'"Freedom" vs. "Morality" – On Orthodox Anti-Westernism and Human Rights,'

EASTERN CHRISTIAN STUDIES 13

ORTHODOX CHRISTIANITYAND HUMAN RIGHTS

Edited byAlfons Brüning and Evert van der Zweerde

PEETERSLEUVEN – PARIS – WALPOLE, MA

2012

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CONTENTS

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V

Introduction: Orthodox Christianity and Human Rights — An Ambig-uous Relationship (Alfons Brüning, Evert van der Zweerde) . . . . 1

1. CLAIMING UNIVERSALITY

The Religious Scope of Human Rights (Johannes A. (Hans) van der Ven) 19

Uneasy Alliances: Liberal, Religious and Philosophical HumanRights Discourse (Evert van der Zweerde) . . . . . . . . 35

Natural Law and Natural Rights according to Vladimir Solovyovand Jacques Maritain (Elena Pribytkova) . . . . . . . . . 69

2. DIFFERENT CIVILIZATIONS?

Humanism and the Traditional Orthodox Culture of EasternEurope: How Compatible were They in the 16th and 17th Centuries? (Mikhail V. Dmitriev) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

From “Natural Law” to the Idea of Human Rights in 18th-CenturyRussia: Nobility and Clergy (Tatiana Artemyeva) . . . . . . 111

“Freedom” vs. “Morality” — On Orthodox Anti-Westernism andHuman Rights (Alfons Brüning) . . . . . . . . . . . 125

3. CENTRAL TERMS

Human Rights in the 2008 Bilateral Discussions of the RussianOrthodox Church with the Evangelical Church of Germany and theEvangelical Lutheran Church of Finland (Heta Hurskainen) . . . 155

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VIII CONTENTS

Sergey N. Bulgakov’s Concept of Human Dignity (Regula Zwahlen) . 169

The ‘We’ in Normative Political Philosophical Debates: The Positionof Christos Yannaras on Human Rights (Kristina Stoeckl) . . . 187

4. CHURCHES, VALUES AND SOCIETAL REALITY

Religiosity, Tolerance and Respect for Human Rights in the OrthodoxWorld (Christopher Marsh and Daniel Payne) . . . . . . . 201

Human Rights — the Orthodox Churches’ Teaching and SurveyData (Inna Naletova) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215

Official and Unofficial Voices of the Russian Orthodox Church:Analyzing Human Rights in Official Documents and PersonalInterviews (Maija Turunen) . . . . . . . . . . . . 237

5. CHURCH – STATE – SOCIETY

Human Rights and Religious Rights: the Context of the Debate inEurope Today and the Orthodox Perspective (Philip Walters) . . 253

The Russian Orthodox Teaching on Human Rights: its Socio-CulturalSignificance and its Social Theory Perspective (Alexander Agadjanian) . 271

Human Rights and their Reception in Orthodoxy — a RomanianPerspective (Radu Preda) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

Bulgarian Orthodoxy and the European Court of Human Rights:The Case of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church(Daniela Kalkandjieva) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

6. ACTIVISM AND REFLECTION

“Human Rights as a Pre-Condition for the Inner Life of theChurch” — Life, Initiatives and Theology of Father Pavel Adelheim(Pskov, Russia) (Paul Baars) . . . . . . . . . . . . 337

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CONTENTS IX

Spiritual and Political Dimensions in the Conception of the Rus-sian Orthodox Church Concerning Dignity, Freedom, and HumanRights (Marina Shishova) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351

General Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391

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“FREEDOM” VS. “MORALITY” — ON ORTHODOX ANTI-WESTERNISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Alfons BRÜNING

Orthodox critical comments on Human Rights frequently identify these as something originally and purely Western. Comments on the issue often mix at least two perspectives: one is concerned with the sec-ularity of the Human Rights concept; the other contests its universality. While the first is to be seen as a rather natural phenomenon in case of a religious institution in relation to the “metaphysical neutrality” of Human Rights, the second perspective is much less clear. It is often built on long-living stereotypes of anti-Westernism and anti-Latinism, which in comparison with fruitful theological comments lack an equally concise methodological foundation. Consequently, this second perspective forms a quasi-ideological and thus potentially serious obstacle to an other-wise promising dialogue between Orthodox theology and the theory of Human Rights.

Introduction

According to many voices from the “Orthodox World”, Human Rights are a specifically Western thing: they are rooted in Western “liberal values” and grounded on rationalism and individualism, the latter being tendencies in the history of ideas that all finally appeared during the Enlightenment, i.e. an epoch that, in itself, is a historical phenomenon typical for what can be distinguished as “Western civilization”. Conse-quently, from this perspective it would be useless, if not dangerous, to adopt Human Rights without more or less radical alterations for any non-Western society shaped fundamentally by a different culture or civ-ilization. It is these latter terms — “culture” or “civilization” — that frequently appear in the corresponding debates, together with the argu-ment that Human Rights are a specific outcome of Western civilization. However, this argument is rarely accompanied by any further reflection on its theoretical basis, answering fundamental questions as: What is a “civilization”? How do civilizations differ, where are the borders

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between them to be assessed exactly, and how does this refer to the claim of Human Rights to universality?

Of course, the debate about the universality of Human Rights is as old as the concept itself and as its contemporary manifestations, e.g. the UDHR.1 The Orthodox, laymen and hierarchs alike, thus merely enter a debate that already exists for quite a while. However, when doing so they make use of a series of their own points of critique of “the Latin West.” There exist a number of specifics in Orthodox voices on Human Rights, which have to do partly with the antagonism between churches and their religious teaching and a secular concept, while for another part they coincide with long established anti-Western, or, more precisely, anti-Latin stereotypes. This essay tries to examine the discourse as it is developed by persons speaking with an explicitly Orthodox voice, be they clergymen or influential lay people.

This paper is not about answering the afore-mentioned questions on what a “civilization” is, or where its limits and divisions are (an under-taking that borders on hubris within the scope of an article), but about exploring the place and function of such questions within the highly confusing context of Orthodox anti-Westernism, which latter can best be exemplified in the issue of Human Rights. I will argue, in particular, that in Eastern Christian, or Orthodox, anti-Westernism there can be found effectively (at least) two discourses mixed with each other: one is that about the Human Rights concept’s claim to universality, regardless of any possible cultural context of their application; the other concerns the theological distinction between the realm of the Church and the sphere of “this world,” i.e. the spheres of the sacred and the secular, in other words, the secularity of the Human Rights concept.

Generally speaking, anti-Western voices in what might be called the Orthodox world come in a whole variety of forms, ranging from rather un-reflected but widespread expressions of distrust and rejection to highly elaborated intellectual frameworks, e.g. the writings in the tradi-tion of 19th-century Russian slavophilism, Serbian concepts such as that of Justin Popovic, or the Greek nea orthodoxia and especially Christos Yannaras.2 Quite often, they take the Human Rights issue as a specific

1 Cf. Stephen P. Marks, ‘From the “Single Confused Page” to the “Decalogue for Six Billion Persons”: The Roots of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the French Revolution,‘ Human Rights Quarterly 20, 1998, no. 3, pp. 459-514, with extensive docu-mentation of this debate.

2 On the variety of Orthodox anti-Western attitudes see also the recent article by Vasilios N. Makrides, ‘Orthodox Anti-Westernism Today: A Hindrance to European


“FREEDOM” VS. “MORALITY” 127

and representative element for the entire theme of how to cope with the alleged threat of “Westernization.”

