Enemies among us: The anti-elitist and xenophobic discourses in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Rexter – časopis pro výzkum radikalismu, extremismu a terorismu

Vydání: 02/2014| Více na www.rexter.cz

42

Enemies among us: The anti-elitist and xenophobic

discourses in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 20

Alena Kluknavská

Email: [email protected]

Abstract

The extreme right parties offer a clear identification between “us” and “them”, translating

the dichotomy into friend-enemy distinction. These parties share a core of anti-elitist

and xenophobic attitudes, that are in the case of the extreme right in Central and Eastern

Europe usually directed at the ruling establishment and the Roma minority. The aim

of this exploratory paper is to analyse the frames employed by extreme right parties that

serve to construct meanings about their main perceived enemies, the political elites

and the Roma,in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The paper builds upon

the assumption that meanings are not naturally attached to objects and events, but are

constructed through interpretive processes producing specific frames. Applying the frame

analysis, the paper examines the discourses of the People’s Party Our Slovakia and

the Worker’s Party of Social Justice in regard to their enemies in the period of 2010-2013.

The results indicate that the strategy employed by the parties is similar to new master

frame combining xenophobia and anti-political-establishment populism. The paper makes

an empirical contribution to the research on the extreme right and the ideological

processes of extreme right parties in Central and Eastern Europe.

20This work was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency under the contract No. APVV-0413-11.



43

Keywords

Right-wing extremism, extreme right, frame analysis, political parties, anti-elitism,

xenophobia

1 Introduction

Extreme right parties throughout Europe share animosities towards several

out-groups and in their discourses offer a strong distinction between “us” and “them”,

which in their worldview translates into more extreme form of friend-enemy dichotomy.

Various actions of the extreme right in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, such as anti-

Roma demonstrations and rallies mixed with anti-establishment stances, contribute to

concerns regarding the relationship between the majority and various minorities.

Even though the enemy stands in the centre of the extreme right’s attention,

the literature usually focuses on immigration issue (e.g. Rydgren 2008), deals with

the ideology (e.g. Betz, Johnson 2004) or discourse (Wodak et al. 2013) in general

or concentrate on the processes of the extreme right’s identity politics (e.g. Caiani et al.

2012). Although there exist some theoretical contributions to different types of enemies

of the extreme right (e.g. Mudde 2007), less work has been done on the ways through

which meanings about these enemies are built in the discourse of the extreme right.

The extreme right groups began to form in the region of Central and Eastern

Europe (CEE) after 1989. In Western Europe, the contemporary extreme right parties,

which are a part of the “new right” (Ignazi 1992), are linked to xenophobic and populist

attitudes. The new master frame of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political

establishment populism (Rydgren 2005) is supposed to be communicated and diffused

between related parties in different countries. Although extreme right parties in Central

and Eastern Europe experienced a different development than their counterparts

in Western Europe, we can hypothesize that this new strategy, shifting the attention

away from the “old right” and referencesto Italian Fascism or German Nazism, also to



44

a certain extent affects the extreme right in the post-communist countries. Within this

master frame, these parties attract voters mainly through populist appeals pointing to

corrupted nature of political elites and xenophobic attitudes aimed usually, but not

exclusively at immigrants in Western Europe and national or ethnic minorities (mostly

Roma) in Central and Eastern Europe.

The important questions therefore ask, 1) how salient are the political elites

and the Roma communities in the discourse of extreme right parties, and 2) how are

the political elites and the Roma minority framed by extreme right parties? This paper

investigates the forms of issue-specific frames in the discourses of the extreme right

in relation to the political elites and the Roma communities in Slovakia and the Czech

Republic. Applying the frame analysis, the paper examines the framing processes of

the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) and the Worker’s Party of Social Justice

(DSSS) in the period of 2010-2013. Both parties currently stand in an extra-

parliamentary spectrum, however, the leader of the ĽSNS Marian Kotleba has been

elected as a governor of the Banská Bystrica region in the 2013 elections. The aim of

the paper is to identify the extent to which the extreme right parties refer to political elites

and the Roma communities and to analyse the extreme right’s active construction

of meanings associated with these perceived enemies.

The paper is structured into four parts. It presents the dichotomous vision

of the extreme right of the world divided into good and bad, and proposes a potential

of the framing perspective in the research on extreme right parties. The methodological

part introduces the case and data selection, as well as the method for analysis used

in the paper. It follows with the results of the analysis, where it focuses on demonstrating

the central position of the political elites and Roma among the extreme right’s perceived

enemies, by presenting the quantifiable measures and qualitative data. It concludes

with the summary and the discussion of the findings.



45

2 Enemy in the spotlight: Anti-elitist and xenophob ic attitudes of the

extreme right

The extreme right parties of the current wave begun to form in Western Europe

during 1980s and 1990s and in Central and Eastern Europe have emerged in the course

of the regime change after 1989. During the last two-three decades many countries

in both Western and Central and Eastern Europe saw an increasing intensity

of achievements of extreme right parties, which have been successful not only

in electoral arena, but also in developing frames and putting issues on the agenda,

mostly on the topics such as immigration, minorities issues or themes related

to the nation and state, with potential to influence the public discourse, mainstream

political parties and their policies.

