Ecological Intersections: Technologies of Global Exchange, Institutionalized Violence, Feminist...

Ecological Intersections

Manuscript Proposal

Ecological Intersections:

Technologies of Global Exchange, Institutionalized Violence,

Feminist Bioethics, and the Struggle for Social Justice

Wendy Lynne LeeDepartment of Philosophy

Bloomsburg University of PennsylvaniaBloomsburg, PA 17815

[email protected]/(01)570-389-4332

mailto:[email protected]/(01)570-389-4332


Ecological Intersections:

Technologies of Global Exchange, Institutionalized Violence,

Feminist Bioethics, and the Struggle for Social Justice

In her 1996 essay “Rape as a Weapon of War,” Claudia Card argues

that one way to resist “martial rape” might be to “reject the

idea that women should not be armed and skilled in weapons use,”

and to equip women such that “they need no more protection than

males” (Card, p. 12). A kind of classically feminist appeal to

leveling the playing field, she goes on to wonder “the likelihood

that males would rape in war if they fought side by side with

equally trained and armed females and under the command of even

more powerful females, in a society in which this phenomenon was

not exceptional” (p. 12-13). Card suggests that in such a society

rape would become difficult if not impossible to justify as a

weapon of war, but she also acknowledges that reaching this level

of equality is about much more than self-defense training:

We may need to be able to rely on each other in a more

organized way than the women’s self-defense movement has

recognized so far…If it makes good sense to be prepared to

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defend ourselves as individuals, why does it not also make

good sense to defend ourselves as communities? When wars of

self-defense are fought not primarily by those who enjoy war,

but primarily by those who hate it, and are inclined to do it

only under grave duress, there may be significantly less

likelihood that military values will come to dominate the

societies of those who participate in the fighting. (p. 13).

The difficulty with this argument is that since 1996, and

especially since the United States’ declaration of “the war on

terror,” a number of Card’s assumptions have been put to the test

and found wanting in some deeply troubling ways. In fact, it’s at

least arguable that while rape is less commonly deployed against

(some) women in virtue of their greater numbers in the armed

services, the use of sexually charged methods of torture and/or

interrogation has, if anything, increased in military prisons

where the victims of this abuse are virtually all male. More

significant still is that the soldiers engaged in these abuses,

including sexual abuse, are nearly as likely to be women as they

are to be men—putting the lie to the notion that women do not

enjoy war, or at least some aspects of it.

As Steven Miles documents, for example, in Oath Betrayed:

Torture, Medical Complicity, and the War on Terror (2006), the violence

institutionalized in military prisons appears largely equal

opportunity. Indeed, the war-training that Card envisions as a

way to protect women against martial rape is put to service in

the torture and neglect of terrorist suspects at military prisons

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like Guantanamo Bay and Iraq’s Abu Ghraib. Consider, for example,

the well-publicized case of Lynndie England convicted in 2005

(along with eleven others, one of whom—Sabrina Harman—was also

female) of participating in the torture and abuse—some of it

specifically sexually demeaning—of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.

Whether England was convicted fairly (by comparison with her

superiors) remains a live question, but that she was involved in

prisoner abuse as an on-duly soldier in a military prison is

beyond dispute in light of the photographic evidence and sworn

testimony from the case. Miles meticulously details the

complicity of medical personnel in the torture of military

prisoners, but that he makes no particular note of the increasing

numbers of women among the ranks of implicated soldiers, medical

attendants, doctors, or commanders itself testifies to the

relatively successful incorporation of women into the armed

services.

