiou. Indeed, this rnay be taken as

ernblematic: the case of Mozambique shows mt only that NGOs are an identifiable

product of expanclhg liberalism, but a poduct that now appean permaaently necessary to

the survival of many thousands of people.

[NGOs] "idao- IégZtiirrate the 110- of w o d order"

This point relates to the issue of normsitive transmission, and to the idemlogid

function of NGOs in socially and culnually validaîing, and thereby giving effect to

standard assumptioas of liberal theory- In Chapters 2 and 3, 1 sought to outline the core normative ekments of contempomy 11'beral governance models, and their ptactical

translation into post-confiict aid policy and analysis. At the core of the ù'beral normative

framework is a concem to ensure aûequate social and politid space for autonomous

private associations and enterprises. Liberal prescriptions for global govemance take this

concem as theu point of depprture, and on this b i s have been developed iato models for

socic~eîonomic development, the resolution of political wnflicts, and the wostniction of

"worlàng peace systems". Though expressed through a of theoretical formulations

(functiondisn, interdependence, d e m d c peace theoly, cosmopolitan theory), these

prescriptions share a ammon set of wmative elements. These may briefly be

sumariseci as, inîer u~iu: A g e n d antagonism towards state power and regdation; a basic aversion to politics as a source of disruption of "hmctional" social relations; a

prefereace for the market as tbe principal mecbaaism for distri'buting resources and

opportunities; a carnmitment to politid pluralisn; and strong bias towards civil society

as an autonomous yet integrated s p k e of orpnidoa saving multiple stabilising

hnctions- The pogrammatic force of these m d v e waimmnents lies in the fkct thot

they interact and mirhially reinforce one anotber within a single logid fiamework Their

potential ideological resonanœ in war-tom societies, and perbaps especialIy in formerly

socialist environments like Mozambique, stems h m the direct triangular cdatiotlsbîp,

established within this logicai fiameworiq among politid fkdom, prosperity aad peace.

in Chapters 5,6 and 7, 1 have sought to illustrate empincally the historical role of

civil society actors in transmitting (or resisting) the underlying noms of colonial and post

colonial order in Mommbique. At pmtïcuIar historicai jimchrres, powerfid socidal groups

have engaged in hegemonic amtrwtion by facilitdg the petration and use, in local

social environments, of mental and intellectual references and ~ a t t e r r ~ ~ of identity

formation, organisation and social interaction inherently supportive of existing political

and economic power. At other jum;tures, they have effectively blocked the co11~01idation

of power structures by Ming to engage in nomative transmission, or by (actively or

passiveiy) suppoitiog wuntervailing projets In the perÏod just prior to and foliowing the

1992 peace agreement, the majority of civil society actors, and certainly the most

influentid among them (intemational NGOs), engaged in various foms of normative

transmission supportive of peacetime power structures, starting with activities designed to

promote the peace setîlement itself: and branching into related areas of support for micro-

enterprises and the promotion of fonnal ciemocraçy, among others. By contrast, with the

possible exception of some orga.iS8tions (radical solidarity NGOs, local traditional

authorities, the anti-debt campaign), relatively few civil socieîy forces appeared able or

willing to engage in a concerteà critique about the nahire, shucture and implication of the

peacetime politicai eumomy, or to force such a dehte ont0 the public agenda.

In Chapter 7, 1 sought specifically to show that the transmission of noms by

in tedonai and some local NGOs was not a just a matter of passive stnictmal fiuicnon,

but of active prograrnming involviog identifiable straîegies for civil society promotion.

During the 1992-97 penod, these included direct financial support for the formation of

national non-govenimental organisations, and for the technical, maaageriai and normative

training of their personnel. In rurai l d t i e s and some mban neighboirrhoods nomative

and organisational "civil society replication" strategies were explicitly applied, often as

jmt of humanitarian or -on projects- Likewise, influentid inteniaiional NGOs

became engaged, through hmding support or direct participaxion, in promotional research and dissemination acbivities, with the aim of de- the coatours, identity, a d purpose

of organised cm1 Society in the national post-wai umtext, anci of communicating the new

knowledge acquired by these efforts to the broader public tbrough publicstions and media

releases. Finally, h m 1994 onwards, an hreasing number of international NGOs

appeard to have becorne engagmi in small-de business promotion activities, not least

in the informal (and @dly illicit) market sector, thereby putthg a clear h'beral stamp on

local initiatives for longtenn development

The de- to which new noms have been absorkd within different segments of

Mozambican society remains an interesting and complex subject for empirical enquisr.

Most probably, S W ' I C ~ S S ~ ~ ~ entrenchment of 11'beral political, socid, and economic models

will depend on their interaction with esîablished local noms and as well as on

the material benefits which they yield It is plausi'ble to argue, however, that the

transmission of noms and the ideological legitimation of a Iiàral post-wsr settlernent in

Mozambique were facilitated by a number of environmental factors: low levels of literacy

and education, pmti~ularly among women and in rural communities, undoubtediy affected

local capaçities to critically interpret the new concepts and organisational models which

have been proposed Long years of frustratifrustration with -ive and ultimately inefféctïve

socialist development strategies undoubtedly helped to gewnite a strong predisposition

towards a l t e d v e models of sociolecono~~~c development Acutely depressed economic

conditions and cbroaic resource scafcity &er the war certainly helped to raise the public

profile and relative power of international NGOs, particdarly outside of the capital city,

and thereby amplifj. the force and credliility of the new organisational models they

suggested Arguably also, local institutions and social identities, progressively weakened

and comtmtiy disputed throughout long years of war, may not have been able, in the shoa

period of intense international NGO intervention, to generate and articulate creûiile,

countervailuig alternatives. The impressively rapid proliferation of local civil society

organisations in Mozambique during the füst five years of peace appears to testifL to the

success of normative transmission and legitimrrtion efforts-

pGOs- uc-- f ~ ~ k e r a l ~ o u r r a r k s ~

Cox's fourth point refers to the maîerkl and m d v e recMtment of leading

elements and social categories into established smictures of power and authority* what

Gramsci refers to as hegemonic block f-on or e--on As noted in Chapter 4, co-

optation is iimxest-based, and occurr when an identity of intemsts or piaposes is perceiveci

arnong leading groups in the state-society cornplex and prevailhg modes of economic

production and exchange. In the case of worId order ~011StniCtion, the formation of

identities of interest occurs at a global level. acms nationai boundaries, coamcting

national group intefests with broder iniecnafjonakd production and exchange systerns

and to the puôic and private institutions which manage them. Beyod the positive pocpss

of building a global identity of interests among leading natiod groupings, the mechaaics

of co-optation also involves a negaîïve dimension, which wnsists in restricting the

panuneters of @ce and analysis, tbus making the comtruction of altemative identities

of interest probtematic. In this sense, Cox has observed that cobptation within an existing

state-society fnimework is likely to succeed wben the pocess "wncords with a concem on

the part of many people for survival in existing wnditions rather than for transfomatkm

of the social order. For many people, clientelism may be preferable to revolutionary

