Displacement, Territoriality and Exile: The Construction of Ethnic and National Identities in Tibetan Refugee Communities

A Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Arts

2004

Laura G. Rubio

Department of History

Thesis Abstract Declaration Copyright Statement Dedication Acknowledgements Notes on Transliteration List of Maps List of Common Abbreviations

Introduction

Chapter 1

CONTENTS

Displacement, Exile and Identity: Theoretical Framework 1.1. Displacement and Exile 1.2. Approaches to the Study of Ethnic and National Identities

in Displaced Communities 1.2.1. Culture, Ethnicity and Identity 1.2.2. Imagining the Nation, Constructing National Identity in Exile 1.2.3. 'Refugeedom' and the Re-Territorialisation of Culture 1.2.4. The Establishment of Sacred Geographies

Chapter 2 Tibetan Diaspora: Refugee Settlement in South Asia and Switzerland 2.1. Tibetan Refugees in India 2.2. Tibetan Refugees in Nepal 2.3. Tibetan Refugees in Switzerland 2.4. Concluding Remarks

Chapter 3 Notions of Territory in Historical Tibet 3.1. The Development of Tibetan Religious Identity and of Religious

Notions of Territory 3.1.1. First and Second Disseminations of Buddhism 3.1.2. The Establishment of Tibetan Sacred Geography

3.1.2.1. Sacred Space and Pilgrimage 3.2. The Rise to Power of the Gelugpa School: Toward the

'Unification' of Ethnographic Tibet? 3.2.1. The Ris-med Movement in Eastern Tibet 3.2.2. Secular Notions of Territory under Gelugpa Hegemony

3.3. Concluding Remarks

Chapter 4 The People's Republic of China: Displacement of Tibetans and the Transformation of Tibetan Cultural Identity 4.1. Imagining the Chinese Nation 4.2. Displacement of Tibetans and Tibetan Culture under Communist Rule

page

4 5 5 6 6 7 7 7

12

28 28

33 33 36 41 43

48 51 55 60 63

65

67 69 74 86

91 95 97 101

102 102 112

1

4.2.1. Democratic Reforms and Socialist Transformation of Tibet 116 4.2.2. Tibetan Religion 121 4.2.3. Ethnic Tourism 126 4.2.4. Ecological Degradation 128

4.3. Concluding Remarks 130

Chapter 5 The Tibetan Nation 'Imagined' in Exile: Pan-Tibetanism and Oppositional Histories 133 5.1. Imagining the Tibetan Nation in Dharamsala 133

5.1.1. The 14th Dalai Lama and the Construction of a Pan-Tibetan Identity 136 5.1.2. Breaching Religious Differences: The Ris-med Movement in Exile 153

5.2. Contesting Official Narratives and Policies 154 5.2.1. Sectarian Differences: The Shugden Controversy 158 5.2.2. Religious Diversity: The Case of Bon 163

5.3. Concluding Remarks 167

Chapter 6 Tibet in Refugee Imagination: The Construction of Space and Territory in Exile 170 6.1. The Construction of the Tibetan Homeland in Exile 171

6.1.1. The Religious Orientation toward the Tibetan Land 172 6.1.2. The Instrumental Orientation 181 6.1.3. The Political Orientation 185 6.1.4. The Primordial Orientation 188 6.1.5. The Spatial-Aesthetic Orientation 192

6.2. The 'Myth of Return' and the Tibetan Nation 194 6.3. The Transplantation of Tibetan Notions of Space into their Host Countries 203 6.4. Concluding Remarks 211

Chapter 7 'Mythos Tibet': Tibet in Western Imagination 213 7.1. Pre- 1950 Imagination: Explorer-Travellers, Conquerors and Missionaries 213 7.2. Post-1950 Imagination: Humanitarians, Scholars, Tourists and Western

Practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism 223 7.3 Concluding Remarks 234

General Conclusions 236

Appendices 243 Appendix 1 Structure of the Tibetan Government in Exile 243 Appendix 2 Table of Interviews 244 Appendix 3 Interview Brief 247 Appendix 4 Tibetan Refugees in Bhutan 249 Appendix 5 Marxist-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought 250 Appendix 6 The 17-Point Agreement 252

References 255

3

The University of Manchester

THESIS ABSTRACT

Submitted by Laura G. Rubio for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and entitled: 'Displacement, Territoriality and Exile: The Construction of Ethnic and National Identities in Tibetan Refugee Communities.' Submitted on April 2004.