Accounts like Miles’ raise serious questions for Card’s

assumed view that women can be counted on to be among those who

“hate” war. Like many of her male counterparts, Lynndie England

entered the armed services as an avenue to economic self-

sufficiency, and likely neither “hated” nor “enjoyed” the

prospect of war. But what the evidence suggests is that she was

as readily co-opted as her male fellows into the abuse and

humiliation of prisoners—including the treatment of prisoners as

sexualized and specifically feminized inferiors. Card’s question,

then, about whether men would continue to commit rape were women

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equally trained and equipped to wage war seems somewhat naïve in

that while it may be true that some women would be less likely to

be targets for rape, it seems equally clear that this does not

mean that there no longer exist targets for rape (as well as

other forms of sexual abuse and humiliation), that these

“others,” men or women, are not feminized, or that “female” does

not continue to token “inferior.” Card writes that “[i]t seems

unlikely that rape could continue to symbolize dominance if women

could dominate as well as men” (p. 12). This, however, seems

patently false in light of recent events at Abu Ghraib, and Card

herself acknowledges that whether women can participate in

military institutions “without succumbing to indefensible values”

is a difficult question (p. 13).

So, what could guarantee against women becoming co-opted

into the purportedly indefensible value of enjoying the violence

of war? Card suggests that if serious penalties for rape were

enforced, as they are not now, that the respect for women’s

equality this would engender might help to achieve this goal (p.

14). She entertains imprisonment and the death penalty (p. 13)—

but it’s her “fantasy,” a speculation she insists is

philosophically serious but not intended to be carried out, that

introduces a new and I think important dimension into the

discourse concerning what might count as an adequate feminist

response to the place of women in cultures/societies/religions

that wage war. “My fantasy penalty,” writes Card, “is what for

lack of a better term I will call compulsory transsexual surgery, that

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is, removal of the penis and testicles and construction of a

vagina-like canal, accompanied by whatever hormone treatments may

be advisable for the sake only of bodily health” (p. 14). The

goal of this “penalty made possible by medical technology” (p.

14) is to “impact social conceptions of gender” by creating an

effective new category, a “she-male” who would be without the use

of the primary symbol/tool of male dominance, and might face many

of the exclusionary prejudices now enforced against women (p. 14-

15). “The primary aim,” she argues, “would be to combat the

symbolic meaning of rape and thereby to eliminate the impulse on

the part of those with power to rely on rape as a weapon of war

at the level of strategic planning” (p.15).

Whether Card’s fantasy penalty (should it be implemented)

would have the consequences she envisions is certainly an

interesting question, although it seems unlikely for the same

reasons that the training of women for combat has insured neither

women’s protection against rape in the society at large nor that

women soldiers cannot be co-opted to participate in the sexual

abuse and humiliation of prisoners. This, however, is not what

interests me primarily. What interests me are the morally,

politically, economically, and technologically charged intersections

embodied in Card’s appeal to medical technology, women’s potential

relief from the threat of rape, the preservation of the feminist

value of equality, what counts as a just penalty, the serious

bioethical issues represented in a potential violation of the

Hippocratic Oath’s injunction to do no harm, and the technological

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alterability of a person’s physical sex. Consider: the governing

moral principle of Miles’ analysis of evident complicity by

medical personnel at military prisons is the Hippocratic Oath; it

is its violation that grounds his scrupulous documentation of

abuse, and it’s the Hippocratic Oath that implicates the actions

of men and women healthcare providers as morally suspect in, for

example, failing to prevent or curtail violations of the Geneva

Conventions, the medical neglect of prisoners post-torture,

and/or falsifying medical records and death certificates.

Couldn’t Card’s fantasy penalty also be described as a

variety of torture, one whose moral culpability is exacerbated by

the fact that it’s carried out by precisely those charged with

providing healthcare? Although the aim of compulsory transsexual

surgery is not coercing information (for which torture fails),

but exacting punishment for rape, it nonetheless violates the

Hippocratic Oath in that it (a) enforces a medically unnecessary

surgical procedure, (b) employs medical technology and personnel

to do it, and (c) is likely to have enduring and negative

consequences for those subjected (or subjugated) to it. Although

torture is, of course, only one way in which medical personnel

violate the Hippocratic Oath, Card’s fantasy penalty qualifies:

the psychological and physical consequences of compulsory

transsexual surgery are profoundly invasive and permanent.

