Doppelgangers of the State: Private Securityand Transferable Legitimacy

MARTHA LIZABETH PHELPSAlderson Broaddus University

The U.S. national military hires private security companies (PSCs) tooperate in zones of conflict. This article introduces the concept of alegitimacy transfer mechanism to answer the question of hownonnational providers of military support can be considered legitimateactors in areas of conflict. PSCs borrow legitimacy from the state thatcontracts the firm. Private firms do not operate alone; they are hiredand, at least marginally, directed by a state. By using the establishedlegitimacy of industrialized states these firms are able to find legitimacyin Western security culture. To maintain future business, privatesecurity is forced to obey the security culture of the hiring state. Moreso, the firm will mimic the goals and policy of the hiring state in anattempt to build its own, independent, sense of legitimacy.

Keywords: Private Security Companies, PSC, PMSC, United States,Mercenaries, Legitimacy, Transfer of Legitimacy, Private Security Firms,Combatant Outsourcing, Conflict and War, Military Intervention,Humanitarian Intervention, Soldiers for Hire, Political Theory.

Related Articles:Lagunes, Paul F. 2012. “Corruption’s Challenge to Democracy: A Reviewof the Issues.” Politics & Policy 40 (5): 802-826.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00384.x/abstractDobransky, Steve. 2014. “Violators amongst Us: International Regimesand the Role of Compliance, a Case Study on Official DevelopmentAssistance.” Politics & Policy 42 (4): 593-634.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12082/abstractNisley, Thomas. 2013. “Send in the Corps! The Peace Corps and thePopular Perception of the United States in Latin America.” Politics &Policy 41 (4): 536-562.http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/polp.12027/abstract

Acknowledgements: This article is dedicated to my mentor and friend, Roger Kanet. My sincerestappreciation to Jeff Del Col, Hope Bringhurst, Devin Johnson, Kyle Jordan, Melanie Goulding,James Hickman, and Genevieve Podleski. Partial funding was graciously provided by the AdamM Phelps Foundation. All errors are my own.

bs_bs_banner

Politics & Policy, Volume 42, No. 6 (2014): 824-849. 10.1111/polp.12100Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.© 2014 Policy Studies Organization.

Related Media:Movie: PBS Frontline, “Private Warriors.” June 21, 2005.http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/contractors/highrisk.htmlMusic Video: Citizen Soldier, 3 Doors Down. 2007 Universal RepublicRecords. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pgV6VUinDEAAudio: NPR, This American Life. “I’m From the Private Sector and I’mHere to Help.” June 4, 2004.http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/266/im-from-the-private-sector-and-im-here-to-helpIraq Coalition Casualty Count. 2012. “Operation Enduring Freedom.”http://icasualties.org/

El ejército de los Estados Unidos contrata compañias de seguridadprivada (PSCs por sus siglas en inglés) para operar en zonas deconflicto. En este artículo se introduce el concepto de un mecanismo detransferencia de legitimidad para responder a la pregunta de cómoproveedores no gubernamentales de apoyo militar pueden serconsiderados actores legítimos en zonas de conflicto. Las compañías deseguridad privada toman prestada legitimidad del Estado que contratala empresa. Las empresas privadas no operan por si solas; éstas soncontratadas y, de cierta forma, dirigidas por un estado. A través de lalegitimidad ya establecida de los estados industrializados estascompañias son capaces de encontrar legitimidad en la cultura deseguridad occidental. Con el fin de mantener el negocios futuros, laseguridad privada se ve obligada a obedecer la cultura de la seguridaddel estado que la ha contradado. Más aún, la compañía adoptará lapolítica y objetivos del estado que la ha contradado, esto con el fin deconstruir un sentido propio e independiente de legitimidad.

In return for monetary compensation, private security has assisted instabilizing states, stopping humanitarian crises, overthrowing dictators, andsupporting lawful governments. In the United States, private securitycompanies (PSCs)1 support or directly maintain almost every aspect of military

1 There are various acronyms used to refer to these companies. Private military company (PMC)and PSC are often used interchangeably by the academic community. For some scholars, thereis a clear divide between what type of firm should be considered a PMC (a firm who providesdirect support for force) and a PSC (a firm who supports the military in means other thandirect support of force). British scholars have shown a preference for private military andsecurity company (PMSC). A search of the U.S. Government Printing office with the terms“contractor PSC Afghanistan” returned over 170 hits, while the terms “contractor PMCAfghanistan” returned 59 (United States Government Printing Office N.d.). Since this studyfocuses on American-based firms, the term PSC is used; however, the reader should be awareof the ongoing debate in terminology within the field.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 825

deployments that do not involve discharging a firearm in combat.2 Examplesof contractor support include logistics such as base building or transport,providing medical assistance, training police, and guarding embassies (Davis2003, 30). American PSCs conduct support operations overseas and train theReserve Officer Training Corps at home (Uesseler 2008, 70; Wayne 2002).3 PSCsbuilt and manage the second biggest computer network in the world (behind theInternet), the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (Hewlett Packard 2014).4 Whilethese firms are extensively used by the United States and its allies, the questionremains: Are these firms legitimate actors in battle space?

The answer is complicated, and requires the assumption that states arelegitimate actors in warfare. When an established, legitimate, state uses PSCs tosupport its military operations, these firms mirror the state’s legitimacy to act inzones of conflict. There is an extensive literature that traces the establishment ofstates gaining monopoly over the use of force and how it is the norm of modernstates to maintain direct, national control over armies. This article supports thatliterature but extends the current body of knowledge by demonstratinghow PSCs use the existing legitimacy of Western states to justify the use ofcontractors within battle space. This article seeks to answer two questions inregards to PSCs: First, what gives private firms the right to support nationalmilitaries in zones of conflict? Second, do these private security forces act withthe legitimacy of the government who hires these contractors or are they, likenongovernment organizations (NGOs), able to be considered independent,valid actors in and around conflict? These answers provide opportunities forpolicy makers to consider what responsibilities states have when contractingprivate force, and also draw a separation between firms that operate in theWestern ethos and who hold to a more historical, mercenary legacy.

Several points must be examined to determine if PSCs should be considereda legitimate actor in zones of conflict. The difference between PSCs and

2 PSCs are fully capable of carrying weapons. USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility’sCombatant Commander decreed that private security contractor personnel are authorized to usedeadly force only when necessary and that contractors must be licensed by both the host state andthe U.S. Armed Forces (United States Central Command 2013).3 This study uses the term American PSCs to refer to firms which are based inside of the UnitedStates. Firms such as Academi (formerly Blackwater) have hired South American third countrynationals from Chile to support contracts abroad (Franklin 2004). The colloquial usage ofAmerican is not intended to discount the impact or contributions of Central or South America.4 There has been excellent work done to explore the bureaucratic aspect of outsourcing (AllisonStanger’s [2009] One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future ofForeign Policy), the legal aspects of PSC use (Paul Verkuil’s [2008] Outsourcing Sovereignty), thehistory of private force (Sarah Percy’s [2007] Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in InternationalRelations and Janice Thomson’s [1994] Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building andExtraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe), and the impact of contractors on militaryeffectiveness (Molly Dunigan’s [2011] Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impact onMilitary Effectiveness). Ulrich Petersohn’s (2011) recent article in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,“The Other Side of the COIN: Private Security Companies and Counterinsurgency Operations,”provides a relevant snapshot of this dependency.

826 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

traditional mercenaries must be explored. This distinction is relevant to theconversation concerning private firms mirroring the legitimacy of a hiring state.Can a contracting state project its legitimacy onto an organized corporate firmor can an individual private warrior be granted the legitimacy of the contractingstate? By examining the difference between PSCs and mercenaries, and findingthat the legitimacy of a state can be projected, the article builds its mainargument: legitimizing the use of PSCs allows private firms to be used asdoppelgangers for state action.