A few examples may serve to introduce the topic of Anti-Westernism and Human Rights. (Many further examples can be found in other articles in this volume.) The former Archbishop of Athens and all Greece, the late Christodoulos, called them a “new deity”:

[…] the forces of Darkness cannot stand it [that Greece is a predominantly Orthodox country – A.B.], and for this reason they want to decapitate it [Greece – A.B.] and flatten everything, by means of globalization, the novel deity that has appeared alongside another deity called human rights, and on account of which they expect us to curtail our own rights.3

In those countries with a statistical Orthodox majority that recently joined the European Union, strong anti-Western resentment was to be heard in the debates that preceded this accession. “The West” in this con-text was Europe and the European Union in particular, identified with a value system based on a Charter of Human Rights, and corresponding institutions like for example the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg. For quite a few Orthodox clergymen, such as the Romanian archbishop Bartolomeu Anania of Cluj, this step towards the EU could only mean to consciously agree with the entering of any kind of immoral-ity into societal life. Addressing mainly the Human Rights theme, he sub-sumed his opinion that ‘Europe asks us to accept sex, homosexuality, vices, drugs, abortions, and genetic engineering, including cloning.’4

Integration?,’ International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, vol. 9, 2009, no. 3, pp. 209-224. For the Russian Orthodox Church, cf. additionally the examples given by Nikolaî Mitrohin, Russkaq Pravoslavnaq Cerkov. Sovremennoe sostoqnie i aktualànxe problemx [Nikolai Mitrokhin, The Russian Orthodox Church. Present State and Actual Problems] (Moscow, 2004), pp. 258-261. On the topoi and the historical background of Orthodox anti-Westernism in general see Vasilios N. Makrides, Dirk Uffelmann, ‘Studying Eastern Orthodox Anti-Westernism: The Need for a Comparative Research Agenda,’ in Jonathan Sutton, Wil van den Bercken (eds.), Orthodox Christianity and Contemporary Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2003), pp 87-120. On Justin Popovic, cf. Klaus Buchenau, ‘Svetosavlje und Pravoslavlje. Nationales und Universales in der serbischen Orthodoxie,’ in Martin Schulze Wessel (ed.), Nationalisierung der Religion und Sakralisierung der Nation im östlichen Europa (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2006), pp. 203-232, esp. p. 221f. On Greek nea orthodoxia, see Angelos Giannakopoulos, ‘Antiokzidentalismus und ostkirchliche Tradition,’ Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 10, 2002, pp. 119-129. On Yannaras in particular cf. especially the chapter by Kristina Stoeckl in this volume.

3 Quoted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Archbishop_Christodoulos_of_Athens (with further references). [Last accessed 07-11-2010]

4 Quoted from Sabrina P. Ramet, ‘Church and State in Romania before and after 1989,’ in Henry F. Larey (ed.), Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics and Society (Lanham/Maryland: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 290. For the Romanian background, see


128 A. BRÜNING

Voices of this type have not disappeared since EU membership became a fact, and as the example just quoted from Greece (EU member since 1980) illustrates, they are not likely to do so in the near future. The general scale concerning Human Rights extends from cautious and reluctant acceptance to harsh critique and categorical rejection — while at the same time anti-Western overtones obviously grow proportionally with the critique of Human Rights. Moreover, anti-Westernism is not necessarily limited to countries with an Orthodox majority. For example, church and society in Poland saw, and still contain similar discussions about national values and “Western liberalism.”5 In most of the cases, the opposition to this “Western liberalism” grounds its arguments on religion. It is mainly clergy or religiously engaged lay people who express their disapproval of “the West.” The picture of countries like Greece, Romania and Russia is generally similar, all preserving a staunch anti-Western and anti-European fraction. The critical stand of these groups in recent times became clear in connection with Human Rights issues such as freedom of religion, freedom of speech and the press, etc. Such well known and widely discussed events like the removal of a remark on religious affiliation from identity cards in Greece6, or an exhi-bition of works of art on religious issues entitled “Beware, Religion!” in Moscow in 2005, not only gave rise to heated debates and even public demonstrations, but also found a vivid echo in the media of Western Europe. And this latter echo mostly came down to a revitalization of Western stereotypes concerning the backwardness and the preference for political authoritarianism in the Orthodox East — so the Human Rights issue apparently works on both sides as a crucial means of renewing older mental divisions between East and West. What, however, is meant by “the West”, at least in cases like these? Besides countless and rather impulsive expressions of distrust and aversion, there are a number of often repeated and thus almost typical features in more systematic statements.

e.g. Bogdan M. Radu: ‘Romanian Orthodox Church and European Union Integration: A Conflict of Values?’, Studia Universitatis Babe≥-Bolyai – Politica, 2005, no. 1, pp. 95-103.

5 Natalia Jackowska, Kosció¥ katolicki w Polsce wobec integracji europejskiej [The Catholic Church in Poland towards European Integration] (Poznan-Gniezno: Przymasowskie Wydawnictwo Gaudentium, 2003). On a still existing critical fraction in Poland, see Robert Zurek, ‘Für Kirche und Volk! Die Radio-Maryja-Bewegung in Polen,’ Osteuropa 59, 2009, no. 6, pp. 113-128.

6 Daniel P. Payne, ‘The Clash of Civilizations: The Church of Greece, the European Union and the Question of Human Rights,’ Religion, State & Society, vol. 31, no. 3, 2003, pp. 261-271.



These can be found in official speeches, newspaper articles, program-matic texts, etc. At this moment, the most elaborate of these statements come from members of the Russian Orthodox Church, which by all evi-dence has dealt more thoroughly with its relationship towards “the West” and the Human Rights theme in particular than other “local” Orthodox Churches have done so far.7 Consequently, there are good rea-sons to focus on key texts from the leading hierarchs of the Moscow Patriarchate, as this paper intends to do. On the other hand, the attitudes expressed there, hardly reflect an isolated opinion. The documents pro-duced in this context have striking parallels and a rather positive echo in many other parts of the Orthodox world, even if they do not meet with full agreement — and this is true for the essentially positive reaction on the Human Rights concept as well as for the many signs of critical dis-sociation from “the West”.8

“Freedom” versus “Morality”

A striking feature in Orthodox statements and documents on the Human Rights theme is the frequent juxtaposition of “freedom” and “morality.” In general terms, “freedom” in this opposition represents the central value of “the West”, and its strengthening appears as the main purpose of any adoption of the Human Rights concept. At the same time, “morality” is what lacks in this concept, and is consequently a quality which, in the eyes of many Orthodox, finds itself in a process of subsequent retreat from Western societies. There is even a special mission which one often finds articulated on the grounds of this alleged Western deficit. According to quite a few speakers with an Orthodox background, it is the Orthodox

7 Cf. Osnovx uweniq Russkoî Pravoslavnoî Cerkvi o dostoinstve, svobode i pravah weloveka’ [The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teachings on Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights], on http://www.mospat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/ [further referred to as Osnovy (2008)]. See also the various programmatic texts, e.g. by Patriarch Kirill, former chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate’s Department for Foreign Relations, collected (in German translation) in Kyrill (Patriarch von Moskau und der ganzen Rus’), Freiheit und Verantwortung im Einklang. Zeugnisse für den Aufbruch zu einer neuen Weltgemeinschaft (Freiburg/Switzerland: Institut für Ökumenische Studien, 2009).

8 For a reaction on Osnovy (2008), see Radu Preda, ‘ Drepturile omului în lectura ortodoxa. Documentul Bisericii Ortodoxe din Rusia (iulie 2008)’ [Human Rights in Orthodox Reading. A Document from the Orthodox Church of Russia], Tabor vol. 3, no. 2, 2009,, also online http://www.teologia-sociala.ro/images/fisiere/biblioteca_digi-tala/preda-drepturile-omului-documentul-rus-iulie-2008.pdf; see also the chapter by Radu Preda in this volume.


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Church which now has to bring the issue of “morality” back into the debate, and to contribute to re-establishing the values connected with it. To preserve or even to reintroduce “morality” not only means then to contribute to the stability of societies in Orthodox countries, but also points to a task of Orthodoxy that pertains to the entire European context. Through remind-ing the West of its allegedly lost cultural fundaments, this mission is directed beyond the borders of countries dominated by Orthodoxy. Many corresponding quotations can illustrate this, and we limit ourselves here to several of them, which seem particularly representative. On occasion of an address to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on October 2, 2007, the former Russian patriarch, the late Aleksy II stated:

[…] today there occurs a break between human rights and morality, and this break threatens the European civilization. We can see a new generation of rights that contradict morality, and in how human rights are used to justify immoral behavior.9

What, however, is to be understood by “morality”? Not long before Aleksy’s remark, on April 6, 2006, metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad (now patriarch) read about “Human Rights and Moral Responsibility” before the 10-th World Russian’s People Council. The congress was entitled: ‘Faith, Humankind, Earth. Russia’s Mission in the 21st Century’. Kirill stated, among others:

Moral law is one and undivided. If we appeal to rights and freedoms of man to unleash sin, if we do not stop human savagery, when they chop icons in the center of Moscow, in Manezh, when they organize a ‘Beware of Religion’ exhibition, or mock believers’ feelings with cartoons in some other places, so what makes us so surprised when we get to know some people can be killing others on grounds of their race or religion? An instinct of destruction, having been set free, has no mercy on either believers in a synagogue or children with a varying skin color.10

This congress — a public forum organized under the auspices of the Moscow Patriarchate — issued a special declaration on Human Rights, with a clear dissociation from the Western and liberal approaches which

9 http://www.norway.mid.ru/news_fp/news_fp_32_eng.html. [accessed on 03.03.2008]; published also in French in Istina 52, 2007, pp. 385-388. For a similar statement from Romania see e.g. RaduÁ Seli≥te, ‘Biserica Ortodoxa Româna ≥i Noua Europa’ [The Romanian Orthodox Church and the New Europe], Rost 35, January 2006, online on http://www.rostonline.org/rost/ian2006/bor.shtml [accessed on 12-13-2009].