This thesis analyses the ways in which the Chinese occupation of Tibet, forced (demographic and cultural) displacement, and 'refugeedom' have influenced the imagination of the Tibetan homeland, and the articulation of notions of space and territory among Tibetans in refugee communities in Northern India, the Kathmandu Valley and Switzerland. The main argument is that Tibetan ethnic and cultural identities have been deeply rooted in the Tibetan land and that attachment to territory was historically expressed in both religious and secular terms. Displacement and the experience of refugeedom have produced, however, some discontinuity with the past. Contemporary notions of territory are shaped by the construction of a national history that privileges traditional religious beliefs, by the incorporation of Western political liberal ideas, and by the persistence of localised identities. Likewise, current perceptions of territory have also been shaped by refugees' varying degrees of experience of ordeal and loss. In this way, contemporary articulations of territory are no longer primarily tied to the notion of sacred place (Tib. gnas) , but to Tibetan refugees' general perception of their right to freedom, and in some cases, to the political principle of self-determination - albeit still largely rooted in ancient perceptions of land.

It is argued that the experience of displacement has intensified territorial consciousness among Tibetan refugees, and has placed the issue of territoriality at the centre of both Tibetan refugees' demand for the independence of Tibet (Tib. Bod rang-brtsan) or genuine autonomy (Tib. rang-skyong ljongs), and of Tibetans' self­representation. This thesis also asserts that Tibetan refugees' territorial consciousness - deeply infused with sacred meaning - reflects an understanding of culture as a highly naturalised phenomenon; that is, as intimately tied to the soil that nurtures (or nurtured) it.

DECLARATION

No portion of the work referred to in the thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning.

COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

(1) Copyright in text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies (by any process) either in full, or of extracts, may be made only in accordance with instructions given by the Author and lodged in the John Rylands University Library of Manchester. Details may be obtained from the Librarian. This page must form part of any such copies made. Further copies (by any process) of copies made in accordance with such instructions may not be made without permission (in writing) of the Author.

(2) The ownership of any intellectual property rights which may be described in this thesis is vested in the University of Manchester, subject to any prior agreement to the contrary, and may not be made available for use by third parties without the written permission of the University, which will prescribe the terms and conditions of any such agreement.

(3) Further information on the conditions under which disclosures and exploitation may take place is available from the Head of the Department of the History Department, School of History and Classics.

5

DEDICATION

To K.T.R. and LJ.T.

To my husband Yamandu and my daughter Daniela

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was funded by a three-year studentship granted by the Department of History, University of Manchester, as well as by the Overseas Scholarship Scheme (OSS) and the Overseas Research Scheme (ORS) Awards.

I am deeply indebted to Prof. Peter Gatrell for his invaluable supervision, which exceeded by far his official duties. His constant support, encouragement, and friendship, as well as his faith in me and his intellectual input during these four years were an indispensable source of inspiration.

Dr. Anindita Ghosh and Dr. Tej Purewal were members of a Committee that convened annually to assess the progress of my work. I am grateful to them both for their useful comments and encouragement.

My special thanks go to my friend Michael Lund (Kunga) whose insightful criticism helped me understand important issues I was taking for granted. He also prompted me to question some of my assumptions about Tibetan identity and sacred place. Thanks also go to his wife Barbara for her support and friendship.

I am grateful to Andrew and Drolma Guttman (Zurich) for their hospitality while I carried out fieldwork in Switzerland. They were incredibly helpful in providing material for fieldwork, as well as in making appointments for my interviews and in introducing me to family and friends of the Tibetan community. Without their support and friendship, my fieldwork would not have been as fruitful and enjoyable as it was.

To the many people in India, Nepal, and Switzerland who so openly talked to me, I am grateful. To Lhasang Tsering, and Dawa Norbu for their willingness to discuss sensitive issues with me. Members of staff at the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, India were equally helpful in providing a lot of the documents on which this work is based. In addition, Toni Huber and Tsering Shakya keenly answered many questions I had accumulated during the course of three years.

I would also like to thank my parents: Emesto and Marta, for doing what they know to do best: to be good friends, as well as for supporting me and encouraging me in the pursuit of all my dreams ... whatever they might be and wherever they might take me.

Finally, many thanks go to Joan and Dick Colclough, my putative English parents, who proofread different versions of some chapters and whose presence in my life has added a great deal to my own experience of displacement.

