The Social Science Journal 47 (2010) 69–89

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

Framing public policy: The impacts of politicalsophistication and nature of public policy

Yu-Kang Lee a,∗, Chun-Tuan Chang b,∗,1

a Department of Political Economy, National Sun Yat-sen University, No. 70,Lien-Hai Road, Kaohsiung, 804, Taiwan

b Department of Business Management, National Sun Yat-sen University, No. 70,Lianhai Rd., Gushan District, Kaohsiung, 804, Taiwan

Received 6 October 2008; received in revised form 24 May 2009; accepted 5 July 2009

Abstract

This empirical research investigates how political sophistication moderates framing effects on publicopinion and attitudes. It explores when framing effects occur and who could be immune to such framing.Experimental results with multivariate analyses indicate that political sophistication enhances or reducesframing effects in shaping public views and stances, subject to the nature of public policy. When a publicpolicy is promoted that is perceived as an easy issue, framing effects are significant for individuals whoare less politically sophisticated. Alternatively, when a hard issue is presented, opposite results areobserved. Framing effects are insignificant in promoting an ideological issue regardless of a person’spolitical sophistication.© 2009 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

Individuals in modern society are faced with a bewildering set of public policies and aconfusing barrage of related information on economic, political and social issues. The ques-tion of how the public perceives messages regarding a promoted policy arises. How to framethe promoted public policy issues advantageously has become an important part of politicalcommunication. Researchers suggest, and it has long been recognized, that an individual’s judg-ments and decisions can be influenced greatly by the way information is presented or framed

∗ Corresponding authors. Tel.: +886 7525 2000x5590; fax: +886 7525 5582.E-mail addresses: yklee@mail.nsysu.edu.tw (Y.-K. Lee), ctchang@faculty.nsysu.edu.tw (C.-T. Chang).

1 Tel.: +886 7525 2000x4627.

0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2009 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2009.07.002

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(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Nelson & Kinder, 1996). The importance and implicationsof message framing have been recognized in political science literature, not least in terms ofhow differently framed political messages can influence public opinion and attitude formation.However, a review of the current literature informs us that most studies concerning framingeffects concentrate on analyses in Western democracies, e.g., the U.S. and Europe (Callaghan& Schnell, 2005, 2009; Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, & Rucht, 2002; Price & Tewksbury, 1997).

This study used Taiwan for its experimental setting and has two major interests. First, itcan fill a gap in the current literature, providing novel lessons for future framing research inAsia, because Taiwan is one of the most dynamic and vibrant regimes in terms of its economic,political and social development. Second, the plurality of Taiwanese public attitudes towardpublic themes offers an ideal ground for studies of political sophistication on framing effects.Public opinion about public policy in Taiwan can vary differently depending on the nature ofan issue (i.e., sensitivity, adversity, and polarization) (Lee & Chang, 2005). These irregularitiesdismantle normative models of democratic governance principally founded on the proposal thatpeople sustain consistent and unwavering partialities (Bartels, 2003). During recent politicalcampaigns and elections in Taiwan, framing has often been a deliberate and strategic processcarried out using press releases, rallies, press conferences, and speeches to achieve their targetedends (Lee, 2005).

This study examines the relationship between framing effects and political sophisticationunder various types of public policy and explains how they influence public attitudes towardthe promoted policy issue. Questions of when framing effects occur (i.e., when does the public“accept” a frame?) and under what circumstances framing effects may not work (i.e., who couldbe immune to a frame?) are explored. Further: What influences will political sophisticationbring to reduce or increase framing effects? Will different types of public policy moderate theframing effects on communication effectiveness? Using different types of public policy, wenot only attempt to test the intricate interrelationship between framing effects and politicalsophistication, but also make broad implications regarding both the magnitude of framingeffects and the implicit nature of political sophistication for those like-minded policy makersand politicians among our readers.

In the next section, we outline a rationale for an interrelationship among framing effects,political sophistication, and the nature of public policy. The subsequent section providesa description of our methodology and variables. In the penultimate section, we describeour results. The paper concludes with a discussion of our findings, limitations and futureresearch, and implications for our understanding of the conditionality of framing influ-ences.

2. Conceptual background and hypotheses

2.1. Framing effects on public policy communication

Framing shapes information processing through a variety of cognitive heuristics andbiases (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Framed messages represent different portions of materi-als and affect how individuals form different opinions and judgments (Druckman, 2001;

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Gamson & Modigliani, 1987; Rabin, 1998; Sniderman & Theriault, 1999). Iyengar andKinder (1987) not only support the views above but also suggest that knowledge and infor-mation about public policy may be substantially shaped by the selection and presentationof information. Framing research is grounded in the basic tenets of Kahneman and Tver-sky’s prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Tverskyand Kahneman (1981) show that two logically equivalent (but not transparently equiva-lent) statements of a problem lead decision makers to choose different options. Kahnemanand Tversky (1982) further argue that the effects of framing encompass not only statisti-cal novices but also statistically sophisticated subjects. Entman suggests that “To frame isto select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communica-tion, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moralvaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (1993, p. 52). Fram-ing is generally defined as the process by which media elites or communication sources,such as news or political organizations, define and construct issues or events (Gamson,1992).

