Evolving Roles of Military Forces : From Warfare to Whole of Government Approach to National...
Transcript of Evolving Roles of Military Forces : From Warfare to Whole of Government Approach to National...
EVOLVING ROLES OF MILITARY FORCES : FROM WARFARE TO WHOLE OF
GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO NATIONAL PROBLEMS
Muhammad Zarrar Haider1 discusses the evolution and characteristics of Whole of the
Government Approach to modern day issues, with focus on evolving role of military
forces from warfare towards an important element of power for solution of various
national problems. Various impediments to achieve whole of the government approach
and way ahead for Pakistan has also been discussed.
Introduction
Military forces are an important element of national power. Their role in national domains
depends upon the history and government structures of the nation. In some states where
military dictators rule the country, the armed forces have strict control on the affairs of the
state. On the other hand, in most democratic states military forces are not directly involved in
execution of state affairs, however, they have a strong influence on national policies,
especially on national security and sometimes foreign policy as well. Since independence,
security environment coupled with military rule in Pakistan has transformed armed forces as
an important part of society. Other than defence of nation against armed attack, military
forces have been involved in counter insurgency, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance,
nation building, census and election duties and other constabulary and benign tasks. The
primacy of military forces in national domain is oftenly criticised by various domestic and
international groups due to various agendas. This article explains the evolution of whole of
government approach in various developed countries and explains the evolving role of
military forces in the Whole of Government Approach. Thereafter, various impediments in
operationalizing whole of the government approach have been discussed. Finally it has been
deliberated that culture is the most significant impediment with measures to resolve the
cultural differences for success of any WGA. Based on the experiences of various countries,
way forward for Pakistan have also been discussed. Primarily the literature regarding
Australia has been used for the study because Australia and Pakistan both are commonwealth
1 Muhammad Zarrar Haider is a mariner by profession. He has studied Nautical Sciences, Maritime Studies and
travelled extensively around the globe. Presently he is studying in College of Asia Pacific at Australian National
University, Canberra. His interests include Geopolitics, Maritime Affairs, Strategic Studies and Foreign Affairs.
His email address is [email protected].
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states. Both have British heritage and government structure and both are heavily influenced
by United States.
Evolution of Whole of Government Approach
Whole of Government Approach (WGA) has gained significance in recent years. In post-Cold
War era, the security environment transformed from military to complex mosaic of trans-
national, national, non-state actors playing their part in terrorism, smuggling, human
trafficking, narcotics and various non-traditional threats to national security.2 Globalization,
improvement in information technology, means of transportation and media has changed the
contemporary conflict into a complex, multi-dimensional and dynamic issue. ‘The conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed the limitations of traditional military and diplomatic
interventions’.3 Similarly the experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have also
highlighted the insufficiency of military responses in multi-dimensional conflicts. The
political and military planners have realized that short term and ad hoc actions cannot
guarantee the long term solution to issues faced in modern world. This has led to the
development of Whole of Government Approach. This approach is based on the concept that
all elements of national power (e.g. diplomatic, information, military and economic) are
necessary for solution to any problem. The combination of these elements required for
solution of any problem varies for different operations.
The terms, Inter- Agency, Whole of Government, and Comprehensive Approach all refer to
similar approaches to the solution of complex problems. These are result of efforts made to:
‘encourage collaboration between departments and agencies – challenging the traditional silos
of policy-making that have characterised large, functionally specialised and differentiated
bureaucracies’.4 These approaches require effective civil-military relations to solve the
problems.5 The combination of military and civilian elements of national powers enables to
2 Tanja Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security,’ The New Century, February 2013,
accessed July 15,2013, http://ceas-serbia.org/root/images/Tanja_Mi%C5%A1%C4%8Devi%C4%87_NEW_
CENTURY_3_eng.pdf, 17. 3‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States,’Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
accessed July 15, 2013, http://www.oecd.org/development/incaf /37826256.pdf ,17. 4‘Whole of the Government,’Institute of Public Administration Australia, accessed July 15, 2013,
www.nsw.ipaa.org.au, 213. 5Christopher M Schnaubelt, ed., Towards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military
Concepts of Strategy. (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2011), 4.
