EASE-OF-RETRIEVAL IN EYEWITNESS CONTEXT - PsyArXiv

EASE-OF-RETRIEVAL IN EYEWITNESS CONTEXT

Original Research

Roy Groncki1, Jennifer L. Beaudry1, & James D. Sauer2

1Swinburne University of Technology, 2University of Tasmania

Authors contribution:

R. Groncki, J. L. Beaudry, and J. D. Sauer contributed to the study design. Testing and data

collection were performed by R. Groncki. R. Groncki performed the data analysis and

interpretation under the supervision of J. L. Beaudry and J. D. Sauer. R. Groncki drafted the

manuscript, and J. L. Beaudry and J. D. Sauer provided critical revisions. All authors

approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

Author note: Correspondence can be addressed to Roy Groncki, [email protected].

Disclosure of Interest: The authors report no conflict of interest

Word Count: 12,477 words

EASE-OF-RETRIEVAL IN EYEWITNESS CONTEXT

Abstract

The way in which individuals think about their own cognitive processes plays an important

role in various domains. When eyewitnesses assess their confidence in identification

decisions, they could be influenced by how easily relevant information comes to mind. This

ease-of-retrieval effect has a robust influence on people’s cognitions in a variety of contexts

(e.g., attitudes), but it has not yet been applied to eyewitness decisions. In three studies, we

explored whether the ease with which eyewitnesses recall certain memorial information

influenced their identification confidence assessments and related testimony-relevant

judgements (e.g., perceived quality of view). We manipulated the number of reasons

participants gave to justify their identification (Study 1; N = 343), and also the number of

instances they provided of a weak or strong memory (Studies 2a & 2b; Ns = 350 & 312,

respectively). Across the three studies, ease-of-retrieval did not affect eyewitnesses’

confidence or other testimony-relevant judgements. We then tried—and failed—to

replicate Schwarz et al.’s (1991) original ease-of-retrieval finding (Study 3; N = 661). In three

of the four studies, ease-of-retrieval had the expected effect on participants’ perceived task

difficulty; however, frequentist and Bayesian testing showed no evidence for an effect on

confidence or assertiveness ratings.

Keywords:

Ease-of-retrieval; Eyewitness memory; Identification confidence; Lineups; Recognition

memory

2EASE-OF-RETRIEVAL IN EYEWITNESS CONTEXT

Eyewitness testimony is convincing to judges and juries; however, mistaken

eyewitness testimony can have severe consequences (e.g., Innocence Project, 2020).

Confidence is often used as an index to assess the reliability of eyewitness identifications

(Brewer, 2006). When measured appropriately, confidence can provide useful information

about the strength of the witness’s memory for the culprit and the extent to which the

identified lineup member matches this memory. However, other non-memorial factors

(such as post-identification feedback; Wells & Bradfield, 1998) can influence eyewitness

identification confidence. Another non-memorial factor that could influence eyewitnesses’

retrospective confidence judgements is heuristics, which are mental shortcuts that allow

people to make decisions quickly and without much effort (Begg, Duft, Lalonde, Melnick, &

Sanvito, 1989). Heuristics influence people’s perceptions and decisions in various domains

(e.g., Koriat, 1997; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2011); however, the vulnerability of eyewitnesses’

confidence judgements to potentially misleading heuristics is not well understood. This

paper explored whether heuristics, namely the ease-of-retrieval effect, influenced

eyewitnesses’ judgements about their identification confidence.

The Availability Heuristic and the Ease-of-Retrieval Effect

When asked which job—police officer or fisher—is more dangerous, people will

typically say police officer. However, in the U.S.A., fishers top the list of dangerous jobs

whereas police officers are not even included in the top 10 (U.S. Department of Labor,

2018). People might tend to think policing is more dangerous than fishing because police

deaths are reported more often in the news and the dangers of policing are routinely

displayed on television and in movies. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) coined the term “the

availability heuristic” to refer to people’s tendency to estimate an event’s frequency based

on the number of instances of that event (or similar events) that they can recall. Thus, if


they can recall more on-duty police deaths, but no or few instances in which a fisher died on

the job, then they will think that police work is more dangerous than fishing.

Most research on the availability heuristic focussed on the amount of information

retrieved (see Sherman & Corty, 1984, for a review), but Schwarz et al. (1991) argued that

the ease with which the information came to mind can also influence people’s

metacognitions. In the original empirical demonstration of the ease-of-retrieval effect

(Schwarz et al., Studies 1 & 2), participants provided either six or twelve instances (i.e., a

‘few vs many’ manipulation) of when they had demonstrated either assertive or non-

assertive behaviours. If the amount of information recalled influenced metacognitions, then

participants who recalled more instances of (for example) assertive behaviours should rate

themselves as more assertive than those who recalled fewer instances. In fact, Schwarz et

al. found the opposite. Participants who provided six instances rated themselves as more

assertive than those who provided twelve instances. Their explanation for this

counterintuitive finding was that participants asked to provide twelve instances found it

difficult, leading them to think they were less assertive compared to participants who could

easily recall the fewer instances of assertive behaviour they were asked to provide. Schwarz

et al. (1991) was the first explicit demonstration that the ease of retrieval itself, rather than

the amount of evidence recalled, influenced people’s metacognitions.

The metacognitive influence of ease-of-retrieval is not restricted to people’s self-

assessments, but rather is a robust and generalisable phenomenon. The literature contains

evidence that ease-of-retrieval effect influences people’s attitudes and the strength of these

attitudes (e.g., Tormala, Petty, & Briñol, 2002; Wänke, Bless, & Biller, 1996; Wänke, Bohner,

& Jurkowitsch, 1997), probability estimates (e.g., Wänke, Schwarz, & Bless, 1995),

stereotyping (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 1999), and persuasion (e.g., Novemsky,


Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson, 2007). In a meta-analysis of 263 studies, Weingarten and

Hutchinson (2018) established that ease-of-retrieval had a medium-size effect on people’s

judgments (rs = .25–.26).

Despite its ubiquity in the judgement and decision-making literature, the ease-of-

retrieval effect has not been examined in the eyewitness literature. However, there is good

reason to expect that eyewitnesses would use the ease with which they can justify their

identification decisions (i.e., why they chose that specific lineup member) as another piece

of internal evidence that would influence their confidence in their identifications and

associated metacognitions (e.g., testimony-relevant judgements, such as perceived quality

of their view). Eyewitness metacognitions are subject to influence by external factors (e.g.,

post-identification feedback; Wells & Bradfield, 1998) and internal factors (e.g., how well

the eyewitness’ memory of the culprit aligned with the selected lineup member; Bradfield,

Wells, & Olson, 2002). Thus, given the robust effect of ease-of-retrieval in a variety of

judgements, we propose that ease-of-retrieval could be a relevant internal heuristic that

influences eyewitnesses’ metacognitions.

Eyewitness Identification Evidence and the Confidence–Accuracy Relationship

Eyewitnesses provide valuable assistance to the criminal justice system (Fox &

Walters, 1986; Wells et al., 2020). At the beginning of a criminal investigation, eyewitnesses

might assist the police by providing a description of the perpetrator and the criminal event.

If police have a suspect (who may or may not be the actual culprit), the eyewitness might be

called to view a lineup and attempt an identification. If the eyewitness identifies the

suspect, the likelihood of the suspect being charged, and eventually convicted, increases.

The importance of eyewitness evidence within the criminal justice system (e.g., Boyce,

Beaudry, & Lindsay, 2007; Semmler, Brewer, & Douglass, 2011) is understandable given that


eyewitnesses provide a first-hand account of the crime and/or culprit, whereas other forms

of evidence (e.g., DNA evidence) are often unavailable (Wells et al., 2020). However,

eyewitness errors are common, and mistaken eyewitness identifications are the leading

contributing factor to wrongful convictions. The Innocence Project (2020) in the United

States of America suggests that mistaken eyewitness identification has contributed to

approximately 71% of over 360 wrongful convictions that have been overturned primarily

based on DNA evidence.

Given that eyewitness identification evidence is common, compelling, and prone to

error, researchers have attempted to find methods to assess the reliability of eyewitness

identifications. In real cases, police typically cannot determine whether an eyewitness

identification is correct or mistaken. Indeed, police use eyewitness identifications to help

establish the identity of the culprit. Thus, in applied contexts, reliability might be better

thought of as the informational value of the eyewitness’ memory (Sauer & Brewer, 2015).

That is, the extent to which this identification evidence, given the conditions under which it

was obtained, can aid in establishing the guilt of the suspect. Given that actual accuracy

cannot be determined in real cases, triers of fact must rely on potential indices of reliability

when determining whether the available identification evidence is likely to be accurate.

Identification confidence is one of the most researched indices of accuracy (e.g., Brewer &

Wells, 2006; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995; Wixted & Wells, 2017).

Recognition memory research suggests that a meaningful confidence–accuracy

relationship should exist for eyewitness identification decisions. Theories derived from

traditional psychophysical models hold that confidence and accuracy should both be closely

tied to memory strength and stimulus discriminability (Egan, 1958; Van Zandt, 2000). In the

criminal justice system, the Neil v Biggers (1972) ruling, which still informs judges’ decisions


(Bernstein, 2019), includes confidence as one of the criteria jurors should consider when

assessing the likely accuracy of an eyewitness identification. Empirically, a growing body of

literature has demonstrated that, under pristine conditions (e.g., when testing conditions

are unbiased and confidence is taken immediately after the identification), confidence is

meaningfully related to accuracy when the eyewitness identifies someone from the lineup.

This relationship is especially evident at higher levels of confidence (i.e., 90% and 100%;

Brewer & Wells, 2006; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Sauer, Brewer, Zweck, &

Weber, 2010). Factors that violate these pristine conditions, such as post-identification

feedback, weaken the confidence–accuracy relationship (Juslin, Olsson, & Winman, 1996;

Sauer, Palmer, & Brewer, 2019; see Wixted & Wells, 2017 for a review). Although these

factors change the eyewitnesses’ confidence (Brewer, 2006; Brewer & Wells, 2011; Wells &

Bradfield, 1998), the original identification decision remains unaltered (Lieppe & Eisenstadt,

2007), thereby creating a confidence–accuracy dissociation.