Political scientists and communication scholars typically use framing to capture the natureof political discourse. One common manipulation is issue framing (e.g., Druckman, 2004;Iyengar, 1991; Jacoby, 2000; Nelson & Kinder, 1996; Nelson, Oxley, & Clawson, 1997).By emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant considerations, a speaker leads individuals tofocus on them, thereby shaping their opinions. For instance, Nelson and Kinder (1996) indicatethat alternative framing for welfare, affirmative action, and AIDS policy influence the relativeimportance of certain predictors of opinion toward these same public affairs. In the case ofAIDS spending, they find that frames focusing on the beneficiaries of a given policy (e.g.,homosexual men) increase the overall importance of attitudes toward that group in influencingopinion of the policy. Attitudes toward the group influence opinions toward the policy morestrongly when the issue is framed in group terms. Iyengar (1991) shows that a framed messagefocusing on individual cases may lead viewers to make internal attributions for social problems(e.g., to blame poverty on a lack of motivation or ability on the part of the poor). On the otherhand, a framed message focusing on broader social, political, and economic forces encouragesviewers to make external attributions (e.g., to blame poverty on economic problems or a lackof political will). Jacoby (2000) uses similar frames to investigate a context of governmentalspending, with a “general issue” frame and a “specific issue” frame as the objects of comparison(Jacoby, 2000). Based on the studies above, issue framing is generally manipulated throughstressing specific values, facts, or considerations to endow people with apparent relevance tothe issue.

In addition to academic research, framing has long been utilized in practice by politiciansand campaigners for the purposes of political communication and of their own political agenda.Take President George W. Bush’s War on Iraq for instance. One could argue that PresidentBush framed the reasons for ‘War on Iraq’ various ways (see the relevant dates in The WhiteHouse News Archive). First, he asserted that for the sake of U.S. homeland security, a waron Iraq was necessary. Second, he also alleged that the Iraqi government possessed weaponsof mass destruction, which was an imminent threat to the United States. Additionally, Bushcontended that without Sadam Hussein the world would be a better place. The aforementionedarguments outline Bush’s rationale for engaging in a war with Iraq. President Bush framed his

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messages in a number of different ways that attempted to convince the U.S. people and the restof the world that his war on Iraq was legitimate.

Elsewhere in the world, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan, for instance,has exploited framing techniques during major election campaigns. There is a common under-standing about the pro-independent stance of the DPP. It is generally believed that the DPP’sapparent independent stance has not served a positive purpose for vote getting (Lee, 2005). Dur-ing major elections, however, the DPP proved to be capable of utilizing framing techniques inits own favor (e.g., Chen Shui-bian’s New Taiwan Middle Way in the 2000 presidential electioncampaign). For example, when the DPP campaigned to get the Taiwanese middle-class vote,the party’s pro-independent stance was diluted through soft-line message framing techniquesbecause the DPP realized that the middle-class voters would favor the status quo regardingthe cross-straits relations. On the other hand, the DPP used die-hard messages to woo votesfrom steadfast independent-minded people regardless of the possibility of military threats fromChina if Taiwan became independent. Thus, it is apparent that the DPP utilized various framingtechniques to influence differently targeted audiences.

The two vivid examples above demonstrate how framing techniques are utilized in real-world situations. In fact, framing effects are remarkably complex. Framing effects can beenhanced, reduced, or even removed (Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990; Nabi, 2003; Smith,1996; Smith & Levin, 1996). In this research, the effectiveness of message framing is proposedto be contingent on an individual’s political sophistication and the nature of public policy, towhich we now turn.

2.2. Moderating role of political sophistication on framing effects

Political sophistication has been regarded as a key element of cognitive tendency in politicalcommunication (Converse, 1964; Guo & Moy, 1998; Jacoby, 2000; Lau & Erber, 1985; Lupia,1994; Shah, 2001; Zaller, 1992). It can be defined as an individual’s prior familiarity with thepolitical issues (Nelson et al., 1997) and his/her ability to think carefully and abstractly aboutpolitics (Luskin, 1987, 1990). Political scientists weigh this element when evaluating what anindividual knows about politics and government (Levendusky & Jackman, 2003). The degreeof a recipient’s political sophistication influences the effects of political communication suchas agenda setting, advocating and persuading (Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 1982; Krosnick &Brannon, 1993).

The integration of message framing and political sophistication in the field of political com-munication has opened up a Pandora’s Box for those who are interested in framing effectsand political science. Here we propose that the magnitude of framing effects on communica-tion effectiveness will be contingent on an individual’s political sophistication toward a publicissue. As mentioned earlier, framing serves as a heuristic cue in information processing (e.g.,Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Less knowledgeable people possess fewer strongly held prior opin-ions (and frames) and thus exhibit increased susceptibility to new frames. Compared withaudiences who are less sophisticated, those of high political sophistication are less likely to bepersuaded by framed messages since they are already acutely aware of the facts and arguments.Zaller (1992) also indicates that people who are involved in public affairs are less likely tochange their opinion based on mass media messages. This is consistent with the findings of

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Hurtwiz (1989) who found in a survey-based experiment that those participants involved inpublic issues are less willing to change their opinion on a variety of issues. Druckman andNelson (2003) further argue that more knowledgeable individuals possess prior opinions andare less susceptible to new frames. People who are of high political sophistication tend to holdconsistent and stable stances on political issues, and are less attracted to persuasive appeals.These people are also more likely to be opinionated in accordance with their perceptions ofpublic policy issues (Knight, 1985; Miller, Miller, Raine, & Brown, 1976). As a result, it wouldbe more difficult to persuade a politically sophisticated person by subsidiary cues. The impli-cation is, therefore, that higher political sophistication facilitates the message recipients tomore readily analyze the information itself and dismiss counter-attitudinal arguments. Highersophistication would act to weaken framing effects. The discussion above leads to the followinghypothesis.