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address the root cause of the problems and presents enduring solutions.6 In Australian context,
the term Whole-of-Government is coined whereas in the United Kingdom, its equivalent
‘Joined-up Government’7 was initiated by Prime Minister Tony Blair. On the similar lines,
United States have come up with the idea of Smart Power8 and NATO has adopted concept of
Comprehensive Operations.9
There are many definitions used for the term Whole of the Government Approach. A concise
definition is: ‘collaboration between all relevant government agencies to achieve better
outcomes for clients’.10
Another definition provided by the Australian Government
Management Advisory Committee (2004) is:
Whole of government denotes public service agencies working across portfolio
boundaries to achieve a shared goal and an integrated government response to
particular issues. Approaches can be formal and informal. They can focus on policy
development, program management and service delivery.
Although WGA is being applied in various issues faced by modern governments, for the
purpose of the study, because of involvement of civil and military agencies, the definition
provided by OECD Fragile State Group is relevant:
One where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the
different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation
of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to
increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.11
6Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security’, 17.
7 Dennis Kavanagh and David Richards. ‘Departmentalism and Joined-Up Government: Back to the Future,’
inParliamentary Affairs 54 (2001), 1-18. 8Edwina Thompson, Smart Power (Canberra: Kokoda Foundation, 2010), 50.
9‘NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, underlines that lessons
learned from NATO operations show that effective crisis management calls for a Comprehensive Approach
involving political, civilian and military instruments. Military means, although essential, are not enough on their
own to meet the many complex challenges to Euro-Atlantic and international security’. ‘A Comprehensive
Approach to Crisis Management,’ NATO, accessed July 15, 2013,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm
10‘Whole of the Government’, 214.
11FSG Work Stream on Whole of Government Approaches, Terms of Reference Phase 1 (6.2 and 6.3,
December 2005.
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Australian Defence Force Publication 5.0.1 (Joint Military Appreciation Process) recognises
that all elements of national power are necessary for implementation of national strategy in
contemporary operations. The combination of these elements required for solution of any
problem varies for different operations. Generally some elements can be ‘supported’ whereas
others could be ‘supporting’. It means that for some operations military element may not be
main effort for solution of the problem however, it can be a key enabler or supporting element
to achieve the desired end state.12
The roles, participation and contribution by different
departments are not static and stable; they change at various stages of the operations.13
For
example in a counter insurgency operations, the police and armed forces have major role to
play in surgical operations and other departments have minimum role to play. Contrarily in
stabilization phase, the role of the development agencies is more pronounced because they
have to speed up their efforts to increase the benefits at grass root levels while role of police
and armed forces is restricted to maintaining law and order.
Application of Whole of Government Approach
The recent conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have highlight that along the political and
security nexus, the involvement of foreign affairs, defence and development agencies is
paramount in contemporary Whole of the Government Approaches. The other important
departments include police, judiciary and treasury. However, in order to avoid delays in
coordination of large number of departments, initially the key departments are involved
whereas other departments are involved on requirement basis.14
Other than combat operations, the Whole of Government Approach is necessary because
natural disasters and other calamities occur in any nation where different government
agencies are responsible for various jobs. Military forces are often the first ones to respond to
such calamities. These agencies have restrictive and sometimes overlapping responsibilities.
The conflicting interests of various agencies lead to incoherent responses to these disasters.
The whole of government approach is necessary to avoid wastage of resources as well as
duplication of efforts.15
The WGA is used in many initiatives requiring multi agency
12
Australian Defence Force Publication, ADFP 5.0.1, Joint Military Appreciation Process, 1-3.
13‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 10.
14‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 9.
15Athol Yates and Anthony Bergin, Here to Help: Strengthening the Defence role in Australian Disaster
Management (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2010), 1.
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cooperation. Crime prevention, border protection, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
are few of such initiatives. The military forces may not be part of all such initiatives.
However, this study is concerned with all kind of WGA operations.
Whole of Government Approach is not restricted to government agencies only. As the name
implies, it is considered that WGA is only concerned with government departments, however
Institute of Public Administration Australia, New South Wales believe that according to the
strategic objectives, issue or area concerned, the approach may require involvement of non-
government entities.16
This is due to the fact that in today’s globalized world, all the required
knowledge and expertise may not be held by government departments and unilateral solution
of one problem may bring subsequent problems to other departments. Although governments
have resources, some non-government entities may offer significant resources and expertise to
solve the concerned problem. Moreover, the public is interested in solution of the problems
regardless of mandates of different departments.17
The challenge in WGA is to know when to
involve other government and nongovernmental participants and under what terms and
conditions.18
However, this study focuses on initiatives involving government agencies at
national level only.
Hence WGA is a philosophy to address a crises or conflict. It enables all the contributing
actors to harmonize their efforts and resources to achieve the common goal. It can also be
described as an attempt to have coherence in thinking from strategic to tactical level and
achieve practical cooperation among diplomacy and politics, economy, armed forces and civil
society.19
The effective implementation of WGA requires all participants to put in dedicated
efforts with honesty to solve the common problem. It is paramount to accord due regard to
individual participants roles, mandates, strengths and autonomy.20
Challenges in Whole of Government Approach
16
‘Whole of the Government’, 215. 17
‘Whole of the Government’, 213. 18
‘Whole of the Government’, 215. 19
‘Whole of the Government’, 227. 20
‘A Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management,’ NATO, accessed July 15, 2013,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics _51633.htm.
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Despite all the benefits of WGA on theoretical and practical level, it is difficult to achieve
whole of government approach due to various reasons. The case studies of various operations
show that lack of combined planning process, departmentalism, organization cultures,
resources and system impediments are the major obstacles in WGA.21
The successful
implementation of whole of government approach requires a dialogue between military and
non-military contributors. ‘Such an implementation requires networking and coordination as
opposed to the need to coordinate others – it is to the same extent civilian-civilian as well as
civilian-military coordination’.22
This approach cannot be instantaneously started, it needs to
be started before any conflict or crises begin.23
Lack of Participation in Planning Process
The obstacles start with lack of participation in planning process. In any WGA, various
agencies are joined because of their roles in the crises. Generally all the participants have
different perception of problem and diverse solutions to the same problem. They also have
different vision and measurement of success. ‘It is considered that civilian agencies lack the
same level of vertical integration since they do not have appropriate centres of operative
planning the way they exist at the level of the army’.24
Military forces have structured thought
process which helps to frame the problem and deliberate various options. Often non-military
participants complain that they are not included in the planning process from the beginning.
Absence of various stake holders in the planning phase leads to lack of coordination in
execution phase. The Swedish Joint Preparation Process is a good example to address the
issue. In this case all the stake holders are involved in the planning process from the
beginning to harmonize their activities throughout the operation.25
Absence of common
strategic vision has also been observed which results in wastage of resources, inefficiency and
impermanence of achieved results.26
A joint policy statement is necessary so that all the
participants and stake holders are at the same grid.27
Definition and measurement of success is
another obstacle in this regard. The measurement of effectiveness in military environment is 21
‘Whole of the Government’, 227. 22
Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security’, 19.
23 Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security’, 19.
24 Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security’, 20-21.
25‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 33.
26Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security’, 17.
27 ‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 11.