~ommitment"~~~. Crucially, CO-optation and bloc formation processes involve not only

national elites, but extead deep down into the social &bric7 through the multiple comiuits

of civil society, to involve leaders d members of leadhg social movements, prof&onal

organisations, labour unions, local producers and tiaders, community groups an4

irnporîantly for this study, indigenous stnrcb<res of political and cultural authoiityiity It is in

this area of CCextended" leadership -ptation thai the work of international NGOs in

Mozambique appears to have been particuiarIy relevant

The case-stuây discussion in Cbapters 6 and 7 indiCates that NGO cooptation

during the pst war transition involved a more or l es well cali'brated mixture of material

incentive and normative transmission Given the degraded socic~economic conditions

prevailing in Mozambique at the time, and in Mcular the resûicted opportunities for

wealth and professional advancement, the material element of peacetime hegemonic bloc

extension has been particuiarly d i e n t At the higher levels of the nationai s o c i ~ n o m i c

strata, the international NGO sector routinely drew firom the available pool of educated

professionals fiom diverse sectors, iaclpding the d o d university Md public &cey in

order to build up local technical and aQninisbetive support for NGO operatioas, and to

conduct relevanî social tesearch Salsries, oonsdtaacy f a , benefit packages and concrete

prospects of upward mobility and enhanced market competitivemss combineci to produce powerhil incentives for tmûmi Mozambicans to enter into the country's

increasingly inîemationalised professional labour force via the humanitarian aid sectorr A

visible effect of this, it was noted, has been an unprecedented %aidmïnn at the expense

of the public sector, and a progressive acclimatisation of sociio-professional elites to

prevailing global political ecoaomy discourse and management practices. At the level of

local civil wciety organisationsy matefial -@on by NGOs was operated though the

discretionary and conditional use of civil Society promotion finids. Several cases indicate

the use of selective hancial targeting towards "appropn*aten local partmm adoptïng

acceptable programme orientations and pject management routines. One result of this

was to set in motion a competitive normative drive among aspiring local NGO managers

to enter the intemational "fùudiag circuit" in Mozambique. At the level of local rural

wmmunities. it was not unco~~llllon during the 1992-97 pexiod for humanitarian

programme aid &self, including food, seeds and household goock, to be used as a material

incentive to recnsit community organisers, attract adberents to associational initiatives3

and bring initially reticent local authorities "on-si&"-

PGOs] (Cabsur& co~ni~1-kge1110& ideer"

This last point clûsely overlaps with the preceding ones on n o m s transmission and

cooptation It refers to the identification, channelling and intenialisation of potentially

wuntewailing concepts or analyses into prevailing ideoiogical fhmeworks and

management modela Su& absorption reduces the likelihood of imrneàiate resistance to

hegemonic construction and, over the longer tem, fàcili(abs the aâjustment of existing

power structures without fimdamentally chailenging them. It has been suggested by aid

observers such as Ian Smillie, DLtffield and others, that the international NGO sector itself

has, over past decades, unüergone a process of ideologicai absorption, reflected in a

general abandonment of criticai "Third World solidarity" positions and in NGOs' growing

pragmatic concern for mamghg humanitarian crises. Others have highlighted the role

internationai N o 0 alliances in '3n-g" originally radical developwntsl

conceptss such as concerns for gen&ry the enviromneut and human ri-, and by way of

pressure and negotiation, fhdhting their entry into exïstïng aid pogismming

heworks . Recent examples of internalïsation of (potentially cornter-begemonic)

concepts, now promllvat in official stmtegy statements aad iocreasingly factored into

programming, cover such issues as poverty alleviation and debt reduction, Their practïcal

effect has been to reorient or re-target (somewhaî) specinc aid progamme süategies and

objectives without callïng into question the fidamental power relations which are

exercised though the aid processprocess

Signincantiy, few spedïc instmces of active absorption appear to have occiirred

in Mozambique duriag tbe postwar traasition @od- This is due less to any fdure on the

part of international agencies and NGOs on the grouod to inîerdise resisiant concepts 422

than to the observable absence of coherent, alternative (local) ideological orientations

Tellingly, what measure of wherent Cnticisrn did axur during the perïod, originated or

was supported nom abroad- The absence of d i l e altedves to liberal reform is itself

attnbuiable to tbe collapse of the socialkt poject in Mozambique, the rapid abandonment

of "emancipatory" discourse by the national leadership, and to elites' espousal, on either

side of the new electoral spectnnn, of increasingly similar politid platfoms regarding

post-codict reconstruction and national development Under these circumstances, the

attention of NGOs and other international actors appears to have fbcussed primarily on the

localised de-politicisation of relations between formerly d g Wons and the

mmmunïties under their influences and to tbe incorporation, or at least formal recognition,

of traditional authorities as fully integrated elements of the peace.

Next Stem in Hegemonic Construction: Future Aid Poticv ALqlications

A number of recent developments in h d t a r î a n aid policy and analysis suggests

two signifiant trends: First, the strong linkage between humanrtanan * - aid and the longer-

term h'beralisation of postwar poiitical economies seems likely to be maintained

Secondly, aid policy didom tow8pds the enci of tbe 1990s appear to be painting

towards the need fa more compreheiisive, and measurably more forcefiil strategies of

Uaematiod intemedon bacW by daper, more pennrating modes of normative

transmission As increasingiy important shPpas of the humanitarian ageada with a

concrete stake in the fidure orientation ofaid ddivery, influentid intematiod NGOs (and

to a lesser but growing extent local civil society organisations in recipieut coimtries) have

wntriiuted to the policy development pocess, by providing rese~rch support to bilateral

or multiiateral aid plannets, participating in policy debates, implementing pilot projects to

help plaaaea determine the efficacy of proposed strategies, or alternatively critiquiag

current practices ami advocatmg appropriate policy adjustments. Four specific policy

developments are discussed in this subsection, with a view to highlighting their

implications for the future of humanitarian ai4 and their potential for fàcilitaîiag 423

hegemonic construction (or co~lsolidation) in war-affected areas .

The first notable development has been a passage h m peacebuilding to d i c t

prevention as a conceptual fremework for addressing civil wars. Both concepts aüude

pnmarily to the potential conhn'bution of humanitacian assistance and other forms of

development aid in generating conditions of institutional stability in areas affecteci by

chronic social economic and political Uisecurity- Each, however, departs fiom a ciiffereut

analysis of the relationship between civil confiict and peace- and in this sense. the

succession nom the first to the second framework reflects a concrete fonn of policy

change. The logic of peacebuilding reflected a departure nom previous forms of

intervention in two concrete ways: Fi- post-confIict humanitarian assistance was no

longer expected to M o n simply as a channel for rapid social s e ~ c e provision, but also

as a meam to rebuild and support local institutions and idhamctufes which would

strengthen the permanence of peace and lower the prospects of fùture instabiiity.