H1: Compared with those of high political sophistication, individuals of low politicalsophistication are more likely to be influenced by framing effects.

2.3. Influence of the nature of public policy on framing effects

Not all public policies are equally vulnerable to framing effects. Different public policyissues have been broadly divided into two types: hard and easy issues (Carmines & Stimson,1980). Hard issues are new, more technical, more difficult, and more detailed oriented. Theseissues require a reasoned and thoughtful attempt by individuals who wish to process the infor-mation. On the other hand, issues described as easy are more familiar and straightforward tocitizens, and can become so ingrained over a long period that they generate “gut responses” tothe issues. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) find energy issues to be more vulnerable to media effectsthan news about unemployment. Their results reflect the relative novelty of energy issues com-pared to those of unemployment. A recent study by Kelleher and Wolak (2006) shows thateasily understood issues, such as many commonly addressed issues relating to the economy,are more likely to be primed in presidential evaluations, while more complex considerationssuch as foreign policy assessments are less susceptible to priming effects. Contextual influ-ences such as question wording can make issues assume greater perceived importance thanthey otherwise might have had (Miller & Krosnick, 2000). Although previous studies do notspeak directly to the influences of framing effects, they together suggest that easy issues willbe less susceptible to media effects than issues that are hard and more complicated. Therefore,we argue that because some pubic policies are easily understood by citizens, they are less likelyto be influenced by framing effects. Alternatively, framing effects will have a stronger impacton public policies that are more complicated to citizens. Different frames thus have a signif-icant influence on communication effectiveness according to the nature of the public policyissues.

H2: The nature of public policy will moderate framing effects on communication effec-tiveness. Framing effects will be stronger in hard issue promotion than easy issuepromotion.

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2.4. Interrelationship among framing effects, political sophistication, and the nature ofpublic policy

The last focus of this research addresses a three-way interaction among message framing,political sophistication, and nature of public policy. One question remains unanswered: willthe nature of public policy moderate the relationship between the framing effects and politicalsophistication? Carmines and Stimson (1980) suggest that more interested, more informed, andmore involved citizens are more likely to discriminate over hard issues than their less interested,less informed, and less involved counterparts. McGraw and Ling (2003) suggest that new issuesare more likely to be primed for the politically knowledgeable, while familiar issues are morelikely to be primed among the less knowledgeable. Druckman and Holmes (2004) furtherexamine the role of political sophistication and find that international issues (hard issues) areprimed for evaluation by the politically knowledgeable, but that presidential images (easyissues) are primed for favorable approval ratings by the less politically sophisticated. Theprevious mentioned literature, above, implies that people with different degrees of politicalsophistication may respond to easy and hard issues in a different way. Therefore, when thenature of public policy is perceived as likely to be easily understood by the citizens, the“diminishing” hypothesis drawn in H1 suggests that citizens of low political sophistication canindeed acquire an understanding of them over the broad political environment with little effort.Compared with those who are politically sophisticated, framing effects are expected to makea stronger impact on those counterparts who are less sophisticated.

In contrast, hard issues require greater cognitive skills and efforts to be used in makingchoices. The framing impact may be minor on the less politically sophisticated since theseindividuals fail to connect these complex issues to the evaluation they are about to make.The politically sophisticated may be more capable of processing public policy issues that arespecific and detailed with nuanced arguments and implications that can be difficult to draw.Sophistication promotes reliance on abstract beliefs and values (Goren, 2004). Richer politicalknowledge boosts learning and use of information and initiates more responses (Iyengar, 1991).Therefore, decisions based on political sophistication may be facilitated by framing effectswhen hard issues are being promoted.

The issue categorization above is based on two types of issues: hard and easy ones (Carmines& Stimson, 1980). What about an issue that is related to ideology? Ideological labels are fre-quently connected to political choices and serve as heuristic devices in political communication(Converse, 1964; Zechmeister, 2006). To replace framing effects, subjective understanding ofan ideological issue will shape citizens’ attitudes, opinion and beliefs. Individuals may belittle affected by how the issue is presented since they may have long ago made subjectiveinterpretations of the issue. Hence, it is predicted that herein framing effects will not differacross levels of political sophistication. Based on the aforementioned arguments, a three-wayinteraction among framing effects, political sophistication, and the nature of public policy isproposed as follows.

H3a: When one is promoting a public policy that is perceived as easy, framing effectswill have a stronger impact on individuals of low political sophistication than those ofhigh political sophistication.

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H3b: When one is promoting a public policy that is perceived as hard, framing effectswill have a stronger impact on individuals of high political sophistication than those oflow political sophistication when promoting a public policy that is perceived as hard.

H3c: Framing effects will become insignificant when one is promoting an ideologicalissue.

3. Research design

The present study began as an inquiry into causality, intending to reveal how framing effectsand political sophistication might influence political communication and public policy promo-tion. Subsequently, an experimental design was employed for addressing issues of causalityin social science research. An experiment tested the relative effectiveness of two framed mes-sages to present the public policy issues with different degrees of political sophistication in a2 (message framing: general vs. specific) × 3 (nature of public policy: easy vs. hard vs. ideo-logical issue) mixed design. Based on previous research in issue framing, framing effects wereconceptualized as treating the same issue but presenting it differently to draw the attention ofthe targeted audience according to a specific purpose. The two frames utilized in this research(general vs. specific) were derived from actual news broadcasts, press releases, and the authors’political observations. Message framing was selected as a between-subjects variable, and thenature of public policy was chosen to be a within-subjects variable.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of the two frames in each public policy issue.Each participant read paragraphs of three public policies in which one version of the messagewas presented. The order of the three public policies to which participants were exposedwas rotated to counterbalance any primacy or recency effects. Most of the measures wereadopted from previous studies (e.g., Lee & Chang, 2005; Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990;Sniderman & Theriault, 1999). Data were tested by detecting framing effects on participants’responses: cognitive responses and attitudes toward the public policy issue.