Theoretical frameworks developed to understand the confidence–accuracy

relationship for eyewitness memory have (a) tended to focus on models developed based

on psychophysical task performance, and (b) overlooked the heuristic biases postulated to

underlie other metacognitive judgements (e.g., judgements of learning; Koriat, 1997). The

psychophysical models (such as signal detection theory) propose that memory strength

underpins both accuracy and confidence (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). These models have

been applied extensively in the eyewitness literature, proposing that an eyewitness’

identification accuracy and confidence are both determined by the strength of the

individual’s memory for the culprit (Clark, 2003; Palmer, Brewer, & Weber, 2010).

These psychophysical models can accommodate post-decisional inferential factors

(including heuristics, such as ease-of-retrieval), but there has been minimal research into


how heuristics are incorporated into eyewitness decision-making. Eyewitness confidence

might be susceptible to influences from heuristics because it is a metacognitive judgement

in which eyewitnesses retrospectively consider how confident they were at the time of the

identification in their recognition decisions. For example, Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, and

Loftus (2000) demonstrated that participants’ confidence was influenced by the conditions

during testing (e.g., testing area luminance). Likewise, Brewer, Keast, and Rishworth (2002)

found that confidence was influenced when participants’ attention was directed to cues that

potentially provided a heuristic for inferring accuracy. Specifically, they had participants

reflect on their encoding and testing conditions or provide reasons for why their

identification might have been incorrect. Thus, there is some (albeit limited) evidence that

eyewitnesses’ confidence judgements might be vulnerable to misleading heuristics.

Past research has demonstrated that heuristics influence, if not primarily drive,

various other metacognitive judgements, including judgements of learning (Koriat, 1997),

feelings of knowing (Koriat, 1993), and the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon (Schwartz &

Metcalfe, 2011). Likewise, the ease of recalling certain information influences people’s

metacognitions and skews subsequent self-assessments and behaviours in a variety of

domains (Wiengarten & Hutchinson, 2018). When experimenters alter the perceived

difficulty by increasing the number of examples or instances of a certain topic recalled,

participants use the experienced ease of retrieval to inform their subsequent judgements

(Haddock, 2002; Haddock et al., 1999; Schwarz et al., 1991).

Whilst our understanding of the conditions under which confidence is and is not

meaningfully related to identification accuracy has improved over the years (e.g.,

differentiating the confidence–accuracy relationship for choosers and non-choosers; Sporer

et al., 1995), further investigation is needed to understand how eyewitnesses assess their


own confidence and what factors might lead to dissociations between confidence and

accuracy (Horry & Brewer, 2016). In this paper, we focus on exploring the effects of the

ease-of-retrieval effect on eyewitnesses’ metacognitions. Therefore, we are particularly

interested in whether the ease-of-retrieval heuristic could influence eyewitness confidence

and related testimony-relevant judgements by causing individuals to internally assess their

memory quality based on how easily related information comes to mind.

Current Studies

We examined whether eyewitnesses’ ease of retrieving information about their

identification decisions or their perceptions of their memory influenced eyewitnesses’

metacognitions (i.e., confidence and other testimony-relevant judgements). Specifically, in

Studies 1, 2a, and 2b, we investigated the effects of ease-of-retrieval in an eyewitness

context through two different manipulations. In Study 1, participants listed few versus many

reasons for their identification decision from a target-absent lineup. In Studies 2a and 2b,

we rephrased and expanded on the ease-of-retrieval manipulation by asking participants to

list few versus many instances of when they had a weak or a strong memory. Additionally, in

Studies 2a and 2b, we manipulated whether eyewitnesses saw a target-present or -absent

lineup. At the risk of foreshadowing the results, when Studies 1, 2a, and 2b failed to elicit

the established ease-of-retrieval effect in the eyewitness paradigm, we conducted Study 3, a

pre-registered direct replication of the original ease-of-retrieval study (Schwarz et al., 1991;

Study 1) to determine whether we could find the traditional effect.

Disclosures

For each study, we report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all

manipulations, and all materials (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). All studies in this

manuscript were approved by the [blinded for review] Human Research Ethics Committee.


The materials, data, and code for Studies 1, 2a, & 2b are available at

https://tinyurl.com/yyx2ymet. The materials, data, and code for Study 3 are available at

https://tinyurl.com/yyhbbjse.

Study 1

Study 1 investigated whether the ease-of-retrieval effect extends to an eyewitness

context. Because we were interested in whether ease-of-retrieval influenced eyewitnesses’

identification confidence, rather than the confidence–accuracy relationship, we used a

target-absent lineup (i.e., the lineup did not contain the actual target from the mock-crime

video) to minimise the contribution of recognition or ecphoric experience (i.e., the similarity

between the stimulus and the participant’s memory; Tulving, 1981) on confidence. As such,

all participants who made an identification from the lineup made a mistaken identification

that was not based on genuine recognition of the target. Given that eyewitnesses are more

likely to be influenced by non-memorial inferential cues when the memorial basis for their

decision is weak (Charman, Carlucci, Vallano, & Gregory, 2010), the use of target-absent

lineups also increased the possibility that the ease-of-retrieval manipulation would influence

eyewitnesses’ metacognitions.

A challenge when investigating ease-of-retrieval in an eyewitness context is designing

a manipulation that will tap into the eyewitnesses’ memorial metacognitions in a similar

way to the manipulations used in the traditional ease-of-retrieval research (e.g.,

assertiveness; Schwarz et al., 1991). To this end, we asked participants to provide a specific

number of reasons for their identification decision (e.g., “the selected lineup member

looked very similar to the culprit’s appearance”). We used three different levels (either one,

three, or seven) because we could not anticipate how many reasons would be reasonable

for participants to give for their identification, and thus, could not predetermine the number


of reasons that would serve as a “few vs. many” manipulation (Weingarten & Hutchinson,

2018). We also included a control condition, in which participants were not required to

provide any reasons. To maximise the number of participants who selected someone from

the lineup—and therefore could provide reasons for their identification—we used biased

instructions (i.e., we did not inform them that the target may not be in the lineup; Steblay,

1997) and did not provide an explicit “not present” option to participants during the lineup.

We expected that requiring participants to provide more reasons for their

identification would increase the difficulty of retrieving that information. In turn, the

perceived difficulty would then reduce eyewitnesses’ perceived strength of the basis for

their identification, which would lead to lower identification confidence (Schwarz et al.,

1991). Therefore, we hypothesised that participants required to recall fewer reasons for

their lineup identifications would report higher confidence in their identification decision

compared to participants required to provide more reasons.

Method

Design. This study used a one-way (ease-of-retrieval: 0, 1, 3, and 7) between-subjects

design. We manipulated ease of retrieval by randomly assigning participants to one of four

conditions: participants were either not asked about why they made their identification

decision (the 0-reason condition) or they were asked to provide one, three, or seven

reasons for their identification.

Participants. We calculated the required sample size using G*Power (Feld, Erdfelder,

Lang, & Buchner, 2007). Based on a between-subjects ANOVA with an alpha level of 0.05,

power of 0.95, numerator degrees of freedom of 3, and 4 groups, we required a sample size

of 279 to find a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.25). To allow for unusable participants for

whatever reason (e.g., did not complete the study), we increased the target sample size to


300. More participants were collected than anticipated; due to an oversight, data collection

continued for two weeks after we achieved the target sample size.

Students, enrolled in first-year psychology and criminology units at an Australian

university (N = 493), participated in this online study in exchange for course credit. After

excluding participants who did not meet our inclusion criteria (see the Analytic Approach

section), the final sample contained 343 participants. Most participants were female (n =

264; 76 males; 3 identified as ‘other’) and their ages ranged from 16–70 years (M = 33.04,

SD = 11.09).

Materials.

Mock-crime video. Participants viewed a 44-second mock-crime video that depicted a

male target acting suspiciously on a rooftop (Bradfield et al., 2002). In the video, the target

notices he is being observed and attempts to flee. As he leaves the scene, the target looks

directly at the camera for approximately six seconds. To ensure that participants did not

view the video more than once, a transparent layer was coded on top of the video to

prevent participants from selecting the replay button. This layer did not impair video quality

or affect other components of the study.

Distractor task. Participants viewed three Where’s Waldo1 images and participants

completed three questions associated with each image (e.g., “How many open beach

umbrellas are there?” for the beach picture). This was done to ensure that participants

would not be able to hold a complete memorial representation of the target in mind and to

facilitate some memorial degradation. The task took approximately five minutes to

complete.

1 TM & © 2008 Entertainment Rights Distribution Limited. All rights reserved.


Target-absent lineup. Participants viewed the original target-absent lineup from

Bradfield et al. (2002). The lineup consisted of six individuals (known as fillers) fitting the

general description of the target. The photos were labelled from 1–6 denoting their lineup

position. Participants could make an identification by selecting the button corresponding to

their lineup choice. We did not provide an explicit “not present” button; instead, if

participants wanted to reject the lineup, they could click “continue” without selecting any

lineup member. We did not explicitly inform them of this option because we wanted

participants to select someone from the lineup. If they clicked “continue” without selecting

anyone, they were asked if they were certain they wanted to continue without having made

an identification; if they said yes, they were directed to the debriefing page.

Ease-of-retrieval manipulation. After making their identification decision, participants

in the zero-reasons (i.e., control) condition were instructed, “Please press continue to

proceed to a series of questions.” Participants in the one-, three-, and seven-reasons

conditions were shown the instructions, “We would like to understand why you selected

that person. Please provide __ (1, 3, or 7) reason(s).” Participants were provided with the

corresponding number of text boxes in which to type their answers. They could not proceed

to the next page without entering something in the text boxes. To be retained in the

analyses, participants had to provide reasons that demonstrated they understood the task.

Typically, participants mentioned specific features (e.g., the hairstyle or eyes) or a match to

their memory (e.g., “He was the most similar to the person I could remember”). Please see

the Analytic Approach section for details about the number of participants we excluded for

providing nonsensical reasons.

Post-identification questionnaire. This questionnaire had only 11 questions. The first

question, adapted from Schwarz et al. (1991), measured perceived task difficulty. This


subjective ease question asked participants how difficult it was to generate the reasons for

their identification choice on a 10-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (not at all difficult) to 10

(extremely difficult). The remaining ten questions, adapted from Bradfield et al. (2002),

measured participants’ identification confidence and related retrospective certainty

judgements (e.g., the quality of their view of the target). Participants reported their

identification confidence on a 0–100% scale, with a higher percentage indicating greater

confidence. The remaining retrospective judgements were rated on 10-point Likert scales,

ranging from 0 to 10 with associated end points (e.g., for view: very poor–very good).