Punishment is conceived as having an end; part of what makes

torture torturous is that, even in conception, it promises

permanent physical and/or psychological injury. That is, no end.

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Indeed, because conversion to a sex conceived as inferior and

victimized as such is what’s intended to be terrifying, women’s

inferiorization and consequent subjugation might just as well be

reinforced—not alleviated. Knowing the social consequences in

advance may add to the torturous character of the procedure, but

it’s unclear whether it would generate any reconsideration of

women’s status for the convicted.

Card might respond that while many penalties are invasive,

this isn’t itself sufficient to qualify compulsory transsexual

surgery as torture, especially since its aims are not the

retrieval of information. Not all torture, however, has this aim;

in fact, Abu Ghraib offers a case where virtually none of the

torture perpetrated could be so defended (and where, however

inchoate the reasoning, torture seemed part of the penalty for

being a suspected terrorist). Unlike the methods deployed to

humiliate and abuse prisoners at Abu Ghraib, compulsory

transsexual surgery deploys an otherwise legitimate use of

medical technology to violent and disfiguring ends. It is, in

other words, not merely invasive, but, in effecting a

fundamental, compulsory, and violent alteration of its subject,

torture. Unlike Abu Ghraib where the culpability of medical

personnel lay in the failure to try to prevent, stop in process,

adequately document, or report torture, Card’s fantasy raises a

different but even more disturbing prospect, namely, that the

very technologies developed to help preserve and restore health

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could be deployed not merely as weapons of war—but as weapons in a

war to end the oppression of women.

This latter prospect, I think, exemplifies a profoundly

important challenge to the feminist movement’s most successful

instantiation—liberal feminism—in that arguments like Card’s fail to

adequately consider the extent to which the intersection of

advanced technology, globalized military conquest, and the roles

that women now play in institutions devoted to medicine, justice,

war, or economic exchange may affect—if not the value of

emancipation and equality—the ways in which they can be realized,

and at whose expense. If, in other words, equality simply means

(and demands) access, say, to weapons training, it will

inevitably confront the sorts of quandaries raised by Card’s

argument concerning whether—in light of these intersections—this

is the equality we want, or whether its implications—borne out in

stories like England’s—are consistent with other values such as

compassion, the prevention of violence, or avoiding complicity in

harm. It is, in other words, one thing to advocate for equality,

but it’s another and more difficult project to comprehend that

equality in light of the institutions instantiating it,

especially given the kinds of technologies that make fantasies

like Card’s compulsory transsexual surgery possible. It is

precisely because such a punishment is possible that what Card

insists is just fantasy can be evaluated in light of the use of

other medical technologies deployed to both humane and morally

indefensible ends.

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That the specific weapon in question should be a surgical

procedure designed to realize some of the deepest and most

significant of human desires—to be properly indentified as male

or female—opens a door to the possibility that classically

liberal feminist responses that focus primarily on equality as

the central tool with which to address social/political injustice

(a) fail to achieve this goal in a fashion consistent with other

feminist principles, (b) are too easily co-opted by institutions

and practices whose patriarchal moorings remain essentially

unaltered by women’s presence, and (c) make apparent that

equality unaccompanied by a thoroughgoing analysis of the aims,

purposes, and worldview of institutions like the military can in

fact contribute to the maintenance of values—like that of

enjoying war—that feminists and others have long rejected. The

introduction of certain varieties of technology—those involved in

transsexual surgery, for example, contributes a level of added

urgency to the analysis of these liberal principles in that such

a surgery is merely one of a host of medically oriented

technologies that include in vitro fertilization, cloning, gene

therapy, cross-species gene splicing, the manufacture of

prosthetics, among others each of which raises anew what we mean

by equal access, whether such technologies benefit human life,

what cost their use may exact from other human beings, nonhuman

animals, and the environment.