Prior to the experiment, the treatment booklets were randomized. The researchers went toprearranged classes at the beginning of different series of lectures to brief students, i.e., thatthis research was to better understand public opinion toward different public policy issues.Students were requested to participate in the research, and were allowed to decline if theychose. Participants received a booklet containing a premanipulation survey, followed by threeframed public policy issues and a postmanipulation questionnaire to indicate their own attitudesconcerning each public policy issue. After the questionnaires were collected, participants werethanked and debriefed. The experiment lasted about 25 min.

3.1. Participants

Participants consisted of 288 part-time undergraduate students (154 males and 132 females,with two failing to specify their gender) from six evening courses across various disciplines inthree national universities in Taiwan. Given the relative strengths of the Kuomingtang (KMT)in the north and the DPP in the south, diversely located universities were chosen advisedly to

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attenuate the divergency of the parties’ stands on the public policy issues. Nine participantshad to be removed from the analysis because of incomplete questionnaires. In the final sampleof 279 respondents, ages ranged from 18 to 62 years, of which the mean = 26.1 and standarddeviation = 7.23.

3.2. Independent variables

3.2.1. Manipulations of message framingDescriptions of each promoted public policy were framed in a paragraph (see Appendix A

for detailed framing manipulations). Two framing conditions were developed for each issueseparately. For the issue of “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed”, one message wasconstructed with a general frame that described why the economy should come first and theother was framed with a specific message that contained positive and upbeat reasoning on notonly why the economy should come first but also how successfully the economy would smooththe progress of social welfare. For the policy of “Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait”,the general-frame message focused on the positive consequences that direct communicationcould potentially bring to Taiwan. Conversely, the other message emphasized the specificconsequences of not having direct communication between the Taiwan Strait. Two messageframes in “The Cross-Strait Relations” dealt with a long-standing issue relating to ideology,which differed in general/specific arguments. The presented information was professionallyproduced in an attempt to make it as realistic to respondents as possible.

3.2.2. Manipulation of public policy natureHighly controversial and debated public policy fields in Taiwan were chosen for potential

experimental materials based on a pretest with 69 part-time students (39 males and 30 females)from one course in economics. The adults classified fifteen public issues, which could representcore themes of political campaigns and major concerns of the general public, into easy, hard,or ideological issues. “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed”, and “Three Direct Linksbetween the Taiwan Strait” were selected to represent an easy issue (55 out of 69 chose it as aneasy issue: Chi-square value = 30.98, p < .01) and a hard one, respectively (50 out of 69 viewedit as a hard issue: Chi-square value = 24.39, p < .01) issues. “The Cross-Strait Relations” (61out of 69 perceived it as an ideological issue: Chi-square value = 36.45, p < .01) was chosen tostand for a highly polarized ideological issue discussed across media, especially after China’sproclamation of its Anti-secession Law and the visits of both KMT and People First Party(PFP) chairpersons to Beijing after mid-2005.

3.2.3. Measure of political sophisticationPolitical sophistication was measured at the beginning of the premanipulation questionnaire.

To avoid subjective assessment, a knowledge scale was constructed from a number of factualsituations to assess political sophistication (Lee & Chang, 2005; Mondak, 1999, 2001; Zaller,1992). The scale of political sophistication was built from ten questions concerning local andnational political issues in Taiwan. A political sophistication scale was constructed by summingup the correct responses to the 10 knowledge items (M = 4.36, S.D. = 1.96). The sample wasdivided into low sophisticates (N = 138) and high sophisticates (N = 134) by a median-split.

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3.3. Other premanipulation measures

In addition to political sophistication, participants’ political behaviors were assessed.

1. Information power. Numbers and categories of sources for economic, social, and politi-cal information were measured to indicate participants’ information power. Participantsspecified their common sources of information (e.g., TV, newspaper and magazines,radio, Internet and so on). The higher the number of categories shown, the strongerinformation power the participant would tend to have.

2. Perceived involvement with public issues. Participants self-reported how they felt abouttheir concern with public issues with a 5-point scale (from not concerned at all toextremely concerned). Higher numbers indicated the participants’ higher perceivedinvolvement with public issues. This question accessed individuals’ subjective percep-tions of their overall political sophistication.

3. Political bias. One question assessed how often participants agreed that the governmentalpolicies are correct with a 5-point scale (from always correct to never correct). A highernumber represents greater political bias of the participant. Such bias could moderateframing effects and served as a control variable in the experiment.

3.4. Postmanipulation measures

After reading a framed paragraph for a public policy issue, participants answered questionsdivided across four dimensions as follows.

1. Attitudes toward the public policy issue. Based on the traditions of behavioral scienceresearch, communication effectiveness can be reflected in viewers’ attitudes toward theissue (Callaghan & Schnell, 2009). Participants’ attitudes were measured with four-item 7-point semantic differential scales, including how likely they would be to endorsethe public policy issue, how reasonable they felt the public policy issue was, and howbeneficial they believed the public policy issue would be to society. The items wereaveraged to derive an overall rating to quantify the communication effectiveness and thisserved as the dependent variable. Higher perceptual ratings on attitudinal measures mayresult in greater communication effectiveness.