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often easy, whereas to measure success in political domain or economic development is a
complex issue.28
Hence there is a need to engage all the participants from very beginning so
that all have common understanding of problem and shared vision of solution. A flexible
approach is also required to measure effectiveness of various initiatives.29
Departmentalism
Once the common understanding of the problem, solution and effectiveness is developed
among all the participants, departmentalism is the next impediment in achievement of
successful WGA. Martin Painter discusses the stovepipe thinking and ‘silo’ attitude regarding
bureaucratic politics in Australia.30
He discusses how various departments and agencies
pursue their own agenda in detached and discrete ways without due regards to outcome of
WGAs. Certain departments often engage in ‘turf war’ to secure financial resources, staff
allocations and political mileage for the continuation of various programmes or survival of
their departments.31
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in few individuals in the departments
to expand and get more resources for their departments even though it may not be in the best
interest of the nation or coalition. This kind of narrow approaches hampers the team spirit in
WGA initiatives.32
Because all departments try to protect their own positions and status at
national level, they often compromise on the success of WGA. Middle level of bureaucracy is
the most preventive of WGA. Unprepared participation, departmental rivalry, inadequate
sharing of info are some of the reasons for failure of the WGA. There is a need to find and
deliberate on the incentives for various departments so that they can be better incorporated
into overall effort. Successful WGA requires: ‘redefining and renegotiating roles,
responsibilities, relationships, accountabilities and power sharing’.33
Unless different team
members do not leave their ‘tribal differences’, cohesion cannot be achieved.
28
Miščević, ‘Philosophy of the Comprehensive Approach to Security’, 20-21.
29Peter Homel, ‘The Whole of Government Approach to Crime Prevention,’ Trends & Issues in Crime and
Criminal Justice (Australian Institute of Criminology), 287 (2004): 5. 30
Martin Painter and Bernard Carey, Politics between Departments : the Fragmentation of Executive control in
Australian Government (St. Lucia, Q. : University of Queensland Press, 1979), 10.
31‘Whole of the Government’, 231.
32‘Whole of the Government’, 228.
33Peter Homel, ‘The Whole of Government Approach to Crime Prevention,’ 5.
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Financial Resources
The method of financing departmental programs is another impediment in WGA. All
departments in the government have fixed financial resources for normal operations.
Additional resources are often allocated for special projects and initiatives. This creates a
territorial mindset among various departments about financial resources. Few departments
fear participation in the WGA due to loss of certain financial resources, 34
whereas others
consider their budget is being used by other departments to pursue their objectives. In order to
avoid this notion, a separate and common pool of budget may be considered for any WGA.35
Apart from finance and budget at operational level, different pay and service conditions for
personnel involved in the same operation also bring a monetary impediment to personnel.
System Impediments
The benefits of WGA can only be achieved if the supporting system is in place. This includes
doctrinal compatibility, structure of the organization, information management systems and
staff capacity. Vincent has deliberated WGA in detail to find out what are the impediments
for the success of WGA.36
He asserts that since WGA is not the part of main stream activity
of the departments and all the departments are not structured to support WGA initiatives.
Similarly WGA operation does not have a significant bearing on the career of personnel
involved at long term basis because of insufficient policies in these domains. 37
He also argues
that creating new structures to support WGA may improve WGA initiatives, but it is likely to
affect the existing tasks and roles of the departments.38
The different departments have different office automation systems which hinder the flow of
information across all the actors involved. Different security classifications and privacy
mechanisms to handle sensitive information also restrict the information to various
participants. Additionally, technical incompatibility of various systems involved further
34
‘Whole of the Government’, 229. 35
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 11. 36
Vincent, ‘Collaboration and Integrated Services in the NSW Public Sector’, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, vol. 58, no. 3, 50–54. 37
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 30. 38
‘Whole of the Government’, 227.