10 Published (in English) on the website of the Moscow Patriarchate, on http://www.mospat.ru/center.php?page=30688&newwin=1&prn=1 [accessed on 02-06-2009] and on the site of the ROC representation in Brussels, http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/97.aspx#3 [accessed on 07-13-2010].



allegedly form a threat to “Russian civilization”. (Neither the conference nor the following press releases did give any explanation about what was precisely understood here by the term “civilization”.) The response else-where, and even in Western churches, was one of exasperation, to say the least.11 Press releases from Russian news agencies drew an even clearer borderline between Human Rights and a Russian approach than Kirill him-self had done, resuming his statements as follows:

“Individuals are prohibited only to realize themselves in a manner that can infringe on somebody else’s freedom,” the main theoretician of the Moscow Patriarchy said about the traditional interpretation of Western democracy. “In other words, human beings must respect laws, but not moral imperatives.”12

According to this approach, Human Rights only guarantee certain lib-erties, but they neither contain nor communicate any orientation on how to handle these liberties responsibly, in order to avoid mere libertinism. As a consequence, this quasi-rootless libertinism — which means a pre-dominance of “anything goes” without further moral orientation — is precisely what Orthodox analysts see occurring in the West. Some put it even more sharply. According to the late Archbishop Christodoulos of Athens and all Greece, the problems that the Orthodox Churches have with Human Rights come from the fact that

[…] the Church cannot accept what the Lord of This World is promoting through the human rights movement: the abolishment of sin.13

The notion of “sin” is obviously central to many statements, and at the same time it forms the starting point for the critique of the Human Rights concept. “Sin”, at any rate, is not a category of a secular theory. The term constitutively belongs to the vocabulary used in Christian theology (as does, by the way, the term “secular”, which also is not a term in “secular theory”). The notion of “sin” simultaneously holds a prominent place in the recently issued document of the Moscow Patriarchate on “Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights”, and is linked there to human dignity in a way that has generated discussions even with Western churches. According to this text, sin seems to be able even to spoil human dignity

11 ‘Orthodoxe Menschenrechte. Die Russische Kirche grenzt sich von westlichen Werten ab.’ Evangelischer Pressedienst (epd), 18.4.2006 — http://www.ekd.de/aktuell/060418_orthodoxe_menschenrechte.html.; kho (Kerstin Holm): ‘Orthodoxe Werte,’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 101, 02.05.2006, p. 45.

12 Vladimir Simonov, ‘Russian Orthodox Church Discusses Human Rights,’ RIA Novosti, cf. http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/94.aspx#2.

13 See fn. 3 above.


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substantially, and consequently to diminish any rights that might be theoretically grounded on this dignity.14 Furthermore, the notions of “freedom” are rather different in the two approaches: for quite a few Orthodox commentators the various “freedoms” claimed in the cata-logue of Human Rights are to be regarded as little more than the free-dom to commit sins without fearing punishment. The “freedom from external oppression and persecution,” which is at the core of the Human Rights’ idea, is transformed into a “freedom to sin”. Orthodoxy, appar-ently in clear opposition to this, is supposed to stand for the spiritual aim of “freedom from sin” — this means a clear shift of emphasis which is at work even in those Orthodox comments, which search for a differentiating view on Human Rights and do not intend to reject them categorically.15

This provides us with another hint regarding the meaning given to the term “morality” and how this term has to be understood in its opposition to the “freedom” that the Human Rights concept represents. The Orthodox approaches apparently combine religious and secular elements, while the Human Rights concept is essentially secular.16 “Morality,” as we shall see, is closely linked to “tradition.” Indeed, a further key point in this respect — the mixture of religious and secular elements of criticism — is to be found in the use of terms like “tradition” and “traditional values.”

For a closer examination one might start with some etymological exer-cises. The word that is usually used in texts from the Moscow Patriarchate (such as the ones quoted above, and several others from Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev), archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin et al.), and which in English translations appears as “morality” is the Russian nravstvennost’ [nravstvennostà]. It is derived from the term nravy [nravx, best trans-lated as “customs”]. The Latin equivalent, which is at the root of the Anglo-Norman “morality” (and, of course, of that of Romanic languages’ parallels, like the French moralité) is mores. German translates nravy as Sitten, and the accurate German expression for the Russian nravstvennost’

14 Osnovy (2008), I.4-5; see also the chapter by Heta Hurskainen in this volume. 15 This juxtaposition of two “freedoms”, the “freedom of choice” and the “freedom

from sin” is one of the key aspects in the recent document on Human Rights issued by the Russian Orthodox Church. Cf. Osnovy (2008), II.2, and the analysis by Aleksandr Agadjanian, Russian Orthodox Vision on Human Rights (Erfurter Vorträge zur Kultur-geschichte des Orthodoxen Christentums 7/2008), p. 8. A similar difference has been emphasized by Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos), ’Orthodoxy and Human Rights,‘ in idem, Facing the World. Orthodox Christian Essays on Global Concerns (Geneva: WCC Publishing, 2003), pp. 49-78, esp. p. 73f.

16 On the secularity of the agreement on Human Rights as in the UDHR, and its rela-tion towards religion cf. the chapters by Hans van der Ven, Elena Pribytkova and Evert van der Zweerde in this volume.



is Sittlichkeit. (As another example from the Germanic group of languages, one can refer to Dutch, which has quite similarly zeden and zedelijkheid for nravy and nravstvennost’.) The interesting point is that both Russian and, for example, German also do have an expression for “morality” that goes back to Latin roots, which is Moralität in German and moralnost’ [moralnostà] in Russian. But the Russian term moralnost’ is never used in the texts discussed here. Both of these expressions (German Moralität and Russian moralnost’, with their slightly more concrete forms Moral and moral’) once were taken from Western, Latin-rooted countries. They entail a less direct reference than the native words to the idea that some long-established customs exist well before any ethical reflection at an abstract level might start, and they bear in themselves the suggestion of a code of behaviour that is constitutive for any community.

Translations into English, a language that does not have this alternative (there is no substantive derived from “customs” that could easily replace “morality”), conceal the fact that Russian Orthodox commentators of the Human Rights concept usually chose this native expression instead of the foreign moralnost’. Of course, one might consider these observa-tions as mere hair-splitting, as e.g. the German Sittlichkeit (just like the Dutch zedelijkheid) is today rather old-fashioned, while the Russian nravstvennost’ certainly is not. Yet even if this preference were not a conscious one, it would allow the presumption that an idea of generally accepted and long established values, which are constitutive of, and thus necessarily as old as any human social life, is rather central to what the (Russian) Orthodox intend to hint at with the term “morality”.

A corresponding term often used for example by Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev), currently chairman of the Department of Foreign Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate (and thus Kirill’s successor), is that of “tradi-tional values.” These are, according to an interview given in December 2009 to the German magazine Der Spiegel, values ‘such as family, childbearing, and the value of human life.’ On the same occasion (as on many others before), the Orthodox bishop sees these values in severe opposition to and threatened by ‘aggressive Western secularism.’ This latter, then, for example found expression in a decision by the ECHR that demanded the removal of crucifixes from Italian schools — truly a violation of ‘traditional Christian values’ in the bishop’s eyes.17

17 Der Spiegel, no. 51 (15.12.2009), p. 111f.; see also http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-68167790.html. The present patriarch Kirill devoted an entire book to the topic: L’Evangile et la liberté. Les valeurs de la Tradition dans la société laïque (Paris: Cerf, 2006).