This conclusion directly opposes James Pattison’s (2003) argument that theuse of PSCs (along with child soldiers and convicts) undermines the legitimacyof an intervention. If PSCs follow the overarching Western ethos, and are heldto the laws and traditions of the hiring state, then private companies will havea vested interest in seeing democratization and reconstruction projects survive.Through success in areas like reconstruction, it is possible that these firms maydevelop legitimacy separate from contracting states (much as NGOs, such asMédecins Sans Frontières and Amnesty International, maintain legitimacyseparate from their home states).5 PSCs are subject to the same failures indevelopment as the state or international institutions that direct PSCs. Otherstudies, such as William Easterly’s (2007) The White Man’s Burden: Why theWest’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good, havedone an excellent job of explaining why the West and affiliated internationalfinancial institutions are unlikely to succeed in developmental assistance. Thesecritiques travel to PSCs; failures to show progress in reconstruction do not restwith the firm but with the neocolonial approaches to development. Success orfailure of the overarching goals does not impact PSCs attempts to acquirelegitimacy; the most important thing a firm must do to gain legitimacy is toappear as if it has internalized the wishes of the contracting state, and acts as adoppelganger for the state’s foreign policy. PSCs seek this legitimacy due to thedemands of the market; trusted PSCs gain more contracts. Deborah Avant(2005) calls this the market reputation mechanism. Ulrich Petersohn’s work onprivate force and civil wars quantitatively demonstrated the market reputationmechanism in action. Private firms need contracts from the state (andpotentially other actors) to profit, and so these firms are forced to comply withdomestic, international, and humanitarian law (Petersohn 2014, 28-9).

The market reputation mechanism only works to control PSC behavior ifthe contracting state is sensitive to the demands of international law or the lawsof the host state; otherwise, the PSC is free to act as it will. PSCs lack internallimitations; these firms are constrained by the market and the support of the

5 It is noted that while most NGOs and PSCs obey laws and social norms, there are undesirableactors in every grouping. NGOs have raised money to support terror, PSCs have committedlarge-scale fraud, states have violated human rights, and the United Nations’ history is rife withscandal. While acknowledging that immoral and illegal behavior exists, this article speaks to theideal-state of these agents.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 827

contracting state. While some firms have called for an industry-wide code ofconduct, there are no overarching norms or internalized set of restrictionsoutside of the security culture of the contracting state. The International Code ofConduct for Private Security Service Providers was adopted in 2010 by the Swissgovernment and has slowly gained support. As of August 2014, there were 708PSCs that had agreed to this code of conduct; 10 percent of those were U.S.firms (International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers2010). Notably, Academi, the company formerly known as Blackwater, hasbeen a signatory since 2010. While a positive start, several major PSCs have notsigned on to this document nor is it required for firms to adopt these restrictionsto be hired. In August of 2013, the U.S. State Department announced it wasconsidering requiring firms to be signatories of this code of conduct beforehiring them (United States Department of State 2013). At the time of writing,this has not yet occurred.

This lack of universally adopted restrictions and/or laws to regulatebehavior means that purchasers of force have no reason to trust the behavior ofthe contracted combatants. The code of conduct has no consequences violatingany of its restrictions. The best guarantee of a successful contract is priorexperience with the firm. Previously successful contracts help alleviate fear ofbad behavior on the part of the PSC and should, thus, increase business. Toachieve this sense of respectability and to start the process of becoming fullyintegrated into global security culture, these firms borrow, or mimic, thelegitimacy of the contracting state. This concept is called the legitimacy transfermechanism.

Through contracting, interdependency, and the vast expansion of themilitary industrial complex, PSCs have become chameleon like in their abilityto absorb the legitimacy of the contracting state. The legitimacy transfermechanism allows private firms to act with the legitimacy of the contractingstate, while allowing the contracting state to avoid troop commitment, domesticbacklash from a casualty-averse populace, congressional or parliamentaryoversight, and other domestic and international restraints.

Private Security Companies as Mirrors for Governmental Action

PSCs have participated in combat operations in diverse ways: these firmshave acted as civilian police for United Nations peace operations, worked asbodyguards for Iraq coalition officers, run prisons, worked as interrogators,trained national militaries, and provided tactical information and advice (Avant2005, 265). While the majority of these companies do not enter conflict, theyassist with many other aspects of military support, including training inmilitary-grade weapons, tactics, modern military technology, militaryintelligence support, military transport, convoy support, and logistical services.Others even deploy medical response teams in the field and provide overallguidance as to the development of the military in question.

828 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

Major events that involve PSCs engaging in direct combat (Nisoor Square,Fallujah, etc.) have changed the course of wars for the United States. In the2000s, the use of military contractors significantly increased due to U.S.deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the eleven years between 2001 and2012, the U.S. Department of Labor reported 1,569 contractor deaths in Iraqand 1,173 contractor deaths in Afghanistan (Division of Longshore and HarborWorkers’ Compensation 2012). This is in comparison to 4,486 U.S. nationalmilitary deaths reported in Iraq6 and 2,088 national military deaths inAfghanistan (Iraq Coalition Casualty Count 2012). This means that 35 percentof people deployed by the United States who died in Iraq were contractors, andover 56 percent of people deployed by the United States who died inAfghanistan were contractors. The United States declared that, in Iraq, aprimary goal “would [be to] help promote transparency in the executive,legislative, and judicial branches of government, and help build nationalinstitutions that transcend regional and sectarian interests” (Subcommittee onNational Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committeeon Government Reform 2006, 7). Even after the troop withdrawal in Iraq, anddespite U.S.’ government-supported calls for transparency, private contractorscontinued to be used to obfuscate the level of Washington’s involvement. As ofJanuary 2013, the total contractor count in Iraq was over 12,000 individuals(United States Central Command 2013).7

The reluctance of the United States to deploy ground troops after thehorrors of Vietnam and Somalia led to increased dependence on PSCs (Belloni2007, 20). During the Cold War, the Western powers deployed troops intodeveloping countries to hinder the Soviet Union’s goals. After the Cold Warended, major powers were slow to interfere in regional conflict; humanitarianconcerns (such as the genocide in Rwanda) have only rarely been sufficient toprompt deployment. There was a notable security gap in the former ThirdWorld when the stability of superpower support was withdrawn (Petersohn2014, 19). This is not simply due to political isolationism. When the UnitedStates took humanitarian action in Somalia in 1993, the public backlash was sosevere that, a year later, the major powers allowed genocide to continue inRwanda rather than risk similar political fallout (Scheffer 2004).8 The UnitedStates turned to PSCs because these corporate entities, in return for monetary

6 The Iraq count starts in 2003, while Afghanistan’s starts in 2001.7 There were 110,000 contractors that were active in Afghanistan in 2013 (United States CentralCommand 2013).8 See Andreas Krieg’s (2010) “The Impact of Casualty Aversion on Humanitarian Intervention”for a more in-depth exploration of casualty aversion on U.S. military decisions. Importantly, hiswork demonstrates how military decisions remained risk-averse even after 9/11 and a populationthat supported invasion. Collateral damage of the hostile state (i.e., dead civilians) was consideredmore acceptable than the loss of life of U.S. soldiers.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 829

compensation and resource concessions, were willing to deploy intoconfrontations in which state actors felt unable to act (such as Croatia andBosnia and Herzegovina).

To be effective, PSCs need to cloak themselves in the legitimacy of the U.S.’consolidated democracy. Armed, uniformed personnel (such as contractorsguarding a convoy) raise questions regarding the legality and morality of theglobal security industry and bring forth accusations that PSCs are nothing morethan formalized mercenaries. There are more questions than answers whenexploring the definitions of private security and battle space. Mercenaries areoften defined as combat-ready units that are able to provide soldiers andequipment as well as engage in armed conflicts. It is hard to differentiate where(or whether) modern-day PSCs fall short of this mark. Do employees need topull a trigger on the corporation’s behalf to be a mercenary, and, if so, dopersonal bodyguards count as mercenaries? Or is one a mercenary if one trainssomeone else to pull the trigger? What if a company provides the weapon, thetraining, the transportation, and the target? Does a PSC employee count as amercenary when he kills an attacker in a manner considered self-defense by boththe host and sender state? Is it about fault, or is it about moral intent? The globalcommunity has no clear answers to these questions. While mercenaries haveexisted since ancient times, PSCs are more professional, corporate, andhierarchical than their ancestors; and though the term “mercenary” carries theemotional impact of historical use, there is some reason to question whether theimplications inextricably tied to the term are appropriate (Tickler 1987, 15).

