Epicurus on the Fear of Death and the Relative Value of Lives

Benjamin A. Rider

Epicurus on the Fear of Deathand the Relative Value of Lives

Abstract: Epicurus argued that death is no misfortune, because when a persondies, he no longer has sensation, and sensation is a necessary condition of va-lue for a person. This argument, however, faces a powerful objection. Contem-porary philosophers argue that death is bad precisely because it deprives oneof good experiences one would have had, had one not died. I analyze and eval-uate the Epicurean response to this objection, showing how, according to Epi-curus, this objection reflects mistaken and unhealthy ideas about how livesshould be evaluated. Uncovering and addressing these modes of evaluationconstitutes a central aim of Epicurean therapy.

Key-words: Epicurus, Lucretius, fear of death, therapy, deprivation

Benjamin A. Rider: Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Central Arkansas,E-Mail: [email protected]

Epicurus famously held that death is not a misfortune for the person who dies.His main argument for this claim appears in the Letter to Menoeceus (Ep. Men.):

Accustom yourself to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil lie insensation [αἴσθησις], whereas death is the privation of sensation. (Ep. Men. 124 = Longand Sedley [LS] 24A1)1

Epicurus was a hedonist: He held that the objective value for any thing is deter-mined by its relation to pleasure (specifically, the pleasure arising from or con-sisting in a pain-free and undisturbed state of the body and mind). Somethingis good for a person if and only if it contains or promotes his pleasure (or re-moves its opposite, pain), and bad if and only if it impedes pleasure (possiblyby causing displeasure or pain) (Ep. Men. 127 = LS 21B1). Moreover, αἴσθησις–sensation, or, more generally, conscious awareness–is a necessary condition forthe experience of pleasure and pain. Experiences of pleasure and pain occur inthe field of conscious awareness, and so without it, they are not possible. But

1 All translations from the Letter to Menoeceus and Principle Doctrines (Κύριαι Δόξαι) are fromLong and Sedley 1987.

DOI 10.1515/apeiron-2014-0001 apeiron 2014; aop

death is the end of all conscious awareness. Like every other living thing, hu-mans are compounds of atoms in void, and when we die, our soul-atoms dis-perse (Letter to Herodotus [Ep. Hdt.] 63–7 = LS 14A). Therefore, since deathneither contains nor promotes pleasure or pain for the one who dies, it can beneither good nor bad for him.

In my view, the most powerful response to this argument is what I call theDeprivation Objection. Proponents of this objection, including, in recent years,Thomas Nagel and Fred Feldman, argue that death is bad for the person whodies not because he feels pain when dead or suffers in an afterlife, but becauseit deprives him of goods or good experiences he otherwise would have enjoyed.In this essay, I analyze and evaluate the Epicureans’ primary response to theDeprivation Objection. I argue that Epicureans have a sophisticated and inter-esting response to this and related objections–such as objections based on thefear of premature death–in which they seek to shift the focus from worriesabout death (and its supposed harms) to thinking about why we value life. Themost serious problem with the Deprivation Objection and other related argu-ments, Epicurus and his followers would argue, is that they reflect unnaturaland unhealthy attitudes about what is important and worthwhile in life.

The multipronged Epicurean therapeutic strategy for dealing with the fearof death can thus be compared to Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of conventionalmorality. Nietzsche certainly takes on what he sees as the false claims of themoralism of his time: The idea that selfless compassion is a supreme virtue2;that we should seek comfort and tranquility3; that humans have free will to actagainst their own natures4; and so on. But his more important project is to bringto light the unhealthy and life-denying attitudes that underlie these claims andmake them seem plausible to their proponents–in particular, the impotence,fear, and ressentiment of those unable to exercise their power.5 In exposingthese attitudes and their fruit, Nietzsche supports an alternative set of virtues,an attitude that says ‘yes’ to life. The Epicurean philosophical outlook differsfrom Nietzsche’s in significant ways, of course, but they employ comparablecritical and therapeutic strategies. Although some scholars have touched on theoutlines of this approach, I contend that, on the whole, both defenders and op-ponents have failed to appreciate the full philosophical, rhetorical, and thera-peutic depth and force of the Epicurean strategy.

2 See On the Genealogy of Morality Preface: 5; Ecce Homo III: D-2; Twilight of the Idols IX: 35.3 Beyond Good and Evil: 225, 228.4 Beyond Good and Evil: 21; On the Genealogy of Morality I: 13.5 See, e.g., On the Genealogy of Morals I: 10–13.

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1 The Deprivation Objection

Most contemporary versions of the Deprivation Objection draw inspiration fromThomas Nagel’s well-known article, “Death” (Nagel 1970). In this article, Nagelexamines why people consider death is a misfortune, and he concludes that “ifdeath is an evil at all, it cannot be because of its positive features, but onlybecause of what it deprives us of” (74). In other words, death is bad because itdeprives us of further life and goods that we would want to enjoy. Feldman1992 develops this reasoning specifically as a criticism of Epicurus. Feldmandistinguishes two kinds of harm or badness, intrinsic and extrinsic. Intrinsicbadness is the positive badness (of, e.g., pain or anxiety) experienced in con-scious awareness. For example, a toothache is intrinsically bad, because of itsinherent painfulness, as is a sleepless night anxiously tossing and turning, wor-rying about the results of a biopsy on a possibly cancerous tumor. But noteverything bad is bad in this direct way. Other things and events are only extrin-sically bad–not because of themselves, but because of how they impact theoverall intrinsic goodness or badness in our lives (133–5). Clearly, Epicuruswould accept the idea of extrinsic value, since he assigns value to manythings–such as virtue, vice, and friendship–not because they are themselvespleasant and painful, but because they promote or hinder pleasure and pain(see Κύριαι Δόξαι [ΚΔ] 5, 28, 33). Nevertheless he denies that death is extrinsi-cally bad, and Feldman thinks this is a mistake.

According to Feldman, Epicurus wrongly ascribes extrinsic badness only tothings or events that cause intrinsic badness (e.g., immoderate drinking thatcauses a headache). But, Feldman argues, this fails to account for all ways theintrinsic value of our lives can be affected. Feldman proposes the following al-ternative principle:

Something is extrinsically bad for a person if and only if he or she would have beenintrinsically better off if it had not taken place. (138)

Consider, Feldman continues, a young boy who dies painlessly during minorsurgery. He suffers no intrinsic harm–no pain, anxiety, or frustration. Neverthe-less, we think it a terrible misfortune, because had he lived, he could have en-joyed many more years of life. According to Feldman, Epicurus underestimatedhis task in showing that death is not a misfortune. He addressed some concerns,but he failed to address perhaps the most important and persistent reasons wefear death.