The extreme right parties share a coherent programmatic position combining two

important factors of anti-political-establishment and xenophobic attitudes. According to

Betz (2003), the combination of differentialist nativism and comprehensive protectionism

seeks to exploit the anxieties and feelings of insecurity provoked by the socio-economic

factors associated with globalization and the socio-cultural transformation of societies

caused by the presence of a growing foreign population. The extreme right’s

mobilization of resentment against political elites is designed to appeal to latent

sentiments of political disenchantment, frustration and cynicism of the part of voters

(Betz 2003). The nationalistic, authoritarian and populist strategy (Rydgren 2005; Mudde

2007) enables parties of the extreme right to mobilise xenophobic attitudes without being

stigmatised as racists and to pose serious critique on contemporary democratic systems

without being stigmatised as antidemocrats (Rydgren 2005).Although the extreme right

in Central and Eastern Europe had a different development due to political regime

change, 25 years after the fall of communism, we can expect the extreme right parties

to be adopting some parts of the strategy employed by the extreme right parties

in Western Europe.



46

In context of high public discontent with politics, some political actors find it

advantageous to build upon this attitude for political purposes through an anti-

establishment discourse (Barr 2009). Although the literature use various naming

of the concept (such as anti-political-establishment politics, anti-party politics),

it describes the claim that the ruling elites are unable or unwilling to represent

the ordinary citizens. Usingthis rhetoric, actors try to appeal to public through “us” versus

“them” dichotomy and offer a solution based on replacing the ruling elites

and on improving the political system that would more accurately represent the interests

of ordinary citizens (Barr 2009). Even though a variety of actors use anti-establishment

rhetoric, including non-radical-right populists, the extreme right parties go further in their

appeals, turning “them” into excluding category of “enemies”.

This is seen not only in the language they use in relation to establishment, but also

in their xenophobic appeals regarding other perceived enemies. The contemporary

extreme right parties developed a comprehensive ideology, which core is based on

the principles of exclusionary, xenophobic and intolerant discourse. In Western Europe,

the main elements appear to be a strident Islamophobia and hostility toward

globalization (Betz 2003), with focus on immigrants from outside of Europe. The extreme

right parties in Central and Eastern Europe focus mostly on the national or ethnic

minorities.In regard to the ethnic minorities, the negative attitudes vis-à-vis the Roma

communities can be traced not only in the political discourses, but also in the public

debate, both in the media (Kluknavská, Zagibová 2013) and among majority population

(SASD 2008; CVVM 2013). The anti-Roma sentiments are particularly present

in countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where the Roma minority is relatively

numerous, such are the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Some 200,000-

250,000 Roma people are estimated to live in the Czech Republic, while the number



47

of Roma in Slovakia has been estimated at 400,000-500,00021. Stereotyping of

the Roma in public discourse and putting the minority into a certain ethnic scheme affect

the attitudes towards the Roma minority and can create favourable ground for extreme

right parties, leading to their electoral successes.

The extreme right seeks to position itself as an oppositional movement defending

a conception of national identity that it considers as fundamentally threatened (Betz

2003).This strategy is based on the in-group–out-group differentiation, which is very

common when people create their own identities. The populists, building upon such

behaviour, divide the world into “us” and “them”. However, while in the populist vision

the world is separated between the “pure people” and “corrupted elites”, the extreme

right interprets the world through “black and white” categories. This conception leads to

division of the world separated between friends, who support extreme right’s causes

and enemies, who oppose them (Caiani, Parenti 2013). The friend is presented as

a strong actor protecting the defenceless people or the society itself, and the enemy as

an outsider, that ranges from holders of power to various minorities. While the friends

suffer from unfair treatment and deprivation, the enemies are expected to benefit from

such an injustice. Within this strategy, the party, as part of the in-group, constructs

an image of itself in opposition to political elites, however, positioning itself between

“normal” opposition and an anti-democratic one (Rydgren 2004). Having said that, it is

the enemy who presents the common feature ofthe extreme right and who stands in

the centre of its discourse.

21According to the Roma Integration Concept for 2010-2013, the number of Roma living in the Czech Republic is estimated at 150,000-200,000. The Council for Europe (2012) estimates the number of Roma at 150,000-250,000 people. According to the Atlas of Roma communities 2004, approximately 320,000 Roma people live in Slovakia, while the Atlas of Roma communities 2013 states that number of the Roma people in the country is around 400,000. The Council of Europe estimates the number of Roma in Slovakia at 380,000-600,000, with the average of 490,000 people.



48

3 The framing perspective

Although much of the literature on the extreme right deals with their electoral

successes and orients on the structural conditions or the individual motivations,

the appeal and influence of extreme right parties based purely on the election results

may be misleading (Minkenberg 2013). The research thus suggests the need to turn

the focus to the role of extreme right parties as a strategic actors attempting to best

respond to their political environment (e. g. Van der Brug et al. 2005; Arzheimer, Carter

2006) and to orient on the level of the analysis that links macro and micro conditions.

Framing perspective is in this regard flexible enough to link ideas, actions and events,

and could shed some light on understanding how the movements present the reality

and actors involved in it (Caiani et al. 2012).

Framing perspective is a quickly developing concept in the social sciences.