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Although it is difficult to assess exactly which values are encom-passed by the general idea of “traditional values,” these values obvi-ously place a stronger emphasis on collective rather than on individual rights and values.18 In general, it is not our aim to explore the exact content of the concept, or to consider the way in which the Orthodox notion of “traditional values” relates to similar concepts currently dis-cussed in some circles in Western Europe and the US (mostly conserva-tive and politically rightwing Christian groups). What should interest us more here is the idea of “tradition” that is active in a system of values expressed as “morality” or “traditional values” and clearly opposed to Western concepts, in which Human Rights hold a prominent place. By all evidence, there is currently no official and clear definition of what is meant by “tradition” as used in such contexts — except, of course, for the “classic” Orthodox Christian definition of this term. The latter essentially means the apostolic tradition concerning dogma and ethical norms, as they have been passed on, according to Christian teaching, since the time of the apostles. Following Patriarch Kirill, this also refers to the forming of an ethically founded life conduct:

Die religiöse Lebensform — und hier geht es um die orthodoxe Lebens-form — zeichnet sich aus durch ihre Verankerung in der kirchlichen Über-lieferung. Die Tradition ist für uns die Gesamtheit der Wahrheiten in Glaubenslehre und Ethos, die durch das Zeugnis der heiligen Apostel von der Kirche angenommen, bewahrt und entsprechend den historischen Umständen und Herausforderungen an die Kirche in verschiedenen Epochen weiterentwickelt wurden.19

Although this is in principle merely the exact core of what any given textbook on Orthodox theology would present, the patriarch puts a rather

18 Another official document, the joint declaration of the Orthodox Churches of Europe released after their meeting in Heraklion, Crete, in March 2003, names the same things as Hilarion did in his interview statements, and gives them a clear accent in favour of collective rights. Article 3 reads as follows: ‘3. Human rights must be safeguarded not only in their individual manifestation but also in the collective and institutional, such as rights and duties of the citizens of Europe: more specifically we would mention the sanc-tity and inviolability of the biotechnology knowledge and application, the protection of the institution of marriage and the family, and the focusing of education on the objective of these principles and values, etc.’ The text is available on http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/14/10.aspx#3 [last accessed on 07-12-2010]. Probably in the same line is the passage in Osnovy (2008), III.4, that refers to the love for one’s community, family and fatherland in particular, emphasizing that ‘The Creator has laid down in human nature the need for communication and unity, saying, ‘It is not good for the man to be alone’ (Gen. 2:18).’

19 Kirill (2009), p. 35.



unusual emphasis on ethics and life conduct here, while explanations (concise definitions are not at hand) of “tradition” normally focus on dogma, teaching, eventually on iconography, and on the interpretation of Holy Scripture.20

However, not only the Christian tradition is meant here. In the inter-view just mentioned, metropolitan Hilarion recalled the most recent events on Russia’s national holiday:

On 4 November, when Russia celebrated the Day of National Unity, we, together with representatives of other religions marched on Red Square. The patriarch was in the front row, the Muslim, Jewish, and Buddhist leaders were in the next one. This was a visible symbol.21

Apart from Orthodoxy (which is replaced by Christianity in general), these religions represent exactly those, which since the release of the controversial Religious Law from 1997 in Russia are named its “tradi-tional religions.”22 In a quite similar way, the joint declaration of the European Orthodox Churches that was issued in Heraklion, Crete, in 2003 (designed as a contribution by the Orthodox Churches to the ongoing debates about a European Constitution draft), states in articles 4 and 6:

4. Religious freedom must be safeguarded not only as an individual human right but also as the right of traditional Churches and Religions of Europe […].6. It is necessary to establish stringent criteria both in respect of the inclu-sion of sects in the framework of religious freedom, and of the legitimacy of their activity and their engagement in illicit proselytism within the Member — States of the union.23

There are thus several “traditional Churches and Religions,” while the Heraklion document also does not offer any clear definition on how to distinguish a sect, preoccupied with ‘illicit proselytism,’ from ‘tradi-tional Churches and Religions of Europe,’ but rather calls for the estab-

20 Cf. Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (London: Penguin Books., 1997), pp. 195-207; Vladimir Lossky, ‘Tradition and Traditions,’ in idem, In the Image and Likeness of God (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1974), pp 141-168.

21 Cf. fn. 17 above; English translation taken from http://www.mospat.ru/en/2009/12/14/news10180/.

22 Strictly speaking, the expression “traditional religion” does not explicitly appear in the text, but the religions named there are since then usually referred to as “Russia’s traditional religions.” For an English translation of the Law see http://www.cesnur.org/testi/Russia.htm [accessed on 07-12-2010]. For further background information about this law, see Zoe Knox, Russian Society and the Orthodox Church: Religion in Russia after Communism (London/New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), pp. 2-4.

23 See footnote 18 above.


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lishment of such criteria. This is a requirement, which has not been fulfilled since then (generally, not many of the proposals of the Orthodox confer-ence found their way into the draft of a European Constitution that was on the agenda at that time).

Neither the statement of bishop Hilarion, nor the draft of the Orthodox joint meeting at Heraklion refer exclusively to Christianity, let alone Orthodox Christianity, as being “traditional” or exclusive bearers of “traditional values.” Bearers of “traditional values” are “traditional religions.” Patriarch Kirill, in the speech quoted above made a similar point when he criticized the secular and individualistic approach which he sees at work in the Human Rights catalogue:

The tragedy is that the very notions of good and evil remain in the person, but he is not always able to clearly distinguish the two. God helps man to maintain this ability to discern through His Revelation, which contains a well-known code of moral rules accepted by practically all religious tradi-tions.24

Meanwhile, the “traditional values” currently propagated by the Moscow Patriarchate have even made their way into the United Nations Human Rights Council, and they still continue to refer not exclusively to Christianity. This council, at its twelfth closed session in Geneva on October 2, 2009, adopted a resolution on “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind.” The resolution recognizes that all cultures and civilizations in their traditions, customs, religions and faiths have com-mon values belonging to the entire humankind, and that these values contribute to the development of the norms and standards of Human Rights. The resolution is the outcome of discussions, which began in March 2008 with a panel on “The Intercultural Dialogue on Human Rights,” in which Patriarch Kirill (at that time still Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for External Church Relations) took part.25 According to the resolution, in order to exchange opinions on the better understanding of the traditional values of humankind, the Council intends to hold an international seminar in the course of 2010, with the participation of all concerned UN member states, regional organizations, civil society and experts.

Admittedly, even after an examination of these and further examples, one still gets a rather impressionistic image concerning the very contents

24 Cf. footnote 10 above. 25 Cf. http://www.mospat.ru/en/2009/10/26/news6832/ [last accessed on 07-14-2010].



of what is outlined by such terms as “morality,” “tradition” and “tradi-tional values,” but some basic features do become clearer. While in some parts, especially when referring to the notion of “sin” and a specific understanding of “freedom,” the conception clearly refers to the Orthodox Christian tradition (although with an unusually strong emphasis on ethics and life conduct), the notions generally go beyond one single religion. Instead, there is the idea that basic convictions and particularly ethical norms are shared by almost all the “traditional” religions, and even “morality” is not something that is specifically Christian. What seems crucial is the following: “Traditional values” and “morality” are not something invented or introduced by some philosophical concept, but have always existed as the base of any society or community that proved able to persist. To reflect upon these terms is to start from any given com-munity in past or present and the values it holds to be constitutive, because in the opposite case, if it would not subscribe to these values in some way, there just would be no community that survives and allows to be reflected upon. In connection with this, the framework which is constituted by the named notions generally takes certain social entities as a whole to be its starting point (like family or nation), and focuses more on communities and correspondingly oriented value systems than on individuals.

However, as stated earlier, this general image is still quite impression-istic, and lacks clear contours. There is rather the impression that the entire framework behind these terms is best defined by what it is not — it is neither invented (which means above all, it is no human invention), nor purely secular (emphasizing its religious roots, and revelation as a main way of how mankind became conscious of ethical norms). It is not individualistic, but oriented towards the inner life of communities and societies. In other words, it clearly dissociates from some of the basic features that many Orthodox ascribe to the concept of Human Rights in its present shape.