Procedure. The entire study was completed online via Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT).

After providing informed consent, participants were randomly allocated to one of only four

experimental conditions.

After answering demographic questions, participants viewed the mock-crime video

and completed the distractor task. Next, participants were provided with the following

biased lineup instructions, “Please read these instructions carefully. Earlier you saw a man

acting suspiciously and running away. You will now view a lineup and your task is to select

the person you saw in the video.”

We then presented the target-absent lineup. Participants who made an identification

completed the ease-of-retrieval manipulation, whilst participants who rejected the lineup

skipped to the debriefing page. This was to ensure that only choosers completed the ease-

of-retrieval manipulation because the manipulation was nonsensical participants who did

not select a lineup member. Finally, participants completed the post-identification

questionnaire, and were then provided with the debriefing statement.

Results

Analytic approach. We were interested in participants who provided reasons for


identifying someone; thus, non-choosers were directed out of the study (n = 3). We

removed participants who did not complete the study (n = 85). We removed another 62

participants who provided nonsensical reasons (e.g., repeated the same reason) or did not

provide the specified number of reasons. Specifically, we excluded 1 participant in the one-

reason condition, 4 participants in the three-reasons condition, and 57 participants in the

seven-reasons condition. The final sample consisted of 343 participants who identified

someone from the lineup and provided a sensible reason for their identification (see

Appendix A for a breakdown of choosers per condition). Including these 62 participants in

our analyses did not change the pattern of results (see the Supplemental Materials for

details).

In terms of effect sizes, we report Cohen’s d with 95% confidence intervals in brackets

for t-tests and for any comparisons between two means. For ANOVAs, we report partial eta

squared (ηp2) with 90% confidence intervals in brackets; we report the 90% confidence

interval because it is equivalent to the traditional 95% confidence interval reported for

Cohen’s d and other effect sizes (see Steiger, 2004). For the Bayesian analyses, we estimated

the Bayes Factor using JASP with default priors (JASP team, 2018). We interpreted the Bayes

Factors using Raftery’s (1995) guidelines: A BF between 1–3 is weak evidence for the

relevant hypothesis (null or alternative), between 3–20 is positive evidence, between 20–

150 is considered strong evidence, and a BF above 150 is considered very strong evidence.

Perceived task difficulty. We conducted a between-subjects (ease-of-retrieval: 1, 3, 7)

ANOVA to determine whether participants’ perception of task difficulty varied depending on

the number of reasons they had to provide for their identification. We did not include the

control condition in this analysis because they did not provide any reasons. As expected, the

ease-of-retrieval manipulation significantly influenced perceived task difficulty, F (2, 238) =


17.85, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13 [0.06, 0.21]. Tukey post hoc tests revealed that the three

conditions were significantly different from one another. Participants who provided one

reason found it easier (M = 4.46, SD = 2.97) than participants who provided three reasons

(M = 5.62, SD = 2.68), p = .008, d = 0.41 [0.13, 0.69], and seven reasons (M = 7.40, SD =

2.12), p < .001, d = 1.07 [0.69, 1.45]. The three- and seven-reasons conditions also

significantly differed from one another, p = .001, d = 0.71 [0.34, 1.07].

Eyewitness identification confidence. A one-way between-subjects (ease-of-retrieval:

0, 1, 3, 7) ANOVA on participants’ identification confidence found that, contrary to

expectations, confidence did not significantly vary across conditions (see Table 1), F (3, 339)

= 1.61, p = .19, ηp2 = 0.02 [0.01, 0.04]. A Bayesian analysis suggested that our data provides

positive support for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis by a BF01 of 9.26.

[Table 1 near here]

Retrospective certainty judgements. We conducted a MANOVA to analyze whether

the ease-of-retrieval manipulation influenced participants’ retrospective certainty

judgements. Consistent with the identification confidence analyses (but contrary to our

hypothesis), participants’ judgements did not significantly vary across conditions, Wilks =

0.96, F (27, 967.33) = 0.65, p = .97, ηp2 = 0.022 (see Table 1). We did not conduct Bayesian

analyses on these variables given the consistency of the non-significant findings and the fact

that the focus of this paper was eyewitness confidence, rather than other retrospective

certainty judgements.

Correlations. In response to a reviewer’s request, we conducted an exploratory

analysis examining the correlation between perceived task difficulty and confidence. We

found a significant, albeit weak, negative correlation, r (241) = –.21, p = .001. However, the

2 We attempted to calculate the 90% CI for ηp2 using Wuensch (2009), but the computation consistently

provided the nonsensical interval of [0.00, 0.00]. Therefore, we do not provide a CI for this value.


scatterplots by condition revealed non-systematic patterns, which make it difficult to

interpret the relationship (see the Supplemental Materials for scatterplots).

In addition, we examined the correlations between perceived task difficulty and the

retrospective certainty judgements. As seen in Table B1, the majority of the judgements had

significant, weak negative correlations with perceived task difficulty.

Discussion

The results of Study 1 did not support our hypothesis that the ease-of-retrieval

manipulation would influence eyewitnesses’ identification confidence and related

metacognitions. Nonetheless, the ease-of-retrieval manipulation did have the expected

effect on perceived task difficulty; participants who provided more reasons reported that it

was more difficult to justify their identification decisions than those who provided fewer

reasons. However, this perceived difficulty did not translate into an effect on mean

identification confidence or other testimony-relevant judgements. The results of our

Bayesian analyses give us additional evidence that our non-significant results are not

indicative of data insensitivity or a lack of power. Instead, these data suggest that the ease-

of-retrieval manipulation did not affect eyewitnesses’ confidence in their identifications.

We propose four possible explanations for this study’s non-significant results. First,

the wording of our ease-of-retrieval manipulation (i.e., “We would like to understand why

you selected that person. Please provide ___ reasons”) might not have been salient enough

to influence participants’ metacognitions about their memory for the target. Nisbett and

Wilson (1977) argued that people are unable to accurately report on their cognitive

processes unless the stimulus (in this case, the ease-of-retrieval manipulation) is highly

salient and their reaction (i.e., participants’ perceptions of their memories) can be plausibly

attributed to that stimulus. In response to our manipulation, participants typically listed


features of the suspect’s face (e.g., his nose or his eyes), instead of reasons indicating that

participants considered their memory in a certain light (whether positive or negative).

Second, participants might have been insufficiently motivated. People with high

motivation to process information might be more affected by the ease-of-retrieval heuristic

than people not motivated to process relevant information (Tormala et al., 2002).

Participants in our study might have lacked sufficient motivation to provide the required

number of suitable reasons for their identification and, more importantly, might have failed

to consider whether the ease of providing those reasons was indicative of their foundation

for the identification. The large number of participants (n = 57) excluded in the seven-

reasons condition provides support for this explanation; perhaps they were not motivated

to provide the required number of reasons.

Third, the target-absent lineup created a weak ecphoric experience for all participants

because their memory of the target was unlikely to provide a strong match to any of the

lineup members. As previously discussed, we had a good rationale for using a target-absent

lineup; however, it could have been counter-productive in this situation. The ease-of-

retrieval manipulation was intended to influence people’s perceptions of the foundation for

their identification. It is possible though that the weak ecphoric experience might have led

participants in all conditions to believe they had a bad memory, which could have produced

floor effects. The relatively low mean identification confidence in each condition (~44%–

53%) provides some support for this explanation. Nonetheless, we did not anticipate that

the lower confidence typically associated with target-absent lineups would preclude the

ease-of-retrieval manipulation from influencing confidence given the effects of other

confidence-influencing factors on target-absent identification decisions (e.g., feedback;

Steblay et al., 2014).


Tying into the previous explanation, the weak ecphoric experience might have

inadvertently led participants to misattribute the perceived difficulty of providing reasons

for their identification. When participants misattribute their ease of retrieval to an external

source (e.g., music or oddly-shaped writing space), their judgements are informed by the

amount of information recalled, rather than the subjective ease of retrieving this

information (Haddock, Rothman, Reber, & Schwarz, 1999; Ruder & Bless, 2003; Schwarz et

al., 1991, Study 3). That is, participants stop viewing the subjective ease of retrieval as a

valid informative cue and instead rely on the amount of information recalled as a cue

(Wiengarten & Hutchinson, 2018). Some tentative support for this explanation is seen in the

slight (but not significant) increases in the mean confidence between conditions in our

study; the observed pattern is opposite to what one would expect if ease of retrieval

affected eyewitness confidence (i.e., more reasons = lower confidence).

A final possible explanation for this study’s findings is that the ease-of-retrieval

heuristic might not apply to eyewitnesses’ confidence in their identifications. The ease with

which information comes to mind has an influence in a number of domains (e.g., ratings of

assertiveness or a preference for one car brand over another; Wiengarten & Hutchinson,

2018), but it is possible that this effect does not extend to eyewitnesses’ metacognitions.

We need to rule out alternative explanations, however, before we can reasonably conclude

that the ease-of-retrieval heuristic does not apply in an eyewitness context.

Study 2a

We expanded on Study 1 by incorporating three key changes to address the

aforementioned limitations. As detailed below, we: (i) altered the ease-of-retrieval

manipulation, (ii) included a target-present lineup, and (iii) added the Need for Cognition

measure.


First, to address the possibility that the ease-of-retrieval manipulation was not salient

enough, we decided to ask participants about general memory ability rather than reasons

for their identification decisions. Specifically, we asked them, “Please provide ___ (1, 3, or 7)

instance(s) when you had a weak [or strong] memory.” This wording retains the ‘few versus

many’ component of the previous manipulation but places explicit emphasis on participants’

general memory. Additionally, this revision allowed us to manipulate the quality of memory

strength (i.e., weak vs. strong; akin to the assertive vs. unassertive manipulation in Schwarz

et al., 1991).

These wording changes are more aligned with the wording of manipulations used in

previous ease-of-retrieval studies, where ease-of-retrieval skewed subsequent self-

assessment in the given direction. For example, Wänke et al. (1996) asked participants to

provide arguments for or against buying a BMW, with participants preferring to buy a BMW

or a Mercedes depending on their arguments. Our revised wording should have influenced

participants’ metamemory by making them view their memory as strong or weak

(accordingly). Consequently, this resultant metamemory should alter how they perceive

their memory for the mock-crime video and suspect, thereby affecting their identification

confidence (Saraiva et al. 2019). As specified in our hypotheses, we were not interested in

the main effect of the memory-strength manipulation, but rather in the interaction of this

factor with the number-of-instances manipulation.

