EDIBLE DIAMONDS? EXPLORING THE ROLE OF FISHERIES

AS A RESOURCE IN CONFLICT FUTURES IN

WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THE

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI‘I AT MĀNOA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE (ALTERNATIVE FUTURES)

August 2020

By

Anna Butchart

Dissertation Committee:

Jairus Grove, Chairperson

Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller

John Lynham

Krishna Sankaran

Nicole Grove

Keywords: conflict, future studies, fisheries, fish, West Africa, Central Africa, Sierra Leone, São Tomé

& Príncipe, resources, scarcity, environmental security.

i

Acknowledgements

Researching and writing this dissertation has been an important and challenging journey

that I could not have accomplished alone. I’d like to thank the great colleagues and friends I

worked with during my time on the Maritime Security desk, those I met during my field

work and the people who gave their time for my interviews, your support, input and advice

has been essential to completing this work. I’d also like to thank the Spark M. Matsunaga

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution for awarding me the Nabumoto Tanahashi Peace

Graduate Fellowship in 2019. My Committee, particularly Jairus and Jon for helping me

navigate some stormy waters and for valuable support and input. And of course, my family

and friends who are always there for me, particularly my Mum for her essential proof

reading and encouragement during our Covid-lockdown, and Dr. Katrina who has been my

cheerleader and guide throughout this whole journey. Thank you all.

ii

Abstract

There is much scholarship examining the role of resources in causing, prolonging or

preventing conflict. Fish have traditionally been considered an open access renewable

resource and this has affected both its management as a resource and its position in

international relations. However, international law has governed access to this resource

since the 1980s and now the climate crisis, ocean acidification, years of overfishing and

growing global demand are threatening its renewable nature challenging the traditional

understanding of fish being a renewable resource. This dissertation argues that fish present

a resource paradox, in that they are both an essential food source for poor coastal

communities and a valuable commodity sold for billions annually on international markets.

Fish sit in both camps of resource conflict literature both subject to the so-called “resource

curse” and providing an essential food source, the scarcity of which could contribute to

scarcity conflict. This dissertation focuses on the coastal countries in West and Central

Africa and in particular Sierra Leone (a resource rich previously war-torn West African

coastal state, historically colonised by Britain) and São Tomé & Príncipe (a small island

developing nation with no rich natural resources in Central Africa previously colonised by

Portugal). It seeks to build on existing resource conflict literature by exploring how fisheries

management in these countries is shaped by colonial legacies, the global political economy,

the intrinsic value of fishing licenses and the historic understanding of this essential

resource as “renewable.”

Management of fisheries in West and Central Africa today will shape its definition and

survival in future. Fish scarcity is not inevitable, but only if fisheries management protects

this valuable resource. Failures in management shaped by the resource curse could lead to

fish scarcity in future with impacts for regional and domestic peace and security. This is a

future studies dissertation that conducts, as part of its analysis, a futures studies alternative

futures scenario exercise examining how fisheries management could impact conflict

futures in West and Central Africa. This analysis hopes to shine light on the paradox of this

resource and explore some of the future implications of fisheries management and whether

the curse can be broken.

iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................. i

Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... ii

Glossary ................................................................................................................................................... v

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1

Fish: An Open Access Renewable Resource? .................................................................................... 10

Divergent Definitions ........................................................................................................................ 13

Changing Values ................................................................................................................................ 14

Resource Conflict and Fish ................................................................................................................ 16

Chapter One: What is Future Studies? ................................................................................................. 19

Using Alternative Futures Scenarios ............................................................................................. 22

Unpicking the Paradox: The ‘Resource Curse’ .................................................................................. 24

Economic Causes of the ‘Resource Curse’ .................................................................................... 26

Broader Political Arguments ......................................................................................................... 29

Scarcity Conflict ................................................................................................................................. 50

Environmental Security ................................................................................................................. 51

Scarcity in the twenty-first Century .............................................................................................. 55

New Discourses of Scarcity ........................................................................................................... 62

Chapter Two: Historical Pathways to Underdevelopment in Africa ..................................................... 66

Historical Analysis and the Slave Trade ........................................................................................ 68

Capitalism and Economic Colonisation ......................................................................................... 72

Neo-Colonialism ............................................................................................................................ 78

China ............................................................................................................................................. 84

Colonial Legacies, Underdevelopment and fisheries management in West and Central Africa ...... 88

Chapter Three: Looking at Fisheries ..................................................................................................... 92

Global Political Economy of Fisheries Management ........................................................................ 92

Case Study: Sierra Leone, Fishing Village of Tombo ....................................................................... 103

Introduction to Sierra Leone ....................................................................................................... 108

Fisheries in Sierra Leone ............................................................................................................. 112

Fisheries as a Cursed Resource in Sierra Leone .......................................................................... 117

Economic Mechanisms of the Resource Curse ........................................................................... 118

The Role of Weak Institutions ..................................................................................................... 121

The Political Economy of the Resource Curse............................................................................. 130

Neo-Colonialism .......................................................................................................................... 133

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 149

Chapter Four: Case Study: São Tomé & Príncipe, Fishing Village of Gamboa .................................... 156

iv

Introduction to São Tomé & Príncipe ......................................................................................... 157

Fisheries in São Tomé & Príncipe .................................................................................................... 161

Fish as a Cursed Resource in São Tomé & Príncipe .................................................................... 164

Economic Mechanisms of the ‘Resource Curse’ ......................................................................... 165

The Role of Weak Institutions ..................................................................................................... 170

The Political Economy of the ‘Resource Curse’ ........................................................................... 175

Neo-Colonialism .......................................................................................................................... 178

Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 188

Chapter Five: Fisheries Management and Scarcity Conflict ............................................................... 191

Looking to the Future ...................................................................................................................... 203

Building Futures Scenarios .......................................................................................................... 205

Developing Scenarios .................................................................................................................. 211

Scenarios (Summaries):................................................................................................................... 214

A: Isolated Action: Strong political will; and weak regional and international cooperation. .... 214

B: Coordinated Reform: Strong political will and strong regional and international cooperation

.................................................................................................................................................... 214

C: Business as Usual: Weak political will and weak regional and international cooperation .... 215

D: Neighbourhood Watch: Weak political will and strong regional and international cooperation

.................................................................................................................................................... 215

Scenarios (Long form) ..................................................................................................................... 217

A: Isolated Action ........................................................................................................................ 217

B: Coordinated Reform ............................................................................................................... 223

C: Business as Usual .................................................................................................................... 228

D: Neighbourhood Watch ........................................................................................................... 231

Chapter Six: Conclusions: Using the Scenarios .................................................................................. 236

General Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 245

Appendix A: Brief Timeline: Sierra Leone ....................................................................................... 250

Appendix B: Brief Timeline: São Tomé & Príncipe .......................................................................... 252

Appendix C: Trends: ........................................................................................................................ 253

Appendix D: Emerging Issues: ......................................................................................................... 255

Appendix E: Stabilising Factors ..................................................................................................... 257

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................... 258

Academic Texts: .......................................................................................................................... 258

Newspaper articles: .................................................................................................................... 264

Websites: .................................................................................................................................... 267

v

Glossary

AIS Automatic Identification System

APC All People’s Congress

AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

AU African Union

BMAT British Military Advisory Team

CMA Community Management Association

Code of Conduct

Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.

COVID-19 Corona Virus 2019

ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States

ECOMOG Military Observer Group of ECOWAS

ECOWAS Economic Community of West Africa States

EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone

EI Emerging Issue

EJF Environmental Justice Foundation

EU European Union

FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GGC Gulf of Guinea Commission

GIS Geographic Identification System

GoG Gulf of Guinea

HRA High Risk Area

ICC International coordination centre

ICCAT International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas

IEZ Industrial Exclusion Zone

ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMO International Maritime Organization

IS Islamic State Terrorist Group

ISATT International Security Advisory and Training Team

ITQ Individual transferable quota

IUU Illegal, unregulated and unreported

JDZ Joint Development Zone

JMC Joint Maritime Committee

JMC Joint Maritime Committee

JOC Joint Maritime Operations Centre

JOC Joint Operations Centre

vi

MDA Maritime Domain Awareness

MERS Middle East Respiratory Syndrome

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MLSTP Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe

MOC Maritime Operations Centre

MPA Marine Protected Area

MSY Maximum sustainable yield

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

NM Nautical Miles

OPEC Oil Producers Economic Community

RFMO Regional Fisheries Management Organization

SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals

SIDs Small Island Developing States group

SL Sierra Leone

SLC Sierra Leone Fishing Company

SLPP Sierra Leone People’s Party

STP São Tomé & Príncipe

TOC Transnational Organised Crime

TTW Territorial Waters

UNAMSIL United Nations Assistance Mission to Sierra Leone

UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USD American Dollar

VMS Vessel Monitoring System

WTO World Trade Organization

1

Introduction “War kills people, destroys resources, retards economic development, ruins environments,

spreads disease, expands governments, militarizes societies, reshapes cultures, disrupts

families, and traumatizes people… A better understanding of the causes of war is a

necessary first step if we are to have any hope of reducing the occurrence of war and

perhaps mitigating its severity and consequences.”1

In the extensive literature academics have generated in their attempts to understand the

causes of war, resources have featured heavily. States go to war for a number of reasons,

but often over competition to control valuable, scarce natural resources. Civil wars can be

fought over competition for resources, divisions driven by resource inequalities or be

lengthened by resources funding violence. Valuable resources encourage “rent seeking”

behaviours and feed corruption which in turn increases inequality and drives resentment

between parties and competition for power that can feed civil war.2 Ideologies, power and

systems often drive wars and there are always multiple contributing causes, but resources

tend to play an important part. Hence to understand the causes of war and to work to

prevent it we must understand the role of resource management in society and its effects.

From 2011 to 2014 I worked at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office as the Desk

Officer with responsibility for maritime security off the West African coast. In 2008 Somali

piracy had demonstrated the dangers a failed state can pose to the world when its unique

business model brought international trade to a standstill. The International community’s

1 Levy, Jack and Thompson, William The Causes of War Whiley Blackwell Publishing p1. 2 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution, August, Vol.49(4), pp.625-633 p.630

2

response included a renewed focus on maritime security and their attention turned to the

Gulf of Guinea. West and Central Africa is a complex region still characterised by poverty,

food shortages, extreme weather, criminality, violence and even civil war. UK maritime

security objectives in the region included: protecting UK trade interests from the threat of

piracy, and armed robbery at sea; tackling trafficking of drugs, weapons and people by

transnational organised crime (TOC) groups; and supporting a secure environment for

sustained economic growth, peace and stability3 in the region. The international community

do not want to see another Somalia having witnessed the impact one state’s failure can

have on them all. They also recognised, however, that the situation in the Gulf of Guinea

differed considerably. States in West and Central Africa are sovereign functioning countries;

consequently, the UK aimed to work to support African-led-solutions to improve security

infrastructure and enforcement.

As I worked to better understand the maritime security picture in the Gulf of Guinea it

became increasingly apparent to me that the most significant, under addressed, security risk

facing the region was not piracy, but the way fisheries are being managed. Fish, in Africa

are an essential source of food and economic livelihoods for coastal communities; smoked,

dried and salted, they are traded across each country creating a complex network providing

protein and livelihoods to many. They are of cultural importance and are often harvested

by different ethnic groups. Other animals need fed and watered, making them far harder to

rear and impossible for poor local communities to farm in large enough numbers that they

3 I recognise historically the term “stability” was used by colonial powers to refer to strength of governance, control and subjugation of colonised populations. In the context of this dissertation, I use the term “stability” in the context of the individual, community and society. “Stability” as relative safety and security from all kinds of violence, but including violent conflict, crime or terrorism. Stability in this sense does not necessarily mean society without political unrest or protest, but it is more about safety.

3

could replace fish. Fish are one of the only resources that communities can rely on to

purchase additional food if crops fail. 40% of the population of West African communities

live in coastal regions and over 9 million people are dependent on fish as their main source

of protein and income.4 Yet international trawlers are overfishing across the region,

damaging the marine environment and risking fish stock collapse without concern for the

local people. Security in West Africa remains one of the key determinants to economic

growth and the improvement of people’s lives. Security in the region remains volatile with

internal and interstate violence, criminal and terrorist activity. Many states are

characterised by the risk factors of scarcity conflict that I will outline from the literature in a

later section. This puts them at particular risk that collapse of these valuable and essential

edible diamonds could lead to worsening security conditions, increased criminality,

terrorism, ethnic divisions and even violent conflict. While piracy presents a risk for

international trade in the region; the future of fisheries presents a much greater risk for the

people living in the region. For the governments in West and Central Africa, I argue that

protecting fish stocks is more than a food security issue, it is an issue of national security,

prosperity and development.

In 2013 the 23 regional states convened at a summit in Yaoundé to sign the Code of Conduct

Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime

Activity in West and Central Africa. This was the first time all 23 regional states had come

together at such a high level to demonstrate their political will to work together to solve a

shared security problem. The Code of Conduct did include an article on fisheries and a

4 Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi (2017) Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the complexities of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea Marine Policy p.1

4

commitment to tackle illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing but the focus was

on building legal frameworks and enforcement mechanisms to address piracy, terrorism and

trafficking. This demonstrated high level political will to be seen to be working to improve

maritime security to address piracy and armed robbery against international shipping. This

was most probably motivated by the importance placed on protecting offshore oil and gas

by the stronger economies and the ambition to start exploiting offshore oil and gas by the

weaker. Despite the brief inclusion of IUU fishing, the Code of Conduct did not demonstrate

a political will to reform fisheries management with science, or improve fisheries

enforcement.

In this dissertation, I want to fill a gap that I believe exists in the literature on the role of

resource in conflict by looking specifically at fish in West and Central Africa. I see fish as a

paradoxical resource, where they span both camps of the resource conflict literature. On

the one hand, I think fisheries management is driven by many of the same factors that cause

mismanagement of other valuable resources, such as minerals, oil and gas. Consequently,

many of the factors highlighted by scholars in literature describing a ‘resource curse’ around

valuable natural resources also apply to and shape fisheries management. While on the

other hand, fish tend to get taken for granted as a renewable resource, but they have never

been at such risk of stock collapse in the developing world as they could be over the next

decade. Consequently, they will very likely become increasingly scarce, which could have

dire consequences for security as highlighted in the scarcity conflict literature. I aim to carry

out an analysis of fisheries management in West and Central Africa with reference to the

‘resource curse’ literature to demonstrate how I think fish are a cursed resource. To

understand both sides of the paradox, I will also carry out a secondary analysis of the socio-

5

political, cultural and economic conditions in West and Central Africa to explore whether

the risk factors highlighted in the scarcity conflict literature are present. Then whether they

point to a risk of increased violence and instability if stocks continue to decline. Even if the

conditions exist that could lead to a worsening security environment it does not mean it will

necessarily happen. The future is not certain and cannot be predicted. One thing that sets

fish apart from other resources is that effective management and environmental protection

could not only maintain, but improve stocks. As a naturally occurring valuable and

nutritious resource, better management could enable them to contribute to inclusive

economic growth and greater stability.

Given the future implications of fisheries management today and the growing vulnerability

of this resource, I also want to analyse what impacts this paradoxical resource could have on

the future. So, the third piece of analysis this dissertation will conduct is a future studies

alternative scenarios exercise. Futures studies is an academic discipline that seeks to

understand change and what can drive change towards different futures. The

methodologies of futures studies will enable me to explore what the impacts of the

management of this resource could be on the future of conflict and development in West

and Central Africa. I will conduct an exercise using the existing trends, systems, potential

drivers of change and stabilising factors shaping fisheries in the region to explore some

possible future scenarios for security and development driven by fisheries management.

Scenarios provide an important tool to better understand the potential positive or negative

implications of change in future; they will help identify some potential opportunities and

risks that may not be expected from fisheries management. Fisheries management has

6

been shaped by historical colonial legacies, neo-colonial relationships and the global

capitalist political economy. It is subject to the ‘resource curse’ and can drive scarcity

conflict. The overall aim of this dissertation is to develop a better understanding of the

potential future impact of this paradoxical resource, to provoke debate and make the case

that changes in management could break the curse and transform fish into a beneficial

resource for inclusive economic development and greater stability in West and Central

Africa.

My research looks specifically at Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe as two very different

West and Central African states that represent many of the dynamics faced by the different

countries in the region. Both have fertile fishing grounds and populations largely dependent

on fish, with a significant proportion of their populations engaged in artisanal fishing.

Neither have domestic industrial fishing sectors and both have waters heavily fished by

international trawlers fishing both legally and illegally. Neither have fisheries policies driven

by sound marine science and both have fisheries classified as “overfished” by the FAO.5

Many of the problems and challenges they face are similar to all the countries along the

coast. Fisheries management is essentially driven by domestic legislation and enforcement.

I have chosen to focus on these two states in depth, rather than conduct a general regional

review. This will give me the opportunity to examine domestic legislation, enforcement,

pressures and relationships to better understand the complexities of the regional picture. I

have selected these two states because Sierra Leone has abundant valuable natural

5 FAO: 2016 The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture Contributing to Food Security and Nutrition for All Report p.6 available at: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i5555e.pdf

7

resources such as diamonds and minerals and a history of civil war. São Tomé & Príncipe on

the other hand is an agricultural state with no significant valuable resources and a relatively

peaceful history. It could be argued that resource management in a country already shaped

by conflict stoked by valuable resources, would be characterised by the ‘resource curse’ and

that fish would simply be impacted as another resource. I argue, however, that fish are

valuable enough on their own for their management to be shaped by the ‘resource curse.’

Hence by choosing one state without other valuable resources, it will give me the

opportunity to explore whether the high value of fish is sufficient to curse their

management or whether this only features in the presence of other valuable natural

resources. The comparative differences in terms of other resources and histories will serve

as contrasts showing how fish can impact very different societies in very similar ways.

Researching and writing this dissertation has required me to walk a delicate balance. While

I am a PhD scholar, I am also a practitioner in international diplomacy, working for the

British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Many of the interviews I conducted during my

research into this dissertation would not have been possible or conversations as open, had I

not had the credibility of my status as a practitioner diplomat behind me. Further, some of

the conclusions I have made and evidence I have used in my analysis were gleaned from my

experience of working operationally on maritime security in West Africa. All my

interviewees were aware of my research and gave their consent to answer my questions

and inform my research, however, some asked to remain anonymous. In my analysis I have

opted to remain vague when citing my sources in order to protect the anonymity of some

and important relationships with and between others. I recognise that as a scholar I have a

8

responsibility to demonstrate how I reached conclusions and provide the information that

supports my arguments and so I hope to take some time now to explain my methodology in

order to demonstrate how I hope to cite information without risking those relationships. It

is hard to write a thorough analysis of an issue as complex as resource conflict without

appearing to criticise governments, actors or officials. I do not seek to do this, but rather to

recognise the historical and systemic events and challenges that have shaped fisheries

management today.

I aim to draw some useful conclusions and demonstrate how the ‘resource curse’ on

fisheries management could be broken to improve stability and inclusive economic growth

for the people of West and Central Africa. As such, the arguments I make and the evidence I

use to support these has come from a variety of different sources. In all research,

particularly in a field as complex as this, there are conflicting opinions, reports and voices. I

am aware that the interviews I conducted were all shaped by each subject’s position,

objectives or experience. Especially as an outsider, it is sometimes hard to glean certainty

or truth, particularly in West and Central Africa. On many occasions, however, interviewees

from very different organisations provided similar opinions and additional evidence in

support of certain events or activities without being aware of my other conversations.

Sometimes satellite data or my own observations further supported this information adding

further credibility and enabling me to draw conclusions. However, in other cases I was

presented with conflicting arguments from different interviews and had to delve further to

deduct which voices to believe and how to make accurate judgements and conclusions. And

in some cases the information I received from a subject in public and in private differed

9

allowing me to better understand where intentional narratives were being presented and

why. This broader understanding of some of the complexities allowed me to better deduct

the truth from the interviews I conducted. For example, sometimes a strong assertion

would be made in an interview, and yet I could find no evidence of activity to support the

assertion and several other interviewees contested it, instead citing their own evidence for

a contrary position. In these cases, I delved further to identify the possible motivation for

the contrasting opinion, often it became clear that I was being delivered an agreed

government line, or an interviewee was protecting their own reputation. In these

incidences I made decisions to present the information that seemed to be supported by

most evidence and listen to the voices with the least cause to exaggerate or conceal.

Consequently, the cases I make in my analysis have come from careful consideration of

evidence and information presented from a number of different sources, often speaking in

confidence. Where I have not cited specific interviews in my analysis, I have tried to

highlight (sometimes in the footnotes) the situations where evidence has seemed

overwhelmingly to support an argument one way or another and draw out the times I have

had to make scholarly deductions. One particular example is the existence, role and impact

of corruption and gaps in capacity within the fisheries management architecture in Sierra

Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe. Initially, my interviews painted a picture of a joined up,

cross-government approach, effective systems and legislation but a lack of funding and

capacity. However, this did not seem to be translating into a secure maritime environment

and successful prosecutions of IUU violations and was contradicted repeatedly by other

stakeholders. A key part of my research, therefore, was to delve into these conflicting views

and activities to try and reach the most scholarly rigorous conclusions about what was

actually happening, delving into the uncomfortable complexities of weak institutions and

10

corruption. I hope that by explaining this methodology it will provide appropriate rigour to

support my arguments without requiring me to risk the relationships and reputations of my

interviewees. I have tried to highlight some of these occasions in my analysis, sometimes in

the body of the text and sometimes in footnotes and hope this provides a suitable

representation of how I have conducted my research and the conclusions I have drawn.

Fish: An Open Access Renewable Resource?

The discourse around fish changes along with environmental and socio-political attitudes

and a growing awareness of the impacts of the climate crisis. Wild capture ocean fisheries

have provided an essential source of protein and economic livelihoods as an open access

renewable natural resource globally throughout history. The assumed fact that fish are a

renewable resource that will always be present has shaped human interaction with the

resource, the importance we place on it and the shape of the global industrial fishing sector.

Living wild in the sea, fish have provided a renewable source of protein that can be easily

harvested without much upfront capital unlike domestic agriculture that require investment

in feed and land for several years before harvest. Fish have therefore provided an essential

food source for poor coastal communities and a cheap protein source for trade or sale to

communities further inland.

In more developed countries, with access to upfront capital investment or subsidies,

industrial fishing trawlers are able to catch large volumes of fish, generating significant

revenue. Fishing is just one industrial sector of many in the industrial agriculture mix of a

developed country’s economy. In 2016 the global wild capture fishing industry generated

11

more than USD130 billion6 from first sales.7 The value of the global industrial fishing sector

led to a changing understanding of fish from an open access resource to a valuable

sovereign resource. The global nature of the industrial fishing sector means fishermen and

sometimes even states have clashed over access to fertile fishing grounds. English and

French fishermen clash in the English Channel,8 for example, and Iceland and the UK

engaged in the “Cod Wars” from 1958-1976. This conflict was about territorial integrity,

access and ownership of a valuable commodity, rather than competition for a depleting

resource. The escalation of the Cod Wars was partly responsible for the inclusion of fish in

the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). When this was agreed and introduced

in 1982 it granted coastal States “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and

exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of

the waters9” within their 200nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). UNCLOS granted

ownership and sovereignty over the resource within a significant geographical area to

coastal states and changed the concept of fish from an open access resource to a sovereign

resource, except in international waters.

Now the notion of fish as a renewable resource is also being called into question. In 2015

the UN Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) recorded only 7% of global fisheries were

6 FAO Report: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Meeting the Sustainability Goals 2018 p.2 available at: http://www.fao.org/3/i9540en/i9540en.pdf 7 First sales are the value at which fish are sold from the trawlers directly after harvest. They then go on to secondary and third etc sales in restaurants, process factories and shops for example. 8 Scallop war: French and British boats clash in Channel BBC News: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45337091 9 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 56.1(a) https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

12

not ‘fully exploited’ to maximum sustainable levels or ‘overfished’ above those levels.10 In

the past it was assumed that a fishery could not collapse as the fish populations could

recover more quickly than fish could be caught. If levels did drop below a certain level it

was believed that after a period of recovery they would return to previous levels. However,

advances in technology driven by the growth in the lucrative industrial fishing industry since

the 1960s have dramatically increased the amount of fish being harvested. In the past fifty

years three significant marine fisheries have collapsed from overfishing and despite a long

moratorium on catch the stocks have not recovered. These are: Pollock in the so-called

“donut hole” in the Pacific, the Atlantic Cod fishery in Newfoundland and the Pacific Sardine

fishery.11 In the Pacific overfishing was thought to occur because this area fell outside of

regulated waters, and in Newfoundland economic gain was placed above sustainable fishing

practices.12 These collapses and greater understanding of fisheries science has led to the

understanding that fish can only be caught up to a certain level, the maximum sustainable

yield (MSY), in order to maintain stock levels, above that the fishery risks collapse.13

Further, biodiversity within the marine food web is now also understood to be essential to

maintain stocks. The fact that 93% of global fisheries are continuing to be overfished above

MSY means 93% of global fisheries remain at significant risk of species collapse. This

advance in fisheries science draws into question the concept of fish as always being a

renewable resource.

10 ‘fully exploited’ and ‘overfished’ are terms used by the UN FAO to describe fishing levels globally. More information can be found here: http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf 11 Kevin M. Bailey (2011) An Empty Donut Hole: The Great Collapse of a North American Fishery Ecology and Society Vol. 16, No. 2 Jun, p.28 12 Myers, R, Hutchings, J & Barrowman, N (1997) Why do Fish Stocks Collapse? The Example of Cod in Atlantic Canada Ecological Applications Vol. 7, No. 1, Feb, pp. 91-106. P.91 13 Tietenberg, Tom & Lewis, Lynne (2009) Environmental & Natural Resources Economics 10th Edition Routledge: New York p. 281

13

Divergent Definitions

Our understanding of fish as a resource is not only changing because international and

domestic laws now control access, or because overcapitalisation is threatening its existence.

It is also shaped by its cultural role in the diets of different societies. As with any food,

different species of fish have different cultural significance across the world. For example,

cod became a staple of the working class during the industrial revolution in England and

dried cod fuelled the Atlantic slave trade. In many forms of Christianity fish serve as a poor

substitute for meat during times of fasting. While, particularly in Asian countries, but also

across the West, certain species particularly of shellfish, pelagic fish or caviar are signs of

affluence, luxury and power. According to the World Health Organization about 20% of the

world’s population derives at least one-fifth of its animal protein intake from fish. Some

small island states depend almost exclusively on fish14 and in developing countries fish

account for more than half of the animal protein.15 In developing countries, fish are

essential to billions of people, but in developed countries with industrial agricultural sectors,

they are one option of many, or even a luxury. Edible diamonds.

The huge value and benefits from the global industrial fishing industry are also

disproportionately distributed. In developing countries, without fish processing facilities, in

Africa for example, fish cannot be exported by artisanal fishers for sale on lucrative

international markets, leaving industrial trawlers from developed countries in Europe and

Asia to benefit from exporting African fish. Fish are incredibly important to poor and weak

14 World Health Organization Nutrition Factsheet: https://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/3_foodconsumption/en/index5.html 15 FAO Paper on Food Security: http://www.fao.org/in-action/globefish/fishery-information/resource-detail/en/c/1027691/

14

communities without the power to properly benefit from them. Yet they are just one of

many products and industries from which communities in wealthier, more powerful states

can profit. Fisheries collapse in coastal waters in developing countries would have

devastating impacts on food security and people’s livelihoods, which could have further

consequences for national security. While in developed countries fisheries collapse would

only have a limited economic impact. This dynamic has also shaped the role of fish in

international relations. The more powerful states, with stronger voices on the international

stage have not prioritised the protection of fish stocks. Rather, they have safeguarded their

own access to the stocks they need to support their local fishing industries and allowed

fishing practises outside of their own waters to continue without significant environmental

controls.

Changing Values

“Natural resources are under increasing pressure from over-exploitation, environmental

degradation and climate change.16” Global capitalism and development policies have

prioritised economic growth over environmental concerns without considering the long-

term implications. Attitudes are slowly beginning to change within the international

community. The debate is moving forward and some policies are being introduced that

attempt to couple development with environmental protections.

16 Nuana, Fiona (2019) Governing Renewable Natural Resources: Theories and Frameworks p.1

15

In 2015 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable

Development setting out seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Agenda

“provides a shared blueprint for peace and prosperity for people and the planet, now and

into the future…an urgent call for action by all countries…They recognize that ending

poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-hand with strategies that improve health

and education, reduce inequality, and spur economic growth – all while tackling climate

change and working to preserve our oceans and forests.”17 The SDGs marked the beginning

of a step change in the international dialogue on development to one of sustainability,

recognising the importance of the environment in human livelihoods. Since 2015, the

expected impacts of climate change on global food production and the true cost of pollution

and unsustainable practises has risen up the international political agenda. In 2018 another

step change in the dialogue took place as activists, including Greta Thunberg and Extinction

Rebellion, succeeded in shifting international language from “climate change” to the

“climate crisis.” Further, the World Economic Forum 2020 Risk Outlook cites “climate action

failure” as the most important risk facing the world and five of the top ten are

environmental concerns, up from four in 2018 and three in 2017.18

While there is growing recognition of the importance of environmental protection and

concerns, the dialogue has begun to address the importance of protecting the ocean. SDG

14 Life Below Water aims to “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine

resources for sustainable development.” Within the SDGs it ranked immediately after

17 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdgs 18 World Economic Forum Annual Risk Report 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, available at: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020

16

SDG13 Climate Action and before SDG15 Life on Land demonstrating its growing priority.

Further, the concept of the Blue Economy, has now been adopted by UN Agencies including

the International Maritime Organization (IMO) providing a framework for attracting

investment for maritime development. The concept first came into use at the Rio Summit in

2012 and has since developed as a scholarly and policy discourse. James Michel (President

of the Seychelles 2004-2016) has been instrumental in pushing it up the political agenda

using the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) group as a forum. In his 2017 book

Rethinking the Oceans: Towards the Blue Economy, he explains how the term builds on the

concept of the “green economy” which is now widely understood by policy makers to be

about supporting low carbon, environmentally sound policies to create economic growth.

Michel describes the Blue Economy as being about “the sustainable use of the sea to meet

human needs.” Many states are now producing Blue Economy strategies which if

implemented sustainably could serve to protect fisheries and contribute to inclusive

economic development and food security.

Resource Conflict and Fish

Significant scholarship has been produced examining the role of resources in causing or

prolonging violent armed conflict. This literature sits in one of two camps, ‘resource curse

conflict’ and ‘scarcity conflict’ and has focused on natural resources such as oil, diamonds

and arable land. Traditionally considered an open access, renewable wild resource, fish

have only recently begun to be explored as having the potential to drive scarcity conflict.

Overcapitalisation, growing populations, environmental degradation, ocean warming and

acidification are starting to have an impact on catch size and quality which is changing

17

fishers’ behaviour and increasing local conflict as competition for resource grows.19 Any

previous role fish had in conflict literature was over access, economics and territorial

sovereignty20 in developed nations. Now scholars are starting to examine the role of fish

scarcity in causing conflict and many scholars such as Pomeroy, et al,21 suggest this will grow

as the impacts of the climate crisis worsens.

Scholars writing about the role of valuable resources in causing or prolonging conflict or

stunting economic development, the so-called ‘resource curse,’ have not assessed the role

of fish; rather, they have focused on the effects of oil and gas or diamonds and minerals.

Fish’s role as a food for the poor, and their relative unimportance in western, developed

countries as well as the markedly smaller revenues they generate in comparison to oil and

gas can help to explain their absence in this literature. I argue that fish bridge both sides of

the resource conflict literature. They can cause conflict through growing scarcity causing

hunger and loss of livelihoods as they are essential for food and subsistence livelihoods for

billions of people in the developing world. They are also a commodity, worth billions on

international markets, making them a source of “rents” to corrupt elites in the form of

valuable licences for foreign trawlers to fish in the waters of developing countries. They are

a product of globalized capitalism, a system built on colonial legacies that benefits the rich

at the cost of the poor.22 These make them vulnerable to having their management shaped

by the ‘resource curse.’

19 Pomeroy Robert, Et al (2007) Fishwars: Conflict and Collaboration in fisheries management in SE Asia Marine Policy 31, pp. 645-656 p.645 20 Swain, A, (2012) Resource Scarcity, climate change and Environmental Security in Understanding emerging security challenges: Threats and opportunities. Routledge p.26 21 Pomeroy Robert, Parks, John, Pollnac, Richard, Campson, Tammy, Genio, Emmanuel, Marlessy, Cliff, Holle, Elizabeth, Pido, Michael, Nissapa, Ayut, Boromthanarat, Somsak and Hue, Nguyen (2007) Fishwars: Conflict and Collaboration in fisheries management in SE Asia Marine Policy 31, pp.645-656 22 Dobkowski, Michael &Walliman, Isidor (1998) The Coming Age of Scarcity Syracuse: New York p.49

18

In this dissertation, I intend to fill a gap in this literature by demonstrating that fish are a

“cursed” valuable natural resource. That their current management is shaped by the

“curse” of their value on international markets and is stunting economic development. I will

examine some of the risk factors highlighted by scholars as contributing to the conditions

for scarcity to provoke violent conflict and assess the risk of potential fish stock collapse

contributing to future violent conflict. I will then use the tools of futures studies to generate

alternative scenarios to examine how these two conflating issues could cause instability and

violence in future. I will also use alternative scenarios to explore how a change in

management, action to break the ‘resource curse,’ could both avoid the potential of conflict

and start to generate inclusive economic development. I hope to contribute to the debate

around development in Africa; to explore how colonial legacies and neo-colonial

relationships have contributed to the impact of the ‘resource curse’ on fisheries

management then by looking at the issue through a futures lens I hope to demonstrate how

the curse could be broken.

19

Chapter One: What is Future Studies?

I have explained in my introduction my intent to carry out a futures studies exercise as part

of this dissertation. I am conducting this research as a futurist with the intention of

demonstrating the risks of continuation along current trajectories and seeking to

understand how positive change could shape a preferred future, harnessing unseen

opportunities and avoiding these risks. I will begin my dissertation with a short introduction

to future studies.

If we look back in history at the transformation of society: from nomadic hunter gatherers;

to more static agricultural communities; through the industrial revolution which created

industrial economies, globalised urban centres and colonialism; and then how new

technologies have enabled the information revolution: the only constant is change23.

Futures studies essentially seeks to understand change. What drives change, holds it back,

how change in some sectors can influence change in another. It explores systems and how

they act and react to each other. It also explores the small changes that occur all the time,

influencing how we as individuals operate and then seeks to understand the more complex

change that alters national systems and structures or even global structures and relations.

If we look back over just the last five to ten years, the world has changed dramatically, look

at the impact mobile phone technology and smart phones has had on connectivity in Africa,

for example, and if we look back at the twentieth century the world has transformed

23 Dator, Jim, (2011) Futures Studies in William Sims Bainbridge, ed., Leadership in Science and Technology. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Reference Series, Vol. 1, Chapter Four, pp. 32-40. P.33

20

significantly. Change moves at different paces in different places, some things remain

similar, but nothing remains the same.

Future studies started to develop as a discipline during the Second World War as

governments tried to better understand which strategies or actions would motivate

populations to fight harder and which would discourage them from continuing the

struggle.24 Since the Second World War, significant technological, economic and social

changes have brought focus on the importance of understanding change and thinking about

the future. This helped to formalise futures studies into an academic discipline in

Universities. Jim Dator, who founded the Futures Studies programme at the University of

Hawai’i argues that “before strategic plans are formulated, organizations should engage in

alternative futures forecasting, and preferred futures envisioning and inventing.”25 This will

enable them to identify potential threats and opportunities that are not necessarily obvious

to us today. Policy officials planning for the future and developing government strategies to

improve economic growth, education or food security, often have a tendency to assume the

systems and structure they operate within today will remain the same throughout the life of

the strategy. This is rarely the case when change is the only constant in societies. I am

writing this during the global COVID-19 health pandemic which has seen, in the space of a

few short weeks, most of the world quarantined in their homes, businesses closed, and

travel halted, as governments struggle to contain and eliminate this deadly virus. The speed

and scale of deaths in many advanced economies including Italy, the UK and the US from

the pandemic has demonstrated how unprepared the majority of governments were to

24 Dator, Jim, (2011) Futures Studies in William Sims Bainbridge, ed., Leadership in Science and Technology. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Reference Series, Vol. 1, Chapter Four, pp. 32-40. P.37 25 ibid. p.41

21

react to this threat. This is despite the fact that a global pandemic has featured highly on

government and international organizations’ risk registers for many years.26 The pandemic

has also highlighted exactly how interconnected systems in our global society are and the

unforeseen impacts of each on others. The impacts of this pandemic are only just beginning

to be felt. The world may change significantly before or when it is over.

The pandemic has helped to highlight some of the assumptions that have shaped systems

without allowing flexibility for change. US food systems, for example, are designed to

supply restaurants, schools, work cafeterias or other institutions, where most people get

their daily food. With restaurants, schools, offices and institutions now closed and people

confined to their homes, millions of tonnes of food has had to be destroyed on US farms.

Grocery stores are struggling to keep shelves stocked to serve a population now limited to

buying food and cooking at home. Despite the clear demand, farms have been unable to

adapt their systems to service supermarket supply chains27 and so tonnes of food have gone

to waste. This demonstrates an unintended consequence of insufficient planning within a

system-in this case the US food supply system-to plan for unexpected change that may

impact business delivery.

While the huge impact of this global pandemic may be a once-in-a-century event, there

have been weak signals for some time that the current US food system is becoming unfit for

purpose. Taking a futurists approach and thinking about potential change in the future

26 World Economic Forum Annual Risk Report 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020: https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020 27 Cagle, Susie April 2020) 'A disastrous situation': mountains of food wasted as coronavirus scrambles supply chain Guardian online available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/09/us-coronavirus-outbreak-agriculture-food-supply-waste

22

could have helped build in contingencies that would have enabled it to adapt to such a

shock. These weak signals of change include: the climate crisis changing growing conditions;

increasingly frequent extreme weather events; the growing migration crisis; tighter border

restrictions; consumer behaviour: growing nationalism; protectionist policies; climate

campaigners calling for reduced imports, and shopping locally; an end to carbon intensive

inhumane industrial farming techniques; the end of beef farming and meat consumption;

the huge increase in the number and popularity of plant-based meat replacement products

on the US market; the changing nature of work; education; physical office spaces becoming

smaller; spiralling education costs challenging the future of learning institutions. All of these

may impact where and how Americans eat. These are just a snap shot of some of the

interconnected emerging issues that will likely drive change in the US food supply system in

future. They demonstrate some of the forward-thinking futurists use across different

sectors to see how they may drive change in each other to enable planners to pre-empt

previously unforeseen risks and harness opportunities.

Using Alternative Futures Scenarios

Futures studies seeks to provide tools to enable organisations and policy makers to think

about how change may be driven in the future. These include short term attempted

forecasts of the most likely way an issue will develop in future, the most famous being Philip

Tetlock and his “superforecasters.”28 As well as longer term exercises, not predicting or

forecasting, but exploring the potential impacts and interactions that may shape change in

the future to create potential alternative scenarios. These are intended to provoke new

28 Tetlock, Philip, Gardner, Dan (2016) Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction Random House: London

23

thinking about change and how it is created and could shape the future. They are designed

to open up debate and change our existing expectations of what the future will inevitably

look like and help identify risks and opportunities that might otherwise be unexpected.

Scenarios also help us to generate an idea of what a preferred future could look like, how it

could be shaped and what would be needed to work towards it.

I intend to use a futures scenarios exercise as part of this dissertation to provoke debate

around the future of fisheries management in West and Central Africa. Scenarios will give

me an opportunity to explore how existing policies, demographics and socio-political,

cultural dynamics could create possible future scenarios. I will examine the implications of

current conditions and activities to see what scenarios these could create. I will then

analyse what factors and drivers could contribute to breaking the ‘resource curse’ and how

small changes could create vastly different possible future scenarios. They will not be

predictions, but a tool to provoke debate and hopefully support policy officers to consider

how different risks could be avoided and previously unforeseen opportunities realised. I

hope to use these to contribute to the debate on African development to contribute to work

to escape colonial legacies and neo-colonial power politics to empower inclusive economic

development. Before I start to think about the future, I will now turn to the literature on

resource conflict to better understand the present.

24

Unpicking the Paradox: The ‘Resource Curse’

There is significant scholarship into the role of valuable resources in causing conflict. This

next section is a literature review of some of this work. I argue that the value of fish as a

natural resource shapes the way they are managed and, in turn, their role in society and

potential for causing conflict. Fish have not featured in the literature on the ‘resource curse’

which focuses mainly on the most expensive resources such as oil, gas and minerals. If I am

to explore the role of fish as a paradoxical resource both driven by its value and risking

scarcity conflict, I must determine what it is about a valuable resource that drives its

management to curse development rather than create it. This next section will travel

through some of the key literature on the ‘resource curse’ to help me identify what these

important factors are. In my analysis of my two case studies I will then return to this

literature in detail to make my case for why I believe it to be applicable to fish and how fish

are a cursed resource in West and Central Africa.

“The ‘resource curse’ can be described as the phenomenon by which oil-producing countries

or localities do not receive the economic and social benefits expected from the wealth

generated by the hydrocarbon industry either directly, through the stimulation of the local

and national economy, or indirectly, through increased tax revenues as a result of

government involvement.”29 In the years between the 1960s to the 1990s many countries

with rich natural resources experienced far slower economic growth than those without

natural resources.30 The discovery of oil, diamonds and other valuable minerals, particularly

29 Hirdan Katarina de Medeiros Costa n, Edmilson Moutinho dos Santos (2013) Institutional analysis and the “resource curse” in developing countries Energy Policy 63, pp.788–79 p.789 30Sachs, J.D. and A.M. Warner,(1995) Natural resource abundance and economic growth, NBER Working Papers. p.827

25

in many newly independent, developing countries, was initially viewed as advantageous to

development. However, by the 1980s the literature started to highlight the fact that the

majority of resource rich countries were experiencing low economic growth, political

instability or war.31 The term “the resource curse” was first used in print by economic

geographer Richard Auty in 1993.32 Since then academics have conducted significant

research into the role of resources on development and conflict and what causes the

existence of natural resources to cause negative growth and conflict.

For a time, the literature debated whether or not there was a ‘resource curse,’ with scholars

such as Havraneketal,33 and Brunnschweiler and Bulte,34 Wright and Czelusta,35 arguing that

it was an anomaly of which data was used to conduct the study. However, the consensus

now is that “one type of mineral wealth, petroleum, has at least three harmful effects: It

tends to make authoritarian regimes more durable, to increase certain types of corruption,

and to help trigger violent conflict in low- and middle-income countries.”36 Initially, the

majority of academics studying this issue were economists. They developed two primary

economic mechanisms to explain how valuable natural resources impact the economy to

have a negative impact. These explain the movement of resources within an economy when

one sector, that of the valuable resource, is significantly more valuable and dominant than

31Rosser, Andrew, (2006) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey Institute of

Development Studies http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/WP268.pdf p.7 32 Auty, R, (1993) Sustaining development in mineral economies: the resource curse thesis London; New York: Routledge 33 Havranek, T,Horvath, R, Zeynalov, A, (2016) Natural resources and economic growth: a meta-analysis World Development 88: pp.134–151 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.07.016. 34 Brunnschweiler C, Bulte, E, (2009) Natural resources and violent conflict: resource abundance, dependence, and the onset of civil wars. Oxford Economics Paper 61: pp.651–74 35 Wright, Gavin, and Jesse Czelusta, (2004) The Myth of the Resource Curse Challenge 47(2): pp.6–38 36 Ross, Andrew, (2015) What have we learned about the Resource Curse? Political Science Review 18 pp.239–59 p.239

26

the others. Additionally, scholars have shown valuable natural resources stunt economic

growth and encourage violent conflict. It is this third concept into which political scientists

have conducted significant research and I consider to be most significant when thinking of

how fish can be shaped by the ‘resource curse.’ I will focus most on this literature exploring

the causes and wider implications of valuable natural resources on development and

conflict. While scholars have reached consensus that oil is the main proponent of the

‘resource curse,’ they have not argued that other minerals and valuable resources do not

have similar impacts and cause similar problems. So, while the majority of the literature

below is focused on oil and gas, it can also be applied to other resources where the evidence

exists.

Economic Causes of the ‘Resource Curse’

The term Dutch Disease gained prominence in the 1980s and has been used to explain how

growth in one sector of the economy damages other areas.37 Corden and Neary,38 Warner

and Sachs,39 Gylfason, Herbertson & Zoega40 and Humphreys et al,41 all analyse the effects

of Dutch disease on resource rich economies. Their economic analysis does not just focus

on developing countries with poor economic growth, but applies the model to Australia, the

Netherlands, Norway and the UK as well as OPEC countries. This demonstrates that the

Dutch Disease effects all economies and is a mechanism of a valuable resource on economic

37 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development no.61: pp.149–159 38 Corden, W, & Neary, J, (1982) Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy The Economic Journal, 92(368), pp.825–848. 39 Sachs, J, & Warner, A, (1995) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. NBER Working Paper Series w5398. http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398 Sachs, J, & Warner, A (2001) The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4–6) pp.827–838. 40 Gylfason, T, Herbertsson, T, & Zoega, G (1999) A mixed blessing (natural resources and economic growth) Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3(2), pp.1091–1115. 41 Humphreys, M, Sachs, J, & Stiglitz, J (2007) Escaping the resource curse. New York: Columbia University Press

27

development. They also demonstrate the applicability of this model to economies where

the single booming sector is not resource dependent, demonstrating it is a symptom of

valuable natural resources.

I will focus here on one of the earlier papers by Corden and Neary who describe the process

whereby a “boom” in one sector, usually valuable natural resources such as oil and gas

(energy sector), produces an influx of foreign capital, causing currency appreciation which

reduces the value of other internationally traded goods and subsequently leads to a “lag” in

other sectors of the economy, particularly manufacturing.42 Further, the “boom” in one

sector causes de-industrialisation in other sectors. Corden and Neary explain how Dutch

Disease can cause direct or indirect de-industrialisation through either the resource

movement effect or the spending effect. The resource movement effect43 is caused by the

boom in the energy sector raising the “marginal products of the mobile factors” which

draws resources out of other sectors causing adjustments in the rest of the economy. So, if

the energy sector requires large amounts of labour, for example, and this is drawn from

other industries this produces de-industrialisation. The spending effect44 is caused by an

increase in real income from the boom enabling more spending on services and producing

an excess in demand. In order to eliminate the excess demand, prices rise, attracting more

resources into the services industry from other sectors of the economy. This causes a

decline in other sectors of the economy, indirect de-industrialisation.45

42 Corden, W.M. and J.P. Neary, (1982) Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy, The Economic Journal, 92 (368), p.825. 43 ibid p.830. 44 ibid p.827 45 ibid p.832.