2. Thought-listing task. Participants were asked to list the thoughts that they had whilereading the description of the public policy issue. Participants were instructed to list onlyone thought per line and that they need not use all of the lines provided. Two judges,who were blind to framing conditions, independently coded the thoughts listed into fourcategories, including either favorable (i.e., statements expressing a positive reaction tothe public policy issue), unfavorable (i.e., statements expressing a negative reaction to thepublic policy issue), neutral (i.e., statements expressing a reaction that was neither clearlypositive nor clearly negative), or unrelated (i.e., statements not associated with reactionsto the public policy issue). They then calculated the number of thoughts. This method,adopted from previous consumer research (Homer & Yoon, 1992; Tykocinski, Higgins,& Chaiken, 1994), has certain advantages, such as that the task is less time-consuming forrespondents, has lower likelihood of generating respondent boredom, captures a broad

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range of responses, and reduces common method covariation with other objective scalemeasures. It was used to measure the effects of framing on individual cognition related tothe respective frames. Interrater agreement was high (γ = .92), and disagreements wereresolved through discussion.

3. Manipulation check on message framing. Two questions provided a check on the framingmanipulation for each public policy issue. After reading a framed message, respondentsjudged it on two 9-point scales including one ranging from −4 (mostly specific) to +4(mostly general) and the other from −4 (mostly narrow) to +4 (mostly broad).

4. Manipulation check on nature of public policy. Two questions assessed the nature of thepublic policy as perceived by participants with 9-point Likert scales including one rangingfrom 1 (perceived as ambiguous toward public welfare) to 9 (perceived as concrete towardpublic welfare), and the other from 1 (easy issue) to 9 (hard issue).

5. Demographics. For classification purposes, participants provided their demographicinformation including age, gender, and partisan identification (i.e., pan-blue, pan-green,pan-purple parties, etc.).2

4. Results

4.1. Preliminary analysis

For each public policy issue, 143 and 136 participants read the two versions of the mes-sage, respectively. No significant order effects emerged in the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).Therefore, responses of participants who were exposed to public policies presented in differentorders were collapsed together in the following analyses. In 279 valid samples, 54 participants(20% of the total sample) indicated they tended to support the pan-green parties. Thirty-nineparticipants (14%) claimed that they prefer the pan-blue parties. More than 60% of all partici-pants (169 participants) identified themselves with a neutral position and the rest 6% failed todisclose their political affiliation. The sample vividly mimics the population’s partisan identifi-cation, suggesting the public’s true, diversified self-placement in politics in Taiwan. Moreover,approximately 75% of participants indicated that they had three or fewer sources of politicaland social information, with the majority (35%) stating that they had three sources. The mostcommon sources were TV (85%), newspapers or magazines (73%), and the Internet (41%).

Reliability of the scales on attitudes toward the promoted public policy issue was checkedand the following Cronbach’s alphas were obtained: easy issue = 0.9, hard issue = 0.91, andideological issue = 0.89, indicating that those scales were satisfactorily reliable.

4.2. Manipulation checks on message framing

Participants’ evaluations of the messages were examined to confirm that the public pol-icy issues differed depending on how the information was framed. A series of ANOVA werecarried out. For the issue, “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed”, participants whoread the general-frame message envisaged the public policy issue as a statement focusingon general reasons (M = 1.11), whereas those with the specific-frame message (M = −1.02)

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were more likely to visualize the policy as supported with specific reasons emphasizing thepromotion of the economy to lower the unemployment rate as having priority followed bythe advancement of social welfare which would come in a latter stage (F(1, 278) = 10.19,p < .01). Similarly, individuals who read the specific-frame message considered the statementto provide narrower reasons (M = −1.23), whereas those who read the general-frame message(M = 1.05) viewed the policy as providing broader considerations (F(1, 278) = 7.99, p < .05).For the issues, “Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait” and “The Cross-Strait Rela-tions”, respondents to the general-frame conditions were more likely to judge the policy asemphasizing general benefits, whereas those to the specific-frame condition tended to perceivethe information as having specific benefits (“Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait”:F(1, 278) = 30.13, p < .01, Mgeneral frame = 2.01, Mspecific frame = −1.67; “The Cross-Strait Rela-tions”: F(1, 278) = 22.79, p < .01, Mgeneral frame = 1.90, Mspecific frame = −1.44). An examinationof participants’ ratings of the message using the scale from mostly narrow to mostly broadrevealed similar patterns. Participants who read the general information judged broader thandid those who read the specific message (“Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait”: F(1,278) = 19.28, p < .01, Mgeneral frame = 1.66, Mspecific frame = −1.38; “The Cross-Strait Relations”:F(1, 278) = 23.86, p < .01, Mgeneral frame = 1.85, Mspecific frame = −1.52). These results suggest thatparticipants could distinguish the main focus of each differently framed message across all threemanipulated public policy issues.