In short, while the critique of liberal feminism is itself

not new, the potential implications of technological advance for

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institutions like medicine, the military, and the global markets

lend it an urgent dimension that remains largely unexplored with

respect to what a feminism informed by this more sophisticated

analysis might look like. Indeed, it’s my claim that liberal

feminism (as it’s classically understood) cannot survive this

more sophisticated critique, and hence leaves open the question

what a feminist theory equipped to perform analyses specifically

directed to the intersection of technology, institution, and

oppression would include. Hence, the aim of my proposal is to

develop one such feminism. Broadly Marxist/socialist in

character, I will take as my point of departure the critique of

arguments like Card’s in the interest of demonstrating the limits

of advocating equality without thoroughgoing analyses of the

technologies and institutions relevant to realizing it. My aim is

to show how such advocacy may actually contribute to the

oppression of precisely those who inform its emancipatory focus.

I will then explore several other contemporary feminist

works, for example, Lierre Keith’s recent The Myth of Vegetarianism

(2008) where I’ll argue that, however well-intended, feminist

(and in this case, environmentalist) analyses which lack a

clearly articulated, well-grounded organizing theory are destined to

misconstrue the complexity and underestimate the

institutionalized character of the many and intimate

relationships between technology, markets, the environment, and

oppressive social institutions. I’ll argue that in cases like

Keith’s, Derrick Jensen’s and several others, that absence of

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such a theory lends itself to a kind of fear-mongering

apocalyptic prognostication that more closely resembles the

rhetorical manipulations of the far right (especially in its

millenarian religious instantiations) than it does the reasoned

discourse of democratic-decision making. Moreover, while it’s

always an open question whether democracy offers the best form of

government, or whether the liberal model of human autonomy is the

most ideal for the emancipation of women, we have little reason

to think that good alternatives include the sorts of

dictatorships—environmental or otherwise—to which these

ultimately poor, but fear-soliciting, analyses lend themselves.

While factory farming, for example, may well be a

condemnable form of institutionalized violence, it’s not obvious

that the only ethically defensible alternative (the one Keith

promotes) is a return to small-scale farming that must include

meat consumption as the only viable form of sustainability (p.

99-103). Indeed, given the agricultural technologies currently

utilized, the complex issues that attend the relationship between

environmental destruction and the economic wherewithal of

indigenous peoples, climate change, deforestation, extinction,

the fact that subsistence farming is performed almost entirely by

poor women, and the fact that some—but not all—living things are

capable of suffering, any analysis that fails to deal

specifically with these issues risks the one-size-fits-all that

more often contributes to oppression as opposed to alleviating

it. There are a number of issues—bioethical, economic, social,

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and cultural, in addition to environmental and animal welfare—

that demand the attention only an organizing theory can provide.

My claim is that such a theory is first and foremost socialist

and feminist in the sense that

First, it’s grounded in a defensible critique of the

institutions responsible for oppression in its many forms:

heteropatriarchal, chauvinistic, ethnocentric, religious,

and capitalist.

Second, its broadly Marxist/socialist in orientation is

equipped to take seriously the claim that

market/capitalist/profit-making values provide the vital

ligament connecting all other forms of oppression—global,

national, and local.

Third, equipped with this critique, such a theory can show

how such values inform the development and use of the

technologies at issue in, for example, militarization,

agriculture, and reproduction, what connects these uses such

that oppressive social institutions are reinforced through

them, and what shape a feminist activism informed by this

more sophisticated understanding of these connections might

take.

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Ultimately, I wish to craft a feminism that neither takes the

presence and use of technological advance for granted nor rejects

it outright as nothing other than an expression of

institutionalized heteropatriarchal and market values. The fact

of in vitro fertilization, surgical sex-reassignment, titanium

prostheses, eye shadow colors, cloning, Bovine Growth Hormone,

Uranium enrichment, the Internet, drones, etc., demands a theory

capable of seeing and seeing through these connections; it is

thus ecological in the sense that it strives to theorize how, for

example, torture is an issue for bioethicists, how the racism of

building waste incinerators in inner-city neighborhoods is an

issue for environmentalists, how the institutionalized violence

of factory farming is conceptually connected to sex-trafficking,

how the increasing rate of incidents of autism connects

environmentalists and bioethicists, or how terrorism incarnates a

new form of global marketing.