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complicates the problem. All these issues affect the efficient flow of information and timely
decision making. Hence overall response time of the organization is also increased.39
Improper record keeping/ knowledge management and staff capacity are also part of system
impediment in this regard. During a crisis, separate task forces is formed which is directly
responsible to the highest levels without following the normal chain of commands. Loss of
institutional memory upon dissolution of the task force is also a challenge.40
The staff
capacity is another impediment in this regard. Because in WGA, different personnel are
drawn from different departments with varying experience and skill, so their capacity to deal
with crises is different. Mostly parent departments retain best personnel with them to run their
routine operations. Moreover, turnover among the assigned personnel is also small and people
are changed after 12-24 months. Hence by the time the staff members establish the contact
with their respective counterpart they have to relinquish their seats. Apart from institutional
memory, these factors severely affect the success of WGA.41
Organizational Culture
Culture is another significant issue in the success of WGA. Cultural differences are due to silo
mentality prevalent in parent departments participating in WGA initiatives. The difference in
organization culture of various agencies and departments is also relevant in this regard. Some
agencies are process oriented whereas others are output oriented.42
Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade and Defence have generally result oriented because generally their focus is
on crises response. It has been observed in various WGA that the economic and finance
departments are generally related to treasury and they tend to push their perspectives in
various operations. On the other hand the transport area is dominated by engineers and their
planning is based on their particular views. Similarly teachers form education departments
and health department is occupied by health professionals. All these departments have their
own particular culture to approach various problems. To benefit from the strengths of all the
departments, it is necessary that the staffs are provided common thematic training and
secondment is also done at various levels to achieve best level of coordination.43
These facts
39
‘Whole of the Government’, 230. 40
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 32. 41
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 35. 42
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 8. 43
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 35.
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have been acknowledged and Australian Public Service’s (APS) efforts are concentrated on
developing ‘organisational cultures and capabilities that support, model, understand and
aspire to whole-of-government solutions’.44
Command and Coordination
Command and coordination of various agencies is also an impediment. Some non-military
actors believe that militaries tend to take over all such initiative, whereas others deliberately
avoid lead role. Both cases result in over-commitment of military forces. A clear political
guidance is necessary on the role of various departments especially the need for leadership
and coordination roles. The leadership role implies other departments have to follow the
directions whereas the coordination role means other departments are at same level for equal
relationship. It is therefore imperative to define the roles of different actors and more
specifically, who has the lead role. 45
Other than lead role, some departments do not feel
comfortable in whole of the government operations because coordination with various
agencies is time consuming. Additionally, in such a solution, many government departments
will have less visibility at national and international level while others might steal the show.
This may be detriment to the reputation to any organization.46
Other than attitudes, different information management system, non-availability of common
operating procedure and absence of information sharing network are some of the obstacles in
coordination. Insufficient level of staff security clearance and access to information for
effective dialogue and deliberation are major obstacles to coordination.47
In order to solve
this issue, a common operating procedure and information network can be devised.
Furthermore, the problem of coordination can be resolved by secondment of officers in
various agencies at the field, operational and ministerial levels. If the secondment is at the
lower levels only, its effects dissipate at the strategic levels. The examples of Canada and the
Netherlands are exceptions in this regards. In the Netherlands WGA to Fragile States, a
development cooperation advisor was seconded to Defence whereas on reciprocal bases,
Military Advisor has been seconded to Foreign Affairs. Similarly in Canada, a Military
Advisor has been provided by Department of National Defence to Canadian International
44
‘Whole of the Government’, 231-232. 45
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 10. 46
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 8. 47
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 11.
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Development Agency.48
These secondments significantly improve the coordination levels. It
is important to understand that WGA does not take place automatically at the operational
level. Various governments have devised various policy frameworks and strategies to
facilitate the WGA so that departments are facilitated to work in close coordination with each
other. These frameworks are necessary for coordination, management and implementation to
avoid the differences.
Most Significant Impediment to Whole of Government Approach
A series of case studies were examined to identify the most significant impediment in WGA.
Study of Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, Australian Green House office and National Illicit
Drugs Strategy recognise the cultural difference to be the major impediment in this
regard.49
Each department strives to preserve its culture, structure and organization and avoid
losing these characteristics for interoperability and coordination.50
The Institute of Public
Administration Australia investigated various WGA operations across Australia and attached
critical importance to transformation of bureaucratic culture. The study highlights
While structural, political and internal barriers are evident, bureaucratic barriers
appear to be the most prominent. Given the nature of the barriers likely to be
encountered, it is therefore arguable that integrated governance is about changing
bureaucracy [emphasis added].51
Even NATO publications describe that NATO has been unable to achieve effective civil-
military cooperation required for Comprehensive Approach. The organizational culture has
been identified as major impediment in this regard. The fundamental question remained: ‘who
is coordinating and who is to be coordinated’.52
Wilson summarises this situation as
48
‘Whole of Government Approach to Fragile States’, 29. 49
Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to Australia’s Priority Challenges (Canberra:
Management Advisory Committee, 2004), 56. 50
Philipp Rotmann, ‘Built on Shaky Grounds: the Comprehensive Approach in Practice.’ NATO Research
Paper, December 2010, 4. 51
Working together: Integrated Governance (IPAA and Success Works 2002), accessed July 23, 2013,
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan007118.pdf 52
Karl Heinz Kamp, ‘NATO’s New Strategic Concept: An integration of civil and military approaches,’
inTowards a Comprehensive Approach: Integrating Civilian and Military Concepts of Strategy. (Rome: NATO
Defence College, 2011), 54.
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Linking various types of power –diplomatic, informational, military and economic
(DIME) –requires much more coordination and faces much greater challenges than
just problems of jurisdiction, capacities and political inertia. One should always bear
in mind that military and non-military challenges are very different in the same
situations– they require different types of responsibility, ways of persuasion; technical
assistance and dangers faced by various actors differ, particularly in terms of defining
a common goal which has to be achieved.53
Having recognized the culture to be the major impediment in WGA, it is necessary to review
the cultural differences among various actors. These differences exist between civil and
military actors and within different civilian actors. Samuel P Huntington recognized, ‘The
military are always happy to have more resources, but if they have to choose between more
resources and more autonomy, they will choose more autonomy’.54
The military forces are
prepared to respond to various crises or emergencies at short notice. Their resilience lies in
surviving harsh environmental and logistic conditions, while the civilian participants are less
prepared to work in adverse conditions. Militaries and aid workers have different opinion on
working in the violent environment as well. Generally aid workers assume their neutrality to
be their protection, whereas they need to know that their neutrality does not protect them from
every combatant. Similarly, the development workers are generally tuned to stable and
permissive environment for long term solution to the issues. Although combat engineers and
development contractors have similar roles but both operate in different environment.55
Some
aid agencies have their own cultures which focus on output rather than sustainable efforts.
Fixed time frames and budget cycles result in inefficient use of resources. Rather than
developing deeper understanding of the issue and participating in consultations, often their
response is tailored to meet donor timelines. The pressures by external agencies and parent
departments for quick assessment of the issue often inhibit the fair assessment which requires
consultation of all the participants. In limited time, participants resort to their preconceived
ideas and despatch the assessments which could be acceptable to the parent departments
rather than what is true or yet to be assessed. Unfortunately, often these reports are far from
reality.56
53
James Q Wilson, Bureaucracy (New York: Basic Book, 1989), 53.
54 Charles D. Allen, ‘The Pit and the Pendulum: Civil-Military Relations in an age of Austerity, ‘Armed Forces
Journal (2013), 20.
55Philipp Rotmann, ‘Built on Shaky Grounds’,6.
56Cedric de Coning and Karsten Friis, ‘Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive
Approach,’ Journal of International Peacekeeping 15 (2011): 243–272.
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Operational Security (OPSEC) concept also creates difference among various contributors.
There is a difference in the cultures of military and diplomatic community vis-à-vis aid
workers. In military and diplomatic organizations everything is classified by default whereas
the aid organizations generally lack understanding of operational security and secrecy.57
The
proceedings of Helsinki seminar also emphasized: ‘the need to move from the ‘need to know’
to the ‘need to share’ approach in information sharing’.58
Information management is key to
success in any WGA. It requires flexible information management strategies and leadership
commitment which allow ‘a networked working environment … moving [away] from content
and actor-based information exchange towards situation and context-based information
exchange’.59
How to Resolve Cultural Issues
Since culture is the major impediment in success of any WGA, it is important to deliberate
how to resolve cultural differences. In any WGA where the success of the initiative is
dependent on the collaboration and integration of all concerned, peculiar culture of each
department is to be kept in mind. It is necessary to encourage the atmosphere of
‘inclusiveness’ by accepting diverse views and approaches to same problem. ‘Without
attention to the cultural dimensions of connecting Government, it is likely that whole-of-
government initiatives can spiral into destructive and unproductive tension with no results’.60
The example of United States Welfare Policy also highlight that transformation of
organizational cultures is necessary to achieve the desired results.61
The successful WGA
requires culture of understanding and sharing horizontally between various agencies and
vertically in each agency. A culture of trust and understanding can exponentially increase the
effectiveness of any WGA. ‘In order to develop a true culture of cooperation and to
mainstream Whole-of-Government and intra-agency coherence, it is necessary to embed
coherence as a core value in our own organisations’.62
One way to improve the coherence
57
Philipp Rotmann, ‘Built on Shaky Grounds’,5.
58 Kristiina Rintakoski and Mikko Autti, ‘Comprehensive Approach Seminar 17 June 2008 Helsinki,’
Comprehensive Approach Trends, Challenges and Possibilities for Cooperation in Crisis Prevention and
Management. (Helsinki: Ministry of Defence Finland, 2008). 59
Rintakoski and Autti, ‘Comprehensive Approach Seminar’.
60 ‘Whole of the Government’, 231.
61Lurie and Riccucci (2003), quoted in the context of United States Welfare Policy, ‘Whole of the Government’,
232. 62
Connecting Government, 45.
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among various contributing partners is to include the coherence in the list of mandatory
reporting requirements. This will drive different departments to keep their actions aligned
towards overall strategy in order to improve their reports.63
It is also important to acknowledge: ‘Culture and capability critically shape the success of
whole of government activities’.64
Different agencies approach different problems according
to their peculiar values and principles which may be conflicting for other participants. One
such example is the values and principles of humanitarian actors’ vis-à-vis security or
intelligence officials. It is important to be aware of these differences to achieve the optimum
solution.65
WGA may involve initiatives where different individuals are working in close
coordination physically or they may be operating on same information domain with minimum
interaction physically. In both cases, significant time is required to develop harmonious
working relationships especially where physical interaction is minimal. The participants of
Indigenous Trials at Wadeye arranged social gatherings to improve networking and build
culture of trust and information exchange. The case study ‘reported that cultural differences
became an asset when agencies built on differences to help each other’. 66
In a similar attempt
to develop better understanding of each other and WGA, the participants of the Sustainable
Regions whole of government initiative arranged a series of seminars. Various methods of
WGA and international experiences in this regard were deliberated before embarking upon
assigned tasks.67
The response to Bali bombing is a good example of successful WGA in
crises where different participants had little experience of working with each other. One
reason for this success was the nature of crises which shaped the environment for goodwill
and eliminated cultural obstacles. The framework of coordination provided by EMA enabled
all the agencies to clarify roles of various actors in crisis response. The experiences of Bali
crisis allowed to evaluate linkages between state and federal government disaster plans,
ascertain and address hiccups in interagency coordination.68
63
Connecting Government, 45.
64Connecting Government, 45.
65Connecting Government, 45.
66Connecting Government, 51.
67Connecting Government, 51.
68Connecting Government, 114-115.
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To summarise, different organizational cultures should be recognized without limiting the
capacity of WGA objectives.69
The culture of understanding can be enhanced by exposing the
employees to various perspectives and organizational cultures. This will enable them to see
big picture and accept diversity of views.70
All of the participants should be made aware:
‘Culture and capability can make or break whole of government endeavours’.71
Way Ahead for Pakistan
Pakistan is a developing country with limited resources. Due to security environment of the
state and government structure in previous years, the military forces have primacy on state
affairs whether it is national security, foreign policy or law and order. Despite limited
resources, armed forces of Pakistan have developed significant combat capabilities and earned
international repute due to their conduct in various national and international conflicts.
Pakistan Army contingent regularly form part of UN peacekeeping forces and have earned
respect due to their ethical conduct on deployments. Pakistan Navy regularly participates in
international maritime exercises, seminars and operates at sea to safeguards national interests
in maritime arena. Since 2004 Pakistan Navy is participating in cooperative maritime security
arrangement in Indian Ocean alongwith other international navies. Since 2009, Pakistan Navy
is participating in international counter piracy efforts in Gulf Aden. Pakistan Navy has
commanded both task forces comprising international navies, which is a testimony of its
competence. Similarly, Pakistan Air Force is also renowned for its competence in air warfare.
Other than combat roles, all the services are contributing to nation building by welfare
organizations, educations institutes and housing developments. All armed forces are important
component of national disaster relief plan. Based on the international experiences of whole of
the government approach, there is a need to utilise Pakistan military forces to resolve national
problems, especially in the areas of poor security conditions. Most of Pakistani coastline is in
Baluchistan where Pakistan Navy has substantial presence. Recently Coastal Command has
also been raised to defend long coastline. The latest mission of Pakistan Navy also includes
69
Connecting Government, 47.
70Connecting Government, 50.
71Connecting Government, 46.
16
development of coastal communities.72
So Pakistan Navy can play an important part in
development of coastal belt especially in synch with Baluchistan Comprehensive
Development Strategy (2013 – 2030) initiated by UNDP.73
Based on the experiences of
developed countries task forces can be formed for dedicated tasks where military may have
lead role or supporting role.
In conclusion, the volatile environment after the end of Cold War leads to realize that military
options are insufficient to deal with the complex challenges to security. Whole of Government
Approach is one of such attempts which seeks to employ all elements of national power
(diplomatic, information, military and economic) in any crises. The contribution and lead role
by any element may change throughout the crises. Non-governmental actors may also be
involved on case to case basis. However, despite all the benefits, it has been observed that
results from any WGA cannot be easily achieved. WGA are not part of mainstream activities
of any department and different departments have various approaches to the problems and
their perceived solutions. The case studies of various WGA reveals that absence in planning
process, departmentalism, financing arrangements, inadequate supporting systems, concept of
command and coordination, and organizational culture are major impediments in this regard.
The incompatible organizational cultures have been identified as the most significant
impediment by Australian and NATO experiences in this regard. However, if it is recognised
that culture can make or break any WGA, differences can be resolved. The example of Bali
bombing, Indigenous Trials at Wadeye and Sustainable Regions WGA highlight that for a
successful WGA, there is a need to develop skills, systems, culture and resources required for
collaboration in the work. Keeping in view the capabilities of Pakistan armed forces and their
national stature they can be involved in Whole of Government approach to various problems.
The experiences of developed countries can be helpful in this regard.
72
Latest Mission of Pakistan Navy is, ‘Protect Maritime Interests of Pakistan, deter aggression at and from sea,
provide disaster relief, participate in development of coastal communities and contribute to international efforts
in maintaining good order at sea’. http://www.paknavy.gov.pk/
73 Draft Baluchistan Comprehensive Development Strategy is available at
http://sprsmbalochistan.gov.pk/uploads/reports/Draft%20BCDS%20-%20Version%201.0.pdf
17
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