Second, to address whether participants’ motivation to cognitively engage and

deliberate on their reasoning for their decision was a potential explanation for our findings

in Study 1, we included a Need for Cognition (NfC) measure. People high in NfC tending to

enjoy more effortful processing than those low in NfC (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis,

1996). Splitting the data based on NfC scores allowed us to determine whether people’s


need for cognition (which, presumably tapped into their motivation) influenced the extent

to which the ease-of-retrieval manipulation affected them.

Third, we manipulated target presence of the lineup to explore whether the weak

ecphoric experience is a feasible explanation for the null findings in Study 1. Participants

who view a target-present lineup should have a stronger ecphoric experience than

participants who view a target-absent lineup because the target should provide a stronger

match to their memory than any of the other lineup members, resulting in greater

identification accuracy and higher confidence. In addition, including both target-present and

target-absent lineups should produce more variability in eyewitnesses’ identification

confidence, which would eliminate floor effects as potential explanation for any null effects.

We had two hypotheses. First, we predicted a significant Number of Instances x

Memory Strength interaction. In terms of the strong-memory condition, we hypothesised

that participants who provided few instances of a strong memory would report higher

identification confidence (and more retrospective certainty on the testimony-relevant

judgements) compared to those who provide many instances (i.e., 1 instance > 3 instances >

7 instances). Conversely, in terms of the weak memory conditions, participants asked to

provide few instances would report lower confidence (and less retrospective certainty) than

those reporting many instances (e.g., 1 instance < 3 instances < 7 instances). Second, we

hypothesised that participants who had high NfC scores would be more influenced by the

ease-of-retrieval manipulation (Number of Instances x Memory Strength) compared to

participants who had low NfC scores.

Method

Design. This study used a 2 (Target Presence: absent vs. present) x 2 (Memory

Strength: weak vs. strong) x 3 (Number of Instances: 1, 3, or 7) between-subjects factorial


design. Target presence was manipulated by either showing participants the target-absent

or target-present lineup. Ease-of-retrieval was manipulated by asking participants to provide

one, three, or seven instances of when they had a weak or a strong memory. We removed

the control condition (zero reasons) used in Study 1 because it did not differ from the one-

reason condition.

Participants. We calculated the required sample size using G*Power (Feld et al.,

2007). Based on a between-subjects ANOVA with an alpha level of 0.05, power of 0.95,

numerator degrees of freedom of 2, and 12 groups, we needed a sample size of 251 to find

a medium effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.25). Adjusting for the large number of participants who

had to be excluded in Study 1, we increased the target sample size to 350. Again, more

participants completed the study than anticipated due to an oversight in data collection.

Students enrolled in first-year psychology and criminology units (N = 447) participated

in exchange for course credit. After excluding participants who did not meet our inclusion

criteria (see the Analytic Approach section), the final sample contained 350 participants. As

in Study 1, most participants were female (n = 277; 73 males) and their ages ranged from

18–75 years (M = 34.11, SD = 10.82).

Materials. We used the same materials in Study 1, except where noted.

Lineups. In addition to the target-absent lineup used in Study 1, we also used the

target-present lineup from Bradfield et al. (2002). This lineup included the same fillers as the

target-absent lineup except that the target replaced lineup member number 3.

Memory Strength x Number of Instances manipulation. Participants in the weak

memory strength condition were shown the instructions, “Please provide ___ (1, 3 or 7)

instance(s) when you had a weak memory (e.g., forgetting your phone at home).”

Participants in the strong memory strength condition were shown the instructions, “Please


provide ___ (1, 3 or 7) instance(s) when you had a strong memory (e.g., remembering an

obscure date to answer a question at a trivia night).” In all conditions, the corresponding

number of text boxes were provided for participants to type each instance. For our analyses,

we retained participants who provided sensible instances (see the Analytic Approach section

for exclusion details).

Need for Cognition measure. This 18-item questionnaire measures participants’ Need

for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Responses were provided on a 5-point Likert

scale, ranging from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic) to 5 (extremely characteristic). An

example item is, “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.” We calculated a

mean score for each participant by summing the values (reversing the score when

appropriate) and dividing by 18.

Procedure. The procedure for Study 2a was nearly identical to that in Study 1, with

three exceptions. First, participants were randomly assigned to receive either a target-

absent or a target-present lineup. Second, participants were randomly assigned to either

provide examples of instances when they had weak or strong memories. Third, participants

completed the NfC measure after completing the post-identification questionnaire.

Results

Analytic approach. The analytic approach was identical to Study 1. We removed

participants who did not complete the study (n = 73). We removed another 19 participants

who provided nonsensical instances (e.g., a question mark) or did not provide the specified

number of instances. Specifically, by condition, we excluded 3 participants in the one-strong

instance condition, 8 participants in three-strong instances, 3 participants in seven-weak

instances, and 5 participants in seven-strong instances conditions. In addition, given our

focus on choosers (n = 350), we removed the small sample of participants who rejected the


lineup (n = 5). For a breakdown of choosers per condition, please see Appendix A.

Perceived task difficulty. To determine whether the number-of-instances

manipulation affected how difficult participants found it to provide the instances, we

conducted a one-way between-subjects ANOVA (number of instances: 1, 3, 7). As expected,

the number-of-instances condition affected perceived task difficulty, F (2, 347) = 3.84, p

= .02, ηp2 = 0.02 [0.02, 0.05]. Tukey post hoc tests indicated that participants found it

significantly more difficult to provide seven instances (M = 5.68, SD = 2.86) than one

instance (M = 4.80, SD = 2.61), p = .04, d = 0.32 [0.20, 0.79], and three instances (M = 4.79,

SD = 2.95), p = .04, d = 0.31 [0.22, 0.84]. There was no significant difference between the

one- and three-instance conditions, p = 1.00, d = 0.00 [-0.46, 0.54].

Eyewitness identification confidence. We conducted a 2 (Target Presence) x 2

(Memory Strength) x 3 (Number of Instances) between-subjects ANOVA on participants’

identification confidence. Contrary to our hypotheses, the main effects of number of

instances, F (2, 338) = 2.14, p = .12, ηp2 = 0.01 [0.01, 0.04], memory strength, F (1, 338) =

0.01, p = .91, ηp2 = 0.00 [0.00, 0.002], and target presence, F (1, 338) = 1.39, p = .24, ηp

2 =

0.00 [0.00, 0.02], were not significant. Also, all interactions were not significant, Fs < 1.86, ps

> .16, ηp2s < 0.01 (see Table 2).

[Table 2 near here]

Bayesian analyses demonstrated that our data provided very strong support for the

null model over the next best fitting model, which contained all main effects and

interactions, by a BF01 of 135,964.83.

To examine whether motivation affected the influence of our ease-of-retrieval

manipulation, we re-ran the confidence analysis after splitting the data file based on overall

Need for Cognition (NfC) scores (Lassiter, Briggs, & Bowman, 1991). We categorized


participants who scored below 3.5 as the Low NfC group (n = 162) and those who scored 3.5

and above as the High NfC group (n = 188). Contrary to expectations, the effects of our

manipulations did not vary according to NfC. For both high and low NfC groups, all main

effects and interactions were not significant, Fs < 1.78, ps > .17, ηp2s < 0.02. Maintaining NfC

scores as a continuous predictor in a linear regression model did not change the results (see

the Supplemental Materials).

Again, our Bayesian ANOVA confirmed that our data provided very strong support in

both NfC groups for the null model over the next best fitting model, which included all main

effects and interactions, by a BF01 of 36,584.51 for the low NfC group and by a BF01 of

37,021.74 for the high NfC group.

Retrospective certainty judgements. We conducted a 2 (Target Presence) x 2

(Memory Strength) x 3 (Number of Instances) between-subjects MANOVA. There were no

significant main effects, Wilks < 0.98, Fs (18, 660) < 1.48, ps > .15, ηp2s < 0.02, or

interactions, Wilks < 0.96, Fs (18, 660) < 1.58, ps > .06, ηp2s < 0.04, for participants’

retrospective certainty judgements (see Table 2). As in Study 1, we did not conduct Bayesian

analyses on these variables.

Correlations. Consistent with Study 1, we conducted an exploratory analysis

examining the correlation between perceived task difficulty and confidence. Again, we

found a significant, albeit weak, negative correlation, r (350) = –.12, p = .03. However, as in

Study 1, the scatterplots by condition generally revealed non-systematic patterns (see the

Supplemental Materials).

In addition, we examined the correlations between perceived task difficulty and the

retrospective certainty judgements. As in Study 1, the majority of judgements had

significant, weak negative correlations with perceived task difficulty (see Table B1).


Discussion

The overarching aim of this study was to further investigate whether the ease-of-

retrieval heuristic is applicable to an eyewitness paradigm. To this end, we revised the

design to address several possible explanations for the null effects observed in Study 1.

Although we successfully manipulated perceived task difficulty, as in Study 1, we found no

evidence that ease-of-retrieval influenced eyewitness confidence. Further, despite our

efforts to increase the salience of the manipulation and account for potentially important

individual differences in motivation, we observed consistent null effects. Perhaps the ease-

of-retrieval manipulation we used was not applicable to eyewitnesses because it targeted

participants’ memory in general, rather than their memory for the specific identification

decision in question. However, given that the manipulation focused on memory, one would

have expected it to have an influence on the retrospective certainty judgements that

specifically addressed memory (i.e., image & stranger judgments). In addition, it appears

that motivation did not explain our null effects because the ease-of-retrieval manipulation

had no significant effect on participants’ confidence, regardless of their NfC score. However,

we are not suggesting that motivation does not play a role in the effectiveness of the ease-

of-retrieval effect in general (e.g., Tormala et al., 2002), but rather that it likely does not

explain the lack of expected findings in this context.

A limitation of both Study 1 and 2a that could potentially explain the observed null

effects is that we did not randomize or counterbalance the order of items in the post-

identification questionnaire. Specifically, participants were always asked the perceived task

difficulty question before rating their confidence and retrospective certainty judgements.