Although the framing perspective was developed in social psychology and elaborated

mostly in social movements studies, it has soon transposed to media studies (e.g. Pan,

Kosicki 1993; Scheufele 1999; Semetko, Valkenburg 2000), policy studies (e.g. Rein,

Schön 1996) or political research (e.g. Lakoff 2004), including the study of extreme right

(e.g. Rydgren 2005; Bosman, d'Haenens 2008; Caiani, della Porta 2011). It builds upon

the assumption that meanings are not naturally attached to objects or events, but are

produced through interpretive processes by actors assigning meanings to events

and conditions in order to motivate constituents or mobilize potential adherents to action

(Snow, Benford 1988). Produced meanings, mediated by various contextual factors

(Snow 2006b), are packaged into frames, which serve as the interpretative structures

that the members of a party or a movement use to address the symbolic construction

of the external reality.



49

Following Snow and Benford (1992: 137), we see a frame as an “interpretive

schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating

and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within

one’s present or past environment”. Frames, that are subject to change over time rather

than static cultural and/or interactional entities (Snow 2006a), attribute blame for

perceived social problems by identifying the individuals or groups that are supposed to

have caused the problem (a diagnosis) and by suggesting the course of action in solving

the problem (a prognosis). While attributing blame to concrete actors, extreme right

parties through strategically built frames usually punctuate the seriousness and injustice

of social conditions, specify the action needed to generate change and offer a rationale

to engage in an action (Snow, Benford 1992).

4 The methodology of the analysis

Case Selection. We focus on two extreme right parties in Central and Eastern

Europe – the Worker’s Party of Social Justice in the Czech Republic and the People’s

Party Our Slovakia in Slovakia. The extreme right political parties in the Czech Republic

and Slovakia began to form in the region of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.

We focus on extra-parliamentary parties, which share a similar path in the development.

Both parties were founded after 2000 and formed from previous extreme right

movements, but had been dissolved (the current ĽSNS in 2006, and the current DSSS

in 2010) and re-emerged with the same leadership. Both parties never entered national

parliament, but run for the office and their electoral gains have been rising. The parties

were to some extent successful at the regional and local level. In Slovakia, the leader

of the ĽSNS M. Kotleba became a governor of the Banská Bystrica region in the 2013

elections.



50

Data Source and Sample Selection. The data are derived from 478 articles that

appeared in electoral programs, party manifestos and the party press (party journal).

The article is a unit of the analysis and presents each press item or each section in

the party programs (separated by the sub-headline). We analysed 250 articles

in the DSSS sample and 228 in the ĽSNS sample. First, we analysed 2010 and 2011

electoral programs for the DSSS and 2010 and 2012 electoral programs for the ĽSNS.

Second, we analysed the on-line journal Our Slovakia (Naše Slovensko, circulated

irregularly, 121 articles), and Workers’ Post (Dělnické listy, circulated 4-times a year,

216 articles). For the ĽSNS we supplemented the data with statements (97 units)

published on www.naseslovensko.net (2010-2013) and www.pospolitost.wordpress.com

(2010-2011). The first is the official Internet page of the party and the latter is the official

page of political movement Slovak Togetherness (Slovenská pospolitosť), with which

the ĽSNS has had close ideological and personal connections and common activities22.

Frame analysis. The paper is based on a qualitative frame analysis,

with providing quantifiable measures. Although theoretically the concept is well

established, there are not shared criteria as how to perform the frame analysis

methodologically. To analyse the framing process qualitatively, most studies use

techniques borrowed from discourse analyses and sociolinguistics, as frames can be

reconstructed through the analysis of the discourse of the social movements (Johnston

1995). The discursive techniques may prove themselves helpful in analysing deeper

structures of the qualitative data. The quantifiable measures present descriptive

statistical data about the enemies and associated frames.

For purposes of the analysis, we build upon Snow and Benford’s (1988) core

framing tasks and Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) catchphrases, through which

22Until 2012 the movement’s webpage was used as a platform for presenting ideas of (then-emerging) political party. We selected only those articles that were signed as written by the ĽSNS’ members.



51

wearrive at a structure of issue-specific frame. For each article, we code various

diagnostic and prognostic framing. These claims represent a sentence or paragraph,

where there can be identified at least one of pre-defined frames. The presence of

a framing element is indicated when one of the sources makes a statement that

addresses the character of the frame. The diagnostic framing refers to 1) the problem

identification and interpretation of perceived reality (What is the problem?), and 2)

identification of the source of problem responsibility – the attribution of blame (Who is

responsible for the problem?), 3) identification of the actors affected by a problem –

problem holders. In this part of the process, the delineation between the perpetrators

(enemies who are to blame) and victims (friends who are affected) takes place.

Prognostic framing refers to 4) the articulation of a possible solution to the identified

problem (How should the problem be solved?). It also carries 5) the actor responsible for

carrying out this strategy (Who is responsible for action?). Based on catchphrases,

we determine the nature of the connections between the different actors, usually

between those who are seen as a cause and who are seen as affected by a certain

problem. For each framing element, we code for stereotypes, dichotomies, metaphors,

and/or historical references. When present, we also code for labelling, naming

or adjectives used to describe respective actors.

In order to identify the issue specific frames, we conducted a qualitative pre-study

on the sample of articles across years and both parties, and developed a codebook

used for further analysis. For each article, we coded multiple diagnostic

and/or prognostic framing elements respectively that relate to either Political elites

or Roma enemies. Under political elites, we include the general references to

the system, the establishment, the government, the politicians, the political parties,

the parliamentarians, or more specific references to particular politicians or political

positions. Under the Roma we include the general references to Roma communities,

the Roma minority or to Roma individuals or groups. For each framing element (a claim),



52

a source is coded. A source could be the party, the party leader or (other) party member.

In total, we coded 660 sources.