28

Although this analysis focused on the oil and gas sector, the same observations can be said

about the fishing industry. In coastal communities in the developed as well as developing

world, fishing is the main income source and the rest of the economy has become shaped

around it. In areas with a distinct fishing season, for example, communities are similar to

holiday communities, with hotels, restaurants and shops opening gearing up for the influx of

customers during the fishing season and winding down the rest of the time. When the

Newfoundland Cod fishery collapsed, it was not just the fishing industry that was hit, but the

services sector dependent on the fishery for business that had developed around it. The

moratorium on fishing led to 39,000 job loses in a very short space of time because the

sector no longer existed to support these businesses.46

The next mechanism was put forward by Gylfason, Herbertson, and Zoega who argue that

“in a two sector endogenous growth model, a productive, low-skill-intensive primary

sector… hampers the development of a high-skill-intensive secondary sector, thereby

reducing growth.”47 In other words, if the natural resource sector requires high levels of

unskilled labour and is productive enough that the wages for such labour are high, this will

attract more workers. With more people employed in highly paid unskilled jobs, it will

prevent innovators and entrepreneurs from developing a profitable secondary sector

requiring highly skilled workers. Further, the dominance of the low-skill-intensive primary

46 Fred Mason (2002) The Newfoundland Cod Stock Collapse: A Review and Analysis of Social Factors UCLA Electronic Green Journal, 1 (17) p.1 47 Gylfason, T, Herbertson, T, & G. Zoega, (1999) A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3 (02), pp.204–225. p.204

29

sector will cause the currency to appreciate which will make other industries more

expensive and further reduce the growth of a secondary-high-skilled sector. Mehlum,

Moene and Torvik support this theory, arguing that the more entrepreneurs and innovators

make up an economy, the more productive economic growth will be.48 Warner and Sachs

further argue that natural resource abundance crowds out entrepreneurial activity or

innovation, because it not only draws all workers into the sector but easily accessible

revenues encourage rent seeking and corruption in government damaging educational

institutions. Gylfason et al’s mechanism is most apparent in those economies with natural

resources that can be extracted using large volumes of unskilled labour, such as diamond,

gold or other mineral mining rather than in economies based on natural resources which

require skilled labour and capital for extraction, such as offshore oil and gas.49 Once again,

this can also be seen in fishing communities where the majority of people will be engaged in

the fishing sector, the majority in unskilled labour jobs at decent wages because of the high

demand for seasonal workers.

Broader Political Arguments

Scholars including Brunnschweiler & Bulte, Essang Esu50 and Pineda & Rodriguez51 argue

that across the board resource abundance may actually be associated with higher income

and a lower risk of civil war. They demonstrate that in general, natural resource abundance

48Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl and Torvik, Ragnar (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) pp.1-20. p.10. 49 Gylfason, T, Herbertson, T, & G. Zoega, (1999) A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3 (02), pp.204–225. p.224 50Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22 (2017) pp.153-213 p.153 51 Pineda, J & Rodriguez, F (2010) Curse or Blessing? Natural Resources and Human Development Human Development Reports: United Nations Development Programme. Research Paper (04), 2010

30

has positive effects on the economy. These scholars agree however, that poor economic

development policies leading an economy to be dependent on its primary exports52 or

institutional factors such as corruption, weak rule of law and government ineffectiveness

dampen growth53 in line with the theory of a ‘resource curse.’ While economists struggled

to understand the economic mechanisms such as a dependence on primary exports in

causing the ‘resource curse,’ political scientists have sought to understand the broader

political economy, social causes and effects of valuable natural resources driving weak

economic growth and instability. This next section sets out some of the main theories

identified in this literature which include: the impact of valuable natural resources in

weakening institutions; the role of weak institutions in causing the ‘resource curse;’ and the

role of global capitalism; the impact of valuable natural resources in causing or prolonging

violent conflict.

It is these political economy arguments that are most relevant when analysing fisheries

management in developing countries and its impact on development and conflict. As a

valuable natural resource, fish are essential in developing countries for food security,

income and economic development for coastal communities. However, just as minerals and

oil have failed to generate sustained economic development, neither has an industrial

fishing sector developed in West Africa. The value of fish on international markets means

the rights to fish in fertile African waters are also valuable. Consequently, in the same way

that valuable minerals have been shaped by weak institutions, rent seeking behaviours and

52 Brunnschweiler, C.N. and E.H. Bulte, Linking natural resources to slow growth and more conflict, Science, 2008, 320, p.616 53 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22, pp.153-213 p.153

31

corruption, so has the fishing sector in these countries. I will conduct a specific analysis of

how the observations and arguments in this literature relate to fisheries in the case studies I

will conduct in the next chapters in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe.

The Role of Institutions

As Collier and Hoeffler identify, much of the political science literature on the ‘resource

curse’ concentrates on the link between natural resources and weak institutions54.

Essentially, government institutions are responsible for the management of resources and

the distribution of capital generated by the resource. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik make the

case that the ‘resource curse’ is caused by ‘grabber friendly’ institutions where rent-seeking

and production are competing activities and will stunt growth.55 In contrast, “producer

friendly” institutions where rent-seeking and production are complimentary activities will

encourage growth. They give the example of Botswana with 40% GDP from diamonds

having the world’s highest growth since 1965 and Norway, one of Europe’s poorest

countries in 1900 who exploited abundant oil and gas reserves to become one of the

richest. Both these success stories can be explained by strong institutions and low levels of

corruption. As opposed to Venezuela, Nigeria and Mexico who all have dysfunctional

institutions that invite grabbing56 and so low economic growth.

54 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August pp.625-633 p.625 55Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl and Torvik, Ragnar (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) pp.1-20 p.2 56 Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl and Torvik, Ragnar (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) pp.1-20 p.3

32

Many scholars (including Arif57, Amundsen,58 Kaznacheev,59 Essang Esu,60 Kolstad, Mehlum,

Moene, & Torvik,61 Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier,62 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler63, Anke,64 Sala-I-

Martin & Subramanian,65 Charlier & N'cho-Oguie,66 Okeke,67 and Obafemi68) argue that it is

the strength of institutions that determines the impact of the ‘resource curse.’ Essentially

weak institutions lead to the ‘resource curse,’ whereas strong institutions lead to the

distribution of revenues back into the economy. Strong institutions, with high levels of

accountability, checks and balances, distributed power and low levels of corruption are

more likely to allow resource abundance to lead to stability and economic growth.

Whereas, weak institutions facilitating rent-seeking behaviours with no accountability and

high levels of corruption will have the opposite effect.69 For example, Peter Kaznacheev

pointed out that strong institutions also help diversify the economy enabling countries to

57 Arif, Sirojuddin (2019) Cursed By Oil? Rural Threats, Agricultureal Policy Changes and the Impact of Oil on Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s Rural Development Journal of International Development 31, pp.165–181 58 Amundsen, Inge. (2014) Drowning in oil; Angola’s institutions and ‘the resource curse’ Comparative politics. 44(2): pp.169–189 59 Kaznacheev, Peter (2017) Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies Policy Analysis January 11 808 pp.1-48 60 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22 pp.153-213 61 Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl and Torvik, Ragnar (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) pp.1-20 62 Robinson, J, Torvik, R, Verdier, T, (2006) The political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics 79, pp.447–468 63 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August, pp.625-633 64 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution, August, Vol.49(4), pp.625-633 p.630 65 Sala-i-Martin, X, Subramanian, A, (2013) Addressing the natural resource curse: an illustration from Nigeria. Journal African Economics 22 (4), pp.570–615 66 Charlier, F, N'cho-Oguie, C, 2009. Sustaining reforms for inclusive growth in Cameroon. A development policy review. The World Bank, Washington, DC. 67 Okeke, C.N., 2008. Mineral resources: Blessing or Curse? vol. 42. The International Lawyer America Bar Association. Spring 2008, Chicago 68 Obafemi, F. N, Uchechi R. & Emmanuel, N, (2013) Petroleum Resource, Institutions and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Journal of Business & Management, 1(3), pp.154 -165 69Robinson, James; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry (2006) Political foundations of the resource curse Journal of Development Economics 79 pp.447-468

33

survive fluctuations in commodity prices.70 Godwin Esu points out that generally crude oil

abundance has had positive effects on the Nigerian economy, however “the resource curse

hypothesis was found to be present, and had been transmitted by institutional factors such

as corruption, weak rule of law, government ineffectiveness, political instability, violence &

terrorism.71 He recommended that institutional quality be strengthened and conscious

efforts be made to diversify the economy to encourage economic growth. He goes on to

argue that resource booms seem to lead to “highly dysfunctional state behaviour,

particularly large public sectors and unsustainable budgetary policies.”72 Esu cites

Newberry,73 Robinson and Gelb74 as agreeing that the role of government is missing from

most economist literature and that policies and institutions have a strong impact on

determining the curse.75 Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier,76 Leite & Weidmann,77 Bulte,

Damania, and Deacon78 argue that the ‘resource curse’ in developing countries works not

through the Dutch Disease but through political mechanisms. Resource rents undermine

the quality of political institutions and increase the tendency of corruption, which

consequently hamper economic growth. Godwin Esu also cites Karl, Leite and Weidmann79

in their argument that natural resources induce corruption because large windfalls create

70 Kaznacheev, Peter (2017) Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies Policy Analysis January, No. 808 p. 1 71 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22 pp.153-213 p.153 72 Ibid p.160 73 Newberry, D. M.G. (1986) Round-table discussion In: Neary, J. Peter, van Wijnbergen, Sweder (Eds.), Natural Resources and the Macroeconomy. Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 74 Gelb A et al. eds. (1988) Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse Oxford University Press: New York. 75 Ibid p.160 76 Robinson, J, Torvik, R, Verdier, T, (2006) The political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics 79, pp.447–468 77 Leite, C. Weidmann, J. (1999) Does mother nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption and economic growth IMF Working Paper No 99/85, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 78 Bulte, E. H, Damania, R, & Deacon, R. (2005) Resource Intensity, Institutions, and Development World Development, 33 (7) pp.1029-1044. 79 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22, pp.153-213 p.162

34

enormous economic temptations and opportunities for corrupt behaviours by government

officials.80 This is particularly emphasised by state ownership of resource industries in many

developing countries. Further, lack of market competition fosters corruption, developing

countries often have ill-defined property rights, and incomplete market structures, all of

which foster corruption.81 He also builds on Torvik, Muhlem and Moene’s analysis pointing

out that resource windfalls divert entrepreneurial talent away from wealth-creating

industrialisation and towards rent seeking, corrupt behaviours.82

Sirojuddin Arif83 argues that weak institutions distract government institutions away from

developing other sectors. Although education and social programmes can benefit from

natural resources84 the agricultural sector often suffers. He argues, using the case of

Indonesia, that a solid agricultural foundation is required for developing countries to

embark on industrial transformation.85 He argues that whether natural resources bring

blessings or curses depends on the state and that state action cannot be understood

without considering the impacts the state and society have on each other. He explains how

threats from rural forces in Indonesia forced the government to strengthen their

institutional foundations so government programmes to support the agricultural sector

could provide real benefits to rural producers. Whereas in Nigeria, the lack of a

80 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22 pp.153-213 p.162 81 ibid p.162 82 Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl and Torvik, Ragnar (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) 1-20 83 Arif, Sirojuddin (2019) Cursed by Oil? Rural Threats, Agricultural Policy Changes and the Impact of Oil on Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s Rural Development Journal of International Development, no.31, pp.165–181 p.166 84 Lederman and Maloney 2008 quotes in Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22, pp.153-213 p.163 85 Arif, Sirojuddin (2019) Cursed by Oil? Rural Threats, Agricultural Policy Changes and the Impact of Oil on Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s Rural Development Journal of International Development 31, pp.165–181 p.166

35

consolidated rural threat enabled government elites to use oil revenues to embark on large-

scale projects for their economic and political interests with weak structures that enable

corruption and rent seeking behaviours.86 Dwumfour and Ntow-Gyamfi add that weak

institutions allow resource profits to be spent in government consumption rather than

investment, especially in countries with low levels of genuine savings which worsens debt

and damages growth potential.87

Weak institutions that allow for high levels of corruption and rent seeking behaviour also

impact the judicial sector and damage the rule of law. In their 2013 paper Costa and Santos

conducted a thorough analysis of how lack of transparency and legal compliance in a weak

judicial system worsened the ‘resource curse.’88 They found that indications of the

‘resource curse’ were present when: “the institutions that allocate the revenues do not

conform to the law, do not protect fundamental social and economic laws, or are not

transparent about the revenue allocations.”89 Consequently, the weak institutions that

couple with valuable natural resources to cause the ‘resource curse’ are broader than the

hydrocarbon sector and consequently have broader implications for development than

purely economic. In summary, the literature shows that the most institutional problems

caused by natural resource rents are: corruption; problems of rule of law or justice; bad

86 Arif, Sirojuddin (2019) Cursed by Oil? Rural Threats, Agricultural Policy Changes and the Impact of Oil on Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s Rural Development Journal of International Development. No.31, 165–181 p.177 87 Dwumfour, Richard Adjei & Ntow-Gyamfi, Matthew (2018) Natural resources, financial development and institutional quality in Africa: Is there a resource curse? Resources Policy 59, pp.411–426 p.413 88 Costa, Hirdan Katarina de Medeiros, Santos, Edmilson Moutinho dos (2013) Institutional analysis and the “resource curse” in developing countries Energy Policy 63, pp.788–79 p.790 89 ibid p.790

36

quality of public services; bad regulations; problems of transparency and accountability;

political instability.90

As mentioned earlier, the majority of this literature is written about oil and mineral

revenues. However, the same arguments and observations can easily be seen in the fishing

sector within states’ EEZs and are important when considering how and why fish are

mismanaged. In many developing countries the institutions governing the fishing industry

including access to their waters by foreign industrial trawlers are weak, opaque, and

corruption in the sector is rife. This has impacts across the whole sector. Weak institutions

and corruption impact the sale of permits granting access rights to international trawlers,

enforcement or lack of enforcement of fishing regulations, complicity in piracy attacks,

fraudulent exports, and prioritisation of rents over economic livelihoods for coastal

communities. The exact role corruption and weak institutions plays differs from country to

country and I will address this further in my case study analysis.

Political Economy

In his 2015 paper Andrew Ross explains how “the idea of a ‘resource curse’ has influenced

many debates in political science, 91 for example, on the causes of democratic transitions

90 Henri, Pr Atangana Ondoa(2019) Natural resources curse: A reality in Africa Resources Policy 63(2019) p.10 91 Ross, Andrew (2015) What have we learned about the Resource Curse? Political Science Review. No. 18, pp.239–59 p.240

37

(Gassebner et al92), the role of taxation in state building (Brautigam et al.93 Smith94), the

consequences of foreign aid (Bermeo,95 Ahmed96) and the factors affecting the onset,

duration, and severity of civil war (Fearon & Laitin,97 Weinstein98).” This next section

reviews some of the literature that seeks to analyse the political economy, wider

implications on politics and structures of the ‘resource curse’ produced by scholars including

Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier99, Rosser,100 Schubert,101 Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz.102

Many make the case that valuable natural resources shore up authoritarian regimes. Kabia

makes the case for this using the example of diamonds in Sierra Leone where he argues

Siaka Stevens (Sierra Leone President at the outbreak of the civil war) was able to satisfy the

needs of his close allies and extended family from the revenues and in doing so strengthen

his rule.103 Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier argue political incentives generated by resource

endowments allow leaders more influence and therefore more power which can lengthen

authoritarian rule as well as increase misallocation of resource. They argue politicians,

92 Gassebner M, Lamla MJ, Vreeland JR (2012) Extreme bounds of democracy. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 57(2) pp.171–97 93 Brautigam D, Fjeldstad O-H, Moore M (2008) Taxation and State-Building in Developing Countries: Capacity and Consent. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 94 Smith A (2008) The perils of unearned income. Journal of Politics: 70(3), pp.780–93 95 Bermeo S (2011) Foreign aid and regime change: a role for donor intent. World Dev. 39(11):2021–31 96 Ahmed FZ (2012) The perils of unearned foreign income: aid, remittances, and government survival. American Political Science Review 106(1), pp.146–65 97 Fearon J, Laitin D (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review 97(1), pp.75–90 98 Weinstein JM (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 99 Robinson, James; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry (2006) Political foundations of the resource curse Journal of Development Economics 79, pp.447-468 100 Rosser A (2006) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey. IDS Working Paper No. 268, IDS: Brighton, Sussex 101 Schubert, S (2006) Revisiting the Oil Curse: Are Oil Rich Nations Really Doomed to Autocracy and Inequality? Oil and Gas Business, (2) pp.1-16. 102 Humphreys M, Sachs J, Stiglitz J (2007) Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia Univ. Press 103 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development no.61 pp.149–159 p.154

38

preoccupied with their own power, tend to over-extract natural resources because they

only care about the future stock of resource if they are in power, so they discount the future

by the probability of their being in power.104 Collier and Hoeffler argue “that states with

natural resources often rely on a system of patronage and do not develop a democratic

system based on electoral competition, scrutiny and civil rights.”105 The same poor

management and lack of transparency, however, can also be seen in democratically elected

governments such as in Nigeria. Bad economic policies are correlated with resource rents

and large public sectors with unsustainable budgetary policies. Further, the connection

between resource rents and public employment becomes about gaining political advantage

because a job equates to a vote. Politicians engage in inefficient redistribution in order to

influence the outcome of elections and build power.106 Godwin Esu adds to this pointing

out that resource booms seem to lead to highly dysfunctional state behaviour, particularly

large public sectors and unsustainable budgetary policies.107

Leite and Weidmann explain how the high rents from natural resources can drive a lack of

transparency. As citizens are not contributing to the revenues coming into the public purse

through the resource sector, leaders, reluctant to report them, can argue the information is

not in the public interest.108 This lack of transparency over resource revenues increases

104 Robinson, James; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry (2006) Political foundations of the resource curse Journal of Development Economics 79, pp.447-468 p.450 105 Collier, Paul and Hoffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August pp.625-633 p.625 106 Robinson, James; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry (2006) Political foundations of the resource curse Journal of Development Economics 79, pp.447-468. p.461 107 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22, pp.153-213 108 Leite C, Weidmann J (1999) Does Mother Nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and economic growth. Tech. Rep. WP/99/85. International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC

39

corruption and hinders democratic process.109 High levels of corruption in government

reinforces the tendency for untransparent and undemocratic institutions to characterise

resource rich countries.110 Even in many democracies, the draw of rent seeking behaviours

and corruption leads to less democratic institutions, corruption in the judicial sector,

inequality and poor economic growth.

Even without corruption and rent seeking behaviours, the extraction of valuable natural

resources and the promise of high revenues can make policy officials overconfident in their

countries. The promise of having ready access to these revenues may relieve pressures on

governments to collect taxes and lead to a lack of fiscal discipline. Governments may exploit

the reduced constraint on expenditure to introduce unsustainable spending and avoid

introducing essential political reforms.111 This behaviour prevents the accumulation of

public finances from other sources leaving them vulnerable to fluctuations in global

commodity markets. Furthermore, the lack of oversight and taxation in other sectors

hinders the development of other robust sectors as well as creating the economic

conditions discussed earlier. In Ghana, for example, the country’s stability and sustained

economic growth has been put down to low levels of corruption and a stable political

system which has allowed the diversification of the oil revenue to focus on a move away

109 Kurecic, Petar, Milkovic, Marin, Kokotovic, Filip (2017) An introduction to Empiric Approach to the Resource Curse Phenomenon in Small Island Developing States 19th International Scientific Conference on Economic and Social Development p.363 110 Zallé, Oumarou (2019) Natural resources and economic growth in Africa: The role of institutional quality and human capital Resources Policy 62 pp. pp.616–624 p.616 111 Henri, Pr Atangana Ondoa (2019) Natural resources curse: A reality in Africa Resources Policy 63 p.3

40

from gold to other agricultural products creating other sectors and avoiding the risks of the

‘resource curse’.112

Corruption and rent seeking behaviours in high levels of government can increase the power

of elites and widen and strengthen inequalities in the country. This corruption creates a

vicious cycle whereby politically powerful groups are able to shift natural resource rents to a

less efficient, untaxable, informal sector. This will not only continue to siphon resources

away from public growth but also weaken attempts to create other sectors in the economy.

Inequalities created by corruption not only reduce infrastructure and inclusive economic

development for the majority of the population but create and worsen political

instabilities.113 The allocation of resource rents to elites and other politically powerful

groups to shore up a leader’s position in power will create a buffer of powerful people who

are benefitting from corruption and lack of transparency and so have no interest in changing

the system for the better. Growing inequalities will increase political instability but the cycle

of resource rents for powerful people often prevents any political change as promotion to a

position of power immediately disincentivises change. This cycle of political instability

without the hope of political change further impacts the economy as the instability deters

foreign investors that would otherwise contribute to the development of other economic

sectors.

112 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development (2018) 61:149–159 p.154 113 Henri, Pr Atangana Ondoa (2019) Natural resources curse: A reality in Africa Resources Policy 63(2019) p.3

41

The selling of valuable fishing rights to foreign trawlers brings large sums of money into the

coffers of the Ministry of Fisheries and the Treasury. As such this money is available to

corrupt elites to shore up their own support and other powerful groups. Consequently, in

the presence of weak institutions, this money feeds political instability in developing

countries. Rather than focus on developing an inclusive industrial sector for local

communities to fully exploit their waters and produce a taxable sector providing food

security and valuable commodity for export, officials are motivated to continue to sell

access to foreign trawlers for their own gain in complete contrast to the interests of coastal

communities and the wider public. The opaque nature of the negotiations and sums of

money changing hands leaves plenty of room for corruption, pushing investment out of the

sector, discouraging enforcement of fisheries laws and regulations and feeding the cycle of

corruption. I will examine this issue in more detail in my case study analysis.

Global Capitalism

In more recent years, scholars such as Adams et al,114 Kolk and Lenfant,115 Kopiński et al116

have explored the role of globalisation of markets in the ‘resource curse.’ They argue that

resources are “socially constructed and controlled by agents and actors in global oil

capitalism.” Zimmerman117 asserts that ‘resources are not, they become.’ Much previous

analysis of the ‘resource curse’ is criticised for ignoring the role of global capitalism and how

114Adams, D, Adams, K, Ullah, S, Ullah, F (2019) Globalisation, governance, accountability and the natural resource ‘curse’: implications for socio-economic growth of oil rich developing countries. Resource Politics 61, pp.128–140 115 Kolk, A, Lenfant, F (2010) MNC reporting on CSR and conflict in central Africa. Journal Business Ethics 93(N°2) pp241–255 116 Kopiński, D,Polus, A, Tycholiz, W (2013) Resource curse or resource disease? Oil in Ghana African Affairs 112(N°449) pp583–601 117 Zimmerman 1957 cited in Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development no 61 pp.149–159 p.152

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resources are socially constructed. “The resources are ‘cursed’ by the emphasis placed on

them by powerful actors and transnational corporations, especially in the global

accumulation of energy and resource wealth.” Capital investment in resources, particularly

in oil exploration, by powerful economic actors (Multinational Corporations MNCs) gives

them a large degree of control over the wealth of developing countries.118 In essence, the

power of global capitalism means many MNCs are now wealthier and stronger than many

developing nations. This creates an unequal power structure for governments trying to

control access and revenues from valuable natural resources which they are dependent on

MNCs to extract. MNCs driven by profit often implement various strategies such as

legitimisation, transfer pricing and tax avoidance to deprive countries from benefiting fully

from their legitimate, legal share of their natural resource endowments.119 Stronger

economies such as the US, UK, and Norway are able to enforce more stringent tax regimes

on oil companies and so avoid this dynamic but the developing world rich in natural

resources find themselves at the mercy of MNCs.

Additionally, multinational firms lack corporate social responsibility commitments including

sustainably responsible exploitation of resources to support environmental preservation

and sustainable growth and development. Oil companies have been criticised for their lack

of corporate social responsibility in Africa and not addressing the root causes of

development. Arguably, the economic responsibilities of multinational companies in Africa

should be at the core of their corporate social responsibility priorities, followed by

118 Zimmerman 1957 cited in Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development no.61: pp.149–159 p.152 119 Henri, Pr Atangana Ondoa (2019) Natural resources curse: A reality in Africa Resources Policy 63. p.2

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philanthropic, legal and ethical responsibilities.120 However, this is often not the case and

companies do not implement sufficient measures to protect the environment and shore up

economic opportunities, such as job creation, for local communities. Furthermore, Bernard

highlights the role of the “enclave model” of resource development where operations rely

on private investments from foreign firms. In turn, these foreign firms rely on foreign

expertise, foreign materials and labour often because of the highly skilled nature of many of

the roles or quality of equipment required for resource extraction. The enclave model

evokes strong resistance from resource communities, who see foreign workers coming to

their communities to benefit while they often continue to suffer high levels of

unemployment.121

The final important structure in global capitalism that impacts the ‘resource curse’ is the

role of other oil producing countries. Lawrence Freedman, as far ago as 1978 explained how

oil is to be considered a particularly precious resource because of the existence of the

powerful OPEC cartel. The cartel is able to set the price far higher than that justified by

production costs or available supplies.122 In addition, OPEC is able to influence the market

and so the fluctuations of the international market for oil and gas which also impacts

developing countries with dependence on relatively new resource extraction. While the

richer OPEC countries can easily weather the shock of low commodity prices, some

developing, particularly African countries relying on the promise of high market prices can

suffer considerable economic loss from low prices. The impact of these losses will also have

120 Henri, Pr Atangana Ondoa (2019) Natural resources curse: A reality in Africa Resources Policy 63, p.3 121 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development, no.61 pp.149–159 p.153 122 Freedman, Lawrence (1978) British Oil: The Myth of Independence The World Today, Vol. 34, No.8, Aug, pp. 287-295 p.1

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a political and security implication for countries with weak institutions and political

economies dependent on providing for elites and powerful citizens.

Just as the global political economy for oil shapes the ‘resource curse,’ so the global political

economy of fish shapes its role as a cursed resource. The UN Convention of the Laws of the

Sea (UNCLOS) was developed to give states control of their maritime resources and prevent

a repeat of such disagreements as the Cod Wars. UNCLOS bares the mark of the superior

negotiating stance of the traditional maritime powers and stronger economies. The most

relevant section is Article 62.6 which states:

“Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it

shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions,

laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of

the allowable catch.”

This global agreement requires developing countries without industrial fishing sectors to

allow foreign trawlers to fish their waters. In doing so, this leaves them open not only to

some of the institution weakening, rent seeking behaviours discussed above but also to the

power and volatility of international markets similar to dynamics on other commodities.

Faced with stronger countries and fishing corporations developing countries are not in a

good position to negotiate for the full value of the access they are selling and so do not fully

benefit from the value of this resource. Further, unable to fish their waters themselves,

they fall victim to international market volatility when importing fish to provide food

security for their own populations. Essentially having their own fish taken from them for

less than its value and sold back at higher prices. This cycle means this essential resource

45

for food security and economic development instead of contributing to development in the

country, instead costs the economy more and threatens food security. For example, Ghana

are currently importing USD5 million in fish a year to feed their own people, fish once

supplied by their own waters.

Resources causing conflict

The literature on resource in conflict will be key to my analysis as I examine the role

fisheries management could have on future conflict. This next section outlines the main

arguments in this literature and I will return to it with specific reference to fisheries in the

Gulf of Guinea in the fifth chapter. In his 2015 paper, Michael Ross wrote “There is now

robust evidence that one type of mineral wealth, petroleum, has at least three harmful

effects. It tends to make authoritarian regimes more durable, to increase certain types of

corruption, and to help trigger violent conflict in low- and middle-income countries.”123

Colllier and Hoffler argue that rents and shocks caused by primary commodity dependence

can lead to multiple routes that risk conflict.124 They argue the type of resource is

unimportant, it is the valuable nature of the resource that is important. They cite

Humphry’s analysis of Chad which illustrates how even the prospect of oil can act as an

incentive for conflict.

123 Ross, Michael (2015) What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? The Annual Review of Political Science no.18 pp.239–59 p.236 124 Collier, Paul and Hoffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August pp.625-633 p.627

46

Andrew Rosser writes about the role of natural resources and the onset and duration of civil

war. He identifies two main perspectives:125 behaviourism which asserts that rebel groups

are motivated by grievances stemming from inequalities, limited political rights and ethnic

or religious divisions; on the other hand, the rational actor perspective which emphasises

the economic incentives and opportunities facing rebel groups, this camp assumes

rebellions are based on greed.126 He advocates a third dependency perspective that

identifies foreign intervention as a causal mechanism for civil war. Resource wealth

increases the probability of a foreign intervention to support a rebel movement or enable

rebels to sell future exploitation rights to minerals they hope to capture (booty futures).

Rosser argues civil wars are usually a combination of foreign intervention or booty futures

combined with state weakness, disaffected military and separatist mechanisms to account

for civil war.127

The majority of literature falls into one of these two camps. Collier, Hoffler,128 Weinstein129

and Owusu argue that conflict is driven by the greed inherent in human nature and

encouraged by the ability to benefit from resource rents.130 They argue the looting of

resource rents and corrupt leaders give rise to rebellions as different factions fight to

control revenue and often replace each other. Mahler makes the case that violence is often

stoked by politicians invested in corrupt practises as violence makes looting and rent

125Rosser, Andrew (2006) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey Institute of

Development Studies http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/WP268.pdf p.7 126 ibid p.17 127 ibid p. 20 128 Collier, Paul and Hoffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August, pp.625-633 p.626 129 Weinstein J (2007) Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 130 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development no.61, pp.149–159 p.150

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seeking easier and ensures weak institutions.131 Weinstein argues that even when

rebellions start because of ideas, they soon become swamped by opportunists when there

is the opportunity for resource rents.132 Pius, Dietz, and Engles,133 on the other hand, argue

inequality and the relative difference between the value of public assets and income in

society attracts looting or rent seeking which in turn lowers growth. In low income,

resource rich countries looting behaviour can lead to competition and violence.134 Further,

patronage systems and the reduction of growth in taxable sectors reduces transparency and

checks and balances which increase looting and therefore inequality leading to conflict

under the grievance model. Neglect, either perceived or real is demonstrated to be capable

of galvanising people into disturbance or violent conflict where sections of the population

feel marginalised, feel the loss of their livelihoods and general situation worsening

particularly when this is in contrast to elites whose wealth is growing.135 Owusu argues it is

the inequalities between those with political power to control resource rents and the public

they are supposed to represent that drive resource conflict.

Tornell and Lane find an economic explanation for the role of resources in conflict arguing

that civil war occurs in resource abundant countries through a process they label the

voracity effect.136 In their 1999 paper, they argue the characteristics of developing countries

131 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22 pp.153-213 p.167 132 Collier, Paul and Hoffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August pp.625-633 p.626 133 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development, no.61, pp.149–159 p.150 134 Siakwah, Pius (2018) Actors, networks, and globalised assemblages: Rethinking oil, the environment and Conflict in Ghana Energy Research and Social Care 38 pp.68-76 p.73 135 Siakwah, Pius (2018) Actors, networks, and globalised assemblages: Rethinking oil, the environment and Conflict in Ghana Energy Research and Social Care 38 pp.68-76 p.73 136 Tornell A, Lane P (1999) The Voracity Effect. American Economic Review 89(1): p.22-46

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showing slow growth are the absence of strong legal and political institutions and the

presence of powerful groups in society.137 In an economy there is a taxed, formal economic

sector that contributes to the community and an untaxed, informal or black economy

including rents and bribes which enable personal wealth accrual. He argues that an increase

in revenues in the formal sector caused by a resource boom will raise revenues, but will also

trigger a voracity effect in the informal sector where groups compete for a larger share.

They argue that the impact of the boom is dominated by the voracity effect and so the

growth rate actually declines in the formal sector. The voracity effect is especially relevant

for the transition from autocracy to democracy because democratisation may intensify this

effect and limit growth.138 When powerful groups compete for a greater share of resource

rents it can lead to violent conflict. I will refer back to these arguments when I look to

analyse the impact of fisheries management on conflict potential in West and Central Africa

in Chapter five.

Too reductionist

Andrew Rosser in 2006 argued researchers have looked too simplistically at resource

abundance, that they have developed a consensus that natural resource abundance is the

cause for poor economic growth and have not taken into consideration the range of

variables, historical and other factors that mediate the relationship between natural

resources and development outcomes. He argued scholars should have been asking what

political and social factors enable some resource-abundant countries to utilise their

137 Tornell, A. and P.R. Lane (1999) The voracity effect, American Economic Review, pp.22–46. p.22 138 ibid p.42

49

resource for development and prevents other countries from doing the same,139 instead of

just accepting there is a curse and looking to explain it. Ayelazuno,140 Obi, Watts141 and

Owusu142 agree adding the ‘resource curse’ theory is too simplistic, reductionist and above

all ahistorical, especially with reference to colonialism and capitalism’s twinned histories.143

These observations are extremely valid especially when examining the way in which

valuable natural resources are managed in countries whose institutions, politics and

economies have been shaped by colonial legacies. In chapter Two, I will review some of the

literature which attempts to understand colonial legacies and lack of development in Africa.

As pointed out by these academics, merely studying the role of a resource on economic

development, political structures and conflict potentials cannot be done without

understanding the wider political, historical and socioeconomic factors at play. In the final

section of this chapter, however, I will first review some of the literature scholars have

developed exploring the role of resource scarcity in causing conflict. Understanding both

sides of the resource conflict paradox will be essential to analysing the role of fisheries

management in West and Central Africa.

139 Rosser, Andrew (2006) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey Institute of Development Studies http://www.ids.ac.uk/files/WP268.pdf p.7 140 Ayelazuno, Jasper (2014) Oil wealth and the well-being of the subaltern classes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A critical analysis of the resource curse in Ghana. Resources Policy no.40: pp.66–73 141 Watts, Michael (2004) Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Geopolitics 9(1) pp.50–80 142 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development, no. 61 pp.149–159 143 ibid p.153

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Scarcity Conflict

In recent years, policy officials and scholars have started to draw attention to the increasing

security risks of environmental degradation and climate change. They are pushing an

“environment-security nexus” to draw attention to the perceived scarcity risks presented by

environmental degradation exacerbated by the climate crisis. As Mehtaa et al. point out, in

many ways this nexus can be seen as a reframing of the environmental security debates of

the early 1990s through a climate change lens.144 In this resource conflict literature,

scholars explored the role of the scarcity of essential natural resources in causing violent

conflict. They focused on arable land, forests and water and looked for connections

between degrading resources and incidents of violence conflict. Through the 1990s,

environmental security research was preoccupied with the question of whether scarcity or

abundance of natural resources predicts risk of violent conflict in the context of ‘weak’

states.145 The main contributions to the environmental security literature in the 1990s came

from scholars including Thomas Homer-Dixon,146 Ken Conka,147 and Simon Dalby.148 They

argued that although scarcity of renewable resources rarely causes interstate wars, it is

often the cause of intrastate civil conflict.149 The way we think about fish is changing as a

result of damage to the marine environment, overfishing disrupting the food web and

climate change causing ocean warming and acidification which is upsetting spawning. These

dramatic man-made impacts on fish are an environment security issue. Consequently, this

144 Mehtaa, Lyla, Huffa, Amber, Allouch, Jeremy (2019) The new politics and geographies of scarcity Geoforum 101 pp.222–230 p.227 145 ibid p.228 146 Homer-Dixon, Thomas, (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press 147 Conka, Ken (2002) Environmental Peacemaking Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press Centre 148 Dalby, Simon (2002) Environmental Security University of Minnesota Press 149 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press p.74

51

literature is really important in an analysis of fisheries management on the future of this

resource and the impacts this could have on poor communities. As fish stocks are declining,

we are already seeing an increase of conflict between fishermen and this will likely worsen

as damage to the stocks and marine environment continues.

Environmental Security

Thomas Homer-Dixon conducted detailed case study analysis on the role of resource

scarcity in contributing to violent conflict. His analysis concluded that environmental

scarcity serves as an indirect cause of violence which exacerbates internal conflict. He

describes three kinds of violent conflict that arise from competition for resources: intrastate

scarcity conflicts, internal group-identity conflicts, and insurgencies.150 He argued that the

second two are most likely caused by scarcity of those resources we rely on to be renewable

such as water, arable land and fish. He illustrated how scarcity reduces or constrains

economic productivity usually worst affecting those people already economically and

ecologically marginalised. Scarcity causes expulsion from land or encourages migration to

urban centres refocusing populations along group identities, encouraging greater

segmentation and deeper rivalries along ethnic lines which in turn increases opportunities

for rebels and insurgents to challenge state authority.151 He argues urban growth caused by

lack of resources in agricultural areas in itself causes increased violence due to the lack of

economic opportunities and close living quarters which encourage communal, ethnic,

political and criminal violence.152 Resource scarcity and reduced economic opportunities

150 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press p.143 151 ibid p.133 152 ibid p.155

52

both encourage criminality which reduces stability. Homer-Dixon argues that poverty and

scarcity alone do not cause conflict, whether this occurs is dependent on contextual factors,

people are more likely to become violent depending, in part, on their notion of economic

justice or the level of “relative depravation” they suffer.153 He continues to argue that state

weakness increases the likelihood of depravation conflicts.

The majority of scholars at this time (including Hauge & Ellingsen,154 and Diehl155) seemed to

agree with Thomas Homer-Dixon that scarcity is more likely to cause internal conflict156 and

although this is less conspicuous than intrastate war, it does have serious ramifications for

international security, particularly as states under high stress tend to fragment and

peripheral regions can be seized by warlords and criminal kingpins. This kind of internal

conflict causes complex humanitarian emergencies embroiling outside parties in

peacekeeping activities. For example, in Somalia in 2008, intrastate conflict and a security

vacuum filled by criminal kingpins led to a massive disruption to global trade as pirates

attacked merchant vessels transiting the Gulf of Aden. Many Somali officials and some

scholars such as Samatar, Lindber & Basil argue fishermen turned to piracy in response to

foreign trawlers desecrating their fishing grounds.157 Furthermore, fragmented states can

become more extremist, authoritarian and militarized often introducing policies abusive to

153 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press p.76 154 Hauge, Wenche & Ellingsen, Tanja (1998) Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May, pp. 299-317 155 Diehl, Paul (1998) Environmental Conflict: An Introduction Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May, pp.275-277 156 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press p.167 157 Samatar, Abdi, Lindber, Mark and Mahayni, Basil (2010) The Dialectics of Piracy in Somalia: the rich versus the poor Third World Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 8 p.1385

53

human rights and adopting more belligerent foreign policies as they attempt to distract local

populations from internal grievances.158

Taking this debate further, Ken Conka argued ecological degradation has exacerbated

localised conflicts along existing social cleavages contributing to the causes or prolonging

conflict. 159 He developed the concept of “ecological security,” essentially arguing that

environmental protection, inclusivity and cooperation will facilitate peace and stability and

avoid the risks of scarcity conflict. He developed a framework to prevent conflict, arguing

that ecological, environmental interdependence on a regional or even global scale has

exacerbated conflict. Efforts to preserve and fairly distribute renewable resources will

prevent the security implications of scarcity.160 Using water in Botswana as a case study, he

argued that whoever controls the water controls the power, but if the responsibility for

preservation is shared then there is less competition for this power and therefore less

likelihood scarcity will lead to conflict. He goes on to apply this to the search for cleaner

energy sources, arguing the conflict prevention benefits of cooperation and conscious

change from existing systems of competition and degradation to a new system of

international cooperative ecological security.161

Paul Diehl makes the case for democratic peace theory in environmental security. He points

out how there is much more analysis of the causes of war than the maintenance of stability

158 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press p.167 159 Conka, Ken (2002) Environmental Peacemaking Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press Centre p.5 160 ibid p.13 161 ibid p.144

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and peace. In the same way, he argues, scholars have examined the role of scarcity and

environmental degradation on causing violent conflict rather than the role of societies in

protecting environmental resources. His work builds on democratic peace theory and work

by Midlarsky arguing that democracies are more successful in protecting the environment

than autocratic systems of governance as people have more of a direct stake.

Consequently, he argues, democracies are better at avoiding “the violence-generating

conditions from environmental degradation.”162 This resonates with work by Elinor Ostrom

where she demonstrates community successes in the sustainable management of common

access renewable environmental resources without conflict.163

Ken Conka’s and Paul Diehl’s work is especially relevant to fisheries management.

Sustainable co-management systems that protect the marine environment, preserve fish

stocks and enable inclusive economic development through the domestic fishing industry

will be good for local communities and security. However, different power dynamics and

poor management can lead to fisheries collapse with very difficult consequences for coastal

communities. Reducing global fish stocks are already seeing a rise in maritime criminality

and conflict both between fishers but also between nations over access to fish stocks and

waters. Fish are an open access renewable resource essential for poor coastal communities.

The current management of this resource is not reflecting the rights and needs of the

people. Consequently, a democratic government should be working to protect this resource

162 Diehl, Paul (1998) Environmental Conflict: An Introduction Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, Special Issue on Environmental Conflict, May, pp. 275-277 p.276 163 Ostrom, Elinor (1999) Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges Science Vol 284, April.

p.278

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and the rights of their coastal populations to nutritious food and economic livelihoods.

Failure in this area will, arguably, be a failure of state responsibility to protect its people and

could lead to an increase in criminality, conflict, starvation and economic desolation.

Sustainable management and ecological security of fisheries will be incredibly important if

these threats are to be avoided.

Scarcity in the twenty-first Century

Since the turn of the century scholars have built on this literature examining some of the

divisions and grievances highlighted in the environmental security work. The debate has

moved on to analyse issues that emerged from further research including a deeper analysis

of ethnic conflict, globalisation, agency and resource ownership. This literature examines

the nexus between resource scarcity and conflict more deeply by expanding these

connected issues and so will be essential for me to understand how great the potential

could be for scarcity conflict caused by mismanagement of fish in West and Central Africa.

The Role of Ethnic Divisions in Conflict

Cigdem Sirin recognised that the link between environmental scarcity and conflict is mostly

indirect and more complex than debates in the 1990s theorised. Many scholars including

De Soysa,164 Hague & Ellingsen,165 Rabushka and Shepsle166 agreed with Homer-Dixon’s

164 Indra de Soysa (2002) Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989–99, Journal of Peace Research 39/4 pp.395–416 165 Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen (1998) Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict, Journal of Peace Research 35/3 pp.299–317 166 Alvin Rabushka & Kenneth A. Shepsle (1972) Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company

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observations that resource scarcity worsens divisions along ethnic lines. They all take this

further by analysing the systemic interactions between environmental scarcity and ethnic

group dynamics on the likelihood of civil conflict. Sirin and Roeder167 argued that

environmental scarcity could lead to inter-group conflict as the result of ethnic population

shares. He hypothesised that the population dynamics are more likely to lead to conflict

when the size of the largest minority group is large enough to have parity with the majority

group.168 Conflict is caused, he argued, when a majority population group sought to

confiscate the minority group’s resource share, or when a minority group sought to

challenge the dominant group in accessing resources. Martin gives the example of an

Ethiopian refugee camp where resource induced insecurities contributed to the perceived

ethnic differences and inequalities and increased the likelihood of civil conflict.169 These

analyses of the effect of ethnic group dynamics on scarcity conflict build on earlier writings

on the ethnic security dilemma theory that gained popularity after the fall of the Soviet

Union. 170 This previous theory proposed that groups are more likely to act up when they

are uncertain about their socio-economic and political position and prospects for the

future.171 Introducing the resource scarcity angle to the analysis of ethnic conflict has not

produced a one-size-fits-all theory on conflict causes and prevention, but rather has

highlighted some of the ways in which divisions have led to conflict. Some scholars such as

Lyal Sunga have criticised this literature for only taking account of ethnic groups. He argues

167 Roeder, Phillip, & Rothchild, Donald (2000) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 168 Sirin, Cigdem (2011) Scarcity-Induced Domestic Conflict: Examining the Interactive Effects of Environmental Scarcity and ‘Ethnic’ Population Pressures Civil Wars, Vol.13, No.2 June, pp.122–140 p.123 169 ibid p124 170 Tang, Shiping (2010) The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Towards a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict Review of International Studies (2011), 37, 511–536 p. 512 171 Sirin, Cigdem (2011) Scarcity-Induced Domestic Conflict: Examining the Interactive Effects of Environmental Scarcity and ‘Ethnic’ Population Pressures Civil Wars, Vol.13, No.2 June, pp.122–140 p.125

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the harmful effects of environmental degradation and scarcity are much wider than

ethnicity impacting the “human rights, democratic participation and human security…with

regard to marginalised populations such as women, children, the elderly, persons with

disabilities, disadvantaged ethnic minorities, the poor and migrants.”172 Marginalisation and

population dynamics are key themes in more recent literature on scarcity conflict both at a

local and global scale.

The states in West and Central Africa are characterised by their diverse ethnic populations

living together in close proximity. Coastal communities dependent on fisheries are often

from different ethnic groups than those that live further inland, or different fishing

communities can sometimes be from a different group from another fishing community

further down the coast. These groups are often across boarders too, stoking tensions

between states. Much of the civil conflict that has been seen in Africa since independence

has been driven by competition and divisions between different ethnic groups.

Furthermore, marginalised communities in Africa often suffer the most from food shortages

and economic decline. Increased urbanisation in an attempt to find work when traditional

sources decline can put these populations at greater risk and put pressures on the ethnic

divisions as competition for resource and closer proximity can stoke tensions. In recent

years human trafficking from Africa to Europe has dramatically increased as criminality and

trafficking worsen conditions and threaten local communities. Consequently, this literature

is really important when considering the importance of sustainable fisheries management

and the impact poor management could have on conflict and security in the region.

172 Sunga, Lyal (2014) Does Climate Change Worsen Resource Scarcity and Cause Violent Ethnic Conflict? International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 21, pp.1-24 p.23

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Globalisation and Capitalism

Scholars such as Dobrowski & Walliman173 Slocum & Saldanha,174 and Sunga,175 analyse the

wider structural injustices and the role of agency, or lack of, in environmental recourses

with relation to violence conflict. Michael Dobrowski and Isidor Walliman argue

globalisation has led to an increase in violent conflict caused by resource scarcity. They

argue globalisation and increased demand for goods in stronger economies has driven a

change in land use and economic activities in developing countries away from traditional

crops or subsistence farming to production of crops and goods for export. They argue these

policies have reduced the availability of essential resources and led to increased

urbanisation with the associated increased potential for violence along ethnic, political or

criminal lines.176 This research supports the arguments made on the role of government

policies that marginalise groups in society, particularly poor groups, trapping communities in

poverty, increasing inequalities and divisions that can lead to violent conflict.

International fisheries are global in nature and require states without a developed industrial

fishing industry to allow foreign trawlers access to their waters. Consequently, fisheries in

West and Central Africa are driven by the dynamics of global capitalism. Where the drive

for cheap fish and fish products in stronger economies is driving foreign industrial fishing

techniques aimed to maximise catch. Industrial fishing trawlers can cause massive

173 Dobkowski, Michael & Walliman, Isidor (1998) The Coming Age of Scarcity Syracuse: New York 174 Slocum, Rachel & Saldanha, Arun (2016) Geographies of Race and Food: Fields, Bodies, Markets New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 175 Sunga, Lyal (2014) Does Climate Change Worsen Resource Scarcity and Cause Violent Ethnic Conflict? International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 21, pp.1-24 176 Dobkowski, Michale and Walliman, Isidor (2002) On the Edge of Scarcity: Environment, Resources, Population, Sustainability and Conflict p.19

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environmental degradation from unsustainable fishing techniques designed to catch

thousands of tonnes of fish; these techniques are often illegal because of the damage they

cause. However, as prices on international markets drop, fishermen come under greater

pressure to maximise their catch and often the easiest way to do this is through adopting

illegal and unsustainable methods. Overfishing and environmental damage are causing

global fish stocks into decline. As stocks reduce competition to catch enough fish to turn a

profit grows which in turn increases the use of unsustainable techniques and puts even

more pressure on global fish stocks. This vicious circle created by global capitalism has huge

impacts for the poor coastal artisanal fishers in West and Central Africa. They are seeing

their stock dramatically decline as the result of the actions and activities outside of their

control and driven by a system that benefits industrial economies at their expense. The

impacts of this dynamic on fish stocks in West and Central Africa puts poor populations at

risk of increased criminality, worsening food security and economic devastation and so is

really important to factor into an analysis of the potential for scarcity conflict from fisheries

management.