The Church and a secular concept

To be accurate, some of the difficulties that Orthodox churches might have precisely as churches with the Human Rights’ concept are a rather natural and already well-known phenomenon. One only needs to recall here that all the branches of Western Christianity, i.e. the various Protestant denominations as well as the Roman Catholics, had to go through a long process of thorough examination and reflection before they saw


138 A. BRÜNING

themselves able to agree with the main implications of the Human Rights concept. A key point is, as might be expected, that Human Rights once had been formulated with a claim to universality regardless of cultural, religious or philosophical context. This implies not only that they were designed for application to the legal framework of a secular state, mostly in the Western understanding. It also implies that any institution, which defines itself on the grounds of a particular religious or philosophical worldview, can agree with Human Rights only to the extent that these proper philosophical or theological foundations would allow — including the risk of eventual changes or rejections on particular points, where the concept would not fit into the teaching of that institution. The process of adoption in Western Christianity thus was a long one, too.26

Consequently, despite their general acceptance, some reservations regarding Human Rights still persist even in Western churches. This is particularly true of the Roman Catholic Church. Pope John Paul II in his first encyclical entitled Redemptor Hominis, issued on March 4, 1979, wrote:

[…] the Church, aware that the “letter” on its own can kill, while only “the spirit gives life,” must continually ask, together with these people of good will, whether the Declaration of Human Rights and the acceptance of their “letter” mean everywhere also the actualization of their “spirit”. Indeed, well founded fears arise that very often we are still far from this actualiza-tion and that at times the spirit of social and public life is painfully opposed to the declared “letter” of human rights.27

Likewise, there are efforts to put “freedom” back into context, and these automatically imply a critical distance from Liberalism and Enlightenment and, together with that, to the first compilations of Human Rights. Similar to Orthodox churchmen, the present pope Benedict XVI (Joseph Ratzinger), already in publications of the 1990s, still as cardinal, pleaded against an isolated and unlimited understanding of “freedom.” Freedom, according to him, has to be grounded in truth, and to be restricted not only by responsibility, but by its metaphysical context, which ultimately defines man not as a separate individual, but as God’s creation — which sets a limit not only to his power and possibility, but likewise to the significance of autonomous reason.28

26 Cf. Wolfgang Huber, s.v. ‘Menschenrechte/Menschenwürde,‘ Theologische Real-enzyklopädie vol. 22, 1992, pp. 577-602.

27 Cf. http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0218/__PI.HTM [last accessed on 07-17-2010]. 28 Joseph Ratzinger, ‘Freiheit und Wahrheit,’ Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift

Communio 24, 1995, pp. 527-542.



Just as in the case of many Orthodox, these approaches lead to a critical stance towards some implications of the Enlightenment and of Liberalism. The disapproval of an alleged “militant secularism” has its equivalent in Joseph Ratzinger’s warning against a ‘dictatorship of rela-tivism’. In 2005, in his famous homily prior to the conclave that would elect him as pope, Ratzinger pointed out:

The small boat of thought of many Christians has often been tossed about by these waves - thrown from one extreme to the other: from Marxism to liberalism, even to libertinism; from collectivism to radical individualism; from atheism to a vague religious mysticism; from agnosticism to syncretism, and so forth. […] We are moving towards a dictatorship of relativism which does not recognize anything as certain and which has as its highest goal one’s own ego and one’s own desires.29

With Orthodox positions, these official Roman Catholic statements share the distance towards “the secularized West”, as well as the roman-tic image of a lost Christian society of the European Middle Ages, and even anti-Communism as being to some degree a motivating force behind their argumentation.30 The sceptical perspective included in these positions on Europe’s modern history, the Reformation and the Enlight-enment in particular, takes up an old argument pointed especially against the Human Rights concept. Papal encyclicals since the late 19th century detect the beginnings of a fatal wrong turn in the emergence of the idea of a purely secular state as early as in the 16th century, and in liberal ideas, alongside with industrialization and liberal economy, which stead-ily expelled the church out of the life of people.31 Human Rights, also in the views of 19th-century Catholicism, are

[…] all those later tenets of unbridled license which, in the midst of the terrible upheavals of the last century, were wildly conceived and boldly proclaimed as the principles and foundation of that new conception of law which was not merely previously unknown, but was at variance on many points with not only the Christian, but even the natural law.32

29 Cf. http://www.vatican.va/gpII/documents/homily-pro-eligendo-pontifice_20050418_en.html [last accessed on 07-17-2010].

30 Cf. Blandine Chelini-Pont, ‘Papal Thought on Europe and the European Union in the Twentieth Century,’ Religion, State & Society, vol. 37, nos. 1-2, 2009, pp. 131-146.

31 See the encyclical “Quod apostolici muneris” by Pope Leo XIII from 1878, esp. no. 2, and the encyclical “Divini redemptoris” by Pope Pius XI from 1937, esp. no. 16, all accessible via www.papalencyclicals.net.

32 Cf. Leo XIII, encyclical “Immortale Dei” (On the Christian Constitution of States), 1883, no. 23f., on http://www.papalencyclicals.net/Leo13/l13sta.htm.


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Of course, much has changed since then in the attitude of Roman Catholicism towards Human Rights, which became mostly positive since the Second Vatican Council, but the question of the relationship between Christian doctrine and secular state and society remains at stake.33 Orthodox and Roman Catholic voices illustrate the troubles that a reli-gious institution can have with a secular concept such as that of Human Rights. Furthermore, the visible similarities obviously entail the possi-bility of new alliances against an imagined enemy such as an “aggres-sive secularism.” At any rate, up to this point the problems on both sides are rooted in the theoretical tensions between a secular concept and a religious doctrine.

A point that is absent from the Roman Catholic approach, however, is the repeated claim for the rights of a different culture or civilization. Roman Catholic theologians may continue to refer critically to some implications of the Human Rights concept, and some of them may dis-like central issues of modernity, and feel that they are bound to do so, on the grounds of their religious doctrine. Nevertheless, Rome is a city in the West. They are thus not able to inscribe this critique into the frame-work of a “clash of civilizations” that confronts their world with an alleged striving for hegemony of “the West,” just because they are geo-graphically a part of it. (In ideological terms, and in the eyes of many Orthodox, Roman papacy even stands at the very beginning of this “cul-tural Imperialism” of the West.) The allusion to such a “clash” is yet another widespread feature in Orthodox critiques of Human Rights. Here things get mixed up.

Religious versus secular civilizations?

As previously stated, there is already a history of the argument that Human Rights are a specifically Western product, and that as such they can or even must be rejected by other civilizations. On the other hand, there is an even longer history of Orthodox distrust and enmity towards Latin Christianity.34 In present statements, in particular those on the Human Rights issue, it seems that both arguments and narratives are combined with one another, and reinforce the reluctance that Orthodoxy

33 See Konrad Hilpert, s.v. ‘Menschenrechte’, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, 3rd ed. (Studienausgabe), vol. 7, (Freiburg: Herder 2006), cols. 119-127.

34 Cf. Makrides & Uffelmann (2003), passim.



as a church and religious community shows towards a secular concept like that of Human Rights.

Currently, it is mainly the Russian Orthodox Church and some of its leaders in particular, who see themselves involved in a conflict of prin-ciple between “traditional,” or sometimes more specifically Christian values, and what they describe as “militant Western liberalism and secu-larism.” While Human Rights are not generally rejected, in this perspec-tive they often are regarded as a main weapon of an alleged Western imperialistic striving to turn other cultures or civilizations into mere colonies, in a political as well as in a cultural sense. Patriarch Kirill is as cautious as he is clear in this respect:

Der Kern des Problems liegt nicht darin, dass der liberale Standard auf dem Niveau der internationalen Organisationen formuliert wird und heute der internationalen Politik zugrunde liegt. Fragwürdig ist vielmehr, dass dieser Standard als verpflichtend für die Organisation des inneren Lebens der Länder und Völker vorgeschrieben wird, einschließlich der Staaten, deren kulturelle, geistige und religiöse Tradition in der Formulierung dieser Richt linien praktisch nicht vertreten ist.35

At this point, Orthodox churchmen enter the old debate about the uni-versality of Human Rights, simultaneously translating their doubts and critiques into the long-established terms of Orthodox resistance against the alleged Western striving for hegemony.

Ever since the Great Schism of the Middle Ages, Latin Christians have been viewed as heretics, whose fatal introduction of a previously unknown sentence (the notorious filioque) into the Christian creed led to a culture of selfishness and rootless individualism. Furthermore, espe-cially the Roman Popes with their claim to primacy display a continuous eagerness for expansion of their influence and power.36 To put it very

35 Kirill (2008), p. 28f., see also p. 64ff and passim. Liberal standards are thus appli-cable as rules of the game between organizations or even cultures, but they do not neces-sarily have to be adopted or regarded as binding by these organizations themselves — a paradox that might need further reflection. See also the chapters by Aleksandr Agadjanian and Paul Baars in this volume.