The difference, and where the point of contention continuously arises, is inthe definition of the terms mercenary and PSC. A PSC is a firm that sendsmilitary troops or any form of military support to another actor for monetarycompensation; some are willing to engage in combat and some are not. To some,a PSC contractor becomes a mercenary when an individual pulls the trigger. Forothers, a PSC contractor becomes a mercenary when s/he violates internationalor state law. A third group views mercenaries as anyone affiliated with themilitary industry but not directly employed by the state.

Military contractors are often retired service personnel of a nationalmilitary working in a formalized capacity for which they have spent yearstraining; these former soldiers work hard to avoid the mercenary label. Muchlike the definition of pornography, these employees feel that they know what anoffer of mercenary work is when they see it, and once this type of work isaccepted there is little chance to redeem one’s reputation. Within the industry,those who accept the title of mercenary are often considered morally deficientindividuals undeserving of respect; those that have completely thrown away anymoral compass (Davis 2003, 34). An individual who acts as a mercenary loseslegitimacy within the contracting community. James Davis, a member of thePSC community and author of the book Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies andthe New World Order, summarizes the issue: “Crossing the line separating therest of the industry from military combat services is much like losing your

830 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

virginity. Either you are a mercenary company or you are not. Once you takethat step, there is no going back” (Davis 2003, 32). Individual contractors objectto being called a mercenary due to a belief that PSC employees are still part ofthe American ethos, and continue to obey military code (Kinsey 2006, 68). Mostprivate contractors state that the desire to serve one’s country has not beendiminished by changing employers from a state military to that of a private firm(Silverstein 2000, 157).

Private security organizations whose contractors are easily confused fornational troops, occupy too complex a place in the international arena to belabeled with such a simple, normatively charged word as “mercenary.” Thefighters in Central America during the Reagan Administration and in Africain the 1960s could, perhaps, rightly be called mercenaries because of theirindividualist nature, cult of personality leaders such as Mike Hoare, andviolent actions against legitimate governments (UN Office of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights 2002, 5). While PSCs are clearly from thesame historical legacy, and bring to mind the same warnings and concerns asthe British East India Company did in the eighteenth century, these firms canalso be viewed as the latest step in corporate privatization (Percy 2007; Phelps2014).

Corporate privatization is not mercenarism; it is important to separate thetwo terms. One of the most standard definitions of mercenaries is “Mercenariesare fighters who participate in hostilities for pecuniary reward. Moreover, theyare not a national of a party to the conflict, and are not integrated into theregular armed forces” (Chojnacki, Metternich, and Münster 2009, 5; Petersohn2014, 2). Therefore, mercenaries are individuals who take on contracts that havea reasonable expectation of entering into combat, and who will halt servicesif direct compensation is removed.9 PSCs are different: Private securitycorporations are corporate entities that undertake contracts, that involve orprovide support for the use of force, from reputable entities, such as stateagencies or international governmental organizations (IGOs), in return formonetary or resource compensation. PSCs manage and regulate their employeesto ensure behavior within corporate culture. These firms take on contracts thatoperate within battle space but do not carry an expectation to engage incombat.10

9 There are historical challenges to this definition, most notability the Nepalese Gurkhas, SwissPikemen, and German Hessians. However, the dissolution of these nationally identifiedcontracted soldiers is a large part of the story of how Western modern security culture formed.The Gurkhas, for example, are now granted British citizenship as payment for service, making themercenary claim moot.10 Firms such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes fall outside the scope of this definition. Thesecombat-based firms were active in the ten years following the end of the Cold War but arecurrently extinct. Peter Singer proposed the term Private Military Firms to describe corporationsthat are willing to directly engage in combat.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 831

It is important to note the word individual (or fighter) in the definition ofmercenary. Corporations cannot be mercenaries, because corporations cannotundertake direct action. Firms cannot fire guns, they cannot dig trenches, and,thus, they cannot be mercenaries. It is possible to say that corporations acceptcontracts that require employees to undertake mercenary actions, but, bydefinition, mercenarism is rooted at the level of the individual.

Corporations, including PSCs, are permanent legal structures. Capitalistfirms are invested in establishing market dominance, investor confidence, andgenerating profit (Krahmann 2001, 7; Petersohn 2014, 7). PSCs can remove thefear of contracted combatants being mercenaries by linking employment to legalbehavior and managing compensation between the employer (the state) and theindividual (the contractor).

In a conversation centered on legitimacy, the difference of focus between theindividual and corporate is more than a matter of terminology; mercenariesconjure up an image of rag-tag criminals who operate on an ad hoc functionand who challenge law, order, and stability (Petersohn 2014, 7). Security firmsseek distance from this legacy. Therefore, semantics is critical; legitimacy isultimately drawn from the belief and support of the population, it is impossiblefor a company which is viewed as illegitimate and criminal to foster strength andstability in the state. It is here that work on legitimacy and PSCs intersects withthat of scholars, like James Pattison, who study the normative implications ofprivate security.

Private firms employ retired officers who are able and willing to influenceinternational policy by utilizing years of well-established connections. Thespokesperson for one of the most prominent military training firms, MilitaryProfessional Resources Inc. (MPRI), made the claim that “We’ve got moregenerals per square foot here than in the Pentagon” (Singer 2004, 119). Theperson quoted, Soyster, was a general himself. The overlap between publictroops and private contractors is where the transference of legitimacy betweenthe state and the contracted firm is clearest. The line between nationalized andcorporate force may be as thin as a military officer taking a six-month leaveof absence to be a contractor, and then returning to the armed forces at theend of the leave of absence. If a soldier represents the state and acts with thelegitimacy of the state, what does it mean to an occupied population whenthat exact same soldier acts in the private sector? As warfare is civilianized, itis difficult to tell if an individual in a zone of conflict is a national soldier orcontractor. For example, provincial reconstruction teams work directly withAfghanistan villages to help build stability, while private firms are trainingand equipping the police in those same locations (Commission on WartimeContracting in Iraq and Afghanistan 2011; United States GovernmentAccountability Office 2010).

One of the oft discussed points regarding the responsibility to protect is thathumanitarian interventions must be morally righteous and accepted by the globalcommunity. The premier theorist on PSCs and legitimacy, James Pattison (2003,

832 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

30), states: “When used in conjunction with humanitarian intervention,legitimacy is used to mean that humanitarian intervention is legal, accepted by theinternational community, procedurally justified, authorized by the SecurityCouncil, and/or morally justifiable.” Yet, how are the locals to know that theindividuals in military gear teaching them concerning agriculture are nationaltroops, and the individuals in military gear training the police are for-profitcontractors? In Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.S. PSC employees were used as UNpolice trainers, and locals were unable to tell the difference between U.S. privatecontractors and U.K. national police (Phelps 2012). In this example, PSCs weregranted legitimacy through the assumptions of the populace; these firmsborrowed the preexisting legitimacy of the contracting state.

The difference between the sender state’s national military and privateforces contracted by the sender state may not be functionally apparent,especially to the government or citizens of the host state. PSCs guard, supply,train, and even enter into combat on behalf of the sender state, meaning it islikely that their theater of operation provides little clarification on if anindividual is a national or private soldier.11 The perception of the local may bethat these firms are actual members of the contracting state’s military, and thusgiven the legitimacy and authority that the military would normally be granted.John Nagl and Richard Fontaine of the Center for New American Securityphrased it aptly: “local populations draw little or no distinction betweenAmerican troops and the contractors employed by them; an act committed byone can have the same effect on local or national opinion as an act carried outby the other” (Committee on Armed Services 2010).