Table 1. Diagnostic frames employed by the extreme right parties and their characteristics

(in alphabetical order), in relation to Political elites and Roma enemies.

Frame Characteristics

Abuse of political power

The government and established politicians abuse their political and economic power, all for their own benefit.

Discrimination of people

Authorities discriminative against majority population. Failure of the authorities to secure safety of people.

Loss of independence

Loss of national sovereignty, federalization of Europe, control over member states by supranational organizations.

Persecution of opponents

Interventions, criminalization and persecution of political opponents, suppression of free discussion.

Positive discrimination of Roma

Unfair protection, support and favouritism of the Roma minority by authorities, who ignore their violations of laws.

Roma menace Roma criminality and Roma parasitism. Roma are criminals and inherently lazy exploiters, live at the expense of society, do not respect basic civilization and moral norms, do not follow rules.

Source: the author.

For coding of diagnostic framing elements, we differentiate between six diagnostic

frames in relation to Political elite and Roma enemies (Table 1). A total of 660 diagnostic

elements were coded: 292 for the DSSS (249 for Political elites, 43 for Roma) and 368

for the ĽSNS (232 in relation to Political elites, 136 to Roma). In addition to diagnosis,

when mentioned by a source, we coded for the attribution of responsibility

and the problem holder. We coded identical numbers of the problem attributions

as the diagnostic frames, and 396 problem holders (171 in relation to Political elites,



53

and 31 in relation to Roma in the discourse of the DSSS; 115 in relation to Political

elites, and 79 to Roma in the discourse of the ĽSNS).

Table 2. Prognostic frames employed by extreme righ t parties and their characteristics

(in alphabetical order), in relation to Political elites and Roma enemies.

Frame Characteristics

Anti -establishment actions

Stopping political elite in the elections, establishing a real democracy, organizing anti-establishment demonstrations.

Empowerment The people or the extreme right should help themselves, mobilize and use their potential, resources, organizational skills, etc.

Law and order Various policy reforms and law changes. The law should apply to all equally. Stricter enforcement of rules and law.

Restitution of independence

Withdrawal from the EU, Eurozone and/or NATO. Stricter foreign policy. Restoration of food, economic and energy self-sufficiency.

Voting for opposition

Vote for real political or ideological opposition, usually the extreme right itself.

Source: the author.

For coding of prognostic framing elements, we identified five major frames (Table

2). A total of 254 prognostic elements were coded (137 for the DSSS and 117 forthe

ĽSNS). In addition to prognosis, we coded for responsibility for carrying out the solution;

a total of 122 responsible actors were coded (54 for the DSSS and 68 for the ĽSNS).

5 The Enemies in the discourse of extreme right par ties

The extreme right parties show negative attitudes towards various subjects,

or events. Such a designation is usually accompanied by identification of a perpetrator

responsible for the problem that is depicted as an enemy and often linked to actors



54

supposedly affected by the problem who are presented as victims. This friend-enemy

differentiation is clearly present in the discourse of both extreme right parties

in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The victims, presented as actors affected by certain

problems, are part of the in-group, which is comprised of the people, including extreme

right parties.

The enemies present a more diverse group than friends,and both parties point to

the same groups of actors whom they consider as causing significant problemsin society

(Figure 1). Throughout the years, the most emphasized enemies in the discourse of both

parties are the political elites and the Roma. The Czech DSSS blames the responsibility

on the political elite in two thirds of its framing activity and the ĽSNS in more than half

of the cases. The political elites are usually presented as the government, the state,

the system or established political parties and politicians. The Roma are to blame in one

tenth of the cases of the DSSS and in one third of the ĽSNS’ framing activity.

Figure 1. Enemies in the discourse of the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (left)

and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2 013 (in %).

Source: the author.

Political elite

Roma

Cultural elite

Foreigners

Economic elite

Homosexuals

Political elite

Roma

Cultural elite

Foreigners

Economic elite

Homosexuals



55

The friends, presented as victims by both parties, are part of the in-group, or “us”.

They consist of “the People” (the society, the majority) and the members of the extreme

right parties (Figure 2). Although the people are the most affected actors

in the discourses of both parties, the DSSS in more cases (27.2 per cent) than the ĽSNS

(7.7 per cent) points to its own misdeeds, presenting the party itself as a victim.

The people are in the discourse of the DSSS usually referred to as “the decent citizens”

and in the discourse of the ĽSNS as “decent people”.

Figure 2.Friends (victims)in the discourse of the W orker’s Party of Social Justice

and the People’s Party Our Slovakia, 2010-2013 (in %) in relation to Political elite and Roma enemy.

Source: the author.

Both parties construct several different diagnostic frames in relation to Political

elites and Roma, and throughout the years mostly emphasized the Roma menace

and Abuse of power frames. However, while the ĽSNS focused mostly on the notion

the Roma communities threaten the majority population and parasite on the society

(Figure 3), the DSSS mostly stressed thenotion of corrupted elites, who stand behind

the “destruction” of the nation (Figure 4). For the ĽSNS, the Abuse of power frame was

the second most visible frame. For the DSSS, the idea of Roma as a threat to well-being

of the majority played less significant role, though by 2013 the salience of the frame

considerably increased.