Secondly, peacebuilding represented a step forward eom previous "peacekeepingn

models, in the sense that it recognised a need to complement existing fonas of

internationai military intervention with humanitmian, social aad political mmponents anâ,

ideally to integrate them into a fonmrd-looking (as op@ to stahis quooriented),

422 The rnost cobercat political ccommy critique of tbe peacc transitjOa to anage during the

period is contaid in the Pargiâu series of publicatioas, ôegitining wïth Mbzuddque.= Tlk T r ~ ~ b f e d T-n in 1995. (Sec Abtnhamssoii a al, 19954 299Sb, 19% in bbliogrrphy) 423

See section on definition of key terms at the end of Chapter 1 ofthis sîudy. 239

unifleci stmtegy fiamework S@c operatid requkements and divisions of labour

within the peacebuildiog mode1 bave newr been coaadely specifïed, d nuiastream

interpretations ofagency fbcti01ls have been based primarily on operationai or thematic

comparative arhgntage: Fmm the No0 Penpective, peacebuilding work has k e n

understood maialy in tenns of usïng humnnituiin field pojects to help riehabilitate local

social institutions, m e d societal links sevmd by civil war, and foster a general

disposition towards resolving local conflicts pescefùily. Lîkew*se, official aid agencies

would support the rrcoveg of national institutions within their r m v e areas of

specialisatioa, for exatnple in e c o d c , administrative a d judicial refomi. Although

peacebuilding did not develop into an operational mode1 as such, it nonetheles

represented a first step towards the application and Iegaimaîion of an extended, more

pervasive international aid agenda which implied increasing lewls of exterual

management of, and interference in, national pst-war politid and economic recovery

processes. Importantly, the developnent of the jmœbuilcling concept wholly wincided

with the post-conflict transition in Mozambique, which pvided an ideal testùig ground

for the new approach.

In the latîer 199ûs, the focus on peacebuilding has given way to donor and NGO

concerm for enhancing the preventive value of aid transfers to politically volatile areas.

Between 1996 and 1998 especialiy, the logic and language of wnflict prevention gained

increasing official attention mong bilataal and multilaterai aid plan nef^^ and beaune an

object of policy development among several Uifluential NGO c o a l i t i o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . In part, the

new focus on conflict prevention has emerged h m -ved conceptual and practical

shortcomings of the peacebuüding approach as experienced in the field Peacebuilding

has ken cnticised conceptually for focusing aùnost exclusively on postumflict

intervention strategies, and for adopting too "linear" an analysis of post-confiict recovery

which emphasises the wntinuity and non-reversibility of humanitarian, institutional and

424 Official &egy statememts irrued on mnflict pmation inchde: The Eun,pean Canimission's

policypaperonthe I t r w c q f c O r r / . J . K a i n A ~ ~ ~ ~ ( EC, 19%); the European COUaCii's Coiiirrion hsi&n ori C h j l Ü t lkwmkm

- dw - udRkd&i im In A/irr (EU, 1997). the OECD's DAC GrliibOur an Gm@ïm d&Dfdqriar C b qmttbn (DAC, 1997); Tbt World Bank's Umfïkc Pticrwiborr Ri~~ns inrdÜm l h p c j h s a d CWB/PCU, 1998), a d the UK Govermnent's policy statement on ÇDli/;liid Radtrcthm ad H- hùsmnm (Dm), 1999). Policy developments in Mis Pre\iention in Caaada have b a n lad by Intanab'onal Devclopment

political ecommy gains achieved in tbe course of war-to peace biansitions. At a more pragmatic level poponents of pwention bave ernpbssised the wsts of coaaict, in tams

of human suffiring . macr~le~~nornic dedine. a d pncticulariy the rising cos& of

international respoases, which might be avoided through betîer pJanneâ and more timely

preventive action In a word, peaceôui1ding has been recognised as an essentislly

"responsive" strakgy, and as such, Critiqueci as inadquate in aQdressing the root causes

of war as means of reducing its costs ta 1 0 4 anâ international commu11ia-es4=. As a

result, the confîïct prevention mode1 builds fkom peacebuilding in important ways: It

adopts a "cyclical" appoach to conflicî analysis which w longer assumes a linear passage

£hm war to pace, but recognïses the po&mthi for the recurretlce ofconfict in politically

and ecowmicaily vulnerable regions And wbereas peacebuilding strategia have aimed to

achieve long-term social and political stability a f k the end of wars, prevention involves

the implementaîion of measmes desigeed to inhibit the outbreak of violence in the nrSt place. Togeîher, the combioetion of peacebuilding and conflict prevention hss wide

ranging impiicatiom for aid pqpmmhg and management. The adoption of cyclical

conflict analysis implies thaî international interventions would be iasrrfficient if con£iaed

merely to post-conflct transitions. Preventive aid programming would need to address

pre-conflkt consideratioas more systemically, as well as developing enhanced strategies

and funding rnechanisms to manage and monitor ~m-arrfrdct situaaons (peace) more

closely. This, in turn, would imply more coherent intmdoaal intementions at deeper

institutional levels of goveniance in recipient wuutries. Taken to its logical conclusion,

wnflict prevention implies a pemanent (UNnterrtlpted?) extemai management of war and

peace in wdid-prone areas-

Much of the policy analysis on d i c t prevention is recent, and the degree to

which preventive aid sûaîegies can or will be operationalised in the near frihue is mt yet

ctear. What does appear clear however, is thaî the srlaption of preventive policy

frameworks reflects a concrete move to rationaüse d legitirnate more forcefiil e x t d

ordering efforts. A d although inter-agency divisions of labour have yet to be defined,

NGOs have already begun to identifj. pmspedve fiinctious unàer the expmded,

Research Centre working grwps urrda tbc titk A M i q/P#cr, reports of wi~Ïch can be obtained a - IDRC's demet site. 425

See fbr example Ni& Killick et al, TlLr # Carglca (London: Safmrtd/International Alert, Uarch 1998)-

241

preventive intervention Eramework. These would involve a contmued provision of social seMces a& transmission of mm, as well as the assumption of new, security-related

tasks sucû as codict and human rights monitoring, early-wambg, conflict-relatai field

research and politicai aoalysis, public sensitisation and gov-ent-targeted advOC8iCy426-

Parallel to the nwrgence of preventive aid h e w o r k s , a second policy

developrnent has involved the revïval of traditional notions of international 0 tnisteeship as a mode1 for external intervention in chronically unstable countfies. Current

variants of husteeshp thinking, as expresscd in acadernic end adMsory cïrcles, respnd

directly to concems raised by "coilapsebstatei, d y s i s end ucomjng anarchy" literatme

in the 1990s. The distinguishing factor of tnisteeship models is that they envisage the

direct undertaking, by one or more external agenciq of wiâe-raaging state functions

including securïty, justice, law enforcement, piblic SerYice provision and even rnacro- 42-7

econornic management - As such, proposed tnisteeship arrangements represent a move to unisr and formalise current aid policy trends towards more pecvaSive, penetrating and forceful modes of in-onai crisis intervention hportaatly9 the expanded range o f

state-like fhctions envisageci wouid imply that external ageuts would be requved to

exercise not only management leaâership in recipient countries, but also direct politicai

authority over local institutions and state-Society forces. Tmsteeship and its variants bave

yet to be fomiaiiy adopted by ùitemationaL organisations, wt least because of the

numerous ethical dilemmas, political liabilities and legal obstacles associated with their

implementation However, the de fado exercise of territorial busteeship powers by

international agencies is hcreasingly evïâent in cases where UN Transitionai Authorities

have been established, beginning with Carnbodia in 1992, and cuiminating more recently

in the international dibiry/civilian administration in Kosovo province and in East Timor.