The vagueness in explaining why these firms are not mercenaries is similarto the difficulty of defining what contracts are legitimate for these firms toundertake. It is here that the argument regarding private force’s construction oflegitimacy begins: Do these private firms have their own validity and reasonsthat are acceptable to the population to be involved in zones of conflict or mustthat validity and reasons be borrowed from the contracting state? As previouslystated, legitimacy exists in the collective awareness of the population; therefore,for private firms to be successful, it is critical that PSCs are recognized aslegitimate by the population. For firms to be considered legitimate on their ownmerits, rather than the transfer of legitimacy from the state, keeping distancefrom the normatively charged phrasing of “mercenary” is critical for thecompany to succeed. The reverse is also true; if legitimacy is transferred tothe firm through the state via contract, then it is critical for the state that the

11 The United States is not the only state that projects military power using private firms; theUnited Kingdom, South Africa, and to a lesser degree, France, have activated military contractorsin foreign theaters as well. South Africa’s flourishing PSC market is illegal under the Regulationof Foreign Military Assistance Act. The first case was prosecuted in 2003. Despite the illegalnature of operating a PSC out of South Africa, Deborah Avant found evidence of South AfricanPSCs active in Iraq. The United States is home to the majority of PSCs (Avant 2005, 167-75).

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 833

contractors avoid the term “mercenary.”12 The previously introduced marketreputation mechanism keeps these firms in check and, in the Western traditionof economic liberalism, provides private security firms with the semblance oflegitimacy. It is assumed that if a firm is bad—meaning either incompetent ormorally despicable—its reputation will be permanently stained, and thereputation mechanism will punish the firm by dwindling profits and lack ofcontracts (Percy 2007, 53; Petersohn 2014, 10).

Private Security and Transferable Legitimacy

Governments directly benefit by using private firms. U.S. PSCs are notsubject to the same congressional oversight that national troops are. As such,the state can engage in cases of post-conflict reconstruction or state stabilizationwith lower political commitment and lesser need for interagency cooperation(Avant 2005, 133). The casualty aversion of the American populace alsoencourages the government to hire private force. The public is rarely madeaware of contractor deaths, so politicians do not risk the same sort ofconstituency backlash they would face vis-à-vis the death of a national soldier(Pattison 2003, 209; Krahmann 2001, 260).

The State Department or Pentagon is able to have its in-theater goals metwhile avoiding domestic oversight and repercussions. PSCs are contracted usingdiscretionary funding; there is no line item for security or logistics contractors.This allows organizational structures like the State Department, the Pentagon, orthe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives to hire thesecontractors without congressional approval. Private security provides theopportunity for the Pentagon and/or the executive branch to bypass legislativecontrols (Frost 2008, 50). Governmental benefits of using PSCs occur partlybecause of transferred legitimacy from the United States; these firms mimic stateactors, without exposing the state to risk. The transference of legitimacy allowsthe state to achieve its foreign policy goals while installing a buffer againstpolitical backlash.

When the U.S. Congress forbids deployment and/or limits on the troopcount (as they did regarding the Bosnia Herzegovina conflict in 1995), theDepartment of Defense is still allowed to outsource, and thus the Pentagon canhire contractors to undertake missions Congress has otherwise prohibited (Wulf2005, 61). Further, because of the separation between the restrictions on

12 When PSCs have misbehaved and acted in a “mercenary” manner it captured the attention ofboth the media and the legislative branch. There have been multiple meetings in Congress thatexplore the activities of contractors and try to break through the obfuscation these firms create.The birth of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), SpecialInspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), and multiple Congressional Research Service(CRS) reports have allowed for information concerning contractor activities to become accessible.However, without the active and tenacious inquiries from the Senate Armed Forces Committees,it is unlikely much of this information would have come to light.

834 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

military action versus military spending, PSCs can act where the nationalmilitary cannot. In the case of Croatia, the United States needed to appearneutral because of its involvement in IFOR (Peace Implementation Force; theNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] led implementation force).Therefore, the United States could not send troops to support Croatia’s militarydirectly. However, the United States was able, as a nonmilitary action, to hire aprivate firm to train and professionalize Croatian national forces; they didso, effectively strengthening the Croatian forces without openly violatinginternational agreements (Jefferies 2002, 114).

The transfer of legitimacy between employer and contractor is not limited tostates. Private security firms have offered their services to the UN when memberstates failed to supply troops. Although it has been discussed, the SecurityCouncil has vetoed hiring private firms (Wulf 2005, xi). The idea that privatesecurity could achieve legitimacy without state backing is validated when the UNconsiders using these firms for peacekeeping. If the UN contracted private forceto run a peacekeeping mission, there would be no state to transfer sovereigntyand no mirror of state-based legitimacy. The firm would be contracted by andreporting directly to an international organization with a large bureaucracy andinternal competing, divergent interests. While a situation where the state is socompletely removed from international peacekeeping may be unlikely, it begs thequestion: At what point does the firm become a legitimate actor rather thansimply being a tool wielded by the contracting state (or organization)?

PSC advocates contend that this line has already been crossed, and these firmsshould be able to undertake missions through the UN or other humanitarianagency. The argument for PSCs being contracted by the UN is, at its core, thatprivate sector involvement in humanitarian missions would be worth the risk andlack of oversight, even if the contracting agencies find the idea of contractedcombatants are morally distasteful. “Too often policy recommendations arebased on idealism and utopian theories. Bad policy recommendations in peaceoperations, as opposed to most other fields of research, cost lives. Critics ofprivate-sector involvement should keep this reality in mind” (Brooks and Chorev2008, 127). The Department of Defense’s Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defenseof African Affairs, James Woods, “believe[s] that privatized security efforts canhelp relieve anarchy and chaos, keep local security disruptions from spreading,and provide sound defense against outside threat” (Wulf 2005, 181).

Transferable Legitimacy as a Replacement for Goodwill

Political scientists, beginning with Enlightenment philosophers John Locke,Thomas Hobbes, and Jean Jacques Rousseau, have attempted to answer thequestion of legitimacy with the idea of the social contract (Stillman 1974, 33).The moral remnants of thinkers like Locke and Rousseau is apparent in mostmodern definitions of legitimacy; Vivien Collingwood (2006, 444) highlights thisEnlightenment legacy by making the linkage between claims of legitimacy and

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 835

norms of correctness: “Legitimate behaviour is rightful behaviour: undertakenby the appropriate authority, in line with an agreed set of rules, and withappropriate or intended effects.” Bruce Gilley (2006, 503) expands upon theseEnlightenment ideals by expressing legitimacy in terms that are dependent on “acitizen’s recognition of the state’s right to hold political authority and anacceptance, at least in general, to be bound to obey the decisions that result.”These definitions of legitimacy place the emphasis on perception. The uniform,the symbols of the state, are trusted. When the populace cannot tell thedifference between a national soldier and a contractor, the legitimacy of thestate covers both sets of actors.

The idea that any intervening force, including PSCs, needs to be viewed aslegitimate by the host population is also supported by David Edelstein. Edelstein(2004, 51) gives three ways that a successful occupation is possible: These are: (1)recognition by the occupied population that there is a need for occupation; (2) allstates involved in the conflict must perceive a “common threat to the occupiedterritory;” and (3) and “the occupying power makes a credible guarantee that itwill withdraw and return control . . . in a timely manner.”