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

2010 2011 2012 2013 2010 2011 2012 2013

DSSS ĽSNS

People

Extremeright



56

The DSSS also highly emphasize Persecution of political opponents frame, while

the idea of oppression of the extreme right members caused by the political elites was

the least visible in the discourse of the ĽSNS. Instead, the Slovak party highlighted

the failure of authorities to secure safety and decent life for people, as well as

the discriminatory policies and actions aimed at the majority population. The salience of

this frame in the discourse of the DSSS was decreasing over time. The ĽSNS also more

than the DSSS emphasized the notions that the government unfairly favours the Roma

communities against the majority population, and that the ruling establishment is

responsible for losing the national sovereignty and for causing that the state is controlled

by supranational organizations.

In overall, though the framing activities of the DSSS were rather balancedin 2010,

the salience of the Abuse of power increased over time and in 2013 tookone third

of the party’s framing. The diagnostic strategy of the ĽSNS persistently highlighted

the threat coming from the Roma communities and the government, either in the form

of “dangerous” Roma, or from the government’s influence on the ordinary people’s lives.



57

Figure 3.Diagnostic framing of the People’s Party O ur Slovakia ( ĽSNS) in relation to

the Political elite and the Roma communities, 2010- 2013.

Source: the author.

Figure 4.Diagnostic framing of the Worker’s Party o f Social Justice (DSSS) in relation to

Political elite and Roma, 2010-2013.

Source: the author.

Roma menace

Abuse of power


0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

2010 2011 2012 2013

Roma menace

Abuse of power


Positive discrimination ofRoma


Persecution of politicalopponents

Abuse of power

Roma menace

Persecution of political opponents

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

2010 2011 2012 2013

Abuse of power

Roma menace

Discrimination ofpeople

Persecution of politicalopponents

Positive discriminationof Roma




58

Since both parties mostly emphasize the Roma menace and Abuse of power

frames, we shall have a look, what deeper meanings parties createin relation to these

frames. Both the DSSS and the ĽSNS create the meanings about the political elite

in a similar way (Table 3), however, the meanings about the Roma communities are

constructed very differently (Table 4). The political elites are in discourse of both parties

depicted in a dismissive way as “treacherous politicians” (the ĽSNS) and “corrupted

establishment” (the DSSS). The Roma are presentedin a very negative, even hostile

way, however, the DSSS engage in more subtle, abstract and ambiguous form than

the ĽSNS. The DSSS addresses the Roma as “Gypsies”, “unadaptable community”,

“members of Gypsy minority”, or “unadaptable individuals”, while the ĽSNS uses more

severe, concrete and direct way of naming the Roma, who are addressed as “drunken

asocial Gypsy parasites”, “asocial parasites”, “Gypsy extremists”, or “asocial Gypsies”.

Table 3. Adjectives and catchphrases used to addres s “enemies” and “friends”

in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the DSSS in relation to Abuse of power fram e, 2010-2013

(selected cases).

Party Date Enemy Catchphrase Friend

ĽSNS

17.02.2010 Politicians

Frauds and thefts by our politicians

regardless their party affiliation.

They are usually all thieves, liars

and crooks.

01.11.2011

Treacherous

Slovak

politicians

They have plundered the state’s

assets after 1989. People



59

01.01.2012 Government The government endlessly wastes

our money.

Us (we),

decent

working

people

01.01.2013

Government,

establishment

after 1989

They devastated, destroyed

Slovakia and stole everything.

People,

Slovakia

01.10.2013 Government

The government wastes our

money with impunity and its

members live luxurious life.

US (our

money)

DSSS

19.03.2010 Ruling

establishment

It is impossible what the current

ruling establishment performs. It

is corrupted, materialistic and

totalitarian regime.

Ordinary

citizens

25.06.2010 Political

parties

Political parties during past 20

years have been asset stripping

our land and leading it to

permanent debt.

Our land

15.04.2011 Corrupted

establishment

The establishment is paralyzed by

corruption and involved in mafia

structures.

18.01.2012 Government

They have ruined and stole our

nation assets, but the

consequences delegated on

citizens.

Nation,

citizens

05.07.2013 Government The government have made a

good business out of politics.

Source: the author.



60

According to the ĽSNS, politicians are all “thieves, liars and crooks”, who “have

plundered the state’s assets”, “devastated, destroyed Slovakia”, “endlessly waste our

money”, and “live luxurious life”. Similarly, the DSSS denotes that politicians “have been

asset stripping our land and leading it to permanent debt”, the government is “paralyzed

by corruption and involved in mafia structures”, and “corrupted, materialistic

and totalitarian regime”, which “lost last remnants of its legitimacy”. Both parties

identically state that the politicians “have made a business out of politics”(Table 3).

Table 4. Adjectives and catchphrases used to addres s “enemies” and “friends”

in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the DSSS in relation to Roma menace frame, 2010-2013 (selected

cases).

Party Date Enemy Catchphrase Friend

ĽSNS

25.10.2010

Drunken,

asocial Gypsy

parasites

Young Gypsies showed a hunt in a

pack; The last month there were a

couple of attacks on white residents

who have such a misfortune that they

live close to the community of asocial

Gypsy parasites.

White

residents;

A young

couple

01.09.2011 Asocial

families

Asocial families live at the expense of

us all, and spend our money. Us (our)

07.07.2012 A group of

Gypsies

A group of Gypsies with axes in hands

threatened a white citizen.

A white

citizen

01.01.2013 Gypsy

extremists

Gypsy terror; Raging Gypsy extremists

terrorize the whole village. They steal,

beat and kill decent people on a daily

basis.