Given the nature and hi& level of engagement of the international NGO sector in al1 of

these operatioas, it is reaiistic to preàict that they would emerge as organisations of choice

for delivering h i c services, engaging in communïty-lwel perocebdding, and other

424 See, for acample, Allison Van Rmy, "Civil Soaety and Corrflict Preventionn in Van Rooy

(ed.), C h d i u n h d p l l l ~ l ~ t Jhpd 1999 (ûüawm North South Instiaite, 1999), pp. 62-70; and Costy, op. a, 1998. 427

For a disaission of t r u s t d p modcls d y under consideraïon within tbc extendad poticy wmmunity, see Lmghd, op- cit, 1999; op- d, 1998.

242

forms of aorms-ûmsmïssion, should tmkesbip arrangements be f d y &pied and

apptied in the fisure-

A tbird recent policy developnent, cOflfempoianeous with the nrst two and briefly

referred to eariier in this cbapter, relates to the iacreasing usage of "pthipl&

approaches to humanitarian aid pgramming. Principled programming, aow f o d l y

implemented in Afphrinistau as part of a br&, m a d y UN ccwrdiaated, strategic aid

fnimework (but also increasingly applied in other conûict-affected regions), draws

primarily fiorn international human rights sEandaràs and apperently seeks to follow a "do

no h m " approach which recognises the potentid political and etbical conûadictioas of

humanitarian aid delivery in war-tom situations, (pdculariy its potential to prolong

codlict and therefore exacerbate himiaa ri&& abuses)- Aithough interpretations of wbet

exactly constitutes principled pgramming vary, its general application roqiiires that

humanitariin assistance mt w d i c t with oppommities for recipient groups to exercise

their £imdamenta1 human rights. Where such conditions arise, it is required that actions be

taken for the adjustment or ethirad of assistance programmes.

The advantages and shortcominp of principled programming have been tbe

subject of considerable discussion within the humanitarian policy community. Roponents

wntend tbat adherence to fimiamenta1 pnisçiples impose a measure of ethical and

practical wherence into cumplex progmmmhg situations, and provide a dêguard against

the misuse of aid for political pirposes in the midst of conflict. However, principled

programming raises some serious problems. Fint, it assumes the universal recognition and

cultural relevance of existing human rights standards- Such assumptions could meet with

resistance on the part of local waming @es and recipient communities and finthet

complicate (poIïticise) aid delivery on the ground Secondly and more importady, it

raises the question of whether the supply of vital humanitarian aid can or should be made

conditional on local adhereace to human rights standards, or whetber access to

humanitacian aid itself coastiaaes a human ri@ The fornia s-O, supported by

proponents of priacipled programming, points to the establishment of new normative

wnditionalities on aid The problem is compounded by the ambiguity and diversity of

human rights interpmtations within the domr community, which raises the spectre of

selective use and politicisation from the top. Rincipled programming provides a

potentially forcefiil tool for mtematod dowrs to use aid fm substantiai bekwioural and

institutional cbange in c o d e s fecovering h m war. As one officiai report mtes, the

concerted use of humen ri* principies sbnagtheas the leverage ofüd o ~ o n s %y

influencing actors' behavio m... by changing tbe relations between conflicting actors

(ethnic groups, the state and c i d society), and by idluencing the social and ecommic

environment in which ooaflict and pam dymmïcs take place" 428-

A fourth important policy development wnsists of men t attempts to bridge the

gap between humanitririan relief and longierm âevelojment programming in codict

affected enviroaments- Concerns about the be#nrr integration of relief and development

activities stem fiom at least two key insights gained fiom eXpeneaces with major

internaiional fesponses to wdlict over the past decade: The tht is that hmmnhrian

~rogramming has not in al1 cases provideci the emabling coraditions for a smooth p~sage

towards the irnplementaîïon of longer-tenn development strategies- On the conhary, relief

delivery has often been found to delay development by perpetuating conflictual dyuamics,

and to lack strategic hkages with longer-term planning £îamew~rks~~~. Second,

development analysts have long argued that long-terni developmeat planning inheredy

aims at sustainable soci~le~~mmic growth and overall improvements of social stability in

recipient couutries. Successful developmenî is identicai to peacebuilding and the

prevention of f h r e conflicts, since deveIopmenîal outcomes raise local d e s in

peace and Limit incentives for the continuation of violence. Both sets of feasoning have

prompted an increasing emphasis within the aid community on the concept of

"developmental relief", whereby humanitarian interventions are increasingly made to fit

planning frameworks for long-term political , social and economic development

Calls for the application of 'developmatal relief models are consistent with otha

plicy developments descri'bed above, particularly as concerns the growing insistence on

the need for more coherent and strategically colordinated fhmeworks of international

intervention. At the same tirne, critical oôservers have pointed out tbat concrete steps to

integrate relief a d developtneia may ovenide objective distinctions ktwan the two

types of activity- In tum, this may bave far reaching implications for the baiance of power

between d o m and recipient couniries mer long-term development agenda-settiag- This

critical argumeat is laid in two msin points: First, whereas relief must be marte to operate

as a "neutral" tool designeci to respond to acine human needs at cntical junctures,

development p m ~ ~ u i g is inberently a political activity involvïng the long-term,

authoritative allocation of riesources, based both on social needs and on the interplay of

domestic politid forces Sewaad. whereas relief is (by definition) necessenly pmvided

fiom outside sources, naîional development is an indigenous process which draws fiom intemal energies and resources. Development thereby requires a restoration of national

local institutions, sutficient to take a 1egitÜnat.e and authoritative lead in the long-tenn

management of nationai developent policy. To the extent tbat the 'datelopmentai relief

approach aeglects these fimiamenta1 distinctions, it poses the ri&, on one hand, of fuaher

politicising humanitanan aid (by linlâng it into the political proces of national

development). On the other hanci, it threatens to weaken the indigenous character of

development planning @y linking the latter increasùigly to extet118Uy dnven humanitarian

programming mechanisms), with predictably adverse consequences for national

ownership of: national authority over, and national accountability for curreut and h m 430

development policy choices . In sum, the "developmental relief' mode1 potentially

tramfers poütical authority over development agendas away h m nationai institutions and

increasingly into the han& of externai humanitarian adors. Furthemore, it has been

argued that since relief activities will continue, for the foreseeable fllhire, to be led by

private, non-govemtnental actofs, the adveat of "deve1opmeuîa.i relief" is emb1ematic of

moves towards the privatisation of long-term naîional development agendas431.

Each of these four policy developments is a refiection of serious programmatic

dilemmas and setbacks experienced by practitioners, anal- aad rnakers of aid policy.

Each responds to legitllnate concerns about the perfomance and uitimate efféctiveness of

429 See Reginald Herbold Green a d Ismail Ahmed Tehabilitation, sutahable Peaœ and

Development: T m & F--- in Tltild Worlil (Vol. 20, No. l), 1999, ~ 8 . 189-206-

43 1 Macrea, op. cit., 1998, pp. 12-19; and h k r w , ïMEetd and Bndbuiy et aï, op. cit., 1997. Macrea, op. at, 1998, pp. 13.