Resource Ownership and Food Sovereignty

“The differential allocation of food is the gross injustice of European hegemony.” Write

Rachel Slocum and Arun Saldanha in the introduction to their 2016 book exploring the racial

biopolitics of food.177 They argue the globalised capitalist food market structure continues

to serve the markets of the west at the expense of the rest. This economic model has its

177 Slocum, Rachel & Saldanha, Arun (2016) Geographies of Race and Food: Fields, Bodies, Markets New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group

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roots in economic colonialism where the colonies were exploited to serve production at the

centre. It still permeates global food markets today. They argue, colonialist and racist

mentalities still characterise contemporary efforts to secure food resources both through

the structure of globalised markets and through neo-colonial policies of development. The

injustices of this system, can be seen as leading to scarcity induced conflict.178 Bina

Agarwal179 builds on this analysis arguing that the massive food price spike in 2008 and

market volatility is a major global concern. She points out that food deficit countries are

dependent on a few producing countries, trade cannot be eliminated180 and climate change

and population growth will worsen this dynamic. High food prices on international markets

incentivise production for export over production for internal needs, often marginalising

poor communities and worsening malnutrition. Tania Li argued the emergence of capitalist

relations poses the most significant challenge because it shifted market relations from

choice to requirement, especially for the poorest people.181

Food security discourses became increasingly embedded in developmentalist discourses of

the 1980s and 1990s, linked to the environmental security mindset of scarcity induced

conflict. In international development, food access was defined as market access and

integration into the global food system. In contrast, food sovereignty came out of anti-

globalisation discourse at the grassroots level in community food security movements, in

178 Slocum, Rachel & Saldanha, Arun (2016) Geographies of Race and Food: Fields, Bodies, Markets (2016) New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 179 Agarwal, Bina (2014) Food Sovereignty, food security and democratic choice: critical contradictions and difficult conciliations Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no.6 pp.1247-1268 180 ibid p. 1250 181 Li, Tania Murray (2015) Food Sovereignty: A Critical Dialogue Can there be food sovereignty here? Journal of Peasant Studies 42, no.1: pp205-211. P.209

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indigenous peoples’ movements for self-determination, and in most FAO international food

policy publications.182 Lucy Jarosz explained the power of this discourse in conflict

prevention as “reframing food security as food sovereignty has the powerful effect of linking

food access to autonomy and the transformation or recuperation of food systems that

nourish people in multidimensional ways and are deeply anchored in ideas of justice, ethics,

responsibility and caring for oneself, others and nature.”183 The Via Campesina movement

in South America started in 1996 and drove forward the concept of food sovereignty as “the

right of people to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through sustainable

methods and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems.”184 The

movement recognised the violence and marginalisation that global capitalism and export

policies had on peoples’ lives, how it impacted scarcity conflict and sought change.

This literature furthered the structural analysis of the environmental security debates

focusing on the role of international politics, global trade, capitalism and markets in shaping

inequalities and injustices within domestic politics and communities. Understanding the

broader context of causes of scarcity is essential in understanding how scarcity of natural

resources can lead to violent conflict. This is especially important with fisheries. Fish play

an important cultural role in diets across the world and this is shaping scarcity. For example,

in China and across Asia shark fins are sought after by elites and for traditional medicine.

This is causing sharks to be targeted across the world particularly in African fisheries where

182 Jarosz, Lucy (2014) Comparing Food Security and Food Sovereignty Discourses Dialogues in Human Geography 4, no.2, July1, pp.168-181 p.179 183 Ibid. p.179 184 Galli, Anya (2015) Security or Sovereignty? Institutional and Critical Approaches to the Global Food Crisis MIT Press. P.143

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enforcement of fisheries standards and illegal activity is poor. Sharks as alpha-predators

who take a number of years to reach sexual maturity are essential to the maintenance of a

healthy marine food web and so environment. The long development time for sharks

means a sustainable catch limit is far lower than for more quickly developing species.

Consequently, appetite for this luxury item threatens shark populations in Africa and in so

doing all the fish in the food web because without sharks, smaller species will grow out of

control unequally impacting other species and halting species growth. The same can be said

for shrimp fisheries. Marine scientists highlight shrimp fisheries, which include small mesh

bottom trawling, as the least sustainable fishing practice which causes the most

environmental damage. Yet once again, shrimp are a species prized in the West and Asia

leading to an increase in shrimp trawling with devastating consequences. The unique

vulnerability of the marine environment coupled with the international nature of fisheries

and structures of global markets particularly threaten poor communities in the developing

world. Furthermore, benefitting from cheap market supply and luxury goods disincentivises

stronger economies from working together to effectively protect global fish stocks by

preventing these damaging practises. The structure of the global capitalist market that

came from colonial legacies and is shaped by neo-colonial dynamics means it remains in the

immediate interests of the powerful to turn a blind eye to the approaching catastrophe.

New Discourses of Scarcity

In more recent years the literature examining the role of scarcity of valuable resource in

causing conflict is going through a further change of discourse. Lyla Mehtaa, Amber Huffa,

and Jeremy Allouchea in their 2019 paper argue it is not enough to examine the role of

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scarcity in causing violent conflict as if the scarcity were a “zero-sum game of ‘all against all.’

They challenge anti-capitalist notions which reduce human nature to limitless and insatiable

desires, and neo-Malthusian notions of a world of inherent limits, to space, labour, food and

energy resources.185 They argue that within this narrative, scarcity is seen as absolute and

neglects the socio-political dimensions of scarcity that allow for the existence of persistent

hunger in certain places even though there is enough water and food to go around. They

argue these views ignore injustice and enable structures that allow some rich farmers to

grow bumper crops during droughts whilst poor families lack basic drinking water. They

argue that scarcity is used to justify certain interventions, such as controversial large dams,

despite high social and environmental costs for certain marginalised groups because they

benefit more powerful actors. They argue scarcity can sometimes be ‘manufactured’ to

meet political ends or created through institutional and social means. These socio-political

dimensions of scarcity thus allow powerful actors to impose their interests which lead to the

exclusion and marginalisation of others.186 They argue that as concerns over climate change

and population growth drive a growing fear of scarcity, this change in discourse will be

essential if truly effective and fair policies are to be introduced to harness and sustain

resources for the many rather than preserve them for the powerful at the expense of the

many. The current dynamics of scarcity as a discourse lead to the conditions that fuel

hunger, poverty, criminality, divisions and conflict.187

185 Mehtaa, Lyla, Huffa, Amber and Allouchea, Jeremy (2019) The new politics and geographies of scarcity in Geoform 101, pp.222-230 p.222 186 ibid p.224 187 Ibid. p.227

64

All of this literature is relevant for an analysis of the impact of fisheries management on

future conflict as it would help to identify the conditions that could lead to an increased

likelihood of conflict if mismanagement leads to fish becoming more scarce. I find the

arguments about ownership, community management, democracy and food sovereignty to

be most pertinent. Fish, as discussed in the introduction, are understood to be a common

access open resource and as such should provide a resource to communities to tap into for

food and livelihoods. However, as I have argued, this understanding of fish as a resource is

changing, and their role in developing economies is shaped by the same challenges as other

valuable resources. This is driven both by international politics, globalisation and the

structure of capitalist international markets, but also by internal institutions and policies.

Consequently, both access to this resource, ownership of its value and essential protein and

its maintenance and protection is often taken out of the hands of coastal communities.

Environmental degradation and overfishing will likely lead to scarcity or stock collapse and

so the literature on scarcity conflict will be important to better understand the complex

network that drives fisheries management in West and Central Africa and assess the

potential for conflict in future.

Essentially, the responsibility to step up, prevent illegal practises and ensure the protection

of the marine environment is a global responsibility. Failure to take action will impact the

lives of the weakest and poorest communities far more than the economically strong and

consequently, as highlighted by Mehtaa, Huffa, & Allouchea, it is not enough to talk about

the impact of fish scarcity when it can be avoided. The global political will to take action is

not incentivised by a system built on exploitation and benefitting the more powerful

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players. The global political economy of fisheries is complex and shaped by colonial

legacies, particularly in West and Central Africa. In order to really understand the

complexities of this system and the impact on fisheries I will need to understand some of

the main arguments scholars have made about the history and structure of global

capitalism, colonial legacies, neo-colonial dynamics and underdevelopment theory. In the

next chapter, I will review some of the key literature on underdevelopment in Africa and the

main arguments around some of these other relevant issues to build a picture of the

historical pathways that have contributed to the structure and system of fisheries

management today. Understanding the past will also help to understand better how change

could be driven in the future.

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Chapter Two: Historical Pathways to Underdevelopment in Africa

In my first chapter I have tried to introduce my argument that fish are a paradoxical

resource and that their value is both driving their management and risking scarcity conflict.

Fisheries management in West and Central Africa cannot be understood through this

literature alone. This is a complex region that has been shaped by its past. Fisheries

management is also characterised by historical colonial legacies, neo-colonial relationships

and the global capitalist political economy. The international political economy of fisheries

is complex, historical and intertwined with many of the drivers of economic development,

political systems and culture in Africa. The literature on resource conflict highlights how the

conditions that lead to poor resource management and its negative impact tend to be more

apparent in developing countries. Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe are among the

poorest countries in the world, ranking 181st and 143rd respectively, out of 189 countries in

the UN Human Development Index 2019.188 Many more recent scholars of resource conflict

have criticised earlier work for being too reductionist and not fully taking into consideration

wider historical considerations that have shaped development in general in these countries

and consequently their institutions, economies and societies. So, before I can turn to an

analysis of fisheries in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe, I need first to review some of

the broader literature on development in Africa. This will help to explain the impact of

historical pathways, colonial legacies, violence and policies that have influenced the

structures and systems of governance that exist today. It will also provide a better

understanding of the role and influence of relationships with ex-colonial powers or stronger

industrial economies on domestic policies. Further foreign peacekeeping interventions,

188 Human Development Index 2019, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking

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development aid and neo-colonial pressures have and continue to influence and drive policy

and development today so understanding the roots and theory around these relationships

will help to better understand the wider context of resource management. This next section

is a brief trip through some of the key literature on history and underdevelopment in Africa

published over the last sixty years to provide this broader understanding of how thinking on

development has evolved and how these historical legacies have shaped the fishing sector

in West and Central Africa today.

There has been extensive research into the relative levels of underdevelopment in Africa,

which solidified into a distinct field of study from the 1950s to 1980s during and in the years

after independence from colonial rule.189 Scholars have written extensively on how

historical colonial legacies, neo-colonial relationships and global capitalism have shaped

economic underdevelopment, weak institutions, corrupt governance and fuelled civil war.

Much of the initial writing was ideological, supporting independence struggles and backlash

against colonialism. Scholars and activists such as Frantz Fanon and Walter Rodney wrote

extensively on colonial exploitation, highlighting the violence and injustice of colonialism.

Many Marxist scholars supported Pan-African movements for unity across the continent,

rejecting exploitative capitalist systems and calling for new economic models.190 During the

1990s scholarly interest in African development waned as the end of the Cold War brought

new challenges for Africa and international relations. In more recent years India and Asia

have overcome their colonial pasts and reached much higher levels of economic growth

than much of Africa, calling into question theories that blame colonial legacies for stunting

189 Akyeampong, Emmanuel, Bates, Robert, Nunn, Nathan & Robinson, James (2016) Africa’s Development in Historical Perspective Cambridge University Press 190 Rodney, Walter (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press p.89

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economic development.191 More recent literature addresses some of the challenges facing

African development such as the recourse curse, development aid, international markets,

continued neo-colonial global structures, much of which was covered in the previous

chapter. Historical path dependencies do have an important role in shaping systems and

societies, so the earlier literature on this wider question of underdevelopment in Africa

remains relevant to an analysis of fisheries management. This next section briefly reviews

some of the earlier literature on African underdevelopment, historical and colonial legacies

drawing out some important themes for my analysis.

Historical Analysis and the Slave Trade

Most scholars of African development agree the Atlantic slave trade was instrumental in

shaping African society today. Many scholars including Robert Bates192 and Basil

Davidson,193 argue African development was headed in a very different trajectory before

European colonisers and settlers came to the continent in the fifteenth century. They argue

that prior to the fifteenth century, few Europeans had been successful in visiting Africa due

to difficult topography and strong local communities. Historically, they suggest, the

topography and climate shaped African societies by determining whether communities were

nomadic or agricultural in nature.194 Walter Rodney, later revered for his historical accuracy

and progression of the Pan-African movement,195 argued that nomadic practises created a

communal society enabling Africans to avoid the transformation to feudalism that had

191 Akyeampong, Emmanuel, Bates, Robert, Nunn, Nathan & Robinson, James (2016) Africa’s Development in Historical Perspective Cambridge University Press p.1 192 Bates, Robert (1983) Essays on the political economy of rural Africa Cambridge University Press 193 Davidson, Basil (1964) Which Way Africa? Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History 194 Bates, Robert (1983) Essays on the political economy of rural Africa Cambridge University Press p.20 195 Hill, Robert (2015) Walter Rodney and The Restatement of Pan Africanism In Theory and Practice Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies 38:3 Spring, pp.135-158

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introduced the landowner-tenant dynamic and the underclass in Europe.196 He argues that

consequently, these early societies were more equal. Africans possessed great

craftsmanship and produced products of a much higher quality than Europeans. In some of

his earlier work, Robert Bates also ascribes African development to have evolved from

nomadic lifestyles, arguing it was the slow process of centralisation that led to monarchies

and hierarchy. He describes how this process of centralisation occurred in some areas more

than others because of trade patterns across the continent, how merchants travelling across

the land of rival tribes and communities used caravans to protect themselves.197 This made

cross-continental trade very resource intensive and so only worthwhile above certain

margins. This structure, he argues led to centralised communities and the growth of

hierarchy as a structure of power. He goes on to describe how the enforcement of the

hierarchy which required men to work unpaid for a few days a year on monarch’s

projects,198 but leaving them to work for their own ends the rest of the year, made societies

of communalism. In the fifteenth century, contrary to Europe and much of the rest of the

world, slavery and exploitation as a mode of production did not exist in Sub-Saharan

Africa.199

It was only once Europeans possessed firepower that they made the breakthrough into the

continent.200 Historical scholars writing from the 1950s to 1980s argued European settlers

used their superior weaponry to take advantage of the communalist nature of small,

196 Rodney, Walter (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press p.41 197 Bates, Robert (1983) Essays on the political economy of rural Africa Cambridge University Press p.7 198 This structure was called the Corvee and is outlined by Rodney, Walter, (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press p.42 199 ibid p.69 200 Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History New York: Touchstone Publishing p.311

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competing communities in West Africa to create the slave trade. Chiefs, keen to achieve

significant operational advantages over rival tribes were hungry for European firearms.

Communities, unaware of the greater threat from the outsiders, raided neighbouring

communities and rival factions, kidnapping and taking prisoners to trade with the Europeans

for more firearms.201 Europeans took further advantage of the decentralised and

community based societies, exploiting political and ethnic divisions for their own ends, to

increase violence and the need from more weapons and so encourage the flow of slaves,202

the smaller African communities could not have foreseen the scale of exploitation of which

the Europeans were capable. This relationship of European exploitation of Africa continued

to grow with the development of the Atlantic slave trade on the West Coast.203

While earlier scholars agreed that the slave trade shaped development in modern-day

Africa, they made different arguments for how and why. Walter Rodney, for example,

claimed that the dramatic population reduction in Africa caused by the slave trade blocked

innovation and progress. He argued that African slaves were supporting British shop

keepers at the expense of the African people204 while increased violence and divisions

damaged development. Friction between communities prevented traditional gold mining

and agrarian activities focusing instead on violence and kidnapping which affected all

branches of economic activity, particularly agriculture.205 However, he then goes on to

argue these factors actually played only a small part in shaping African development.

201 Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History New York: Touchstone Publishing p.311 202 Rodney, Walter (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press p.79 203 ibid p.22 204 Ibid p.105 205 Ibid p.99

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Rather, he argued in his writings on Pan-Africanism that inspired activists and scholars alike,

it was the spread and institutionalisation of racism as a deeply rooted element in European

thought that drove historical development. He wrote: “no nation can enslave another for

centuries without coming out with an air of superiority, and when the colour and other

physical traits of those peoples were quite different it was inevitable that the prejudice

should take a racist form.”206

The slave trade was not an isolated phenomenon. Rather it was a by-product of the global

capitalist system, an ideological system based on exploitation which led to colonisation.

Many of the theories from this literature focus on the role of colonialism in building legacy

institutions and culture. Scholars such as Fanon,207 Walters208 and So209 from the earlier

literature and more modern writings such as Mamdani210 and Young211 agree that

colonisation was always about domination and exploitation. Deleuze and Guattari212 wrote

about the “decoding and recoding” of colonised societies, particularly through the economic

and ideological effects of capitalism.213 Scholars such as Davidson,214 and Bates215 argue

that the motives of colonisation drove very different models of rule and created different

legacy institutions that are key to understanding the political and economic structures of

different postcolonial countries today. Whereas Robert Young argues that the history and

206 Rodney, Walter (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press p.88 207 Fanon, Frantz (1967) Black Skin, White Masks New York: Grove Press 208 Rodney, Walter (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press 209 So, Alvin (1990) Social Change and Development Sage 210 Mamdani, Mahmood (1997) Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism 211 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell 212 Deleuze, Gilles, Guattari, Felix (1977) Anti-Oedipus: capitalism and schizophrenia New York: Viking Press p.68 213 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.24 214 Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History New York: Touchstone Publishing 215 Bates, Robert (1983) Essays on the political economy of rural Africa Cambridge University Press

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administrative models of colonialism are irrelevant from the point of view of the colonised,

because colonisation of all forms brought about similar disruptive consequences.216

Capitalism and Economic Colonisation

From a historical context, scholars agree that capitalism created colonialism. The Industrial

revolution in Britain and Europe was characterised by cheap labour, exploitation, profit, and

global expansion was the logical next phase. Young argued feudalism had characterised

Europe up until the advent of capitalism, the dynamics of this new system for the first time

enabled the accumulation of enough capital to revolutionise the whole economic and social

system.217 Colonisation was the economic instrument of globalised capitalism, which

enslaved nations and drove the Atlantic slave trade. Hobson described economic

colonisation as “a system of economic exploitation where the metropolitan centre drains

the resources of the periphery while at the same time encouraging it to consume its

manufactured products in an unequal, unbalanced system of exchange.”218 Economic

colonisation allowed unfettered access to the raw materials: gold, cotton, diamonds,

rubber, to name but a few, to feed into capitalist manufacturing in industrialised Europe.219

By its very nature the system sought to build success for the European powers at the

expense of the colonised populations. Scholars and activists argue that as most of Africa

ended up under colonial rule, economic colonialism was the beginning of a process of

purposeful underdevelopment of the continent.

216 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.49 217 ibid p.102 218 Hobson quoted in Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.48 219 Rodney, Walter (1973) How Europe underdeveloped Africa Pambazuka Press p.76

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Proponents of economic colonisation argue it was motivated by the drive for raw materials

to feed manufacturing, and the resulting requirement to rule came about as a consequence.

Scholars, such as Basil Davidson, arguing colonial legacies shaped institutions and

governance today point to the fact different colonising powers used different methods of

control over their colonised populations in Africa. This is particularly important when

comparing countries in West and Central Africa. The different levels of development and

socio-economic paths the countries have taken since their independence from Portuguese,

British, French, or Belgian colonial powers. The British, learning from their experience in

India preferred to use “indirect rule,” while the French and Portuguese preferred a more

direct, brutal system. 220 The British looked for kings or princes to use as a vessel of indirect

rule, however, the communal nature of societies in Africa meant this was not always

possible. Where they did not find an obvious leader to rule through, they nominated

leaders and called them “warrant chiefs”221 which dismantled traditional forms of rule and

helped to shape the structures we see fuelling corruption today. Structures of governance

characterised by clan-based tribalism, family-based nepotism and elites focused on personal

gain rather than the good of the country.222 Whereas, in those countries ruled more

directly, the continued influence of neo-colonialism, strong ties with the ex-colonising

power and the role of development aid from that country can still be seen to play a strong

role in the economy and society, stunting economic independence and development.

Frantz Fanon points to French imperialism in building and creating the institutional

structures of newly independent African states by describing their education systems. He

explains the creation of a new African elite who had received a western education, created

220 Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History New York: Touchstone Publishing p.287 221 ibid p.287 222 ibid p.288

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a new elite who felt more at home in alien, colonial order than the old traditional one.223 To

them Europeanism was civilisation and they were preoccupied with their relationship with

Europeans, caring little for their uneducated countrymen who made up the majority of

Africa. As elites they never questioned Africa’s subordination to and exploitation by the

global market economy or colonisers. They wanted concessions in their self-interest that

would enhance their social status and their economic securities.224 This same attitude can

be seen today in some African elites who participate in governmental corruption to

purchase houses in London and send their children to European boarding schools, putting

self-interest and the western experience over their duty to their country’s development.

Robert Young argues that the role of imperialism was key in shaping colonial legacy

institutions. Increasingly, colonisation became about feeding national prestige through

conquest and territorial expansion abroad. The moral argument for imperialism was about

spreading culture, religion, and civilisation. Superior education of modern medicine, for

example, mosquito nets, and sanitation to prevent disease was lauded over African

populations. Missionaries brought Christianity, Christian values, western medicine and basic

education. Educational opportunities were provided to those who gave up their culture

under the French imperialist model, which explains why so many anti-colonial intellectuals

came from French colonies.225 Religion, Christianity, Islam and Voodoo based religions still

play a central role in Africa. Basil Davidson argues that Islam made inroads into West and

Central Africa from the North and Middle East much earlier than colonialism and took hold

223 Frantz Fanon referred to in L Stavrianos (1981) Global Rift New York: William Morrow & Company Inc p.566 224 L Stavrianos (1981) Global Rift New York: William Morrow and Company Inc p.566 225 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.29

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because it was easily adapted to African society and culture.226 Christianity did not come to

the continent until it was imposed on the people through imperialist colonialism and

missionaries. Colonial legacies and the model of governance used by the different colonial

powers is evident in today’s religious make-up. For example, Sierra Leone, has a majority

Muslim population and only a small Christian minority, demonstrating the limited activities

of British Christian missionaries in Freetown. Voodoo and secret societies still play an

important role in people’s daily lives. São Tomé & Príncipe were occupied by Portuguese

colonial settlers in the fifteenth century. Slaves from other colonies and Africa were

brought to work on plantations.227 Unlike other colonising powers, Portugal did not have a

trading middle class, colonising policies came from the expansionist, imperialist actions by

the Crown. These expansionist actions were strongly based on the ideology of a crusade for

“Christianisation,” and later “civilisation”228 which explains their majority Christian faith.

Scholars such as Hobson,229 and Said230 argue the role of Imperialism in colonial legacies is

so important because it shaped the global bias, already driven by economic colonial

capitalism that Europe, the west and “whites” are in some way superior to African countries

and peoples.231 British Imperialism, came about in the second half of the nineteenth

century after a period of anti-colonial sentiment in Britain where the colonies had come to

be seen as an unprofitable burden following the mutiny in India. British Imperialism was

226 Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History New York: Touchstone Publishing. P.311 227 Almeida, Miguel Vale de in Stewart, Charles Edt (2007) Creolization: History, Ethnography, Theory Left Coast Press: California p.109 228 Ibid p.110 229 Hobson, J (1938) Imperialism: A Study Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p.85 230 Said, Edward (1978) Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient New York: Vintage Books 231 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.40

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based on racial ideology, rather than religion, seeing the Anglo-Saxon citizens of the Empire

as having a common heritage. It drew a contrast between the white settler colonists in the

Americas and Australia and the black economically colonised in Africa. The majority of Brits

at the time, opined a difference between the “white parts” of the Empire who they

considered were ready for democratic self-governance more or less right away in contrast

with the “black parts” that would only be ready somewhere in the far future.232 Imperialism

sought to extend British, French, Spanish, Flemish, Portuguese and German culture and

civilization to their African colonies. By 1880 imperialism had become a common policy and

the overall guiding strategy of British foreign policy.

The structure of colonial rule and the relationship between colonial masters and ruled

population has played very different roles in how countries have developed since

independence. I have chosen two case study countries who were previously colonised by

different parties in order to draw some of the differences and similarities that came about

from the different ruling techniques and independence struggles. The Portuguese

colonisation of São Tomé & Príncipe came about through the Portuguese imperialist

objective of controlling the seas and major trade routes with India, benefitting from capital

from other nations trading and ruling with a sense of superiority to spread Christianity.

Portuguese concepts of racism and difference developed from the idea of blood purity in

their settler colonies in India and Brazil. São Tomé & Príncipe had a particular role within

the Portuguese empire as an “adaptation” post for slaves coming from Portugal’s main

colony Angola to their settler colony in Brazil. Brazilian independence in 1822 brought a

232 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.40

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third wave to the Portuguese Empire.233 The last years of Monarchy in Portugal and those

of the First Republic (1910– 1926) were marked by the effort to obtain actual control over

their African colonies. In 1930, when the totalitarian regime was being established in

Portugal, the Colonial Act was issued, proclaiming the need to bring indigenous peoples into

western civilization and the Portuguese nation.234 This totalitarian nature of the regime in

Portugal was to impact on how colonial populations were ruled in Africa. In 1953 a new law

saw the reclassification of the colonies into “provinces” in an attempt to push back against

decolonial sentiments in the international community after WWII. The population of São

Tomé & Príncipe came from a few Portuguese settlers and slaves brought to the island to

work on the plantations or settled there after the abolition of the slave trade in Portugal

and Brazil in the 17th century.235 Real or imagined threats from Spain were compounded by

apparent threats from communism and African independence in the 1960s and 70s. An

overriding feeling of insecurity coupled with a knowledge of the national plight reinforced

Portuguese objectives to retain their African colonies. The connection between

independence from Spain and the possession of territories overseas was firmly rooted in the

ruling circles of Portuguese society.236 This helps to explain why Portugal was one of the last

colonising forces to grant independence to their colonies and the violence with which they

repressed independence protests in the 1960s. It can also explain the Portuguese

continuing neo-colonial role in São Tomé & Príncipe.

233 Almeida, Miguel Vale de in Stewart, Charles Edt (2007) Creolization: History, Ethnography, Theory Left Coast Press: California p.111 234 Henriksen, Thomas (1973) Portugal in Africa: A Noneconomic Interpretation African Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Dec., 1973), pp. 405-416 p.406 235 Almeida, Miguel Vale de in Stewart, Charles Edt (2007) Creolization: History, Ethnography, Theory Left Coast Press: California p. 112 236 Henriksen, Thomas (1973) Portugal in Africa: A Noneconomic Interpretation African Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 3, Dec, pp.405-416 p.410

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Neo-Colonialism

Neo-colonialism first developed out of American Imperialism, which reached its high point

between 1889 and the First World War, primarily for economic reasons. The American

model allowed colonial independence but maintained economic power and control. This

became known as neo-colonialism and arguably still shapes development policy and global

capitalist markets today.237 Kwame Nkrumah, the Ghanaian leader who was first to achieve

independence in Africa. In his 1965 book Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism he

recognised the economic ties with which the colonial west still held Africa preventing its

economic independence. “Independence is a sham” he wrote, Africa would only triumph

when it became economically free and politically united.238 Built on a legacy of racism and

colonial imperialism, neo-colonialism today still allows the relocation of capital production.

Corporations relocate to escape western environmental controls and market products in the

third world which are deemed unhealthy or unsafe in the western world, for example,

cigarettes and contaminated powdered baby milk. The term neo-colonialism remains useful

in that it insists on a primarily economic account of the postcolonial system and has allowed

theorists and activists to develop a cultural and political analysis within the framework of

economic arguments. “As a concept, neo-colonialism is as disempowering as the conditions

it portrays. Removal of the possibility of agency is equally a problem of more recent

theories of power operating through economic exploitation.”239

A large body of work on neo-colonialism focuses on the development policies of the

stronger economic countries after the Second World War and its role in shaping

237 Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.42 238 ibid p.46 239 Samar Amin in Young, Robert (2001) Postcolonialism Oxford: Blackwell p.48

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development in Africa. Samir Amin argues that “where colonialism left off, development

took over.”240 Scholars such as Robert Young argue that in the 1950s and 60s the

international community saw Africa as a region “in need of development,”241 to be

modernised and made to emulate industrialised Europe and North America. He argued

international development policies delivered by foreign states were driven by national

interest rather than altruistic need. Many development interventions were designed to

develop economic and food systems, and were characterised by concerns for global food

security in the face of growing urban populations, and based on free market principles.

Consequently, rather than supporting local food security through supporting increased

production of indigenous crops, they promoted the maximisation of crop production for

export. The main financial international development institutions at the time, the World

Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the UN

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), were based on neoclassical liberal capitalist

norms pushing for the creation of export commodities and creating markets for economic

growth. These financial instruments funded the so called “green revolution,” the

repurposing of agricultural land for the growth of high calorie, high yield wheat and maize

crops across the third world.242 These development policies were well-meaning, intending

to secure enough food to feed a growing global population and stimulate economic growth

in the third world. However, neoliberal capitalist structures inevitably meant multinational

corporations monopolised export markets, setting low prices and profiting at the expense of

240 Kathari (1998) in Slocum, Rachel & Saldanha, Arun (2016) Geographies of Race and Food: Fields, Bodies, Markets New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group p.122 241 Slocum, Rachel & Saldanha, Arun (2016) Geographies of Race and Food: Fields, Bodies, Markets New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group p.122 242 Agarwal, Bina (2014) Food Sovereignty, food security and democratic choice: critical contradictions and difficult conciliations Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no.6, pp1247-1268 p.1265

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poor populations. The green revolution replaced indigenous crops and modes of food

production with high calorie, low nutrition food243 stunting food security and low prices did

not stimulate valuable economic growth. Bina Agarwal argues capitalisms’ search for cheap

food was a principle driver in the formation of today’s global food systems and economic

models. It can be traced to the hunger of urban populations in Europe and North America,

creating a hierarchy of food production where the provision of cheap food in the first world

was driven by exploitation of the third world.

A key neo-colonial dynamic impacting fisheries management is the relationships West and

Central African states have with both the former European colonising powers and,

increasingly, China. Despite independence, the relationships between the first and third

world are still very much structured to benefit the ex-colonial masters. An example of this is

in the structure and role of international law, in particular the UN Convention on the Law of

the Seas (UNCLOS) which governs international fisheries. Developed in complex

negotiations between more than a hundred states UNCLOS still bares the marks of the

superior negotiating stance of the traditional strong maritime powers. The most relevant

section is Article 62.6 which states:

“Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it

shall, through agreements or other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions,

laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of

the allowable catch.”

243Agarwal, Bina (2014) Food Sovereignty, food security and democratic choice: critical contradictions and difficult conciliations Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no.6, pp1247-1268 p.1251

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Consequently, UNCLOS serves a neo-colonial role by requiring less developed states to open

their waters to international commercial fishing trawlers and therefore give up their

sovereign rights to those resources. Neo-colonial dynamics and legacy power relationships

mean the states purchasing access rarely pay a price for a licence that is anywhere close to

the value of the fish. The value of these licences, however, is still high enough to encourage

potential rent seeking behaviour by corrupt elites which in turn can lead to as large a

number of licences being sold as possible. The neo-colonial, capitalist model serving

stronger economies at the expense of weaker also disincentivises foreign states from

enforcing environmentally sound fishing practises and preventing illegal or over fishing in

African waters. The environmental impact of these trawlers and illegal and damaging

practises is having a profound impact on fish stocks, limiting catch for artisanal fishers and

risking future stock collapse.

The neo-colonial relationship Europe has with Africa drives the price negotiations for

licences. This is worsened by the lack of collective action in Africa which means individual

African states are negotiating with the power of all twenty-seven member states in the

European Union Common Fisheries Policy. This asymmetric power relationship further

lowers the price of the licences. Neo-colonial powers take advantage of competing

development priorities in these countries and will trade under-priced licences for promises

of assurances of security and aid in times of crisis such as the Ebola outbreak, or other

essential infrastructure projects. The EU built a new road in São Tomé & Príncipe, for

example, which was worth less than the value of the fish European trawlers caught in their

waters that year, but required essential expertise. The neo-colonial dynamics and unfair

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negotiations are not limited to Europe, Japan, Taiwan, China and Russia also use similar

techniques to secure fisheries licences below their true value in exchange for trade deals on

for example rice imports.244

A UK Government policy in Africa is to deliver assistance in support of African led policies so

as to respect African Sovereignty. The structure of the global economic system, however,

and ingrained colonial legacies mean that even well-meaning policies often have a neo-

colonial effect. For example, consumer-based movements designed to tackle some of the

legacy issues of unfair pricing and environmental degradation, such as Fair Trade have

actually just created monopolies at the expense of other small farmers.245 Furthermore,

movements based on consumer agency cannot effectively challenge broader, systemic

issues of inequality and exploitation. These systemic issues produced by globalised

neoliberal capitalism also have a neo-colonial effect. For example, a foreign supermarket

opened in São Tomé to support Portuguese expats immediately monopolised local produce

and fish, driving down prices and profiting at the expense of local food producers. This

same dynamic has driven the development of the international commercial fishing industry.

Neoclassical liberal markets have shaped global demand for fish, and profit maximisation

strategies have driven the creation of new fishing technologies and techniques. Huge

factory trawlers harvest and process billions of tonnes of fish for sale on international

markets and otter trawls, purse seines, longlines and bottom trawlers all harvest the most

244 I learned this during my interviews in São Tomé & Príncipe in 2013 and in 2019. This is an example of where my professional and scholarly responsibilities clash and I have opted to be vague in my citation of this knowledge rather than risk my professional relationships. 245 Samba Sylla, Ndongo, (2014) Fairtrade is an unjust movement that serves the rich The Guardian Newspaper, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/sep/05/fairtrade-unjust-movement-serves-rich

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fish possible while damaging the marine environment and harming other species essential

for the maintenance of complex marine food webs.

The international fishing industry is worth over USD130 billion annually. High upfront costs

mean fishers need significant catches to cover these costs and make a profit. Driven by the

market economics of the capitalist system, the international commercial fishing industry has

grown enormously in the last fifty years. Initially, fishing was an easily lucrative business,

but overcapitalisation, particularly in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, lowered stock

levels and reduced fishers’ profits driving technological advances and sending boats further

afield to distant waters where fish stocks had been less exploited. This overcapitalisation in

the European, North American and Asian commercial fishing industries has led to an

increase in fishing in the waters off the coast of West and Central Africa.246 These fertile

fishing grounds provide essential protein for billions of people living in the region through

local artisanal fishing but increased international commercial harvesting means these waters

are now classified as “overfished” by the FAO reducing harvests for local fishers.247 Once

again, this is a consequence of the capitalist model exploiting poor parts of the world for

profit in richer areas, another example of how free market economics and industrialised

production can damage local livelihoods.

246 Longo, Stefano, Clausen, Rebecca, Clark, Brett, (2015) The Tragedy of the Commodity: Oceans, Fisheries, and Aquaculture Rutgers University Press: New Brunswick, New Jersey and London p.105 247 FAO Report: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Meeting the Sustainability Goals 2018 available at: http://www.fao.org/3/i9540en/i9540en.pdf

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China

The relationship between China and states in Africa is becoming one of the most interesting

dynamics in international Affairs. While European nations have historical legacy relations

with countries in Africa, Chinese activity and relations with Africa have only really developed

over the last 20-30 years. Chinese activity and engagement with Africa has grown

exponentially since the launching of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation248 raising

concerns amongst the international community of neo-colonial intentions to exploit African

resources similar to the scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. The Chinese now have

resident Ambassadors in most West and Central African states, despite having no legacy

relationship, giving them the largest foreign diplomatic presence in the region. China are

investing heavily in development and infrastructure projects in Africa as part of their Belt

and Road initiative to expand their access to global markets and supply chains. The

international community and scholars including Sachikonye,249 Seifudeim 250 and Lumumba-

Kasongo251 are concerned their goal is to exert influence over African nations and increase

Chinese food security and access to resources. Chinese aid is dramatically increasing, at a

time when many countries, faced with financial austerity and rising nationalism at home,

are reducing their foreign aid budgets. Recent support by several African nations for

Chinese positions in negotiations in international fora, such as the tribunal on the South

China Sea252 for example, demonstrate how China is using aid to gain influence in this part

248 Chen, Ying (2012) China’s Investment and Trade in Africa: Neo-colonialism or mutual benefit? Cardozo Journal of International & Competition Law Vol. 24:511 p. 512 249 Sachikonye, Llyod (2008) Crouching Tiger, Hidden Agenda?: Zimbabwe-China Relations, in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China, Ed. Kweku Ampiah & Sanusha Naidu, Scottville, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press 250 Seifudeim, Adem (2010) The Paradox of China’s Policy in Africa African and Asian Studies, Vol. 9 No. 3. 251 Chen, Ying (2012) China’s Investment and Trade in Africa: Neo-colonialism or mutual benefit? Cardozo Journal of International & Competition Law Vol. 24:511 p. 512 252 Wang Wen & Chen Xiaochen (2016) Who Supports China in the South China Sea and Why: The psychology behind global support for China’s South China Sea position: a desire to avoid war. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/who-supports-china-in-the-south-china-sea-and-why/

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of the world. Chinese industry is also benefitting as Chinese industrialisation allows

contractors to bid for and deliver African infrastructure projects at lower cost and to shorter

timetables than local or other international contractors. Consequently, Chinese

construction companies are working on a number of big infrastructure projects across the

continent while the Chinese government is providing finance and debt for a number of

others.253

Despite increased aid and winning several construction contracts, however, China are not

proving successful at gaining influence in all West and Central African nations except some

of those with weak institutions, high insecurity and corruption such as Guinea, Guinea

Bissau and Sierra Leone. On the surface, the Chinese relationship with Africa appears to be

a mutually beneficial business relationship.254 China need access to mineral resources, oil

and fisheries. Their booming economy means they have surpluses of funds for investment

in infrastructure and they are also interested in the future market potential in Africa as

these economies develop.255 In exchange Africa lacks critical infrastructure and healthcare

and struggles to get access to FDI with weak security and poor credit ratings. Their physical

activity in Africa, however, seems to benefit the Chinese far more than the African states. I

asked a government official in Accra in 2013 why China was not more popular in Ghana

given the amount of aid and construction they were contributing. He told me the Chinese

deliver poor quality construction, think they know best and do not consult with officials. He

explained how the Chinese had built a hospital on the wrong side of town where there was

253 Chen, Ying (2012) China’s Investment and Trade in Africa: Neo-colonialism or mutual benefit? Cardozo Journal of International & Competition Law Vol. 24:511 p. 527 254 Ibid. p.513 255 Ibid. p.528

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no transport infrastructure for doctors let alone patients and so it remained unused.

Chinese construction workers do not seek to integrate into local communities, even shipping

in their own food from China rather than purchasing local provisions. This builds suspicion

and animosity among superstitious local communities, dubious of outsiders.

When you look more closely at Chinese activities in Africa it becomes more apparent that

they are being delivered for the benefit of China at the expense of Africa. China are

developing new markets for cheap goods; winning government funded infrastructure

projects; securing fishing access; and demanding support in international arenas because of

generous aid projects of defaulted loans. At a time when most foreign nations are

increasingly trying to deliver aid and assistance in response to African leadership and

respect African Sovereignty, the Chinese policy appears to be neo-colonial and based solely

on Chinese interests. Infrastructure projects paid for by Chinese loans and built by Chinese

workers paid by Chinese construction companies are being built in Africa rarely to meet that

country’s development priorities but rather in line with developing infrastructure that would

be far more beneficial to Chinese objectives than economic growth in Africa. A USD28.9

million industrial fishing port infrastructure project in Sierra Leone, for example, will be far

more beneficial to Chinese industrial trawlers operating in the Gulf of Guinea than to Sierra

Leone who has no industrial fishing fleet.

Culturally, China has historically placed great dependence on fish. It is the second largest

protein source in China after pork and certain species play a central role in Chinese

traditional medicine and status. As overcapitalisation has reduced the fish stocks in their

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local waters Chinese fishing trawlers have been forced to travel further and further from

China and explore new ways to reduce economic overheads. A large number of Chinese

fishing trawlers are fishing legally and illegally in African waters which has led to a huge

amount of interaction between the Chinese fishing agents, the Chinese government and

African fisheries Ministries. Chinese commercial fishing taking place in the waters off the

West coast of Africa has impacted market prices, particularly in Ghana through the illegal

practice of 'saiko' fishing, which is the transhipment of frozen fish at sea from Chinese

industrial factory trawlers to artisanal canoes for sale in local markets.256 This practise has

been taking place on a small level for years, but in recent times has increased to a level

where it has artificially increased the supply of fish to local markets driving down prices and

negatively impacting those legitimately trying to make a living from artisanal fisheries.

Further, Chinese fishing vessels are hiring local African labourers to work on fishing vessels

in African waters where they are being worked as slaves in poor conditions with no hope of

escape.257 The role of China in global fisheries and in West and Central Africa will be key to

my analysis of fisheries management. While other post-colonial nations are also driving

management, the scale of Chinese fishing activities and interactions with African states sets

them apart from the rest of the international community. An analysis of the management

of this paradoxical resource in West and Central Africa would not be complete without a

specific analysis of Chinese activity in the region. I will conduct a specific study into Chinese

activity in my analysis of each of my case study countries.

256 Environmental Justice Foundation, (2019) Investigation reveals illegal fishing by foreign trawlers is devastating Ghana’s fisheries available at: https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/investigations-reveal-illegal-fishing-by-foreign-trawlers-is-devastating-ghanas-fisheries 257 BBC Documentary, Paul Adams & Charlotte Pamment, (2019) Is China’s Fishing Fleet Taking All of West Africa’s Fish? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47698314/is-china-s-fishing-fleet-taking-all-of-west-africa-s-fish

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Colonial Legacies, Underdevelopment and fisheries management in West and Central

Africa The literature summarised in this chapter gives some history of Africa’s colonial past and

attempts to set out some of the main arguments on colonial influence on development,

institutions and governance in Africa today. All the countries in West and Central Africa

have similar and differing challenges and all have different pasts not least shaped by the

colonial power that governed, the process of independence and their relationship with their

colonial masters since independence. Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe are very

different nations, with very different pasts but they were both shaped when a group of

settler colonialist chose to bring slaves from all different places to live in these countries.

For Sierra Leone, this meant around 50,000 freed slaves were brought from colonies all over

the world from all different ethnic groups and settled to live in Freetown in 1896 under

British crown rule.258 During this period the country was characterised by competition

between the African Protectorate Elites in the North, and the Creole Elites in Freetown in

the South.259 These divisions drove politics towards and after independence.

As argued in the literature by Basil Davidson and Christopher Allen, the British policy of

indirect rule created the foundations for political elitism, localism and corruption that

continued following independence. When Sierra Leone was established as a Protectorate in

1896, the political system was one of autonomous chiefdoms where both power and wealth

were concentrated in Paramount Chiefs and their ruling families. This localism was

deepened by the fact Sierra Leone developed at very different rates, with Freetown,

258UNDP fact sheet on Sierra Leone available at: https://www.sl.undp.org/content/sierraleone/en/home/countryinfo.html 259 Kandeh, Jimmy (1992) Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No. 1, Apr, pp. 81-99 p.81

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developing structures and institutions far more quickly than the rest of the country. When

the British colonial government allowed the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP), to take

charge of local government from 1953, this did not significantly reduce the local power of

chiefs. Their wealth and position allowed them to profit considerably from modernisation,

and the system of indirect rule enabled them to profit from corrupt practices, such as the

levying of excessive taxes.260 The country became further divided, with the missionaries

concentrating in the South, which was accessible, while neglecting the Muslim North and

East. Mineral mining started in the North and East in the 1930s, however, the

misappropriation of profits from this mining only further divided the country. Many miners

were foreign migrants and any local miners were poorly paid. The tax from minerals that

was spent on infrastructure development, was spent in the West and South and the North

and East remained neglected with political ramifications. After thirty years of rural

discontent and sporadic uprisings against the chiefs, culminating in the anti-tax riots of

1955-56, the colonial authorities allowed greater representation and democratisation in

local government. This eventually led to independence, but the chiefs' power was left

untouched which created the backdrop for governance in Sierra Leone today and allowed

for the divisions and chaos that eventually led to the 1991 civil war. Even though Sierra

Leone has been independent for nearly sixty years, colonial legacies can still be seen to have

played an important part in her development.

In contrast, São Tomé & Príncipe was governed under much stricter direct Portuguese

imperial rule from the 15th century. The population was established under strict

260 Allen, Christopher (1968) Sierra Leone Politics since Independence African Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 269, Oct, pp. 305-329 p. 306

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Portuguese Christianity and policies of blood purity, Portuguese or other, separating the

slaves working in STP on the plantations from the Portuguese landowners. Overtime the

small population on this island has lost previous ethnic identities and religions and the Forro

make up the majority of the population, a small Cape Verdean community that work on

some of the larger plantations and the Angolares artisanal fishermen, are the only

exceptions. However, the Portuguese reluctance to give up their colonies can be seen in the

continued neo-colonial role they play in the archipelago to this day. The Portuguese remain

STP’s primary partner in development as illustrated by the larger hotels and supermarket all

recently established by Lusophone brands. The sense of us and them also continues to

characterise STP politics today with nepotism rife in every government institution,

particularly in the criminal justice sector, holding back development.

These colonial legacies help to explain how the weak institutions, divisions and elitism has

developed to characterise governance in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe today. The

next two chapters contain a more detailed analysis of these countries as they are today with

an emphasis on understanding what shapes their fisheries management. I want to

understand how historic colonial legacies, neo-colonial relationships and the global

capitalist system has shaped the institutions and systems that govern fisheries. These are

essential to understanding the broader structural factors that cause fish to be a cursed

resource and could lead to stock collapse in West and Central Africa. They are also essential

to understanding the potential for conflict that could come about due to scarcity of the

resource. Scarcity of fish is not inevitable, if it comes about it will be because of a failure of

management. My analysis of the broader context and historical factors that have shaped

management will help illustrate the expected trajectory for the future of this resource. This

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analysis will set the scene for my fifth chapter, my futures scenario exercise where I will

examine how these could influence alternative futures for fisheries in West and Central

Africa.

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Chapter Three: Looking at Fisheries

This next chapter is an analysis of fisheries management in Sierra Leone, drawing on the

essential literature and theories I have outlined in the first two chapters. This analysis will

help me to establish the structures and systems that shape fisheries management and

develop an understanding of what factors are driving it to be a cursed resource. Whilst

fisheries are essentially a domestic legislative issue and I am going to look at two specific

countries, the migratory nature of fish and global nature of markets also makes them an

international issue. Before I begin my country specific analysis, I will first analyse the global

political economy of fisheries. Andrew Rosser criticised some of the literature on the

‘resource curse’ as being “too reductionist” for not taking into account the broader historic

and international variables. The global political economy of fisheries drives how fish are

managed domestically in West and Central Africa. In order to make a complete analysis of

what makes fish a cursed resource it is important to understand some of the history that has

created the global system and its dynamics. This will then inform my analysis of domestic

fisheries management in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe to better understand how

their management is being driven by the ‘resource curse.’