36 In the 19th century, Russian Slavophiles began to translate older dogmatic differ-ences as that about the introduction of the famous filioque sentence into the Creed from theological to “culturological” terms: an apparently pure theological problem as that of the filioque formula, which had been introduced into the creed in the Medieval Western Church, in the views of Russian thinkers like Aleksey Khomyakov or Lev Karsavin received the quality of a constitutive aberration, founding nothing less than a - basically mistaken - “culture of filioque”. Characteristic features of this culture are the already mentioned: now the high-handedness of the popes originally paved the way for a culture of self-will, struggle and exaggerated rationalism, while the force for reconciliation and


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roughly, the claim to universality of the Human Rights concept in such a perspective has to be fought against, just like the crusaders of the infa-mous fourth crusade in 1204, the church unions of the 15th and 16th cen-turies (as being mainly papal attempts at “unfriendly takeover”), or even the Napoleonic invasion in Russia after 1812. The idea that Human Rights and their realization in their present, allegedly “Western liberal” shape, mean a threat for the societies of Russia, Romania or Greece, is almost omnipresent in corresponding debates in those countries. The afore-mentioned statements of Archbishop Christodoulos are a good illustration of the attitude of some circles in Greece.37 In Russia, this argument appears among others in the expert reports produced in con-nection with legal proceedings against the organizers of the famous “Beware, Religion!” exhibition in Moscow in 200538, the neo-conserv-ative “Russian Doctrine” [Russkaq doktrina] conceived in 2007 (with the blessing of metropolitan Kirill),39 and also in a series of statements from leading churchmen of the Moscow Patriarchate.40 Human Rights are perceived as the main ideological weapon in Western efforts directed at colonization of other cultures and civilizations.

From this perspective, at any rate, there is a “clash of civilizations” rising, in which Orthodoxy plays a significant role. Some, however, even expect Orthodoxy’s victory in an already ongoing struggle, while the “Western civilization” is in decline. Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, former vice-rector of the Department of Foreign Relations of the Mos-cow Patriarchate and since 2009 leader of the Synodal Department for Mutual Relationships between Church and Society [Predsedatelà Sinod-alànogo otdela po vzaimodeîstviù Cerkvi i obÏestva], in 2007 named Western democracy a direct result of sin, whose downfall is not far off. Russia and Russian Orthodoxy had to put in its place a ‘com-munitarian [sobornxî] ideal of unity between Church, nation [narod]

unity remains on the side of Orthodoxy and the people of its adherents. Cf. Bernd Ober-dorfer, Filioque: Geschichte und Theologie eines ökumenischen Problems (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2001), pp. 438-447.

37 For Greek Orthodoxy, these mechanisms are profoundly analyzed by Giannakopoulos (2002). For the Romanian background, see e.g. Bogdan M. Radu, ‘Romanian Orthodox Church and European Union Integration: A Conflict of Values?’, Studia Universitatis Babe≥-Bolyai - Politica, no. 1, 2005, pp. 95-103.

38 Documented (in German translation) in Osteuropa 54, 2004, no. 4, pp. 48-50, 51-58.

39 See the text on http://www.rusdoctrina.ru/page95507.html [accessed on 17.07. 2010]

40 Numerous examples can be taken from the chapters in Kirill (2009).



and power.’41 These, in his opinion, are the main elements in an “Ortho-dox civilization” that has to be opposed to the Western model.

At first, this looks like 19th-century slavophilism in new clothes. How-ever, the foundations of such ideas are taken from approaches of “cul-turology”, which since the early 1990s was established as a new academic discipline in Russia, and since then has played a steadily increasing role in intellectual debates.42 Cultures or civilizations — both terms in this context are used alternatively and with equal meaning — and thus the exploration of their inner rules or development, officially appear as the subjects of this new discipline. The main aim of these explorations, however, is beyond pure academics. It consists in what for example has been named a “culturoligization of education” [kulturologizaciq obrazovaniq] — in other words, to provide national programmes of education with a background that assists moral orientation and the search for identity.

Having rather little in common with Western cultural studies, “cul-turology” sets itself the goal of inventing all-encompassing explanatory models, continuing in this manner the claim of historical materialism of the Soviet period. In contrast to the elevated pretensions of the disci-pline, outside observers reflect a rather sceptical assessment of the meth-odology connected with studies in “culturology.” Obviously lacking a concise framework of how to define “civilizations” and their inner lim-its and divisions, the new discipline readily operates with well-known “historical prophets” like Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee or, not the least among them, Samuel Huntington.43 At the same time, science has to deliver the framework for the moral good: with an approach that declares “civilization as moral,” “culturology” is in search not only of pure mechanisms of culture or society, but even more for moral laws on allegedly scientific grounds. Corresponding publications already in the

41 http://www.blagovest-info.ru/index.php?ss=2&s=3&id=15307 [accessed on 07-19-2010]

42 Cf. Jutta Scherrer, Kulturologie. Russland auf der Suche nach einer zivilisato-rischen Identität [Essener Kulturwissenschaftliche Vorträge, vol. 13] (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2003); Marlène Laruelle, ‘La discipline de la culturologie: un nouveau “prêt-à-penser” pour la Russie?,’ Diogène 204, no. 4, 2003, pp. 25-45.

43 Scherrer (1998), pp. 34-38, 83, 107ff.; Laruelle (2003/4), pp. 30-33. Probably in the same context can be seen the re-edition of 19th-century work Nikolaî Danilevskiî, Rossiq i Evropa. Vzglqd na kulàturnxe i politiweskie otnojeniq slavqnskogo mira k germano-romanskomu [Nikolai Danilevsky, Russia and Europe. A Perspective on the Political and Cultural Relations of the Slavic World to the German and Roman] (Moscow, 2003), provided with an extensive introduction that tries to apply Danilevsky’s theses on NATO and EU – pp. 7-24.


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1990s started to flood the Russian book market. The still relatively new discipline not only owes its rise to a significant extent to disappointment with formerly praised Western models, but it is also under suspicion of being a mere transformation of the academic historical materialism of Soviet times, sharing with the latter the all-embracing claim, the belief in science and progress and, last but not least, the academic staff.44

That religion is a main factor in shaping culture is a widely accepted element in the otherwise rather disparate culturological theories. In Russia’s case, it is Orthodoxy that has had the most important impact on the Russian civilization since Great Prince Vladimir’s baptism in 988. The Religious Law of 1997 devotes a sentence of its preamble to ‘the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture.’45 Likewise, the still widely discussed school subject “Bases of Orthodox Culture”, promoted by the Orthodox Church, puts this link in the center of its teachings, and already in its title reveals its close relation to “culturology.”46 These are only two of the most prominent examples for the widely accepted idea that it was Orthodoxy which contributed most fundamentally to the “Russian civilization.” Furthermore, this idea is likewise shared by politicians, intellectuals and clergy. Programmes and ideologies declare the Orthodox Church the main guarantor for Russia’s capacity to counteract Western cultural and political hegemony.47

While “cultorology” in all its various forms concentrates on the distinctiveness of a “Russian civilization,” political movements and ideologies increasingly rely on a dissociative framework that has been

44 Scherrer (1998) and Laruelle (2003), passim. Both authors, despite their generally rather critical relation towards “culturology” as an academic discipline and its methods, as for the quality of science differentiate between chairs and centres at established univer-sities in major cities on the one hand, and minor professorships in the province, or in connection with additional ‘humanist’ programmes of technical schools on the other.

45 Cf. footnote 22 above. 46 The parallel entitling of “Bases of Orthodox Culture” [osnovx pravoslavnoî

kulàturx] with that of the formerly taught “Bases of Marxism-Leninism” is presumably more than only accidental. For an examination of textbooks of this subject cf. Joachim Willems, Religiöse Bildung an Russlands Schulen. Orthodoxie, nationale Identität und die Positionalität des Faches “Grundlagen orthodoxer Kultur” (OPK) (Münster: LIT, 2006), esp. pp. 91-99.