245

large scale humanitarian interventions, a d tnmslates into a general wish to achieve better

programme cohemxe and bette? resuits in the field Taken togehx, however, they

follow a similar appmach to wnflict and post-conflict situations which involves

incfeasingly comphensÎves penetmhg, forcefiil and pemianent forms of internaîional

intervention. Signüïamtly h m the Gtamscian standpoint, these models also appear to - *

involve increasiagly integmted combinrnions of hknmtionai political, nrbninistrative,

socioeconomic and military wntrol (state-proper) and strategies for noms-transmission

and legitimation of exteraal a\ahority through societal intewention (civil society/extended

state). To the extent that they cohere with prevailing blueppiats for a liberalid, rights-

based and market-onented global orda h m which national state authority is increasingly

absent, they may be understood as CO-1 and pmgnunmatic building blocs for

contemporary he$emo~c wmtruction

Civil Societv and Socio-Economic Chan= in Mozambiaue.

Admittedly, peace is in all cases preferable to war. The contn'bububon of

humanitarian NGOs to building and seeking to stabilise the post-war political ewnomy in

Mozambique has been caRied out on this premise. At the same thne, the desirabiiity and

quality of peace must be assessed on its own terms, and not merely compareci agakt the

devastation of war. The new political and economic order in Mozambique, B e the war

economy More if bas its social +ers and losers, and foreigu organisatons canwt take

for granted that the passage nom the first condition (war) to the second (peace) will

automatidly enlarge the social winners* circle.

Likewise, hegemonic construction need not be subjected merely to an ethical or

ideological critiqye. As my discussion in the second section of this study bas sought to

point out, hegemonic projects reflect social ordering processes that are contingent upon,

and at the same time aim to shape and manage* the structure of social and economic

relations w i t h . a society. In Mozambique, hegemonic pojects have varied in content and

orientatio~ Ultimaîeiy, hegemonic or- and the sociozcoaomic stnihires of peace

which they support and reproduce, must be assessed wntextually, in terms of what they

mean and what potential they offer to most people: Wbat levels of material hardship or

benefit do they impose? How wide is the c h l e of interests which they reflect? What

opportunities do they provide for individual and coilective advancement? What provision

do they meLe for meaoiagful seKaetermïna!ion and social empowemneat? And

fec~gnisuig, as Cox bas mted, that civil society is both "an agent of stabilisation and

reproduction, a d poîential agent of transformatio~~~~, how equipped axe the "trenches

and earthworks" of civil society, in which orders are ultùnately rooted and contested, to

mobilise and bring about change? How disposed are they toward the maintenance and

reproduction ofthe status quo? The remainder of this côapter briefly reviews the strucnaal

challenges posed for most people by the l i i peace in Mozambique, and in the absence

of any serious prospects for signiI?cmt structural c h g e , considers options for national

and international cml society forces to engage more fully and progressïvely in the

country's pst-war soc i~ le~~nomic develojment

Many observers of the post-war transition, dong with many Mozambicaas, bave

commented tbat life coadiaous for large segments of the population have remaïned

extremely difficuit since the end of the war, and in some cases have f k k r ckterioraed

Indeed, basic sacid iadicators at the end of the 1990s did not a m enwuraging. Despite

much aid, siistained inteml reform and strong ecunomic growth, Momnbique continued

to rank towaràs the very bottom the 1999 UNDP Human Developrnent Index (1. out of

174 countries). Atter neady a decade of peace, 70% of Mozambiauis lacked access to

health care services, while only 39% of the population could expect to reach 40 years of

age. Overall adult ïlliteracy hovend at some W h (75% for women), and under4ive child 433

mortaliîy was at over 20% .

Debt financing consumed over halfof the annuai gov-ent budget, a d remains

heavily dependent on new international lending Strict limits on public spending, imposed

jointly by the international debt burden and by aggressive ad-inflation measures, have

curbed capital investments in the social sectors and in inhstructure, both of whici

continue to d e p d on intexnational aid Outside of a semi-@tory informal market and

some NGO prograames, redit for Mozambicans, essential to revitalking the country's

niral economy and rnanufkctmhg base, was largely unavailable. Accelerated privatisation . -

aod restructuring of public sector companies eliminsted tais of thousads of industrial

432

433 COX, OP- cit., 1999, W. 4-5. UNDP Human Dtnlopmcnt Rcport, 1999 (Inciex Tables).

247

jobs, while few Mozambicans seemed positioned to take advantage of the opprtdties at

hand As a resdt, pivatised assets were increasïngly co~'~ntraîed in no~~-Mozambican

bands. For its part, privaîe foreign direct investment has txen heavily concentrated in

high yield areas of the 8conorny valued by regional and global markets, but not

necessarily wmspoadiog to the longer-term developmental meds of the country as a

whole,

A local entrepreneurid class, a key component of h i - s a t i o n , bas been slow to

emerge due to adverse ecommic pessures. Real incows for most people have falien

consistently, while prices of basic consumer commodities have risen, hming the salaricd

middle classes especiaily bard and forcing many to seek additional income through the

secondary markets or. more seriously through generatised cotrclptiom The

elunination of minimum pice thresholds as plut of economic stabilisation, and a tenâency

towards monopoly buyîng by city traders, hs meant that rural tems of trade have steaâily

declined since the nim of the dccde (requiring férmers to produce ahost twice the

quantity of crops to buy the seme basket of nnisheù goods), leeding to their de facto

irnpoverishment- The vulnerability of rurai populations to external shocks, ïncludiag

global market fluctuations and naturaï alamities, remains hi&. At the t h e of the peace,

prospects appeared particuiarly discouraging for many of the 95 000 ex-cornbatants re-

entering the postwar economy. According to one nirvey, 40% of ex-soldien were

illiterate at the time of demobilisation, and 90.A had gained no profdonai qualifications 434

prior to entering rnilitary life . Several international initiatives have sought, with some

success, to assist former fighters h u g h vocational and literacy training, and the

distribution of fàxm implements anci credits. At the same tirne, a 1998 UN study of illicit

drug traffickïng in Maputo found that lû?? of ex-soldiers surveyed had entered the dnig

tr;id$)? Violent aime rose dramaticaUy in the y- a f k the General Peace Accord,

mainly as a result of urban and nwl impoverishment, high mernployment, a wide

circulation of weapons and, ironicaily, better geographical mobility brought on by the

peace. At the same tirne, public security became increasingiy compro~xüsed by low police 436

salaries and govermuent corruption -

434

43s UNRISD, op. &, 1996, p. 15. This infôtmmioa was obtaiaad with permission hom zarrvey mtcs ofthe UN Dnig ControI

Programme in 1998, 436

UNRISD, op. ck, 1996, p. 17.