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2 Epicurus’ response

It is clear from surviving texts that Epicurus, as well as the later EpicureansPhilodemus and Lucretius, faced or anticipated the Deprivation Objection fromcontemporaries. A particularly vivid expression of the objection appears in Lu-cretius’ De Rerum Natura [DRN] Book 3, which contains a moving passagewhere the poet dramatizes the laments at the possibility of a man’s death:

“No longer will your happy home give you welcome, nor your best of wives, nor willyour sweet children race to snatch the first kiss and touch your heart with silent sweet-ness. No longer will you be able to defend your flourishing affairs or those who areyours. Miserable man,” they say, “miserably has one cursed day deprived you of all therewards of life!” (3.894–9)6

The complaint is powerful and poignant in part because the “rewards of life”the man imagines losing are not excessive luxuries, but the simple pleasures offamily and home. He is also worried, quite understandably, about what willbecome of his projects and family when he is gone. Lucretius’ response is strik-ingly terse: “Nor does any desire for these things bother you any longer”(3.900–1). Of course, a dead person will no longer enjoy the rewards of life, butneither does he desire them! The deprivation cannot harm him, because, oncehe is dead, he cannot feel frustrated by being deprived.

Scholars debate how strong this response is. In my view, it fails to addressthe main point of the objection–the worry is not that I will feel frustration, butthat my life will actually be worse overall than it might have been, regardless ofwhether I know about it.7 If the father dies, he will have fewer chances to spendtime with his wife and children, provide for their needs, and see his childrengrow up and have families of their own. That he cannot be aware of his lossonce he is dead does not seem, in itself, to provide sufficient comfort. The pos-sibility of being deprived disturbs him now.

Epicurus himself, however, developed another response to the DeprivationObjection, and it is one of the more intriguing (and puzzling) ideas in his

6 My translation, from the text of Kenny 1971.7 Lucretius’ response is criticized by Feldman, defended by Braddock 2000. One way to thinkabout the point at issue here is through Derek Parfit’s discussion of theories about what makesa person’s life go best (Parfit 1984). Parfit distinguishes Preference Hedonism – according towhich one’s life goes well when one feels pleasure, arising from a subjective awareness thatone’s preferences are satisfied–from Success Theory–where the value of one’s life is determinedby the extent to which one’s preferences are in fact satisfied, whether or not one knows thatthey are. Lucretius’ response (unsurprisingly) is compatible with Preference Hedonism,whereas the Deprivation Objection requires something like Parfit’s Success Theory.

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philosophy. Epicurus accepts that death deprives us of continued pleasure.But he denies that the deprivation is a misfortune, because he claims thatduration and quantity makes no difference to the overall happiness or valueof a good life.

This idea is presented, somewhat unclearly, in Principle Doctrines 19–20:

[19] Infinite time and finite time contain equal pleasure, if one measures the limits ofpleasure by reasoning.

[20] The flesh places the limits of pleasure at infinity, and needs an infinite time to bringit about. But the intellect, by making a rational calculation of the end and the limitwhich govern the flesh, and by dispelling the fears about eternity, brings about the com-plete life, so that we no longer need the infinite time. But neither does it shun pleasure,nor even when circumstances bring about our departure from life does it suppose, as itperishes, that it has in any way fallen short of the best life. (ΚΔ 19–20 = LS 24C1–2)

According to Epicurus, pleasure, which is the goal or τέλος of human life, has a“limit.” That is because the highest kind of pleasure, and the one that countsfor happiness, consists in “the health of the body and the soul’s freedom fromdisturbance” (Ep. Men. 127). (This kind of pleasure is sometimes called “kataste-matic pleasure” to distinguish it from “kinetic pleasure” that arises from activ-ities such as eating or drinking [see Diogenes Laertius [D.L.] 10.136 = LS 21R1].)Epicurus holds that once a person achieves freedom from pain and disturbance,his life becomes “complete” and is as good as it can get; making it longer doesnot make it better. A short and long time contain equal pleasure (ΚΔ 19).8 Thus(ΚΔ 20), if an Epicurean sage must die, he will not believe he has “in any wayfallen short of the best life.”

The best contemporary analysis of this doctrine, in my view, appears in Ro-senbaum 1990. Rosenbaum compares Epicurean katastematic pleasure to per-fect health, which is “an occurrent state of persons […] such that one is in thatstate or one is not” (26). Once you achieve perfect health, it is not possible tobecome healthier. Your healthy life can only be “varied,” by engaging yourhealthy body in different kinds of activities. More importantly, a healthy lifethat lasts 80 years is not thereby more healthy than a healthy life of only30 years. Judging by the standard of health, both lives rate the same, and if one

8 The wording of ΚΔ 19 and the first two sentences of ΚΔ 20 leave it somewhat unclear whetherEpicurus is criticizing only the desire for immortality, or if he means to address in addition thedesire for a longer, but still finite lifespan. See Warren, 130–3, for discussion of this interpretivequestion. However, the last sentence of ΚΔ 20 seems to specify that, for the Epicurean sage,there is no need for any further life once katastematic pleasure has been achieved and lifebecomes complete.


prefers the longer life, it must be because of some other value such a life con-tains. Epicurus’ thinking with katastematic pleasure seems to be similar: Once aperson attains the highest pleasure, his life has become as complete and happyas it can possibly be. Living longer does not make his katastematic pleasurebetter or more choiceworthy. A pleasant life of 30 years and a pleasant life of80 years are equally pleasant, and thus equally good.9

This is a difficult idea to grasp–we are accustomed to thinking that, ifsomething is good, more of it is better. We assume that good should be max-imized. So we think that if the Epicurean sage is enjoying the best possible life,free from anxiety and stress, her life would become even better if she couldcontinue living longer. Epicurus, however, rejects this inference, recommendinga different way of evaluating and comparing the goodness of lives.10 As Rosen-baum puts it, “[For Epicurus] completeness [of life] lies in a certain time-inde-pendent quality of one’s activities, not in whether the activities produce specific(future) results” (36–7). Rosenbaum calls this time-independent completeness“complete living.” Complete living is entirely a matter of how the person lives herlife.

We can now summarize Epicurus’ response to the Deprivation Objection.The Deprivation Objection claims that, when a person dies, his life as a whole isoften worse than it would have been had he lived. For Epicurus, however, thegoodness and badness of anything must be explained solely by reference to thefinal end (see, e.g., ΚΔ 25). When comparing two happy lives, one lasting, say,twenty-five years and the other eighty, there are no grounds, at least in terms ofEpicurus’ τέλος, to prefer the latter over the former. Both lives are complete,both happy. If one prefers a longer life, therefore, it cannot be for reasonsgrounded in the τέλος. For Epicurus, then, quantity is not only less importantthan quality – it is not important at all. The limit of happiness, and the goal oflife, is simply to live pleasantly so long as we are alive.