6

Notes on Transliteration

Names of Tibetan and Chinese places and people, as well as Tibetan and Chinese

tenns, are presented in simplified, roughly phonetic fonn. Except in the case of well­

known names, the Tibetan and Chinese orthography (following Turrell Wylie (1959)

system and Chinese pinyin respectively) are given in brackets at the first appearance

with the abbreviations 'Tib.' for Tibetan and 'Ch.' for Chinese. When dealing with

important Buddhist tenns and names of Buddhist deities, the Sanskrit tenn or name is

given at the first appearance in brackets with the abbreviation 'Skt.' Thereafter only

the Tibetan or English tenn or name is used. In cases where the Sanskrit word is

commonly known in the West, the Sanskrit tenn will be used throughout, for instance:

Stupa (Tib. mchod-rten, 'reliquary mould'), Vajrayana (a branch of Mahayana

Buddhism, also known as Tantra), and Buddha-Dharma (Tib. chos, 'the Buddhist

Doctrine').

List of Maps

Map 1. Sacred Geography of Tibet

Map 2. Map of Political and Ethnographic Tibet

Map 3. Map of Tibetan Refugee Settlements

Map 4. 1994 Norbulingka Institute's Illustrated Map of Tibet

List of Common Abbreviations

AMI CCP CTA GIE GMD GOI LTWA PCART PLA PRC TAR TIPA TWA TYC UNHCR

Amnye Machen Institute Chinese Communist Party Central Tibetan Administration Government-in-Exile Guomin Dang (Nationalist Party) Government of India Library of Tibetan Works and Archives Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet People's Liberation Anny People's Republic of China Tibetan Autonomous Region Tibetan Institute for the Perfonning Arts Tibetan Women Association Tibetan Youth Congress United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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Introduction

The delineation of the territorial and cultural boundaries of the new Chinese state

following the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 had the

effect of displacing the 'minority-nationalities' (Ch. shaoshu minzu) of the south and

west of China. Particularly, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under Mao's

leadership invaded Tibet in 1950 and fully incorporated it into the PRC by 1959. The

displacement produced in Tibet was multifaceted. On the one hand, the violent

occupation of the country in 1959 produced the demographic displacement of

thousands of Tibetans, who followed their spiritual and political leader, the 14th Dalai

Lama into exile, settling as refugees in the bordering South Asian countries. Out of an

estimated population of approximately 4.6 million Tibetans (Chinese 1990 census,

quoted in Heberer 2001: 113), the refugee community is estimated to have reached

112,000 in 1998. There are approximately 85,000 Tibetans living in India where the

Tibetan Government-in-exile (GIE) has settled; 14,000 in Nepal; 1,500 in Bhutan; and

10,000 in Western Countries (particularly in Switzerland and North America)

(Planning Council 2000).

On the other hand, the imposition of Han Chinese culture and communist

ideology, as well as the implementation of anti-religious policies throughout Tibet had

the immediate effect of displacing Tibetan culture. This fact has been interpreted by

different members of the Tibetan diaspora as tantamount to cultural genocide. Hence,

displacement is understood not only as the separation of people from their native

cultures through physical dislocation (e.g. refugees, migrants, exiles, internally

displaced people, and so forth), but also, metaphorically, as the colonising imposition

ofa foreign culture (Bammer 1994).

This thesis analyses the ways in which the Chinese occupation of Tibet, forced

(demographic and cultural) displacement, and 'refugeedom' (Gatrell 1999) have

influenced the imagination of the Tibetan homeland, and the articulation of notions of

space and territory among Tibetans in refugee communities in Northern India, the

Kathmandu Valley and Switzerland. The main argument is that Tibetan ethnic and

cultural identities have been deeply rooted in the Tibetan land and that attachment to

territory was historically expressed in both religious and secular terms. 1

Displacement and the experience of refugeedom have produced, however, some

1 I use Gatrell's term 'refugeedom' interchangeably with exile. Exile here is understood as an

12

discontinuity with the past. Contemporary notions of territory are shaped by the

construction of a national history that privileges traditional religious beliefs, by the

incorporation of Western political liberal ideas, and by the persistence of localised

identities. Likewise, current perceptions of territory have also been shaped by

refugees' varying degrees of experience of ordeal and loss. In this way, contemporary

articulations of territory are no longer primarily tied to the notion of sacred place (Tib.

gnas) , but to Tibetan refugees' general perception of their right to freedom, and in

some cases, to the political principle of self-determination - albeit still largely rooted

in ancient perceptions of land.

It is argued that the experience of displacement has intensified territorial

consciousness among Tibetan refugees, and has placed the issue of territoriality at the

centre of both Tibetan refugees' demand for the independence of Tibet (Tib. Bod

rang-brtsan) or genuine autonomy (Tib. rang-skyong ljongs), and of Tibetans' self­

representation. This thesis also asserts that Tibetan refugees' territorial consciousness

- deeply infused with sacred meaning - reflects an understanding of culture as a highly

naturalised phenomenon; that is, as intimately tied to the soil that nurtures (or

nurtured) it.