A return to war almg old lines is imlikely, but chronic social distress and . . cnminalisatïon of substantial psits of Maambique's postwar political ecommy appemd,

by the end of 1997, to bave become the mm. A mid-19% monitoring siuvey conducted

by the Organisation for International Migration identifiai 25 districts, including principal

urban centres, to be "at hi@ risk of iastsbility" and another 34 districts as " d g 437

situationsw . Organisai armed movements were widely reported to be active in remote

parts of Mozambique in 1996, in some ceses with cross-border connections into neighbo-g countries, and may begin to acquire a local ethmc territorial base mted in

matenal di~contest~~~. At the end of 19%, the resident coimtry direcbr of one innuentïal

intemational NGO issued a cautionary waming aga* the anergence of a

LJawless society wbre the only things that d e are money and guns. And that is what it is beginning to look like right now. You bave well documented situations tbat show thaî in a war society there are winaers, lots of losers but also winners. War is highly lucrative, vay attractive for certain people especiaily if you can keep it away

439 fiom where you iive. War caa becorne a f'ajrly decent proposition -

Likewise, Colin Leys wmed in late 1997, that "if conditions become too extreme,

[local] solidarities cm become last resort defences apainst disaster, based on ethnicity or even on violent forms of atavistic bonding, as in the smzalied rebel amies of teenagers in

Mozambique and Northern Uganda, M d together by fiar and forced complicityn*. As

recentiy as May 2000, Renamo members in Zambezia have reportedly begun forming

'%rigades who are creating distiirbances in various parts of the province", leading to 441

arrests in several districts -

Clearly there is no question ihat political settlement ôetween the warring parties

has been concretely felt throughout the country. The General Peace Agreement was

suçcessfui in bnnging one of the Afncan continent's most destructive and drawnaut civil

437 Intetaationai Orgaiiisatim €br Mïgrstion, rrC A ~ ~ I s af in Mozrndiqire

AM^ 38 R w ) , M.pd031996-

439 UNRISD, op. àt., 1996, p- 18.

440 Interview, Dkector, CARE Interaatiod, Maputo, Odobcr 19%.

441 Coiin Leys, "Colin Leys Replies" in S a d e m AEicrr, &ptw (VOL 12, No. 4), 1997, p- 22- "RENAMO Mcmbers Arrested By Motbmbican Poüœ", Panaf3can News An- 1Cçay 2,2000 .

wars to a conclusive end. In aiany iastanceg vital truispoit linlrs and eaergy have been

restored for the first time in y-- b?emal trade, travel and ~0mmunïcrdi0~1~ between

town and country bave teMved, Agricdtural production cycles are a0 longer at risk of

military or political disuptiov~ Socially, a penmive aversion to political wnflict and, above all, a generaiïsed desk for s o c i ~ n o m i c normalisation have enableci thousanâs

of displaced commmities to revive locel production systems and engage in peacefhl

subsistence activities. Yet for most people, the peace dMdend in Mozambique is mder sustained pressure h m stnictural coostraints on human and social secrority. Having

endured and sucviveci the multiple hardships of civil conflict, the majority of

Mozambicans mw face powerful new challenges in their efforts to build sustainable

livelihoods. These challenges are pervasive and not as easily identifid as a govemwnt

detachment or rebel raidhg force may once have been, but they are no less cormete.

As âiscussed in Chspters 6 and 7, humanitarian NGOs have been integraily

associateci with the wnstruction of a liberal politicai ecommy in Mozambique. A key

element of this work bas been to promote the emergence ofa local civil society t h wodd

function as stabilising force supportive of the ww order. Yet as it mw stands,

Mozambique's extenally-generated civil society appears to have Little in the way of

resources or organisational capcity in order to help tedress current social imbalances-

This is partly due to the magnitude of the challenges in question, and prtly to the acute

shortages of fun&, equipment and local human capital mth *ch iiatiooal civil society

organisations must operate. Indaed, six years into the peace and with few available local

sources of inwme, either public or private, the dependency of national NGOs and local

associations on exîemal aid sti1l hovered between 90 to 1ûû%.

At the sarne time, the weaEaiess of the new civil society in independdy

addressing core governance issues and helping to shape the fuhue course of national

development camot be dissoci~ated h m some of the more perverse dynamics of

humanitarian assistame de-: These have iacluded a fhgmentation of socid sector

management, acute fimding cornpetition, and a tendency for national organisations to

identie more easily with externai donor programmes or NGO projets than with local

constituemies or issws of collective public interest. More importantly, the weakness may be found in the Liberal design itself: The effects of d e r a t e d pluralisation w i t h the civil

sector have been to d e n , wt strengthen, the aoileaive -al power needed to respond

politically to pressing economic challenges, and may in fhct serve as a fkamework for

m e r national hgmentation and sporadïc violence. Iadead, there bave been severaï

repom ~01l-g the formaton of "NGOs" with cthnic and temtorial aspirations in

some parts of the countryu2. The uncritical adoption by some of the most prominent

national NGOs of prevailiag 11- values, Pad their unqwd~ning embrace of extemally-

produced peace and development models, presentiy maLes difEi:cuit any form of commoq

organïsed respome to the socidy problemaiic, and potentially destabilising, structural

contradictions embedded in the peace.

Ta move beyond coping d engage more wostnictively in the development of an

equitable and sustainable peace in Mozambique, civil society organisations would have to

distance themselves nOm current practices and begin to consider alteniative options for

action Invariably this would involve making ciifficult pracUcal choices relating not only

to their fimding prospects, but their very social identity ami purpose within the ongoing

transition. As a f h t step, Mozambican civil society wodd have to be progressively de-

coupled fkom the current aid £ramework , that is, fiom the mual donor programmes and

short-tenn budget lines which, par la force des choses, it bas grown up so closely to

reflect This would lower the level of cornpetition amoag local NGOs and associations,

and help to foster stronger, more substantive intelledual and operationai links and

solidarities within and across their respective areas of action. Importantly, it would enable

them to interact more freely with their local constituencies, draw more directly fiom them,

and thus better tailor themselves to represent local views and interests.

Likewise, national NGOs wuid positively contribute to the fornation and dissemination of an alternative, locally informed, body of practical and scientific research,

on the b i s of which to formulate new development strategies appropriately designed to

identiSr, study and respond to the structural deficiencies of the 11- peace. In this

442 Magode and Khan (op. cit., L9%, 9-97.) hrve ideniÏiied as civic ossociatioas: PROTETE,

which is linked to "social s p a d cancans in cenb.l Mozambique; ASSANA, "with interests in the tedorial dominion of tbe Makm ethnicity"; ADESSO, repmsemhg the rebel-linked Ndau ethnicity; SOTEMAZA, "worlang to (re)buiid tbt id* of the SeMg; a d NGYANA "concerned to d@aad tbe idcatity and persoarlity of tbe Ronga". Intertstingly, at lcast thme of these orgaaiSao*oas have meivcd finrncid support h m int-onal donors and NGOs (Interviews, ADESSO, Food for the Enuigry, Beira and Maputo, 1995-6-

2!5l

respect, their cumnt &fi& in technicd and human capcity would have to be brïdged by

creaîively and strategicaily forging new alliances outride of the NGO commuaity

narrowiydefined, includïng labour unions and peasan~ associations but also nationai

minides, the wersity system and local technical instmaes. Crucially; Mommibicsn

organisations would select their intemational NGO pattners more critidy, on the besis of

their programmatic profile and orientation, as opposed to the money they have to offer.