4.3. Cognitive responses to the framed messages

The total number of thoughts listed by participants was calculated to determine whetherthere were differences across conditions in terms of cognitive responses to the framed policy.It was found that the total number of thoughts was significantly different across respondentswith different degrees of political sophistication for the issue, “Economy First and SocialWelfare Postponed” (F(2, 278) = 3.25, p < .05). Participants of low political sophisticationhad more thoughts (M = 1.57) than those of high political sophistication (M = 1.10). It wasalso found that participants who read the message with specific deliberations generated morethoughts (M = 1.41) than those who read the message with a general rationale (M = 1.01) (F(1,278) = 5.90, p < .01). This suggests that people process information more thoroughly when pro-vided with specific descriptions. Opposite patterns were found for the issue, “Three Direct Linksbetween the Taiwan Strait”, wherein participants of high political sophistication generated morethoughts (Mlow political sophistication = 1.19, Mhigh political sophistication = 1.58). However, differences inthe number of thoughts were not statistically significant across the three levels of politicalsophistication for the issue, “The Cross-Strait Relations”. Respondents showed a similar num-ber of thoughts across the three levels of sophistication (F < 1). A possible explanation lies in thereality that people are not easily influenced by the dogma of ideological issues since they gener-ally have certain steadfast beliefs, and will not be manipulated so easily by framing techniques.

4.4. Outlier detection and assumption testing of ANOVA

As ANOVA is sensitive to outliers, we started our data analyses by testing for outliers(Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). Our analysis revealed that no observations might be considered

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Table 1Summary of treatment means as a function of message framing, political sophistication, and nature of public policywith attitudes toward the promoted policy as the dependent variable.

Low political sophistication High political sophistication

General frame Specific frame General frame Specific frame

Easy issue 4.10 (1.17) 4.50 (1.20) 4.12 (1.14) 4.14 (1.25)Hard issue 4.42 (1.19) 4.61 (1.03) 3.91 (1.32) 4.52 (1.25)Ideological issue 4.02 (1.28) 3.94 (1.21) 4.07 (1.26) 3.88 (0.77)

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations of treatment cells.

univariate outliers and no observations were needed to be eliminated from the data matrix.Inspection of the histograms, normal-probability plots, skewness and kurtosis for each depen-dent measure of each cell was conducted. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test was used to confirmthe normality of the distribution. Another assumption underlying ANOVA is equality of thevariance–covariance matrix. This assumption was supported by using Levene test to confirmthat the variances of the dependent variable were equal across groups.

4.5. Hypotheses testing

An initial set of analyses was conducted to determine whether any of the demographic orother premanipulation variables moderated attitudes toward the public policy issues. No moder-ating effects were ascertained. All the analyses are presented collapsed over these factors. First,two-way interaction between political sophistication and framing effects was not found (F(1,278) = 1.33, p < .05). H1 was not supported. Second, the two-way interaction between the natureof the public policy and the framing effects was significant (F(1, 278) = 7.01, p < .05). Post hoctests with Bonferroni’s adjustment were used to examine how the nature of the public pol-icy moderated the framing effects. The results indicated that the framing effects were strongerwhen the hard issue (i.e., “Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait”) was presented (fram-ing difference between the two messages = 4.59–4.14 = 0.45); framing effects became less butwere still significant when the easy issue (i.e., “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed”)was presented (framing difference between the two messages = 4.32–4.01 = 0.31). Therefore,H2 was supported. Nevertheless, the framing effects became insignificant when the ideolog-ical issue (“The Cross-Strait Relations”) was presented (framing difference between the twomessages = 3.96–3.90 = 0.06).

An ANOVA was performed to investigate a three-way interaction among message fram-ing, political sophistication, and the nature of the public policy. As expected, the three-wayinteraction effect was significant (F(1, 278) = 5.18, p < .05). Post hoc tests with Bonferroni’sadjustment were conducted to test the complicated interaction effect in three public policyissues. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. H3a, H3b and H3c were further scru-tinized to see whether they could be verified, subject to the different natures of the publicpolicy.

In the issue of “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed”, a 2 (framing: general vs.specific) × 2 (political sophistication: low vs. high) ANOVA revealed that there was a two-wayinteraction between message framing and political sophistication (F(1, 278) = 4.14, p < .05).

Y.-K. Lee, C.-T. Chang / The Social Science Journal 47 (2010) 69–89 81

Fig. 1. Results of “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed” (easy issue).

The results with treatment means are depicted in Fig. 1. Among respondents of low politicalsophistication, the public policy framed with specific attributions (M = 4.50) was found to bemore effective than those described with general reasons (M = 4.10) (F(1, 106) = 5.04, p < .05).However, framing effects were null and became insignificant to participants who were highlypolitically sophisticated (F < 1). The results were in line with the “diminishing” hypothesis.H3a was supported.

For the issue, “Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait”, an ANOVA revealed thatan interaction effect between message framing and political sophistication also existed (F(1,278) = 4.98, p < .05). The results with treatment means are presented in Fig. 2. Opposite to thefindings dealing with the issue, “Economy First and Social Welfare Postponed”, significantframing effects were found among participants of high political sophistication, which wasconsistent with H3b. The specific-frame message (M = 4.52) was found to be more effectivethan the general-frame message (M = 3.91) when the public policy was perceived as hard (F(1,94) = 4.96, p < .05). Framing effects were attenuated for the respondents of lower politicalsophistication and became insignificant (F < 1). H3b was thus supported.

Finally, no significant interaction was found between framing effects and political sophisti-cation for the issue, “the Cross-Strait Relations” (F < 1) (see Fig. 3). When dealing with such an

Fig. 2. Results of “Three Direct Links between the Taiwan Strait” (hard issue).

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Fig. 3. Results of “The Cross-Strait Relations” (ideological issue).

ideological issue, participants showed similar attitudes across the levels of political sophistica-tion. H3c was confirmed. The overall results of the three issues were in line with the predictionsof H3a, H3b, and H3c, i.e., that nature of public policy would moderate the relationship betweenframing effects and political sophistication. Contextual influences should be considered inexplaining whether political sophistication may enhance or reduce the framing effects.