Displacement is conceived by Tibetan refugees as 'pathological' and as having

produced an 'ailing cultural identity and a damaged nationality' (Malkki 1996:444).

According to this view, Tibetan culture cannot survive for a long time outside the land

where it originated and developed.2 In this way, the return to the homeland assumes

crucial importance to the survival of the national culture. As a result, displacement

can be said to put in motion a dual process. It forces the de-territorialisation of the

refugee's culture by depriving him/her of hislher traditional cultural and physical

habitat, putting issues of territory and return to the homeland at the forefront of

refugee identity and nation-building; engendering thereby, the re-territorialisation of

culture. Such a naturalised view of culture is a distinctive feature of many displaced

communities all over the world, including the Armenians (1920s) and the Jews.

I use the term 'deterritorialisation of culture' to refer to 'the ways in which

displaced people feel they belong to various communities despite the fact that they do

not share a common territory with all the other members. It also refers to the way that

a national or even a regional culture can no longer be conceived as reflecting a

experience of violent dispossession, and physical dislocation.

13

coherent and distinct identity. [ ... ] The authenticity of a cultural fonnation is no

longer singularly linked to its physical proximity to a given cultural centre'

(Papastergiadis 2000: 115-6). Similarly, re-territorialisation of culture is used here to

refer to the process through which forcibly displaced people see themselves as

belonging primarily to a single community; and through which they relocate their

regional and national cultures, as well as their homeland at the centre of their ethnic

and national identities, perceived as coherent and distinct. In addition, cultural

authenticity is linked to the successful reproduction of significant aspects of their pre­

migrating culture. However, it is stressed that in the context of exile, the re­

territorialisation of culture does not preclude the emergence of various centres of

cultural production. Similarly, the re-territorialisation of culture does not imply that

cultural identities become fixed and static. Rather, they remain fluid, and are

constantly re-negotiated.

The aim of this thesis is threefold: first, it seeks to analyse the traditional

religious and secular notions of space and territory, and the fonnation of Tibetan

sacred geography in pre-1959 Tibet.3 It argues that the emergence of spatial referents

in Tibet was detennined in great measure by a pre-Buddhist religious lore centred on

mountain cults, the introduction and assimilation of Buddhism and the establishment

of a Lhasa-centred polity in the seventeenth century, which set up a regime in Central

Tibet based on a combination of religion and politics (Tib. chos srid gnys 'breI). The

establishment of a sacred geography, and the development of Tibet's unique social

and political system generated strong attachments to the Tibetan land. The presence of

(Buddhist) Tantric yo gins and lamas, a rich Buddhist textual tradition, the projection

of the Tantric mandala principle into the Tibetan landscape, and the notion of 'hidden

lands' (Tib. sbas-yul), as well as the idea that Tibet is the special field of activity of

the Buddhist deity Chenrezig (spyan-ras-gzigs; Skt. Avalokitesvara), embodiment of

compassion, and that Tibetans are his descendants, all contributed to the shaping of

religious conceptions of territory, and of attachment to the homeland.4

2 Apparently, nor can it survive when it is supplanted by a foreign culture in its own soil. 3 I use the term 'sacred geography' to refer to the mapping of a landscape which gives prominence to sources of sacred power, which is established through myths of cultural origins, as well as through the interaction of human beings with gods, and of saints with the environment (MacDonald, M. 2003: 10-13). 4 See Map 1, for the Sacred Geography of Tibet.

14

The need for this historical analysis arises from my assumption that, although

current Tibetan narratives of self-representation have emerged as a result of the

Chinese occupation of Tibet and are influenced by Western political ideas, Tibetan

national identities in exile are rooted in a sense of ethnie, or ethnic identity, which is

deeply historical. In privileging a sense of historicity in approaching this topic we are

less prone to indulge in 'historical shallowness' (Smith, A. 1999:48) or 'ahistorical'

understandings of Tibetan identities that tend to over-emphasise their modernity (or

post-modernity).

Second, this thesis seeks to establish the continuities as well as the changes in

the contemporary articulation of notions of space and territory brought about on the

one hand, by Chinese rule in Tibet, and on the other, by the resulting demographic

and cultural displacement and exile. It analyses the ideological templates imposed on

Tibetans by the Chinese Communist Party, according to which the Tibetan homeland

should be perceived. It also analyses the ways in which a substantial amount of the

material basis of Tibetan religion has been destroyed, and the Tibetan landscape

desacralised, as well as the main changes brought about in the Tibetan economy and

Tibetan traditional ways of life.