Global Political Economy of Fisheries Management I mentioned in my introduction that fish are worth over USD130 billion261 to global markets

annually and provide the most important contribution to protein and livelihoods for poor

coastal communities in developing countries across the globe. They are an important part

of the economies and diets of all countries including developed countries. Fish are

261 FAO Report: The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture. Meeting the Sustainability Goals 2018 p.2 available at: http://www.fao.org/3/i9540en/i9540en.pdf

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migratory species and the challenges facing the maritime domain are regional and global

and so logically, cannot be managed effectively in isolation. However, with the exception of

countries in the EU,262 fish in coastal waters remain subject to domestic legislation and on

the “high seas” are for the most part unregulated. There are international legal and treaty

instruments that facilitate global cooperation on fisheries, and seek to raise standards, for

example, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT).263

However, as with many international legal instruments, they are only as strong as states

choose to allow them. The international political economy of fish is based on the political

norm that fish are an open access, renewable resource, thus as international norms begin to

shift, there could be potential for international cooperation to evolve and there have been

rumours of potential changes, but, at time of writing, there is no action planned. In

international fora and within domestic legislation fish are an environmental and economic

issue. In international law, fish are subject to legal instruments including the UN Convention

on the Law of the Sea, but they also come under provisions in the World Trade Organization

(WTO), International Labour Organization (ILO) and other Regional Fisheries Management

Organizations (RFMOs).264

262 With the Exception of the EU Common Fisheries Policy, even with the common bargaining power and enforcement of this body, fisheries in European countries remains a domestic issue with many countries coming under criticism for their fishing practises in foreign waters. The EU have powers to address illegal fishing practises in the form of yellow and red cards ceasing or stopping trade with that country, but this still does not effectively police their own fleet. In addition, countries within the EU, the UK and France for example, or Spain and Italy still clash on a regular basis over access to fish and access to different fishing waters despite all being in the Common Fisheries Policy and sharing access to each other’s waters. https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp_en 263 ICCAT website: https://www.iccat.int/en/ 264 More information on RFMOs can be found on the UN FAO website at: http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166304/en

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The United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets out international

legislation for the maritime domain. It was negotiated in response to growing friction and

conflict from the enormous increase in the 1950s-1970s in the use of the ocean for

commercial and military transport, fishing, energy production and scientific research265 that

pointed to inadequacies in the existing international law of the sea. That regime was based

on maritime jurisprudence which was said to have come about from Rhodesian Sea Law,

which emerged from the codified practises in the second or third Century, when policing the

seas was about movement, trade and tackling pirates. These existing arrangements were

based on freedom of movement and trade. They classified most of the seas and oceans as

the “high seas;” states were only responsible for their territorial waters out to 3 nautical

miles.266 The UNCLOS negotiations were intended to provide a framework for the use of the

sea for “peaceful purposes.” UNCLOS was finally established in 1982 following over a

decade of negotiations between more than 150 countries. These started in 1970 when the

UN General Assembly established the “Committee on the Peaceful Exploitation of the

Seabed” as a forum for debate on exploitation of mineral resource exploitation at sea.267

The General Assembly declared the seabed minerals to be the “common heritage of

mankind” and proposed the creation of an international regime for the seabed that would

ensure “equitable sharing by states in the benefits derived therefrom.”268 These

negotiations came about from concerns that the huge potential value from offshore

minerals, oil and gas would lead to conflict if a framework was not established. There was

265 Antrim, Lance & Sebenius, James (1992) Mediation in International Affairs Springer p.99 266 Fernando, Sithara (2013) Maritime Cooperation in South East Asia New Delhi: Regional Centre for Strategic Studies p.20 267 More information on the negotiations that led to the UNCLOS conferences and its eventual establishment can be found in the UN archives available at: https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/uncls/uncls_ph_e.pdf 268 Sebenius, James (1984) Negotiating the Law of the Sea Harvard: Harvard University Press p.8

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also appetite amongst the newly independent countries in Africa to benefit from these

seabed minerals and not see them exploited by their ex-colonisers. The negotiations were

based on avoiding conflict, ensuring sovereignty and economic ownership whilst securing

freedom of movement in the ocean. They were partly motivated by the Cod Wars of the

1950s between Iceland and the UK when Iceland tried to prevent UK fishermen from

accessing fertile fishing grounds near Iceland. The Cod Wars highlighted conflicting interests

in the maritime domain. In Iceland, fisheries made the largest contribution to their GDP,

whereas in the UK access to these fishing grounds had contributed significantly to their

catch. As the industrial fishing industry grew and advances in technology led to larger and

larger catches of increasing value these conflicting interests became more apparent.269 A

gap was identified for states to have an agreed framework on sovereignty, ownership and

access in the maritime domain.

The legal framework agreed during the UNCLOS negotiations grants states sovereign

territorial waters (TTWs) out to 12nautical miles, extended from the previous 3nm, the

TTWs are regulated by domestic legislation. There is also a 24nm “contiguous zone” which

allows for “hot pursuit” and additional enforcement of state laws when crime is committed

in TTWs. Additionally, UNCLOS gives sovereign ownership of the resources in the seabed

and water column to the coastal or island state out to 200 nautical miles from their coast270

in the form of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) giving states control and ownership of their

marine resources. This is slightly different where a state has a large continental shelf or an

269 Jónsson, Hannes (1982) Friends in conflict: the Anglo-Icelandic cod wars and the Law of the Sea Hurst: University of Michigan p.184 270 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Part V, Articles 55-75. P.40: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

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archipelago of islands. The different zones are illustrated in Figure 1. Outside of these

zones UNCLOS classifies as “High Seas” these are open access and belong to no one, this

area is multijurisdictional. Vessels operating in the high seas must be registered to a state

(the “flag state”) and the domestic laws of that state then apply onboard the vessel unless in

the TTW of another state. However, this is complicated because people onboard the vessel

are also subject to the laws of their own nations. Consequently, a crime committed on a

vessel in the high seas can be complex to prosecute and often leads to diplomatic

incidents.271

Figure 1: Legal jurisdictions under UNCLOS

While UNCLOS gives states sovereign ownership of the resources in their EEZ and

consequently control of who accesses their fisheries. It also gives states power to control

271 For example, the Indian authorities arrested a group of Italian private security guards onboard an Italian flagged vessel for illegal carriage of arms and allegedly shooting 2 Indian fishermen they mistook as pirates in Feb 2012. They made the case the vessel had been in Indian waters at the time where possession of weapons is illegal, but Italy argued it was outside of 12nms and so subject to flag state jurisdiction. The disagreement went on for many months and eventually went to the Court of Arbitration at the Hague for settlement. Cusumano, Eugenio (2017) Security privatisation at sea: Piracy and the commercialisation of vessel protection. International Relations 2018, Vol. 32(1) 80–103 p.87

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what fishing is legal within their EEZ and what fishing is illegal both in terms of where it is

caught, how much is caught and the methods used. In addition, UNCLOS requires in Article

62.2 that:

“Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it

shall, through agreements or other arrangements … give other States access to the surplus

of the allowable catch.”272

UNCLOS was negotiated by the international community at a time when fish were defined

unquestioningly as an unending, renewable resource. It was also a time when the global

population had started to grow like never before and the international community was

concerned about global food security. Article 62.2 was designed to prevent the risk that

granting states sovereignty over fish, even if they did not have industrial capacity to fully

harvest this resource, would lead to a global shortage. It had, however, the unintended

consequence of creating an asymmetric system where states with a strong commercial

fishing industry retained agency over this national resource, while those without a

developed commercial sector have this aspect of their sovereignty eroded. This article in

UNCLOS has been instrumental in shaping the global political economy in fisheries as the

commercial industrial fishing industry has grown. This international legal architecture

promotes the rights of states with stronger economies at the expense of weaker states

further disadvantaging their developing economies. As UNCLOS requires developing

countries to sell fishing rights to foreign powers, it not only denies them the right to reserve

access to their waters for their domestic non-industrial fishers, but reduces their negotiating

272UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Part V, Articles 55-75. Specific quote Article 62.2 p.42: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

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power when agreeing the price of this access. The global fishing industry has been subject

to the same dynamics that have shaped all global capitalist food markets since the Second

World War. These dynamics have served to drive down the cost of food exported from the

developing world to service demand for cheap food in the developed. 273 It is in the interest

of stronger economies to keep fish prices low and facilitate international trade in this

commodity, not to act to protect fisheries in the waters of weaker economies.

The global wild capture fishing industry has grown from 18.71million tonnes in 1950 to

90.91million tonnes in 2016 and demand for fish continues to rise with growing populations

and economies.274 Driven by subsidies in countries across the board including China, the US,

Canada, Iceland and Europe,275 more and more fishers have come to the water while ever-

improving technologies and bigger boats have increased the catch of each boat

dramatically. Initially, fishing subsidies were viewed as a positive way of ensuring food

security and supporting economic growth but over the years fisheries science has developed

a better understanding of the vulnerability and maintenance of fisheries. Fisheries

management is now based on the knowledge that catch must remain below maximum

sustainable yield (MSY) in order to prevent collapse.276 Many states now enforce

restrictions that limit the amount of fish caught in their waters to ensure the maintenance

of their fish stocks for future economic and food security. The restrictions imposed include

273 Slocum, Rachel & Saldanha, Arun (2016) Geographies of Race and Food: Fields, Bodies, Markets New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 274 2018 State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture p.1 FAO Report: http://www.fao.org/state-of-fisheries-aquaculture 275 2013 Global Fisheries Subsidies Report from European Commission. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/513978/IPOL-PECH_NT(2013)513978_EN.pdf 276 Tietenberg, Tom & Lewis, Lynne (2009) Environmental & Natural Resources Economics 10th Edition Routledge: New York p. 281

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closed seasons, gear limitations, catch limits, and Marine protected Areas (MPAs) all have

varying levels of success in maintaining stocks and all cause unexpected externalities. For

example, a total allowable catch shared among all fishers, and a limited season in the

Alaskan King Crab fishery created a “race to fish” externality.277 This created an incredibly

dangerous industry as fishers raced to sea as soon as the season opened regardless of

weather and boat condition to compete for as much of the catch as possible. When the

total allowable catch was replaced with an individual transferable quota (ITQ), it eliminated

the race to fish and dramatically improved safety in the industry.278 However, this then had

the unforeseen impact of destroying coastal economies that had developed around the

fishers’ need to remain close to shore during the season. In another example, a state

enforced MPA implemented in Palau to protect coastal fisheries and encourage tourism

prevented local artisanal fishers from accessing a resource essential to them, drove up food

prices and worsened food security.279

In more recent years, overcapitalisation of the global industrial fishing industry, years of

sustained depletion and environmental degradation have reduced catches and threatened

fish stocks in many areas. In the international legal system fish are not a priority item. They

fall under the purview of the UN technical agencies, such as the UN Development Program

(UNDP) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). The concern over reduced catch

is causing fisheries to gain international priority as an environmental concern alongside

277 Alverson, Dayton Lee (2008) Race to the Sea: The Autobiography of a Marine Biologist New York: iUniverse inc p.476 278 Costello, Christopher, Gaines, Steven, Lynham, John (2008) Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries Collapse? Science September, Volume 321 p.1680 279 Gruby, Rebecca, Basurto, Xavier (2013) Multi-level governance for large marine commons: Politics and polycentricity in Palau’s protected area network Environmental Science & Policy Volume 33, Nov, pp.260-272

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plastic waste although it has not yet moved into significant debate on food security or even

international security. As such fisheries have not yet generated more than “voluntary

commitments” from an environmental UN Conference in 2017: Our Ocean, Our Future: A

call for action.280 International fishing quotas and commitments to protect fisheries have

been agreed under the RFMOs, but these organizations have no enforcement capacity

themselves. They all rely on “flag state” responsibilities for enforcement, but flag state law

only requires states to enforce their own jurisdiction onboard the ship and many states do

not include fisheries protection in their domestic legislation. Further, UNCLOS only becomes

legally binding once a state has ratified it and chosen to write provisions into their domestic

legislation and enforce them, they cannot be forced to uphold UNCLOS. An illustration of

one of the weaknesses of international law is the fact that the US, global hegemon and

strongest economy since the end of the Cold War has not yet ratified UNCLOS,281 although

many of its requirements are mirrored in their domestic legislation.282 Under UNCLOS, a

ship can also change which flag they choose to hold their registration and do so at any time.

Some registries including the Marshal Islands, the Bahamas, and Panama (to name but a

few) have gained a reputation for being “flags of convenience.” These are flags who hold

registries but have very limited requirements for their registered vessels and do not hold

vessels accountable for violations or criminal acts. Flags of convenience not only provide

loop holes around regulatory legislation but they create a world where global capitalism can

continue to shape exploitation. For example, under US law, to operate in US waters you

280 A second UN 2020 Ocean Conference has been cancelled amid the COVID-19 Pandemic: https://www.un.org/en/conferences/ocean2020 281 UN Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements available on the UNCLOS website: https://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm 282 US Maritime Legal Instruments: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/laws-policies

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must be US flagged and employ US nationals under US employment regulations. Paying

staff minimum wages, and benefits required under US law such as health insurance and

unemployment insurance would significantly raise the operating costs of the cruise ship

industry and make it commercially unviable to operate in US waters. The US cruise industry

is competing with global markets, and many flag states do not require costly standards for

workers. US maritime law, therefore has a loophole for cruises that enables them to flag to

another registry so long as their route takes them outside of US waters for part of the

cruise. Consequently, the Disney Cruises, for example, are registered in the Bahamas.283

This creates a dynamic where a US corporation can profit from the popularity of the cruise

industry in the US while employing foreign workers at low pay in order to maximise their

profits.

Flags of convenience are also used regularly in the global fishing industry. Fishing has high

upfront costs and risks, so fishing trawlers often cut costs by lowering safety and

environmental provisions.284 Flying a flag of convenience can be a useful way to cut

operating costs. As fish stocks deplete and catch volumes reduce, fishing trawlers are being

forced to venture further afield to find fish which is increasing overheads as fish become

harder to catch and markets evolve to keep fish prices for most fish species low. This has

283 Disney Cruise Ship Details: https://disneycruise.disney.go.com/ships/ Disney Magic: https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/Ships/Disney-Magic-9126807.html Disney Dream: https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/Ships/Disney-Dream-9434254.html Disney Fantasy: https://www.vesseltracker.com/en/Ships/Disney-Fantasy-9445590.html Disney Wonder: https://www.vesseltracker.com/dn/Ships/Disney-Wonder-9126819.html 284 This is one of the main challenges facing countries working to tackle IUU fishing. Reports have been produced by several countries, NGOs and International Organizations. For example: Australia and the WWF: http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/flagsofconvenience.pdf; EU: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A5-2001-0405&language=EN and EJF: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/Lowering-the-flag.pdf

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led to an increase in the use of slave labour onboard fishing trawlers. All across the globe

young men are being held captive on fishing trawlers, working long hours in poor, unsafe

conditions, suffering malnutrition, abuse at the hands of their captives and even death.285

Often the victims of illegal immigration in a desperate attempt to find work, they are taken

far from their families with no hope of returning even if they escape.286 Slavery in the

fishing industry is prevalent across Asia, but local African men are also being held and

working as slaves onboard foreign trawlers fishing in African waters.287 As well as slavery,

flag state compliance is the main mechanism used for enforcement of global fisheries

standards and regulations to police illegal fishing, overfishing, environmental damage and

unsustainable fishing techniques. Consequently, when a fishing trawler is flagged to a

convenience registry or their own state do not choose to implement regulations and quotas

then there is very little the rest of the world can do to enforce them. This means

international attempts to improve standards in the fishing industry and protect fisheries and

the marine environment have limited success. The EU and some other states try to enforce

compliance through requiring point of sale jurisdiction, this has slightly more chance of

success, however, the opaque, transnational and remote nature of the international fishing

industry makes it very hard to determine the origins of fish being sold on international

markets. Many fishing companies transfer fish caught illegally, using slave labour or

unsustainable fishing methods onto another vessel in a ship-to-ship transfer on the high

285 Report available on the link between IUU fishing and slavery produced by the ILO (2020) available at: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/policy-areas/fisheries/lang--en/index.htm 286 EJF. 2015. Thailand’s Seafood Slaves: Human Trafficking, Slavery and Murder in Kantang’s Fishing Industry. London: Environmental Justice Foundation. Accessed May 15, 2017: http://ejfoundation.org/sites/default/files/public/EJF-Thailand-Seafood-Slaves-low-res.pdf 287 BBC Documentary, Paul Adams & Charlotte Pamment (2019) Is China’s Fishing Fleet Taking All of West Africa’s Fish? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47698314/is-china-s-fishing-fleet-taking-all-of-west-africa-s-fish

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seas and then sell it as catch from the vessel that can demonstrate they have only been

fishing legally.

In summary, the global political economy is shaped by the international legal instruments

designed to regulate the maritime domain. UNCLOS, however, while establishing a regime

has also created a structure that furthers the asymmetry between developing and

developed countries by requiring non-industrial countries to allow industrial trawlers access

to their waters. Further loop holes and weaknesses in agreeing, applying and enforcing

international law has made a system whereby illegal activity and exploitation can thrive in

the fishing industry. These difficult externalities drive the global political economy of

international fishing which provides the backdrop for fisheries management in Africa. I will

now turn to my analysis of Sierra Leone to better understand what drives and shapes

fisheries management there.

Case Study: Sierra Leone, Fishing Village of Tombo As well as being shaped by the international political economy of the fishing industry, fishing

within the EEZ of a state is regulated by domestic jurisdiction. In the previous chapters, I

have outlined some of the key literature scholars have produced analysing the potential

impact of resources on economic development and conflict in Africa. I will now turn to my

observations of how fish are managed in Sierra Leone and then São Tomé & Príncipe,

drawing on that literature to establish what factors drive the management of fisheries as a

cursed resource. I will then analyse the conditions that I have observed to exist in relation

to the literature on scarcity conflict and environmental security. I hope this analysis will

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shape a better understanding on the role and impact of fisheries management as driven by

the ‘resource curse,’ creating the backdrop for a futures exercise that could examine

whether there could be potential for breaking the curse.

West and Central Africa is a complex region made up of twenty-three very different

countries. Each has its own unique history, demographics and challenges’ and each brings a

different dynamic to the region. Africa is often ignored in political science fisheries

research. I argue that this is partly because very few countries on the continent have

developed industrial fishing fleets and they are not significant exporters on the global stage.

In addition, fish, as a renewable, open access resource has attracted study mostly for

economic and territorial reasons. African states have traditionally been “sea-blind;” faced

with many competing development and security challenges, the expensive and complex

maritime domain has not really featured in policy making. Consequently, their maritime

economies are limited to off-shore oil and gas and some shipping. In addition, maritime

security in the waters off the West African coast is weak as all states lack enforcement

capacity and capability. This lack of maritime security is starting to present significant

additional threats to security and stability as illustrated by Somali piracy, piracy in the Gulf

of Guinea, and increased trafficking by transnational organised crime groups (TOC).

Further, as the climate crisis, overcapitalisation, IUU fishing and environmental degradation

start to threaten global fisheries it is becoming more important for us to consider the impact

of poor fisheries management and enforcement on the future of food security and

economic livelihoods for coastal populations in these already very poor nations. In contrast

to Somalia, the coastal states of West and Central Africa have functioning governments and

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security sectors and so should be able to effectively manage their fisheries to prevent

collapse, yet, their waters are rife with IUU fishing and policies managing fisheries are rarely

based on scientific evidence to maintain stocks and support local populations. A lack of

resources, capability and political will has not conducted the necessary scientific studies into

the marine ecosystem in their waters to develop the necessary policies. My research then

looks to understand why and how fisheries are managed and try to illustrate the impact this

could have on the future of conflict and development in West and Central Africa.

Fisheries remain a sovereign, domestic issue, and so understanding the impact of fisheries

management requires an in depth look at individual countries. To gain an understanding of

some of the issues and challenges shaping fisheries management in West Africa and their

impact, I have chosen to focus on two specific states instead of broadly across all 23. I have

based my research in the West African coastal state of Sierra Leone and the Central African

small island developing state of São Tomé & Príncipe. I have chosen these states because

they are small economies with food security challenges and consequently represent many of

the states in the region. Further, I have chosen one country (Sierra Leone) which has many

valuable natural resources and consequently has been shaped in several sectors by the

‘resource curse.’ The second (São Tomé & Príncipe) possess no valuable natural resources.

I wanted to choose a state without any other valuable natural resources so that the impact

of the intrinsic value of fish to create the conditions of the ‘resource curse’ in isolation can

be explored. There could be an argument that poor management of fisheries in a country

already shaped by the ‘resource curse’ could simply be an extension of the other resources,

I argue that the value of fish in developing countries makes them a cursed resource with

similar impacts and so this gives me an opportunity to demonstrate this.

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Further, both states were established by different colonial masters as colonies for freed

slaves and had different paths to independence. The ethnic divisions, institutions and

colonial legacies from these periods of colonial rule have created different path

dependencies. Sierra Leone was colonised by the British and São Tomé & Príncipe by the

Portuguese. In chapter two I examined some of the literature on historical development,

colonial legacies and neo-colonialism both in Africa in general, but also in these two specific

countries which highlighted some of the important differences the colonial systems of rule

and paths to independence had in shaping the institutions and culture in each country. As

well as how these have shaped their continuing relationship with their ex-colonial masters

and the wider international community and how this in turn is impacting development.

Colonial legacies have played an important role in creating the countries in West and

Central Africa. I have chosen two countries with different colonial histories to illustrate

some of the differences between the colonial models and relationships in shaping

governance, institutions and culture today. I also wanted to focus on two of the smaller

economies who are geographically further away from the huge regional force of Nigeria.

Nigeria’s massive oil reserves, huge population, limited navy, security challenges and

political difficulties create a massive driving force in the region. In order to avoid, as far as

possible, the complications of Nigerian influence, I have chosen two countries relatively

geographically separate. I recognise regional politics and cooperation drive the socio-

political relationships and economics of the region and impact fisheries and maritime

security. Nigeria, as the regional hegemon, is a key driving force of this and I will address

this as part of my analysis. However, countries such as Benin saw a 55% drop in their GDP in

2011 as a result of pirate activity largely blamed on Nigerian criminal gangs and it was this

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strong influencing factor that I hope to avoid by looking at my chosen, case study countries.

I will begin my analysis with Sierra Leone, and in particular in the fishing village of Tombo on

the Sierra Leonean coast.

Field research for this dissertation was carried out in December 2019. When I interviewed a

broad range of people engaged in fisheries or maritime work in Sierra Leone. These ranged

from government officials in the fishing and security sector, to NGOs, international

organizations, aid agencies, diplomatic missions based in Freetown, academics working in

fisheries in Sierra Leone, representatives from fisheries community management

organisations, fishermen and workers in the fishing sector, and private citizens. I have also

drawn on my experience as a practitioner working to improve maritime security in the

region from 2011-2014. I mentioned in my introduction the delicate balance I have had to

create in writing this dissertation. As a practitioner and scholar, I am faced with some

difficult challenges, where the ethical responsibilities of each sometimes come into

contention. As a scholar I want to provide evidence of the rigor of my investigations and

sources. But as a practitioner I am in a position of privilege that enables me greater access

to information than I would have if I was not in this profession. Diplomacy is based on

integrity, discretion and trust and these professional ethics have sometimes hampered my

scholarly endeavours to rigorously report my sources. Some of the topics covered in my

interviews were sensitive and could have impacted the position or even safety of some

interviewees. I have a professional responsibility to respect my interviewees’ trust, to allow

them to speak freely but without consequences. In my analysis in the coming chapter, I will,

at times, be vague about my sources, but I have explained in my introduction how I

gathered the evidence for the assertions I make which I hope will provide sufficient

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scholarly rigor for the reader.ide. In this situation, however, my professional ethics have to

take priority over my scholarly responsibilities. It is also important for me to assert at this

stage than none of the observations I make reflect the policy or opinions of the British

Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Government. Any perceived criticisms are not

intended as judgement or to discredit, but rather a scholarly analysis of resource

management in West and Central Africa aimed at providing a better understanding and tool

that could drive positive change and insight into how the curse could be broken.

Introduction to Sierra Leone

Situated between Liberia and Guinea on the West African coast, with a population of

7million, Sierra Leone was established as a British colony for freed slaves in 1787 and gained

independence in 1961. Despite being rich in valuable natural minerals including gold,

diamonds, bauxite and now potentially off-shore oil and gas, Sierra Leone ranks 181st out of

189 countries in the UN Human Development Index 2019.288 The people of Sierra Leone

suffered a brutal civil war from 1991-2002 which killed over 50,000 people and displaced 2

million. They were then ravaged by the Ebola epidemic in 2014, which claimed nearly 4000

lives.289 Sierra Leone has one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world.290 In 2017

devastating mudslides killed 1,141 people in Freetown,291 but despite all this the country

has seen relative stability since 2002. The 2018 Presidential elections were conducted

288 Human Development Index 2019, available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/2019-human-development-index-ranking 289 World Health Organization Figures sitrep March 2016: http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-16-march-2016 290 Boima, Francis (2014) In Sierra Leone, Food from WFP Vital to Fight Against Child Malnutrition: https://www.wfp.org/stories/sierra-leone-food-wfp-vital-fight-against-child-malnutrition 291 Glynn, Paul (2018) The day the mountain fell: Sierra Leone's mudslide: A look at how and why predictions of environmental disaster were ignored in a country recovering from war and disease. Aljazeera, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2018/02/day-mountain-fell-sierra-leone-mudslide-180221122154473.html

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without significant violence and Julius Maada Bio for the SLPP eventually won the runoffs to

take power with 51.8% of the vote defeating Samura Kamara from the All People’s Congress

(APC) replacing President Ernest Bai Koroma, who stepped down after serving a second five-

year term.292

Sierra Leone has a turbulent political past. The British policy of indirect rule served to create

a wealthy class of Creole Elites in Freetown and empowered the warrant chiefs and their

families. In the 1950s when the British colonial powers allowed the SLPP a stronger role in

governance the divisions between elites disincentivised them from further democratisation

and their policy continued to increase the power and wealth of the chiefs while attempting

to subordinate them nationally.293 Diamond mining had started in the north in the 1930s

but many miners were foreign migrants and local miners and communities did not benefit

from diamond profits which were spent mainly in the south leaving the north lagging

significantly behind. The neglect of the north, misappropriation of diamond rents and

patronage to elites and chiefs continued after independence during the reign of Sir Milton

Margai, who led the SLPP through independence, and then remained Prime Minister.

Margai used power and wealth to absorb opposition leaders294 ignoring real divisions

between north and south and attempting to hold autocratic power through absorbing

opposition leaders and trying to rig the 1967 elections.

292 2018 Presidential Elections Media Reports: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/sierra-leone-opposition-leader-wins-presidential-election-runoff-180405050505118.html 293 Allen, Christopher (1968) Sierra Leone Politics since Independence. African Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 269, Oct, pp.305-329 p. 307 294 ibid p.310

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The underdeveloped north supported the opposition APC, while the SLPP were supported

by elites in the south. Freetown continued to hold a special place in national politics

because of the previous economic position of its Creole population. In Kono District, where

most of the diamond mines were established, resentment grew from the failure to spend

more on local development, and the draining away of diamond profits to foreign workers.295

Margai’s attempts only led to further divisions and more chaos. Siaka Stevens’ APC party

won the 1967 elections and took power, only to be almost immediately arrested in a series

of coups that led to a period of military autocracy under Lieutenant Colonel Juxon-Smith.296

The APC had campaigned on the promise to stamp out corruption, more fairly appoint funds

from mineral resources and to support rural farmers. This military regime masqueraded as

supporting APC policies but took no action to do so, instead censoring the press and banning

demonstrations and stifling opposition. The military rule eventually came to an end in 1968

when Siaka Stevens era began, running till 1985. Ethnic divisions are highlighted by many

scholars including Jimmy Kandeh as characterising Sierra Leone politics through

independence and into present day. Sierra Leone has over 17 different ethnic groups living

there today with three main languages spoken297 representing the three largest groups:

Mendes, followed by the Temnes and then Limbas. Politicians are said to have consistently

used their positions to build power and wealth for their own groups and the political parties

are seen to represent the interests of the Mende from the south for the SLPP and the

Temne from the north for the APC. These ethnic divisions helped to stoke political divisions

295 Allen, Christopher (1968) Sierra Leone Politics since Independence. African Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 269, Oct, pp.305-329 p. 307 296 ibid p.324 297 Statistic from the Ministry of Information and Communications Government of Sierra Leone. Available at: http://mic.gov.sl/dotnetnuke/AboutSL/People-Culture

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that prevented the development of strong governance, setting the scene for the civil war in

1991.298

At 71,740 km² and with a population of 7.65million,299 Sierra Leone is similar in size to many

of the countries along the West African coast and suffers many of the same challenges.

Sierra Leone has huge economic potential, it has beautiful beaches, jungles and national

parks, a fertile marine environment, and rich natural resources. Yet more than 50% of its

people live on less than USD1.90 a day, despite the presence of significant valuable natural

resources including diamonds, gold, bauxite and an EEZ of 215,611 square kilometres.

Sierra Leone experienced lower economic growth than her neighbours in recent years

growing only 3.8% in 2017 and 3.5% in 2018. In 2019 it was expected to rebound to 4.8%,

while total public debt increased from 60.9% of GDP in 2018 to 62.3% of GDP in 2019.

Inflationary pressures and exchange rate fluctuation have damaged the economy while

elevated food prices mainly due to increases in fuel prices, lower than expected export

receipts, depreciation in parallel markets, lower donor inflows and increased demand for

foreign exchange to finance imports.300 Sierra Leone do not yet export oil and gas although

they have started the licensing process and hope to in the near future. The diamond

industry in Sierra Leone was not only a contributory factor to the causes of their civil war,

but served to lengthen it as so-called blood diamonds were used to buy weapons and

competition for the diamond fields continued to motivate rebel groups.301 Sierra Leone’s

298 Kandeh, Jimmy (1992) Politicization of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone African Studies Review, Vol. 35, No.1 Apr, pp.81-99 p.94 299 Census 2018 World Bank Data: https://data.worldbank.org/country/sierra-leone 300 World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sierraleone/overview 301 Audrie Howard (2016) Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, 15 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 137 p.147

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poor economic development despite such rich natural resources can be explained by many

of the arguments made in the ‘resource curse’ literature. I argue these same arguments can

be seen in how fisheries are managed in Sierra Leone and that the value of this natural

resource leaves it open to the same threats of the ‘resource curse.’ In this next section, I

will analyse the fisheries management in Sierra Leone with reference to the literature on the

‘resource curse.’ I will conduct my analysis at a micro level using the fishing village of

Tombo as a case study and at a macro level through government fisheries policy,

institutions, legal enforcement and regional dynamics. Additionally, many of the

observations made in the environmental security, resource conflict and resource ownership

literature can be said to apply to fish in Sierra Leone, these will be particularly important as I

start to explore potential alternative futures of conflict and fisheries management in

Chapter five.

Fisheries in Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covers 215,611 square kilometres from the

coast and inland fisheries including rivers, mangroves and lakes providing in excess of an

additional 200,000 square kms. Over 500,000 people in coastal communities are dependent

on the artisanal fishing sector for their livelihoods. In the 80s, during the cold war, the

Soviet Union invested in Sierra Leonean industrial fishing and Sierra Leone had a commercial

fishing sector, consisting of one company: the Sierra Leone Fishing Co (SLC) established in

the 1980s with funding from the government (25%) Development Bank (10%) the Franco-

Soviet Company (Société FRANSOV) (20%) and the final (45%) by private Sierra Leonean

entrepreneurs. There was a long-term agreement between the government of Sierra Leone

and the Soviets to exchange technical, economic, biological assistance and training to

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develop Sierra Leonean fisheries in exchange for access to Sierra Leone’s EEZ for Soviet

boats and the provision of shore services. In 1984 SLC had 17 vessels consisting of 15

shrimpers and two finfish trawlers.302 In addition to the Soviets, Senegalese, Spanish,

Ghanaian, Italian, Greek, and Liberian vessels were all licenced to fish in their EEZ in 1984.

The collapse of the Soviet Union followed by the 1991-2002 civil war in Sierra Leone ended

Russian engagement with fishing in Sierra Leone. The industrial fishing sector has not

recovered since the civil war and the fishing fleet in Sierra Leone is now artisanal, consisting

of 6-12foot wooden canoes, some with engines, and some larger, semi-industrial canoes

which have ice boxes and are capable of travelling further.

All local vessels fish the coastal demersal fishery. In addition, the Ministry of Fisheries

brings in about USD12 million annually selling licences to foreign trawlers from the EU,

China and Russia to fish their waters.303

302 FAO Fisheries overview report Sierra Leone, available at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/R9003E/R9003E03.htm 303 Figure given in multiple interviews with officials and stakeholders during field research.

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Fisheries regulation is led by Minister of Fisheries Emma Kowa Jalloh, who heads up the

Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources, but is implemented by Director of Fisheries,

Khadijatu Jalloh. Fisheries enforcement is an important part of maritime security capability.

In 2013 Sierra Leone signed the Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed

Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.304 In doing

so, they committed to a joint approach to securing the maritime domain, however, Sierra

Leone had already been leading the field on creating a multiagency approach to maritime

affairs with the formation of the Joint Maritime Committee (JMC) through a government

mandate in 2008 which has been operational since 2009. I visited the JMC in 2019 and

interviewed several officials working there and important stakeholders with experience of

working with the JMC. The JMC consists of representatives from nine government agencies:

The President’s Office of National Security has overall authority and then the centre

includes: Ministry of Defence (Navy, Air Force, Army), Ministry of Internal Affairs (Sierra

Leone Police), Immigration Authority, Ministry of Fisheries, Revenue Authority, Ports

Authority, Maritime Administration, and Transnational Organised Crime Department. The

JMC is situated down by Murray Town Wharf in Freetown where the country’s one patrol

boat and three rubber skiffs sit. The Patrol Boat was grounded during my visit as they

cannot afford the necessary parts to fix the engines, the parts had been ordered by the

World Bank during a recent visit and would arrive in three months. There is a Joint

Operations Centre (JOC) in the JMC building which has VMS, AIS and GIS305 capability and

304 The Code of Conduct was part of regional cooperation work to address maritime threats across the region and provided Head of State level commitment to complement to the Department of Transport commitments in the 2008 The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Establishment of a Sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard Function Network (the IMO/MOWCA MoU). More information available at: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/Code-of-Conduct-against-illicit-maritime-activity.aspx 305 VMS: Vessel Monitoring System - is a general term to describe systems that are used in commercial fishing to allow environmental and fisheries regulatory organizations to track and monitor the activities of fishing

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satellite data as well as radio and telephone connections. Maritime Security and fisheries

enforcement operations are planned based on information from the JOC. IUU fishing

patrols are the main priority of the JMC who also lead on joint maritime security work under

the Code of Conduct. 5% of revenues made from fines from breaches of fishing regulations

are supposed to return to the JMC from the Revenue Authority to pay for patrols. However,

in the last 2 years, I was told they had only successfully arrested 5-6 vessels violating fishing

regulations. The arrests were followed up by the Ministry of Fishing, the few that were

convicted had the charges reduced to lesser administrative charges that brought smaller

fines than the original violations they had been arrested for allegedly committing. The 5%

revenue was not reaching the JMC making it hard to continue patrols.306

New fishing regulations recently adopted by the Sierra Leone Parliament are hoped to make

a big difference to enforcement and revenues as they are stronger and have larger fines

connected to crimes. In 2018 the Government worked with a team from the UNDP and

international experts to develop a Maritime Strategy and Implementation Plan for Sierra

Leone and develop new fishing regulations. This work came out of the Code of Conduct

work which intended to help the countries in the region develop their “Blue Economies.” At

the time of my research, I was informed by local diplomats that the Strategy was sitting with

vessels. AIS: Automatic Identification System - is a communications technology which is normally used within VMS applications. AIS is typically used on VMS systems deployed on smaller fishing vessels under 60tonnes. GIS: Geographic Information System - is software that blends maps and databases allowing intelligent tracking and analysis. All three are combines in maritime information and enforcement centres. 306 Whilst visiting the JMC and JOC it was clear the team were proud of their work in developing the centre and establishing procedures to support patrols and rigorous security measures. On the surface it seemed the processes were running well and regular patrols and arrests were taking place. However, the one patrol boat had been out of action for several months and there was no public record or evidence of prosecutions under the fishing regulations. I delved further into this issue both with the team at the JMC and with other stakeholders. This made me aware of the chain of command, the charges that had been levied and the failure for the 5% return to the JMC from these fines.

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the President for approval before it could pass into law, but the new fisheries legislation has

been passed. The government established Community Management Associations with

World Bank funds to enable community management of artisanal fisheries. There are 641

artisanal landing sites in Sierra Leone. The artisanal fishing sector employs over 500,000

people and the CMA seeks to enable community management in their waters. The funds

come through the Ministry of Fisheries and so they are limited in their scope and impact,

and the conflict of interest makes it difficult for them to raise concerns to the government.

My observations and analysis from interviews led me to conclude that enforcing sustainable

practises and preventing IUU fishing is being held back by four main factors: lack of capacity

and fisheries expertise; lack of enforcement capability and capacity; corruption; and lack of

political will to address the other three. It seems that the ‘resource curse’ which blights the

mismanagement of other valuable natural resources in the country, also blights the

mismanagement of this valuable and essential resource. The state and future of fisheries in

Sierra Leone is bleak and it would take significant change to break the curse and turn this

around.

My next section will look in greater depth at the management of fisheries in Sierra Leone

with reference to the literature on the ‘resource curse,’ to make my case for why I consider

fish to be a cursed resource.

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Fisheries as a Cursed Resource in Sierra Leone

This section uses the main themes drawn from the ‘resource curse’ literature with reference

to my observations during field research and from interviews in an attempt to fill a gap in

the literature by making the case that fish are a cursed resource and the curse is stunting

economic development and driving the risk of conflict in a similar way as other valuable

resources including oil and gas. This analysis will take into consideration the wider

international political economy of fisheries. As well as historical, colonial legacies and the

neo-colonial structures of international relations and development aid to understand the

wider factors of fisheries management in Sierra Leone.

The literature on the ‘resource curse’ set out several main causes and effects that limit the

contribution of valuable resources to economic development and threaten stability. These

include economic mechanisms such as the Dutch Disease; weak institutions allowing rent

seeking behaviour and corruption; and the global political economy causing exploitation in

the international system including market price volatility. This next section examines each

in detail.

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Economic Mechanisms of the Resource Curse

In the economics literature on the ‘resource curse,’ scholars including Corden and Neary,307

Warner and Sachs,308 Gylfason, Herbertson & Zoega309 and Humphreys et al,310 analysed a

number of mechanisms whereby the existence of a valuable natural commodity prevented

economic development in other sectors. My literature review detailed these scholars’

arguments for economic mechanisms created by the cursed value of resources to stunt

growth through direct or indirect deindustrialisation, drawing resources out of other

sectors; diverting employment to low skilled jobs; stunting innovation and preventing the

development of more highly skilled secondary industries; and an influx of foreign capital

causing price appreciation of other internationally traded goods. These economic dynamics

are immediately visible as you arrive in Tombo. The town is built around the main

thoroughfares (dirt tracks) that connect the fishing wharfs with the main road to Freetown

and other markets. The whole town exists to land the fish, process them and get them to

market, but does not really possess the infrastructure for this. There is no electricity, and no

other significant industry or jobs in the town; everyone is working in support of the fishing

effort or surviving off its scraps. There are no guest houses, no street food sellers, no

restaurants or bars, no bank, no industry at all seems to have developed to support the

fishers or to cater for the people coming each day to buy fish. Further, despite being in

quite a remote location, there is not even any obvious subsistence farming taking place to

307 Corden, W & Neary, J (1982) Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy The Economic Journal, 92(368) pp.825–848. 308 Sachs, J & Warner, A (1995/1997) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. NBER Working Paper Series w5398. http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398 Sachs, J, & Warner, A (2001) The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4–6) pp.827–838. 309 Gylfason, T, Herbertsson, T, & Zoega, G (1999) A mixed blessing (natural resources and economic growth) Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3(2), pp.1091–1115 310 Humphreys, M, Sachs, J, & Stiglitz, J (2007) Escaping the resource curse. New York: Columbia University Press

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provide much needed additional food to residents. Instead, the villagers seem to trade

what fish they can for rice, and basic goods which are sold by individuals around the wharf

out of plastic basins and tiny shed-like shops. The people in Tombo are very poor. They live

off a diet of rice, palm oil and smoked fish. Many of the people are obviously malnourished,

including some small pot-bellied malnourished children playing in the street. Without

infrastructure, hygiene in Tombo is terrible. The people use the open street gutter as a

toilet and rats, mice, cockroaches and fleas infest every packed household. Many people

pass through the town daily to purchase fish in small quantities to take to sell elsewhere. At

a micro level, this little town has put everything into the fishing sector, but the valuable

commodity passing through has not really benefitted this coastal community.

Gylfason, Herbertson, and Zoega311 argued that a growth in one sector prevented

innovation in other sectors and once again this can be seen in Tombo. Elsewhere on the

coast, where there were no fishing wharfs, I encountered small villages, with small resorts

and businesses. They had generators set up near the beautiful beaches, food is grown and

fish is sold in small beach front restaurants at a premium to foreign aid workers weekending

at the beach and to tourists. In Tombo, it seems, a micro level of the ‘resource curse’ has

shaped the town to crowd out any other innovation. For example, I learned from

interviewing artisanal fishermen that in Tombo and in Sierra Leone industry has not sprung

up to support the artisanal fishing sector; all nets and equipment, for example, are imported

from overseas, no one is manufacturing or supplying them locally. Workshops to repair the

expensive outboard engines have not been set up or any attempt at a factory to supply the

311 Gylfason, T, Herbertson, T, & G. Zoega (1999) A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3 (02), pp.204–225. p.204

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expensive parts for repairs, as with the nets these are all sourced at great expense from

overseas and imported. The lack of education in mechanics and repairs is also holding back

the development of such potentially supportive infrastructure.

At a macro level, the USD12 million the Revenue Authority receive every year from selling

fishing licences to foreign trawlers is the greatest proportion of FDI coming into the

country,312 foreign currency and foreign investment is something Sierra Leone simply cannot

afford to do without. Once again this is in line with the literature on the resources curse

economic mechanisms as the influx of foreign capital in this sector causes a lag in other

sectors.313 In April 2019, the government introduced a one-month ban on foreign industrial

trawlers fishing in their waters. The move was greatly supported by the local artisanal

fishers and CMA, who would like to see a permanent reduction or moratorium of foreign

trawlers in their EEZ.314 It is understandable, however, that the government discounts the

value of protecting the maritime domain for this USD12 million assurance to the economy.

312 I was told this by several NGOs and diplomatic missions in Freetown, this was one of the occasions that everyone seemed to agree on a position. 313 Corden, W.M. and J.P. Neary (1982) Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy, The Economic Journal, 92 (368) p.825 314 Unis Bah, Usman (2019) Was Sierra Leone’s one-month fishing ban enough to replenish fish stocks? Mongabay News https://news.mongabay.com/2019/07/was-sierra-leones-one-month-fishing-ban-enough-to-replenish-fish-stocks/

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The Role of Weak Institutions

In line with the analysis of scholars including Arif315, Amundsen,316 Kaznacheev,317 Essang

Esu,318 Kolstad, Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik,319 Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier,320 Collier, Paul &

Hoeffler321, Anke,322 Sala-I-Martin & Subramanian,323 Charlier & N'cho-Oguie,324 Okeke,325

and Obafemi,326 the ‘resource curse’ is shaped by weak institutions and corruption in the

criminal and justice sector. Fisheries in Sierra Leone have been shaped and are still blighted

by weak institutions and corruption. When Julius Maada Bio and the SLPP came to power in

2018, they published three main priorities for economic and social development in Sierra

Leone: fisheries, tourism and education, but I was informed that quickly, agriculture had

overtaken fisheries on this list. Under the SLPP and the new Minister many of the people I

spoke to were optimistic that fisheries management was improving and the new

government and Minister were far less corrupt than the previous regime. However, the

speed at which the government priorities dropped fisheries demonstrates a lack of political

315 Arif, Sirojuddin (2019) Cursed By Oil? Rural Threats, Agricultureal Policy Changes and the Impact of Oil on Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s Rural Development Journal of International Development 31, pp.165–181 (2019) 316 Amundsen, Inge (2014) Drowning in oil; Angola’s institutions and ‘the resource curse’ Comparative politics. 44(2) pp.169–189 317 Kaznacheev, Peter (2017) Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies Policy Analysis January. 11, 808 pp.1-48 318 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22, pp.153-213 319 Mehlum, Halvor, Moene, Karl & Torvik, Ragna, (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) pp.1-20 320 Robinson, J, Torvik, R, Verdier, T (2006) The political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics 79, pp.447–468 321 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August, pp625-633 322 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution, August, Vol.49(4), pp.625-633 p.630 323 Sala-i-Martin, X, Subramanian, A (2013) Addressing the natural resource curse: an illustration from Nigeria. Journal African Economics 22 (4) pp.570–615 324 Charlier, F, N'cho-Oguie, C, (2009) Sustaining reforms for inclusive growth in Cameroon. A development policy review. The World Bank, Washington, DC. 325 Okeke, C, (2008) Mineral resources: Blessing or Curse? vol. 42. The International Lawyer America Bar Association. Spring, Chicago 326 Obafemi, F. N, Uchechi R. & Emmanuel, N (2013) Petroleum Resource, Institutions and Economic Growth in Nigeria, Journal of Business & Management, 1(3), pp.154 -165

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will at the highest levels to reform the fishing sector, suggesting resource rents are fuelling

corruption. The Ministry, as with most in Sierra Leone, remains a weak institution with low

capacity and lacking fisheries expertise. The government campaigned for the 2018 elections

with a desire to address corruption and improve economic development. They had a great

opportunity to work to improve the economy in their first year in power, but little progress

has been made, due more to incompetence and weakness than corruption.327 Institutional

and governance weakness make tackling problems even harder when the power structures

of the international political economy come into play.

Fisheries enforcement falls under the jurisdiction of Khadijatu Jalloh, the Director of Fisheries.

Interviewees explained to me that when evidence of IUU fishing or a report of a violation

from one of the enforcement officers comes into the JOC, the decision to act is made by the

Director. Again, once a ship has been arrested, the final charge levied against them and fine

served comes from the Director working with the judicial sector. This suggests to me that

this position, therefore, holds a great deal of power, for example, a lesser administrative

violation rather than the alleged crime could be served in exchange for a bribe or through

intimidation.328 The power this one position has on decision making demonstrates the

weakness of not only the fishing Ministry, but also the JOC and JMC. It is important to

327 This reflects the opinion of several interviewees from various stakeholder groups from NGOs, diplomatic missions, private citizens who although interviewed separately had similar views leading me to conclude this to be the case. 328 I drew this conclusion after considerable exploration of the issue with a number of different stakeholders. As mentioned earlier, my initial visit to the JMC and JOC presented a hard-working team, underfunded but with processes and structures that were operating to arrest vessels and improve maritime security. However, this did not support the lack of criminal charges being brought. I probed further to understand the chain of command and decision-making processes. What I was being told did not seem to match up with the reality. In private, with a number of different stakeholders, I delved further into these issues and asked for their observations and opinion on what was happening and why. I was as a result of the many and delicate conversations that I concluded the chain of command, weakness of institutions and corruption were most likely at play.

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mention at this point the strength of the foreign fishing agents in the country and the

networks of corruption and intimidation they have established. Demolishing these systems,

increasing transparency and empowering officials to strengthen institutions and systems is

no small task. Change would take significant top-down political will and buy in across the

board and would require taking on some powerful players to dismantle the existing systems.

This high-level corruption is worsened by the susceptibility to bribery or intimidation of

poorly paid, unarmed and unprotected fisheries enforcement officers alone onboard foreign

trawlers. A 2019 BBC documentary highlighted how corruption is hampering fishing

enforcement efforts in Sierra Leone. The film makers accompanied enforcement officers on

a patrol voyage to arrest ships identified on VMS committing illegal activities. As the patrol

boat headed towards the offending vessels, they separated and sailed for distant waters

indicating they had been warned of the impending operation.329 At the JOC I was told how

any illegal activity in fisheries picked up by VMS data had to go to the Director of Fisheries to

decide whether to take action or not. Only a total of 6 vessels had been arrested in the last

year, but despite being picked up for criminal activities, none had been charged and fined

for the alleged crimes, but rather charged with administrative violations, carrying small

penalties. All of this indicates the strength of the foreign fishing agents and their networks

within Sierra Leone and how they hold power over both low and high level officials.