9 A similar analysis of this doctrine appears in Warren 2004, pages 154–5.10 Warren claims that Epicurus rejects what he calls the “comparative” analysis of harms andbenefits that underlies the Deprivation Objection (see Warren, 201). However, while Warren’sown arguments against the comparative approach are forceful, he does not provide sufficientevidence that Epicurus or his followers used such arguments. My view is that, although it isdifficult to give a satisfactorily precise analysis of comparative harms and benefits, the basicintuition behind, e.g., Feldman’s argument must be addressed. I contend that Epicurus acceptsthe comparative or counterfactual way of evaluating lives, but rejects the criteria that mostpeople employ in making the comparison.

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3 Three models of happiness

It turns out, therefore, that Epicurus has a more sophisticated response to theDeprivation Objection than critics like Feldman realize. Even so, this solutionhas often seemed unsatisfying, because it rests on premises that are at least ascontroversial as the problem they are meant to solve. Granted, Epicureans en-dorse different model for evaluating lives, a non-quantitative model that is verydifferent from the way most people think. But why should we accept Epicurus’model? Is this doctrine merely an implausible ad hoc artifact of Epicurus’ at-tempts to defend his implausibly strong views, or is there anything to say for it?Even Warren, who is generally sympathetic to the Epicurean position, decidesthat Epicurus’ conception about what makes life complete is “perhaps the leastplausible of the Epicurean arguments […] because it relies heavily on counter-intuitive and highly debatable elements of […] Epicurean theory” (217). It seemsthat Epicurus has not addressed the real concern, but merely obfuscated theissue with a confusing and implausible doctrine about how we ought to evalu-ate goodness.

The problem, as I see it, is as follows: By my count, there are at least threecommonly used basic models for evaluating the goodness of lives, two of which,unlike Epicurus’model, support the Deprivation Objection in many cases:– Time-Independent Completeness: A life is happy and good in virtue of a

time-independent quality of how that life is being lived; no particularamount of time is necessary. (This is, of course, Epicurus’ model.)

– Time-Dependent Completeness: A life is happy or good insofar as it in-cludes or completes well certain stages or elements or achieves certaingoals.

– Additive: A life is good insofar as it accumulates goods or good experiences;one life X is better than another life Y just in case X contains, on balance,more goods or good experiences than Y.11

Though they do not present the issue explicitly in these terms, it is clear fromreading the Epicurean texts on fear of death that Epicurus and his followerssaw the threat that these alternative models posed to their position. Indeed, I

11 Other models are possible. An early commentator on this essay, for example, suggested thatlives be evaluated by comparing their average goodness. I focus on the Time-Dependent Com-pleteness and Additive Models for two reasons: First, they are the ones I see Epicureans expli-citly addressing; and second, these models are, I believe, the ones that underlie most pre-phi-losophical thinking about death. Further work would need to be done to work out whetherother models, such as the Average Value Model, might turn out to be superior to Epicurus’.


argue that they recognized, in these ideas, some of the gravest dangers to ourability to live happy lives. My objective, in the following, is to uncover and eval-uate the various arguments that Epicurus and his followers deployed to supporttheir model and criticize the two competing models.

The second model, what I call the Time-Dependent Completeness model,has deep roots in our cultural ideas about life and mortality. For example:

To every thing there is a season, and a time to everypurpose under heaven.

A time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant,and a time to pluck up that which is planted. (Ecclesiastes 3: 1–2)

Many people believe that it is terrible when someone dies ‘prematurely,’ butthat, at the same time, at some point death becomes natural and even right–that is, there is ‘a time to die.’ This is a powerful idea: That once people havelived a full (or complete) life, they ought to accept (or even welcome) death asthe appropriate conclusion to a well-lived life. In Epicurus’ own time, followersof Aristotle likely upheld a version of this model. In his discussion of happiness,Aristotle asserts that εὐδαιμονία requires a “complete life” of activity andachievements, which necessarily takes some time (Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 9).As Aristotle puts it, “A single swallow does not make spring, nor does a singleday; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a short time, make a manblessed and happy” (1.7, 1098a19–20).

The Additive Model receives less explicit cultural endorsement; neverthe-less, I think it drives many of people’s intuitive attitudes about death. WoodyAllen once said, “I don’t want to achieve immortality in my work, I want toachieve it by not dying.”12 Death may be a fact of life, but, if possible, the pro-ponent of the Additive Model would prefer not to suffer it. The Additive Modelconceives of happiness as a function of the accumulation of goods or good ex-periences through life – the more goods you accumulate, the better your life is.Therefore, you want to continue living in order to continue accumulating goods,and death is always a bad thing, insofar as it prevents further accumulation. Itis this way of thinking, I believe, that most strongly motivates the widespreaddesire for and belief in immortality or an afterlife, and that Epicurus attackswhen he criticizes those who “place the limits of pleasure at infinity, and [need]an infinite time to bring it about” (ΚΔ 20). People imagine an afterlife becausethey want to be able to continue experiencing and accumulating goods.

12 Quoted in Overall 2003, 230n1.

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Both competing models support the Deprivation Objection, at least in manysituations, and both, it seems to me, have significant initial plausibility. Epi-curus rejects both models, however, on the grounds that they are grounded infalse and ultimately unhealthy beliefs about what is important and worthwhilein life. Most of the time, people do not reflect explicitly on the ways they areevaluating their own and others’ lives, and they remain largely unaware of theattitudes and patterns of thinking that influence their choices, emotions, andresponses. Nevertheless, according to Epicurus and his followers, these implicitand often unconscious ways of thinking create and fuel fear of death, which inturn serves to undermine a person’s peace of mind, to destroy his chances athappiness, and to infect his relationships with his fellow human beings (seeDRN 3.31–93). So, just as when Nietzsche exposes the ressentiment and psycho-logical diseases that give birth to conventional morality, so also, I argue, Epi-curus and his followers seek to expose and critique these unhealthy models forevaluating lives in order to promote what they see as a more robust and healthymodel for thinking about human life and what makes it valuable.

4 Against the Time-Dependent CompletenessModel

Let’s begin with the Time-Dependent Completeness model. According to thisway of thinking, living a good life necessarily takes a certain amount of time,and therefore ‘premature’ death represents a serious threat to its achievement.One common manifestation of this model is in the idea of the ‘ages of man,’ touse Shakespeare’s phrase (As You Like It, Act 2, Scene 7). People often think, ina vague way, that human life involves certain natural stages (childhood, adoles-cence, a career, parenthood, retirement, etc.), and a life is good to the extentthat these stages turn out well for a person. Death is natural and appropriate asthe conclusion of a well-lived life, but only after the (most important) stages ofthat life have been completed in a satisfactory way. To die early is to be deniedthe opportunity to experience and complete later stages of human life, and theearlier a person dies, the more they lose.