5. General discussion

In the context of Taiwan, this research echoes previous findings in Western countries thatmessage framing is influential in public policy promotion (Callaghan & Schnell, 2005, 2009;Ferree et al., 2002; Jacoby, 2000; Price & Tewksbury, 1997). Experimental results from threepublic policies using multivariate techniques support the general proposal that framing a mes-sage differently can affect public attitudes. We proposed political sophistication and the natureof public policy as important moderators, and sought theoretical explanations to explain whenframing effects could and could not work. Three observations from the experimental resultsare noteworthy.

First, not all public policies are equally vulnerable to framing effects. Adopting the typologyprovided by Carmines and Stimson (1980), we found that easy and hard issues are classifiedaccording to the nature of the public policy, thus an easy issue is likely to be an unresolvedconflict long in the public eye. A hard issue is usually new, unfamiliar, and/or complicatedto the public. Our results indicate that framing effects are stronger in promoting a hard issuethan in promoting an easy issue. This finding is in line with what previous studies (e.g., Lau &Redlawsk, 2001) suggest that framing effects may be enhanced when information is unfamiliarand the message frame serves as a heuristic in information processing.

Second, the moderating role of political sophistication on framing effects depends on thenature of the public policy. To be specific, framing effects are enhanced when the less polit-ically sophisticated face an easy issue, which is consistent with the diminishing hypothesis(Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Hurtwiz, 1989; Knight, 1985; Zaller, 1992). Compared with highpolitical sophisticates, low sophisticates tend to be more influenced by framed messages in an

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easy issue. The message with specific attributions was found to be more effective than thatwith a general frame. No such differences were observed among the individuals of high polit-ical sophistication. Conversely, when we presented a hard issue, the framing effects increasedcommunication effectiveness among the high political sophistication respondents. This obser-vation supports the idea that political sophistication can lead to greater learning and informationuse, and generate responses to the issue framed in the message (Druckman & Holmes, 2004;Iyengar, 1991).

Third, resistance to framing effects occurs for long-standing issues such as ideological ones.Participant’s attitudes are barely affected simply by how information is presented. Messageframing can influence public attitudes toward easy and hard issues, but not toward an issuerelated to ideology. Political scientists identify ideology as heuristics (e.g., Converse, 1964;Zechmeister, 2006) because subjective comprehension and interpretation of an ideological issuecan determine a person’s attitudes and beliefs. Framing effects thus have limited influenceson ideological-issue promotion. The results may be also explained by participants’ cognitiveresponses to framed messages and the number of thoughts aroused after reading the message.Our tentative findings suggest that the interactive pattern between message framing and politicalsophistication could lie in the nature of a public policy.

This article makes theoretical and practical contributions to political communication, mes-sage framing, and public policy marketing practice. One remarkable discovery indicates thatpolitical sophistication moderates framing effects in different ways, which could assist in fill-ing in the gaps across diverse theoretical relationships between framing effects and politicalsophistication found in previous studies. It is important to go beyond simple demonstrations ofthe effects of framing effects, and to clarify when the impact of a particular frame is likely tobe effective, reversed, or eliminated by consideration of individual differences and the natureof the issue. A clear summary can be succinctly made: that an appropriately framed messageshould be incorporated into an existing marketing program or media campaign to increase itseffectiveness for promoting various issues of public policy. Political elites should have thewisdom to diagnose under what circumstances message framing can be effective.

6. Limitations and future research

Although the findings and implications of the study provide an important extension ofpolitical communication, several potential limitations should be considered in interpreting theresults of this study. First, the participants were drawn from a convenient sample of students.Although using student samples is common in academic research, and a homogeneous sampleis acceptable when testing theory (Sternthal, Tybout, & Calder, 1994), this practice limitsthe generalizability of the results. The robustness of the results from this study needs to betested by future research conducted with a larger, more representative sample. Second, insteadof using a quasi-experiment (as in this article), pretested attitudes included in an experimentshould be useful in accounting for the pre-existing differences between the groups (Babbie,2004).3 Another possible limitation was that the laboratory setting might have created anartificial but unwanted high attention. A field study would be useful in future investigations. Forexample, Lee (2005) used a discourse analysis to evaluate political communication in Taiwan.

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A field study with a qualitative approach could grant fruitful explanations in improving politicalcommunication. Furthermore, generalizations could be further improved through examiningother highly debated topics (e.g., a comprehensive issue regarding nuclear power plants whichinvolves several disciplines) and complicated public policies containing several disciplinessimultaneously (e.g., socio-economic, political, ecological, and ideological).

Moreover, future investigations should continue to explore other boundary conditions whichmay tell us when framing effects should be enhanced or decreased. For example, some attemptshave been made to investigate the magnitudes of framing effects depending on situationalfactors (Nabi, 2003; Rothman, Martino, Bedell, Detweiler, & Salovey, 1999). Source credibilityhas been identified as a moderator of framing effects (Callaghan & Schnell, 2009; Yoon,Pinkleton, & Ko, 2005). The public are likely to show favorable attitudes toward a policyadvocated by responsible politicians, reliable parties, and credible media. Conversely, framingeffects should decrease given incredible sources. Another worthwhile issue for further researchis the exploration of other framing tactics (e.g., goal framing) (Ganzach & Karsahi, 1995;Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998; Rothman et al., 1999; Smith, 1996) in promoting publicpolicy. Different manipulations of message framing can also be considered in future researchto observe whether their moderating role in communication effectiveness is consistent with ourfindings. Examining these issues will provide public policy makers and campaigners guidelinesto develop appropriately framed messages for particular types of public affairs aimed at differentpublic segments.