Poor enforcement incentivises trawlers to fish these waters using illegal techniques such as

“tandem trawling,” ignoring gear limitations, catch limits, closed seasons and even slavery

329 BBC Documentary, Paul Adams & Charlotte Pamment (2019) Is China’s Fishing Fleet Taking All of West Africa’s Fish? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47698314/is-china-s-fishing-fleet-taking-all-of-west-africa-s-fish

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to improve margins and profits. The Becker crime model argues the expected utility of

criminality becomes more likely if the benefit of committing the crime is larger than the

probability of getting caught and the penalty imposed upon capture.330 Hence, without

enforcement and with huge profits to be made on international fisheries markets IUU

fishing practices will be encouraged as poor enforcement continues. Henri argued that

strong international corporations should demonstrate corporate social responsibility when

operating in developing countries, but lack of oversight and enforcement allows them not to

as another aspect of the ‘resource curse.’331 This poor behaviour by trawlers indicated the

aspect in fisheries. A stricter enforcement regime and more stringent application of

regulation and penalties for criminal practises could drive up standards for foreign trawlers.

In turn this would drive up the cost of fishing licences and generate more revenue to feed

into this and other sectors. However, the fishing agents benefitting from the weak maritime

security regime are strong and change will be difficult to achieve. Effective enforcement

requires funding, good practices, transparency, no corruption and consequences in order to

build strong institutions whereby systems protect officials from external influence.

Ineffective enforcement of fisheries regulations in Sierra Leone waters is enabling foreign

trawlers to continue to flout regulations, overfish and damage the marine environment.

This is having destructive impacts on the sustainability of the fishery. For example, a

sustainable cephalopod fishery has closed seasons of the year to allow spawning in shallow

coastal waters and then the adults are fished as they head back out to sea afterwards.

330 Becker, Gary (1974) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach Chicago: University of Chicago Press p.38 331 Henri, P, Atangana, Ondoa (2019) Natural resources curse: A reality in Africa Resources Policy 63, p.3

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However, several Italian trawlers had allegedly been witnessed fishing the squid during the

closed season before they had been able to spawn which was having a dramatic impact on

future generations and stocks.332 This kind of behaviour is incredibly damaging to the

fishery and can be easily identified and prosecuted with VMS data but in Sierra Leone it is

going unchecked, demonstrating the lack of enforcement. At the JMC enforcement officials

cited a lack of resources, funding and capacity as the limiting factor on fisheries and

maritime security enforcement. However, after speaking to artisanal fishers, NGOs and

international partners working in fisheries and development in Sierra Leone it seems

unlikely weakness in the Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources and judicial sector are

not the main contributing factor. The new fisheries regulations assign much larger fines to

criminal offences and consequently, the more criminality prosecuted, the more funds would

flow back into the JMC to more strictly enforce the regulations and raise standards in the

fishery. However, in confidence a number of interviewees told me that even when ships are

arrested for these crimes, they are rarely fined for more than a lesser administrative

violation, if at all, so resources remain low, criminality high and the detrimental impacts on

the fishery continue.333

Sirojuddin Arif334 argued that weak institutions distract from development in other sectors.

As already highlighted, this is demonstrated at the micro level in Sierra Leone in Tombo,

332 This example once again came up in several interviews, seemingly this activity can plainly be seen on VMS data and is also being observed by local fishermen. I was shown satellite data clearly showing the illegal activity and yet action is not being taken to stop it from taking place. 333 Once again, the failings between intent and work in the JMC to translate into arrests and charges for fishing violations that could be clearly seen on satellite data presented an issue for me that did not make sense and so it was after many private discussions with a number of different stakeholders that I drew these conclusions. 334 Arif, Sirojuddin (2019) Cursed by Oil? Rural Threats, Agricultural Policy Changes and the Impact of Oil on Indonesia’s and Nigeria’s Rural Development Journal of International Development Journal of International Development 31, pp.165–181 p.166

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where other industries and sectors have not developed. It has also had an effect at a macro

level because a strong and effective Ministry could be seen to be implementing the fishing

regulations and supporting local artisanal fishers in inclusive economic development.

However, this is not happening in Sierra Leone, and the lack of enforcement, failure to

protect the marine environment and support local fishers is distracting from development in

not only fish processing and product diversification, but also tourism, restaurants, and retail.

Secure fisheries cannot be achieved without high-level political will to strengthen the

institutions, tackle corruption, improve transparency and value for money in government

funds, and create a more robust criminal justice sector. The Code of Conduct Concerning the

Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and

Central Africa was encouraging as it received political support from Heads of State across

West and Central Africa to work together to address issues of maritime security. In states

like Sierra Leone, IUU fishing and lack of fisheries enforcement is not only the greatest

unaddressed risk to maritime security, but also a great risk to security, economic

development and food security. Maritime security is a multijurisdictional issue due to the

complexities of the maritime domain and so if some of these challenges presented by the

‘resource curse’ of valuable fishing revenues are to be tackled it will require strong top-

down political will to enforce the commitments made in the Code of Conduct. Previous

projects run by NGOs, the World Bank and IMO working with Fishing Ministries and

Ministers for Transport335 simply did not have sufficient political support at the right level.

335 Department of Transport commitments in the 2008 The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Establishment of a Sub-regional Integrated Coast Guard Function Network (the IMO/MOWCA MoU). More

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Maritime security and effective fisheries management is a regional and international issue

and effective change will require regional and international cooperation, so this work is an

important step, it also helps to avoid the risk of one state becoming the weak link in

protecting against criminal activity. Regional work and any international cooperation, as I

discussed earlier, however, is only as effective as sovereign states allow it to be, and so

domestic political will to empower the JMC and strengthen institutions will be essential if

Sierra Leone is to benefit from the Code of Conduct work and improve their fisheries

enforcement and maritime security. Regional politics will also play a significant limiting role

in the effectiveness of this joint work. All countries in the region lack resources and are

challenged to differing levels by internal security struggles and institutional corruption.

Further, competition between states and disputes over maritime boundaries could

disincentivise cooperation and prevent this work from ever having a significant impact.

Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier and Collier and Hoeffler336 argued that states in possession of

valuable natural resources tend to employ systems of patronage, and do not develop strong

democratic institutions capable of transparency, scrutiny and civil rights. There is stark

inequality in Sierra Leone between government officials and elites and the general

population. This is demonstrated by the convoys of government vehicles I witnessed driving

government officials between meetings at fancy hotels surrounded by high walls. In a

information available at: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/WestAfrica/Pages/Code-of-Conduct-against-illicit-maritime-activity.aspx 336 Collier, Paul and Hoffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August pp.625-633 p.625

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strong democracy, government officials serve the electorate and should be accountable to

them. In Sierra Leone however, the elevated status of government elites and the chasm

between them and the artisanal fishers suggests this aspect of the ‘resource curse’ is

present in fisheries management. There seems to be high-level influence preventing

efficient fisheries enforcement, demonstrating a lack of transparency and effectiveness in

the criminal justice sector.

The fishers and NGOs I spoke with demonstrated a clear appetite for a reduction, if not

moratorium on foreign industrial trawlers fishing in Sierra Leone waters. Yet, the huge

political will to enforce the required measures to achieve this does not seem to be present.

None of the officials I spoke with in maritime security or fisheries had anything negative to

say about the government officials or their policies. The general consensus was that the

Ministry of Fisheries was becoming stronger and less corrupt. However, this lack of criticism

did not align with the stories everyone I spoke with told alluding often indirectly to

corruption driving the lack of fisheries enforcement. For example, evidence from the JOC

being reported up and not acted on, charges being reduced at a later date, or fishing

trawlers evading patrol vessels. This demonstrates how weak institutions are empowering a

few elites at the expense of the rest. The dramatic difference in status, and perhaps fear of

retribution could be important motivation for the conflicting messages from interviewees.

There were obvious concerns over badly implemented policies, corruption, intimidation and

incompetence which resounds with the literature on the ‘resource curse.’

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In April 2019 the Sierra Leonean government closed the country’s waters to industrial

fishing vessels for the whole month; while allowing artisanal fishers to continue to fish. This

generated huge support from the local people, who reportedly felt the new government

was taking action in support of them over foreign industry. In 2012, the Ministry had also

designated four MPAs closed to fishing and introduced a 6nm exclusion zone from the shore

to allow artisanal fishers and local communities a safe space to fish without competition and

damage from trawlers. In 2019 however, the MPAs have not been implemented337 and

fishers report regular incursions by foreign industrial trawlers not only into the 6nm limit

but also fishing in the inland riverways. Further, in 2018 the UNDP and IMO funded some

maritime experts to work with the Sierra Leone government to develop a new Maritime

Security Strategy and Implementation plan. At time of research the Strategy was awaiting

Presidential final approval before it could come into law. As an intern to these maritime

experts, I contributed to the draft that was submitted to the government. When I asked the

team who had visited Sierra Leone to develop the strategy about their observations and

discussions when they had visited the fishing villages and communities, I was shocked to

learn they had not visited them at all, but rather the government had brought a selection of

representatives to meet with them in Freetown.338 My concern is that all these measures

are merely paying lip service to pressure from regional partners, local fishing communities

and the international community to address fisheries management and maritime security.

Without significant political will to enforce and empower change it will not be achieved and

with competing priorities and many players pushing against these changes driven by the

337 Unis Bah, Usman (2019) Was Sierra Leone’s one-month fishing ban enough to replenish fish stocks? Mongabay News https://news.mongabay.com/2019/07/was-sierra-leones-one-month-fishing-ban-enough-to-replenish-fish-stocks/ 338 In March 2018 I undertook an internship for I.R. Consilium who were working as part of the team to develop the strategy as part of the Code of Conduct work. https://irconsilium.com/

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‘resource curse,’ it may not happen before it is too late to maintain and sustain Sierra

Leone’s valuable and essential fishery.

The Political Economy of the Resource Curse

Scholars including Robinson, Torvik, & Verdier339, Rosser,340 Schubert,341 Humphreys, Sachs

and Stiglitz342 wrote about the wider political economy and role of global capitalism in the

‘resource curse.’ I argued in the previous section that weak institutions are enabling poor

fisheries enforcement, by allowing corruption and rent seeking behaviour, as well as

external intimidation. Leite and Weidmann also argued that high rents from natural

resources can drive a lack of transparency over resource revenues which hinders democratic

process and further drives corruption and rent seeking behaviour.343 Global fish markets are

volatile and lack transparency and negotiations over fishing access are confidential and

shaped by the global political economy. Although fisheries legislation sets out the cost for

foreign trawlers to fish in Sierra Leonean waters, the actual agreements are far from

transparent and are protected by government institutions. As mentioned previously, Sierra

Leone is one of the poorest countries in the world, who face multiple security and health

challenges. The USD12 million a year earned from selling fishing licences is essential

income. Consequently, the government starts from a weaker negotiating position with

foreign states. The lack of enforcement means the government cannot easily prevent a

339 Robinson, James; Torvik, Ragnar; Verdier, Thierry (2006) Political foundations of the resource curse Journal of Development Economics 79 pp.447-468 340 Rosser A (2006) The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey. IDS Working Paper No. 268, IDS: Brighton, Sussex 341 Schubert, S (2006) Revisiting the Oil Curse: Are Oil Rich Nations Really Doomed to Autocracy and Inequality? Oil and Gas Business (2) pp.1-16. 342 Humphreys M, Sachs J, Stiglitz J (2007) Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia Univ. Press 343 Leite C, Weidmann, J (1999) Does Mother Nature corrupt? Natural resources, corruption, and economic growth. Tech. Rep. WP/99/85. Int. Monet. Fund, Washington, DC

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country from fishing their waters if they refuse to pay a fair, higher price. This means the

government is better placed to accept what they can rather than attempt to negotiate

higher knowing full well that the multijurisdictional dynamic of the maritime domain would

mean a ship could simply reflag to gain access or continue to fish illegally.

The high value of fish on international markets means it is very unlikely the government are

earning anywhere near the same amount from selling licences as the cumulative profits

foreign trawlers are making from selling their fish. But the same dynamics that mean they

have to sell access under UNCLOS puts them in a weak position with international partners.

Further, partners, such as the EU often represent important markets for Sierra Leone and

important development partners. The EU has had a yellow card against Sierra Leone since

2016 for their failure to monitor and control illegal fishing in their waters.344 The yellow

card is the first step in the European Commission’s IUU enforcement measures and if Sierra

Leone is not seen to take action to improve the situation it risks losing access to European

markets. While on the surface these enforcement sanctions are intended to improve

fisheries enforcement and prevent corruption from allowing IUU fishing, they also have the

possible unintended effect of dramatically strengthening the EU position in negotiations for

access with Sierra Leone. The EU can link development aid and promises of technical

support to help lift the yellow card to the purchase of fishing licences securing them at far

below their market value. While the EU as an organization seek to promote security and

development overseas and use these mechanisms to raise international standards; they are

also an economic union charged with promoting the economic interests of their member

344 EU Commission Report April 2016: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_16_1457

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states. This calls into question the power of the yellow card system and could be an

example of many industrial states’ exploitation within the global political economy when

purchasing access to developing countries’ waters under UNCLOS requirements. The lack of

transparency in these negotiations not only enables rent seeking behaviour and corruption

within weak local government institutions, but also enables deeper exploitation of Sierra

Leone as a poor, developing economy, by stronger industrial nations.

Adams et al,345 Kolk and Lenfant,346 Kopiński et al347 argued that resources are “socially

constructed and controlled by agents and actors in global …capitalism.” This is true of fish

both in the exploitation by more powerful economies when buying access to Sierra Leone

waters, and in the behaviour of foreign trawlers in Sierra Leonean waters. Fishing in African

waters requires far-water trawlers to travel large distances with high fuel costs, motivating

them to cut other costs as much as possible and catch as many fish as possible to increase

margins. This is an example of the economic drivers of global capitalism that drive

overfishing, illegal fishing methods, slavery and other illegal activities. Further, global price

volatility impacts local artisanal fishers. In Sierra Leone, fishers have to purchase nets and

outboard motors from abroad leaving them vulnerable to currency market fluctuations and

high upfront operating costs. The local fishermen are supplying the very poor people in

local markets so they cannot charge anything like the same for their catch as a foreign

345Adams, D, Adams, K, Ullah, S, Ullah, F (2019) Globalisation, governance, accountability and the natural resource ‘curse’: implications for socio-economic growth of oil rich developing countries. Resource Politics 61, pp.128–140 346 Kolk, A, Lenfant, F (2010) MNC reporting on CSR and conflict in central Africa. Journal of Business Ethics 93(N°2), pp.241–255 347 Kopiński, D,Polus, A, Tycholiz, W (2013) Resource curse or resource disease? Oil in Ghana African Affairs 112(N°449), pp.583–601

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trawler supplying international markets. This keeps their profit margins low and means

price increases in imported gear have a substantial economic hit. As fish stocks in Sierra

Leone come under increasing pressure and fish become harder to catch, fishermen are

forced further out to sea, using more fuel, this increases their operating costs and leaves

them susceptible to international oil price volatility and supply shortages. When I

interviewed artisanal fishermen, they explained how they could sell their fish across the

border in Liberia to get a better price for their fish in the relatively stronger economy. This

helps to cover the fishermens’ mounting costs but it reduces the fish available on local

markets driving up prices and risking local food security. Further, crossing into Liberian

waters unlicensed risks conflict and clashes with Liberian fishermen or authorities.

Neo-Colonialism

Andrew Rosser, Ayelazuno,348 Obi, Watts349 and Owusu350 argued that the ‘resource curse’

theory is too simplistic, reductionist and above all ahistorical, especially with reference to

colonialism and capitalism’s twinned histories.351 Consequently, it is impossible to illustrate

and analyse the role of the ‘resource curse’ in fisheries management in Sierra Leone without

considering the role of colonial legacies, development policies and neo-colonialism. Sierra

Leone was ruled as a British colony from the late 19th Century until eventually gaining

independence in 1961. As such the institutions and structures of government began under

348 Ayelazuno, Jasper (2014) Oil wealth and the well-being of the subaltern classes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A critical analysis of the resource curse in Ghana. Resources Policy 40 pp.66–73. 349 Watts, Michael (2004) Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Geopolitics 9(1) pp.50–80 350 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development 61 pp.149–159 351 ibid p.153

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the British system of indirect rule. 352 Further, as a postcolonial state, Sierra Leone is

impacted by the exploitation of the structure of global capitalism that developed out of

economic colonialism. This is demonstrated in the asymmetry of their fishing licence

negotiations with other states and the impact of currency fluctuations and price volatility on

fuel and imported fishing equipment. There are three most striking postcolonial legacies

that can be seen in fisheries in Sierra Leone. The first is the attitude of government officials

and local fishermen to expertise, advice and influence from outside, particularly from the

colonial states. The second is the role of development aid in the country and in fisheries.

The third is the relationship with China and the influence they have over fisheries

management in Sierra Leone.

The World Bank has a West Africa Regional Fisheries Programme designed to support the

sustainable management of fish and aquatic resources by: (i) strengthening the country's

capacity to sustainably govern and manage the fisheries; (ii) reducing illegal fishing; (iii)

increasing the value and profitability generated by the fish resources and the proportion of

that value captured by the country; and (iv) developing aquaculture.353 This project is not

yet operating in Sierra Leone, but they did receive a USD4 million grant from the World Bank

to support fisheries in 2017. Suggesting their willingness to accept financial support, but a

hesitance at accepting assistance in the form of structured support from strong foreign

actors imposing structures and systems on them. This is understandable given the failings

of neo-liberal international institutions in developing countries during the green revolution

for example. The grant funded the patrol boat and the World Bank recently ordered the

352 Davidson, Basil (1995) Africa in History New York: Touchstone Publishing p.287 353 The World Bank: https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P124812?lang=en

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parts needed to repair it. Their work is limited however, as funding commitments and

follow up work promised by the government rarely come through. This could lead to the

World Bank having to scale back their support rather than increase it. A number of other

international partners, NGOs and international organisation are working or have worked

with Sierra Leone to address fisheries and IUU fishing. However, the government often see

offers of assistance imposed without appropriate protocols or highlighting weaknesses as a

form of interference and neo-colonialism particularly from European states and America.354

So this assistance can be met negatively. For example, a London based NGO committed to

raising standards in fishing and other sectors had a very impactful project in Sierra Leone

empowering local fishing communities to assist with fisheries enforcement. However,

anecdotally, I have been told by other sources, inevitably their work led them to highlight

corruption and weaknesses in the system which was poorly received and they have been

barred from working in Sierra Leone. They are still working with Guinea and Liberia and

hope to start work in Sierra Leone again.355 Further, the international experts who came on

an evidence gathering mission before supporting the development of the Maritime Strategy

and Implementation Plan were kept in Freetown and had their meetings tightly controlled

by officials suggesting an appetite to control the narrative and not be patronised or dictated

to by white outsiders.

354 This was an opinion shared with me in private both by government officials, aid agencies, diplomats and NGOs. Government officials were often defensive and scathing of outside interference and foreign practitioners shared stories where they had walked a delicate balance between offering support and expertise without risking being seen to be interfering. 355 The EJF success story in Bonthe skirts around the issue of the lack of government cooperation they received. This article is an example of an NGO trying to show support for the Sierra Leone government and demonstrate the value of their work to local people in an attempt to repair relationships. https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/community-spirit-and-co-management-ejf-in-sierra-leone

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Sierra Leonean government officials do work with the World Bank, and other external

experts and organizations on maritime security and despite the colonial past have a good

working relationship with Britain. For example, an ex-Royal Navy maritime security expert,

previously British Defence Attaché to Sierra Leone, has been seconded to help improve

processes and security in the JOC, as part of the Code of Conduct work and the International

Security Training Team (ISATT) formerly the British Military Advisory and Training Team,

(BMAT) work closely with the JMC and Sierra Leonean Military, Navy, Air Force and Police.

The strong relationship with the British heralds from the end of the civil war. From 1999 to

2006 the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), with support from the Military Observer

Group of ECOWAS (ECOMOG) worked to protect civilians and bring an end to the civil war.

When the RUF violated the Lomé Peace Agreement and threatened Freetown in 2000 British

armed forces intervened in support of UN and ECOWAS troops finally bringing the conflict to

its conclusion in 2002. The success of this intervention and the continued support with

finance, training and equipment has built a good relationship. However, good relationships

and support for security infrastructure will continue to have a limited effect if the political

will to strengthen institutions and tackle corruption does not exist.

Sierra Leone is plagued by the international development sector, and yet still struggles with

development. Freetown is packed with large compounds and offices for all the major UN

agencies, development offices of foreign states, international charities and NGOs. Fleets of

white Toyota Landcruisers with logos on the side and diplomatic plates ferry white aid

workers around the town from one gated building to the next, meeting with the diplomatic

community and government representatives in high class hotels behind high walls. There

are so many foreigners working for NGOs, aid agencies and Embassies in Freetown that

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someone has even developed an app similar to Uber to summon a fleet of Landcruiser taxis.

Colleagues at the British Embassy explained how for them Sierra Leone is a two-car post,

meaning any travel outside of Freetown had to be undertaken in a convoy of two vehicles in

case one broke down, got stuck or crashed. These kind of safety rules, although

understandable for organisations and governments with a duty of care to their staff

dramatically limit work and serve to carve deeper divisions between wealthy foreign

diplomats and poor local communities. The juxtaposition between the mainly white

foreigners in their Landcruisers and airconditioned, generator-powered, gated compounds

and the local black population walking or crammed into crowded public transport, living in

often squalid conditions is stark. A bold illustration of the fallacy of the unintended impact

of international development aid and the neo-colonial dynamics of the international system

which continues to drive difference and subjugation.

The same can be said of government elites, who I regularly saw driving in convoys of black

4by4s flanked by trucks carrying armed military and police escort bikes. These transport

dynamics illustrate and deepen the divisions between the local people, government elites

and foreign aid workers. In the UK government ministers and officials are administered by a

strict Ministerial or Civil Service Code which seeks to prevent rent seeking behaviours or

abuses of power.356 Policies are developed to keep them connected to the people. All

356 UK Government Web Sources: Ministerial Code, (2019) Issued by the Cabinet Office https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/826920/August-2019-MINISTERIAL-CODE-FINAL-FORMATTED-2.pdf Civil Service Code updated March 2015 sets the statutory basis for the management of the Civil Service as per Part 1 of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The Code can be viewed online here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/civil-service-code/the-civil-service-code The recent decision by British PM Boris Johnson to support his advisor, Dominic Cummings and not hold him to account for breaching lock down regulations as part of the pandemic response has demonstrated how quickly the electorate lose trust in a government when these codes are not upheld.

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Members of Parliament hold “surgeries” (face-to-face meetings with their constituents) on a

Friday and any member of the public can sit and watch debates in both houses of

Parliament. Ministers share a fleet of small Toyota Priuses, fly economy class and walk

between government buildings and Parliament, dodging through the tourists. Such pomp

and ceremony as we witnessed daily in Freetown, in the UK is reserved for Royalty or to put

on a show on special occasions when foreign dignitaries visit.

While across the globe inequality, wealth, power and entitlement of the few creates elites in

all societies, being a government official in a democracy is rarely associated with wealth as

public salaries are capped by Parliament. Yet, across West and Central Africa “security and

safety requirements” mean even the most junior diplomats and aid workers travel and live

in conditions out of reach of local communities. It is understandable that this dynamic helps

to set a precedent for government officials to travel and live in conditions that set them

above these foreigners, to maintain their status. I am reminded of the postcolonial mindset

that Fanon and Walters wrote about and wonder if colonial legacy can still explain the

existence of this behaviour today, nearly fifty years after independence? Whether the

British system of indirect rule and creating an entitled elite ruling class of warrant chiefs still

continues to drive behaviour in government officials today? Or whether it is influenced by

the apparent neo-colonial presence of the mainly white international development and aid

community? Or whether it is a hangover from the increased security needed to protect key

government officials from ambush and attack by rebel groups? The locals I spoke with did

not express any surprise or annoyance at this expensive elitist behaviour and seemed to

think it fitting for government officials. But I am not convinced at whether this was their

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actual view or whether they were just reticent to be critical of the government to a white

outsider.

Whether this does stem from colonial and security legacies, I am convinced it serves to

support continued corrupt behaviours amongst government officials. Simply because this

special treatment can contribute to a sense of entitlement and power above the rest of the

population that makes benefitting from rents from government resources seem fair and

logical. Rents enable government officials to achieve a level of wealth and freedom far

exceeding that of other people. Democratically elected officials can transform themselves

from public servants into an elite class, separate from the people they were elected to

serve. It is easy to understand how growing up in abject poverty anyone achieving power

would be tempted by the opportunity to benefit personally and help their friends or family.

Looking at levels of corruption across the countries in West and Central Africa and economic

development it is clear to see how these rent seeking behaviours are holding economic

development back. Some countries, however, have managed to largely overcome the

colonial legacies of their past that shaped entitled, corrupt elites. Ghana, for example,

started exporting oil and gas ten years ago. The government worked hard to fight

corruption, enforce accountability and transparency. As a result, they have experienced the

highest levels of economic growth of any country in the region and the people have

benefitted from the resource revenues.357 In Sierra Leone international development aid

provides some of the basic services that people would not be able to access otherwise, such

357 Siakwah, Pius (2018) Actors, networks, and globalised assemblages: Rethinking oil, the environment and Conflict in Ghana Energy Research and Social Care 38 pp.68-76 p.69

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as clean water, vaccinations and healthcare. But with so much money flowing through the

country being spent to support foreign workers and elites it is worth questioning their value.

International development often has the unintended consequence of stunting economic

growth by preventing competitiveness and discouraging foreign investment. Further, much

of the money spent to support foreign workers comes from procuring equipment and goods

from outside the country and so this money does not benefit the Sierra Leone economy.

Sierra Leone are currently under a yellow card from the EU for health and safety and IUU

violations in their fishing sector. EU nations development agencies have been working with

Sierra Leone to improve sanitation and address IUU fishing. The new fishing regulations will

be a big part of the work the Sierra Leonean government have put in place to demonstrate

they have addressed the concerns cited in the yellow card. In addition, EU development aid

agencies, mainly from Scandinavian countries licenced to fish Sierra Leone waters, and the

World Bank are working to improve sanitation in artisanal fisheries. At the wharf in Tombo,

they are constructing covered, hygienic landing areas, with ceramic tiles that are easily

cleaned for the fish to be descaled, gutted and sorted before going to market. When I

visited, the structures were still under construction. Several had been built and were in use,

but none yet had the ceramic tiles and were merely roofed concrete platforms. A significant

amount of fish were still being processed on tarpaulins or just on the dusty ground,

demonstrating the inadequacies of these facilities and lack of education on sanitation.

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This work, demonstrates a tendency in international aid to impose external standards on

local fishers rather than to work with them to establish the best ways to address their

needs. Smoking is the main method of preserving fish for transport in country or just to

preserve it longer. The smoking sheds, (Bandas) use open wood fires and smoking wracks

that are unhealthy for the people working in them and living round about. To try and

improve the health of these facilities, the aid project had built some new smoking ovens

that use less wood and keep the smoke contained. These new ovens were welcomed, but

were not working correctly when I visited and the locals had not received proper training

and were struggling to figure out how to fix them.

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Consequently, most of the new ovens were not being used, but were still taking up space in

the bandas meaning the traditional ovens were being used even more than usual actually

increasing the smoke. In recent years, an ice making, freezing and processing building had

been built near the wharf to help fishers preserve more valuable fresh fish and to provide

ice for the larger canoes that cover larger distances. Tombo, however, has no electricity,

and no running water so in order to stock the ice shed water had to be pumped from the

town’s one well and transported into the shed and generators run to provide electricity

burning expensive fuel which could be used for boat motors. Sierra Leone faces fuel

shortages and import difficulties due to fluctuations in the international oil and currency

markets. As a result, the shed is simply not economically viable for the local fishers who

cannot afford to run it. Instead, ice is shipped on public transport from Freetown to stock

the ice stores on the larger boats and fish is sold on the day it is caught, or smoked and the

ice house lies empty.

These projects demonstrate the gap between the well-meaning international community

and development projects and actual concrete actions that could support the development

of inclusive economic growth from fisheries. Tombo could benefit from electricity, running

water, improved hygiene and sanitation infrastructure. Once in place these would facilitate

the creation of facilities such as cold storage to support business development. It is

understandable that the international community see such infrastructure as a sovereign

issue for the government of Sierra Leone and so will not work to address gaps. However,

the fishermen have challenges that could be supported. For example, their biggest

challenges are the high cost of nets, outboard engines, compasses and spare parts for

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maintenance. All this essential kit is imported from overseas and presents huge upfront

costs worsened by currency fluctuations. Support to subsidise and facilitate supply chains,

training in motor maintenance or even gifting equipment would significantly support local

fishermen. Additionally, industrial trawlers are infringing further and further into the 6nm

industrial exclusion zone (IEZ) designed to protect local fishers. These trawlers are

damaging the marine environment, catching huge volumes of fish and endangering the

small local canoes. High upfront costs and reduced catches are also increasing conflict

between local fishers, and between fishers and international trawlers. Some international

aid agencies, The Global Institute for Change for example, are working with the government

to try and improve fisheries enforcement to control the illegal activity of trawlers, and

arguably this kind of assistance could better support local fishermen.358 Most aid agencies,

however, are delivering aid in small affordable projects that provide little assistance to the

local fishermen.

China has the biggest far-water fishing fleet in the world and is actively engaged in West

African fisheries. Consequently, an analysis of the political economy of fisheries in Sierra

Leone requires a careful examination of Chinese activity in particular. In 2019 China had

approximately 68 vessels operating in Sierra Leone’s EEZ making up roughly 75% of Sierra

Leone’s industrial trawlers.359 The Chinese fleet provides USD7 million annually in licensing

fees and USD2-3 million in export fees. China and Sierra Leone developed a Comprehensive

358 Institute for Global Change were one of the NGOs interviewed during my field research. A short promotional video of their work can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UlSckXfyMA 359 Source Undercurrent News: China strengthens ties to Sierra Leone with new fishing harbour available at: https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2019/01/08/china-strengthens-ties-to-sierra-leone-with-new-fishing-harbor/

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Strategic and Cooperative Partnership in 2016 to “comprehensively expand and deepen

bilateral, friendly as well as mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields.”360 The

Chinese have made several major investments in Sierra Leone including the Jui hospital, the

ultra-modern Foreign Affairs Ministry building and the Regent-Grafton Road, (which remains

under construction) as well as an annual scholarship programme to Sierra Leonean students.

The majority of fishing Agents in Sierra Leone are Chinese and their presence can be felt

across fisheries. In Tombo, for example, the only two storey building belongs to the Chinese

fishing agents. The volumes of fish being caught legally by these trawlers is huge. One

vessel can catch over 100tonnes of fish a day, compared to a total of 17tonnes annually

being caught by artisanal fleets. In a bid to demonstrate their commitment to addressing

IUU fishing in Sierra Leonean waters China has announced that they have not licenced any

additional trawlers to fish in the EEZ, however, evidence from VMS data suggests trawling

hours have been increasing steadily361 and there are reports in the fishing media of new

ships leaving Yantai in China for Sierra Leone.362 In April 2019 the government implemented

a one month moratorium on industrial trawling in their waters. The Chinese made public

assertions that they would adhere to the ban, which local fishers would have liked to see

implemented for longer. Lack of enforcement capacity, however, meant the ban was

difficult to implement and it is unlikely all fishing stopped during this time. Following the

ban, the Chinese announced plans to work with the government of Sierra Leone to carry out

360 Taken from the Awoko local Sierra Leonean Newspaper: Sierra Leone Business: China and Sierra Leone sign $29.8m Fish Harbour project available at: https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/sierra-leone-business-china-and-Sierra Leone-sign-29-8m-fish-harbour-project/ 361Ogundeji, Olusegun, (May 2019) Sierra Leone takes steps to tackle overfishing: Can a one-month industrial fishing ban and population count help the nation regain control of its dwindling fish? China Dialogue: https://chinadialogueocean.net/8182-sierra-leone-tackles-overfishing/ 362 Godfre, Mark, (June 2019) Seven trawlers leave Yantai, headed for Sierra Leone Seafood Source: https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/environment-sustainability/seven-trawlers-leave-yantai-headed-for-sierra-leone

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research into the fishery to establish sustainable catch limits for trawlers, something that

Sierra Leone does not yet have the fisheries science data to put in place. In addition, in

2019 China and Sierra Leone signed a USD29.8 million agreement for China to build a fishing

wharf and supporting infrastructure to enable fish to be landed and processed in Sierra

Leone for export and so benefit more from the industry. On the surface all of this is good

international cooperation and business development aid for Sierra Leone but the

motivations and true picture behind the diplomacy may paint a very different picture.

China, with the world’s largest population, accounts for the most seafood loving nation.

According to the FAO Chinese seafood consumption is 41kg per capita a year, double the

world average. According to FAO figures, China’s wild capture fishing fleet produced

15,246,234 tonnes in 2016, more than double that of the second largest producer Indonesia

at 6,109,783 tonnes.363 In addition, an extra roughly 70 million tonnes were produced

through aquaculture in China.364 Although aquaculture provides an important contribution

to fish production for food security as stocks in certain species dwindle, the rise in demand

for fishmeal feed for the farms further threatens the oceans. As aquaculture production has

gone up, wild capture of small species for fishmeal has risen dramatically. While not

targeting fish for human consumption, this fishery causes considerable damage to the

marine ecosystem. In the wild fish will typically eat fish one tenth smaller than them and so

throughout the lifecycle of a large fish, tuna for example, their diet will cover a range of fish

as they grow. Removing too many fish from lower down the food chain in the wild capture

363 2018 State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture p.9 FAO Report: http://www.fao.org/state-of-fisheries-aquaculture 364 2018 State of the World Fisheries and Aquaculture p.19 FAO Report: http://www.fao.org/state-of-fisheries-aquaculture

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fishery can have significant impacts for a number of species. Additionally, catching smaller

fish requires smaller mesh nets that catch everything in their way and cause more damage

to the marine environment. Further, fish are migratory species and often spawn in one

location and then move down the coast or out to sea as they grow. Targeting fishmeal

stocks in an area where juveniles of another species live can have a drastic impact on those

species who become by-catch. Unsustainable aquaculture production and fishmeal fisheries

can present a significant threat across the marine food-web. China’s two main sources of

animal protein are fish and pork. In 2019 the global pork industry was ravaged by an

outbreak of swine flu which hit hardest in China and increased fish demand to meet food

security needs. The Chinese are motivated to maximise their distant water fleet wild

capture production, which raises questions about the true intentions and objectives of their

fisheries support to Sierra Leone.

In chapter two I discussed Chinese neo-colonial activities in Africa and the mechanisms they

use for neo-colonial exploitation of African resources for Chinese benefit. Their work in

Sierra Leone fisheries can be seen as an example of these policies. There is significant

evidence365 that Chinese trawlers are operating illegally, conducting tandem trawling, using

small mesh nets, fishing within the 6nm industrial exclusion zone, not being careful of

bycatch, targeting species in spawning areas and catching huge volumes more than they are

reporting. Under UNCLOS, China, as the flag state, has responsibility for ensuring their

365 VMS data in MDA centres anywhere in the world can track the location and activity of Chinese trawlers in Sierra Leone waters and the wider Gulf of Guinea. The BBC Documentary, for example, demonstrates how two vessels can be seen tandem trawling in Sierra Leone’s EEZ-an illegal fishing technique that causes significant damage to the marine environment. BBC Documentary, Paul Adams & Charlotte Pamment, (2019) Is China’s Fishing Fleet Taking All of West Africa’s Fish? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47698314/is-china-s-fishing-fleet-taking-all-of-west-africa-s-fish

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trawlers are operating legally and responsibly. The World Bank, UN and many international

partners are assisting the Sierra Leonean government with work to improve their maritime

security and fisheries enforcement. The Chinese have gifted a couple of very old vessels to

assist with security, but they have been in poor condition and not lasted more than a few

months. Instead of enforcing legal fishing techniques on fishing trawlers flagged to China,

they are investing USD28.9 million in infrastructure to grow Sierra Leone fisheries. There is

significant concern that the support the Chinese government are providing is a front to

maximise their far water fishing capacity at the expense of Sierra Leone.

The Chinese Agents and trawlers already take full advantage of Sierra Leone’s weak

institutions and governance to ensure maritime security remains poor and fisheries

enforcement lax so their trawlers can continue to operate with impunity. Sierra Leone does

not have an industrial fishing sector and so the development of an industrial fishing port and

processing facilities would not benefit the fishers in Sierra Leone. Arguably this port would

provide Chinese trawlers operating in the area with essential infrastructure to land, process

fish and ship it back to China more efficiently. The Chinese had been in negotiations for

some time to build a deep-water industrial port in São Tomé, but have recently seemed to

change their minds and have now announced their plans to build in Freetown. Such a huge

infrastructure project could bring jobs and economic activity to Sierra Leone but the Chinese

have a track record in Africa for importing their own equipment, workers and supplies for

those workers from China and so local communities rarely benefit from the infrastructure

projects. Further, their record in Sierra Leone is similar to that in other countries. In 2002

China agreed to build a new building for the Sierra Leonean Ministry of Foreign Affairs which

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was completed in 2012 and cost USD10 million. It was constructed by a Shanghai based

Chinese company.366 Building the building for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents an

opportunity to be seen at the heart of raising prestige for Sierra Leone on the International

stage. However, as many conversations and much work that will happen in the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs is sensitive, building it provides a significant security concern for Sierra Leone

and opportunity for China to maintain an advantage and exert pressure. Other notable

infrastructure projects the Chinese have built using Chinese companies and funds loaned to

the Sierra Leone government include the Charlotte mini-hydropower plant that was

completed in 2012 and the Regent-Jui road which started construction in 2011 was a USD33

million project, once again carried out by Chinese construction companies using Chinese

development aid loaned to the Sierra Leone Government.367 At the end of 2019, the road

remained a dirt track with little obvious progress made.

Chinese promises to deliver huge, essential infrastructure projects such as power plants,

roads and ports using low interest development loans seem to be opportunities too good to

pass up by many developing countries. The projects often get delivered quickly and cost far

less than if another foreign company were to have been contracted and initially cost the

Sierra Leone Government nothing. However, China have been seen to use these significant

built up debts to force countries into supporting them on the international stage, in votes at

the UN for example. Further, the fast projects often cut corners on materials or processes

and products either do not last or are unsafe. With these promises of significant

366 Information publicly available at: https://china.aiddata.org/projects/2223 367Details of project available at: https://china.aiddata.org/projects/35649

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infrastructure investment, providing the largest portion of the USD12 million the

government are dependent on each year from fisheries and with an ear to the MFA, it can

be argued that China hold significant power over Sierra Leone. This is characteristic of the

neo-colonial techniques scholars such as Sachikonye,368 Seifudeim 369 and Lumumba-

Kasongo370 have argued China have implemented across Africa and the developing world to

benefit from their valuable resources and growing markets. China’s investment in

infrastructure in this part of the world is part of their Belt and Road initiative to expand their

access to global markets and supply chains. Using these indirect economic methods of

exerting neo-colonial pressure has become a trademark of Chinese foreign and

development policy and it is unlikely their intentions in Sierra Leone fisheries are any

exception.

Conclusion

Having examined fisheries management in Sierra Leone with relation to the literature

scholars have developed on the ‘resource curse,’ I think there is a strong case to be made

for fish being a cursed resource in Sierra Leone. Their value has enabled a sector where

weak institutions particularly in the security and justice sector in Sierra Leone allow

corruption and intimidation to thwart effective management and hence prevent this sector

contributing to inclusive economic development and the good of the Sierra Leone people. It

is a complex issue with many interacting layers stemming from the very structure of the

368 Sachikonye, Llyod (2008) Crouching Tiger, Hidden Agenda?: Zimbabwe-China Relations, in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: Africa and China, Ed. Kweku Ampiah & Sanusha Naidu, Scottville, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press 369 Seifudeim, Adem (2010) The Paradox of China’s Policy in Africa African and Asian Studies, Vol. 9 No. 3. 370 Chen, Ying, (2012) China’s Investment and Trade in Africa: Neo-colonialism or mutual benefit? Cardozo Journal of International & Competition Law Vol. 24:511 p. 512

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international political economy and UNCLOS, through capitalist exploitation, colonial and

neo-colonial influence that shape a system where corruption and diversion of investment

from other sectors is caused by the intrinsic value of fishing licences and the fish

themselves. If managed appropriately fish could provide a very real opportunity for

inclusive economic development and food sovereignty for communities in Sierra Leone. In

the environmental security and scarcity literature, many scholars made the case for

appropriate fair protection of these vital resources and the benefits this had for stability and

development. This is currently not the case in Sierra Leone, where increasing damage to the

marine environment, overfishing and impacts of the climate crisis, are already starting to

reduce catch for artisanal fishers.

When I arrived at the CMA in Tombo, the first thing I encountered was a group of local

fishers who had been called in to settle a fight that had broken out between them at sea the

day before when they clashed competing for the same school of fish. Near Banana Island

(another fishing village) I was told about how the activities of Italian trawlers in the

cephalopod fishery is generating intense animosity amongst the local fishers and business

owners dependent on the fishery there. I was even told some of the local fishers were

considering taking direct action against these trawlers in the absence of a government

response.371 The impact and consequences of government failures and the injustices of the

global political economy impacts all of the people of Sierra Leone and indeed across West

and Central Africa it goes much further than threatening food security and the livelihoods of

371 I think it’s important to just mention the wide disconnect between rumours and talk of a desire to commit violent acts and the actual physical planning and action to make an attack. These rumours are most probably more representative of the resentment and suffering of local fishermen and less an indication that violence is imminent. It is understandable how violence could break out given the building resentment.

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800,000 people working in artisanal fishing and supply. Fishers are seeing their catch

decline; while inflation and weak economic growth is driving up the costs of diesel and nets

whilst also lowering the price fishers can get for their catch on local markets. The declining

catch is not only leading to scuffles between boats, but also forcing fishers to sail further out

to sea or along the coast to Liberia where they can also get a better price for their fish.

These longer, deeper journeys put the fishermen at far greater risk from an accident at sea,

with little hope of rescue, and I am told, these happen frequently.

Further, Chinese and other foreign trawlers are selling frozen trawler caught fish to the

fishermen. This practise of “saiko” has contributed to significant decline in the Ghanaian

fishing industry. As local fishers saw their stocks decline it was the only way they could get

fish. Not only did this mean more damage from the trawlers, but also meant the money

went directly to Chinese companies and out of Ghana. In Sierra Leone this practise is

starting to increase. Ghana’s fishery is in dire straits and the government currently spend

between USD3 and 5 million a year importing fish from South America. World Bank

fisheries experts predict Sierra Leone’s fishery to be only a year or two behind Ghana.

Ghana’s economy has been experiencing strong growth over the last ten years, however,

whereas Sierra Leone simply could not afford these imports so there are very real

consequences for food security if the fishery continues to decline. The international far-

water fishing fleet is taking advantage of weak governance, corruption and lack of

enforcement in West and Central Africa to serve their own economic interests. Using VMS

data from anywhere it is possible to see this illegal activity taking place. In Guinea Bissau,

for example, Russian Trawlers, licenced to fish Guinea Bissauan waters are hoovering up all

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the sardinella for fishmeal in Africa.372 The fish migratory path comes South round the West

African coast meaning that overfishing with small mesh nets in Guinea Bissau has significant

impacts on juvenile fish for Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana and on into

the Gulf of Guinea. As fish are migratory species, poor management and illegal practises in

one country’s waters affects the whole region.

The Code of Conduct work to coordinate and cooperate on maritime security across the

region could, if implemented and enforced, lead to a regional response that could prevent

this illegal activity. Each country has significant challenges, however, from Guinea Bissau

essentially being a collapsed narco-state; to regional competition between Nigeria,

Cameroon and Angola. Significant internal security threats in Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon, DRC

in particular but the threat of terrorism and extremism from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State terrorist group (IS) and transnational organised

criminal groups and activity. Coupled with severe lack of maritime capacity or capability in

most countries. All these challenges stand in the way, but none are as great as the barrier

created by corruption, weak institutions and the benefit to a few powerful elites to keep

things as they are.

Another issue is the lack of fisheries science expertise across the region and understanding

of just how endangered the fisheries could be becoming. The Code of Conduct does cover

IUU fishing, however, its main focus is on piracy and armed robbery at sea which in the Gulf

of Guinea targets the oil and cargo shipping industry. It has not increased significantly since

372 I was shown the VMS data by an interviewee that clearly demonstrated the kind of trawlers fishing, their activity, time of year fishing to demonstrate this action is taking place.

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the 1980s and industry working there consider it to be a “manageable risk of doing business

in the region.”373 Furthermore, the majority of attacks are taking place in or near Nigerian

waters and so present a far lower risk for Sierra Leone, Liberia and those countries further

west along the coast. IUU fishing does feature and there is some lobbying taking place from

the international community to address this issue as part of the Code of Conduct work. The

case for tackling IUU fishing, however, is made in economic terms, in the billions lost to

countries each year from this work, no lobbying is really taking place on the very real risk of

fisheries collapse. Interestingly, the first hailed success of cooperation under the Code of

Conduct in May 2020 has thwarted an attack by local pirates against a Chinese fishing vessel

in Cote D’Ivoirian waters.374 I argue, the action of local people in attacking a Chinese fishing

trawler rather than the far more valuable diesel tankers usually targeted, demonstrates

some of the anger and desperation felt by local fishers as fish stocks are ravaged by foreign

trawlers. I find it sad that the first example of the effectiveness of the new security

infrastructure is once again supporting foreign industrial fishing trawlers at the expense of

local communities. It would be great to see the security infrastructure actively tackling IUU

fishing. I hope this analysis and the alternative future scenarios I produce in chapter five

will go some way to making the case for the importance of improved fisheries enforcement

and management, not only to coastal communities but to every aspect of life for the

countries in the region.

373This is supported by IMO data. Whilst working in maritime security in the region, I spoke regularly with shipping and oil companies in the region who explained their position to me that it was a manageable risk. 374 Chinese fishing trawler hijacked, quickly rescued by Nigerian Navy May 21, 2020 In Insurance Marine News, Keep, Political Risk, Credit & Finance: https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/chinese-fishing-trawler-hijacked-quickly-rescued-by-nigerian-navy/

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The impacts of the ‘resource curse’ on fisheries management in Sierra Leone is not only

preventing inclusive economic development and the creation of other industries, while

threatening food and economic security for coastal communities. It is also demonstrating a

massive failure of government to protect and serve their people. Mehtaa, Huffa, and

Allouchea375 in their 2019 paper set out a new discourse of scarcity, where they explained

how scarcity is not an inevitable part of life in a world of limited resources, but a

consequence of exploitation by the few against the many. The role of powerful

international actors and corrupt officials in fisheries in Sierra Leone demonstrates this.

There are very real concrete challenges to creating a sustainable fishing sector in Sierra

Leone and it may even be too late to save stocks. These challenges, however, are not too

great given some of the support available from international organisations and the

economic benefits down the line from inclusive economic development. The lack of political

will, however, is creating conditions of scarcity at the expense of poor, weak communities

without a strong voice. In many other places, such as those in Elinor Orstom’s research,

collective action to create systems of community co-management have created inclusive,

sustainable fisheries. There is appetite in Sierra Leone for similar work to achieve the same

benefits. The work the CMA are doing with the government to improve fisheries regulations

and try to improve infrastructure is a good example of this. While corruption continues to

drive weak maritime enforcement and foreign industrial trawlers continue to operate in

Sierra Leonean waters and the wider Gulf of Guinea, this work will have little impact. Strong

political will, can turn around a fishery as has been noted in the recent strong enforcement

375 Mehtaa, Lyla, Huffa, Amber & Allouchea, Jeremy (2019) The new politics and geographies of scarcity in Geoform 101 pp.222-230 p.222

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of policies in Indonesia.376 Strong political will and concerted regional action could do the

same in Sierra Leone. The Manu River Union between Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and

Sierra Leone, has made significant gains in tackling illegal weapons trafficking for peace and

security377 and demonstrates how collective action backed by UN assistance can make a big

difference in the region. Without the top down political will and work to tackle corruption,

strengthen institutions and enforce strong policies it is likely too late for Sierra Leone

fisheries and the impacts of that will hurt poor local communities. This is a sad consequence

of the ‘resource curse’ on these valuable, edible diamonds, created by both the global

political economy of power, exploitation in the structures of global capitalism, and

corruption by local elites, who are failing their citizens.