This ‘Stages’ version of the Time-Dependent Completeness model, however,may seem too rigid, and a proponent might want to adopt a more flexible ver-sion, where what is important is not to follow any specific, one-size-fits-all lifepattern, but simply to formulate and achieve some long-range goals and pro-jects for one’s life; to meet and overcome some challenges; to fulfill one’s “lifepossibilities”; or to cultivate and enjoy some significant long-term relationships


with other people.13 (Call this the “Projects” version.) These projects and rela-tionships provide meaning and structure to the person’s life, but they necessa-rily take time to develop and reach completion. Premature death is a misfortunefor the person who dies, because his life projects and core relationships are un-able to reach their fruition.

For Epicurus and his followers, however, both versions of the Time-Depen-dent Completeness model are flawed, insofar as both posit psychologicallyharmful and ultimately arbitrary standards according to which lives are evalu-ated. Lives that fail to satisfy these standards – that fail to complete the requi-site stages or achieve certain kinds of goals – are judged incomplete and there-fore deficient. But Epicurus thinks this is a wrong-headed way to think aboutlife.

Epicurus repeatedly insists that the τέλος of a human life, and the sole cri-terion of its value, is pleasure, specifically katastematic pleasure, arising fromthe pain- and disturbance-free state of mind and body. Epicurean doctrine aimsto help us to achieve and sustain this state (Ep. Men. 127). But Epicureans main-tain that this τέλος provides no grounds for distinguishing or valuing different“stages” of life. As Epicurus writes in the Letter to Menoeceus,

Let no one delay the study of philosophy while young nor weary of it when old. For noone is either too young or too old for the health of the soul. He who says that the timefor philosophy has not yet come or that it has passed is like someone who says that thetime for happiness has not yet come or that it has passed. Therefore, both young andold must philosophize, the latter so that although old he may stay young in good thingsowing to gratitude for what has occurred, the former so that although young he too maybe like an old man owing to his lack of fear of what is to come. (Ep. Men. 122; cf. Ep.Men. 126)

According to Epicureans, it is irrelevant whether one is a child, an adolescent, aparent, or elderly – the goal of life is the same (see Warren 2004, 133). Any hu-man, at any stage of her life, lives well insofar as she enjoys a pain-free, undis-turbed state. The only “stages” that matter have to do with progressing towards

13 I borrow the term “life possibilities” from Callahan 1987, where he articulates the followingversion of the Time Dependent Completeness model:

My version of a “tolerable death” is this: the individual event of death at that stage in alife span when (a) one’s life possibilities have on the whole been accomplished; (b) one’smoral obligations to those for whom one has had responsibility have been discharged;and (c) one’s death will not seem to others an offense to sense or sensibility, or temptothers to despair and rage at the finitude of human existence. … A “natural life span” maythen be defined as one in which life’s possibilities have on the whole been achieved andafter which death may be understood as a sad, but nonetheless relatively acceptable,event. (66)

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the wisdom or “prudence [ϕρόνησις]” that maintains pleasant experience (Ep.Men. 132 = LS 21B6).

Admittedly, this latter concession opens Epicurus to the objection that thosewho have not yet become Epicurean sages will have reason to fear death. Whenthey die, it turns out that they are deprived of the best life, which they may yethave reached.14 This fact leaves, it seems to me, a serious residual version ofthe Deprivation Objection, which remains a challenge for Epicureans. Epicur-eans do have other arguments in their arsenal. They could point out, as doesLucretius, that, when you are dead, you cannot regret failing to achieve thehighest pleasure, because you no longer exist. Although this answer is not fullysatisfying, for the reasons I noted above, it does have some force. They mightalso be able to minimize the bite of the objection somewhat by pointing to(what they see as) the easy accessibility of the Epicurean τέλος. Epicurean plea-sure is not like Stoic virtue–supposedly, it is readily available to anyone whointernalizes the truths revealed by Epicurus’ philosophy (Ep. Men. 130–1; ΚΔXV). At one point, Lucretius goes so far as to suggest that, if you fail to achievehappiness, it is your own fault. Everyone has the chance to enjoy Nature’sbounty:

Away with your tears, you bottomless pit, restrain your complaints! Having enjoyed allthe rewards of life you wither away; but since you lust for what you don’t have, anddespise what is present, life, incomplete and unfulfilled [ingrata], has slipped away fromyou. (DRN 3.955–60)15

As we will see below, both Epicurus and Lucretius frequently criticize the ingra-titude that characterizes many people’s attitudes about life. We have a readychance for happiness, but we let it slip away.

14 Philodemus seems to concede this point, at De Morte XIII.36–XIV.14. See Warren, 148–9.15 Compare Philodemus’ treatment of this issue:

[The young man who cannot remember how many good] things he experienced becausehe has lived wisely does not deserve pity, but rather the old man who has found so farnothing naturally good, but still has convinced himself that he will attain all his dreamssometime in the future. […] But, it being possible both to achieve and enjoy the greatest[good] in some certain period of time, as I have demonstrated, will any young man who isnot insane desire any longer even endless time, or even try to win the life of an old man?While still a young man he will come to possess a plentiful supply of goods and as aresult will pass away joyfully and even be said to have lived more of a life than those whodo not enjoy all the years they live” (XII.26–XIII.17, cited by Warren, 146).

Philodemus emphasizes that anyone, in principle, could achieve tranquility in short order(“some certain period of time”) if they seriously tried. The old man who continues to look tosome indeterminate future for the attainment of his dreams is the real fool.


Epicurus also rejects the notion that, in order to live well, you must achievegreat goals or overcome specific challenges, which underlies the Projects ver-sion of this model. For example, Epicurus famously claims that we must “liber-ate ourselves from the prison of routine business and politics” (Sententiae Vati-canae [SV] 58 = LS 22D1). Epicurus focuses on specific common ambitions, butthe point has general significance: People often take on difficult and stressfulpursuits (pursuing political office, building a business, earning advanced de-grees, etc.) in the hopes of accomplishing something of lasting importance, be-lieving these accomplishments will provide value to their lives. According toEpicurus, however, the value of such ‘accomplishments’ is illusory. Political in-fluence, fame, and wealth are simply not worth the effort, because they serveonly to increase stress and anxiety without increasing one’s potential to enjoy apleasant life. In ΚΔ 21, Epicurus insists that once you recognize how easy it is toobtain “that which makes life complete,” you no longer need these “competitiveinvolvements.”