Over four studies, Tybout, Sternthal, Malaviva, Bakamitsos, and Park (2005) demonstrated

that the ease-of-retrieval effect has the greatest influence on subsequent metacognitions


when participants retrieve moderately accessible information. If the information is too easy

or too difficult to retrieve, then the individual shows the standard availability heuristic effect

in that they rely on the amount of content recalled, rather than the ease of retrieval.

Kuhnen (2010) argued that question order influences information accessibility, which in turn

influences the ease-of-retrieval effect. Applying this logic to our studies, asking participants

about their perceived task difficulty at the beginning of the questionnaire might have made

the information too accessible, thereby constraining our ability to detect an ease-of-

retrieval effect on the subsequent items of interest. One counterargument to this

possibility, however, is that in our two studies there is no evidence that the amount of

content recalled influenced eyewitnesses’ metacognitions (i.e., they were not more

confident when they recalled 7 strong memory instances than 1 instance). Nonetheless, we

cannot rule out this possibility without changing the question order.

Study 2b

This study investigated the possibility that question order was responsible for the

observed null effects of our ease-of-retrieval manipulations on eyewitness confidence.

Whilst arguably a potential explanation for the null results, Weingarten and Hutchinson

(2018) found the placement of the subjective ease question had no significant effect on the

dependent variables of interest. Nevertheless, to ensure that we accounted for as many

explanations for the null results as we could, we conducted a study similar to Study 2a, but

moved the perceived task difficulty question to the end of the post-identification

questionnaire. We had the same hypotheses as Study 2a.

Method


Design. As in Study 2a, we used a 2 (Target Presence: absent vs. present) x 2 (Memory

Strength: weak vs. strong) x 3 (Number of Instances: 1, 3, or 7) between-subjects factorial

design.

Participants. Our target sample size of 251 participants was based on the same power

analysis used in Study 2a. Students enrolled in first-year psychology and criminology units

participated in this online study in exchange for course credit (N = 379). After excluding

participants who did not meet our inclusion criteria (see the Analytic Approach section), the

final sample contained 312 participants. Most participants were female (n = 251; 60 males; 1

identified as ‘other’) and their ages ranged from 18–63 years (M = 32.49, SD = 10.65).

Materials. The materials were identical to those used in Study 2a, with the exception

that we changed the order of the questions in the post-identification questionnaire. We

placed the perceived task difficulty question (i.e., “How difficult was it to generate the

requested number of instances demonstrating the strength of your memory?”) at the end of

the questionnaire instead of at the beginning as in Study 2a.

Procedure. The procedure was very similar to that in Study 2a with one key exception.

The perceived task difficulty question was presented at the end of the post-identification

questionnaire.

Results

Analytic approach. We used the same analytic approach as in Study 2a. We removed

participants who did not complete the study (n = 53). We removed another 10 participants

who did not provide the specified number of instances or provided nonsensical responses

(e.g., a question mark). Specifically, we removed four participants in the one-strong instance

condition, two participants in the three-strong instances, and four participants in the seven-

strong instances condition. In addition, we removed eyewitnesses who rejected the lineup


(n = 4) from any further analyses, leaving only choosers (n = 312). For a breakdown of

choosers per condition, please see Appendix A.

Perceived task difficulty. Contrary to our expectations and the results of Study 2a, the

one-way (number of instances) between-subjects ANOVA revealed no significant differences

between one (M = 4.64, SD = 2.44), three (M = 4.93, SD = 2.73), and seven-instances

conditions (M = 5.23, SD = 2.85) on perceived task difficulty, F (2, 309) = 1.30, p = .28, ηp2 =

0.008 [0.00, 0.03].

The Bayesian ANOVA indicated that our data provided positive support for the null

hypothesis over the next best fitting model, which included the main effect, by a BF01 of

8.85.

Normally, if we did not find an effect of ease-of-retrieval on perceived task difficulty,

we would not investigate further. However, in this case, we argue that the following

analyses remain informative because they demonstrate a similar pattern of non-significant

results on eyewitness confidence and retrospective certainty judgements, irrespective of the

success (or lack thereof) of the key ease-of-retrieval manipulation.

Eyewitness identification confidence. We conducted a 3 (Number of Instances) x 2

(Memory Strength) x 2 (Target Presence) between-subjects ANOVA on participants’

identification confidence. Contrary to our hypotheses, but consistent with our previous

studies, we found no significant main effects: number of instances, F (2, 300) = 0.21, p = .81,

ηp2 = 0.001 [0.00, 0.01]; memory strength, F (1, 300) = 0.11, p = .75, ηp

2 = 0.00 [0.00, 0.01];

and target presence, F (1, 300) = 2.72, p = .10, ηp2 = 0.01 [0.01, 0.04]. Furthermore, none of

the interactions were significant, Fs < 1.26, ps > .29, ηp2s < 0.008 (see Table 3 for descriptive

statistics).

[Table 3 near here]


Bayesian analyses reveal that our data provides very strong support that the data

were much more likely to occur under the null model compared to the next best fitting

model, which included all main effects and interactions (BF01 = 367,527.77).

To examine whether motivation influenced the ease-of-retrieval effect, we reran the

confidence analyses, splitting the Need for Cognition (NfC) scores as in Study 2a. Contrary to

expectations, all main effects and interactions were not significant for both Low (n = 142)

and High NfC groups (n = 170), Fs < 2.38, ps > .09, ηp2s < 0.03. As in Study 2a, maintaining

NfC scores as a continuous predictor in a linear regression model did not change the results

(see the Supplemental Materials).

Again, our data provided very strong support for the null hypothesis (Raftery, 1995).

The results of a Bayesian ANOVA demonstrated that the null model was favoured over the

next best fitting model, which included all main effects and interactions, by a BF01 of

106,713.73 for the Low NfC group and by a BF01 of 4,632.09 for the High NfC group.

Retrospective certainty judgements. We conducted a Number of Instances x Memory

Strength x Target Presence between-subjects MANOVA on participants’ retrospective

certainty judgements. There were no significant main effects, Wilks < 0.98, Fs < 1.56, ps

> .13, ηp2s < 0.02, or interactions, Wilks < 0.99, Fs < 1.09, ps > .64, ηp

2s < 0.03 (see Table 3 for

descriptive statistics). As in previous studies, we did not conduct Bayesian analyses on these

measures.

Correlations. Contrary to the exploratory correlations in previous studies, there was

no significant correlations of perceived task difficulty with confidence or any of the

retrospective judgements (see Table B1 for correlations; see Supplemental Materials for

scatterplots by condition).

Discussion


The results of Study 2b suggest that the null effects were not caused by asking

participants about perceived task difficulty before key metacognitive questions.

Unexpectedly, when the perceived task difficulty question was moved to the end of the

post-identification questionnaire, the ease-of-retrieval manipulation no longer influenced

perceived task difficulty and the exploratory correlations of perceived task difficulty with

eyewitnesses’ confidence and retrospective certainty judgements became non-significant.

Nonetheless, similar null effects on identification confidence emerged in Studies 1, 2a, and

2b. Across three studies, we systematically eliminated various explanations for the lack of

the ease-of-retrieval effect on eyewitness identification confidence. Furthermore, Bayes

Factors in each study favored the null hypothesis over the alternative hypotheses. Thus,

eyewitnesses’ assessments of identification confidence (and associated retrospective

certainty judgements) are likely not influenced by the ease-of-retrieval effect, at least not

with the stimuli and methods used in these studies (Yarkoni, 2019).

In summary, regardless of whether we manipulated participants’ retrieval of specific

reasons for their identification or instances of more general memories, the ease-of-retrieval

manipulation did not significantly influence participants’ metacognitions in an eyewitness

context. Interestingly, in two of the three studies, participants reported greater difficulty

when providing more reasons; however, this perceived task difficulty did not influence

participants’ identification confidence as intended. Given these consistent null effects, we

decided to conduct a direct, pre-registered replication of the original ease-of-retrieval effect

to ensure that—outside of the eyewitness paradigm—the findings are as robust as

presumed.

Study 3


Our first three studies suggest that the ease-of-retrieval effect, in particular the ‘few vs

many’ manipulation, might not be applicable in an eyewitness context. Perhaps

eyewitnesses rely on different decision-making processes to assess their identification

confidence than someone deciding their level of assertiveness (Schwarz et al., 1991), their

attitude towards politicians (Haddock, 2002), or car manufacturers (Wänke et al., 1997). In

order to justify that conclusion, however, we conducted a pre-registered direct replication

of the original study (Schwarz et al., 1991; Study 1) to ensure that the effect replicated. This

would also determine whether the ease-of-retrieval effect is as robust as presumed in the

literature.

The ongoing replication crisis, which has demonstrated that some previous findings in

the social and behavioral sciences do not reliably replicate (e.g., Ebersole et al., 2020; Klein

et al., 2018; Open Science Collaboration, 2015), prompted our direct replication attempt.

Although the Weingarten and Hutchinson (2018) meta-analysis concluded that the ease-of-

retrieval effect was robust in a variety of conceptual replications, we are not aware of any

published direct replications of Schwarz et al. (1991; Study 1). Furthermore, we resisted the

tendency to accept that an effect exists based on one meta-analysis, given the concerns

raised about the validity and fallibility of meta-analyses (Carter, Schönbrodt, Gervais, &

Hilgard, 2019). Indeed, in ego depletion research two meta-analyses contradict each other

about the strength of the effect (Carter & McCullough, 2014; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, &

Chatzisarantis, 2010). Therefore, before concluding that the ease-of-retrieval effect does not

apply to the eyewitness area, we wanted to ensure that the ease-of-retrieval effect, using

the ‘few vs many’ manipulation, is replicable.

Our pre-registration (https://tinyurl.com/yyjy859d) detailed same hypotheses as

Schwarz et al. (1991; Study 1). Specifically, we hypothesized that participants who provided


6 instances of when they behaved assertively would rate themselves as more assertive

compared to participants who provided 12 instances. Conversely, participants who provided

6 instances of when they behaved unassertively would rate themselves as less assertive

compared to participants who provided 12 instances.

Method

Design. This study used a 2 (Number of Instances: 6 vs. 12) x 2 (Behaviours: assertive

vs. unassertive) between-subjects factorial design. Participants were randomly assigned to

one of only four conditions in which they provided either 6 or 12 instances of when they

displayed assertive or unassertive behaviours.