47 Cf. e.g. V.V. Petrunin, Politiweskiî isihazm i ego tradicii v socialànoî koncepcii Moskovskogo Patriarhata [V.V. Petrunin, Political Hesychasm and its Traditions in the Social Concept of the Moscow Patriarchate] (Sankt Peterburg: Aleteija, 2009). Cf. Kristina Stoeckl, ‘Political Hesychasm? Vladimir Petrunin’s Neo-Byzantine Interpretation of the Social Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church,’ Studies in East European Thought 62, 2010, pp. 125–133.



subsumed as pochvennichestvo [iowvenniwestvo — from the Rus-sian word powva (pochva), meaning “soil, ground”], i.e. Russia has to follow its own path and should withstand the temptation of adopting other, particularly Western models, which only lead to chaos, moral decline and political weakness. After the desillusions with “Liberal-ism” through the failure of radical democratic reforms in the early 1990s, and the experience of “proselytism” (the loss of believers and parishes due either to missionary activities of neo-evangelical groups, or to the restoration of the Uniate church in Ukraine after 1989), the Russian Orthodox Church has followed a similar path, not only in its growing distance towards “the West”, but also in the adoption of the models of “culturology”.48

How are Human Rights inscribed in these debates about competing cultures between East and West? Of course, in circles that are less pre-pared to enter a dialogue, one usually finds them categorically rejected, together with everything else coming from “the West”. However, the church generally cannot ignore the fact that it was mainly the strength-ening of Human Rights, including freedom of religion, which once freed it from previous oppression in the officially atheist Soviet regime. As we have seen, often there is a cautious approval of Human Rights, together with immediate hints at the incompleteness and deficits of the concept. As metropolitan Kirill (now patriarch) has put it:

On the one hand, human rights serve for the benefit of people. We must not forget that it is thanks to their influence on public opinion in the countries of the former socialist bloc that the Russian Orthodox Church and other religious communities in Eastern Europe were freed from the shackles of atheism. Moreover, human rights combat various abuses, humiliation and evils committed against the person in society. But on the other hand, we have become witnesses to the fact that the human rights concept is used to cover up lies, falsehood and insults against religious and national values. Moreover, the catalogue of human rights and freedoms is gradually being augmented by ideas which conflict not only with Christian but also with the traditional moral understanding of the person. This is alarm-ing since behind human rights stands the compulsory force of the state, which can compel people to commit sin, sympathize with or allow sin to occur through banal conformity.49

48 See the thorough analysis by Christopher Selbach, ‘The Orthodox Church in Post-Communist Russia and her Perception of the West: A Search for a Self in the Face of the Other,’ Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft 10, 2002, pp. 131-173: on the affinity of Kirill’s writings to leading theorists of pochvennichestvo (as for example. Natalia Narochnitskaya) as well as to Samuel Huntington see ibid., p. 167f.

49 Cf. footnote 10 above.


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Although many Orthodox would be ready to admit that Western “cul-tural imperialism” and its use of Human Rights,50 as well as the negative results of their implementation in society, are rather a matter of misuse of the Human Rights concept in its original intention, they simultane-ously feel able to present the culprits of this misuse. The image of the enemy is found in the allegedly anthropocentric and anti-religious ”Western liberalism and secularism” that goes back to the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution — all of which, are, of course, seen as peculiar developments of Western culture and civiliza-tion.

The Orthodox, in this perspective, cannot but keep a distance from what they regard as key elements of Western history in the modern era. Such ideas like the secular state, democracy and Human Rights, with their dangerous bases like secularism and individualism are thus not an achievement, but a threat. Corresponding statements about the limited value of the “Western” Enlightenment and its achievements again came from the Russian Orthodox Church, when in 2003 the Constitutional Treaty of the European Union, and the included Human Rights cata-logue, was under discussion:

In our opinion, the ideas of the Enlightenment played an important role in some countries, but they are not universal or commonly accepted, since many people do not share them fully. A reference to the ideas of the Enlightenment is no more ideologically neutral than a reference to a par-ticular religion. In addition, anthropocentric formulations included in the Preamble to the Constitution of the European Union may provoke a nega-tive attitude of many religious Europeans including Orthodox Christians to the integration processes.51

The threat comes from “cultural aberrations” as much as from the secular state, i.e. from a government that is no longer bound by religious values and thus immediately exposed to the temptations of power. In the eyes of many Orthodox theologians, modern secularism long ago has set off to eliminate the holy Church and the Christian faith. A particularly striking feature is the link that outstanding Russian churchmen have made between the anti-clerical tendencies of the Enlightenment, and the

50 A key event in this respect was the bombardment of Belgrade by NATO forces during the Kosovo war in 1999, which for many constituted the final confirmation of the use of “double standards” in Human Rights, cf. Selbach (2002), p. 163f, with further references. Some Westerners likewise criticized the inadequateness of these actions. Cf. the remarks made by the former director of the Keston Institute, Lawrence Uzzell, in Orthodoxie aktuell 2002, no. 5, p. 10.

51 Cf. http://orthodoxeurope.org/page/4/3.aspx.



French Revolution in particular, and the anti-religious campaigns of Communism in the former Soviet Union. According to Patriarch Kirill, and also for example Bishop Hilarion of Volokolamsk, former repre-sentative of the Russian Orthodox Church in Brussels, both stem from the same root: one straight and dangerous path leads from the atheistic statements of some of the Enlightenment philosophers and from anti-clerical riots during the French Revolution to the violent persecutions of Christians in the Soviet era. The enemy of Christendom is still the same — it is what they call “militant secularism,” narrowly connected with an “idolatry of the individual”: ‘l’Occident chrétien n’a pas dénoncé l’idolâtrie de l’individu qui s’est développé depuis l’époque des Lumières et qui s’est inscrite sous la bannière de la lutte antireligieuse en Union soviétique.’52

Some critical observations

Against the above-mentioned background, one cannot but state that with such views, the Moscow Patriarchate puts itself into an ambiguous position not only in the entire Human Rights discourse, but even in rela-tion to possible allies. This is a problem because its members frequently express their will to enter into a dialogue about the concept, and some Western experts on the issue have found several elements of the Orthodox critique serious and well-founded.

On one hand, there are some striking parallels with views present in Roman Catholicism, both approaches being essentially nurtured by theo-logical critique of a pure secular understanding of Human Rights. Even in terms of cultural criticism or criticism of modernity, the warning of an allegedly “aggressive secularism and liberalism” that is about to con-tinue the anti-Christian movement of the Reformation, the Enlighten-ment and Communism finds its match in the “dictatorship of relativism” that the Roman Pope and many around him have identified as a threat of modernity. On the other hand, the severe dissociation from “the West” and the insistence on the distinctiveness of an “Orthodox Russian civili-zation” tend to create a distance that might be difficult to overcome, if taken seriously. At any rate, however, one gets no clear idea of whether

52 Kirill, ‘Néoliberalisme occidental et traditionalisme orthodoxe,’ Istina 45, 2000, pp. 292—295, quotation p. 292. See also Bishop Hilarion, ‘Der militante Säkularismus und das Christentum. Die religiösen und die “allgemeinmenschlichen” Werte“,’ Orthodoxie aktuell, nos. 5-6, 2005, pp. 12-17.


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it is a competition of ideologies (like “atheism and liberalism” versus “religion and traditional values”) or a “clash of civilizations” which is at stake. In other words, the question whether Human Rights are regarded as universal, but incomplete, or as a specific outcome of Western civili-zation presumably in decline anyway that needs to be replaced by better concepts, is not answered unambiguously.

The reference to the Post-Soviet academic discipline of culturology also leads to dubious results in this respect. Generally speaking, to note - or pretend - that there are different “civilizations” and that Russia or “the Orthodox World” represent a “civilization” or “culture” distinct from “the Western civilization” is one thing, and some kind of every day experience might make one agree to some extent. To state that for this reason the Human Rights concept cannot be applied in this “Orthodox World” is something different, even in terms of methodology. To argue that Human Rights do not fit a civilization that, like the Russian one, is different from “the West,” can be convincing (or at least deliver suffi-cient grounds for further discussion) only if there are commonly accepted criteria of what defines such things as “civilizations” or “cultures,” and if there are clear indications where the borders between them are to be found (especially those borders that a concept as that behind Human Rights allegedly cannot overcome). If such criteria are lacking, this argument must seem ideologically biased, and more the result of wishes and aversions than of sober analysis. Even if one should not subscribe to the critique on Post-Soviet culturology in its various forms that has been formulated by several Western observers (like those referred to above), the crucial point remains that this discipline does not deliver more of such commonly acceptable criteria than Western cultural studies pres-ently do. Such a consensus does not exist (neither is there a consensus about how borders between “civilizations” differ from those between nations, or different lifestyles in urban centres and on the countryside etc.), and is perhaps not likely to come about in the near future. Theo-retically, this may be explained by the fact that definitions of “civiliza-tions” or “cultures” are themselves probably (or necessarily) determined by the “cultural’ context from which they originate, an argument which, however, in turn must not lead to a new arbitrary decision, in other words, a groundless claim of difference. In other words, the questions what actually may allow to speak about a sharp borderline between “civilizations” that necessarily affects a universal concept such as that of Human Rights is anything but easy to answer beyond established stereotypes.