Lucretius makes the same point when he writes,

Pleasantest of all is to be master of those tranquil regions well fortified on high by theteaching of the wise. From there you can look down on others and see them wanderingthis way and that and straying in their quest for a way of life–competing in talent, fight-ing over social class, striving night and day with utmost effort to rise to the heights ofwealth and become owners of substance. O miserable minds of men, O unseeing hearts![…] Do you not see that nature screams out for nothing but the removal of pain from thebody and the mind’s enjoyment of the joyous sensation when anxiety and fear havebeen taken away? (DRN 2.6–19 = LS 21W2–3, trans. Long and Sedley; see also DRN 6.1–28 = LS 21X)

With its vivid imagery, Lucretius’ poetry imbues the doctrine with a vivacity thatEpicurus’ sparse prose lacks: We see, from the “tranquil regions” apart from thefray, that those who waste their lives competing for social position, wealth, andachievement are missing what life is about. They have been told that, to amountto anything, they should be rich and famous, achieve big things, and make animpact on the world. They also fear death and believe (falsely) that wealth andhonor might somehow gain them security against it (DRN 3.31–93).16 This deep-rooted habit of thought, inculcated from an early age, prevents many from en-joying the happy lives of which they are capable, poisoning their ability to ap-preciate the true goods life offers. Although people do not often reflect on thispattern of thought, it ruins their lives. Epicurean therapy seeks to unmask this

16 See Konstan 2008, Chapter 2, for an analysis of how fear of death feeds immoderate desireand ambition, which in turn reinforce the fear of death.


habit of thought and, by revealing it as empty and irrational, to replace it withhealthier attitudes rooted in the proper understanding of human nature.

Similar reasoning applies to the idea that humans have certain “life possibi-lities” or at least a reasonable expectation of having a certain quantity of life.17

(C.f. Psalms 90: “The days of our years are threescore years and ten.”) Again,we are encouraged, by various cultural and societal influences, to expect to liveto a certain age, but, from the perspective of Epicureanism, these expectationshave no rational basis. In a world of atoms in the void, with no teleologicalorder, no one is guaranteed or owed anything, certainly not a quantity of life.Moreover, no desire for or anticipation of a certain amount of life can be sup-ported by the Epicurean τέλος. The expectation of “threescore and ten,” like theexpectation that people ought to achieve certain kinds of goals or pass throughspecific stages, is a culturally imposed belief that has no rational basis in thecorrect Epicurean understanding of human nature and that, if taken too ser-iously, can prevent one from enjoying true happiness.

This is not to say that a prudent Epicurean could and would not pursuelong-term goals or cultivate deep relationships. On the contrary, Epicuruscounts friendship as one of the most important goods in human life (see ΚΔ 27,28, SV 23). (In fact, the benefits Epicurus sees in friendship–the sense of securitybuilt on mutual trust; a friend’s wise advice and support; the enjoyment of eachother’s company–seem to be ones that, like fine wine, would grow better withtime.18) Moreover, he devoted his own life to a significant long-term project,seeking to discover and lay out the true nature of reality, in order to free hisfellow humans from unnecessary misery.19 But he would insist that any long-term relationship or project must be pursued with the right attitude. This aspectof Epicurus’ view is clearest when it comes to friendship, where Epicurus thinksit is important to develop a community of friends, so that no one friend, no mat-ter how long and deep your bond, becomes indispensible.20 Similarly, when

17 As in Callahan’s proposal, quoted in fn. 15 above.18 See Cicero, De Finibus 1.66–70 = LS 22O. In this passage, Cicero’s Epicurean spokesmanTorquatus compares three strategies adopted by Epicureans for explaining how friends loveeach other for their own sake; O’Keefe 2009, Chapter 15 provides a plausible interpretation ofthis passage, comparing the “orthodox” and “heterodox” theories of friendship.19 An interesting, but little remarked passage from the Vatican Sayings reads, “As you growold, you are such as I would praise, and you have seen the difference between what it meansto philosophize for yourself and what it means to do so for Greece. I rejoice with you” (SV 76).Taken on its own, this passage is ambiguous, but when read with other passages (such as SV44, 66, and 67) it seems clear that the speaker (Epicurus?) is praising someone who sees thevalue and joy in philosophizing not just for himself, but also for others as well.20 See O’Keefe 2009, 148.


pursuing long term projects or goals, you must recognize that any such projectis, in itself, unnecessary for happiness, and you should be prepared to let it goif circumstances so require.

It may help to think about this issue in terms of Epicurus’ distinction be-tween the three types of desire–natural and necessary, unnatural but unneces-sary, and unnatural and unnecessary (see ΚΔ 29 and 30).21 According to Cooper1999, necessary and natural, merely natural, and unnatural desires can be di-rected toward what are extensionally the same objects (504). The difference isin how the person views the object. There are two important differences be-tween natural and necessary and merely natural desires: First, natural and ne-cessary desires are for general categories of items that one needs to avoid painand maintain ἀταραξία (e.g., some food to satisfy hunger, some shelter fromcold), whereas merely natural desires are for more specific items in those gener-al categories that could satisfy those desires (e.g., a lobster dinner, a four starhotel room) (504–7). Second, while a natural and necessary desire cannot begiven up or ignored without causing serious pain, a merely natural desire canbe “dispelled,” the need satisfied with an appropriate substitute (such as breadand water when luxurious foods are not available) (ΚΔ 26; see also SV 21). Thisidea can be applied in our case: While all humans have general natural andnecessary desires for steady sources of pleasure and for friends to secure theconfident expectation of continued happiness, people also have and may pur-sue natural but not necessary desires to cultivate close long-lasting relationshipswith specific people and pursue long-term projects. At least from the perspec-tive of personal happiness, these projects are important only insofar as theyfurnish opportunities for varied pleasure.22 But, for an Epicurean, whether these

21 An anonymous reviewer expressed doubts that these desires (to maintain a friendship orcomplete a long term project) could be located in Epicurus’ trichotomy of desires, since Epi-curus seems to restrict ἐπιθυμία to only certain kinds of objects, and friendship and long termprojects are not the right kind. If this is right, my application of this specific doctrine would notbe warranted. But, first, it is unclear to me that Epicurus really did mean to restrict the applica-tion of the trichotomy – quite a range of objects are mentioned in the texts, including highoffice, fame, wealth, and the erection of statues (ΚΔ 6, 7, and 14; Scholion on ΚΔ 29). Thetrichotomy thus seems able to accommodate desires not only for things seen as intrinsic goods,but also for instrumental goods as well. In any event, even if this particular language cannotbe employed directly to explain a person’s desires to pursue and maintain a long-term relation-ship or project, the general psychological idea still seems applicable, as I explain.22 Purinton 1993 argues that variation in kinetic pleasures plays a more important role in Epi-curus’ theory of happiness than is often recognized. According to him, katastematic pleasureitself does not feel good, but “one makes katastematic pleasure one’s end only on the assump-tion that doing so will also allow one to enjoy kinetic pleasures–and, indeed, purer kineticpleasures, and more of them, at least in the long term” (314). If Purinton’s interpretation is


projects end with particular results makes no difference to their value or theoverall happiness of one’s life.