Edelstein’s idea of returning control is critical, especially when examininghow private actors can achieve legitimacy without being dependent on a state.For PSCs to carry their own legitimacy, rather than hide in the cloak of theircontracting state, the lines of control over these firms must be clear. If a memberof an NGO is accused of a crime while working abroad, there is an establishedunderstanding of how the various judicial systems will unfold. However, theprotections afforded PSCs by the contracting state, and the legal complicationsof if they are members of an armed force or civilians, can obfuscate and impedejustice. As long as this obfuscation of justice continues, PSCs can only exist asagents for the hiring state. A system of control and oversight is required forPCSs to achieve legitimacy separate from a contracting state.

In the case of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia andHerzegovina, this complicated mirror of legitimacy allowed crimes bycontractors to occur without repercussion. Washington hired a U.S.-based firm,DynCorp, to represent the United States in the IPTF mission. These contractors,who were U.S. citizens, looked identical to other IPTF national police forces.While these contractors were in theater, they confiscated women’s passports, keptthem as personal sex slaves, and distributed videos of the women being raped(Bolkovac and Lynn 2011, 190; Capps 2002; Singer 2004, 222). The U.S. JusticeDepartment ruled that these U.S. contractors serving on this UN’s missionwere outside the reach of U.S. law (United States Institute of Peace 2004). TheUN said it did not have the authority to prosecute the contractors since theywere employed by the United States. Even today when the UN is implicatedin trafficking and sex crimes, the IPTF case quickly rises to the surface(MacFaquhar 2011). The United States hired DynCorp to work for the UN, yetthe UN faces the blame for the firm’s actions. The private actor is seen as nothingmore than an extension of its controlling organization.

836 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

The critical aspect of legitimacy remains at the level of the population. Inorder for PSCs to achieve acceptance separate from a state, the populationneeds to believe that there is effective control and oversight of firms. Crimes byNGO employees have certainly fallen through the cracks, but the perception ofthe American population is that NGOs are accredited, honorable, andaccountable. Hugo Slim’s (2002) discussion of legitimacy and NGOs is relevant.He points out that nonstate legitimacy comes from two sources: morality andlaw, and is generated by “tangible support and more intangible goodwill.” PSCslack an intangible goodwill throughout the American population. Policydecisions show this difference as well. In Department of Defense Instruction3020.50, “Private Security Contractors (PSCs) Operating in ContingencyOperations, Humanitarian or Peace Operations, or Other Military Operationsor Exercises,” there is a specific exemption allowing area commanders to grantexceptions for NGOs (Department of Defense 2011).

Barry Buzan’s (1991, 58-66) definition of the state focuses on a government’sdomination over political allegiance and authority, command over instrumentsof force, a physical base of population and territory, institutions to govern thepopulation, a sense of legitimacy from its constituency, and sovereignty. Thedifference between NGOs and PSCs can be placed within this definition thatprioritizes the ideals of the populace: there is a collective belief that many NGOsare attempting to benefit the world in some way. This idea that NGOs intend todo good in the world is acknowledged even by those tracing the harm or misstepsthat neocolonial foreign aid has created.13 These organizations have been grantedthe normative support of their home states, and perhaps, in the case of MédecinsSans Frontières and the International Red Cross, the international community.Private security is not seen through the same form of altruistic lens, forcinglegitimacy to be borrowed from the contracting state.

Private security firms borrow the legitimacy of the state to act where statescannot. I argue that this transfer of legitimacy can exist on a larger scale thanstate actors. Any actor can transfer its authority to a PSC if that organizationhas both a recognizable visual identity and that the international communitygrants normative acceptance to act in humanitarian or foreign interventions.14

These legitimacy-granting organizations can be as disparate as Germany, theUN, or Médecins Sans Frontières.

13 The paper archive of conferences held by the International Society for Third-Sector Researchgives an overview of the challenges faced by NGOs seeking to be a force of good while notsuccumbing to neocolonialism or being white saviors.14 This idea of a visual identity could further be expanded to explore the visual culture ofcontracted combatants. Mitchell explains visual culture as follows: “vision is (as we say) a culturalconstruction, that it is learned and cultivated, not simply given by nature; that therefore it mighthave a history related in some yet to be determined way to the history of arts, technologies, media,and social practices of display and spectatorship; and (finally) that it is deeply involved withhuman societies, with the ethics and politics, aesthetics and epistemology of seeing and being seen. . .” (Mitchell 2002, 166). The discussion of showing and seeing vis-à-vis private security firmswould be a fascinating one which deserves further exploration.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 837

If it is accepted that the provision of subsistence-level security stabilizesstates, and private security can provide such logistics, then it is logical fororganizations such as the UN to turn to private security. The UN faceschallenges getting member states to donate troops, and has proposed that PSCscould provide such personnel. In 1995, Kofi Annan sought proposals fromDefence Systems Ltd. to guard Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire (SelectCommittee on Foreign Affairs 2002). While the UN chose to not move forwardwith Defence Systems Ltd., this provides an example where private security hasbeen seriously considered as a way to intervene in humanitarian situations. Anexamination of the UN approved vendor list shows that the harbinger ofinternational law and holder of normative global behavior is no stranger toprivate contractors. Names like Aegis Defense Services, Defense SystemsLimited, G4S, Control Risks, DynCorp, Fluor, L3 (MPRI’s parent company),and Brown & Root appear next to the expected financial services and medicalsuppliers (United Nations Office of Central Support Services 2013). The UNSpecial Rapporteur on Mercenaries, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, expressedconcerns that this trend of acceptance and the broadening of PSCs’ powers willlead to an overall weakening of state sovereignty and human rights. Ballesterosfears that, as more companies become involved, PSCs will become a legitimatepart of the accepted global culture; this will endanger nascent states’ securityobligations and the citizens’ guarantee of human rights (Granelli 1997).

Transfer of Legitimacy as a Theoretical Mechanism

In the case of the United States, the growth of the military industrialcomplex and increased reliance on outsourcing has granted contractors de factolegitimacy.15 Contractors are active everywhere in the Department of Defense;they can be found in the soup kitchens to supply chains to working checkpoints.Contractors repair and operate highly complex equipment (Singer 2004, 64).Private firms are so integrated in the U.S. military’s day-to-day operations thatsome have speculated that they are now necessary for military operation (Wayne2002). Within the United States, contractors are granted legitimacy becausethey are intrinsic to the system. Through perception that U.S. contractors workunder the umbrella of U.S. legitimacy, thus the ability for contractors to operatein theaters of conflict is transferred from the state, and allows PSCs to act in themilitary arena.

Contracting is an accepted tool of foreign policy because PSCs borrow thelegitimacy of the sender state. In the case of the United States, contractors havemoved past simply mirroring the legitimacy of the state and have becomedoppelgangers of national soldiers. When private contractors are so deeply

15 A thorough examination of U.S. outsourcing can be found in Allison Stanger’s One Nationunder Contract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy.

838 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

imbedded that PSCs are involved in training the U.S. Reserve Officer TrainingCorps, it is nearly impossible to separate private from public actor.16 This doesnot mean that PSCs can act separately from the state. While challenging thelegitimacy of private force at the global and local levels, there are aspects ofdemocratic military force that remain solely the realm of the state. JamesPattison (2003, 209) points out that “[PSCs] are likely to lack many of the otherqualities of effectiveness necessary for successful intervention, such asnonmilitary resources, a suitable post-war strategy for building and maintaininga peaceful resolution to the crisis.”

Carl von Clausewitz’s definition of war as the continuation of politics byother means now confronts the use of private actors (Avant 2005, 3).17 While thecivilianization of force is a matter of privatization and deliberate outsourcing inthe developed world, the developing world is plagued by insurgent groups,ethnic conflicts, and civilian lawlessness. In both cases, there is no longer a statemonopoly on the means of coercion, as private actors are frequently central tocontemporary warfare and peacekeeping (Singer 2004, 65). The security voidcreated by the decline of troop count after the Cold War, coupled with the beliefin neoliberal economics, legitimatized military privatization. Contractors are inuse, and they carry the legitimacy of the government that hires them. This placesthe responsibility for oversight and control firmly with the hiring state. AsAllison Stanger (2009, 11) states in her aptly named book, One Nation underContract: The Outsourcing of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy:“contractors aren’t the problem; the problem is the loss of good government.”