Consider, for example, the current human-made disaster in

the Gulf of Mexico. Well beyond the obvious—that the consequences

of Beyond/British Petroleum’s (BP) negligence and cost cutting

are catastrophic for economy, ecology, and wildlife—lay a host of

questions we’re only beginning to ask. We want to know who’s

responsible, but as countless daily news updates have made

painfully clear, no easy finger pointing is going to answer this

question or even offer solace to an obliterated coastline. Part

of what’s so difficult here is that the BP disaster is not just

about the failure to regulate deep-water drilling, and it’s not

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just about government complicity in corporate negligence, and

it’s not just about the West’s addiction to oil; it’s not even

just about the failures/lack of safe technologies, etc. Rather,

it’s about all these things—but without an organizing theory

through which we can critically evaluate its economic,

heteropatriarchal, militaristic, governmental, and technological

dimensions—through which we can clearly see the intersections

through which petroleum has become the lifeblood of global

exchange—we’ll remain not only without answers but vulnerable to

the apocalyptic rhetoric of both the far right and the

environmental far left.

And these observations bring us back around to the opening

lines of my proposal. Card’s fantasy penalty (compulsory

transsexual surgery) supplies an answer to the question: How can

we prevent rape, particularly martial rape? As I have suggested,

her answer presupposes a set of assumptions consistent with a

classic liberal feminism whose real-life consequences are at

least a mixed bag with respect to morally defensible actions both

individually (Lynndie England) and collectively (women’s

participation in torture, including sexual torture). Moreover,

there are good reasons to think that this penalty would not only

fail but also contribute to the oppression of women. What’s

needed is a better theory—one that can organize the many and

complex strands economic, political, social, institutional,

relevant to addressing the question of rape. So too, I suggest,

environmental crises like that perpetrated by BP’s negligence. We

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can subject those most obviously responsible for this “rape” of

the environment to criticism, interrogation, imprisonment, hefty

fines, the dismantling of BP as a corporate enterprise; and we

likely should. But this will no more prevent another petroleum

disaster that compulsory transsexual surgery will prevent rape.

Moreover, there are a host of bioethical questions concerning the

effects on the health of those subjected to technologically

facilitated “fixes.” Whether the “fixed” are convicted rapists

subjected to an invasive surgical procedure or entire ecosystems

subjected to a barrage of oil-dispersing chemicals, the

intersection of bioethics, government policy, law, human welfare,

and environmental integrity is one that deserves sustained

attention. Only a theory that can explore the conceptual and

empirical intersections among the responsible institutions—and

then offer potential avenues of action—stands a chance of

achieving the weighty goal of devising an effective and morally

defensible activism. We must come to see the trees and the

forest, and we must think much harder about whom this “we” has

included and excluded. It is this latter project that a socialist

feminist commitment to human emancipation and welfare is, I

think, in the best position to undertake.

There is, of course, much work to be done to craft such a

theory, but it is my contention that a feminism grounded in a

Marxist/socialist critique of market forces, and equipped with a

fuller understanding of the role technology plays in the

maintenance of the oppressive social institutions that benefit

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from these forces can offer a substantial contribution to an

activism whose emancipatory goals reach well beyond women, per se,

and towards an improved future for indigenous peoples, gays and

lesbians, nonhuman animals, and many others—an improved future

for which we sorely need good reason to hope in the face of

catastrophes like BP. While it’s no doubt woefully unrealistic

(and I think undesirable) to hope for a future that incarnates a

return to some less-technologically saturated era, a feminist

theory equipped to critically evaluate what we do with

technologies like deep-water drills, transsexual surgery, etc.,

who is affected by them, who is the “we” who controls its use and

dissemination is one that might be able to reimagine an

“equality” whose realization does not come at the cost of

sacrificing social justice.

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