Decent

People



61

01.10.2013

Gypsy

extremists;

Gypsy

asocials

Gypsy extremists destroy our land

and people, who have a right to live

here. White children are afraid to go

to school, because Gypsy kids

beat,torture andbully them.

People;

White

children

DSSS

30.10.2011

Members of

Gypsy

minority

They cause problems; The attacks on

decent people by members of Gypsy

minority are growing.

Decent

people

30.10.2011 Gypsy

community

The attacks of Gypsy community on

the Czechs.

The

Czechs

14.10.2012 Gypsies Gypsies do not want to comply with

the law and order. Citizens

05.07.2013 Unadaptable

individuals

Aggressiveness of unadaptable

individuals towards decent citizens.

Decent

citizens

16.10.2013 Gypsies

The thefts, noise, destruction of

municipal and private properties are

on the rise.

Source: the author.

As the ĽSNS is more severe in naming the Roma minority, the more extreme form

in framing is seen also in overall phrasing and the way of connecting the enemies

with the victims. The DSSS rather distantly puts forward claims such as “The attacks of

Gypsy community on the Czechs” and “Aggressiveness of unadaptable individuals

towards decent citizens”, and formally states that “Gypsies are favoured against majority

population” or “The thefts, noise, destruction of municipal and private properties are

on the rise”. The ĽSNS uses more emotional, expressive and dramatic presentation

and points to “Gypsy terror”, “Brutal attacks by Gypsy extremists”, who “terrorize

the whole village”, and presents claims that “Asocial families live at the expense of us



62

all” or “the Raging Gypsy extremists… steal, beat and kill decent people on a daily

basis”(Table 4).

The most salient prognosis persistently throughout the years in the discourse

of both the DSSS and the ĽSNS is the Law and order (Figure 4). The greater emphasis

on the frame can be traced in the discourse of the ĽSNS (60.8 per cent) in comparison

to the DSSS (45.3 per cent). The frame generally refers to notions of equal application

and stricter enforcement of law. The parties ask for demands such as “so that law will

finally apply to everyone equally – to the Whites, as well as to the Gypsies” (ĽSNS),

or “the corruption and stealing our common assets must be punished severely” (DSSS),

and that the party will “eliminate unfair favouring of not only Gypsy parasites” (ĽSNS).

It also includes more concrete actions, when the parties want “to adopt orders to protect

decent people” (DSSS), or to “lower the criminal responsibility to ten years of age.

We will change the criminal law policy so each politician and parasite will think twice,

whether he will honestly work or steal, rape and kill” (ĽSNS).

Figure 4. Variations in prognostic framing of the W orker’s Party of Social Justice (left)

and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (right), 2010-2 013.

Source: the author.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

DSSS

ĽSNS



63

The salience of other frames in the discourses of two parties is similar,

with the exception of the Anti-establishment actions frame, which is more salient

in the discourse of the DSSS (21.9 per cent) than in the ĽSNS (7.7 per cent). The DSSS

calls for “immediate purification of political scene” (17. 4. 2012, Worker’s Post) and to

“head to streets and show them that our goal is only to have peaceful and criminal-

abuse-free life” (30.10. 2011, Worker’s Post). The ĽSNS also wants to “head

to the streets and try to change this system” (5. 5. 2011, Our Slovakia), and calls for

radical measures, because “the nation needs real political change” (13. 4. 2012,

Our Slovakia). However, it also emphasizes the need of withdrawal from supranational

organizations such as the EU and NATO, and the restoration of food, economy

and energy self-sufficiency.

6 Conclusion and discussion

The paper aimed at answering the questions how salient are the political elites

and the Roma communities in the discourses of the two extreme right parties

in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and how have these parties constructed meanings

about them in the period of 2010-2013. The Worker’s Party of Social Justice (DSSS)

and the People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) clearly engage in the populist differentiation

between “us” and “them”, turning the dichotomy into more extreme form of “enemies”

and “friends”. Moreover, the results indicate that the extreme right presents this friend-

enemy distinction within the category of victims-perpetrators. The group of victims,

which is affected by certain problems caused by the perpetrators, comprised of

“the People” and the members of the extreme right. The group of enemies is more

diverse than the group of friends, but the results showed that the political elites

and the Roma communities are in fact the most salient perceived enemies

in the discourses of the DSSS and the ĽSNS.



64

Both parties construct several diagnostic and prognostic frames in relation to

political elites and the Roma communities, but throughout the years mostly emphasized

the perceived threat of the Roma for the people and the corrupted nature of political

elites. However, while the ĽSNS focused mostly on the notion the Roma communities

threaten and parasite on the society, the DSSS mostly stressed the notion of corrupted

elites causing deprivation of the people. Nevertheless, the Abuse of power was

the second most visible frame in the discourse of the ĽSNS and the salience of the idea

of Roma as a threat to well-being of the majority in the discourse

of the DSSSconsiderably increasedby 2013. Both parties to some extent changed their

framing strategiesduring the course of the years. While in 2010 the framing strategies

of the DSSS were more balanced, by 2013 the visibility of the idea of political elites

abusing their power became very salient in the discourse of the party. The ĽSNS

persistently highlighted the perceived threat posited by the Roma minority

and the government, and their combined blame over the misdeeds of the ordinary

people, and by 2013 the framing strategy became more balanced. It is also important to

mention that while the framing strategy of the DSSS is rather subtle and abstract,

the ĽSNS uses, especially in relation to the Roma communities, severe and dramatic

rhetoric.