376 Cabral, Renial, Mayorga, Juan, Clemence, Michela, Lynham, John, Koeshendrajana, Sonny, Muawanah, Umi, Nugroho, Duto, Anna, Zuzy, Abdul Ghofar, Mira, Zulbainarni, Nimi, Gaines, Steven, and Costello, Christopher (2018) Rapid and lasting gains from solving illegal fishing Nature, Ecology & Evolution Volume 2, April pp.650–658 377 UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel report, 2019 available at: https://unowas.unmissions.org/support-mano-river-union

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Chapter Four: Case Study: São Tomé & Príncipe, Fishing Village of

Gamboa

In Chapter Three I used my observations from field research in Sierra Leone to analyse

fisheries management in reference to the ‘resource curse’ literature. Sierra Leone is a

country rich with valuable resources who has suffered not only economic decline but also

civil war. In contrast, the small island developing nation of São Tomé & Príncipe (STP) has

no significant valuable natural resources, sitting in fertile equatorial waters and with a huge

EEZ fish represent their most valuable resource potential. In my analysis of Sierra Leone, I

concluded that the intrinsic value of fisheries was sufficient to demonstrate fish as a cursed

resource. I argued the current management is shaped by colonial legacies, weak

institutions, corruption and the power dynamics of neo-liberalism, the global political

economy and neo-colonialism. I also highlighted the existence of some of the economic

mechanisms the literature cites as stemming from the ‘resource curse,’ both at a micro and

macro level.

I will now turn to an analysis of fisheries management in STP with reference to the literature

on the ‘resource curse,’ and development. I argue that the conditions of the ‘resource

curse’ can form around the valuable nature of fisheries in the absence of other valuable

natural resources and this analysis should demonstrate that. Field work for this analysis was

carried out in December 2019. A colleague at the STP Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) was

kind enough to set up meetings for me and attend where necessary to interpret. Keeping

with the same methodology as in Sierra Leone, I interviewed representatives from the STP

Government including the Ministry of Fisheries, MFA, Navy, Police, members of the

international diplomatic community working in STP on fisheries related work, NGOs,

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Consultants, International Organisations, fishermen and private citizens. I also drew on my

previous experience as a practitioner working in maritime security in West Africa and an

official visit to São Tomé & Príncipe in 2013. Once again, I am faced with the dilemma of

managing my scholarly responsibilities to cite sources, with my professional requirements to

maintain and protect relationships. As such, similar to the previous chapter, I have had at

times to remain vague in my sources, but I will attempt to flag these instances and cite

where possible. Once again, any criticisms are not intended to offend, but rather make

scholarly observations with the intention of highlighting an under addressed issue that if

tackled could have significant benefits for STP and also explain the risks of current structures

and inaction. My views do not reflect the views or policies of the FCO.

Introduction to São Tomé & Príncipe

Sitting about 500km off the coast of Gabon, the Central African nation of São Tomé &

Príncipe (STP) is very different from Sierra Leone. Slowly colonised by the Portuguese from

the 15th Century as a stop off on the Atlantic slave trade, and then established as a

plantation colony populated by slaves from other colonies to work the plantations. STP

gained independence after a military coup in 1975, although socialist oriented Movement

for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe (MLSTP) was recognised as the sole political

group. São Tomé & Príncipe has experienced relative peace and stability since

independence, although multiple military coups and public protests over conditions have

coloured her politics since then. During the late 70s and 80s STP forged close links with

communist countries in South America and Angola which limited their political development

and they remained a one-party state. Following an attempted coup in 1988, a new

Constitution was brought into force and multi-party representation and elections were

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introduced in 1990. Today they are a Presidential Democracy and the people are pretty

politically engaged, with about 72% turning out for elections in recent years.378 In 2016

former Prime Minister Evaristo Carvalho won the Presidency from Manuel Pinto da Costa

who was STP’s first President after independence when he ruled from 1975-1991 and then

won again and served from 2011-2016. Costa dropped out of the Presidential race in 2016

and Carvalho became President.379 The country has struggled with significant debts since

Independence and in 2007 the World Bank, and IMF forgave USD360 million in debt owed

by STP which was about 90% of the country's foreign debt.

A developing small island state, they are in close proximity to the three strongest in the

region: Nigeria, Cameroon and Angola. The fragility and relative weakness of their position

is tangible and they are very engaged with regional politics. They are a member of the

Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission

(GGC) both organisations that intend to facilitate closer working relations among the states,

with mixed results. The business environment is also very difficult and the local currency,

the Dobra, is susceptible to currency volatility. In 2019 STP saw 9% inflation, up from 7.7%

the previous year, it has stabilised since 2010 but was as high as 20%. The government is in

debt to Angola of between USD150 and USD200 million, which is the size of the entire state

budget.380 This is all for oil and diesel which STP purchase from Angola to fuel their 2

nationally owned power plants and various generators. Electricity is very expensive and

supply is volatile. In 2018 the whole island was without power for 3-4 days which triggered

378 Data on electoral processes, results and engagement available at: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/3116/ 379 Although this information came up at many of my interviews, an account can be found here: May 2018 BBC Sao Tome and Principe country profile: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14093493 380 I was informed of this debt by multiple different government officials and diplomats during interviews.

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violent protests against police for one of the first times in recent history. The government

are keen to diversify supply to reduce the costs but are in a difficult position against their

stronger neighbour who they fear could demand payment in full if they establish trade links

with another country. Negotiations are underway to agree to a payment plan with the

Angolan Government. Unlike Sierra Leone, STP does not have any valuable natural minerals

such as oil or diamonds. Although, there is exploration currently underway in their EEZ and

in the overlapping Joint Development Zone (JDZ) with Nigeria. It is unclear if the oil fields

will prove economically viable, but if they do, they are expected to come on-stream in the

next few years. The JDZ agreement includes a provision that Nigeria will provide security for

any oil installations that are built in the JDZ.

The majority of the population live a subsistence lifestyle but food availability is

unpredictable and so São Tomé & Príncipe is heavily dependent on food imports.

Infrastructure is incredibly limited as there is no deep sea port and landing in bad weather

can be difficult on the country’s one small airstrip which can only land aircraft up to a

certain size. As a remote tropical island where it rains about 9 months of the year, STP is

susceptible to natural hazards such as flash floods and landslides. At independence

Portuguese-owned plantations covered 90% of the cultivated areas. Cocoa is their main

product representing about 95% of agricultural exports, whiles sugar, palm and coffee are

also grown. As a small island developing nation, the land mass of STP is only around 1,001

square kilometres, but the archipelagic nature of the islands means her EEZ is around

160,000 square kilometres and fertile with valuable pelagic fish.

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STP faces significant development challenges ranking 143rd out of 189 countries in the UNDP

Human Development Index in 2019.381 In 1975 the population was only around 65,000 but

by 2018 it had grown to 211,028 people.382 32% of the population live on less than USD1.90

a day and although official unemployment figures seem quite low at 13%, the majority of

jobs are low paid or subsistence. Literacy is 90%, one of the highest rates across West and

Central Africa as the majority of children receive at least 12 years of education. However,

there are very few opportunities for young people once they leave school. The population

in STP is growing at a rate of about 5000 a year. Roughly 2700 young people graduate from

high school each year, 1300/1400 will go to university (usually abroad on some kind of

scholarship scheme) and a small number will get jobs, but over 1000 young people each

year will end up unemployed due to a lack of opportunities in the country.383

381 World Food Programme (WFP) Sao Tome and Principe Country Brief August 2019: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP%20STP%20COUNTRY%20BRIEF%20AUGUST%202019.pdf 382 World Bank Data available at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe 383 Figures taken from an interview with the Assistant Director of Fisheries during fieldwork.

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Fisheries in São Tomé & Príncipe There are roughly 5000 men working in artisanal fisheries and a further 3000 women

process and sell the fish. Their artisanal fishery is much less sophisticated than Sierra Leone

and the 3000 canoes are very small, often propelled by sail and paddle,

and the slightly bigger boats are still only around 10feet long, fiberglass and flat bottomed

with outboard engines.

None of the canoes are particularly seaworthy and fishing in poor weather can be a

dangerous business.

Foreign trawlers fishing in their EEZ are predominantly from EU countries who are licenced

to allow 37 boats to fish. Of these, roughly 13 are Spanish. All are purse sein or long line

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vessels fishing the valuable pelagic species found in these waters. Japan has historically

been an important partner to STP and fished their waters, but have recently stopped

because of a policy decision from the Japanese government to protect their fishermen from

the risk of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2014-2018 the EU paid the STP government

€700,000 per year and an additional €350,000 in technical assistance. In August 2019 the

next licence was agreed after a year of negotiations and the EU are paying €7million for five

years access. There is a catch limit for this access which is supposed to be shared across the

EU fleet and enforced through flag state obligation. There appeared to be a significant lack

of fisheries science expertise in the Ministry of Fisheries so it is unclear from where this limit

came. Fisheries officials told me STP are keen to put fisheries enforcement officers onboard

all vessels fishing in their waters but are finding it challenging physically getting them to the

ships. IUU fishing is causing huge problems in the EEZ and the government have no patrol

boat capacity to arrest ships. The Portuguese are assisting in joint patrols and have loaned

an old fisheries enforcement patrol boat to STP but it did not leave port once for the

duration of my visit in December 2019 and I was told it had not successfully arrested any

fishing vessels in 2019.

The previous PM, recently elected as President, has announced three developmental

priorities: Agriculture, Tourism and Fisheries. STP signed the Code of Conduct in 2013 under

the previous President and are part of Zone D under the joint patrol agreement alongside

Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon. I was informed, the first step is to negotiate a

legal agreement allowing the countries to enter each other’s waters in “hot pursuit” of

criminals and conduct joint patrols. The São Toméan Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) is

operational but equipment needs improved and they have no enforcement capacity even if

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a violation is spotted.384 The MOC has VMS and AIS data, but two of their three radars are

not working and they do not have skills, parts or money to repair them. Officials said they

believed the joint zones under the Code of Conduct are working well. There is a whatsapp

group with all 25 domestic and joint operations centres communicating daily which has

improved information coordination. STP were hoping to participate in the 2020 Joint Naval

Obangame Express exercise coordinated by the US Navy which would include a fisheries

enforcement exercise through their waters. At time of writing the majority of the world is in

lockdown fighting the COVID-19 pandemic and Obangame Express 2020 was cancelled. The

exact scale of IUU fishing taking place in STP waters is apparently unknown, however, the

fishermen give anecdotal evidence of trawlers without flags fishing with TTWs not just the

EEZ and international organisations suggest that it is rife and presents a huge threat to the

nation’s fishery. The country lacks capacity and capability for effective fisheries

enforcement.

The Blue Action Fund, a German based conservation fund is working with Portuguese NGO

Oikos, INGOs Fauna & Flora International and Marapa to bring together government and

artisanal fishing communities to develop a system of co-community and government

management for artisanal fishers.385 The project started in 2015 with 10 fishing

communities and aims to strengthen institutional management of marine protected areas

and community fisheries. The fishing communities in STP have seen a significant decrease in

their catch and conflict between fishers is increasing. Stocks particularly in the North of the

384 This is despite the presence of the Portuguese patrol boat, suggesting it is not adding much capacity to fisheries enforcement. I will address this further later on. 385 I interviewed a representative from the NGOs who gave me the details and comments provided in this section.

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island are already depleted and they are working to protect stocks in the South. The project

has two pillars. One aims to improve knowledge of fisheries science so fishermen

understand the importance of ecology, food webs, minimum sizes, spawning zones and

times and monitoring. The second seeks to improve engagement of government and

communities to work together on the sustainable management of the fishery. Creating an

open environment of shared governance between the government and communities. The

project had hosted over 200 community meetings in 21 different areas over the last two

years. These meetings collected the problems and concerns of fishing communities and in

January 2019 hosted a General Assembly of delegates from all 21 communities, government

departments, private investors and NGOs, over 150 delegates presented their views

creating the first real opportunity for open dialogue between the government and fishing

communities. The next General Assembly of this group will be to discuss a way forward and

come up with a system of co-management that could protect the fisheries while protecting

the rights and livelihoods of fishermen. This will likely be a zonal approach with proposals

for rules for all areas agreed in the form of a small-scale fisheries agreement. The NGOs are

working with the government to get the agreements codified into law, much of it is

complementary to the existing maritime strategy and legislation but the new approach will

only have real impact if it is signed into law. This work is ongoing. It is unclear whether this

work has been connected into the recent Maritime Strategy approved by Parliament in 2019

or the Implementation Plan which, I am told, is under review.

Fish as a Cursed Resource in São Tomé & Príncipe

This section mirrors my analysis of Sierra Leone. I use the main themes drawn from the

‘resource curse’ literature with reference to my observations during field research, from

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interviews and my experience as a practitioner working on maritime security in an attempt

to fill a gap in the literature by making the case that fish are a cursed resource. I argue the

curse is stunting economic development and driving the risk of conflict in a similar way to

other valuable resources including oil and gas. This analysis will take into consideration the

wider international political economy of fisheries as well as historical colonial legacies and

the neo-colonial structures of international relations and development aid to understand

the wider factors of fisheries management in São Tomé & Príncipe.

This analysis aims to complement the analysis in chapter three and set the scene for the

futures exercise in chapter five that will map potential future implications of the

management of this resource. The literature on the ‘resource curse’ set out several main

causes and effects that limit the contribution of valuable resources to economic

development and threaten stability. These include economic mechanisms such as the Dutch

Disease; weak institutions allowing rent seeking behaviour and corruption; and the global

political economy causing exploitation in the international system including market price

volatility. This next section examines each in detail.

Economic Mechanisms of the ‘Resource Curse’

Arriving into the small fishing community of Gamboa a few kilometres outside of the capital

city of São Tomé the economic effects of the ‘resource curse’ are immediately visible.

Gamboa has beautiful beaches, is in close proximity to the airport and is connected to the

electricity grid. It has potential to attract and cater to tourists, sell trinkets or set up a café

or bar similar to many of the other small towns and settlements in STP. However, Gamboa

is one of the few landing sites in the north of the island, near São Tomé and the main

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market, where the larger fibre glass fishing boats can land their catch. Gamboa is very poor,

and there is no other obvious industry in this little town. Gamboa is set up to meet the

fishermen landing onto the beach at 10am daily to either pass the fish onto women from

their own families, or sell directly in small volumes to other women. The women then

process the fish and take it to sell at the main market in São Tomé, or to the smaller towns

and villages across the island. A few women stand around near the beach selling essentials

from plastic basins and hand carts. There are no physical little shop buildings or anything

similar.

When I visited STP for the first time in 2013 on a UK government mission, I was informed by

an official that the people in STP are poor, but they have a subsistence living based on the

fertile rain forest and the people are not hungry. I never saw any data to support this

assertion, but if this was the case in 2013, it is no longer so in 2019 in Gamboa. Similar to

Tombo, there does not appear to be anything growing around Gamboa to support the

people who are a long way from the jungle in the centre and south of the island.

Malnourished pot-bellied children can be seen in the street, people are standing around and

when I passed through the town alone, everyone I passed asked me for money or food. The

volume of fish passing through Gamboa every day is far less significant than in Tombo. Yet

there is evidence of the effects of Dutch Disease as argued by scholars including Corden and

Neary,386 Warner and Sachs,387 Gylfason, Herbertson & Zoega388 and Humphreys et al.389

386 Corden, W, & Neary, J (1982) Booming sector and de-industrialisation in a small open economy The Economic Journal, 92(368), pp.825–848. 387 Sachs, J, & Warner, A (1995/1997) Natural resource abundance and economic growth. NBER Working Paper Series w5398. http://www.nber.org/papers/w5398 Sachs, J, & Warner, A (2001) The curse of natural resources. European Economic Review, 45(4–6) pp.827–838. 388 Gylfason, T, Herbertsson, T, & Zoega, G, (1999) A mixed blessing (natural resources and economic growth) Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3(2), pp.1091–1115. 389 Humphreys, M, Sachs, J & Stiglitz, J (2007) Escaping the resource curse. New York: Columbia University Press

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The only industry and economic activity in this town is the landing, processing and selling on

of the fish every day. This demonstrates the economic argument that the existence of this

valuable resource causes de-industrialisation and detracts from development in other

industries. Further, Gylfason, Herbertson, and Zoega390 argue that relatively well paid, low

skilled jobs in a valuable sector will detract from growth in other sectors. This is a little

more complex in STP, where there is a large young, male population and a shortage of jobs.

However, the majority of young men in the town are fishermen and secondary industry to

support the fishermen and serve the people living in Gamboa has not developed. This

supports Mehlum, Moene and Torvik’s theory that the existence of valuable natural

resources prevents innovation and entrepreneurial activity in other sectors.

Speaking to fishermen, international organisations, government officials and NGOs, I was

told the fisheries catch in STP has significantly declined in recent years, especially in the

north where Gamboa is situated. Fish are hugely important both culturally and for food in

STP and special fish dishes are very much at the heart of life. The declining stocks, I was

told, are leading to increased competition for fish between the local fishers. It is also

causing them to need to sail further out to sea to find fish. The fishing canoes are barely

seaworthy and so it is becoming increasingly dangerous for fishermen, who, seemingly,

often don’t return. Similar to Sierra Leone, STP has no search and rescue capability. In

Sierra Leone everyone I spoke to left responsibility for the declining stocks firmly at the feet

of the foreign trawlers overfishing and fishing illegally. In STP, the local fishermen also

blame foreign trawlers and illegal fishing but the limited range on their boats and the sheer

390 Gylfason, T Herbertson, T & G Zoega (1999) A mixed blessing: Natural resources and economic growth, Macroeconomic Dynamics, 3 (02), pp.204–225. p.204

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size of STP’s EEZ mean there is a lesser understanding of the scale of the IUU fishing in STP

than in Sierra Leone. In addition, government officials and some locals seemed to disregard

the impact of trawlers completely and blamed the declining catch on artisanal fishers using

unsustainable fishing techniques, such as catching juveniles with small mesh nets. The fact

that the trawlers are operating far from shore and out of sight seems to colour policy.

Rather than supporting the local artisanal fishers with greater education and better

equipment while working to address illegal fishing, some government officials just criticised

the artisanal fishers.

At a microlevel in Gamboa, the existence of fish as a valuable economic resource can be

seen to have diverted away from the development of other industry, differentiating it from

towns elsewhere on the island where fish are not the primary sector. At a macrolevel, the

government continue to grant fisheries licences to the EU at a value significantly lower than

the fish that will be harvested from STP’s pelagic fisheries, yet do not request specific aid to

help build up their local fisheries, processing and export potential. The fisheries licence fees

bring essential FDI and development aid into the Treasury on which the government are

dependent on, just as in Sierra Leone. Yet, the Assistant Director of Fisheries assured me,

they are prioritising the protection of the fishery and have not yet granted any licences to

Chinese trawlers. If this is the case it would suggest the STP government are working to

support local fishers and are less impacted by the ‘resource curse.’ I was not convinced by

this assertion however; Chinese trawlers are fishing illegally across the GoG and I find it hard

to believe they are not fishing in STP waters. It is far more likely they are stalling the

negotiations while they continue to fish illegally. STP’s weak judicial sector, lack of maritime

enforcement and ineffective maritime domain awareness (MDA) capability makes IUU

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fishing easy to commit. The Chinese relationship with STP is growing stronger and they are

investing more heavily in infrastructure projects. I find it more likely weak institutions and

rent seeking behaviours are serving to keep maritime enforcement poor thus allowing

Chinese trawlers to fish informally.

The US Navy, World Bank, and UN have worked with STP to support their MDA capability

and enforcement, gifting several fast, small enforcement vessels, the MDA kit and training

to enable a joint departmental response to maritime criminality. Further, the Portuguese

Navy have agreed to support maritime security enforcement and have seconded a patrol

boat to STP. Yet, any fisheries enforcement activities still sit with the Ministry of Fisheries

and are not taking place. This suggests that rather than preventing access, corrupt officials

could be turning a blind eye to Chinese trawlers without formal licences. STP is an

archipelago and the majority of the industrial trawlers target large pelagic fish for which

they use long line and purse seine trawlers and fish out to sea in deep waters. These

trawlers do not cause the same visible environmental damage as the shrimp and bottom

trawlers operating in coastal waters in Sierra Leone. They do, however, have their own

significant environmental impact, mainly in the form of over fishing large pelagic fish,

specifically targeting alpha-predators essential to the food web including sharks, or catching

them by mistake as bycatch. The large pelagic species, such as Yellow-fin and Big-eye Tuna,

are very valuable on international markets, so it is unlikely, given the lack of enforcement,

that IUU fishing is not taking place in large volumes in the STP EEZ.

Consequently, at a macrolevel, this lack of enforcement and the continued selling of

valuable fishing licences to foreign trawlers demonstrates how the presence of this income

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is diverting away from attempts to develop a local industry. Arguably, the economic

benefits of supporting local fishers and building up the local artisanal fleet and processing

facilities to enable exports, would be far higher in the long run than the USD7 million in

selling fishing licence. But the short-term benefit and rent seeking potential of the valuable

licences is prioritised, demonstrating this draw of the ‘resource curse.’

The Role of Weak Institutions

Scholars including Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 391 Kaznacheev,392 Esu,393 Collier, Paul &

Hoeffler394, Anke,395 and many others, make the case that institutional weakness increases

the strength of the ‘resource curse.’ Further, Costa and Santos argued a lack of

transparency and legal compliance in a weak judicial system worsened the ‘resource

curse.’396 Everyone I spoke with in STP explained how stability and economic development

was being held back by nepotism and corruption especially in the judicial system. On such a

tiny island, with a population of only about 200,000, where everyone is connected to

everyone else, it is very hard to say no to being asked a favour. The institutions are weak

and significant incompetence seems to blight policy-making and implementation. In one

meeting, a government official explained to me that overfishing in the shark population was

having a significant impact on the local artisanal fishers. “Without the sharks to scare the

smaller fish into shallow waters, the fishermen were seeing their catch decline,” he

391 Mehlum, Halvor; Moene, Karl and Torvik, Ragnar (2006) Institutions and the Resource Curse. The Economic Journal 116 (Jan) pp.1-20 392 Kaznacheev, Peter (2017) Curse or Blessing? How Institutions Determine Success in Resource-Rich Economies Policy Analysis January 11, 808 pp.1-48 393 Essang Esu, Godwin (2017) Assessing the Resource Curse Question: A Case of Crude Oil Production in Nigeria Journal of Economic Research 22 pp.153-213 394 Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke (2005) Resource Rents, Governance, and Conflict Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. 49 No. 4, August, pp.625-633 395 ibid p.630 396 Costa, Hirdan Katarina de Medeiros, Santos, Edmilson Moutinho (2013) Institutional analysis and the “resource curse” in developing countries Energy Policy 63 pp.788–79 p.790

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explained, with no mention of food webs or understanding of the marine science and long-

term impacts on the fishery from a reduction in the shark population.

In meetings with the Department of Fisheries they explained the Ministry lacked funding

and expertise and were working to put together a proposal with the university to try to get

some funding from international organizations. They knew IUU fishing was an issue, but did

not know, or were not prepared to tell me, the scale. They seemed confident the licenced

fishing vessels were only using long line and purse seine techniques and were dividing a

total allowable catch between the boats. Government fisheries enforcement officers were

required to be onboard the boats and they had not reported any illegal activity. There

seemed to be some issues with getting the enforcement officers onto the trawlers,

however, as fishing companies would sometimes pay for them to fly to port of origin, but

sometimes would not. The new government policy, I was told, was for the fishing trawler to

come to STP before commencing fishing to collect the enforcement officer. There had been

some push-back on this, apparently and it had lengthened the negotiations for the new

round of licences. This draws into question the assertion that fisheries enforcement officers

are on every ship. Given the lack of expertise within the Ministry, I wondered how equipped

the enforcement officers were to track illegal activity. And further, given the poverty of the

population and the low government wages, it is likely these enforcement officers are subject

to bribery or intimidation. Fisheries protection enforcement requires coordination between

the Department of Fisheries and the coast guard. The VMS/AIS data to track industrial

trawlers for fishing practices is held in the Department of Fisheries, while any enforcement

operations would need to be initiated by the coast guard working with the Portuguese

patrol boat. The operations centre in the Department of Fisheries is only manned during

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office hours and so is closed and unmonitored over evenings, nights and weekends.

Arguably, most fishing takes place at night, as does much illegal activity and so it is logical

that failure to monitor at night could lead to a significant amount of IUU being unrecorded

or reported.

São Tomé & Príncipe were one of the proponents of the work that led to the Yaoundé

Summit in 2013 and the signing of the Code of Conduct. In 2013 STP authorities arrested a

vessel in their waters for conducting an illegal ship-to-ship transfer of oil cargo,397 accusing

them of being connected to piracy and the illegal oil trade in the Gulf of Guinea. On the

surface, therefore, the STP government have strong political will to address maritime

criminality and IUU fishing. Having impounded the vessel, the government sold the USD6.5

million of illegally bunkered cargo, leading to a court case which was only finally settled this

year over the legality of the sale. While the court case found the STP government to be

within their rights, the financial benefit from arresting this vessel does question the

motivation for the arrest, and with it, whether the government are as committed as they

purport to be. Given their apparent commitment to the Code of Conduct and their

cooperation with neighbouring countries and the operation centres within Zone D in

particular, it was surprising to me to hear the VMS/AIS monitoring was within the

Department of Fisheries and not in the MOC alongside the other maritime surveillance data.

This is even stranger given the amount of training and assistance the US Navy has given the

government and departments on a whole-of-government approach to maritime security. I

find myself wondering whether this disconnect in the information chain is due to

397 Reports from most recent court verdict relating to the case on shipping media, available at: https://shipandbunker.com/news/emea/545798-monjasa-wins-court-case-over-65-million-sao-tome-and-principe-bunker-cargo-dispute

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incompetence or design by rent seeking officials. Either possibility would demonstrate a

significant weakness in the maritime security and fisheries institutions which is leading to

illegal activity and damaging the local fisheries. This weakness demonstrates one of the

impacts of the ‘resource curse’ of valuable fisheries in STP in line with the ‘resource curse’

literature.

Costa and Santos argued in their 2013 paper that the ‘resource curse’ leads to a lack of

transparency and legal compliance in a weak judicial system. Everyone I spoke with, from

government officials to private citizens, made no secret of the lack of transparency,

corruption and nepotism in the judicial system. They see this as the biggest problem

holding back economic development in STP. The people of STP are incredibly poor, and yet

the fines for minor crimes and infringements are unachievably high. The system is unfair,

favouring the better connected and wealthy. It is also burdensome and slow, for example,

resolving conflict in business can take ages and so hold back business development in the

country. Weakness and corruption in the judicial sector, and weak institutions across

maritime security, fisheries and all sectors leave the country open to criminality and rent

seeking behaviour. I was told by several contacts that illegal oil bunkering and money

laundering are currently causing big problems in STP, feeding corruption and rent seeking

behaviour from government officials. According to the UNODC, I was told in an interview,

Russians can currently launder USD1/2 million through STP banks in 24hours, with 10%

roughly left behind for corrupt officials. The UN and EU have been working with the

government since 2003 spending €3-400,000 a year to try and improve independence and

transparency in the judicial sector with little impact. The political will to reform the sector

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does not exist. Further, the prospect of oil revenues in the next few years presents little

incentives for politicians to tighten a system that may significantly benefit them in future.

Weak maritime security in STP, is not only leading to the loss of significant revenues to the

Treasury in fisheries each year but threatens stocks for local people, their food security and

livelihoods. It also leaves this small island nation, in a strategic location in the Gulf of

Guinea, open to increased criminality. International organisations are not so worried about

violent extremism breeding here as they are on the West African coast, including Sierra

Leone. They are concerned, however, that it will become a transit point for transnational

organised criminal groups (TOC) for both the smuggling of drugs, weapons and people; and

a safe haven for money laundering; and weapons stockpiling for international terrorist

groups. Abject poverty and weak judicial systems in STP have already created a network of

child sex abuse rings, including low level sex tourism from Europe in isolated Príncipe. While

these crimes are not specifically connected to the fishing sector, the same rent seeking

behaviours that keep institutions and the judicial system weak to facilitate corruption in

fisheries is enabling increased criminality. There are very few economic opportunities for

such a small island developing nation as São Tomé & Príncipe, however, tourism and fish are

the most promising developmental sectors for the economy. Weakness in the fisheries

enforcement and maritime security systems on the island demonstrates this aspect of the

‘resource curse’ literature in that the intrinsic value of the licences holds back development

across the board.

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The Political Economy of the ‘Resource Curse’

All boys in São Tomé & Príncipe must complete two and a half years national service when

they turn 18. This seems to have two purposes. Firstly it provides food and payment for a

large youth population with little employment opportunities and secondly it provides

military training for a significant proportion of the population. As a small island with limited

resources, the fact that mandatory national service is in place demonstrates the threat STP

feel from the might of the bigger players in the region: Angola, Cameroon, Nigeria. Nigeria

and Gabon also have mandatory national service for their 18 year old boys, so this policy

brings STP to a similar level. As a small island developing nation who lived under colonial

rule for so long and are in huge debt to Angola, it is not surprising STP fear pressure or even

invasion from the stronger players in the region. STP work hard to push their profile and

position in the region. They are members of both ECCAS and the GGC and are often one of

the first nations to sign up to be part of any additional political alliances that could benefit

them. This regional dynamic also helps to explain why STP, along with other countries in the

region, are keen to develop their own coast guard, Navy, Air Force and Military wings of

their armed forces to project power and protect themselves.

A further regional dynamic can be seen in the Joint Development Zone. This section of

water where STP and Nigerian EEZs overlap is governed by an agreement with Nigeria. The

agreement requires the Nigerians to provide security enforcement within the JDZ at a cost

to STP but does not allow either party to sell licences to fish here. The JDZ is the location

where oil and gas are most likely to be found and so exploitation of this valuable resource

would benefit Nigeria as well as STP. The JDZ was set up after the maritime boundary could

not be agreed and enabled the two countries to share the cost of oil exploration. In 2018

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activity in the JDZ had stalled as STP were unable to pay their contribution for activities and

were in debt to Nigeria for USD27 million.398 While Nigeria already has significant oil

revenues, STP will need the JDZ to start producing before they generate any oil and gas

revenue, but this debt is holding this back. This demonstrates the weakness of STP in

relation to her stronger neighbours. In debt to both Angola and Nigeria, who have

significantly stronger economies, and Navies. STP will also be dependent on the stronger

parties for enforcement of the Code of Conduct patrols limiting her strength and position in

the region.

Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier argued in their 2006 paper, that the ‘resource curse’ causes

poor economic policies, large public sectors and national resources. They argue the

connection between resource rents and public employment leads to a focus on gaining

political advantage because a job equates to a vote.399 This can clearly be seen in the

governance of STP where the main energy company is nationalised and many are employed

by government including in national service. Despite the absence of an obvious valuable

natural resource, such as oil to drive this, it demonstrates corruption in government

enabling rent seeking whenever possible. This feeds directly into the fishing sector, where

the valuable licences and development aid delivered on top of the licence fee provide two

opportunities for rents. In addition, kick-backs from poor enforcement can add still further

incentive. The significantly lower value STP receive from foreign trawlers for fishing their

waters despite the huge value of the large pelagic fish and the size of their EEZ,

398 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Blog (2018) More costs than income so far: the quest for oil in São Tomé and Principe available at: https://eiti.org/news/more-costs-than-income-so-far-quest-for-oil-in-sao-tome-principe 399 Robinson, James, Torvik, Ragnar, Verdier, Thierry (2006) Political foundations of the resource curse Journal of Development Economics 79 pp.447-468. p.461

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demonstrates the asymmetry STP suffer in fishing licence negotiations with other countries.

It is also important to realise that while €7million over several years is far lower in value

than the true value of the stocks, it is a huge amount of money to enable some small rents

to be taken when a typical salary is €70 a month.

STP suffers from both their relative weakness on the international stage and the UNCLOS

requirement to sell access to their waters to foreign trawlers. They have little enforcement

capacity or capability. This means if they were to try and withhold a licence until a higher

price is agreed they would be powerless to prevent those foreign trawlers from fishing

illegally without a licence. As a weak economy with little resources, they have very little

clout on the international stage meaning licences will be very difficult to sell for the

appropriate value. Then this is worsened by weak institutions and corruption incentivising

officials to sell the licences, because access to any money that can benefit them in rents is

beneficial for them, if not for the people and the country. The true market value of the

pelagic fish in their huge EEZ are of little use to the STP government as the country does not

possess the infrastructure to harvest and export to international markets. Unlike in Sierra

Leone where the local fishers are competing directly in coastal waters with some of the

foreign trawlers, in STP the trawlers are mainly operating in deep water beyond the reach of

artisanal boats. The sale of licences is the only way the Treasury can benefit from this

valuable resource. The global political economy and dependence of the government on

development aid limits their ability to negotiate a fair price for these licences. Exploitation

of weak economies at the benefit of stronger, industrial ones is demonstrated significantly

through the incredibly low fisheries deal STP have with the EU. EU ships and EU economies

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will be making huge profits on valuable tuna and illegally caught sharks from STP’s

resources, while STP only benefit from the relatively small licence fee.

Neo-Colonialism

As mentioned in chapter two, Andrew Rosser, Ayelazuno,400 Obi, Watts401 and Owusu402

argue that the ‘resource curse’ theory is too simplistic, reductionist and above all ahistorical,

especially with reference to colonialism and capitalism’s twinned histories.403

Consequently, it is impossible to illustrate and analyse the role of the ‘resource curse’ on

fisheries management in São Tomé & Príncipe without considering the role of colonial

legacies, development policies and neo-colonialism. Of particular relevance for fisheries in

STP is the colonial impact on governance, international development aid and, once again,

the role of China.

STP was uninhabited before it was founded as a Portuguese plantation colony and stop off

port for processing slaves being transported from Central Africa onwards. The majority of

the people who lived in STP from the 15th century were slaves brought to the island to work

the plantations for Portuguese plantation owners. As such it was a nation ruled through

exploitation and slavery. Even after slavery was abolished by the Portuguese in 1822 it

continued to be governed as a plantation colony, with the Portuguese plantation owners

significantly benefitting from the labours of the poor plantation workers.404 The majority of

400 Ayelazuno, Jasper (2014) Oil wealth and the well-being of the subaltern classes in Sub-Saharan Africa: A critical analysis of the resource curse in Ghana. Resources Policy 40: pp66–73. 401 Watts, Michael (2004) Resource Curse? Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. Geopolitics 9(1): pp.50–80. 402 Owusu, Bernard (2018) Doomed by the ‘Resource Curse?’ Fish and Oil Conflicts in the Western Gulf of Guinea, Ghana Development 61, pp.149–159 403 ibid p.153 404 Almeida, Miguel Vale de in Stewart, Charles Edt (2007) Creolization: History, Ethnography, Theory Left Coast Press: California p. 109

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the population lived in poverty, supporting themselves through subsistence while elites

benefitted from valuable exports of cacao, sugar, and palm and lived in far better

conditions. Portugal was unwilling to give up its colonies meaning São Tomé & Príncipe did

not gain independence until 1975.405 Even since granting independence, the Portuguese still

remain actively engaged in São Tomé & Príncipe and their presence can be strongly felt. The

Portuguese Embassy sits proudly next to the MFA, the large hotels all belong to the

Portuguese Pestana hotel chain and the two new Super CKDO supermarkets are part of a

Gabonese chain that stock mainly Portuguese brands. The only European airline operating

flights to São Tomé airport are the TAP Portuguese national airline while many of the small

hotels, guest houses, plantations and restaurants are run by Portuguese expats. Visiting in

2013 as part of a UK delegation we were called into the Portuguese Embassy on the second

day to enquire why we had not consulted them before our visit. Consulting a third-party

foreign Embassy before a visit is not normal practise for diplomatic missions and the

meeting felt to me like neo-colonial overreach. In 2019, however, when I visited for

research purposes they were much more hospitable and keen to help inform me about the

maritime security situation in the Gulf of Guinea.

The nature of Portuguese rule during colonial times when Portuguese plantation owners

were in a class above the rest of the population and the final twenty years when the colony

was ruled as a remote province of Portugal can be seen to have shaped attitudes and

governance today. As with many other countries across West and Central Africa,

government officials are seen as elite. This is most pertinent in the criminal justice system

405 Henriksen, Thomas (1973) Portugal in Africa: A Noneconomic Interpretation African Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 Dec, pp. 405-416 p.410

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where a case or charges can be dismissed by the right official, demonstrating the power of

certain individuals above the rest. Even after independence, the Portuguese had only

allowed for one political party in the constitution and it was not until 1990 following

protests when a multiparty system was established. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,

the people of STP are very politically engaged and electoral turn out is usually around 72%.

However, President Manuel Pinto da Costa was re-elected to serve from 2011-2016 despite

his having served as President from Independence in 1975 until the introduction of the

multiparty system in 1990. Costa’s re-election suggests a lack of appetite for reform as the

country reached backwards and raises the question of external influence over elections.

Although at the time it was argued the mainly young electorate had no memory of his

previous rule406 and voted for the better candidate. This could have been a contributing

factor, as the demographics in STP are such that most of the electorate are young. The

simple fact, however, that there are so few players in São Toméan politics, despite 90%

literacy, suggests the colonial legacy of ruling elites as a class above the rest, still influences

politics.

The continued Portuguese role in STP is mainly an extension of economic neo-colonialism,

but it does seem to go a bit deeper today. Portugal benefit financially from their ex-colony

as the majority of businesses are run by Portuguese companies or expats. Tourists drawn to

this beautiful paradise fly TAP airlines and stay in a hotel or guest house most likely owned

and operated by a Portuguese company or individual. Many of the plantations producing

cacao, sugar and coffee are still run by Portuguese-owned companies and the produce they

406 BBC News (2012) Sao Tome independence leader Pinto da Costa wins poll available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14442508

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export is destined for Portugal or other European markets. In addition, Portugal, is still

STP’s closest international partner. They have a security agreement with the Portuguese

Navy to provide maritime security support, established in 2018 and extended in 2019. It

was this agreement that brought the Portuguese patrol vessel to São Tomé although I was

told in the two years it had arrested only a few ships for illegal fishing and no prosecutions

had followed. Suggesting a lack of political will to prosecute these crimes from both the São

Toméan but also Portuguese authorities.

Although the relationship with Portugal does feel uncomfortably close, STP have benefitted

from the FDI, and they have also taken advantage of assistance from a number of different

international partners. I have already spoken about their oil arrangement with Angola, JDZ

with Nigeria and the hopeful joint patrols that will come in future from the Code of Conduct

work. Another good example is the Voice of America radio towers the US built just down

the coast from the capital that transmit US international radio to the west coast of Africa. In

addition, the US Navy also provided the maritime domain awareness equipment, although I

was told the two main radars are now broken and the STP coastguard do not have the

expertise to repair them. The Portuguese still continue to benefit financially from their ex-

colony and appear to still hold considerable influence. But, STP appear to have recognised

that in order to access important external investment and FDI, close partnerships with the

international community are essential. STP are little known to the rest of the world, and so

attracting FDI for tourist infrastructure is difficult; therefore, leveraging the Lusophone, ex-

colonial relationship to get hotels, flights and attract tourists is smart. The flights from

Europe are now also transiting via Cape Verde or Accra, in Ghana. Enabling them to take

advantage of the slightly higher profile of Cape Verde as a holiday destination; increasingly

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attracting tourists from a growing middle class in Ghana and taking advantage of more

connecting flights into Accra.

While international development aid agencies are not as apparent in STP as in Sierra Leone,

their role and the work they have done is still important in STP. There are schools, water

pumps and other infrastructure with clear labelling of the funding provided by US aid, the

EU or another partner. As with Sierra Leone, foreign aid also plays a role in the structure of

fisheries management. The deals to sell licences often come alongside promises of

development aid and so are sold for less. For example, in 2013 the EU had recently

constructed a new road connecting the capital with the crossing port of Alegre connecting

to Rolas island. This road, I was told had been built as part of the fisheries agreement. It

also had the added benefit of connecting the 5* Pestana hotel in São Tomé with the other

Pestana property on Rolas island. This once again questions the Portuguese influence in

leveraging this finance and suggesting the route for the road. In 2019 this road has now

fallen into rack and ruin without maintenance, so arguably the European fishing companies

profiting from access to STP waters and the Pestana hotel group benefitted most from this

donation from the EU Commission. A few years later, the people of STP are back to a

potholed, dangerous road with no promise of follow up repairs and no profits from the

fishery to allow the government to finance their own repairs.

This is not the only example of development aid influencing fisheries management in STP.

In Gamboa, the fibreglass boats had been gifted several years earlier, I was told, by the

Japanese. Further, a covered processing facility, similar to the ones in Tombo, had been

built to provide a more sanitary place for the fish to be processed after landing. However,

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as is often the case with development aid, the structure was not built after consulting the

fishers and was not accompanied with education on the importance of raising sanitation

standards. The facility was built around 50 yards from the beach where the fishermen land

their catch and consequently goes unused by fishermen. Instead occupied by some women

cleaning clothes while the fish are processed on tarpaulins on the beach as has always been

the way. The facility can be seen on the right of the picture below and the fishers

processing their catch in the front of the picture.

The fibreglass boats are small and flat bottomed, making them good for landing on the

beach, but dangerous in rough seas. Further, their supply did not come with training and

equipment to repair them and so they only have a limited shelf life. US aid has built pumps

to provide access to clean water in Gamboa, however, these pumps are nowhere near the

fishing beach making it hard for clean water to be used when processing the fish and instead

different batches are rinsed in the same plastic bucket of dirty water.

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There are NGOs working to support the development of more sustainable artisanal fisheries

in STP. For example, the project to establish co-management and coordination with the

government should serve to benefit artisanal fishers in time, but the majority of aid is

serving to build soft power and diplomatic influence, while serving little actual purpose for

local fishing communities. The EU agreement to provide €700,000 per year for 5 years, plus

€350,000 in “technical assistance,” is a good demonstration of this. STP are in desperate

need of investment and technical assistance such as fisheries science training for the

Fisheries Ministry, but the EU also benefit from better systems and knowledge in STP

fisheries. Consequently, the EU could have provided the technical assistance as part of their

annual aid budget. Yet to tie it to the fisheries licence and provide it as part of the deal

rather than paying a fair price comes across as patronising and neo-colonial. One question I

couldn’t find an answer to was what this technical assistance entailed and whether it was

provided in areas requested by STP or whether it was imposed by the EU. Either way, the

thousands of tonnes of tuna taken by the 37 EU Trawlers each year would fetch far more

than €700,000 on international markets and so the licensing system robs STP of their

valuable revenue.

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Examining the neo-colonial influence of the international community in STP as with all

African countries requires an exploration into the activities of China. As with Sierra Leone

the Chinese are working to develop strong ties with STP. However, unlike Sierra Leone,

there is little benefit for them in STP except for their fisheries. In 2013 I first heard the

government were in negotiations with the Chinese to invest USD12 million in constructing a

deep-water industrial port in STP. This would allow them to become a trading hub for the

region and support their import/export development. In 2019 I was told the Chinese had

withdrawn and were now talking to the Sierra Leoneans about building a wharf in Freetown

instead. São Tomé & Príncipe and China only resumed diplomatic ties in 2016 after STP

relinquished relations with Taiwan, which also has a large far-water fishing fleet and

alongside the Japanese and EU had fished SPT waters in exchange for licensing fees and aid.

STP continued to support Taiwan and not the One China Policy which is a requirement for

any diplomatic relations with Beijing. After the STP government agreed to sever ties with

Taiwan, however, the Chinese resumed relations and reopened their Embassy.407

I had barely arrived in STP when a Chinese official pushed passed me in the queue for

passport control and proceeded to argue with the Boarder Control Officer. He was part of a

Chinese Delegation arriving in STP to provide technical assistance and training for

agriculture I overheard him rudely shout at the Officer who seemed reluctant to let him in

without a valid visa. Arriving into São Tomé it is hard to miss the fleet of yellow minibuses

and taxis with “Gifted from the Chinese Ministry of Development” written in red on the

side. When I asked about them, I learned they had been gifted to the government, who had

407 Crabtree, Justina (2018) The island paradise that could be China’s next strategic transport hub CNBC News: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/17/china-transport-hub-could-be-the-african-island-of-sao-tome.html

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in turn loaned them to private drivers at a low cost to provide safe transport for the public.

Reports in the media announce various significant financial contributions the Chinese intend

to make to STP over the next few years. As with many African countries, STP signed a five-

year cooperation agreement with China in 2017 for cooperation on infrastructure,

technology, student scholarships and medical assistance.

It is unclear exactly how much money the Chinese intend to spend in STP. One news article

reported “USD146 million for the modernisation of its International Airport and the

construction of a deep-sea container port, which could serve as a logistics hub for Chinese

exports to Central Africa.”408 Another claimed “China is donating US$30 million to the

country every year, as well as providing other occasional support, in addition to its

participation in projects which we consider to be structural.”409 As well as the buses, I was

told the Chinese plan to refurbish the dishevelled city centre and build 200 new housing

blocks near the capital. A study is apparently underway to help refurbish the airport

including extending the runway so it can land larger planes, and despite everyone I spoke

with informing me the deep-water port project was off, newspaper reports suggest they are

still developing proposals.

While this huge investment in infrastructure would be fantastic for STP and they are already

benefitting far more from the Chinese relationship than they did with Taiwan it does

demonstrate the power of Chinese influence over this poor state. Officials, locals and

408 Crabtree, Justina (2018) The island paradise that could be China’s next strategic transport hub CNBC News: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/17/china-transport-hub-could-be-the-african-island-of-sao-tome.html 409 Macau Hub (2019) China is “very important partner” for São Tomé and Príncipe, says prime minister:https://macauhub.com.mo/feature/pt-china-e-um-parceiro-importantissimo-para-sao-tome-e-principe-afirma-primeiro-ministro/

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members of the diplomatic community I spoke with were sceptical of the arrangement and

Chinese motivations. Seemingly, there is one quarry in STP which had been closed as it is in

the middle of the protected National Park area of the jungle, which has recently reopened

under Chinese ownership-presumably to provide materials to support the housing

development. Further, Chinese companies have been connected to illegal sand mining,

which is causing devastating erosion in STP. While the fisheries Ministry told me they do

not yet have a fishing agreement with China, there have been plenty of reports of Chinese

trawlers fishing illegally in their waters.410 Given the value of the pelagic fishery, the large

number of long line and purse seine vessels in the Chinese far-water fleet and their activities

in the rest of the Gulf of Guinea, the Chinese are potentially the most active IUU fishers in

their waters. Corruption in the judicial sector and weak institutions are likely further stalling

enforcement attempts to catch illegal fishing. It is understandable that the government

would not want to risk this essential investment in critical infrastructure for the sake of fish

that they do not yet have capability to benefit from. Given the drastic overcapitalisation,

damage to the food web and further pressure from climate change if STP do not get control

over fishing activities in their waters soon, it may be too late for them to benefit from the

deep-water fishery which could risk stock collapse.

The strategic location, small population and relative stability of STP further questions

China’s motives for investing in STP. A better runway and deep-water industrial port would

enable China to use the country as an important hub as part of its Belt and Road Initiative as

they increasingly export natural resources from West and Central Africa. While the only

410 I have been informed of these reports by colleagues in the Royal Navy, US Navy, IMO, UNODC and Interpol.

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significant resource the Chinese are interested in in STP is the fish which they can harvest

illegally at present, the location will be of increasing importance in the future, just as the US

have benefitted from the strategic position of Hawai’i for their main defence outpost in the

Pacific. If China was to establish a Naval base in STP they would be well placed to protect

their trade routes with African countries and the isolation, weak governance and small

population in STP make this the perfect location.