Participants. We calculated the required sample size using G*Power (Feld et al.,

2007). Based on a between-subjects ANOVA with an alpha level of 0.05, power of 0.95,

numerator degrees of freedom of 1, and 4 groups, we required 210 participants to find a

medium effect size (Cohen’s f = 0.25). We selected a medium effect size because we could

not calculate the original effect sizes from Schwarz et al.’s (1991) reported data. However,

we later realised that Weingarten and Hutchinson (2018) reported the effect sizes (which

were equivalent to fs ranging from 0.375–0.880).

Given the large number of participants we had to exclude in Studies 1, 2a, and 2b, we

increased the target sample size to 300. Upon reaching this target, we discovered a coding

error that caused the program to skip one entire condition (12-unassertive). Thus, we did

not analyse the data, but instead fixed the coding error and continued data collection. To

ensure that participants were still randomly assigned to conditions, we over-allocated them

to the 12-unassertive condition while still also assigning participants to the other conditions

(with a ratio of 2:2:1:6 for 6-assertive, 6-unassertive, 12-assertive, and 12-unassertive

conditions, respectively). We ended data collection at the end of the week when the


conditions reached relatively equal numbers of participants. As a result, our final sample

was larger than required to examine the ease-of-retrieval effect and substantially larger

than Schwarz et al.’s (1991) original sample of 40.

Students enrolled in first-year psychology units (N = 910) participated in this online

study in exchange for course credit. After excluding participants who did not meet our

inclusion criteria (see the Analytic Approach section), the final sample consisted of 661

participants. Most participants were female (n = 516; 142 males; 2 identified as ‘other’; and

1 participant did not indicate their gender). Several participants (n = 21) did not provide

their age; the age range of those who provided that information was 17–69 years (M =

29.36, SD = 10.86).

Materials

Our materials were based on those used in Schwarz et al. (1991). The original author

assisted us with this replication by providing the original materials and translating from

German into English (N. Schwarz, personal communication, November 2017).

Number of Instances x Behaviours manipulation. The instructions presented to the

participants varied depending upon their assigned condition. Participants in the assertive

example condition saw the instructions, “Please describe ___ (6 or 12) examples of

situations in which you behaved very assertively and felt at ease.” In the unassertive

example condition, participants saw the instructions, “Please describe ___ (6 or 12)

examples of situations in which you behaved unassertively and felt insecure.” In all

conditions, the corresponding number of text boxes were provided for participants to type

their answers. Participants had to enter text in each text box to proceed with the study. For

our analyses, we retained participants who demonstrated that they understood the task by

providing sensible instances (i.e., similar to the examples provided in the instructions).


Questionnaire. Participants completed a questionnaire of only 4 questions. The first

question asked participants how difficult it was to generate the requested number of

instances on a 10-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (not at all difficult) to 10 (extremely

difficult). The next three questions asked participants to rate how assertive, insecure, and

anxious they view themselves on 10-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 (not at all) to 10

(very much). Aligning with Schwarz et al (1991), we combined the rating of assertiveness

with the reverse-coded ratings of insecurity and anxiety; therefore, higher values on this

aggregated score indicated greater assertiveness. Given that the question order was not

specified in the original paper, we decided to ask the subjective ease question first followed

by the assertive, insecure, and anxious questions. The ease-of-retrieval manipulation had

the expected effect on perceived task difficulty when the subjective ease question was the

first question (Studies 1 and 2a) rather than last question (Study 2b).

Procedure. Although Schwarz et al. (1991) conducted this study in the lab, in line with

other ease-of-retrieval studies (Tormala et al., 2002; Wänke et al., 1996), we administered

the study online via Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Participants read the consent

information statement and consent was implied if the participants continued with the study.

Participants were then randomly allocated to one of only four conditions. After answering

demographic questions, participants provided either 6 or 12 examples of situations where

they behaved in an assertive (on unassertive) manner. Following this, participants

completed the questionnaire, and were presented with a debriefing statement.

Results

Analytic approach. In a similar approach to previous studies, we removed participants

who did not complete the study (n = 115). We removed another 134 participants who

provided nonsensical instances (e.g., a question mark) or did not provide the specified


number of instances. Specifically, by condition, we excluded 58 participants in the six-

assertive instances condition, 15 in the six-unassertive, 32 in the twelve-assertive, and 29 in

the twelve-unassertive instances condition. For a breakdown of the final sample (n = 661)

per condition, please see Appendix A.

In terms of analyses, we used the same approach as in previous studies, with one

exception (which was also the only deviation from our preregistration). Instead of Bayesian

analyses, we conducted equivalence testing using the two one-sided t-tests procedure

(TOST; Lakens, 2017; Lakens, Schell, & Isager, 2018). We decided that this was a more

suitable analysis because we could use the original Schwarz et al.’s (1991) findings to

calculate the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI). We followed Simonsohn’s (2015)

suggestion of using an objective criterion by setting the SESOI as the effect size that the

original study had 33% power to detect. Using G*Power (Feld et al., 2007), we calculated for

a one-tailed t-test (because we had an assumed direction) with an alpha of 0.05, power of

0.33, and sample sizes of 10 for both groups3. This analysis provided a medium effect size (d

= 0.56). This is admittedly a large effect size for the SESOI; however, it is still smaller than the

original effect sizes (ds = 0.75–1.76; converted from r-values) that Weingarten and

Hutchinson (2018) reported for Schwarz et al. (1991; Study 1).

Perceived task difficulty. A between-subjects (number of instances: 6, 12) t-test

revealed that participants reported that it was easier to provide 6 instances (M = 6.13, SD =

2.51) than 12 instances (M = 7.32, SD = 2.18), t (570.18) = 6.41, p < .001, d = 0.50 [0.35,

0.66].

Assertiveness. We conducted a Number of Instances x Behaviours between-subjects

ANOVA on participants’ assertiveness ratings. We did not find significant main effects of the

3 Schwarz et al. (1991) did not specify the exact sample size for each group; they reported that there were 9 to 10 participants per group.


number of instances, F (1, 657) = 0.51, p = .47, ηp2 = 0.001 [0.00, 0.008], or the behavior

manipulation, F (1, 657) = 2.81, p = .09, ηp2 = 0.004 [0.00, 0.02]. Contrary to expectations,

the Number of Instances x Behaviours interaction was not significant, F (1,657) = 1.34, p

= .25, ηp2 = 0.002 [0.00, 0.01]. In the assertive condition, ratings of assertiveness were not

significantly different regardless of whether participants provided 6 instances (M = 5.22, SD

= 1.68) or 12 instances (M = 5.16, SD = 1.81), d = 0.03 [-0.19, 0.26]. Likewise, in the

unassertive condition, ratings of assertiveness were not significantly different between

participants who provided 6 instances (M = 4.83, SD = 1.75) and 12 instances (M = 5.09, SD =

1.68), d = 0.15 [0.05, 0.36].

The TOST results were significant for both the assertive, t (264.33) = 4.55, p < .001,

and unassertive conditions, t (343.87) = 3.82, p < .001. This suggests that our effect sizes

were equivalent to zero and that the observed effect was smaller than the SESOI.

Correlations. In line with the previous studies, we examined the correlation between

perceived task difficulty and assertiveness scores. We split the data file based on behaviors

requested, because we expected a different pattern of results to occur depending on the

behaviours provided. Specifically, more (vs. few) instances of assertive behaviors should

lead to lower reported assertiveness; however, more (vs. few) instances of unassertive

behaviors should lead to higher reported assertiveness. In the assertive behavior condition,

there was a significant negative correlation between reported assertiveness and perceived

task difficulty, r (311) = –.33, p < .001. In contrast, in the unassertive behavior condition,

there was significant positive correlation between the two variables, r (350) = .16, p = .002.

The scatterplots for each condition demonstrate systematic patterns that align with our

original hypotheses (see the Supplemental Materials).

Discussion


We expected to replicate Schwarz et al.’s (1991) original study. As expected, we found

that the ease-of-retrieval manipulation significantly influenced participants’ perceived task

difficulty. However, our high-powered, preregistered direct replication found no significant

effect of the ease-of-retrieval manipulation on participants’ ratings of assertiveness.

Moreover, the equivalence testing provided additional support that the ease-of-retrieval

manipulation had no effect on assertiveness ratings. Therefore, we did not replicate the key

findings of Schwarz et al. (1991; Study 1). Nonetheless, our exploratory correlations did find

significant relationships between perceived task difficulty and assertiveness ratings in the

expected directions, suggesting that the effect might exist, but not as robustly as originally

presumed. For the assertive condition, we found a similar correlation to Schwarz et al.

(1991; –.33 and –.35, respectively). However, we obtained a noticeably smaller correlation

in the unassertive condition (.16 vs. .66, respectively). We do not propose any explanations

for the discrepancy in the unassertive condition, especially given the similarity in the

assertive condition. Interestingly, Schwarz et al.’s (1991) unassertive condition correlations

varied between Study 1 and Study 2 (i.e., .66 to .32).

Our replication deviated from the original study in two respects. First, the sample was

drawn from Australian, rather than German, university students. However, Weingarten and

Hutchinson (2018) reported the ease-of-retrieval effect did not consistently vary according

to the country in which the study was conducted. Second, participants completed the study

online rather than in the pen and paper format used by Schwarz et al. (1991). It is possible

that physically having to write their answers may have placed participants under a greater

cognitive load. Participants might be more likely to use ease-of-retrieval to guide

subsequent decisions when they had lower cognitive capacity (Greifeneder & Bless, 2007;

Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2018). However, we contend that the different format was


unlikely to undermine the effect given that the manipulation had the expected effect on

participants’ task difficulty ratings. Furthermore, previous online studies reported the

anticipated ease-of-retrieval effect in other domains (e.g., O’Brien, 2013).

With the breadth of ease-of-retrieval research and the recent meta-analysis, it would

be injudicious to claim—based solely on these findings—that the ease-of-retrieval effect

does not exist. However, our results indicate that further research is necessary. Determining

the robustness of the ease-of-retrieval effect is important because it is theoretically linked

to other social psychological phenomenon (e.g., availability heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman,

1973) as well as the idea that we use metacognitions when forming judgements and making

decisions (Greifeneder, Bless, & Pham, 2011). Given that the equivalence testing suggested

our effect size was equivalent to zero in our well-powered sample, it might be worth

replicating the other studies in Schwarz et al. (1991) to better understand this effect.