Some scholars – including Warren and Luper-Foy 1987–criticize Epicuruson the grounds that an Epicurean would lack sufficient reason to continue tolive, since he would have to avoid desires, attachments, and projects that mightbe cut short by death.23 It seems to me, however, that both fail adequately toapply Epicurus’ distinction. An Epicurean can have all sorts of desires and pro-jects, so long as he maintains those desires with the attitude that, if necessary,he can let them go.24 For example, suppose an Epicurean is writing a book. Hewants to continue living in order to keep working on it; the project furnisheshim with ample opportunities for varying pleasure, maintaining his tranquility,and avoiding disturbance and boredom. But suppose he discovers that he has aterminal illness and will be unable to finish his book. Since he is versed in Epi-curean doctrines about the τέλος of life, he knows his life as a whole will notbe diminished if he fails to finish the book, and so he will not be regretful ordisturbed. In this way, merely natural desires give a person reasons to continueliving, though they do not provide any reason to fear death.25

Warren expresses skepticism about this solution. He writes,

It is difficult to see … that a desire can be strong enough to motivate an agent to act butbe weak enough that the individual should remain entirely indifferent to its fulfillment.Further, the problem for the Epicurean is that in order not to fear death at all, in ordernot to feel anxious at the thought that he might die and be prevented from obtainingsome goal, it appears that there should be no desires held with sufficient strength thatthey are accompanied by anxiety about their fulfillment. (212)

Warren’s mistake, I would argue, is to assume an overly simplistic connectionbetween the “strength” of one’s desires and one’s level of anxiety about theirfulfillment. In Epicurean psychology, it is our attitudes about the objects of our

correct, relationships and life-projects that provide abundant opportunities to vary one’s plea-sures would play an important role in a prudent, pleasant life, and a wise Epicurean wouldseek zealously to cultivate them.23 Warren, 205–212.24 Cooper writes, “It is sometimes rashly assumed that Epicurus taught, as part of the pursuitof the Epicurean goal of life, that we should limit ourselves only to the necessary desires […]This is a bad mistake; once we understand the character of the natural but unnecessary desiresand their vast difference from the groundless ones, it is obvious that Epicurus could have noobjection whatsoever to anyone’s having lots of those […]” (507).25 Thus, Purinton writes, “Epicurus would say that it is rational to prolong one’s life especiallywhen one has attained the telos […] If one is going to go on living, it is rational to desire tocontinue to enjoy the highest pleasure” (317–18, fn. 70). See also Rosenbaum 1989, 83.


desires and how we conceptualize them, in the context of our lives as awhole, that cause anxiety, not how strong or weak the desires are (whateverthat means). To use my earlier example, I could be strongly motivated to fin-ish my book (insofar as I enjoy the time that I spend on it, and thus devotemuch of my free time to working on it) but then, when it becomes clear Icannot finish it, I shrug my shoulders and move on. Such a psychological atti-tude may be difficult to imagine or cultivate, but it is not obvious that it isimpossible.26

Even though the Time-Dependent Completeness model has deep roots inour common thinking about life and death, I conclude that the Epicureanswere right to challenge it. Any claim about stages or goals a life must achieveseems arbitrary and unhelpful. Epicurus would contend that the widespreadadherence to these ideas derives not from their intrinsic value or truth, butfrom social pressure and cultural indoctrination (thus, his frequent denuncia-tions of “groundless opinion” [ΚΔ 29, 30] and praise for those who free them-selves from “culture [παιδεία]” [LS 25F and 25G]). Why take these notions soseriously, to the extent that we consider our lives deficient if we fail to achievewhat society tells us we must? Conversely, why accept that once a person hascompleted some arbitrary set of goals or stages her life is thereby “complete”and therefore may end without significant harm? Overall 2003 worries (rightly,I think) that this model is often rooted in subconscious ageism – we assumethat older people have less value and possibility and can no longer fully enjoylife. As Epicurus points out, people (falsely) think that it is for a young man tolive well but that all that is left for an old man is to die well (Ep. Men. 126).Convinced by the failure of the Time-Dependent Completeness model, Overalladvocates a version of the Additive model, arguing that, even if someone haslived a “full” or long life, by our current standards, she may continue to havethe same reasons to continue living and enjoying life as anyone else (110–23).27

26 I see some parallels between the Epicurean position on merely natural desires and the Stoicdoctrine of preferred and dispreferred indifferents (Brennan 2005, Ch. 13 gives a good explana-tion of the Stoic doctrine). The doctrines differ in significant ways, of course, but they are simi-lar in that both explain how our lives contain many activities and things that – although wespend significant time and energy on them – are not indispensable in the final reckoning. Thepoint of philosophical reflection, for both schools, is to illuminate the difference between whatis necessary for happiness and what is not and to help us to realign our priorities accordingly.27 Nagel reaches a similar conclusion at the end of his article: “If there is no limit to theamount of life that it would be good to have, then it may be that a bad end is in store for usall” (80).


5 Against the Additive Model

Even in the brief selections of his work that survive, it is clear that Epicurusrecognizes the Additive Model as the most serious challenge to his claims abouthappiness and death, and thus one of the most substantial threats to our abilityto live good lives. He refers to the proponents of the Additive Model explicitlywhen he criticizes those who believe they “need infinite time” to be happy (ΚΔ20) and “desire immortality” (Ep. Men. 124; see also D.L. 10.121 = LS 21K). Hav-ing internalized this way of thinking, such people suppose that death is a terri-ble misfortune, because it puts an end to their continued and theoretically un-limited accumulation of goods. Epicurus and Lucretius deploy several differentstrategies for bringing to light the dangerous errors they think are inherent inthis model of evaluation, some better than others.

I have already mentioned one of Epicurus’ responses to the Additive Model:He thinks it rests on a mistaken view about the kind of pleasure that matters. InΚΔ 19, he asserts that most people mistakenly measure pleasure by the “flesh”– that is, they conceive of it in terms of distinct episodes of pleasurable sensa-tion, from the satisfaction of bodily appetites. Appetite-satisfactions and epi-sodes of pleasurable sensation (kinetic pleasures) can be counted, accumulated,compared, and maximized.28 Once the pleasurable sensation has passed, how-ever, the person is left wanting more, which feeds an endless, unsatisfiable cy-cle.29 But, according to Epicurus, the important kind of pleasure consists in apain-free, undisturbed state, which is continuously present and does not arisein distinct, countable bursts. Once a person reaches the limit of pleasure,further striving to add more and more bursts of pleasure is unnecessary.

I am sympathetic with the idea of identifying a qualitative limit to pleasure.Unfortunately, as some scholars have pointed out, this response fails as a re-sponse to the Additive Model, because even Epicurean pleasure can be quanti-fied, if not in distinct episodes, then at least in terms of duration. Ten years ofpleasant living is still more than five months, which seems to be enough for theAdditive Model to get a grip.30

28 Such as in, for example, the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. Similar theories with whichEpicurus would have been familiar include the egoistic hedonisms of Callicles in Plato’s Gor-gias (491e–492c) and of the Cyrenaics (D.L. 2.88–90).29 See Lucretius, DRN 3.1003–10 (= LS 24F5), where he compares the impossible quest to fillthe bodily appetites to the punishment of the Danaïds, condemned eternally to fill a pitcher fullof holes. The original source of this reading of the myth may be Gorgias 493a-4a.30 See, e.g., Furley 1986, 81.