Conclusion

Artisanal fishers in STP are seeing a significant decline in their stocks. In the north of the

island the fishery is practically already collapsed, and in the south, it is getting worse. The

artisanal fisheries in STP are essential for food security in a country where all imports have

to come by small boat or small plane because they do not have the infrastructure for big

cargo ships or planes. Imports are very expensive for a local population who live in poverty.

The fish that are being caught are increasingly smaller and younger, therefore diminishing

this aspect will further damage the fishery for the future. The impact of overfishing in the

shark population as well as of big pelagic predators is no doubt playing a role in these

declining catches, worsened by the climate crisis and ocean acidification.

The impact of the value of selling licences to foreign trawlers fulfills the ‘resource curse,’ just

as it did in Sierra Leone, although in this smaller nation is manifesting this hex in a slightly

more complex way. The draw of resource rents from the financial income for the licences is

motivating corrupt officials to maintain an opaque, underfunded and incompetent fishing

sector. Despite lacking resources, STP do possess the MDA kit, small enforcement vessels,

the Portuguese patrol vessel and fisheries enforcement officers onboard trawlers. So strong

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fisheries enforcement operations could be run and ships arrested. This would bring money

back into the STP treasury in the form of fines and help to better preserve the fishery. This

is not happening as it seems that there is simply too much at stake, with powerful elites

benefitting from the current system, but increasingly also subject to intimidation by foreign

powers. China and the EU are offering essential aid to the country for infrastructure

projects that could lead to a brighter future, but illegal activity and overfishing is damaging

the fishery while foreign trawlers continue to profit from poor enforcement in STP waters.

It can only be imagined that there must be considerable pressure on government elites to

maintain the status quo. I have argued previously that effective fisheries enforcement

requires top down political will to reform institutions and stamp out corruption and then to

improve systems. Without this top down strong political will fisheries enforcement will not

improve.

STP has another storm brewing. They have a large youth unemployment problem that is

only getting worse. The population is growing at a rate of about 5,000 babies a year.

Without employment opportunities and now plugged into a more interconnected world, the

people of STP are growing restless and in the last couple of years the capital has seen some

violent protests break out, as well as increased criminality. The rich marine ecosystem off

STP could present significant opportunities for the people of STP in terms of tourism and

also in fisheries imports. There are significant development hurdles that stand in the way of

developing these industries and upfront finance would be needed, but if action is not taken

to prevent IUU fishing and the degradation of their maritime domain then it will be too late

to benefit from these opportunities. Further, as stocks continue to decline it will have a big

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impact not only on food security but on the important role that fish and eating together play

in the culture of STP.

The country appears to me to be at a cross-road. The growing youth population are

increasingly aware of their relative deprivation compared to other countries. The climate

crisis is worsening extreme weather on the island, increasing the likelihood of flash floods

and landslides. The fishery is suffering and this will continue if overfishing and

environmental damage is not prevented. At the same time, development funds from the

World Bank and IMO could be accessed to support the development of their “blue

economy” and UNODC and UNDP are motivated by the growing threat of TOC to invest in

reforming the judicial sector. In order to take advantage of these opportunities the

government would need to have the strong political will to reform the country. Weak

institutions enabling rent seeking behaviours from corrupt officials is disincentivising reform

which will likely worsen as huge money floods into the country for Chinese infrastructure

projects. The Chinese trawlers fishing illegally are benefitting from a weak fisheries

enforcement regime so it is not in Chinese interests to encourage reform. If the economy

does not start to pick up soon, unrest and criminality could increase which would be

devastating for this paradise in the South Atlantic. Likewise, if steps are not taken to

improve and protect the fishery it will likely collapse which would have huge implications for

the local population and could serve to discourage Chinese investments.

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Chapter Five: Fisheries Management and Scarcity Conflict

In the last two chapters I have conducted an analysis based on my observations and

interviews of how the ‘resource curse’ influences fisheries management in Sierra Leone and

São Tomé & Príncipe. My conclusion is that the high value of selling fishing licences to

foreign trawlers is cursing this resource. Weak institutions, especially in the security and

justice sector, are stunting maritime security enforcement and enabling IUU fishing by

international trawlers. The rent seeking opportunities connected to licence fees and weak

maritime security is benefitting elites at the expense of local fishing communities. In São

Tomé & Príncipe fewer licences are sold and at lower prices than in Sierra Leone, so it is

harder to connect the licence fees to creating the curse. Institutional weakness and poor

maritime enforcement is demonstrating the additional rent seeking opportunities

connected with fisheries management that worsen the curse. The easy capital from selling

licences and connected aid money has diverted resources away from building up other

industries. For example, it has restrained the development of a local semi-industrial fishing

sector and processing facilities and thus has prevented inclusive economic development.

The global political economy of fisheries and capitalist exploitation also plays an important

role in cursing these fisheries. These dynamics are also driving IUU, overfishing and

environmental degradation that is damaging fish stocks, reducing the catch for local fishers

and risking stock collapse.

In my introduction, I explained how fisheries are at an important cross-road.

Overcapitalisation since the 1960s by industrial fishing trawlers and environmental damage

caused by industrial fishing techniques are now combining with ocean acidification and

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rising water temperatures from the climate crisis. This perfect storm is threatening the

survival of global fisheries. Meaning we can no longer consider fish to necessarily be a

renewable open access resource, because, as we saw in the histories of the Newfoundland

Atlantic cod fishery, Pollock in the so-called “donut hole” in the Pacific, and the Pacific

Sardine fishery,411 overfishing can lead to stock collapse. Further, despite twenty years plus

moratorium on fishing, these collapsed stocks have not recovered, suggesting stock collapse

is permanent. This new reality means the very real outcome of the continued poor

management systems and lack of enforcement to prevent IUU fishing could well be fisheries

collapse in the Gulf of Guinea. Fisheries collapse would lead to scarcity of this essential

source of protein and livelihoods for coastal communities. I will now use the literature on

scarcity conflict and environmental security to analyse the potential risk of violent conflict as

fish scarcity worsens in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe. Scholars set out a number of

indications in the literature that they found to increase or worsen the risk of conflict and I

will examine whether these conditions exist to better understand the security threat of the

‘resource curse’ leading to fish scarcity.

Thomas Homer-Dixon412 argued that scarcity causes insurgencies and group-identity

conflicts by constraining access to resources or economic activity of often already

marginalised communities. He observed that scarcity caused migration to urban centres in

search of employment opportunities and the increased populations in cities encouraged

communal, ethnic, political and criminal violence.413 In both Sierra Leone and STP

411 Kevin M. Bailey (2011) An Empty Donut Hole: The Great Collapse of a North American Fishery Ecology and Society Vol. 16, No. 2, Jun, p.28 412 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press 413 ibid p.155

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urbanisation has been steadily increasing over the last ten years. In 2018 42% of the

population lived in urban environments in Sierra Leone, up from 36% at the end of the war

in 2002.414 While in STP in 2018 the urban population was nearly 73% up by 10% in the last

ten years.415 Crime regularly goes unreported in both countries and so it is hard to assess

whether this increased urbanisation is leading to increased criminality. Anecdotally,

however, I was informed this was the case in both places during my visits. I was also told

STP has been seeing increasing numbers of violent protests in recent years. In 2018 a 72-

hour ban on protests was put in place to prevent violence following the announcement of

Constitutional Court elections416 which demonstrates some of the rising tensions. Sierra

Leone, on the other hand has seen violence at every election since the end of the civil war

and although this has improved in recent years, the ethnic divisions and polarised politics

present a significant risk of violence.

In both countries I was told conflict between local fishermen was increasing as competition

for increasingly scarce fish intensified. In Sierra Leone I was also told some fishermen may

be considering taking violent action against foreign trawlers fishing illegally in coastal

waters. Both countries also have growing youth populations and unemployment which

conflict literature suggests can often have a contributory effect on the risk of violent

conflict. Homer-Dixon went on to argue that scarcity and deprivation alone did not cause

violent conflict but that it depended on specific contextual factors. He argued people are

414 Statistics from World Banks Data available here: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=SL 415 Urbanisation statistics from Statistica available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/729434/urbanization-in-s%25C3%25A3o-tome-and-principe/ 416 Lusa (2018) Police ban protest up to 72 hours after the announcement of the final results Platforma media, available at: https://www.plataformamedia.com/en-uk/news/politics/police-ban-protest-up-to-72-hours-after-the-announcement-of-the-final-results-9988010.html

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more likely to become violent dependent on the level of relative depravation they suffer.417

If Homer-Dixon’s observations were correct, then the reduction in fisheries, economic

decline and growing food insecurity suffered by local fishermen, whilst foreign trawlers can

be seen from shore catching tonnes of fish for foreign markets is a great concern.

Scholars such as Hauge & Ellingsen,418 and Diehl419 agreed with Homer-Dixon on the

likelihood of scarcity to cause internal conflict, however, they also highlighted the threats of

state fragmentation and increased criminality on international security. All the states in

West and Central Africa are fragile, many have suffered civil war over the last couple of

decades or still have internal insurgencies or terrorist groups to contend with. Borders are

porous and there is free movement between ECOWAS member states and ECCAS member

states. In Sierra Leone, the artisanal fishermen explained to me that they were already

venturing over the border to Liberia where they could sell their catch for a better price.

Maritime boundaries between many states remain disputed and the migratory nature of

fish mean activity in one states’ waters impact fish in other states’ waters. With conflict

amongst fishermen increasing and fishermen having to travel further afield in search of

catch, the potential for scuffles with fishing communities in neighbouring states increases.

Further, the maritime security agreements under the Code of Conduct give states “hot

pursuit” access into their neighbours’ waters increasing the likelihood of fishermen being

targeted by their neighbour’s coastguard for illegally fishing in their waters. This has already

417 Homer-Dixon, Thomas (1990) Environment, Scarcity and Violence New Jersey: Princeton University Press P.155 418 Hauge, Wenche & Ellingsen, Tanja (1998) Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May, pp.299-317 419 Diehl, Paul (1998) Environmental Conflict: An Introduction Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May, pp.275-277

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happened in Cameroon in 2002, where the coastguard allegedly shot and killed 97 Nigerian

artisanal fishermen for fishing illegally in Cameroon waters.420 In Sierra Leone I was told a

story of how some fisheries enforcement officials had boarded a trawler for illegally fishing

in Sierra Leone waters but the ship sailed into Liberian waters and the officials had been

arrested for piracy for illegally boarding the vessel. This suggests there are already tensions

with neighbouring states exacerbated by declining fish stocks. So as these dwindle and

Sierra Leone and STP remain weak links in the regional work to improve maritime security

and enforce fisheries regulations, it is likely competition for resource could increase regional

tensions.

There are other significant security threats in the region in the form of international terrorist

groups particularly Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) a jihadist terrorist group

dedicated to the dismantling of regional governments and implementation of sharia law.

They are currently operating in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Libya, Tunisia, and Niger but are a

significant concern for all states in the region particularly given the speed at which they

steamed into Mali in 2012.421 This terror concern has grown significantly since 2017 when

the Islamic State Terrorist group (IS), with whom AQ are fighting against in the Middle East

have started to coordinate attacks with AQIM in West Africa. These international terrorist

groups are seen as a particular threat to countries with large young, disaffected,

unemployed male Muslim populations. 78% of Sierra Leone’s population are Muslim and

42% are under 15. They also have one of the highest youth unemployment rates in West

420 Okafor-Yarwood, Ifesinachi (2017) Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and the complexities of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) for countries in the Gulf of Guinea Marine Policy. P.4 421 Tran, Mark (2013) Mali: a guide to the conflict: Malians have welcomed France's decision to commit forces but there are fears conflict could spread in fragile Sahel region The Guardian available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/16/mali-guide-to-the-conflict

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Africa at 60%.422 American and French militaries currently operating in West Africa have

been providing significant intelligence and military support to the countries in West Africa to

fight this threat. However, there are growing rumours that the US may be considering

drawing down their support for West Africa in favour of moving troops to the Pacific to

counter the threat from Russia and China.423 This withdrawal of military support is

particularly concerning for the states in the region ill-equipped to tackle this threat alone.

The draw of violent extremism has been demonstrated to grow in the face of increasing

relative depravation, reduced opportunities and disenfranchisement. This is the concern of

the potential impact for the worsening condition of the fishing sector for young male

fishermen.

A further threat is the increase in activity by TOC groups in West and Central Africa. The UN

Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) published a Threat Assessment for Transnational

Organised Crime in West Africa in 2013. The report concluded that, at the time, flows of

cocaine through West Africa to Europe from Brazil were declining, but there was a worrying

increase in methamphetamines being manufactured locally, destined for the East Asian

market. In 2013 illegal migration to Europe was declining in the aftermath of the global

economic crisis. However, this has since changed with Europe seeing record numbers of

Sub-Saharan Africans applying for asylum in 2016: 196,000 and 2017: 168,000.424 An influx

422 Word Population statistics available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sierra-leone-population/ 423 Warrick, Joby (2020) ISIS and Al-Qaeda join Forces in West Africa: “This Cancer will Spread far beyond here if we don’t fight together to the end” says Malian Minister as Concerns Grow about Extremism Resurgence in the Independent available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/isis-al-qaeda-terror-west-africa-mali-burkina-faso-niger-a9353126.html 424 Pew Research Centre (2018) At Least a Million Sub-Saharan Africans Moved to Europe since 2010 available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2018/03/22/at-least-a-million-sub-saharan-africans-moved-to-europe-since-2010/

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of 20,000 weapons from Libya in 2013 was a significant concern in the UNODC report, which

also highlighted the high number of illegal weapons generally circulating within the region.

The report also highlighted how piracy and illegal oil bunkering have been a constant

concern and threat to the shipping industry since 1980 (according to IMO figures). In May

2020 the Nigerian Navy arrested a group of pirates after they attacked a Chinese fishing

vessel in the waters of Cote D’Ivoire.425 The majority of pirate attacks in the GoG are against

diesel tankers and merchant shipping. An attack against an industrial trawler therefore,

could demonstrate growing desperation and the rising value of these trawlers as high value

targets worth local groups taking the risk to attack. The UNODC cite all these TOC threats in

the region as presenting significant threats to stability and security in West and Central

Africa.426

Interpol has also raised concerns over human trafficking in the area, 220 people were

rescued by police in an operation in 2019, a further 232 in Niger in February 2020 and these

are just examples of ongoing Interpol operations to disrupt human trafficking in the

region.427 The rescued victims were destined for forced labour, housekeeping and sexual

slavery. There are also reports of illegal migrants ending up working on far-water fleet

425 Chinese fishing trawler hijacked, quickly rescued by Nigerian Navy May 21, 2020 In Insurance Marine News, Keep, Political Risk, Credit & Finance: https://insurancemarinenews.com/insurance-marine-news/chinese-fishing-trawler-hijacked-quickly-rescued-by-nigerian-navy/ 426 UNODC 2013 Report on Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa Key Findings, available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOCTAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_KEYFINDINGS.pdf 427 Interpol human trafficking reports available at: https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/Niger-Police-rescue-232-victims-of-human-trafficking https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2019/Trafficking-victims-rescued-during-INTERPOL-coordinated-operation-in-Mali https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2019/Human-trafficking-hundreds-rescued-in-West-Africa

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fishing vessels in slavery.428 It is difficult to quantify the exact numbers of people in West

Africa falling prey to human trafficking by TOCs because poor local law enforcement is ill-

equipped to tackle this criminality and record figures. A lack of economic opportunities and

desperation motivates people to take a risk with traffickers trying to escape to a better life.

Consequently, as declining fish stocks lead to worsening hardship it is likely this illegal

trafficking and migration will increase.

Child sex abuse, including sex-tourism and money laundering are also growing concerns.

These were specifically raised to me by UN agencies and government officials in STP. This

increasing criminality in West and Central Africa demonstrates a level of violence against

local communities that should be the role of Governments, particularly security and justice

infrastructure, to prevent. Corruption and weakness in these institutions, however, is

facilitating criminality by providing an environment where these criminals can operate with

little threat of capture or prosecution. Failure to enforce fishing legislation and prevent IUU

fishing is adding to this violence by threatening the food supply and economic livelihoods of

coastal populations. Failures to effectively manage fisheries in the region and crack down

on IUU fishing is therefore contributing to the threats to local communities presented by

TOC.

Ken Conka argued in his 2002 book that ecological degradation exacerbated localised

conflicts along existing social cleavages and contributed to prolonging conflict. His concept

of “ecological security” was used to theorise that environmental protection, inclusivity and

428 BBC Documentary, Paul Adams & Charlotte Pamment (2019) Is China’s Fishing Fleet Taking All of West Africa’s Fish? https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-africa-47698314/is-china-s-fishing-fleet-taking-all-of-west-africa-s-fish

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cooperation will facilitate peace and stability and avoid the risks of scarcity conflict. He

developed a framework to prevent conflict, arguing that ecological, environmental

interdependence on a regional or even global scale has exacerbated conflict. He argued

efforts to preserve and fairly distribute renewable resources will prevent the security

implications of scarcity.429 The situation in connection to fisheries management in West and

Central Africa do no evidence ecological security. The current systems are not preserving or

fairly distributing fish, but rather allowing foreign trawlers to poach and pillage for their own

gain on international markets. Food security is further threatened. Ghana are currently

importing roughly USD5 million annually in fish from South America to feed her local

population. If the same situation arises in Sierra Leone or STP it is unclear whether these

countries will be able to finance such imports to feed their people.

Paul Diehl430 makes the case that democracies are better at preserving and distributing

resources fairly and avoiding the threat of scarcity. However, in West and Central Africa,

there is a separate status for wealthy ruling elites putting them above the rest of the

population and the polarised two-party political systems limit political representation and

democratic values. In both Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe not only do the political

parties return to power, but previous leaders have been voted back in for second terms a

number of years after first ruling. All of this helps to hold back the development of an

ecological security regime where fisheries could be preserved and distributed fairly for the

inclusive benefit of the people. Further, it demonstrates some of the worrying trends in the

mismanagement of fisheries and how this could contribute to scarcity conflict in future.

429 Conka, Ken (2002) Environmental Peacemaking Washington: Woodrow Wilson Press Centre p.13 430 Diehl, Paul (1998) Environmental Conflict: An Introduction Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 3, May, pp.275-277

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Many scholars including De Soysa,431 Hague & Ellingsen,432 Rabushka and Shepsle433 agreed

with Homer-Dixon’s observations that resource scarcity worsens divisions along ethnic lines.

They analysed the systemic interactions between environmental security, ethnic group

dynamics and the likelihood of conflict. Roeder434 argued that environmental scarcity could

lead to inter-group conflict as the result of ethnic population shares. He hypothesised that

the population dynamics are more likely to lead to conflict when the size of the largest

minority group is large enough to have parity with the majority group.435 Sierra Leone has

over 17 ethnic groups, however, her largest group, the Temne make up 35% of the

population whilst the Mende make up 31%. The additional groups are significantly smaller

ranging from 8% Limba, Fula 7%, Kono 5%, Krio 2%, Loko 2%, Mandango 2% and a mixture

make up the final 3%.436 In accordance with Roeder’s hypothesis then, Sierra Leone is

incredibly vulnerable to scarcity conflict exacerbating divisions along ethnic lines. While

other scholars such as Lyal Sunga437 have criticised this literature for being too reductionist,

it does however, present a worrying sign for the conflict potential once fish scarcity starts to

bite in Sierra Leone.

431 Indra de Soysa (2002) Paradise is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War, 1989–99, Journal of Peace Research 39/4 pp.395–416 432 Wenche Hauge and Tanja Ellingsen (1998) Beyond Environmental Scarcity: Causal Pathways to Conflict, Journal of Peace Research 35/3 pp.299–317 433 Rabushka, Alvin & Shepsle, Kenneth (1972) Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company 434 Roeder, Philip & Rothchild, Donald (2000) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 435 Sirin, Cigdem (2011) Scarcity-Induced Domestic Conflict: Examining the Interactive Effects of Environmental Scarcity and ‘Ethnic’ Population Pressures Civil Wars, Vol.13, No.2 June, pp.122–140 p.123 436 World Population Review Statistics available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/sierra-leone-population/ 437 Sunga, Lyal (2014) Does Climate Change Worsen Resource Scarcity and Cause Violent Ethnic Conflict? International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 21, pp.1-24 p.23

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Scholars such as Dobrowski & Walliman438 argue globalisation has led to an increase in

violent conflict caused by resource scarcity. They argue globalisation and increased demand

for cheap goods in stronger economies has driven developing economies away from

supporting their own people and onto creating goods for export. This criticism can clearly

be seen in Sierra Leone and STP fisheries. Global capitalism and industrial far-water fleet

trawlers are capitalising on the valuable fish from Gulf of Guinea waters to export to their

own countries. The price paid for fisheries licences and for aid is dramatically lower than

the value of the fish on international markets, so they are profiting greatly at the expense of

African populations. This is even if they are paying for licences at all, the huge number of

IUU vessels estimated as operating in the region are benefitting from these profits with no

contribution to the countries who should own the resource. Not only are people in STP and

Sierra Leone not benefitting from the billions they could be making from harvesting and

exporting this resource themselves, but the artisanal fishers are suffering further at the

hands of trawlers overfishing and causing environmental destruction. Dobrowski and

Walliman’s research concluded that the role of government policies that marginalise groups

of society, particularly poor groups, trapping communities in poverty and increasing

inequalities and divisions, can lead to violent conflict. Once again, the situation in West and

Central African fisheries fits with the arguments in this body of literature supporting the

notion that the mismanagement of fisheries in this region could lead to scarcity induced

conflict.

438 Dobkowski, Michael & Walliman, Isidor (1998) The Coming Age of Scarcity Syracuse: New York

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More recent scholarship including that of Bina Agarwal,439 Lucy Jarosz,440 Lyla Mehtaa,

Amber Huffa & Jeremy Allouchea441 reframes the way we think about the role of scarcity in

causing violent conflict. They explain that scarcity is not “a zero-sum game of all against

all,”442 arguing instead that scarcity in itself is a form of violence which as a concept neglects

the socio-political dimensions of scarcity. To frame this argument in terms of fisheries in

West and Central Africa: if fish stocks collapse it will not only have been caused by the man-

made climate change of wealthy industrial economies, but also the actions of stronger

economies in overcapitalising on the fishery and the failure of their government to tackle

corruption, stand up to foreign states, improve maritime security and protect the fish stock

for their local people. In this case, therefore, there is considerable sociological violence in a

system that supports the strong and wealthy over the poor and weak to lead to fishery

collapse. Failure from the international community and governments in the region can

therefore be seen as a kind of violence that will lead to a desperate situation for local

fishers. Although UNCLOS requires in Article 62.2 that states not in possession of industrial

fishing sectors allow other states access, recent activity in Indonesia has demonstrated this

is no longer a given. Indonesia recently banned foreign trawlers from fishing in her EEZ,

banned ship-to-ship transfer of fish caught in their EEZ and took strong enforcement

actions, arresting and confiscating ships found to be operating illegally, even at times

publicly scuttling vessels.443 As a result, fish stocks have dramatically started to recover,

439 Agarwal, Bina (2014) Food Sovereignty, food security and democratic choice: critical contradictions and difficult conciliations Journal of Peasant Studies 41, no.6 pp.1247-1268 440 Jarosz, Lucy (2014) Comparing Food Security and Food Sovereignty Discourses Dialogues in Human Geography 4, no.2, July1, pp.168-181 441 Mehtaa, Lyla, Huffa, Amber and Allouchea, Jeremy (2019) The new politics and geographies of scarcity in Geoform 101, pp.222-230 442 Ibid p.222 443 Cabral, Renial, Mayorga, Juan, Clemence, Michela, Lynham, John, Koeshendrajana, Sonny, Muawanah, Umi, Nugroho, Duto, Anna, Zuzy, Abdul Ghofar, Mira, Zulbainarni, Nimi, Gaines, Steven, & Costello, Christopher (2018) Rapid and lasting gains from solving illegal fishing Nature, Ecology & Evolution Vol 2, April pp.650–658

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growing catches for local fishermen and enabling them to further develop their own fishery.

This demonstrates that states need not be powerless within the global political economy of

UNCLOS, they just have to choose their battles. Currently, the situation in West and Central

Africa looks bleak and there is significant potential that if dramatic action is not taken to

redress these issues soon, the resulting scarcity could lead to increased violence and even

violent conflict. The results in Indonesia demonstrate that with strong political will and

work to address corruption, this can be changed. This example could influence policy

decisions in West and Central Africa that could restore the fishery. However, the hex of the

valuable fishing licence fees, relations with foreign partners, especially China and weakness

in institutions mean incredibly strong political will and leadership would be needed for this

to be effective.

Looking to the Future This new discourse on scarcity, recognising how it is driven by policy and enforcement

failings and corruption and the factors of the ‘resource curse’ suggest that reform could

break the curse and prevent fish scarcity in West and Central Africa. In both Sierra Leone

and São Tomé & Príncipe the structures and systems mismanaging fisheries are so deeply

ingrained that it would take nothing short of significant reform to turn them around. This

kind of reform takes strong and determined political will. The countries in West and Central

Africa face multiple challenges and threats every day and policy makers are always juggling

multiple priorities with very limited budgets. In order to garner the kind of political will that

would be required to make such changes, demands a strong case for why reform is

necessary and would be beneficial in the long term. This is where futures studies can serve

as a useful tool. My analysis of both case study countries paints a pretty bleak picture on

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the role of the ‘resource curse’ in fisheries management and the potential for scarcity

induced conflict if this is not turned around. Futures studies can provide a tool for looking

at the impacts of actions and interactions within systems in potential futures in order to

illustrate risks or opportunities that might not have previously been expected.

This next section seeks to use futures studies techniques to generate a number of different

alternative future scenarios in order to understand how change could shape conflict futures

in West and Central Africa with a specific focus on fisheries management. To begin a futures

exercise, futurists decide upon a focal issue or question.444 For the purposes of my research,

I want to understand: How fisheries management could impact future stability and

development in Sierra Leone, São Tomé & Príncipe, and more widely of West and Central

Africa? The exercise requires several steps. Firstly, it is important to understand some of

the basic historical events that have led to the current state of stability, development and

fisheries management. I have developed this historic background as part of my earlier

analysis. Fisheries management, stability and development are driven by a number of

interacting systems and layers. The next step is to identify these: the trends, emerging

issues and stabilising factors that will serve as the building blocks for my alternative futures

scenarios.445 Once again, many of the existing trends have been detailed in my earlier

analysis but I will list some specific trends before beginning to build scenarios.

444 Lum, Richard (2016) Four Steps to the Future: A Quick and Clean Guide to Creating Foresight Futurescribe Honolulu, Anchorage, Boston, Oxford. p.29 445 Curry, Andrew & Schultz, Wendy (2009) Roads Less Travelled: Different Methods, Different Futures Journal of Futures Studies, May, 13(4): pp.35 – 60 p.36

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Building Futures Scenarios

A futures project is driven by the desire to understand the causes, impacts and drivers of

change to create the future. Often when policy makers develop strategies the thinking

behind that strategy is siloed and does not really take into consideration the full range of

drivers and implications that could impact that policy. This is true when we think about

fisheries or maritime security strategies across the globe. An example is when Somali piracy

and the dramatic risk it presented to global trade caused many states, including the UK, to

develop a counter-piracy strategy that allowed the use of armed private security guards

onboard their flagged ships transiting the high risk area (HRA).446 I worked as part of the

team implementing the strategy and whilst guards proved to be very effective at deterring

attacks, they generated a raft of serious unforeseen international security incidents.

Significant cuts to navies in the years proceeding this policy meant there was a keen, eager

and trained workforce available, high demand and lucrative profits. The private maritime

security industry proliferated at dramatic speed and quickly became saturated. The

complexity of multijurisdictional maritime law led to diplomatic incidents and arrests of

guards operating legally under one jurisdiction, but not under another in a world where

maritime boundaries are often unclear. Weapons movements soared as teams shuttled

shipments back and forth to support their teams at either end of the HRA. Concerns over

these shipments being used as a coverup for weapons trafficking grew, pirates got shot and

there were significant other concerns over alleged human rights abuses carried out by the

guards. Regulation and enforcement presented huge challenges in government

departments under-resourced and under-equipped to tackle the challenges. Then the

446 Warrell, Helen & Wright, Robert (2011) Armed Guards on UK Vessels to Counter Piracy FT, available at: https://www.ft.com/content/eacd1ad4-0313-11e1-899a-00144feabdc0

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industry developed “floating armouries,” essentially gun lockers aboard ships in

international waters at either end of the HRA. These presented significant policy and

enforcement challenges that governments were not equipped to handle. Soon, the

saturated industry started working to find new avenues for service delivery and

geographical hotspots in which to operate and the problems they had presented became

worse.

This is just one example of the unintended consequences that can come from a policy

developed without sufficient thinking on the cascading impacts and indirect drivers of

change that could be important to consider. But the unforeseen issues can also represent

opportunities. A futures project attempts to give policy makers the tools and space to think

more broadly to develop comprehensive strategies that anticipate risks and opportunities

that might not otherwise be obvious.

Developing alternative future scenarios requires preparations. Futurists collect a number of

building blocks to generate the scenarios. These include: an understanding of the different

systems that have grown up within society and how these influence other areas. So when

looking at the future of West and Central Africa, for example, some of these are: the

sovereign state system that shapes international politics; regional politics amongst the

states in West and Central Africa; Regional Economic Communities; the international

political economy and UNCLOS; international aid organisations; neo-colonial relationships

with other states; colonial legacies; international partners’ differing interests. This is far

from a comprehensive list and each will impact systems and events in positive and negative

ways. For example, regional politics can both disincentivise cooperation and prevent

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regional responses and trade; whilst also facilitating regional working, joint peace keeping

missions and joint maritime security enforcement. Understanding how the different

systems are currently shaping the sector and how they impact each other can indicate how

these could interact to drive or prevent change.

The second building block for scenarios development are trends.447 These are snap shots of

how present systems have developed over time and now stand, these are often based on

statistics. Some key trends for this exercise would include: population size and growth;

demographics in the population; the number of trawlers fishing an EEZ each year; birth

rates; death rates; food imports; GDP; and economic growth. Trends illustrate expected

trajectories, for example, the population and particularly youth population has been

growing steadily in São Tomé & Príncipe. These trajectories can be changed by emerging

issues, for example, the global economy was headed in a majority upward trend, until the

2007/8 global financial crisis when it dramatically reduced, this has since recovered; but

now the pandemic in 2020 is causing global economic losses. Understanding expected

trajectories and what it would take to change or continue these helps to develop alternative

futures scenarios.

The third building block is emerging issues (EI).448 These are issues that drive change. They

start as weak signals that get stronger as they begin to shape change in society. They can be

447 Dator, Jim (2011) Futures Studies in William Sims Bainbridge, ed., Leadership in Science and Technology. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Reference Series, Vol. 1, Chapter Four, pp.32-40. P.37 448 Curry, Andrew & Schultz, Wendy (2009) Roads Less Travelled: Different Methods, Different Futures Journal of Futures Studies, May, 13(4): pp.35 – 60 p.45

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technological, economic, social, political, or environmental in nature.449 A historical

example of an EI that has driven significant change is: the development of mobile

technologies and smart phones. This has reshaped communications across the globe;

enabled mobile banking systems and virtual payments; given access to communications to

populations previously isolated due to lack of infrastructure; developed navigation systems

and location based service provision; changed how we communicate with each other;

receive our news; and scientists are now developing track-and-trace apps to help with the

global pandemic. Smart phones have also enabled a permeation of social media that is

driving its own raft of changes. The change an EI is capable of delivering within a system is

not always immediately obvious, particularly several years before an EI starts to drive

change, when it can seem more like fiction or dreams than future reality. For example,

automated cars were once the stuff of science fiction, but now are beginning to operate in

parts of the Middle East and US and will have dramatic impacts for road safety and

transport systems. EI are essential to thinking about how change could be driven in the

future to develop the forward-thinking mentality to identify opportunities and risks that

may not be obvious today.

The final important building block to understand change and develop alternative future

scenarios is an understanding of what prevents changes: stabilising factors.450 These are the

449 An example futurist Richard Lum uses is the notion of “the ethical treatment of machines” machines, automation, artificial intelligence (AI), and algorithms are taking on increasing roles in systems and society. As machines permeate into more and more aspects of our lives ethics is starting to play a more important role in how we think about them. There is work today, for example, to try to prevent racist or sexist bias being built into algorithms teaching AI, arguments over what moral values and judgements they should be taught, and potentially in future, when we may have AI assistants, we may argue about the ethical of how the machines are treated. 450 Lum, Richard (2016) Four Steps to the Future: A Quick and Clean Guide to Creating Foresight Futurescribe Honolulu, Anchorage, Boston, Oxford p.29

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things in society that prevent or slow down change. They include limiting factors such as:

government regulations; corruption in a system; lack of political will; limits in supply chains;

cultural inertia; societal pressures; entrenched attitudes; powerful voices (these can both

drive and limit change) infrastructure limitations; or some other change derailing one

developing trend and pushing in another direction. Change does not happen in isolation.

Societies are interconnected systems pushing against each other and so to really think about

change it is important to remember the role of these stabilising factors when developing

alternative futures scenarios.

People are all influenced by unique unconscious biases.451 Everyone has their own concept

of what the future will look like, their own images of the future. Recognising our own bias

and assumptions is important when developing futures scenarios. Using a range of different

trends, EI and stabilising factors can free us from those biases and develop an understanding

of how change could develop in previously unforeseen ways. Using a specific method for

structuring the building blocks to develop the scenarios also helps prevent the impact of

unconscious bias and creates a useful exercise for understanding change.

Many academics and practicing futures consultants,452 will work to generate their own

mechanisms and methods for developing alternative future scenarios. The practise of

futures is an ever-evolving field and the scenarios essentially seek to understand change and

try as best as possible to remove bias and presumptions about the world. Sohail Inayatullah

451 Banks, Ralph, Ford, Richard (2009) (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter: law, Politics, and Racial Inequality Emory Law Journal vol. 58, p.1053 452 For Example, Jim Dator, Wendy Schultz, Andrew Curry, Richard Lum, John Sweeney, Sohail Inayatullah, Christian Crews to name a few.

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created the “Causal layered analysis” method in 2004; Jim Dator, founder of the Hawai'i

Research Center453 for Futures Studies preferred his method of “incasting;” and the Mānoa

school method was developed in 1991 as part of a project undertaken by the Hawai'i

Research Center for Futures.454 Each scenarios mechanism on its own has gaps and

assumptions, and futurists use other techniques to try to better prepare for a scenarios

exercise and explore change within the systems. For example, Richard Lum in his 2016 book

provided a number of different exercises to do this, and his own “Types of Change”

scenarios method.455

The most common method used to develop futures is the ‘2x2 scenarios matrix’ method,

also known as the 'double uncertainty' method or the ‘axes of uncertainty’.456 This is the

method I plan to use in this dissertation. The method uses two axes labelled with the “most

significant uncertainties of the overall system under scrutiny” and the scenarios are created

by combining these uncertainties. The scenarios created by the combination of the axes

should generate challenging strategic questions for the domain.457 Essentially, it takes two

of the most uncertain and thought-provoking questions and plots them on two, crossed

axes. Each increase in one direction and decrease in the other which creates four quadrants

with different conditions.458

453 US spelling adopted here as this is a US based institution. 454 Curry, Andrew & Schultz, Wendy (2009) Roads Less Travelled: Different Methods, Different Futures Journal of Futures Studies, May, 13(4): pp.35 – 60 p.46 455 Lum, Richard (2016) Four Steps to the Future: A Quick and Clean Guide to Creating Foresight Futurescribe Honolulu, Anchorage, Boston, Oxford 456Schultz, Wendy, Crews, Christian, Lum, Richard (2012) Scenarios: A Hero’s Journey across Turbulent Systems Journal of Futures Studies, September, 17(1): pp.129-140 p.129 457 Curry, Andrew & Schultz, Wendy (2009) Roads Less Travelled: Different Methods, Different Futures Journal of Futures Studies, May, 13(4): pp.35 – 60 p.42 458 This method has traditionally been very popular in futures work, but it has also faced criticism, from scholars including Andrew Curry & Wendy Schultz, Richard Slaughter and Ken Wilber who describe the

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Developing Scenarios

Please refer to the appendix at the end of this dissertation to find the building blocks I have

used to develop my alternative futures scenarios. These include: brief historical timelines

for Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe; lists key trends that apply to both and some

specific to each country; followed by some emerging issues and stabilising factors.

In this exercise I want to develop scenarios to explore the focal issue: How fisheries

management could impact future stability and development in Sierra Leone, São Tomé &

Príncipe, and more widely of West and Central Africa? I intend to explore some to the

potential risks and opportunities that could arise from the existing system or from making

changes to fisheries management. These scenarios are not intended to be forecasts, but

rather to provoke thinking about how fisheries management has much wider reaching

impacts on security and development than may be traditionally understood. Many policy

makers across the globe consider fish to be solely an environmental, sovereign ownership,

and food security issue. Through these scenarios, I want to try and demonstrate how they

are far more and explore how ambitious or small changes in their management could have

significant benefits in West and Central Africa and in contrast, a business-as-usual approach

to the sector as it is currently managed could have devastating consequences.

I will develop scenarios set fifteen years in the future, as the potential benefits or risks could

be felt in the short to mid-term. This is a difficult time to conduct a futures exercise as the

COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has thrown many of the norms of the global economy,

scenarios developed using this method as creating “flatlands:” a set of future worlds in which "current ideologies ... were insufficiently problematized and seen as natural."

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potential health outcomes, politics and even global capitalism into question. Whilst

complicating scenario development, however, the pandemic has illustrated the value of

integrating a futures scenarios exercise into policy planning. The risk of a pandemic has

been known for many years and the rising frequency of zoonotic infections has been plainly

seen in the last decade with SARS, MERS and Ebola proceeding COVID-19. Yet the world

seems to have been unprepared for the scale and speed of this current virus which has

highlighted some of the inequalities and injustices societies have chosen to accept in the

past. The fear now is that the human and economic cost will be far higher in poor

developing countries than in rich industrial economies. At the time of writing, it cannot be

said what the rest of 2020 will hold and what changes will come from the outbreak. I will

therefore, make several assumptions about the economic impact of the pandemic and will

pick up the timelines in 2021 with an assumption that the pandemic will have passed by

then. I will make some assumptions about likely change that could have been driven by the

pandemic but will not focus too deeply on a forecast of what the world could look like in a

post-2020 world as the aim is to explore fisheries management.

Throughout my analysis I have highlighted the difference strong political will to address

corruption, strengthen institutions and tackle IUU fishing could make to fisheries

management in West and Central Africa. I have also stressed the importance of regional

and international cooperation to tackle IUU and develop a sustainable fisheries

management system. I have decided to explore these two pivotal issues in my scenarios

exercise, using the ‘axis of uncertainty’ method to create four scenarios for Sierra Leone,

São Tomé & Príncipe and the region.

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The axes of uncertainty will look like this:

The four scenarios from these axes will be as follows:

A: Isolated Action: Strong political will and weak regional and international cooperation

B: Coordinated Reform: Strong political will and strong regional and international

cooperation

C: Business as Usual: Weak political will and weak regional and international cooperation

D: Neighbourhood Watch: Weak political will and strong regional and international

cooperation

I am only going to develop one set of scenarios, but will differentiate where the impact

would most likely be different for each country. The reader should assume that in each

scenario Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe are acting in isolation. Except in scenarios B

and C where all the countries in West and Central Africa will be taking similar actions with

strong regional and international cooperation. As these scenarios are designed to provoke

thinking around the potential impact of these two drivers on the future a separate set of

four would likely involve significant duplication, so by drawing the two together I hope to

achieve the same goal with brevity.

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Scenarios (Summaries):

A: Isolated Action: Strong political will; and weak regional and international cooperation.

Policies to tackle corruption and improve transparency transformed the business

environment and enabled effective fisheries enforcement. IUU fishing was eradicated in

their waters while MPAs further supported fish stocks. Artisanal fishers saw stocks recover.

Micro-distributed renewable energy and micro-loans created new supply chains and enabled

inclusive economic growth. Urbanisation slowed and fishing communities became more

affluent. Weakness in other states in the region however, meant rising tensions over

maritime borders. The Chinese relationship declined, but attracting investment and support

from other partners filled the deficit. In São Tomé & Príncipe tensions over debts with

Angola and Nigeria increased. Weak regional security caused Sierra Leone to struggle under

the burden of refugees fleeing terrorism in neighbouring Guinea.

B: Coordinated Reform: Strong political will and strong regional and international cooperation

Renewed transparency and government reforms created a better business environment and

enabled efficient maritime security enforcement. The Code of Conduct work improved

coordination and cooperation between states, eradicated IUU and reduced the number of

foreign trawlers. Investment and assistance became easier and international organizations

supported the development of “blue economies.” Micro-distributed renewable energy and

micro-loans created new supply chains and facilitated inclusive economic growth. Reduced

pressure on fish stocks led to stock recovery and growth. Urbanisation slowed and fishing

communities became more affluent. Fisheries education and expertise improved in the

region supporting new careers and sectors. MPAs and recovering stocks benefitted tourism.

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Food security improved. Ethnic tensions reduced and relations between regional states

improved facilitating an increase in local trade and international trade.

C: Business as Usual: Weak political will and weak regional and international cooperation

Corruption and regional competition continued to hamper fisheries and business in a post-

pandemic recession. IUU fishing continued to damage the marine ecosystem and artisanal

fishers saw their stock decline and eventually collapse. Tensions along maritime borders in-

creased as fishermen competed for remaining fish. Urbanisation rose sharply and violent

criminality grew. In São Tomé & Príncipe criminality thrived as TOC groups took advantage

of weak enforcement. Human drug and weapon trafficking, and international terrorism in-

creased. Many disaffected poor young men with reduced opportunities and growing anger

were recruited to violent causes in Sierra Leone. Ethnic tensions grew and violence broke

out, particularly around elections, which were even more polarised. The relationship with

China and other international partners soured meaning less financial support or aid. Malnu-

trition rates rose and child mortality increased. Pockets of ethnic conflict erupted.

D: Neighbourhood Watch: Weak political will and strong regional and international coopera-

tion

The COVID-19 economic downturn left economies weak and corruption continued to enable

IUU fishing. International funding improved maritime security in the rest of the GoG. Fish

stocks declined and then collapsed in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe. More fishermen

turned to criminality and trafficking increased. Urbanisation sharply increased as people

moved to cities in search of work. Weak maritime security hampered trade with Sierra Leone.

Tourism in São Tomé & Príncipe struggled to recover without the draw of fertile dive sites and

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crumbling infrastructure. Violence began to erupt especially around elections and destitute

young men turned to crime and even terrorism. International organizations were keen to

facilitate sustainable “blue economy” growth and invested heavily in other countries in the

region. Work and support in SL and STP continued to be hampered by corruption. In the

worsening security situation infrastructure development aid became less accessible and food

aid and basic supplies became the only support.

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Scenarios (Long form)

A: Isolated Action

2021-2025:

The 2020 COVID-19 recession and collapsed global oil price ended both Sierra Leone and

São Tome & Príncipe’s hopes of exporting oil. Sierra Leone was hit further by a global

reduction in manufacturing that reduced demand for minerals. Economies contracted

significantly in the global COVID recession. Currency fluctuations caused significant

devaluation of African currencies. Industrial far-water fleet trawling had continued pretty

much as usual during the pandemic, but the price of fish had decreased. Criminality and

trafficking increased in 2020-2021 as people in the region struggled with growing economic

hardship.

Desperate to recover the economy and improve the future outlook, the government took

tough action to tackle corruption. In São Tomé & Príncipe this was partly motivated by an

attempt at re-election in the 2021 Presidential elections. Government salaries and accounts

were published online. A new code of ethics for ministers and officials code was introduced.

Several government ministers, unable to account for their wealth were dismissed for

corruption. A whistle-blowing hot line was established to empower the public to report low

level corruption and inappropriate behaviour by officials and police. The indiscriminate

reach of the COVID-19 virus and these new measures changed the public’s attitude and

reduced the power of elites. Empowering citizens used social media to call out corrupt

behaviour and a free media became stronger. Particular effort was made to address

corruption and nepotism in the security and justice sector. Increased transparency and

reduced corruption facilitated a business-friendly environment attracting investment. In

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São Tomé & Príncipe the community co-management system for artisanal fisheries came

into force.

The new transparent systems made it harder for fishing agents to bribe or intimidate

officials. The fisheries enforcement institutions received better funding enabling more

regular patrols that reduced IUU fishing. A record number of foreign industrial trawlers

were arrested, charged and fined in line with fishing regulations. Improved transparency

meant these fines now contributed to further improving enforcement, better equipment

maintenance and increased capacity. The Sierra Leone government were re-elected in 2023

with unparalleled support. The number of foreign trawlers fishing in their waters declined

as enforcement reduced IUU activity, but governments also sold less licenses.

By 2024-2025 maritime security enforcement was far more effective which had dramatically

reduced maritime criminality and IUU activity. Unregistered trawlers had moved instead to

the waters of neighbouring states. Fewer foreign trawlers were sold licenses and

environmentally damaging techniques were banned. Chinese work to build the industrial

fishing wharf in Sierra Leone did not start, Chinese finance for foreign infrastructure had

been diverted to rebuild their own economy post-COVID. China continued to purchase the

majority of Sierra Leone’s fishing licences but had started to demand a reduction in the

price. The reduction in trawlers meant the 6nm industrial exclusion zone in Sierra Leone

was now reserved for artisanal fishermen making fishing safer. In São Tomé & Príncipe the

Chinese relationship also wavered as China looked to reshape their economy in a post-

pandemic world. No longer able to fish illegally in STP waters had reduced their benefit

from investing there. Funding for fisheries science education grew facilitating the

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development of greater expertise locally. This expertise helped facilitate greater fisheries

protection measures including MPAs, MSY and ITQs. New environmental protections

improved dive sites and attracted greater numbers of tourists.

2026-2030:

Improved transparency and reduced corruption had encouraged more FDI in infrastructure

and business. Increasingly, investment came in the form of micro-loans from small foreign

investors into small local businesses. The pandemic had shifting people’s acceptance of

inequality and injustice, particularly in the developing world. The change in attitude made

sustainable micro-loans more fashionable. Increased investment was used to provide

distributed solar micro-power generators to small communities, villages and towns across

the country. This leapfrog technology enabled access to electricity for thousands of people

previously unsupplied by government infrastructure. Improved electricity supported

electric pump systems and villages were able to supply clean water to more buildings and

improve sanitation. Tombo and many of the small fishing villages were now able to run cold

storage facilities enabling the preservation of fresh fish. The electricity and micro-loans also

supported more freshwater aquaculture facilities. The farms used freshwater aquaculture

and aquaponics to produce a new supply of Carp, Tilapia and vegetables for local markets.

The facilities did not rely on soil so could be protected from the threat of erosion during the

rainy season and enclosed systems limited water requirements making them more resilient

to increasing droughts in Sierra Leone as the climate crisis worsened. Malnutrition rates

began to decrease. The elections in São Tomé & Príncipe were won by the existing regime

with a firm majority.

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Artisanal fishers had seen a slight recovery in their catch and new storage and processing

facilities enabled them to sell more in a slower timeframe. Improved fisheries expertise had

permeated to coastal communities and the Community Fishing Management Association in

Sierra Leone developed a co-management system between all the local artisanal fishers and

government designed to best protect future stocks. Food security and sanitation and

business development was beginning to improve local communities’ livelihoods. Political

approval had never been so high and in 2028 the elections in Sierra Leone were once again

won by the sitting government with a large majority.