General Discussion

The original goal of this paper was to examine whether the ease-of-retrieval

phenomenon applied to an eyewitness context. The first study used a few-versus-many

manipulation, adapted from the ease-of-retrieval research, such that participants provided a

specific number of reasons (1, 3, or 7) for their identification decision, or were assigned to a

no-reason control condition. As seen in the ease-of-retrieval literature, our manipulation

significantly influenced participants’ perceived task difficulty. Importantly, however, this

ease-of-retrieval manipulation did not significantly influence eyewitnesses’ confidence in

their identification from the target-absent lineup. Bayesian analysis provided a Bayes Factor

that strongly favoured the null over the alternative hypothesis. To rule out possible

explanations for the lack of an ease-of-retrieval effect in the eyewitness context, we altered

several methodological components in Studies 2a and 2b.


Specifically, we changed the ease-of-retrieval manipulation to reflect memory more

generally rather than focussing on their identification decision. We also included a target-

present lineup and the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo et al., 1984). In Study 2a, we

found the expected effect of the ease-of-retrieval manipulation on participants’ perceived

task difficulty; however, it had no significant influence on eyewitnesses’ confidence,

regardless of whether the target was in the lineup or participants’ Need for Cognition score.

In Study 2b, we used the same manipulations and moved the subjective ease item to the

end of the questionnaire to rule out a possible explanation for the null results.

Unexpectedly, participants’ perceived task difficulty did not significantly vary across

conditions. We found similar null results of the ease-of-retrieval manipulation on

identification confidence. In Studies 2a and 2b, the Bayes Factors demonstrated that the

data very strongly favoured the null hypothesis over alternative hypotheses.

Taken together, these three studies showed no significant effect of the ease-of-

retrieval manipulation on eyewitness confidence, despite our efforts to identify and rule out

design elements that might have supressed the effect. Our conviction in the absence of an

effect is bolstered by the consistent Bayesian support for the null hypotheses over the

alternative hypotheses. Based on these results, we were prepared to conclude that the

ease-of-retrieval phenomenon found in a number of different domains (e.g., decision-

making, Wänke, Schwarz, & Bless, 1995; persuasion, Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz, & Simonson,

2007; stereotyping, Dijksterhuis, Macrae, & Haddock, 1999), likely did not apply to

eyewitnesses asked to report their confidence in their identification decisions using our

stimulus and manipulations. To bolster that conclusion, we decided to replicate the first

study that established the ease-of-retrieval effect (Schwarz et al., 1991; Study 1).

Ease-of-Retrieval Replication Failure


In Study 3, we attempted to replicate the original Schwarz et al. (1991) study as closely

as possible. Participants provided either 6 or 12 instances of when they behaved “assertively

and felt at ease” or “unassertively and felt insecure.” As expected, participants who

provided 6 instances found it easier than those who provided 12. However, in contrast to

the original study, the ease-of-retrieval manipulation did not influence participants’ ratings

of their assertiveness (d ranged from 0.03–0.15). We followed up this null result with

equivalence testing, setting our smallest effect size of interest (SESOI) as the effect size that

Schwarz et al. (1991) had 33% power to detect (d = 0.56). The observed effect was

equivalent to zero and smaller than the SESOI for the assertive and non-assertive conditions.

This replication failure leaves us in an awkward position. As detailed in our

preregistration, we expected to obtain the ease-of-retrieval effect in this replication study,

which would support our conclusion that this phenomenon did not apply in an eyewitness

context (as shown by Studies 1, 2a, and 2b). Instead, we found no effect of the ease-of-

retrieval manipulation on participants’ ratings of assertiveness. Taken together, these

findings provide compelling evidence that this phenomenon is likely not as robust as we

expected. Publication bias can lead certain findings reported in the literature to appear to

be larger than the true effect size because studies with null or inconsistent effects are less

likely to be published (Schafer & Schwarz, 2019). Although our replication failed, we are not

alleging that researchers in this area have engaged in questionable research practices.

Furthermore, we cannot definitively state that the ease-of-retrieval effect does not exist

given the large number of studies that have reported these effects (see Weingarten &

Hutchinson, 2018). However, our study lends support to Weingarten and Hutchinson’s

(2018) findings that the there is evidence of publication bias in this literature, as the

strength of the ease-of-retrieval effect was reduced by up to one-third when publication


bias was factored into the analyses. Next, we discuss the implications of the results of our

studies in an eyewitness context and the implications for understanding how eyewitnesses

make confidence judgements.

Ease of Retrieval in an Applied Eyewitness Context

The results of our first three studies suggest that the ease-of-retrieval effect is not

applicable to an eyewitness context. However, this conclusion is limited by the paradigm

used. Whilst this paradigm is common in the eyewitness literature, it would be rash to

conclude that the ease-of-retrieval effect does not apply to eyewitnesses in general

(Yarkoni, 2019). These results might be attributable to the type of memory retrieval evoked

by eyewitnesses and how this informs their confidence. Indeed, eyewitness identifications

are recognition memory tasks, whereas the ease-of-retrieval literature has predominantly

focused on recalling certain information (e.g., instances of certain behaviours, Schwarz et

al., 1991; reasons for certain choice, Tormala et al., 2002).

The eyewitness literature has drawn upon psychophysical models that explain

recognition decisions in other domains (Horry & Brewer, 2016). These models suggest that

confidence is an index of the individual’s ability to evaluate how closely the presented

stimulus matches the individual’s memorial representation (Sauer & Brewer, 2015).

Furthermore, these models agree that factors that make stimulus discrimination easier will

increase confidence. However, these models are relatively silent on the influence of

heuristics. In contrast, theoretical frameworks for recall tasks outside of the eyewitness

literature, have relied on heuristics and inferential processes to understand associated

metacognitive assessments, including confidence. The majority of ease-of-retrieval studies,

using the ‘few vs many’ manipulation, have altered participants’ recall of certain events to

observe any influence on subsequent judgements (Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2018). Whilst


these heuristics can influence metacognitions, they do not influence stimuli discrimination.

Therefore, given the recognition nature of the eyewitness task, these findings lend credence

to the psychophysical models employed in the eyewitness literature (Brewer, 2006; Clark,

2003; Horry & Brewer, 2016), as the lack of any significant effect on confidence could be

attributed to the lack of stimulus discrimination (from the ease-of-retrieval manipulation).

It is also possible that our first three studies were underpowered because G*Power is

poor at powering for factorial designs (Simonsohn, 2014). Although our Bayesian analyses

suggested that our null results were not due to data insensitivity, we merged the two similar

studies (Studies 2a and 2b) and reran the analyses on this merged dataset to confirm that

our null results were not driven by a lack of power. These results were largely consistent

with those we reported here (see Supplemental Materials); as such, a lack of power is an

unlikely explanation for our null results. Nonetheless, future studies should ensure that they

have appropriate power for the relevant designs.

Given that the ease-of- retrieval effect has been demonstrated in multiple

psychological domains (see Weingarten & Hutchinson, 2018), further investigation into why

it might not be applicable within an eyewitness context is needed. Our studies excluded

several potential explanations for the obtained results. However, further research could

investigate whether the null results are attributable to the differing tasks involved (i.e.,

recall vs recognition), because the ease-of-retrieval effect is not as robust as originally

presumed, a potential lack of power, or some other reason.

Future research should further examine how various ease-of-retrieval manipulations

could influence identification confidence. Our manipulations that targeted memory in

general (especially in Studies 2a and 2b) might have limited the degree to which participants

linked the instances of strong or weak memories to their identification performance.


Therefore, future research should test a manipulation that more strongly targets facial

recognition ability (e.g., “think of a time when you forgot that you had previously met

someone”).

In the general ease-of-retrieval literature, future research should further explore the

effect of question placement. Weingarten and Hutchinson’s (2018) meta-analysis reported

that the placement of the subjective ease question was not a significant moderator;

however, our studies suggest otherwise. In Studies 1, 2a, and 3, we found the expected

effect of the ease-of-retrieval manipulations on perceived task difficulty when we asked the

subjective ease question before any other measure. In contrast, when we asked all other

questions before the subjective ease question (Study 2b), we found no significant effect on

perceived task difficulty. We do not hazard a guess as to why our findings conflicted with

their meta-analysis, but we think it warrants further investigation.

Conclusion

In summary, over three studies, we found no evidence that the ease-of-retrieval effect

influenced participants’ confidence and subsequent metacognitions in an eyewitness

context. Then, our pre-registered, high-powered direct replication failed to replicate the

original study (Schwarz et al., 1991; Study 1). In this paper, we chose to provide an accurate

and transparent reflection of the research process, rather than provide the neatest narrative

(i.e., presenting only the failed replication attempt). Guided by the extant ease-of-retrieval

literature, we first sought to investigate this effect in a novel domain. When our attempted

extensions failed, we then tried to directly replicate the original phenomenon. Taken

together, our results suggest that the ease-of-retrieval effect might not be as robust as

presumed and, moreover, that different memory tasks (i.e., recognition vs. recall) might

moderate the influence of the ease-of-retrieval phenomenon.


Determining why the ease-of-retrieval effect did not have the anticipated effect has

three benefits. First, it will increase our understanding of the confidence–accuracy

relationship within a forensic setting, and allow us to determine when eyewitness evidence

is reliable. Second, it will increase our understanding of the robustness of the ease-of-

retrieval effect and its boundary conditions. Finally, we contend that our consistent null

results should be informative to other academics in a more general sense. Studies with null

findings inform researchers about which manipulations are unsuccessful and which lines of

research are likely not worthy of further exploration. Thus, researchers can make more

informed decisions about study design and better allocate their resources, which are

necessary to advance psychology.

To illustrate this point, we provide this anecdotal evidence: after completing Study 1

and beginning Study 2a, we discovered that another academic had also unsuccessfully

attempted to apply the ease-of-retrieval effect within a lab-based eyewitness context. Based

on the null results, this academic relegated the studies to the file-drawer and never

published them. Of course, we understand this decision based on previous pressures to

produce novel, significant findings. Nonetheless, had their paper been published (or

available as a pre-print), it would have answered our initial research question about

whether the ease-of-retrieval effect applied in an eyewitness context. We hope that others

can build on our findings in this area.

Acknowledgment

This work was partially supported by the Australian Government Research Training

Program Scholarship to the first author.