Addressing the stnictural i a c o 1 1 s i ~ e s of the peacetime politicai economy

means aiming at the heart of the liberal project, its tradc and iïtmcial =@mes, debt

management pmcess, and secununty fhmework as well as its expaoduig biowledge

structure and penetrating normative system. Tbe task at hand would seem insurmomîable

to a fledgling, post-conflict civil society, and indeed in this enterprise Mozambican NGOs

camiot go it al- Here, in-onal civil society partne wealthy, influential and

globally interconnected such as they now stand, are solidly pmitioned to support

progressive Mozambican dissemination and mobilisation initiatives, and to

bettcr hamess the national biowledge base, its wncems and pro@ solutions, in the

formulation of progressive and @table development agendas- For international NGCk

working in support of postconfïict transitions tbis would requirr hard choices as well: It

would mean identifjing local partners and building local alliances more critically, and

attempting to replace current humanitarian crisis management paradigms with more

coherent, conflict-sensitive, long-terrn human development stmtegïeses It wuld also si@

severing some links at the top, engaghg in stronger public advoc8cy to influence aid

policy towards altemative forms of developnenf adopting stricter d e s of conduct .- . .

concerning No0 involvement in donor-Med aid programmes, and possibly aostauiiag

fiom intavention altogether.

How realistic is it for NGOs to consider such options in the current climate of

globalisation? At pesemt, international civil society appears increasingly central to global

processes of both wntinuity and change. On one band, BfOadhead has summarjsed recent

NGO experiences in Mozambique, and their role in the aid process more generally, by

o b s e ~ n g -y that "civil society appears increasingiy like a tame force intended to play

a role in the maintenance of the system rather tban as an arena for the interplay of

legitimate ckmadsmu3. Aad yet at the same time, civil -ety organisations bave

acquired new influe~ice as legitunate components of the global govemance hmework,

and rendered thnaselves indispnsabie to the pocess "of negotiation and re-negotiabon

of the structure of North-South relations"? Their collective potentiel to counteract and

generate viable altematives ta likral govemance models would sean greater than before.

In recent years, a wi& range of social movernents a d intemt groups have becorne

increasingly active in identifjing and mobilising around key social and developmental

concems r a i d by gbbalisatiotl, Recent media coverage at global e c o d c summits

would indicate tbat transnational civil cditions bwe g a d d l y begun to shift public

attention away fiom isolated, issue-specinc debates of the 1990s (the enviro~ment,

gender, human rights, population p w t h and so on), towacdS a stronger and more direct

focus on the core economic mecbanisms of the Ii"beral project (trade, finance7 iavestment,

international debt, bio-techno1ogy)- By directly challenging the modalities of global

production and exchange* civil society movements are, perhaps for the fint time since the

end of the wld war, beginniag to tuga the essential stnichwl d e - u p of the global

political economy.

The fundamental dichotomy between civil movements supportive of world order

and those which challenge it underscores the original Gramscian understanding of civil

society as a terrain of iâeological wnfiict Contmting ideological positions. in turn,

reflect concrete divisions within the prevailing structure of socibeconomic relations. Cox

has recetltly noted that although ttaditiod class structures are rapidly evolving within the

contemporary global politicai economy, clear hierarchical divisions and relations of power

have emerged, particularly between minority social categories which are matedly

integrated &O the globaiisation ptocess and those, in the majority, who are increasingly

bypassed or marginalised by h The numerical weight of the Iatter suggests that aid NGOs

and other civil organisations may inCfe8Siagly nad themselves Qawa to a "nahwl" global

constituency nom which to draw support and legitimacy for collective social action. At

the same time, Cox cautions that efforts on the part of progressive civil socieîy forces to

build morne- for global sociolecommic change from the bottom up -what wouid in

443 Lee Aane B m a d k d , "Commissioning Con-: Giobalisation d Global ûovcnmncc" in

1- 444

Jowncd,(Vd.IA,No.4)1996, p.661. Woodhouse, op .&, 1996, p, 13 1.

253

praaice amount to a "cornter-hegemonic blockn- are Wrely to encounter major .

withintbe poentïal "global coostmceacy" challenges: Material and political htemsts itsetf

&e highly difkÙsed a d diversifieci, and thus suscepaile to in- subdivisions h g

national, ethnie, religious7 pmfeSSi01181, popdist and eco-c lines- The strategic

challenge therefoze, is to seek to iden* and articulate cocmtervailing cornmon interests

generated by giobal Iiberalisation &self, or, in the words ofcox:

IT]o bridge the differences among the vanvanety of groups of didwantaged so as to brhg about a common Mderstaading of îhe nature and coasequences of globalisation and to devise a common strategy towards subordinating the workl economy to a

445 regime of social equity -

The role of critical analysis, in imtiating dialogue and Mtat ing communicaîio~~s

among diverse marginaiised groupings, is important if such common understandings are to emerge Givea its global geographical presenœ, tmnmatioaal lcnowledge networks and

privileged access into local social nelities, the intemational NGO wmmunïty is

strategicaliy positioned to pmduce kmwiedge on the implications of globalisation, which

would be of universal value, and which in turn muid provide a starting point for

generating aiteniative models of development

For their pars humanim.an NGOs d tikely continue to be f d with the

imrnediate imperatives of responding to acute himian crises. Arguably, the pressures of

short-term emergency and reco~lst~ction work undercut theh poteritid to engage in a

long-term reorientation of global politid d ecowmic 7. And yet, the case of

Mozambique positively illustrates that hummitarian action can be centrai in settiag the

tone and direction of subsequent dmlopnent efforts More criticai analytkal, opemtional

and perhaps also ethicai attention to the smictinal dynamics of post-COII£Iict recovery, in

both their global and local dunensions, may belp avert the worst consequences of

accelerated liberal development, M e providing vital insights for aitemative comrnon strategies.

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AGENCY-AUTEORED REPORTS AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

ACORD. aevr3qpwrit in Con/lù#2a Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper 5. London: OU- April 1995.

African American htitute, CCAcfvda: Que Papl.Pant as ONGs Locais" and Monitrizaçao e AvPliaçao & Rojectos: Um Maoual para as ONGs Locais". Maputo, 1995-6,

Centro dos Estudos f i c a n o s , "Relatorio final do seminario sobre a Lei e d~volvimento das ONGs nacionais". Maputo, 1995.

Chr. Michelsen Iwti-Me, Evulrrodon of Nonvegh Am- P&ce. Rewncüh&n d Rehabihtbm iri MoI.ndlque Report #4-97. Betgen, CMUMimstry of Foreign Affairs, 1997.

Department for Inteniatiod Developmenî, PdZcy SWtmenwnt on ConJlid Re&dbn anâ Eu- AssZstance, hadon, 1999.

European Cominission, Pikrsc II Counhy Repos MoLPmbiQu~' EYOIUrrtion of the I m p G e m e e n of the B*tt Una BI-3210 "Assbmwe to Rekûdktw ' n Progranvnes in Sowthem Af&am .nd B7d410 YRehabühthn in AU Uo@i icg Counhies, ACP Scron" HnancUtl Y i 19944997, Bmsels, 1998.