Maritime security remained weak across the Gulf of Guinea despite the dramatic

improvements in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe. Fisheries continued to decline in

the waters off Guinea and Liberia, which were worsened as IUU trawlers left Sierra Leone’s

EEZ. Increasing numbers of artisanal fishermen from Liberia and Guinea crossed the

maritime border to fish in Sierra Leone waters. Scuffles erupted between foreign and local

fishermen and the incursions upset the co-management plan. Tensions rose over disputed

maritime borders as enforcement officials arrested and fined foreign artisanal boats.

Maritime criminality increased across the Gulf of Guinea which increased pressure on

maritime enforcement authorities.

In São Tomé & Príncipe their increased maritime security sent IUU fishing and other illegal

activities into the waters of neighbouring Gabon, Angola, Cameroon and Nigeria. Hot

pursuit activities from these countries’ coastguards into each other’s and São Tomé &

Príncipe’s waters increased tensions over maritime borders. Massive oil price fluctuation

during the pandemic and resulting recession had reduced oil revenues to Angola and

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Nigeria, who both put pressure on São Tomé & Príncipe to repay their debts. The

government set up a monthly payment plan with each, but tensions were high and

economic gains from improved investment, tourism, and fisheries were reduced.

In 2029 AQIM started a campaign in Guinea which sent thousands of refugees over the

border into Western Sierra Leone. The US had significantly scaled down their presence in

the region following an increase of tensions with China after the pandemic. Many of the

economic and stability gains Sierra Leone had achieved came under threat with the

increased burden of refugees. UN agencies, charities and aid organisations sent what

support they could and the crisis was discussed at the UN and by ECOWAS.

2031-2035:

While fisheries in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe had improved, in neighbouring

states IUU and environmental degradation had continued unchecked. 2032 saw the least

industrial trawlers fishing Sierra Leone’s waters since before the civil war. The stock had

been recovering over the last decade as industrial activity had reduced. But environmental

degradation elsewhere limited recovery. Some excess fish was also sold to Liberian and

Guinean fishermen struggling with their dwindling fisheries. The new local fishing industry

generated tax revenues that helped to replace the reduced finance the government had

suffered from the reduction in licence sales.

A record number of tourists were recorded in Sierra Leone. The renewed business

environment and increased investment had helped to develop eco-resorts and hotels along

the coast. Local businesses established restaurants, dive tours, surf lessons, snorkelling

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tours, water equipment rentals, souvenir shops, transit services from Freetown and car hire.

The increased revenue and taxes helped increase the provision of distributed micro-

renewable power generators and supported the development of better infrastructure to the

new tourist locations. The UN launched an intervention in Guinea but limited capacity and

funding made it ineffective. Without political will to cooperate on regional issues the Code

of Conduct work had stalled. The people became increasingly worried their progress could

be turned around by the added pressure of the security threat spreading across the border.

Now that IUU fishing was no longer damaging the shark population in São Tomé & Príncipe

it began to slowly recover. More tourists came on diving holidays now that the reefs were

recovering from the MPAs. The government sought funding for canning and processing

facilities, hoping to develop a sustainable product for export to capitalise on their own

valuable pelagic fisheries. The renewed business environment facilitated investment.

Renewable power micro-generators provided cheap electricity to hotels, guest houses,

restaurants and shops. Small tour businesses, car hire companies, souvenir shops and even

boat trips were expanded to cater for the increased number of visitors. Fishermen were

able to sell their improved catch to the restaurants and hotels to sell to tourists at a

premium. The EU purchased more licences as maritime security was improved facilitating

further development in fisheries infrastructure.

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B: Coordinated Reform

2021-2025:

The 2020 pandemic caused a global recession reducing trade, manufacturing and economic

growth. Massive reductions in the global oil price reduced upstream investment and ended

Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe’s hopes of exporting oil. Reduced manufacturing also

lowered demand for valuable minerals further hitting the Sierra Leone economy. Demand

for fish on international markets rose increasing prices. Criminality had increased in West

and Central Africa as people struggled with growing economic hardship. The pandemic

highlighted the true implications of global inequality and injustice in the globalised capitalist

economy which drove a change in global attitudes. In 2022 many countries introduced

policies to reform their economies, to stimulate green growth and create a more equal,

sustainable economic future. Global trade, particularly with China fell. Many states sought

to shorten their food supply chains, trading with neighbouring countries to reduce emissions

and strengthen resilience. Support for ‘Blue growth’ increased maritime funding from the

international community.

In an attempt to recover the economy and improve future outlook governments in SL and

STP acted to tackle corruption. Government salaries and accounts were published online

and a code of ethics was introduced for ministers and officials. Several government

ministers were unable to account for their wealth and resigned. A whistle-blowing hot line

empowered the general public to report low level corruption and inappropriate behaviour

by officials and police. The indiscriminate reach of the COVID-19 virus and these new

measures reduced the status of elites to serving officials. Empowered citizens used social

media to hold politicians and officials to account. Other states across West and Central

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Africa introduced similar policies. ECOWAS set up a transparency committee to end

corruption within the institution. In São Tomé & Príncipe these measures were partly

motivated by the 2021 elections and had the desired effect. The government remained in

power with strong support.

By 2023 maritime security capacity and capability improved across the region as the Code of

Conduct implementation began to take effect. Many states still lacked capacity to conduct

enforcement operations, but shared information and cooperation made some

improvement. Trawlers were arrested when they entered other states’ waters or ports.

Across the region, more transparent systems made it harder for foreign fishing agents to

bribe or intimidate officials. Maritime enforcement institutions now got their allocated

share of the fishing licence fees, and were able to conduct more regular patrols. In 2022-

2023 a record number of foreign industrial trawlers were arrested, charged and fined. The

new systems meant the legislated proportion of these fines funded improved enforcement

capacity. Fines now brought in a decent income which enabled maritime enforcement

authorities to better maintain equipment and conduct more regular patrols.

The Sierra Leone government was re-elected in 2023 with unparalleled support. Funding

and expertise from international institutions blue development funds facilitated investment

into greater fisheries science expertise in the region. MPAs were established to have

maximum impact in protecting spawning grounds and biodiversity. The MPAs were

designed both to sustain fish stocks and create biodiverse attractions for scuba diving

tourists. Local fisheries scientists conducted a regional survey of coastal and deeper

fisheries to establish an MSY for each species in each EEZ that could help replenish regional

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stocks. The greater fisheries enforcement patrols ensured no industrial trawlers entered a

coordinated 6nm industrial exclusion zone making fishing safer for artisanal fishers. The

number of foreign trawlers operating in the GoG also began to decline as illegal activity

became harder to commit.

An additional green economy development fund, set up to assist green recovery in the

developing world, installed distributed renewable power generators to communities not yet

connected to the electricity grid. These leapfrog technology, micro-power plants provided

electricity to towns and villages who would otherwise not have had access for many years.

The generators enabled electric pumps giving villages running water which improved

hygiene and sanitation. Micro-loans had also become popular in the developed world when

it became fashionable to support economic development in Africa. A number of small

businesses took advantage of these, and entrepreneurship flourished. By 2025 artisanal

fishers had started to see their catch increase for the first time in over a decade and were

able to take advantage of new infrastructure to start developing processing and storage

facilities for fish.

2026-2030:

The transparent business environment, MPAs and blue economy international funding

facilitated the development of tourist infrastructure, hotels, restaurants, dive and snorkel

tours, surf schools and eco-resorts. This infrastructure rejuvenated a tourist industry which

brought in foreign money and visitors. Local coastal communities benefitted from inclusive

economic development as they used micro-finance to establish small businesses to serve

the growing coastal tourist industry. Numbers were not huge, but they were growing.

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Investment also supported the establishment of locally run aquaculture and aquaponic

farms. The farms provided a secure supply of Tilapia, Carp and fresh vegetables to local

markets and the enclosed, sustainable, cheap to run infrastructure was resilient to both

floods and drought. Nutrition and food supply across the country improved.

Artisanal fishing communities benefitted from recovering stocks, electricity and improved

infrastructure. The recovering supply in the EEZs of neighbouring countries reduced

tensions over maritime borders as competition for fish reduced. Trade in certain species

between neighbouring countries increased. A breakthrough in fish feed for land-based

aquaculture facilities creating feed from insects dramatically reduced the price and

environmental impact of aquaculture. This led to a reduction in industrial nations far-water

fleets and a reduction in countries purchasing licences to fish in the Gulf of Guinea, except

for large pelagic species.

In 2029 with the assistance of a government loan and money from the blue economy trust

fund, the CMA were able to purchase several small industrial trawlers from Europe. The

infrastructure to support industrial trawlers was not yet in place, Chinese investment had

stalled during the recession. Each ship became community owned and was able to catch

more than the whole artisanal fleet of each village together. The fishermen worked

together to share the catch through ship to ship transfer using the smaller vessels as barges.

With less foreign trawlers in their EEZ, the fishermen were for the first time able to

capitalise on the catch. The new processing facilities and storage kept fish for longer

without the health implications of smoking, and secured a demand for local markets, as well

as a secure supply to the new restaurants serving tourists on the coast.

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2031-2035:

By 2031 the economy was the strongest it had been on record and nutrition rates had

improved significantly. The global economy had recovered and demand for valuable

minerals for manufacturing returned. The transparent, strong government institutions that

characterised Sierra Leone now prevented the return of the ‘resource curse’ around mining

and the valuable minerals increased GDP. With government funds from taxes increasing

over the last ten years and now with mining bringing in large revenues the government

became able to fund bigger infrastructure projects. Road and drainage projects started and

slowly infrastructure improved. This further improved sanitation, health and hygiene.

Better drainage limited the growing impacts of the rainy season on transport and better

infrastructure facilitates regional trade.

All across the region, better cooperation and reduced corruption had facilitated sustained

economic growth and greater security. The threat of international terrorism had decreased

as young populations had more opportunities and poverty had reduced. Improved security

and judicial sectors had made it harder for TOC groups to operate in the region and their

activity had reduced. Global trade had recovered and improved regional infrastructure and

a more secure maritime domain facilitated it. Ethnic tensions and divisions reduced as the

sustained growth reduced competition and enhanced people’s relative wellbeing.

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C: Business as Usual

2021-2025:

The 2020 COVID-19 recession and collapsed global oil price reduced upstream investment

and ended Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe’s hopes of exporting oil. The global

recession reduced manufacturing and so demand for valuable minerals confounding

economic decline in Sierra Leone. During the pandemic and following recession tourism and

trade reduced and food prices rose. Criminality had increased towards the end of 2020-

2021 in West and Central Africa as people struggled with growing economic hardship. In

São Tomé & Príncipe the elections took place amid significant protests from a poor,

struggling population divided on whether the government’s response had helped or

hindered.

Across the world tourism had decreased as aviation companies had not survived the

economic downturn. Political elites continued corrupt rent-seeking activities and

institutions remained weak. IUU fishing continued unabated in the face of continued weak

enforcement. Overfishing and environmental degradation continued to damage fish stocks

as the climate crisis impacted spawning and artisanal fishers saw their catch continue to

reduce. Conflicts between local fishermen worsened and became more regular as stocks

reduced. Violence broke out between neighbouring fishing communities and tensions

increased around maritime borders as fishermen travelled further to find fish. Piracy and

violent attacks against industrial trawlers fishing increased. More fishermen were lost at

sea as canoes travelled further sea in search of catch and firefights broke out regularly

during scuffles. In 2023 the Sierra Leonean elections were the most violent since the civil

war as relative depravation sparked divisions.

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2026-2030:

By 2026 artisanal fish stocks collapsed. Maritime criminality including weapons, drugs and

human trafficking increased as desperate fishermen looked to repurpose boats. Piracy

increased further against merchant shipping and foreign trawlers. The majority of the

500,000 fishermen in Sierra Leone and 5000 in STP moved to cities in search of employment

and food. Malnutrition and child mortality rose again. There was not nearly enough

housing in the cities to support desperate citizens and slums and homelessness grew.

Sanitation related diseases increased, bringing fears of an outbreak of Lassa Fever in densely

populated areas. In cities violent criminality rose as desperate people struggled to make

ends meet. The disaffected young, male population angered at their relative depravation

since fisheries had collapsed became ripe for employment by TOC groups or recruitment by

international terrorist groups. Divisions along ethnic and political lines worsened and

violence increasingly broke out between groups.

In both Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe human traffickers became more powerful, as

the number of people wanting to migrate to Europe grew and marginalised people became

more vulnerable to kidnap. Global trade and international relations had reduced in the

wake of the pandemic. Rising tensions between the US and China had prompted the

withdrawal of US troops who assisted West and Central Africa with intelligence and

response to prevent international terrorist activities. In the vacuum, AQIM, IS and Boko

Haram become more powerful and started carrying out more regular attacks in more

countries. The 2028 Sierra Leone elections were even more violent that even the previous

ones. With opposing political and ethnic groups taking to the streets in violent stand offs.

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Terrorist groups took advantage of the violence to increase attacks against government

infrastructure and communities.

2031-2035:

Some desperate citizens began to support AQIM viewing sharia law and stability as

favourable to the increased criminality and poverty of the current regime. In an attempt to

prevent terrorist groups taking hold in Sierra Leone an ill-equipped ECOWAS peace keeping

mission arrived to help calm the tensions that had increased since the unresolved elections.

They had little impact and helped to further worsen the sporadic violence. Along the coast

all artisanal fishing stocks had now collapsed and countries were adapting as best they could

to the unemployed communities and failings in the food supply. Fresh water aquaculture

was helping in some places, but where the security situation was deteriorating it became

harder to manage and maintain these farms.

In STP the economy had failed to recover. Growing pressure from Angola and Nigeria to

repay debts had bankrupted the government. With increased urbanisation, high food

prices and little supply violence and criminality grew particularly among young communities.

Overcrowding and poor hygiene in slums increased communicable disease and coupled with

malnutrition to increase child mortality rates. TOC groups took advantage of desperation

and the weak security and justice sector to increase their activities and the islands became

transit points and storage facility for trafficking operations.

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D: Neighbourhood Watch

2021-2025:

The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 brought the oil price to an all-time low and caused a

recession worse than the 2008 global financial crisis. Upstream investment in oil and gas

significantly reduced in the aftermath ending Sierra Leone and São Tome & Príncipe’s hopes

to bring offshore oil onstream. Coming out of the crisis the shape of global trade had

changed. Many industrial nations shortened their food supply chains and sought to bring

more manufacturing back onshore to reduce their reliance on global trade. Tourism would

remain significantly lower for a number of years. Following the pandemic governments

introduced policies to support green growth and resilience, fearing the future disruption to

their economies from the worsening climate crisis. Far-water fishing fleets had continued to

operate as normal during the pandemic, but global food prices rose. In the wake of the

economic downturn significant volatility and uncertainty remained in the oil markets and

prices remained low. Nigeria and Angola both called on São Tomé & Príncipe to repay their

significant debts further adding to their economic pressure.

The pandemic had hit African economies hard, the low oil price, slowed international trade

and caused significant inflation and currency devaluation. The measures had been more

effective at containing the virus in some states than others. As part of the green recovery

the international community turned their attention to improving sustainability in global fish

stocks. Money was made available in a Blue Economy trust fund for developing nations to

improve their maritime security and fisheries. Flag state responsibilities were better

enforced and EU member states held their trawlers accountable for IUU activity. Portugal

increased their fisheries enforcement patrols in São Tomé & Príncipe. STP also applied,

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unsuccessfully, to the trust fund for support for their industrial port ambitions. IUU fishing

activity continued in the Gulf of Guinea. The behaviour of European trawlers improved as

European states sought to improve relations with Africa as states competed for lucrative

mining contracts for the rare earths and metals needed to manufacture renewable energy

and technology.

Western countries had reduced their trade with China, whose economy shrank with the

economic impact of the recession and reduced trade. IUU fishing continued to blight the

Gulf of Guinea. Chinese investments in Africa stalled as China worked to restore its own

economy. Artisanal fishers, also recovering from the crisis, continued to see a reduction in

their stocks. Some private companies applied to the blue economy trust fund to establish

aquaculture and aquaponics facilities for food production. Conflict between fishermen

worsened as competition for reducing stocks grew and violent scuffles increased tensions

around maritime borders. Corruption worsened as elites and low-level officials focused on

their own economic recovery in the wake of the recession.

2026-2030:

European and US markets had a renewed focus on manufacturing “green” energy and

technology, such as rechargeable vehicle batteries, solar panels and microchips. They vied

for renewed relationships with those African states in possession of rare earth metal

mineral mining. To improve relationships the EU offered to pay larger sums for fishing

licences which increased government revenues. In addition, a project to provide renewable

energy using distributed micro-generators to small communities not yet on the power grid

was initiated in countries, including Sierra Leone with rare mineral deposits. Local artisanal

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fishers initially benefitted from this electricity using previously useless cold storage and ice-

making facilities to enable them to travel further afield as catches dwindled. Oil revenues

remained low as the global economy redesigned itself to support a greener economy with

less travel and trade. Tourism returned in 2026 as people finally had the confidence to

travel again. The aviation industry had significantly shrunk and the industry was a shadow

of its pre-2020 self. São Tomé & Príncipe started to see tourists returning after a significant

decline. Huge investment was needed to recover tourist infrastructure however and this

limited the return of numbers. With no valuable minerals for mining, STP saw a decrease in

the price the EU were prepared to pay for fishing licences and supporting aid funding.

ECOWAS and some other states in the region, had taken advantage of the blue economy

trust fund to finance joint patrols and had cracked down on IUU fishing in their waters. This

sent more IUU activity into Sierra Leone and São Tome & Príncipe’s waters, however,

worsening their situation and fish stocks continued to decline. Faced with starvation and

economic ruin, many artisanal fishers turned to other avenues to make a living, some

migrated into cities to try and find work. Others were recruited by TOC groups to run

maritime trafficking operations, particularly in people as the number of economic migrants

continued to grow, making good business for the traffickers. Increasingly, fishers bought

fish from Chinese trawlers and sold it on at higher prices to local markets. With significant

poverty, malnutrition rose dramatically alongside childhood mortality.

2031-2035:

Economic devastation, high food prices, lack of available food and growing urban

populations increased divisions between ethnic groups. Criminality increased and human

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trafficking, illegal migration and kidnapping was at an all-time high. The 2028 Sierra Leone

elections saw significant violence between polarised political and ethnic groups. The

tensions calmed but did not resolve after the elections. Mineral mining was now trading

significant amounts to European states by boat. However, the rise in maritime criminality

and armed robbery attacks against ships raised insurance prices and flag states started

putting pressure on the government to address the issue. The maritime enforcement

authorities remained underfunded, and were unable to respond to the threats. Further,

worsening corruption meant key officials were complicit in the attacks and not motivated to

improve security. Despite a rise in revenues from mining, corruption prevented this from

having a significant impact in helping relieve the growing hunger and hardship. The 2033

Sierra Leone elections generated even more violence than the previous round. Desperate,

vulnerable young populations were recruited by international terrorist groups operating in

the area and attacks increased. Concern rose across ECOWAS about the deteriorating

security situation.

In São Tomé & Príncipe violence had also increased. The dwindling tourism industry, high

government debts, reduced fishing licence fees and related aid revenues had worsened the

economic impacts from a decade earlier. Artisanal fishers continued to see their fish stocks

dwindle and conflict was breaking out more regularly between fishing communities. Tourist

numbers had dropped further as a reduction in biodiversity from overfishing and

environmental damage had killed the reef and there were few fish to see. Some local

businesses had appealed for blue economy funding to set up aquaculture and aquaponics

farms to produce fresh water fish and vegetables which had helped to supply food in the

short term. However, dissatisfaction with the government grew in the face of decreased

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economic opportunities, rising food prices and shortages. With dwindling fish stocks, many

young fishermen had moved into the capital São Tomé city, where many were homeless and

destitute. Overcrowding, malnutrition and bad hygiene increased the spread of

communicable disease and child mortality rose. TOC groups took advantage of the

desperate economic situation and weak criminal justice sector and STP became a base for

their trafficking operations. Criminality in the country was increasing as economic

opportunities continued to decline. Government popularity was at an all-time low and

sporadic violent protests broke out in the streets of the capital as anger at government

inaction boiled over.

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Chapter Six: Conclusions: Using the Scenarios

The “axes of uncertainty” method for generating alternative future scenarios has been

criticised for generating a “flatlands” of scenarios without sufficient difference between

them.459 While I agree with the assertion that this method has its limitations, it remains a

useful tool to explore the potential impact of two key factors to generate potential futures.

The scenarios generated in the previous section are just four possible futures that could

come about from a change in the strength of political will both at the domestic and

international/regional level. The scenarios are not intended as forecasts but rather are an

exercise to stimulate broader thinking about the potential impacts of the melting pot of

issues surrounding fisheries management.

In my experience, most policy officials and politicians do not consider fisheries to be a

priority issue, particularly in Africa, where there are so many challenges facing governments.

Artisanal fisheries, are just one part of the economy and food supply chain. Fishing

communities are just one stakeholder group, and foreign fishing companies and their agents

are another stakeholder group. While artisanal fishers fall under the responsibility of the

state to protect their interests, the foreign trawlers contribute significantly to the revenue

of countries in desperate need of FDI. The scenarios provide an exercise to help to

demonstrate how important fish can be, how much further the consequences of poor

management can reach, and how better management could present real opportunities for

inclusive economic growth.

459 Curry, Andrew & Schultz, Wendy (2009) Roads Less Travelled: Different Methods, Different Futures Journal of Futures Studies, May, 13(4): pp.35 – 60 p.42

237

Fish are unique to any other resource; they are the only open access renewable resource

that poor communities can harvest both for food and economic livelihoods, they do not

require land ownership or feeding, they are wild and renewable. However, fisheries

scientists and international institutions are warning this will only remain the case in a

warming world if they are managed correctly. Consequently, governments will need to

provide strong leadership and governance to maintain stocks. My analysis and the scenarios

exercise draw several conclusions. First, fisheries collapse would have devastating

consequences for already marginalised communities and could contribute to deteriorating

security. Second, both domestic and regional/international commitment is required to

create effective change and action to maintain fish stocks and facilitate inclusive economic

development. Third, deteriorating security in one state has implications for the whole

region and the international community. Fourth, government action to protect this

resource will demonstrate their commitment to their electorate and improve political

support; equally failure to do so will have the opposite effect. Finally, the migratory and

fluid nature of the marine domain means the responsibility to protect fish stocks is shared

among all regional and international partners and the stronger each parties’ actions, the

more effective.

The scenarios are useful because they provide an exercise where both the positives and

negatives of the potential drivers to shape the future can be explored. Scenarios A and B

demonstrate some of the unrealised opportunities: potential economic growth; capital

investment; food supply and political stability that could be generated through a well-

maintained fishery. While scenarios C and D, on the other hand, demonstrate some of the

wider security risks. Further, scenarios B and D provide an opportunity to better understand

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some of the potential benefits of regional and international cooperation in fisheries

protection and maritime security enforcement. The scenarios demonstrate some of the

potential benefits of cooperation and also the difficulties created when one country

becomes a weak link in regional and international cooperation.

I started this study because the discourse around fish is changing with the worsening of the

climate crisis. Scientists are becoming increasingly concerned over the future of global fish

stocks and yet overfishing continues across the world. The international community are

slowly starting to grasp the seriousness of this issue, but the political will to turn it around

does not yet exist. The damage of overcapitalisation and environmental degradation is

combining with warming and acidifying oceans to create a ‘perfect storm’ for fisheries

collapse. The pain of this potential collapse will be felt hardest by developing countries and

their coastal communities. Effective management, environmental protections, regional and

international cooperation should be able to prevent that eventuality, but it will take strong

domestic and international political will, cooperation and leadership.

I wanted to conduct this study to develop a greater understanding of the complexities that

drive the current state of fisheries management in West and Central Africa. What I have

found is that poor management is shaped by injustice in the global political economy, and

failure by domestic governments to protect powerless coastal communities from the

violence of global fisheries. As Mehtaa, Huffa, and Allouchea 460 argued in their 2019 paper,

the discourse around scarcity is changing, resources such as fish are not finite and scarcity

460 Mehtaa, Lyla, Huffa, Amber and Allouchea, Jeremy (2019) The new politics and geographies of scarcity in Geoform 101, pp,222-230 p.222

239

does not need to be endured. The causes of scarcity are not the natural progression of

resource use, but rather an injustice of mismanagement and exploitation. Communities in

Africa have long since survived and even thrived in the face of injustice, violence and failed

governance through community action. For example, in Sierra Leone community action was

key to tackling Ebola and was led by the so called “Mammy Queens,” strong female

community leaders, who are now once again driving the community response to COVID-

19.461 Further, Elinor Ostrom has documented communities’ resilience and cooperation

over common access resources. Yet when it comes to fisheries, community action alone

cannot prevent the overfishing and damage being done by foreign trawlers. This challenge

requires strong government action and cooperation with regional and international

partners. If something does not change, experts from the FAO, World Bank and fisheries

scientists are signalling that the fishery in Sierra Leone will collapse in the next few years. If

the government allows this to happen it will be a significant violence of inaction against

poor coastal communities, but also the rest of the population. My analysis has also

demonstrated the responsibility that colonial legacies have had in shaping fisheries

management today and the continued damage caused by neo-colonialism. Fisheries are a

sovereign African concern, but they are being shaped by huge injustices and violence in

international systems. Why does UNCLOS continue to require developing nations to allow

foreign trawlers access to their waters? Reducing fish stocks has demonstrated that the

increase in global industrial fishing is leading us closer to global stock collapse and not

ensuring food supplies which was the intended objective in 1982. Why then should African

countries be forced to continue to allow foreign trawlers to ravage their waters and not

461 Whitelaw, Ben & Von Villa, Edward (2020) Coronavirus struggles for toehold in Sierra Leone as ‘mammy queens’ go into battle in The Sunday Times, available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coronavirus-struggles-for-toehold-in-sierra-leone-as-mammy-queens-go-into-battle-8snnvd0gs

240

close them to enable the recovery of stocks and empower local communities to benefit

from this natural resource? Equally, although path dependencies of colonial legacies no

doubt played an important role in shaping the weak institutions and corruption that

characterise governance in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe today, this does not need

to continue to shape governance. Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo and his

predecessor have taken strong action to tackle corruption and advance economic

development in Ghana. He has campaigned for the countries in the region to stop blaming

colonial injustices and legacies for continued corruption and weak institutions today, but

rather to take action to bring about change. He has campaigned for a renewed relationship

with Europe and for African countries to step up and take control of their own

development.462 This is the kind of strong leadership that could bring about change and

fisheries management is an area where tackling corruption and standing up to foreign

powers could have significant benefits for local communities.

These scenarios were developed at a very uncertain time in global politics, as the world

struggles to respond to the first global pandemic in over a century. How COVID-19 will

change and shape the world over the next few years is still unknown; as is the depth of the

economic downturn and continued disruption to trade, travel and tourism. Similarly, we are

living through another period of uncertainty as we watch the climate crisis increasingly bite.

In the exercise, I tried to capture some of the impacts of the climate crisis that we are

already seeing and expect to get worse: more regular extreme weather events; heavier

462 Ghana's president wants Africa-Europe relationship to change (2019) Nana Akufo-Addo says the continent must 'take our destiny in our own hands' and transform dynamic with Europe. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/ghana-president-africa-europe-relationship-change-190711194253643.html

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rains; longer droughts; ocean warming and acidification; changing weather patterns

affecting crops; increasing migration and climate refugees to name a few. The exact

uncertainties of these two global crises will take time to become apparent, what we can say

with some certainty, however, is that both will add considerable challenges to humanity.

Further, the continued protests, solidarity marches and progressing conversation about

racism, inequality and violence not just in America, but across Europe, Australia, New

Zealand and Canada are highlighting a growing appetite for change in society. It is unclear

how far this conversation will develop and what changes could come about, but there is

hope for a renewed understanding and action to rectify some of the injustices of the global

political economy in future, only time will tell.

Adaptation, planning and increased resilience will be essential to protect vulnerable and

marginalised communities from some of the challenges of the climate crisis. But these will

mean nothing the powerful continue to unjustly put themselves before the weak and

continue to desecrate resources. Injustice is violence, for example, heavy rains in Freetown,

would probably not have caused the landslide of 2017, rather it was caused by injustice,

deforestation and improper use of the land by corrupt politicians, which removed its natural

resilience to the heavy rains allowing the mud to slide463 killing over a thousand innocent

people. Similarly, fisheries collapse in West and Central Africa is not inevitable, but it will

take significant political will to reform institutions, tackle corruption and stand up to

external pressures. It will also take regional cooperation and support from international

463Glynn, Paul (2018) The day the mountain fell: Sierra Leone's mudslide: A look at how and why predictions of environmental disaster were ignored in a country recovering from war and disease. Aljazeera, available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2018/02/day-mountain-fell-sierra-leone-mudslide-180221122154473.html

242

organizations. Indonesia’s strong action to ban foreign trawlers from her waters and

enforce that ban preventing IUU fishing demonstrated that with strong political will it can be

done. The economic and environmental benefits have been great and it is the people of

Indonesia who have benefitted.464 Just as work to tackle corruption in Ghana has led to

sustained economic development and improved livelihoods for much of society.

My research has demonstrated that the current fisheries management system in both Sierra

Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe does not serve or benefit the artisanal fishers or the people.

The system is currently best serving first: the fishing trawlers fishing illegally in the Gulf of

Guinea, using cheap, damaging techniques. Second: international markets and developed

economies receiving cheap and consistent fish supplies. Third: the government elites

benefitting from rents from the fishing licences and for enabling maritime security

enforcement to remain weak. The losers are the people of West and Central Africa, of

Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe, not just the artisanal fishers, but those dependent on

fish as their main source of protein, and those who make a living indirectly from the local

fish trade. Additionally, the whole electorate who rely on government elites to serve and

protect them are suffering from this failing as the knock-on consequences of fisheries

collapse will impact them all.

If the spreading protests against injustice, racism and inequality demonstrate a change in

people in the global society’s attitudes then this could lead to concrete change. For

example, in the emerging issues I used to develop these scenarios I tried to capture how

464 Cabral, Renial, Mayorga, Juan, Clemence, Michela, Lynham, John, Koeshendrajana, Sonny, Muawanah, Umi, Nugroho, Duto, Anna, Zuzy, Abdul Ghofar, Mira, Zulbainarni, Nimi, Gaines, Steven, & Costello, Christopher (2018) Rapid and lasting gains from solving illegal fishing Nature, Ecology & Evolution Vol 2, April pp.650–658

243

new financial technologies (fintech) can support these ambitions. They are already enabling

crowd funding and investments directly from these global citizens to entrepreneurs in the

developing world. An expansion of this person to person, technological loan facility could

empower people who previously had fewer options. With the consequence that FDI no

longer needs to come in the form of development aid or investment from MNCs but could

shape direct investment from community to community. There is potential for evolving

attitudes and new technologies to reshape the global political economy and provide

opportunities for development that would not have been possible previously.

Consequently, leadership to tackle corruption and reshape fisheries management could

unlock previously unforeseen potential to empower communities and promote inclusive

economic development.

Further, it is not just people whose values are evolving, international organizations, once the

tools of strong economies at the expense of developing nations, are also evolving.

Environmental security and justice are rising up their agendas influencing how they provide

support. In the past their funding often generated questions over who the beneficiaries

really were, the green revolution in South America for example, but with these changes this

dynamic is hopefully also changing. As awareness of systemic racism in the global political

economy and the injustices that have shaped development aid grows the way development

aid is delivered should also change. International development funding is increasingly

seeking to support environmental sustainability, green and blue growth and environmental

justice for weak communities and African-led-solutions. Although still at the mercy of

strong member states, the technical assistance provided by international organizations

should in time become more trusted by those it could most benefit. And if the current

244

crises alter the attitudes of those strong governments, raise awareness and stimulate

change to address systemic racism and injustice then this could also shape international aid.

245

General Conclusions

This dissertation sought to develop a better understanding of fisheries management as a

paradoxical resource with implication for future security and stability in West and Central

Africa. My analysis of fisheries management in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe has

highlighted the historical legacies, global political economy and neo-colonial influence that

have shaped this resource. As a result, high value licences have turned this renewable, open

access resource into a cursed resource and this curse is leading towards a path of fish stock

collapse with significant potential for future scarcity conflict.

In addition, to global drivers, these edible diamonds, are being mismanaged through weak

institutions, rent seeking behaviours, and weakness in the security and justice sector. The

future of fish stocks in the Gulf of Guinea, at least in coastal waters, looks bleak and

international institutions are warning fisheries collapse may be only a few years away. To

turn this around would mean dismantling the drivers of the ‘resource curse’ that are causing

this mismanagement. To do so would take significant political will and swift action to

address corruption and prevent IUU fishing, or perhaps enforce a moratorium on all foreign

industrial trawlers in the waters off Africa’s west coast.

The conditions exist and are growing that could lead to scarcity induced violence, criminality

and ethnic divisions in Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe and this is most likely also the

case across the region. Although there are fewer ethnic divisions in São Tomé & Príncipe,

the most significant ethnic groups are the fishing coastal communities, the Angolares, and

the Forro who make up the majority of the rest of the population. In Sierra Leone there are

246

a large number of ethnic groups and the largest two, who make up similar proportions of

the population, the Temne and Mende are each represented by one of the two main

political parties. Consequently, divisions around elections are both political and ethnic.

Scholars of environmental security have highlighted ethnic divisions as a stress factor

contributing to the causes of violent conflict as resources become scarce. Further, both

countries have large, and growing, unemployed youth populations and are already seeing

increased conflict between fishermen competing for fish. Both lack significant alternative

economic opportunities and have growing urban populations, high child malnutrition rates

and significant food security challenges. All of these trends are highlighted in the literature

as risk factors for scarcity induced violence and conflict.

Furthermore, many scholars of the environmental security or resource conflict literature

argue that it is depravation relative to previous conditions and other communities that are

most likely to lead to conflict. The impact of reducing fish stocks is being felt as a relative

deterioration to the conditions for coastal communities each year. Consequently, fish

collapse in several years’ time could have greater implications than simply economic loss to

coastal populations, increased food prices and greater food import requirements. The loss

and eventual collapse could well risk an increase in violence and even violent conflict in

West and Central Africa. In Ghana, fish stocks have all but collapsed already, but over the

last decade work to tackle corruption and facilitate oil revenues has served to improve

peoples’ overall situation and so it has not led to an increase in tensions. This is not the case

in other countries in West and Central Africa and collapse could be catastrophic.

247

The states in this region also suffer significant other security challenges. TOC groups, local

criminality, international and local terrorist groups, and regional competition all colour

security, governance, and relations between the states in West and Central Africa. Given

the regional nature of marine fisheries and fishermen increasingly crossing maritime

boundaries in search of fish there is a risk that regional tensions could intensify if fish stocks

continue to decline and collapse. The framework for regional cooperation on maritime

security enforcement has been set out in the Code of Conduct implementation agreement.

Effective cooperation to enable the successful implementation of that agreement and joint

patrols could have a significant impact both on tackling IUU fishing and maritime criminality,

but also in improving regional relations which could open up new opportunities. This would

be a far greater victory for the region than merely tackling piracy against merchant shipping.

Finally, relations with international trawlers introduce another important and complex

dynamic. Arguably, sustained fish stocks and the protection of the marine environment

should be in the interest of those states fishing in their waters. But the lack of fisheries

enforcement and fisheries expertise is facilitating greater profits for foreign trawlers today

discounted against the potential collapse of the fishery in future. Companies are making far

more money today than they would be able to using legally, environmentally friendly

techniques and catch limits. Foreign states will likely seek to support the interests of their

companies and ensure them access to African waters, just as the governments in West and

Central Africa have a responsibility to deny them access to support their coastal

communities. These conflicting priorities will provide an additional hurdle to any reform of

the current fisheries management systems. It is in the long-term interests of all to protect

fisheries but this does not mean the message has been received by all.

248

Of particular concern is the evolving relationships African nations have with Europe and

China. These are the relationships that Sierra Leone and São Tomé & Príncipe are currently

benefitting most from financially. China and Europe are also benefitting the most from

weak enforcement of fisheries regulations and so would lose out most in the face of

strengthened enforcement or a moratorium. Consequently, it is understandable that

governments would be nervous about taking the strong action required to save the fishery.

Given the changing attitudes in the international community, there is hope that a mutually

beneficial agreement could be reached to prevent any loss of investment or repercussions

from a tightening up of enforcement. Chinese objectives in Africa are a concern for all

African countries and the international community. China is seeking to exert greater

influence and control while establishing strong supply chains and infrastructure in their Belt

and Road Initiative. While this investment in infrastructure must be attractive to countries,

the balance of what it could mean for their future should make them hesitant to accept

support.465

Fisheries is just one sector that would benefit from greater transparency, reduced

corruption, stronger institutions and a fairer criminal justice system in West and Central

Africa. Addressing these damaging characteristics could improve the business environment,

enable greater FDI and facilitate more effective infrastructure and development projects. It

is easy as an outsider from an industrialised economy to criticise the lack of will to change

these things. These are not small challenges to address and they have been run that way for

465 The continued debate around Chinese involvement in 5G infrastructure development in the UK demonstrates how the balance of Chinese investment and cheap infrastructure and security is not only a challenge for developing countries.

249

over fifty years since independence and were often worse beforehand. The risks, of

fisheries collapse from not taking action, however, of increased criminality, starvation,

poverty, violence; versus the benefits of inclusive economic development and a stronger,

more just society, however, make a very strong case for change.

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Appendix A: Brief Timeline: Sierra Leone

1787 British colony established in Freetown

1930s Diamond mining started

1950s British allow political representation in form of SLPP

1961 Independence

1967 Military Rule

1968-1985 Siaka Stevens becomes President

1980s Soviet investment in industrial fisheries

1982 UNCLOS

1985-1992 Joseph Saidu Momoh President

1989 Charles Taylor leads rebellion in Liberia

1991 RUF Rebellion starts in Sierra Leone

1991 End of the Cold War

1991-2002 Civil War in Sierra Leone

1992-1996 Military Rule: Captain Yahya Kanu; Valentine Strasser; Brigadier Julisus Maada Bio

1996-1997 Ahmed Tejan Kabbah President

1997-1998 Military Rule: Major Johnny Paul Koroma

1999-2006 UNAMSIL and ECOMOG

2000-2002 British forces assist in bringing end to civil war

2001 Sierra Leone Ratifies UNCLOS-declares EEZ

2002-2012 Amhed Tejan Keddah President (second time)

2002 China agree to build new MFA building

2006 Charles Taylor Arrested

2007 Charles Taylor Trial starts in the Hague

2008 Joint Maritime Committee Established

2008 Global Financial Crisis

2009 JMC Operational

2011 China announces plans to build Regent-Jui Road-still uncompleted.

2012 Government announces MPAs and 6nm Industrial Exclusion Zone

2012 China complete new MFA building and Charlotte mini-hydro powerplant

2012 Charles Taylor convicted-50 year sentence

2013 Charles Taylor appeal dismissed, 50 year sentence upheld

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2013 Yaoundé Summit: Code of Conduct signed

2014 Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone

2016 Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership with China

2016 EU serve Sierra Leone with a Yellow Card for fisheries non-compliance

2017 USD4 million grant for fisheries from World Bank

2018 Maritime Strategy and Implementation Plan Developed

2018 SLPP win Presidential run-off election Julius Maada Bio (second time)

2019 April one month industrial fishing ban

2019 BBC Documentary on IUU fishing in Sierra Leone

2019 China and Sierra Leone sign USD29.8 million agreement for China to build the industrial fishing wharf

2019 Global pork industry hit by swine flu

2020 COVID-19 global pandemic shuts down global economy and halts flights

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Appendix B: Brief Timeline: São Tomé & Príncipe

15thC São Tomé & Príncipe established as Portuguese Colony

1822 Portuguese Abolish Slavery

1950 Portuguese assume colonies to be sovereign territory

1975 Independence

1975-1991 Manuel Pinto da Costa is President

1982 UNCLOS

1987 Ratified UNCLOS established EEZ

1988 Attempted Coup

1990 New Constitution, two party system

1991 End of the Cold War

2003 UN & EU start funding work to improve transparency in security & justice sector

2007 World Bank write off significant debts

2011-2016 Costa President Again

2016 former Prime Minister Evaristo Carvalho becomes President

2012 EU construct new road connecting North and South of island

2013 Japan stop fishing in the Gulf of Guinea due to piracy concerns

2013 STP sign Code of Conduct at Yaoundé Summit

2013 International Oil companies begin exploration in STP JDZ

2014-2018 EU Fisheries agreement with STP

2015 Communities co-management project initiated by NGOs

2016 Resume Diplomatic relations with China after relinquishing with Taiwan

2017 Signed 5 year cooperation agreement with China

2018 Exploration in JDZ stalls due to huge debt to Nigeria for security

2018 Bilateral agreement with Portugal on maritime security-Navy Patrol vessel

2019 Agreement extended

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Appendix C: Trends:

The following trends have been pulled from data on the World Banks country profile data

page, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/sierra-leone. Fisheries and

aquaculture trends come from the UN FAO statistics website, available at:

http://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/SLE/en#CountrySector-Statistics. Other data and evidence

of trends has come from research and is referenced earlier in the analysis. The available

online statistics or lack of available statistics on certain issues, demonstrate some of the

gaps in data collection and reporting in West and Central African fisheries. Under-reporting,

IUU activity and a lack of data processing and recording has stunted a clear view of fisheries

statistics in the Gulf of Guinea. For brevity, rather than pulling the graphs for each of these

trends into the document, I have represented the trend data for each issue as one sentence

demonstrating the trajectory. Some trends are relevant to both Sierra Leone and São Tomé

& Príncipe and others are individual, the common trends are listed first.

Common trends:

1. Steady population growth

2. Recent fluctuation, reduction in GDP

3. Improving, but still low life expectancy at birth.

4. High consistent levels of poverty in the population

5. High, but fluctuating levels of child malnutrition

6. Growing youth population

7. Growing youth unemployment

8. Reducing fish stocks in GoG (FAO classified as overfished)

9. Growing global population and rising global food demand

10. Declining global economy from COVID-exact impacts unknown at time of writing

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11. More regular extreme weather events

12. Growing awareness and dissatisfaction with inequality and poverty

13. Reduction in global trade in response to COVID-19

14. Growing global dissatisfaction with inequality and injustice

15. Growing awareness of environmental security globally

16. Ocean temperature rising, ocean acidification worsening

17. Increasing Chinese investment in Africa

18. Growing global aquaculture industry

19. Growing urbanisation

20. Growing climate activism

21. Rising levels of migration from Sub-Sharan Africa to Europe/America

Trends: Sierra Leone

1. 200,000 tonnes of wild capture fish a year-static since 2007 suggesting poor reporting

2. Slightly higher exports of fish than imports

3. Per capita supply of fish rose to 2008 and now is declining

4. Growing artisanal fishery (according to Ministry of Fisheries)

5. Large number of foreign industrial trawlers

6. 75% of foreign trawlers Chinese

7. Growing threat of TOC and International terrorism

8. Significant contribution of fishing to GDP

Trends: São Tomé & Príncipe

1. Growing threat of TOC

2. High levels of IUU fishing

3. Increasing levels of debt to regional partners

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Appendix D: Emerging Issues:

The Emerging Issues relevant to the futures of fisheries management, security and

development will be relevant to both countries, so I have listed these in one table below.

Emerging issues are weak signals of things that could drive change in the future. These

range from the EI that are already, or very nearly starting to drive change,(maturing

development) things that are still coming together but may have an impact in the mid-

future(strengthening signal) and weak signals of things that are just starting to develop but

could drive significant change in future(intuitive possibility).466 The EI with relevance for

fisheries management, security and development in West and Central Africa are listed

below, in three sections reflecting their level of maturity. For the purpose of this exercise I

am only developing scenarios that cover the next 20 years, consequently most of the EI will

be maturing developments and strengthening signals, very few will be intuitive possibilities.

Maturing Developments:

1. Code of Conduct cooperation on maritime security

2. Blue Economy Funding from UN

3. Empowered community action (such as EJF project to allow artisanal fishers to report IUU fishing)

4. Global Economic Recession (COVID-19)

5. Aquaculture reshaping global fish supply

6. Micro-finance loans-regular people investing in developing world using fintech

7. Fintech avoiding dramatic impact of currency fluctuation in Africa

8. Misinformation online

9. Micro-distributed renewable power generation

10. Urban non-soil-based farming techniques

466 Lum, Richard (2016) Four Steps to the Future: A Quick and Clean Guide to Creating Foresight

256

11. Aquaponic farming

12. Electric Vehicles

13. Blockchain in fisheries enforcement

Strengthening Signals:

14. Reduction in West trading with China post COVD-19

15. Reduction in size of developed economy industrial fishing fleets

16. Collapse of global fish stocks

17. Land-based, sustainable aquaculture fed on insects

18. On-line digital communities

19. Universal Basic Income

20. Autonomous shipping and transport

21. Innovative waste management

22. Climate crisis driven reduction of animal protein in Western diet

23. Block chain in seafood supply chains

Intuitive Possibilities:

24. Global fish shortage

25. Lab produced meat products

26. 3-D printing reshaping global supply chains

27. Solar desalination

28. Solar powered shipping and vehicles

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Appendix E: Stabilising Factors

These are the factors that slow down the inevitable pace of change, they are regulatory,

cultural, social or financial and serve to counteract our drivers of change to limit disruption

to current systems. Some key ones that could slow change in exploring how fisheries

management could impact future stability and development in west and Central Africa

include:

1. Lack of Regulation or existing regulations

2. Weak institutions

3. “Sea blindness”

4. UNCLOS and the relative power of stronger foreign states

5. Sustained environmental damage to the marine domain in GoG

6. Corruption

7. Poverty and lack of capacity

8. Colonial legacy culture

9. Ethnic divisions

10. Political polarisation

258

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ment_data/file/826920/August-2019-MINISTERIAL-CODE-FINAL-FORMATTED-2.pdf

• UN Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention

and the related Agreements available on the UNCLOS website:

• UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 56.1(a)

https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/closindx.htm

• UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Part V, Articles 55-75. Specific quote Article 62.2

P.42: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

• UN FAO to describe fishing levels globally. More information can be found here: http://www.fao.org/newsroom/common/ecg/1000505/en/stocks.pdf

• UN FAO website at: http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/166304/en

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• UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel report, 2019 available at: https://unowas.unmis-

sions.org/support-mano-river-union

• UNCLOS negotiations: https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/uncls/uncls_ph_e.pdf

• UNDP fact sheet on Sierra Leone available at: https://www.sl.undp.org/content/sierrale-

one/en/home/countryinfo.html

• United Nations Sustainable Development Goals: https://sustainabledevelop-

ment.un.org/sdgs

• UNODC 2013 Report on Transnational Organised Crime in West Africa Key Findings,

available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/toc/Reports/TOC-

TAWestAfrica/West_Africa_TOC_KEYFINDINGS.pdf

• US Maritime Legal Instruments: https://www.fisheries.noaa.gov/topic/laws-policies

• Word Population statistics available at: https://worldpopulationreview.com/coun-

tries/sierra-leone-population/

• World Bank Data available at: https://data.worldbank.org/country/sao-tome-and-prin-

cipe

• World Bank: https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sierraleone/overview

• World Banks country profile data page: https://data.worldbank.org/country/sierra-leone

• World Economic Forum Annual Risk Report 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, available at:

https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-risks-report-2020

• World Food Programme (WFP) Sao Tome and Principe Country Brief August 2019:

https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/WFP%20STP%20COUN-

TRY%20BRIEF%20AUGUST%202019.pdf

• World Health Organization Figures sitrep March 2016: http://apps.who.int/ebola/cur-

rent-situation/ebola-situation-report-16-march-2016

• World Health Organization Nutrition Factsheet: https://www.who.int/nutrition/top-

ics/3_foodconsumption/en/index5.html

• World Population Review Statistics available at: https://worldpopulationre-

view.com/countries/sierra-leone-population/