This theoretical dilemma certainly deserves a more thorough exami-nation, which is, however, beyond the limits and scope of this paper. While this dilemma might yet be somehow solved practically by allu-sions to an Orthodox mission (to enrich the deficient Human Rights concept) and to peaceful dialogue between civilizations, which is also continuously propagated (and thus to make eventual borders less significant),53 other points are more precarious. To declare Human Rights merely the outcome of an atheist Enlightenment, inimical to church and religion alike, obviously means to operate with highly selective images that historical research has long left behind. Clergymen, for example, took an active part in the formulation of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen) in 1789, before these rights were trampled underfoot during a later phase of the revolution.54

As for the Enlightenment in general, it is no longer an exciting or original statement to recall, that most figures in the large movement commonly called the Enlightenment were anything but atheistic or inspired only by an aggressive atheism. The latter perhaps may be true of some philosophic tendencies in France, and of course of the radical Jacobin heirs of Rousseau. However, it was certainly not true of the Americans who formulated the Declaration of Independence with its open allusion to the Creator, even if some notions of deism may simi-larly evoke the protest of Orthodox or Catholic churchmen. Partially differing from France at this point, intellectual forces in Germany and England were directed much more towards the reshaping, rather than the rejection, of Christian faith.55 The return of a systematic interest in reli-gion into the historiography of the Enlightenment dates back — along with many other “revivals of religion” — to the early 1990s. As a pre-liminary result, one can state that staunch atheism was rather the excep-tion even in the 18th century, while the real agenda was set by a broaden-ing spectrum of scepticism, non-confessional and heterodox belief, and

53 According to Kirill (2009), pp. 141-146, it is precisely the narrow and quasi-ideo-logical understanding of Human Rights that currently tends to block this dialogue.

54 See. Bernard Plongeron (ed.), Aufklärung, Revolution, Restauration (1750-1830) [Geschichte des Christentums vol. 10] (Freiburg: Herder, 2000), pp. 315-319; on Catholic misinterpretations, cf. p. 343ff (reviewed translation of the French edition: Histoire du Christianisme des origines à nos jours. Vol. 10: Les défis de la modernité (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1997).

55 Ibid., pp. xv-xxi; Alister E. McGrath, s.v. ‘Religion,’ in John W. Yolton et. al. (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to the Enlightenment (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 447-452.


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strive for reform. All of that, however, was still in some way connected with, or at least related to the churches.56 Ironically, the reviewed Orthodox stereotype of the Enlightenment and of the historical circum-stances that shaped the origin of the Human Rights concept shows much more similarity with the likewise reduced, though in that case positively connoted image that is spread, e.g. by protagonists of a “New Atheism” movement like Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins and others.57 Furthermore, in the light of the present state of historical research, these stereotypes hardly can be regarded as capable to define an all too obvious border between a Western and a non-Western, for example Russian civilization that might be relevant for the discourse on Human Rights.

Conclusion

In their critical stances towards Human Rights, Orthodox voices often reveal a mix of various perspectives. After an examination of them, most of our critical remarks refer to an anti-Western perspective, which, on the grounds of rather specific notions of “tradition” and “traditional values,” operates predominantly with terms of differing “cultures” and “civiliza-tions,” while in fact making use of long-living stereotypes, yet at the same time lacking the degree of theoretical clarity that would allow to enter into a serious further discussion on this level..

While the treatment of some other issues like “freedom” is generally based on Orthodox Christian teaching, the notion of “tradition” (in rela-tion to “morality,” “traditional values”) obviously refers not only to Christian religion in its opposition to the secular Human Rights concept. It is in fact a key term to transform a theological critique into an argu-ment that rejects central parts of the Human Rights concept on the grounds of a general dissociation from “Western civilization.” While these “traditional values” are most obviously defined by what Human Rights in their Western liberal perception are not, the further relation of them is specified neither to Christian ethics, nor to e.g. what Western

56 See the review essays under the overall title ‘God and the Enlightenment’ by Dror Wahrman, Dale K. Van Kley, Jonathan Sheehan in The American Historical Review, vol. 108, no. 4, 2003, pp. 1057-1103.

57 See Alister McGrath, ‘Atheism and Enlightenment: Reflections on the Intellectual Roots of the “New Atheism”.’ Lecture held at Radboud University Nijmegen on December 3, 2009, available online via http://www.refdag.nl/media/2009/20091204_Lezing_McGrath_Nijmegen.pdf [last accessed on 07.21.2010].



discourse has as natural law. It is thus not clear, whether the Orthodox Church with its comments aims at a dialogue between Christian theology and the secular foundations of the Human Rights concept,58 or at a dialogue between different civilizations, as might be assumed on the grounds of statements elsewhere.

An answer to this question theoretically could be found in presuming that it is about both: To enter into dialogue as a Christian civilization with a secularized (or “godless”, if one puts it polemically) “Western civilization.” Apart from the disturbing fact that, for example, some of the Orthodox points of critique are likewise present in critical comments of Western churches, while some other key elements of the Human Rights concept have more religious bases than is commonly known, such a view can hardly be kept pure from polemical overtones, and it indeed makes use of quite a number of older resentments and stereo-types. As observed in practice, in the majority of reactions during the preceding years, it is precisely the Human Rights issue that evokes strong signs of estrangement and mutual misunderstanding between East and West.59 The assumption seems justified then that on the part of the Orthodox, this might be due to stereotypes and to perspectives mixed with long-living anti-Western patterns and with concepts of “culturol-ogy” that in Western eyes often are either insufficiently founded or insufficiently understandable — notwithstanding the fact, of course, that other stereotypes are probably at work in the West as well, and to a similar degree.

To which extent, however, is this alleged “clash of civilizations” a real one? At any rate, central terms often used particularly by repre-sentatives of the Russian Orthodox Church proved to stand only with some difficulty a thorough analysis of their content. Much work on ter-minology and within various academic disciplines needs to be done until in a so-called encounter between “cultures” or “civilizations” one can clearly distinguish between real differences and ideological covering of a simple lack of understanding.60 For the time being, things seem to

58 This is explicitly stated e.g. in the introduction to Osnovy (2008). 59 For a more detailed documentation, see Alfons Brüning, ‘”Orthodoxe Werte” und

Menschenrechte — Hintergründe eines aktuellen Diskurses,’ Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 62, 2010, no. 1-2, pp. 103-152.

60 At this point, I also have in mind here the simple fact that in terms of logics the only clear opposite of a civilization or culture is non-civilization, which latter, depending on which interpretation is preferred, can mean either “nature” or, more often, “barba-rism”. Not only with regard to the fact that this is precisely the way in which already inhabitants of the Byzantine Empire spoke about their Western counterparts since the


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become unclear and eventually biased, and the dissociation from “the West” a rather artificial one, as soon as one leaves the ground of pure theological argumentation.

Conversely, the theological perspective, however controversial it may seem, can obviously claim more relevance, as it operates with a more concise terminology. Insofar as they touch upon themes, which result from opposite views, like those of Christian theology and secular theory, the Orthodox churches and their representatives rightly hint at questions which still need an answer. Consequently, statements by Orthodox intel-lectuals in recent years have received some support among Western phi-losophers and theologians, not the least because they hint at points in which the debate on Human Rights in its present state is generally inter-ested. Such points in fact are questions like those for the grounds on which a secular state can persist, and the foundations for the moral behaviour and education of its citizens.61 This can be seen as a first and positive sign that, on this level, the intended dialogue effectively works, and that it may lead to positive results for all parts involved. Critique of what is considered to be “Western” in principle can play a positive role as well, while mere anti-Western resentments in their present state are perhaps too confused to do so.

early Middle Ages, the question generally and always remains to be answered, to which extent such older, now hidden discriminations continue to exert their influence in present debates about the differences between “civilizations” and for example. the universality of Human Rights.

61 Cf. the editor’s note in Kirill (2009), pp. iii-xiv; Barbara Hallensleben, ‘Russische Beiträge zur westlichen Menschenrechtsdebatte’, G2W 27, no. 10, 2009, pp. 25-27.


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