The use of private force in support of U.S. military operations has becomeroutine. Both Iraq and Afghanistan saw more contractors in theater thannational troops. In Afghanistan, the percentage of the workforce that was

16 The following is text from the ROTC contractor’s website: “Team Engility mission is to providehighly qualified and motivated contract employees who are focused on enhancing the UnitedStates Army Cadet Command’s mission of recruiting, training, retaining, and commissioningthe Army’s future leaders at over 270 colleges and universities across the country. Engility is theprime contract holder and is supported by the following partner companies: Able Forces,Communication Technologies, OnPoint Performance Solutions, Prairie Quest Corporation, andThe Ventura Group. Team Engility supports the U.S. Army Cadet Command (USACC) and itssubordinate Brigades and Battalions in achieving objectives related to recruitment,administration, training, retention, and commissioning of Army Reserve Officers’ Training Corps(ROTC) Cadets. Team Engility provides command-wide specialized support in the functionalareas of Cadet Recruitment, Military Science Instruction, Retention and Training, MilitaryScience Field Training, administrative, and logistical services support. We are placing ArmyRetired, Reserve, National Guard, IRR Officers and NCOs, and those leaders separatedhonorably within five years into ROTC units at colleges and universities across the United States.Team Engility offers opportunities with a robust compensation and benefits package. Contractedpositions include Senior Military Science Instructor (SMSI), Military Science Instructor (MSI),Administrative Technician (Admin), and Administrative Support for Logistical and OperationActions also known as Staff Specialist (SS).” http://www.goarmyrotc.com/aboutus.html17 For Clausewitz’s idealization of the theory of war by continuation of politics by other means,see Keegan’s (1993) A History of Warfare.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 839

contracted by the Department of Defense from PSCs was as high as 69 percent(Isenberg 2010). War is always difficult on a population, but the situation inAfghanistan was particularly brutal. The reconstruction proceeded slowly andoften unsuccessfully, civilian deaths were high, human rights violations wererampant, and the most visible form of PSC activity—training the police—was anabsolute disaster (Barfield 2010, 277; Marsden 2009, 163). The PSCs lack oflegitimacy in this scenario cannot be viewed as a counterargument to the idea thatprivate firms carry the host state’s legitimacy. Robert Tucker and DavidHendrickson (2004) believe that there are four pillars of legitimacy, and whenthese are violated, national troops will have no claim to validity nor findacceptance from the population. This applies to PSCs as well. Tucker andHendrickson’s (2004) four pillars of legitimacy are “[the U.S.’] commitment tointernational law, its acceptance of consensual decision-making, its reputationfor moderation, and its identification with the preservation of peace.” Whenlegitimacy is transferred from the host state to a PSC, these four pillars must bemaintained to uphold the population’s belief that contractors are legitimateactors.

The populace of the host state, as well as the international community,judges a government by its adherence to the rule of law. Therefore, the use ofPSCs must take place within a conflict that is perceived as righteous. The currentassumption is that the state must be viewed as the holder of the principal meansof coercion, and the principal enforcer of justice and punishment. However, thecontinual use of PSCs by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, andNATO has given these firms the appearance, if not the actuality, of legitimacy.

The interaction between private force and legitimacy operates in athree-tiered process. First, to be effective, PSCs must be considered legitimateby the host population (even if they do not know the individuals arecontractors). PSCs could either gain legitimacy on its own merit, for example,private firms are valid for use in post-conflict reconstruction, or they could“piggy-back” on the legitimacy of the hiring state. PSCs have been mistaken forAmerican troops in-theater; there is no reason to assume that the umbrella ofthe U.S. armed forces does not apply to contractors as well. Second, it iscritically important for private contractors to separate themselves from thephrase “mercenary.” If PSCs hold to a mercenary legacy, they will be unable toforge a sense of legitimacy with the host population. In addition, if thecontracting state’s population views these firms as mercenaries, the contractingstate’s government (in this case the United States) will face skepticism andinquiry from its constituency. Last, the struggle for legitimacy exists within thecontracting community itself. There is a stark difference between a professional,well-executed company like MPRI and a company like Custer Battles that isaccused of war profiteering (Schorn 2006).

If the state, as Christopher Pierson (2011) suggests, is something that isintrinsically identified then the legitimate use of force can fall under the samecriteria. Like pornography, or the state, the metric of “I know it when I see it”

840 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

is being applied to determine if the use of private force is legitimate or not. This,in and of itself, means that the idea of private force is becoming more accepted.It is necessary to understand how the legitimacy of private force is created, andto show how these firms are becoming an integrated and vital part of Westernsecurity culture. Private force undertakes foreign policy by proxy, and mirrorsthe legitimacy of the contracting state.

Conclusion

The legitimacy transfer mechanism allows U.S. PSCs to participate inWestern-led military deployments. While private force has a long history withinWestern state development, the resurgence of contractors as a means to supportmilitary deployments has flourished since the Cold War. This is partly due to abelief that contracting with private industry would be cheaper than publiccontrol and partly due to the rapid decline in troop count once the USSR wasno longer perceived as a threat. These two things created a situation in whichcontractors were increasingly used to support U.S. military operations, becameintegrated into the military industrial complex, and became an intrinsic part ofthe U.S. security culture. Private firms were born through long-term decisionsto embrace the tenets of economic liberalism and privatize nonessentialgovernment functions. Contractor support personnel are now an intrinsic partof the military industrial complex.

The increased use of privatized military support has created a situationwhere it is often difficult to differentiate between national soldiers andcontractors. This obfuscation is an example of how legitimacy is smoothlytransferred between the state and a private actor. The perception of thepopulace allows the PSC to hide behind the state rather than needing its ownlegitimacy to be in theater. Unlike NGOs, PSCs do not carry their own sense oflegitimacy. One of the ways NGOs have built legitimacy is through having analtruistic mission and being granted global goodwill. Until populations seePSCs as a needed and welcome part of outside assistance, PSCs will not be ableto be considered independent, valid actors in and around conflict.

To examine under what conditions PSCs can gain legitimacy, the differencebetween mercenaries and private firms must be determined. Mercenaries areindividuals, while PSCs are corporations. While this may seem trivial,corporations are not individuals, and cannot undertake action. A mercenarycan shoot a person, a contractor can dig a ditch, but a company can do neither,and so cannot carry the blame for an action. This difference addresses theoverarching points that are normally presented when trying to delineate PSCsfrom mercenaries. PSCs are professional, government-contracted, organizedfirms, while mercenaries are rag-tag outlaws. PSCs can benefit from thelegitimacy transfer mechanism, while private individuals cannot.

Currently, the legitimacy transfer mechanism only occurs from the stateto private firms. This mechanism could be expanded to include other

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 841

internationally legitimate actors; IGOs and well-regarded NGOs could acquirethe power to grant legitimacy as well. To restate, I claim that any actor cantransfer its authority to a PSC if that organization has both a recognizablevisual identity and a normative acceptance from the international community,which grants it permission to act in humanitarian or foreign interventions.These firms are limited by the market reputation mechanism and the need toborrow legitimacy from the contracting agency. To be granted legitimacy andcontinue receiving contracts, PSCs must internalize the goals and desires of theiremployers. In this way, a PSC acts as a doppelganger for the contracting agency.If PSCs hope to gain independent legitimacy and grow to act without statebacking, these firms must be perceived to obey laws, maintain a positive, or atleast neutral, reputation with the population, and be seen as trying to achieve apositive goal, that is, one that assists the population.