European Commission. D & d of Cblllllyinky Resourcc~ AwiZobk for H11411~ing the ad^ of NC&- Bnissels, 1997.

European Commission, Unking R a R&a&d&&m ud Devdopment Bmsels, 1996-

European C o d , Civllullon Pdtibn on CorrfUct R d o n ul Raelvaron In AfriCa- Bnissels, 1997.

European Union Delegatioo, "NGO Oewl F i h g Systemw @aîabme) Maputo, 1998.

European Union, "Compe~um of Donorin. Maputo, 1998.

GTZ: 'cDemocrathîion and Development in Mozambique: The Role of Non-

IOM/OIM: "After One Year: The Status of Reintegation in Mozambiquen. Maputo, 1996.

L D K : "Who's Doing Whaî Where: hventory of NOOS in Mozambique" (Database). Maputo, 1 9%.

LINK, c'Draft Response to the New NGO Law". Maputo, October 1996.

LINK, B o l e h Momativo das ONGs Moçambicarias. No- 1. Maputo, 1995-

Mozambique Ministry of Finance and Planning, "Financiamento Extemo em 19%, For Tipo de Ajuda em Milhoes de Dolares Americanosnn Maputo, 1999.

Mozambique Mïnistry of Finance and Planning, "Plano Econ&co e Social para 1998". Maputo, 1997.

Mozambique Minisûy of Foreign M a ù s and Coloperation, 'Draft Decree on the Activities of NGOs in the Republic of Mozambique". Maputo, 1995.

National Democratic Institute for International AfErs, "Manual de Refefecncia Para Formadores de Educaçao Civican. Maputo, 1996.

ODA/MiD, "Mozambique: Country Aïd Programnie Statementn. Maputo, 19%.

OECD/Development Assistance Commimmittee, "ODA Receipts and Selected Indicators for Developing Countries and Temtories". Paris, 1999.

OECDiDevelopment Assistance Cornmittee, Cbnllicr, Peace anâ Devdopment A s s m e on tke TkskoId 4th 21H Cèntury. Development Co-operation Guidelims Series, Paris, 1998.

OECDiDevelopment Assistance Cornmittee, GÙUWMS on Con/rict, Pevace ami Development -n Paris, 1997-

OXF'AM/Saferworld, "Psrbiership 2000: The Future of EU-ACP Relations and Conflict Prevention". London, September 1997.

Save the Children Fimd wMombique Country Strategy -1997". Mapito, 19%.

üNDP Human Develapment Report, 1999.

üNDP 1994-95 Country Report "Development Co-operation: Mozambique". Maputo, 1996.

UNDP3 "DHA Trust Fimd Rojects Scbedule of Balancesn. Maputo* 1996.

UNHCR, "Rebuilding a War-Tom Society: A Review of the UNHCR Reintegration Prognunme for Morrmbcan Refiigeesnn hdaputo, 1996.

UNHCR, "Review of the UNHCR Reintegration Programme in Mozambique". Maputo* 1995.

UNHCR, ''Reintegration Strategy". WorLing Paper- Maputo* 1994.

UNICEF, Trofile of Domsw- Maputo3 1996.

Unidade Tecnica para a R v des Empesas (UTRE), "Rivatisation in Mozambique, 1998: Comlidating the Gainsn- Information BulIetin No. 5, Maputo, 1998.

UNOHAC, ''Consolidated Humanitarian Assistance Rognunme 1992-94: Final Report". Maputo, 1 995.

UNOHAC/UNSCERO, Financiai Summaries May 199 1 -January 1995.

UNOHAC (Sofàla), Monthly Reports, May 1993-August 1994 (UNDP Archives). Maputo, 19%-

UNRISD, f'War Tom Societies Project Mozambique Finai Reportn. Maputo, March 1997.

UNRISD, ''Mgambique: Imagent do Pais", War Tom Societies Project, Maputo7 1996.

USAID, "Assistance to Mozambiquen Maputo, 1996.

USAID, "A Pre-Design Stuây for PVO Support II Projectn, Maputo, 1994.

World Bank, C o n m Pnvsnijo~ ond Past-Cionflid RewlLdCUCtiOn.- P- and Prospas Washington D.C., 1998-

INTERVIEWS AND RESEARCE SüPPORT

National Programme Director/ Nationai NGO Liaisan Directsr, MÏnistry of Social WeIfare , Maputo; Director, Depratment of NOOs, Minisûy of Foreign Main and Ct~)~oa lNat ionaI Planning Commission, Maputo; Senior Researcber, Bpmîment of NOOs, Ministry of Foreign ~~ aud Cooperation(Natioaal Planning Commission, Maputo; Director, National Professionai Reintegration Programme, Ministry of Hdth, Maputo. Provincial Director, Deputment of Social WeJh7 Beira; Provincial Director, Provincial Planning Commission, Beira; Provincial Director, v e n t of Disaster Preventiioo, &ire; District Administrator a d Departmencal Directors, Gomngosa district; Distnct Administnitor and Depertmedal Directors. party delegates* Caia district; Disbict Administrator and Departmentai Directors, Traditional Authority Representatives, Renarno Delegate (Chiramba), Chemba &strict; District Administrator and Departmental Directors, Milange district

ActionAïd (UC) Action Nord-Sud (France) . .

Action Contre la Faim (France) Afncan American Institute (USA) Associaçao dos Deslocados de Sofala (Mi) Adventist Developmemt and Relief Agency (üSA) AFRICARE (USA) Associaçao Moçanbicana dos Deslocados de Guerra (Mz) Associaçao Moçanbieacÿi para Reintrgraçao e sa (Mi) Associazione Italiana per Io Sviluppo ( M y ) Associaçao da Mulher Rural (Mz) Aro Juvenil (Mz) AR0 Solidarity (Sweden) Associaça0 Educaçao de Meninos (Mz); A-an North South Institute CARE (International) Comite Espanol para la Ayuda a los Refugiados (Spain) CONCERN (Ireland) CUAMM (Italy) Freidrich Ebert Foundation (Gerrnany) Food for the Hmgry Intemationai WSA) Hanicap International (France) IwL- W) LINK Forum das ONGs (Mz) Liga Moçambicana dos Direitos Humanos (Mz) Lutheran World Federation (USA) Mennonite central cornmittee (USA) Movimento L i i o n e e Sviluppo (Italy)

m

Norwegian Re* C o d Forway) National Dernomatic Wute (USA) Medecins sans hntieries (Fraace/8elgium/SpaUi) Oxfiun-UKAreland PRoGRESSO (Mi) Population Services Internationai (USA) Redd Barna (Sweden) R e c o n c i i i ~ R e i n t e ~ R e a b i l i t a ç a o (Mz); Save the Children F d SkiUshare Afnca (WC) Trocaùe (Ireland) Worl d Relief International World Vision Intemational VetAid (UK) ZOA Refigee Care (Netherlands)

Bilateral and Multiknl Donor Agtncks

High Commission of the United Kingdom High Commission of Canada Embassy of ftaly Embassy of Sweden Europeaa Union Dele@-on United States Agency for international Development World Bank United Nations Development Programme United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees