Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225

Ethics and the athlete: why sports are more than

a game but less than a war

Steven D. Stovitz, MD*, David J. Satin, MDDepartment of Family Practice and Community Health, University of Minnesota,

2615 E. Franklin Avenue, Minneapolis, MN 55406, USA

Are the ethics of athletes complex? Consider that an elite bicyclist might

inject himself with hormones to increase his exercise capacity, but if his oppo-

nent falls, then that same hormone-abusing athlete will likely stop until his op-

ponent has regained control. Consider that we as a society have very little problem

with Mike Tyson trying to give Evander Holyfield a concussion during a boxing

match, but we find it horrifying that Tyson bit Holyfield’s ear. What are we to

make of these apparent contradictions?

Some feel that ‘‘sports ethics’’ is something of an oxymoron [1]. We disagree.

Through our formative years, sports provide a wonderful forum by which we can

and do develop moral character [2]. At the professional level, sports present a

forum to exercise moral fortitude under physical and emotional duress, while

placing an entire nation of spectators in the position of arbiters. What are the

ethical standards against which we measure the individual athlete’s moral con-

duct? How can one judge, prescribe, or proscribe an athlete’s behavior?

At first glance, it may seem simple. Some say that sports are merely games

and that players need only follow the rules. But as we will demonstrate, rule

following is neither necessary nor sufficient for moral conduct in sports. Others

analogize sports to war, stating that participants must do everything in their

power to win. This too will be exposed as an untenable philosophy of moral

conduct, as its limits are far too lenient. This article elucidates why, with respect

to an athlete’s conduct, sports must be considered more than a game, but less

than a war.

We will present six cases to further the reader’s understanding of ethics

and the athlete. The analysis of each case will reveal a critical concept in as-

0278-5919/04/$ – see front matter D 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.csm.2004.01.002

Gender specific terms have been employed throughout this article for simplicity.

* Corresponding author.

E-mail address: stovi001@umn.edu (S.D. Stovitz).

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225216

sessing the moral status of athletic behavior. These concepts form a practical

template rather than a metatheoretical account of the morality of sports. The

following six concepts will emerge:

The behavior of athletes is meaningful. Spectators and participants have a

right, and perhaps a responsibility, to judge.

The ethos (unwritten rules) of the game is more relevant than the written

rules as a context for interpreting the moral quality of individual behaviors.

The difference between fouling and cheating is, in practice, a function of the

ethos of the game. In principle, this difference is determined by either the

spirit of the rules, a contract between competitors, or respect for the game.

Sports have both internal and external values. Judging the moral conduct of

athletes requires consideration of both.

Without exception, the ethics of ‘‘real life’’ trump ethical judgments with-

in sports.

Sports may be viewed as institutions of moral education. Role models are

critical to this end, thus all involved have a duty to preserve the integrity

of their sport.

Case #1—Tonya Harding, Nancy Kerrigan, and the fallacy of moral

subjectivism: why we have a right, and perhaps a responsibility, to judge

How often do we hear the statement ‘‘it’s a war out there’’ in reference to a

football game. Or that ‘‘athletes try to win at all costs.’’ But, athletes typically do

not try to injure their opponents off the playing field. One obvious exception

is the infamous 1994 case in women’s figure skating in which Tonya Harding’s

friends and family purposely injured her chief rival, Nancy Kerrigan. If it were

as simple as ‘‘win at all costs,’’ wouldn’t incidents like this be more common?

Moral subjectivism is the belief that morality is simply a matter of taste

and that there is no objective truth regarding right and wrong [3]. If the sub-

jectivist is correct, then who are we to judge? For the moral subjectivist, Tonya

Harding’s camp demonstrated a different set of values, neither better nor worse

than any other. But we all know that assaulting a competitor with a crowbar is

wrong. Our moral intuitions tell us so. Moral subjectivism fails not only on a

theoretical basis, herein not discussed [4,5], but more importantly, it fails on a

practical basis to capture the most fundamental grounding of morality—the moral

intuitions of humanity. Even those who claim that sports are analogous to wars

and that athletes should be free to win at all costs would concede that it is not

acceptable to physically injure one’s opposition off the playing field.

Not only do we have a right to make moral judgments, but as we will discuss

in case #6, those involved in sports have powerful incentives to enforce strict

standards. The good name of sports relies upon the moral conduct of their

participants. We must recognize that the health of athletes within their sport may

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 217

depend upon the priority we place on judging, prescribing, and proscribing

behaviors that bear moral qualities.

The behavior of athletes is meaningful. Morality is not simply a matter of taste.

Spectators and participants have a right, and perhaps a responsibility, to judge.

Case #2—Jan Ullrich, Lance Armstrong, and ‘‘the stop heard round the

world’’: why playing by the rules is not enough

Consider the sport of elite bicycling, a sport plagued by allegations of the

widespread use of illegal methods to boost hemoglobin and increase endurance

[6,7]. Yet it is this same sport in which Jan Ullrich was in a neck-and-neck race

with Lance Armstrong in the 2003 Tour de France, and when a spectator

accidentally hooked Armstrong’s handlebars causing him to fall, Ullrich stopped

and waited for Armstrong to get back up on his bicycle. Is there a written rule

that you must stop when an opponent falls? No. Had Ullrich continued he might

have gained ground and won the race. What would compel a professional athlete

to give up an advantage gained legally in a sport renowned for its athletes’ at-

tempts to gain illegal advantages? The answer is the ethos of professional

cycling—its unwritten rules. First described by D’Agostino, ‘‘the ethos of the

game is that set of unofficial, implicit conventions which determine how the rules

of that game are to be applied in concrete circumstances’’ [8]. Level playing fields

depend upon the ethos of games, and the value of winning depends upon level

playing fields.

British Tour de France rider Sean Yates said of the Armstrong-Ullrich incident,

‘‘It is normal for this to happen. If everyone behaves in the same way it all evens

itself out in the end. And, it’s best for the sport’’ [6]. Sports at all levels depend

upon the general acceptance of unwritten rules. Additionally, the value of victory

relies upon defeating a worthy opponent. As legendary basketball coach John

Wooden stated, ‘‘What joy can be derived in sports from overcoming someone

who is not as capable as you are? But there is great joy and satisfaction in

competing against an opponent who forces you to dig deep and produce your best.

The worthy opponent brings out the very best in you’’ [9]. Although we cannot

say for certain, one would hope that Ullrich stopped in accordance with the ethos

of the game, as a means of maintaining a level playing field and allowing the best

man to win. Amidst all the money, blood doping, and advertising in professional

sports, the ideal remains a contest between fairly matched competitors, each

competing with maximal effort, with the winner gaining advantage by sheer will.

Although Yates’ statement about a level playing field was in reference to

Ullrich’s display of sportsmanship, a parallel argument can be applied to the

practice of blood doping. Despite the fact that hematocrits are checked before

races and illegal boosting substances have been banned, it is suspicious that the

vast majority of hematocrits have fluctuated over the years, consistently falling

just within the newest legal limit. A similar pattern has been observed in other

endurance sports [10]. In such sports, is raising one’s hematocrit to the legal limit

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225218

through blood doping, although technically illegal, immoral? Some might argue

that to stay competitive, one’s hematocrit must approach the upper level of legal.

This requirement to ‘‘keep up with the Joneses’’ has been described by psy-

chologists as a ‘‘prisoner’s dilemma’’ [11], whereby the only real option for an

individual within the game is to seek the illegal advantage, because each par-

ticipant must assume that his opponents will do the same. The dilemma is that

each individual is in the same position, and therefore must act accordingly by

assuming that all others will attempt to gain the illegal advantage. Though such

an argument may not exculpate the athlete who blood dopes, perhaps at the very

least it offers mitigating circumstances for how wrong this act might be [12].

There are still others who believe that no rationalization can excuse blood doping

and that a moral high-road remains open to athletes engaging in such sports [13].

Notwithstanding, the link between these two seemingly contradictory behav-

iors—stopping for the fallen opponent and the use of banned substances—is that

both arguably fall within the ethos of the game; both arguably maintain a level

playing field. Although reference to the ethos of the game does not, in itself,

determine the morality of stopping for a fallen opponent or the immorality of

using illegal substances, it does provide a context to better judge the moral con-

duct of an individual athlete.

Adherence to the written rules is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethical

conduct in sports. The ethos of the game is more relevant than the written rules

as a context for interpreting the moral quality of individual behaviors.

Case #3—the special case of Shaquille O’Neal and the intentional foul: how

are we to judge the one who ‘‘hacks a Shaq’’?

As we have seen, not only does the ethos of the game reveal additional rules,

it rewrites some, and erases others. For example, it is common for professional

basketball players to commit the violation of ‘‘traveling,’’ yet have their violation

ignored by the referees. Furthermore, anyone who has recently seen a profes-

sional basketball game knows that in practice, basketball is hardly the noncontact

sport it is on paper. A special case of how the ethos of the game supercedes

the rules is the issue of intentional fouling. Intentional fouls occur when one

purposely breaks written rules and accepts the ramifications. All intentional fouls

are not equal, and those that follow the ethos of the game remain acceptable,

whereas those that do not are deemed unacceptable. Intentional fouling exposes

subtle issues within the concept of the ethos of sports.

Shaquille O’Neal (Shaq) is a dominant basketball player, but a very poor free-

throw shooter. As a result, opponents have taken to the so-called ‘‘hack a Shaq’’

strategy, whereby they intentionally foul O’Neal (by pushing in a manner that

will not cause injury) toward the end of the game to take advantage of his

poor foul shooting. How are we to judge this act of intentional rule breaking?

Regarding the way it is practiced at the moment, the ‘‘hack a Shaq’’ strategy is,

de facto, acceptable within the NBA. In other words, unlike the faux pas of

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 219

passing a leading Tour de France cyclist when he is down, the ethos allows for

‘‘hacking a Shaq’’. Not only does the ethos allow for such play, competitors who

are savvy enough to initiate the strategy at the opportune time are praised for their

smart and competitive play. In response to the widespread use of this strategy, the

National Basketball Association even adopted new rules to shore up this loophole

and restore greater equality of competition.

What if a team put in its worst player to not only intentionally foul Shaq,

but to do it in a manner that might cause injury to Shaq (eg, with an elbow to the

face or other means of physical contact that occasionally happen inadvertently

within the course of a game)? This would further the fouling team’s chances of

winning were Shaq to become injured. As physical a game as basketball has

become, this would be seen as cheating and as an unacceptable act. What

distinguishes this cheater who performs an illegal and unacceptable act from the

worthy competitor in good standing who performs an illegal but acceptable act?

Once again, it is the ethos of the game. The cheater’s behavior falls outside of

the ethos, whereas the worthy competitor’s falls within.

But this tells us only how a given rule violation likely will be judged. It says

nothing of how the violation ought to be judged. This distinction exposes how the

ethos of games is a descriptive theory, in that it describes how the sports culture

actually is. It is useful in that it provides a context for interpreting the moral

significance of a player’s actions more accurately. What we need, however, is

a prescriptive theory to illuminate how the sports culture should respond to a

particular rule violation. Of those surviving academic natural selection, three

such theories [14] may be instructive:

The spirit of the rules: one might subscribe to the spirit of the rules by plac-

ing oneself in the shoes of the game’s creator, looking to the intended

purposes behind the actual rules. This notion is commonly played out

when a participant assists an opponent in the spirit of competition. The

weakness of this theory is that it says nothing about how to precisely

determine the spirit of the rules.

Fair play as a contract: one might ground appropriate play in an informal

contract between competitors about what sorts of actions will be acceptable

within the competition. This theory is strong in that consenting to formal

and informal rules before each competition disposes of much potential for

disagreement. The fault with this theory is that it is unrealistic to negotiate

the acceptability of every possible strategy before each game.

Fair play as respect for the game: this sophisticated theory contends that

treating the game with respect, as you would a person you greatly admire,

should result in a morally appropriate outcome. This is helpful in ad-

dressing our question of how the intentional fouler ought to be judged,

because the answer to whether such a player is a cheater or not hinges on

what adopting this style of play would do for the game itself. For example,

if this sort of intentional foul makes for a more skillful, strategic, or

competitive game, (elements known as internal values—see case #4), then

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225220

the fouler is a worthy competitor, respecting the game. If it places an

unnecessary burden of time stoppage, imposes an unfair advantage, or

increases the chances of serious injury, then the fouler is deemed a cheater.

Given Shaq’s dominance, intentionally placing him on the foul line ar-

guably promotes a more competitive game. The challenge of this theory

hinges upon whether it is fair to expect a player, in the heat of competition,

to discern the impact of a given play on the future of the sport itself.

Admittedly, all of these approaches have loopholes, most notably their in-

ability to deal effectively with competitions that are themselves unethical, such

as dueling to the death or gladiator games. Still, they provide a framework de-

picted by Table 1. As we will discuss in the next case, in addition to fair play

as respect for the game, playing to the internal values of sports is a critical ele-

ment of ethical athletic conduct (see Table 1).

The difference between fouling and cheating is, in practice, a function of the

ethos of the game. In principle, this difference is determined by either the spirit

of the rules, a contract between competitors, or respect for the game.

Case #4—John Wooden on internal and external values: how television is

changing the spirit of the game

When asked what is ruining the game of basketball, former The University

of California Los Angeles (UCLA) coach John Wooden named, among other

things, ‘‘television.’’ He comments that players now play to the television camera

at the expense of the game of basketball: ‘‘Today’s showboating runs contrary to

what the spirit of the game is all about. Excessive dunking, pointing at other

players and taunting them, all belittle your opponent and show a lack of respect’’

[9]. Although we have discussed the ‘‘spirit of the rules’’ and ‘‘respect for the

Table 1

Rule and ethos driven categories of behaviors in sport

Rule and ethos - prototypic character Example of behavior

Illegal and unacceptable - ‘‘cheater’’ - A basketball player intentionally fouling

another team’s star player with the hope

of inducing injury.

Illegal and acceptable - ‘‘worthy competitor’’ - A basketball player intentionally fouling

a poor free-throw shooter when losing by

a close margin towards the end of the game.

- A bicyclist using illegal means to raise his

hematocrit to just below the legal limit.a

Legal and unacceptable - ‘‘social outcast’’ - A bicyclist in the Tour de France passing

the leader that was knocked off of his bicycle

by a spectator.

Legal and acceptable - ‘‘rule abider’’ - The vast majority of actions within sports.

a We recognize that many would argue that it is not acceptable to use illegal means. Others would

say that it has become so commonplace that it is somewhat accepted.

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 221

game,’’ what is meant here by the ‘‘spirit of the game’’? Wooden touches on a

characteristic of sports that we believe to be a missing link in prescriptive theories

of moral conduct.

In describing the positive aspects of sports, there appear to be two distinct

values: internal and external. Whereas some believe that external values, which

mirror the values of society, are the only values that exist in sports, we believe

that ‘‘sports have internal connections to certain values and these internal values

can often conflict with those of the wider society’’ [15]. Whether a player is

playing consistently with the internal values of their sport is a key to the moral

status of a given behavior.

Examples of internal values include adherence to mutually agreed upon rules,

strategy, and competitiveness, all of which promote enjoyment and fulfillment of

participants. Literature within the philosophy of sport suggests that the ideal

game is one in which competitors ‘‘play at or near their best’’ and ‘‘the outcome

[is] determined by sporting skill’’ [14]. More specifically, each sport has its own

internal values, such as the value of teamwork and physical sacrifice in the game

of football versus the value of prolonged concentration in a four-day golf tour-

nament. Note that adherence to the internal values of sports, although a necessary

condition, is not sufficient for moral conduct. It too fails to deal effectively with

sports that are themselves unethical. This challenge will be addressed in case #5.

In contrast to internal values, external values include such things as fame and

fortune. The critical distinction is that external values can be realized in non

sports-related ways, such as becoming a rock singer or a movie star. Interestingly,

studies suggest that motivations for internal and external values (known as

intrinsic and extrinsic motivations) are not additive, but rather that extrinsic

motivations tend to diminish intrinsic motivations [16,17]. ‘‘Scholarship athletes

. . . in high-profile sports like basketball and football, showed decreased intrinsic

motivation in the presence of extrinsic rewards, whereas those in low profile

sports, such as wrestling, and women with scholarships did not . . . . If the ex-

trinsic rewards are seen as controlling or coercive, they will tend to diminish

intrinsic motivation’’ [14].

Coach Wooden was well known for extolling the virtues of the intrinsic and

expressing his disdain for the extrinsic values of basketball: ‘‘I believe you should

go out and work hard, play hard, and compete hard in sports and in life without

extra histrionics’’ [9]. There is good reason to believe that motivation for the

internal values of sports is especially beneficial for the athlete: ‘‘The general

position on intrinsic motivation is that people who are intrinsically motivated . . .get more enjoyment from the activity and persevere longer than those who have

been extrinsically motivated. People who are intrinsically motivated also tend to

be more creative in their approach to the task at hand, whereas those who are ex-

trinsically motivated tend to do the minimum required to receive the reward’’ [14].

Sports have both internal and external values. Judging the moral conduct

of athletes requires consideration of both. The relative degree to which an athlete

is motivated by particular internal and external values is essential in under-

standing the intentions behind that athlete’s behavior.

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225222

Case #5—Jackie Robinson and ‘‘Who’s going to cover first base?’’: when

there are more important issues than playing to the ethos of the game, the

spirit of the rules, and respect for the game

When Jackie Robinson broke baseball’s color barrier in 1948, he suffered

innumerable racial insults from opposing players. It was not uncommon for a

racist pitcher to pitch balls on the inside part of the plate in an attempt to in-

timidate Jackie. Legend has it that when Robinson drew more than his share

of racially charged inside fastballs, he would bunt the ball toward the first base-

man, forcing the pitcher to cover first base. During his college years at UCLA,

Jackie had been an All-American running back in football. Given the potential

for a physical collision at first base, the pitcher would avoid this possibility and

Jackie would be safe [18].

In the sport of baseball, it is certainly more acceptable to intimidate an

opponent by brushing him off the plate with an inside fastball than it is to run

over a fielder. Yet the vast majority who read this story today side with Robinson.

Despite Robinson’s behavior going against the ethos, spirit, and respect of the

game, serious baseball fans and nonfans alike support such behavior because it

speaks to a greater moral good. That is to say, racial equality, though considered

here in the limited context of baseball, is the domain of society at large. The

immorality of racism is felt to be a far more important offense than the running

over of a pitcher in a baseball game. The ethos of society and the general ‘‘real

life’’ morality of humanity always trump the ethos and even the spirit of a sport.

This principle exposes how our aforementioned theories are insufficient for

determining proper moral conduct. For example, dueling to the death, prizefight-

ing, and gladiator games were once acceptable. But when their societies came to

see the barbarism and injustice of such competitions, the activities were outlawed

[19]. No theory before this point has been capable of exposing the moral defi-

ciency of sports that are themselves immoral—sports with a draconian ethos

and barbaric rules designed with equally unconscionable spirit. Respecting such

a sport could hardly be considered respectable. As such, there must be an ad-

ditional requirement that an athlete’s behavior accord with not only the ethos,

spirit, contract, or respect for the game, but it must be held up to the broader

morality of society and humanity. Although our previous theories help contextu-

alize the athlete’s conduct, there can be no substitute for general moral reasoning

and judgment.

Without exception, the ethics of ‘‘real life’’ trump ethical judgments with-

in sports.

Case #6—Charles Barkley and the moral institution of sports: why he is a

role model and sports are teaching tools

When asked why ‘‘Sir’’ Charles Barkley, renowned for his less-than-gentle-

manly conduct, spat on an eight-year-old girl in the stands of an NBA game,

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225 223

Barkley responded that he meant to hit a heckler, but because it was the fourth

quarter and he was tired, his spit didn’t travel that far [20]. What are we to

make of a professional sports star who proclaimed adamantly, ‘‘I am not a role

model’’ [20]?

Organized sports are being played by an increasing number of children at a

very young age. Sports serve as a means of socialization and ethical education.

They can be described as a microcosm of life, providing a safe venue to act out

ethical dilemmas (Table 2). Although we have downplayed the status of rules as

an adequate benchmark for judging moral conduct, they are integral to the

structure of sports. By participating in sports, athletes, for the most part, agree to

follow rules and are thus presumed to be acting morally. It is in this way that

sports represent a just society, and it is in this way that great athletes are perceived

as moral agents. Indeed, celebrity athletes are consciously and unconsciously

ascribed great status by society. These athletes acquire such status using their

sport’s good name as moral collateral and come to represent the internal values

of their sport, such as justice and fairness (see Table 2).

Professional athletes, especially in this age of television, cult of personality,

and international competition, are ambassadors of society. When an athlete

behaves in an unjust manner, whether on or off the field, we as a society have

a right to judge. Whether he likes it or not, Charles Barkley is, ipso facto, as

much a role model as he is a great basketball player. Our disappointment with the

moral conduct of certain celebrity athletes is often accompanied by a feeling of

betrayal, as if the player had pledged an oath to us that he would play and live

according to high moral standards. Although this expectation of moral character

may not be warranted, can it be justified?

Sports are a part of our earliest socialization experiences and often play a

pivotal role in our moral development. As John Wooden says, ‘‘Athletes should

be good role models, but not heroes. A role model is someone that those who

love you would want you to be like. A hero is just someone the general public

holds up to acclaim. They are often different people’’ [9]. We agree that, although

celebrity athletes need not be heroes, it is crucial that they serve as positive role

models for sports to maintain their status as institutions of moral education. Those

who love sports deserve nothing less.

Table 2

Sports as a microcosm of life

Sports Real life

Rules Cannot step out of bounds Cannot drive through a red light

Group Competitors at a similar level One’s local community

Enforcer Referee Police officer

Frequency of observation Nearly constant Intermittent

Ramifications Minor (ball to other team) Major (serious injury)

S.D. Stovitz, D.J. Satin / Clin Sports Med 23 (2004) 215–225224

Sports may be viewed as institutions of moral education. Role models are

critical to this end; thus all involved have a duty to preserve the integrity of

their sport.

Summary

John Wooden once said, ‘‘Your reaction to victory or defeat is an important part

of how you play the game. I wanted my players to display style and class in either

situation—to lose with grace, to win with humility’’ [9]. With respect to assessing

the ethical nature of an athlete’s conduct, we have tried to demonstrate how the

moral and social stakes of sports place them above games and below wars.

We believe that our six precepts form a practical framework for appreciating

the complex ethics of athletes and assessing the moral status of the individual

athlete’s behavior. There is, however, no substitute for good judgment, developed

by refining moral intuitions through careful thought and genuine experience.

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