A second response that appears in Epicurean texts rests on the naturalismof ancient ethics. The Epicureans would argue that the mode of thinking repre-sented by the Additive Model is “unnatural” and therefore flawed, insofar as itfails to accommodate the unavoidable fact of human mortality. In SV 31, Epi-curus writes, “Against other things it is possible to obtain security. But when itcomes to death we human beings all live in an unwalled city” (LS 24B). Lucre-tius makes this line of argument explicit, in the climax of his own discussion ondeath:

Besides, what is this great and evil lust of life that drives us to be so greatly agitatedamidst doubt and peril? There is an end fixed for the life of mortals [certa … finis vitaemortalibus], and death cannot be avoided, but die we must. (DRN 3.1076–9; see also3.931–43, 967–71)

Human life has an undeniable and certain end (certa finis), a necessary conse-quence of our nature as complex atomic compounds; we cannot avoid it. TheAdditive Model, however, posits a goal for human life (the limitless accumula-tion of goods) that we cannot achieve. A person whose thinking is shaped bythe Additive Model will therefore be driven by a “great and evil lust for life”,unable ever to be satisfied with the natural facts. But it is the job of ethicaltheory to posit a τέλος that fits human nature and necessary facts about humanlife.31 Accordingly, Epicurus would label the desire for continued accumulationof goods as “unnatural and unnecessary.” These desires, by their very nature,are bound to be frustrated and cause pain and anxiety. They “are produced bya groundless opinion and […] fail to be dissolved not because of their own nat-ure but because of the groundless opinions of mankind” (ΚΔ 30).

This second response makes assumptions about the constraints on ethicaltheory that most ancient philosophers shared, but that we might question to-day. Ancient philosophers assumed that the goal of ethical theory is to tell ushow to become the best humans we can be, taking human nature as given. Evenwhen ancient ethicists recommend transcending certain aspects of humanity (e.g., Plato’s recommendation to “become as like God as possible” [Theaetetus176a-b], or Aristotle’s endorsement of the life of contemplation [NicomacheanEthics X.7, esp. 1177b25–1178a2]), they rooted their arguments in a deeper char-acterization of human nature; we transcend certain (bodily or animal) aspectsof our nature, for the sake of other, more important or essential aspects (the

31 See Annas 1993: “The ancient appeal to nature is an appeal to what human nature is. […]Though [ancient ethicists] disagree about what it is that human nature requires for its fulfill-ment, they agree that it is human nature that we should look to, if we are to determine theproper place of virtue in our lives” (136).


divine and rational aspects). So an ancient ethicist would hesitate to endorse aconception of the τέλος that is, by his own theory, inconsistent with humannature. The purpose of ethics in the ancient world was to make sense of humanlife as a whole and to uncover and refute notions and desires that are inconsis-tent with the necessary, natural truths of being human.

Today, however, rightly or wrongly, we are not as quick to agree that hu-man nature is or should be either immutable or normative. Most people thinkwe can and should improve on nature, even human nature; therefore, it is notnecessarily an objection if a theory posits goals that are inconsistent with theway that humans currently are. Nature is both fallible and mutable, and wemight improve upon it. We do not have to accept our natural status (perhapseven our mortality).32

Lucretius suggests another interesting response to the Additive Model whenhe personifies Nature herself chastising the man who laments his imminent de-mise:

What is ails you, mortal, that you indulge so excessively in sickly lamentation? […]Why do you seek to add more, only to be miserably lost again and to perish whollywithout gratification? […] For there is nothing else I can devise and invent to pleaseyou: Everything is always the same [eadem sunt omnia semper]. If your body is not al-ready withered with years and your limbs worn out and languid, yet everything remainsthe same, even if you shall go on to outlive all generations […] (3.933–4, 941–8; cf.1080–1)

The target of Nature’s criticism here is clearly under the sway of the AdditiveModel – he does not want to die, because he wants to continue his excessiveindulgence. Nature argues that he has no reason to “seek to add more” because“everything is always the same.” This argument makes some sense–one com-mon response to the possibility of immortality is that it would be dreadfullyboring33 – but it is hard know exactly what this premise refers to in terms ofEpicurean theory.34 What is “always the same”? In saying this, Lucretius’ Nat-ure may be referring to the fact that katastematic pleasure is “always the same,”at least considered in itself; that is, one period of katastematic pleasure is quali-tatively the same as any other, qua katastematic pleasure, and this pleasure iswhat really matters for happiness. The brief ἀταραξία of mortals is qualitatively

32 Weiner 2010 chronicles the efforts by some contemporary scientists to understand the biolo-gical mechanisms of aging and death, in order to overcome natural death and discover a tech-nological “fountain of youth”.33 See Williams 1973.34 For more on this passage, and the challenge of interpreting it in a way that is consistentwith orthodox Epicurean doctrine, see O’Keefe 2003.


identical to the eternal blessedness of the gods (SV 33; D.L. 10.121). However,omnia here probably includes also the kinetic pleasures which are the object ofnatural but not necessary desire, which serve to vary katastematic pleasure (ΚΔ18; SV 21). Thus, someone might desire to continue living, not to improve thequality of her pleasant state (which is impossible), but rather to experiencefurther variations upon it. If that is true, Nature may be making the point thatthe range of variations has limits. For example, once you have seen the samemovie five times, seeing it again is pointless – whatever value the variation hassoon wears off with repetition. The same reasoning applies to other kinds ofvariation. Therefore, since there are only so many ways to vary your experience,there is no point in extending life indefinitely. No matter how long you go onliving, you will just be adding more of the same to the experiences you havealready enjoyed.

Of course, as has rightly been pointed out, it would take (considerable) timeto experience all possible variations.35 What if there are variations of pleasurethat you have not yet experienced? Would that give you reason to fear deathand desire further life? In answering these questions, it is important to remem-ber that, although pleasure can be ‘varied’, for Epicureans the variation is notin itself necessary for happiness. Variation of pleasure is naturally desirableand may even contribute somehow to sustaining ἀταραξία while alive, but itdoes not itself constitute an independent τέλος or value. The person who, likethe wretch of this passage, gets caught up in accumulating a variety of fleetingsatisfactions manifests a poor understanding of the τέλος of life and fails tounderstand the true sources of a good and happy life (ΚΔ 15).