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Appendix ANumber of Participants per Condition for Studies 1, 2a, 2b and 3

Table A1.

Choosers per Number of Reasons for Identification in Study 1

Number of

Reasonsn

0 1021 1003 987 43

Table A2.

Choosers per Memory Strength and Number of Instances in Studies 2a and 2b

Weak Memory Strength Strong Memory Strength

Lineup Type 1 Instance 3 Instances 7 Instances 1 Instance 3 Instances 7 Instances

Study 2a Target-absent 30 31 24 26 34 29 Target-present 32 31 35 32 20 26Total 62 62 59 58 54 55

Study 2b Target-absent 29 20 25 25 28 28 Target-present 25 34 28 25 23 22Total 54 54 53 50 51 50

Table A3.

Participants per Assertiveness and Number of Instances Conditions in Study 3

Condition n

Unassertive 6 Instances 169 12 Instances 181Assertive 6 Instances 119 12 Instances 192


Appendix BCorrelations between Perceived Task Difficulty and Retrospective Certainty Judgements

for Studies 1, 2a, and 2b

Table B1.

Summary of Correlations of Perceived Task Difficulty with Identification Confidence and

Retrospective Certainty Judgements (Studies 1, 2a, and 2b)

Judgement Study 1 Study 2a Study 2b

ID confidence –.21 ** –.12 * .04

View –.11 –.01 .07

Detail –.21 ** –.04 .06

Attention –.03 –.05 .11

Basis –.22 ** –.12 * .10

Ease –.28 *** –.14 ** .01

Time .20 ** .24 *** .10


Testify –.24 *** –.12 * .01

Recognition –.12 –.13 * .05

Memory –.23 *** –.11 * .06

Note. Identification (ID) confidence reported on a 0–100% scale. The retrospective certainty

judgements were reported on 10-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 to 10.

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 1.

Summary of Means (with Standard Deviations) for Identification Confidence and

Retrospective Certainty Judgements across the Number of Reasons Conditions (Study 1)

Judgement 0 reasons 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons

ID confidence 44.49% (26.14) 44.83% (25.31) 49.77% (26.77) 52.74% (26.02)

View 5.25 (2.33) 5.53 (2.60) 5.51 (2.46) 5.49 (2.25)

Detail 4.39 (2.13) 4.57 (2.46) 4.63 (2.27) 4.77 (1.89)

Attention 4.96 (2.47) 5.07 (2.56) 5.18 (2.35) 5.09 (2.23)

Basis 3.98 (2.62) 3.82 (2.52) 4.15 (2.57) 4.05 (2.45)

Ease 3.65 (2.57) 3.84 (2.65) 4.27 (2.68) 4.21 (2.40)

Time 4.39 (2.00) 4.22 (2.14) 4.13 (1.94) 4.33 (1.57)

Testify 2.38 (2.35) 2.63 (2.57) 2.89 (2.75) 3.00 (2.97)

Recognition 4.88 (2.47) 4.57 (2.51) 5.01 (2.59) 5.42 (2.69)

Memory 3.54 (2.32) 3.65 (2.53) 4.05 (2.51) 4.21 (2.47)

Note. Identification (ID) confidence reported on a 0–100% scale. The retrospective certainty

judgements were reported on 10-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 to 10.

Table 2.

Summary of Means (with Standard Deviations) for Retrospective Judgements across Memory Strength and Number of Instances Conditions (Study 2a)

Weak memory Strong memory

Judgment 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons

Target-absent lineup

ID confidence 45.33% (30.28) 46.26% (32.35) 53.13% (24.27) 44.23% (29.06) 46.97% (28.40) 48.41% (27.26)

View 4.87 (2.70) 5.58 (2.19) 5.58 (2.21) 5.42 (2.85) 6.06 (2.49) 6.45 (2.85)

Detail 3.83 (2.44) 4.26 (2.72) 4.29 (1.94) 4.46 (2.60) 5.18 (2.59) 5.41 (2.75)

Attention 4.70 (2.32) 4.48 (2.49) 5.00 (2.36) 5.35 (2.55) 5.50 (2.59) 4.86 (2.31)

Basis 3.67 (2.85) 4.39 (2.87) 4.25 (2.35) 3.62 (2.62) 4.32 (2.69) 4.48 (2.87)

Ease 4.77 (2.99) 4.26 (3.01) 4.21 (2.60) 3.85 (3.06) 4.50 (3.12) 3.83 (2.55)

Time 3.83 (2.51) 3.74 (2.38) 4.04 (2.22) 3.92 (2.48) 3.91 (2.21) 5.04 (2.46)

Testify 2.93 (2.69) 3.03 (2.86) 2.71 (2.58) 2.62 (3.06) 2.85 (2.94) 2.48 (2.63)

Recognition 5.20 (2.31) 4.84 (2.67) 5.46 (1.98) 4.15 (2.78) 4.65 (2.56) 5.10 (2.91)

Memory 3.57 (2.47) 4.16 (2.58) 3.63 (2.67) 3.46 (2.70) 3.85 (2.62) 4.00 (2.70)

Target-present lineup

ID confidence 39.69% (27.56) 56.07% (30.42) 55.69% (22.68) 54.13% (27.06) 43.95% (26.93) 56.35% (30.00)

View 5.63 (3.02) 6.23 (2.54) 6.03 (2.50) 5.91 (2.62) 5.15 (2.16) 6.08 (2.74)


Judgment 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons


Detail 4.72 (2.66) 5.42 (2.73) 4.71 (2.04) 4.81 (2.42) 4.45 (2.69) 5.58 (2.44)

Attention 4.41 (2.54) 5.26 (2.60) 4.86 (1.79) 5.66 (2.44) 4.95 (2.89) 5.42 (2.89)

Basis 3.78 (2.73) 4.90 (2.70) 4.49 (2.01) 4.78 (2.73) 3.85 (2.72) 4.65 (3.11)

Ease 3.41 (2.66) 5.19 (3.08) 4.37 (2.03) 4.66 (2.81) 4.25 (2.94) 4.62 (3.34)

Time 5.31 (2.46) 4.19 (1.78) 4.06 (1.53) 4.56 (2.27) 4.10 (2.10) 3.04 (1.69)


Testify 2.06 (2.49) 4.32 (2.91) 3.40 (2.46) 3.72 (2.80) 3.10 (2.92) 3.19 (2.76)

Recognition 4.34 (2.81) 5.07 (2.92) 5.14 (2.19) 5.06 (2.72) 4.90 (2.95) 4.35 (2.81)

Memory 3.13 (2.43) 4.74 (2.78) 4.11 (2.13) 4.41 (2.85) 3.55 (2.67) 3.77 (2.80)

Note. Identification (ID) confidence reported on a 0–100% scale. The retrospective certainty judgements were reported on 10-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 to 10.


Table 3.

Summary of Means (and Standard Deviations) for Retrospective Judgements across Memory Strength and Number of Instances Conditions (Study 2b)


Judgement 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons

Target-absent lineup

ID confidence 44.76% (20.81) 48.95% (25.16) 45.68% (27.65) 46.84% (25.30) 43.04% (25.60) 52.25% (21.66)

View 5.10 (2.24) 6.25 (2.07) 6.76 (2.76) 6.00 (2.20) 5.21 (2.28) 5.61 (2.39)

Detail 4.21 (2.08) 4.45 (2.14) 5.16 (2.44) 4.68 (2.46) 3.96 (2.20) 5.07 (2.43)

Attention 4.55 (2.18) 4.95 (2.09) 5.56 (2.76) 5.12 (2.35) 5.00 (2.34) 4.93 (2.28)

Basis 3.66 (1.90) 3.60 (1.79) 4.72 (2.81) 3.96 (2.64) 3.71 (2.40) 4.64 (2.30)

Ease 3.38 (1.94) 3.65 (2.74) 3.80 (2.97) 3.48 (2.49) 3.32 (2.74) 4.21 (2.49)

Time 4.48 (1.86) 4.75 (2.38) 4.64 (2.72) 4.44 (2.16) 5.46 (1.97) 4.57 (2.22)

Testify 2.59 (1.82) 1.90 (1.86) 2.96 (2.69) 2.44 (2.24) 2.39 (2.36) 2.96 (2.59)

Recognition 5.31 (2.41) 5.55 (2.35) 4.52 (3.06) 5.24 (2.39) 4.96 (2.76) 4.93 (2.34)

Memory 3.79 (2.11) 4.05 (2.61) 4.16 (2.79) 4.40 (2.58) 3.68 (2.47) 3.86 (2.68)


ID confidence 49.32% (28.41) 57.91% (24.04) 46.46% (21.23) 53.60% (30.37) 52.78% (28.58) 50.23% (27.55)

View 5.08 (2.75) 6.00 (2.63) 5.04 (2.58) 5.84 (2.64) 5.13 (2.94) 5.18 (2.46)


Judgement 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons 1 reason 3 reasons 7 reasons


Detail 4.16 (2.27) 4.85 (2.35) 4.32 (2.23) 4.76 (2.83) 4.30 (2.40) 4.82 (2.24)

Attention 4.80 (2.52) 5.47 (2.26) 4.71 (2.02) 5.40 (2.84) 5.13 (2.58) 5.41 (2.22)

Basis 4.20 (2.31) 4.65 (2.74) 3.96 (2.47) 4.44 (2.80) 4.44 (2.79) 4.18 (2.65)

Ease 3.92 (2.45) 4.53 (2.87) 3.64 (2.20) 3.80 (2.57) 4.30 (2.46) 3.77 (2.74)


Time 4.12 (2.49) 4.24 (2.50) 4.43 (2.19) 4.40 (2.35) 5.13 (2.22) 5.36 (2.19)

Testify 2.92 (2.60) 3.41 (2.88) 2.36 (2.22) 3.44 (2.73) 3.48 (2.66) 2.77 (1.88)

Recognition 4.88 (2.93) 4.77 (2.57) 4.39 (2.51) 4.64 (2.52) 4.78 (2.86) 5.55 (2.74)

Memory 4.12 (2.30) 4.38 (2.70) 3.57 (2.20) 3.88 (2.65) 4.87 (2.42) 3.59 (2.04)

Note. Identification (ID) confidence reported on a 0–100% scale. The retrospective certainty judgements were reported on 10-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 to 10.

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