The results indicate that the framing strategy employed by the parties is in line with

the new master frame combining the xenophobia and anti-establishment populism,

according to which the extreme right parties mobilise xenophobic attitudes and pose

a critique on contemporary democratic systems. Although the literature points to

different characteristics of the extreme right organizations in Central and Eastern Europe

due to different historical development and political and cultural conditions in which it

has been evolving, we can see the adopting and the adaptation of the similar strategy

that is used by the extreme right parties in Western Europe. Even though it is true that

differences do exist (e.g. the more extreme references to “white people” in contrast to



65

“Gypsies” in the discourse of the ĽSNS) in regard to their ideologies, especially when

looking into deeper structures, they do not overtly emphasise the relation to the historical

continuity of fascism or Nazism and the overall frame indicates that the extreme right

parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia mobilise the voters against both

the established structures of power and the latent xenophobic views in the society.

The parties build upon the public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment, the appeal

to the common people, and the anti-minorities sentiments.

Although extreme right parties are not the only political actors targeting Roma

or the political elites, they are usually the most extreme (Mudde 2007). However,

the negative attitudes in regard to the Roma communitiestend to surface also

in the mainstream political and public discourse.Categorization of Roma

and stereotypingof the whole minority can in turn create discursive opportunities, i.e.

favourable breeding ground, for extreme right parties, leading to their electoral

successes. The popularity of the Czech extreme right party, Worker’s Party of Social

Justice, has in recent years increased mainly in those regions, where the public was

more inclined to accept the racial explanations offered by the party. The Slovak People's

Party Our Slovakia adopted a similar strategy and in parliamentary elections 2010

and 2012 was on the local level successful in the regions with perceived problematic

relations between the majority and Roma minority (Kluknavská 2013). The research

indicates that the extreme right parties’ strategies tend to be resonant with the public

in regions with perceived problematic relations between majority and minority

population.

This paper analysed the form of the frames that parties construct in their

discourses. Acknowledging that such discourses do not exist in a societal and political

vacuum, more elaboration is needed in regard to the overall context accompanying

the presence of the parties in public and political arena. Furthermore, this analysis also

presents the first step in explaining why the parties chose certain strategies and avoided



66

others, and why certain frames better resonate with the public. The further research

should thus aim at explaining how these frames help or hinder the electoral success

of extreme right partiesin the electoral arena, or to orient on explaining why do actors

choose and modify the frames they do and neglect others. Although the theoretical

and empirical literature on the framing perspective is extensive, we still do not know

enough about the determinants of selection of particular framing strategies.

The literature suggests that extreme right frames are mainly determined by factors

on the demand side, e.g. socio-demographic factors, as well as on the supply side,

mainly opportunity structures, organizational resources, the party leadership

and the ideology. The future research can therefore elaborate more on both the area of

the extreme right organizations as well as the framing perspective.



67

7 Literature

Arzheimer, K., Carter, E. (2006). Political opportunity structures and right-wing

extremist party success.European Journal of Political Research, 45 (3), pp. 419–44.

Barr, R. R. (2009). Populists, Outsiders and Anti-Establishment Politics. Party

Politics, 15 (1), pp. 29-48.

Benford, R. D., Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An

overview and Assessments.Annual Review of Sociology, 26, pp. 611–39.

Betz, H.-G. (2003). Xenophobia, Identity Politics and Exclusionary Populism in

Western Europe. In Panitch, L., Leys, C. (Eds.). Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and

Ethno- Nationalism. London: Merlin, pp. 193–210.

Betz, H.-G., Johnson, C. (2004).Against the current—stemming the tide: the

nostalgic ideology of the contemporary radical populist right.Journal of Political

Ideologies, 9 (3), pp. 311-327.

Bosman, J., d'Haenens, L. (2008).News reporting on Pim Fortuyn: framing in two

Dutch newspapers. Media Culture Society, 30 (5): pp. 735 – 748.

Caiani, M., della Porta, D. (2011). The elitist populism of the extreme right: A frame

analysis of extreme right-wing discourses in Italy and Germany. Acta Politica, 46, pp.

180–202.

Caiani, M., della Porta, D., Wagemann, C. (2012). Mobilizing on the Extreme

Right: Germany, Italy, and the United States.Oxford University Press.

Caiani, M., Parenti, L. (2013).European and American Extreme Right Groups and

the Internet. Ashgate Publishing Company.



68

Council of Europe (2012). Estimates on Roma population in European Countries

(http://hub.coe.int/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=3f6c4a82-0ca7-4b80-93c1-

fef14f56fdf8&groupId=10227).

CVVM, Public opinion research center, (2013).Romové a soužití s nimi očima

české verejnosti – duben 2013 [Roma and co-existence with them through eyes of the

public,2013]

(http://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/media/com_form2content/documents/c1/a7017/f3/ov130521.pdf)

.

Dělnické listy [Workers’ Post].The party press, vol. 8, no. 25 (January-March 2010)

– vol. 11, no. 41 (October-December 2013).

Electoral program of the DSSS (2010).Programová listina [The programmatic list]

(http://www.dsss.cz/programova-listina).

Electoral program of the ĽSNS (2010).14 krokov pre budúcnosť Slovenska

a našich detí [14 steps for the future of Slovakia and our children]

(http://www.naseslovensko.net/dokumenty/14bodov.pdf).