This idea of perception and law impacts states as well. In the Cold War,the United States clothed itself in an altruistic framework based on freedomand democracy. This dominant paradigm created the idea of the West as abenevolent force. The United States has legitimacy to transfer to PSCsbecause it has lingering goodwill with the world. It remains to be seen if theU.S.’ crumbling soft power will allow the legitimacy transfer mechanism tocontinue. The perception of the U.S.’ home population may also change;topics such as the militarization of policing and crimes by private contractorsmay create a tipping point against the privatization of force. A decline in thelegitimacy of the hiring actor means that the transfer of legitimacy to a privatefirm will be less successful. If the state does not have sufficient standing to bein a zone of conflict, then it lacks the ability to transfer legitimacy to a PSC.

In a case like Afghanistan, the international community and the Americanpopulation supported the U.S.’ use of force, but the Afghan community did not.Here the use of PSCs has the same impact as the use of U.S. troops; the hostpopulation considers neither a legitimate actor. However, the United States isjoined in Afghanistan by other Western powers, which view the use of PSCs aspart of the military system. The only way to challenge the legitimacy transfermechanism is through an agent that can impact the perception of a legitimatedeployment. The Afghan population has had little say in the occupation of theircountry; it is the Western populations that hold the power to impact PSC’stransferred legitimacy.

It is necessary to understand how the legitimacy of private force is created,and to show how these firms are an integrated and vital part of Western securityculture. Even if the transfer of legitimacy between state and private firmoriginally occurred organically, understanding that the state allows these firmsact with its own legitimacy demonstrates an urgent need for proper regulationand oversight. When a firm misbehaves, it damages the standing of the actorthat hired the firm. This was clearly shown when DynCorp committed crimes inBosnia and Herzegovina. DynCorp was contracted by the United States tofulfill a U.S. manpower promise to the UN. While working for the UN,

842 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

DynCorp contractors kidnapped and raped underage girls (Bolkovac and Lynn2011). The crimes committed still stain the UN’s reputation.

There is a deeper question of whether private firms should be present inzones of conflict at all. This debate continues in many forms, from thephilosophy of just war theory, to humanitarian interventions, to repeatingpatterns in history, to military analysis. The analysis of the legitimacy transfermechanism is separate from the debate of whether contractors should be used,and focuses on teasing out the reasons behind why contractors are accepted atall in zones of conflict.

Future research is needed to explore the mechanism of PSC legitimacyoutside of states that obey a Western ethos. It seems likely that the legitimacytransfer mechanism would not hold up in nondemocracies, but case studiescould prove enlightening. Are PSCs from developing states as welcomed,well-behaved, and effective as Western PSCs? If they are, why? Third countrynationals are hired by Western PSCs, so perhaps the lessons taught by exposureto Western security culture will return with those contracted individuals andnew, local firms will be created. Or perhaps different systems of law and culturewill produce different results; what would a PSC look like whose contractingstate obeyed Sharia law?

The other area that is worth investigation is the difference in legitimacybetween corporations and individuals. The United States transfers its legitimacyfor PSCs to act in zones of conflict. Does the legitimacy transfer mechanismrequire a firm, or can this transfer of legitimacy occur on an individual basis? Itseems unlikely that a private individual would be directly contracted by theUnited States and be seen by the population as representing the interests of theUnited States. If this is true, then why are corporations different, and why islegitimacy able to be passed to firms but not individuals? This area of inquirybecomes more interesting when adding the fact that third country nationals areused by U.S. PSCs. Does that impact the transfer of legitimacy between stateand firm, and, if so, how?

PSCs can be legitimate actors in zones of conflict when supported byinternationally recognized organizations that follow a Western ethos. This isachieved by transferring legitimacy from the state to the private firm. It is in thebest interest of the firm to uphold and act in accordance with the legitimacy ofthe state, in order for the firm to secure additional contracts. Together, themarket reputation mechanism and the transfer of legitimacy mechanism havecreated a space in Western security culture where private force has blossomed.

About the Author

Martha Lizabeth Phelps (M. Dee Beutel) is an expert on the civilianizationof warfare and the use of private military contractors. Her publications examinethe effect of privatization on post-conflict reconstruction. Specifically, her workfocuses on the impact of contracted combatants on international development,

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 843

state building, and human rights. Dr. Phelps received her PhD from theUniversity of Miami in 2012 with subfields in Comparative Politics andInternational Relations and joined the faculty at Alderson Broaddus Universityin 2013. Dr. Phelps has been recognized for her outstanding teaching at both theUniversity of Miami and Alderson Broaddus University.

References

AVANT, DEBORAH. 2005. The Market for Force: The Consequences ofPrivatizing Security. New York: Cambridge University Press.

BARFIELD, THOMAS. 2010. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

BELLONI, ROBERTO. 2007. State Building and International Intervention inBosnia. New York: Routledge.

BOLKOVAC, KATHRYN, and CARI LYNN. 2011. The Whistleblower: SexTrafficking, Military Contractors, and One Woman’s Fight for Justice.Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

BROOKS, DOUG, and MATAN CHOREV. 2008. “Ruthless Humanitariansm.” InPrivate Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies and Civil-MilitaryRelations, edited by Alexandra Andrew, Deane-Peter Baker, and MarinaCaparini. New York: Routledge. 116-130.

BUZAN, BARRY. 1991. People, States and Fear. Boulder, CO: Lynne RiennerPublishers.

CAPPS, ROBERT. 2002. “Outside the Law.” Salon. Accessed on September 16,2014. Available online at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2002/06/26/bosnia/print.html

CHOJNACKI, SVEN, NILS METTERNICH, and JOHANNES MÜNSTER. 2009.“Mercenaries in Civil Wars, 1950-2000.” Wissenschaftszentrum. Accessed onSeptember 16, 2014. Available online at http://bibliothek.wz-berlin.de/pdf/2009/ii09-05.pdf

COLLINGWOOD, VIVIEN. 2006. “Non-Governmental Organisations, Powerand Legitimacy in International Society.” Review of International Studies 32(3): 439-454. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.un-ngls.org/orf/pdf/Non-governmental%20organisations_power%20and_legitimacy_in_international_society.pdf

COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN. 2011.“Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks.”Washington Headquarters Services. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Availableonline at http://www.whs.mil/library/Reports/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf

844 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES. 2010. “Contracting in a Counterinsurgency:An Examination of the Blackwater-Paravant Contract and the Need forOversight.” U.S. Government Printing Office. Accessed on September 16, 2014.Available online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg57827/pdf/CHRG-111shrg57827.pdf

DAVIS, JAMES. 2003. Fortune’s Warriors: Private Armies and the New WorldOrder. Vancouver, Canada: Douglas & Mcintyre Ltd.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. 2011. “Number: 3020.50. Private SecurityContractors (PSCs) Operating in Contingency Operations, Humanitarian orPeace Operations, or Other Military Operations or Exercises.” Departmentof Defense. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online athttp://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/302050p.pdf

DIVISION OF LONGSHORE AND HARBOR WORKERS’ COMPENSATION. 2012.“Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation.” U.S. Department of Labor.Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm

DUNIGAN, MOLLY. 2011. Victory for Hire: Private Security Companies’ Impacton Military Effectiveness. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

EASTERLY, WILLIAM. 2007. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts toAid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: PenguinBooks.

EDELSTEIN, DAVID. 2004. “Occupational Hazards: Why Military OccupationsSucceed or Fail.” International Security 29 (1): 49-91. Accessed on September16, 2014. Available online at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/529/occupational_hazards.html

FRANKLIN, JONATHAN. 2004. “U.S. Contractor Recruits Guards for Iraq inChile.” The Guardian. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online athttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/mar/05/iraq.chile

FROST, MERVYN. 2008. “Regulating Anarchy: The Ethics of PMCs in GlobalCivil Society?” In Private Military and Security Companies: Ethics, Policies andCivil–Military Relations, edited by Andrew Alexandra, Deane-Peter Baker, andMarina Caparini. New York: Routledge. 46-55.