Some will find this reasoning compelling, but as with the previous re-sponses, it is not decisive. The proponent of the Additive Model might ask: Whynot desire more of the same? If the point is to accumulate goods, it should notmatter if the goods accumulated are qualitatively similar, as long as they con-tinue to provide pleasure. The pleasures of life may lose their savor someday,but that does not mean it is not desirable to continue living until that daycomes. That is the intuition behind the Additive Model. Here, however, the atti-tudes underlying the Additive Model begin to become clear. As he vividly illus-trates, Nature has provided a banquet of pleasures for humans, yet they remainunsatisfied (DRN 3.1082–6). Vatican Saying 69 expresses this idea nicely: “Theingratitude of the soul makes an animal greedy for unlimited variation in its lifestyle.” The idea that we should be grateful for the great bounty and “naturalwealth” we have, rather than wanting what we do not and cannot have, runs

35 E.g., Temkin 2008.


throughout the Epicurean ethical texts (ΚΔ 20; SV 19, 55, 65, 68). Each of us hasthe chance to live “as a god among men,” enjoying “immortal goods” in thespan of our short lives (Ep. Men. 135). Ingratitude and dissatisfaction only spoilthat chance.

Both Epicurus and Lucretius suggest we should be grateful for our lives,but grateful to whom? Epicurean gods do not concern themselves with humanaffairs and are not responsible for the circumstances of our lives, in any event(Ep. Hdt. 76–7; DRN 2.167–81, 5.156–94), and although Lucretius personifiesNature and opens his poem with a moving hymn to Venus, he would acknowl-edge that these are just poetic tropes for presenting impersonal facts in a non-teleological universe (DRN 1.50–61). I would argue that, in this case, “gratitude”is a convenient way to refer to a set of psychological attitudes concerned withhow a person thinks about and evaluates his life. Recent psychological researchhas confirmed the Epicurean position: “Gratitude” for one’s life, even if not ex-pressed toward a personal deity, is strongly correlated with happiness (Emmons& McCullough 2003). For the Epicureans, “ingratitude,” by contrast, manifestsunhealthy and irrational attitudes and is a symptom of the diseases brought onby adherence to one of the opposing models.

Of course, the claim that those who desire more life are ungrateful is harderto make when the person dying is young and has had relatively little life toenjoy. Remember, on the Epicurean position, the only relevant considerationwhen evaluating a life is its quality; quantity does not matter. This entails that,even if you enjoy ἀταραξία for only five minutes, you have experienced “thebest life” and should be grateful to have enjoyed the blessedness of the gods.Some Epicureans seem to have recognized this problem; in a brief passage inDe Morte, Philodemus appears to suggest that, indeed, some time is needed be-fore a person can be counted blessed:

But as things are, the greatest good is acquired by a man who has become wise andthen in addition lived for a certain period of time. His way of life has become stable andconsistent and it is quite appropriate for him to proceed on his way forever, should thatbe possible. (XIX.1–6, cited by Warren, 150)

Be that as it may, the Epicureans remain convinced that the Additive Model ishopelessly flawed and, when a person internalizes it, his ability to enjoy a tran-quil life is seriously threatened. Whenever Epicurus refers to the Additive Model(as in Ep. Men. 124, ΚΔ 20; see also SV 25), he asserts that, on the Additive Mod-el, a good life requires “infinite time,” suggesting that, since we do not haveinfinite time, the Additive Model makes a good life impossible. Epicurus hasdiscovered the “limits” of life, where pleasure and the goodness of life as awhole become complete and cannot be improved. If a person recognizes the


natural limits of desire, he is able to achieve satisfaction, tranquility, and happi-ness and does not need more. The Additive Model, however, rejects the idea oflimits and supposes that one’s life is never complete. At any point, one couldimagine adding more pleasurable experiences or a longer duration of good liv-ing–since, ex hypothesi, a life with more good is always better. Satisfaction isimpossible. Moreover, since the Additive Model rejects Epicurus’ natural limitsto the goodness of life, it is left with no principled way ever to draw the line. Nomatter when you die, you feel you are being deprived of further goods that youmight have enjoyed. Actually, it is worse than that–whenever your death occurs,you are actually being deprived of an infinite amount of goods. Death wouldalways be a terrible misfortune, no matter when it occurred, and our mortallives will always seem cursed, compared to the immortality we might (or per-haps should) have had.36 The death of a person who is 100 years old and haslived a full life would be nearly as bad as the accidental death of a child at age10!

This result is highly counterintuitive, and for the Epicureans, it constitutesa reductio ad absurdum of the Additive Model. In addition, it would, as Epicurusfears, make anyone who has internalized the Additive Model extremely afraid ofdeath. Indeed, people might imagine an eternal afterlife, with judgmental godsthat must be propitiated, as the only way of compensating for the apparent tra-gedy that has befallen all of us in being born mortal.

I share the Epicureans’ view that these consequences raise serious ques-tions about the viability of the Additive Model. Perhaps a clever defender of theAdditive Model could respond, by working out a version of the model thatavoids the slippery slope to unlimited desire. Nevertheless, this consequenceseems inherent in the basic intuitive model that drives much pre-philosophicalthinking about death. It is important to recognize that the Epicurus’ primaryintended audience is not clever philosophers, but ordinary people with ordinarybut often corrupted and dangerous attitudes.

6 Conclusions

All in all, the Epicurean arguments against the competing models for evaluatinglives are not decisive, since, as I have noted, for the most part they focus onresponding to the relatively unsophisticated pre-philosophical notions aboutdeath and the value of life that normal people accept. Nevertheless, this discus-

36 Cf. Lucretius, DRN 3.1087–94.


sion illustrates that opponents of Epicurus’ claims about death face a challenge:If they hold that death is bad because it deprives us of life or goods, they areled either to accept that death is always terrible, even after long and fruitfullives, or to find some non-arbitrary way to define when life becomes completeor sufficient and death is okay. As Epicurus seeks to show, either option facesproblems. By contrast, Epicurus’ claim that lives should be judged on qualityrather than quantity has significant appeal. Epicurus thinks we should judgelives on how they are lived, not on how they turn out or how long they go on.We should enjoy the time we have, rather than worrying about nebulous, so-cially imposed goals or our running total of good experiences.

I would argue that many contemporary discussions of Epicurus’ viewsabout fear of death – both among those that reject Epicurus’ claims and thosewho support them – fail to appreciate the full force of Epicurus’ arguments,because their concern is to analyze the value of death: What, they ask, could bebad about death? In what circumstances should one fear it? Whom does deathharm? For Epicurus, however, these are the wrong questions to ask. On the con-trary, he would argue that we should examine our thoughts about death so thatwe might discover what they reveal about how we value life. Fears about deathoften manifest false, unhealthy, and unnatural ways of thinking about what lifeis about and what makes life good. Therefore, for the Epicureans, the personwho thinks correctly about death recognizes that it happens (since “we humanbeings all live in an unwalled city”) but focuses her efforts on living the best lifeof which she is capable, while she is alive.

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Epicurus on the Fear of Death and the Relative Value of Lives

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