7. Conclusion

The present research corroborates earlier findings that message framing influences publicopinion and attitudes. In addition to political sophistication, the nature of the public policyplays an eminent role in determining framing effects and shaping public views and stances.This research should enrich current public opinion literature insofar as it sheds light on howpeople respond to differently framed messages and behave according to their political sophis-tication and the nature of the public policy. Altering the frame of a persuasive message canbe a relatively straightforward task, but how to manipulate the framing effects in one’s favorseems more intricate and complex, yet still attainable. Political sophistication under variouspublic policy contexts offers immaculate lessons to better understand framing influences. Pub-lic policy campaigners should note that the public does not necessarily—in fact, most likelywill not—respond similarly to framed messages. Therefore, they should know not only howto frame their messages, but also who is more likely to respond to such framing. As WilliamBernbach rightfully observed, “The facts are not enough. . .Don’t forget that Shakespeare usedpretty hackneyed plots, yet his message came with great execution” (Kotler, 2003, p.592).

Notes

2. In Taiwan, major political parties include the KMT, DPP, New Party (NP), PFP andTaiwan Solidarity Union (TSU). A major difference among them is their attitudes toward

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the cross-strait relations. Parties such as the KMT, NP and PFP, which are in favor ofunification with China, can be designated ‘pan-blue’ parties. The DPP and TSU, on theother hand, are ‘pan-green’ parties because of their apparent stance supporting Taiwanindependence. As for ‘pan-purple’, it can be regarded as those who are sick-and-tired ofthe long term deadlock created by the ‘pan-blue’ and ‘pan-green’ parties.

3. The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for steering the research in thisdirection.

Appendix A. Framing manipulations

A.1. Economy first, social welfare postponed

A.1.1. General frameIn recent years, due to the rapid decline of Taiwan’s economic growth and the global eco-

nomic depression, the government has proposed the policy of ‘economy first, social welfarepostponed’. The government hopes to put the national budget’s priority on building the publicinfrastructures and related developments in order to help with the country’s economic recovery.While Taiwan’s economic growth is now at the lowest level it has been in the last few decades,it is important to make priority decisions on how to promote the country’s economy. Socialwelfare, once highly prioritized on the government’s policy agenda, will no longer be classifiedas a priority.

A.1.2. Specific frameIn recent years, due to the rapid decline of Taiwan’s economic growth and the global eco-

nomic depression, the government has proposed the policy of ‘economy first, social welfarepostponed’. The government would like to put the national budget’s priority on means topromote the economy (i.e., to increase the budgets for the development of public infrastruc-ture). By doing so, it hopes to not only stimulate a boom in Taiwan’s economy and create jobopportunities, but also reduce the unemployment rate in order to accomplish its social welfareobjectives. In such difficult times for Taiwan, this method can be regarded as the best plan for‘killing two birds with one stone’.

A.2. Three direct links between Taiwan and China

A.2.1. General frameAs Taiwan and Mainland China have joined the WTO one after the other, and the Cross-Strait

trading ties have become more closely attached, the government has been planning optimalpolicies for the Cross-Strait Three Direct Links. Since these policy goals have already beenset, issues relating to the Three Direct Links such as Taiwan’s sovereignty, national securityand economic development should be cautiously addressed. The Cross-Strait Three DirectLinks will effectively promote Taiwan’s economy and reduce trade costs so as to successfullysmother China’s threats of military and political oppression in the future.

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A.2.2. Specific frameAs Taiwan and Mainland China have joined the WTO one after the other, and the Cross-Strait

trading ties have become more closely attached, the government has been planning optimalpolicies for the Cross-Strait Three Direct Links. Since these policy goals have already beenset, issues relating to the Three Direct Links such as Taiwan’s sovereignty, national securityand economic development should be cautiously addressed. Without the Cross-Strait ThreeDirect Links, China’s threats of military and political oppression will be all the more serious.Not only will Taiwan’s economic development face severe restrictions, but also cross-straitsecurity will become an underlying worry for Taiwan’s national security.

A.3. The cross-strait relations

A.3.1. General frameReopening the negotiation gates with China has become a major policy focus for the (DPP)

government. Recent visits of the Chairpersons of the two major opposition parties to theMainland have gained the spotlight among the people of Taiwan. For the two parties’ lead-ers visits to China not only can break the deadlock between Taiwan and China, but have thepotential to restore negotiations between Cross-Strait government officials and making thema successful reality. In attempting this, the government is optimistic about seeing such a stabi-lization in cross-strait relations as to reduce the tension created by the Chinese government’slatest ‘Anti-succession Law’, and about generating the greatest support among cross-straitChinese.

A.3.2. Specific frameReopening the negotiation gates with China has become a major policy focus for the (DPP)

government. Recent visits of the Chairpersons of the two major opposition parties to theMainland have gained the spotlight among the people of Taiwan. While the government antic-ipates restoring the flow of negotiations across the Taiwan Strait, the recent visits of the twoopposition parties’ leaders to China will hopefully bring the Cross-Strait government officialstogether for meaningful negotiations and making them a successful reality. Whether this mayhelp reduce the persistent military threats such as the latest tensions created by the Chinesegovernment’s ‘Anti-Succession Law’ remains unclear. The government has opted for a morevigilant approach.

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