GILLEY, BRUCE. 2006. “The Meaning and Measure of State Legitimacy:Results for 72 Countries.” European Journal of Political Research 45 (3):499-525. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.web.pdx.edu/~gilleyb/Gilley_MeaningMeasureofLegitimacy.pdf

GRANELLI, MARCO. 1997. “UN Said to Probe Executive Outcomes’ MercenaryActivity.” Saturday Star. November 23.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 845

HEWLETT PACKARD. 2014. “The Future of Navy IT Today.” Navy MarineCorps Intranet. Accessed July 7, 2014. Accessed on September 16, 2014.Available online at http://h10131.www1.hp.com/public/nmci/about-nmci/

INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE

PROVIDERS. 2010. “International Code of Conduct for Private Security ServiceProviders.” Nov 09. Accessed June 28, 2014. Accessed on September 16, 2014.Available online at http://www.icoc-psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_September_2013_-_Composite_List-1.pdf

IRAQ COALITION CASUALTY COUNT. 2012. “Operation Enduring Freedom.”icasualties.org. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online athttp://icasualties.org

ISENBERG, DAVID. 2010. “Private Military Contractors as Buzz Lightyear: ToAfghanistan and Beyond.” Huffington Post. Accessed on October 20, 2014.Available online at http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/private-military-contractors-buzz-lightyear-afghanistan-beyond

JEFFERIES, IAN. 2002. “Private Military Companies—A Positive Role to Play inToday’s International System.” The Quarterly Journal 1 (4): 103-125. Accessedon September 16, 2014. Available online at http://procon.bg/article/private-military-companies-positive-role-play-todays-international-system

KEEGAN, JOHN. 1993. A History of Warfare. New York: Knopf.

KINSEY, CHRISTOPHER. 2006. Corporate Soldiers and International Security.New York: Routledge.

KRAHMANN, ELKE. 2001. States, Citizens and the Privatisation of Security. NewYork: Cambridge.

KRIEG, ANDREAS. 2010. “The Impact of Casualty Aversion on HumanitarianIntervention.” Publications in Contemporary Affairs. Accessed on November 15,2014. Available online at http://www.thepicaproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/The-Impact-of-Casualty-Aversion-on-Humanitarian-Intervention.pdf

MACFAQUHAR, NEIL. 2011. “Peacekeepers’ Sex Scandals Linger, On Screenand Off.” New York Times. September 7. Accessed on September 16, 2014.Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/08/world/08nations.html

MARSDEN, PETER. 2009. Afghanistan: Aid, Armies & Empires. New York:Palgrave Macmillan.

MITCHELL, WILLIAM JOHN THOMAS. 2002. “Showing Seeing: A Critique ofVisual Culture.” Journal of Visual Culture 1 (2): 165-181. Accessed onSeptember 16, 2014. Available online at http://vcu.sagepub.com/content/1/2/165.short?rss=1&ssource=mfc

846 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

PATTISON, JAMES. 2003. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility toProtect: Who Should Intervene? New York: Oxford University Press.

PERCY, SARAH. 2007. Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in InternationalRelations. New York: Oxford University Press.

PETERSOHN, ULRICH. 2011. “The Other Side of the COIN: Private SecurityCompanies and Counterinsurgency Operations.” Studies in Conflict &Terrorism 43 (10): 782-801.

___. 2014. “The Impact of Mercenaries and Private Military and SecurityCompanies on Civil War Severity between 1946 and 2002.” InternationalInteractions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations 40(2): 1-46. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03050629.2014.880699#.VBjqrPl5OSo

PHELPS, MARTHA L. 2012. “Failure to Protect and Serve: Private Police inBosnia Herzegovina.” Paper presented at the International Studies AssociationAnnual Convention, San Diego, CA. April 1-4.

___. 2014. “The Tally on Charles Tilly: Resource Extraction, Private Security,and State Capacity.” Paper presented at the International Studies AssociationAnnual Convention, Toronto, Canada. March 26-29.

PIERSON, CHRISTOPHER. 2011. The Modern State. New York: Routledge.

SCHEFFER, DAVID. 2004. “Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide.” GeorgetownJournal of International Affairs. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Availableonline at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/centers-programs/centers/carr/programs/TransitionalJustice/LessonsFromRwandaGencoide.pdf

SCHORN, DANIEL. 2006. “Billions Wasted in Iraq.” CBS News. Accessed onSeptember 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/billions-wasted-in-iraq/

SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 2002. “Memorandum fromGeneral Sir David Ramsbotham GCB CBE.” UK Parliament. Accessed onSeptember 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/2061313.htm

SILVERSTEIN, KEN. 2000. Private Warriors. New York: Verso.

SINGER, PETER W. 2004. Corporate Warriors, the Rise of the Privatized MilitaryIndustry. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

SLIM, HUGO. 2002. “By What Authority? The Legitimacy and Accountabilityof Non-Governmental Organisations.” International Council of Human RightsPolicy. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.gdrc.org/ngo/accountability/by-what-authority.html

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 847

STANGER, ALLISON. 2009. One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing ofAmerican Power and the Future of Foreign Policy. New Haven, CT: YaleUniversity Press.

STILLMAN, PETER. 1974. “The Concept of Legitimacy.” Polity 7 (1): 32-56.Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/3234268

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS, AND

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM. 2006.Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help AchieveU.S. Goals and Overcome Challenges. Washington DC: United StatesGovernment Accountability Office. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Availableonline at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06953t.pdf

THOMSON, JANICE E. 1994. Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns:State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe. Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.

TICKLER, PETER. 1987. The Modern Mercenary: Dog of War, or Soldier ofHonour? New York: Sterling Publishing Company.

TUCKER, ROBERT W., and DAVID C. HENDRICKSON. 2004. “The Sources ofAmerican Legitimacy.” Foreign Affairs. Accessed on September 16, 2014.Available online at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/60262/robert-w-tucker-and-david-c-hendrickson/the-sources-of-american-legitimacy

UESSELER, ROLF. 2008. Servants of War: Private Military Corporations and theProfit of Conflict. Berkley, CA: Soft Skull Press.

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE OF CENTRAL SUPPORT SERVICES. 2013. “List ofApproved Vendors by Country of Origin.” UN Procurement Division. AccessedOctober 5, 2013. Available online at http://www.un.org/depts/ptd/pdf/vendors.pdf

UN OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. 2002. “FactSheet No. 28, the Impact of Mercenary Activities on the Right of Peoples toSelf-Determination.” UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights.Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479477460.html

UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND. 2013. “Contractor Support of USOperations in the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility to Include Iraq andAfghanistan.” Department of Defense. Accessed on September 16, 2014.Available online at http://psm.du.edu/media/documents/reports_and_stats/us_data/dod_quarterly_census/dod_quarterly_census_jan_2013.pdf

848 | POLITICS & POLICY / December 2014

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 2013. United States Department ofState. State Department to Incorporate International Code of Conduct intoWorldwide Protective Services Contracts. Press Release. August 16. Accessed onNovember 15, 2014. Available online at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/08/213212.htm

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE. 2010.“Improvements Needed in Management of Contractors Supporting Contractand Grant Administration in Iraq and Afghanistan.” United States GovernmentAccountability Office. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online athttp://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-357

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE. N.d. FDSys Search Results.Accessed on January 28, 2012. Available online at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/search/search.action

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE. 2004. “Building Civilian Capacity forU.S. Stability Operations the Rule of Law Component.” United States Instituteof Peace. Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.usip.org/publications/building-civilian-capacity-us-stability-operations-the-rule-of-law-component

VERKUIL, PAUL. 2008. Outsourcing Sovereignty. Cambridge, UK: CambridgeUniversity Press.

WAYNE, LESLIE. 2002. “America’s For-Profit Secret Army.” New York Times.Accessed on September 16, 2014. Available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/13/business/america-s-for-profit-secret-army.html

WULF, HERBERT. 2005. Internationalizing and Privatizing War and Peace. NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan.

Phelps / DOPPELGANGERS OF THE STATE | 849