Electoral program of the ĽSNS 2012.Desatoro Ľudovej strany Naše Slovensko na

odstránenie následkov zločinov spáchaných politikmi po novembri 1989 a nastolenie

sociálnej spravodlivosti [Ten Commandments of People’s Party Our Slovakia to

eliminate the consequences of the crimes committed by politicians afterNovember 1989

and the establishment of social

justice](http://www.naseslovensko.net/dokumenty/desatoro_lsns_2012.pdf).

Gamson, W. A., Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on

Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 95 (1), pp.

1-37.



69

Ignazi, P. (1992). The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of

Extreme Right-Wing Parties in Europe. European Journal of Political Research 22, pp.

3-34.

Johnston, H. (1995). A Methodology for Frame Analysis: From Discourse to

Cognitive Schemata. In Johnston, H., Klandermans, B. (Eds.). Social Movements,

Protests, and Contention. Volume 4, pp. 217-246.

Kluknavská, A. (2013). Od Štúra k parazitom: Tematická adaptácia krajnej pravice

v parlamentných voľbách na Slovensku. Politologický časopis 20 (3), 258-281.

Kluknavská, A., Zagibová, L. (2013). Neprispôsobiví Rómovia a slušná väčšina?

Spravodajský diskurz po násilných udalostiach na severe Českej republiky 2011

[Unadaptable Roma and decent majority? News discourse after violent incidents in the

north part of the Czech Republic in 2011]. Central European Political Studies Review, 15

(4), pp. 300-323 (http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=608).

Lakoff, G. (2004). Don't Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the

Debate--The Essential Guide for Progressives. Chelsea Green Publishing.

Naše Slovensko [Our Slovakia]. The party press, September 2011 – December

2013.

Minkenberg, M. (2013).The European Radical Right and Xenophobia in West and

East: Trends, Patterns and Challenges. In Melzer, R., Serafin, S., Eds.

Country Analyses, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies, pp. 9-

34.

Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New York: Cambridge

University Press.

Pan, Z., Kosicki, G. M. (1993). Framing analysis: An approach to news

discourse.Political Communication, 10 (1), pp. 55-75.



70

Party manifest of the DSSS 2011.Manifest Dělnickej strany Sociální spravedlnosti

(http://www.dsss.cz/program-dsss-2011).

Plenipotentiary of the Government for Roma Communities (2004).Atlas of Roma

Communities 2004 (http://www.minv.sk/?regiony_atlas).

Plenipotentiary of the Government for Roma Communities (2013).Atlas of Roma

Communities 2013 (http://www.minv.sk/?atlas_2013).

Polletta, F., Kai Ho, M. (2006).Frames and their consequences. In Goodin, R. E.,

Tilly, Ch. (eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, pp. 189 – 209.

Rein, M., and Schön, D. (1996). Frame-Critical Policy Analysis and Frame

Reflective Policy Practice. Knowledge and Policy, 9 (1), pp. 88-90.

Rydgren, J. (2004). Explaining the Emergence of Radical Right-Wing Populist

Parties: The Case of Denmark, West European Politics, 27(3), pp. 474-502.

Rydgren, J. (2005). Is Extreme Right-wing Populism Contagious? Explaining the

Emergence of a new Party Family.European Journal of Political Research, 44, pp. 413-

37.

Rydgren, J. (2008). Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-

wing voting in six West European countries. European Journal of Political Research 47,

pp. 737–765.

Slovak archive of Social Data, SASD (2008).Rovnosť a menšiny na Slovensku

2008 [Equality and minorities in Slovakia 2008]

(http://sasd.sav.sk/sk/data_katalog_abs.php?id=sasd_2008005).

Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., Tillie, J. N. (2005). Why some anti-immigrant

parties fail and others succeed: A two-step model of aggregate electoral support.

Comparative Political Studies, 38 (5), pp. 537-573.



71

Semetko, H. A., Valkenburg, P. M. (2000). Framing European politics: A content

analysis of press and television news.Journal of Communication,50 (2), pp. 93-109.

Scheufele, D. A. (1999).Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.Journal of

Communication,49 (4), pp.103-22.

Snow, D. A. (2006a). Frame. In Ritzer, G. (Ed.).Blackwell Encyclopedia of

Sociology, Vol. IV, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 1178-1780.

Snow, D. A. (2006b). Framing and Social Movements. In Ritzer, G. (Ed.).Blackwell

Encyclopedia of Sociology, Vol. IV, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 1780-1784.

Snow, D. A., Benford, R. D. (1988). Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant

Mobilization.International Social Movement Research, 1 (1), pp. 197-217.

Snow, D. A., Benford, R. D. (1992). Master Frames and Cycles of Protest. In

Morris, A., Müller, C. (Eds.). Frontiers in Social Movement Theory. New Haven: Yale

University Press, pp. 133-55.

Webpage Naše Slovensko. Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko [People’s Party Our

Slovakia] (www.naseslovensko.net).

Webpage Slovenská pospolitosť.Slovenská pospolitosť[Slovak Togetherness]

(www.pospolitost.wordpress.com).

Wodak, R., KhosraviNik, M., Mral, B. (2013).Right-wing populism in Europe:

Politics and Discourse.Bloomsbury Academic.

Enemies among us: The anti-elitist and xenophobic discourses in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Documents

Transcript of Enemies among us: The anti-elitist and xenophobic discourses in the Czech Republic and Slovakia