This thesis establishes that in Tibetan refugee communities worldwide, due to

differences in the experiences of ordeal, sinicisation (adoption of Chinese values as

one's own), age-gaps, historical memory, attachment to the homeland, and in views of

the idea of 'return', different ways of imagining the Tibetan nation have developed.

Out of such imaginings several narratives of Tibetan-ness (Tibetan ethnic and national

identity) have emerged. The thesis accordingly looks at the mainstream or official

national discourse and the narratives of ordinary Tibetans, namely non members of

the Tibetan governmental elite. The 14th Dalai Lama and the Government-in-exile

(GIE) generally represent the former, and they tend to put forward a Pan-Tibetan

narrative based on what I call the 'One People, One Territory' and 'One Culture, One

History' principles that portray a Tibetan diaspora that is pan-national, cohesive and

relatively homogenous. 5

5 I use the phrase: 'One People, One Territory' deliberately as an allusion to Deng Xiaoping's. formula 'One China Two Systems' presented in the mid-1980s for the reunification of Hong Kong, TaIwan and Macao to the mainland, which stems from the territorial dimension of the communist imagination of the Chinese nation. See Appendix 1 for the Structure of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile.

15

In the second category of narratives can be included those of ordinary Tibetans

who are often part of sectarian and regional groups (particularly from Eastern Tibet),

youth organisations, and non-Buddhist groups, as well as non-partisan simple

Tibetans who go about their business earning a living and participating routinely in

religious rituals. Their narratives often reflect a lack of knowledge of the discourses

emanating from Dharamsala, the so-called Tibetan 'capital-in-exile', and at times

express more localised, and even opposing views. This thesis looks closely at the

tension inherent in the differences of Tibetan self-representation in exile.

According to the results of the 1991 election for the Tibetan Parliament-in­

Exile, 70 percent of the Tibetan refugees in South Asia belong to the former Tibetan

provinces of U-Tsang (dbus-gtsang in Central Tibet) and Ngari (Western Tibet), 25

percent to the south-eastern province of Kham, while only 5 percent belong to north­

eastern province of Amdo. In striking contrast, the distribution of Tibet was 20

percent for U-Tsang, 53 percent for Kham and 27 percent for Amdo according to

Chinese statistics for 1959 (DIIR 1994:93). This configuration of the Tibetan refugee

community is extremely important to the understanding of the construction of Tibetan

identities in exile, as well as of the nationalist project that has developed since 1959.

The prominence of central Tibetans, and consequently of the Gelugpa School (to

which the 14th Dalai Lama belongs) in exile unmistakably shapes the 'national'

historical narrative, and the official conception of Tibetan-ness.

At this point I should explain the denomination of Tibet and Tibetan

communities. In the post 1951 setting, when talking about Tibet, one encounters terms

such as 'political' and 'ethnographic' Tibet, and the distinction should be clear:

Political Tibet refers to the polity that was ruled by the Dalai Lamas from the

seventeenth century onwards, which includes the regions of Ngari (West), and U­

Tsang (Central Tibet). Since 1951, following the '17-Point Agreement' signed

between the Dalai Lama's government and PRC officials, this region has been

referred to as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Ethnographic Tibet refers to the

ethnic Tibetan areas of Amdo and Kham that are today part of Qinghai, Sichuan,

Gansu, and Yunnan provinces of the PRC, which people of Tibetan origin once

inhabited exclusively and where they were in the majority, at least until 1959 (See

Map 2). The Dalai Lama's regime exercised jurisdiction in these regions only in

certain places and at irregular intervals; for the most part, local lay or monastic chiefs

16

were in control of districts of varying size, and their political loyalties and alliances

shifted through time. Thus, most of these areas in fact were not a part of its polity for

the two centuries preceding the rise to power of the communists in China in 1949

(Goldstein 1998:4). Amdo in particular remained largely outside of central Tibetan

political control throughout, and Kham retained its own specific identity (McKay

2003b).

Finally, this thesis aims at analysing the ways in which 'Mythos Tibet', that is,

Western imaginations of Tibet, and foreign involvement in the Tibetan cause have

contributed to yet another form of cultural displacement, and to current Tibetan self­

representation.6

It also examines how Western appropriation of Tibetan Buddhism,

and Westerners' participation in the enactment of religious rituals, contributes to the

reassessment of Tibetan identity among refugee communities.

There are two main factors that make this topic worthy of scrutiny. The first is

the virtual absence of Tibet in diaspora studies (Korom 1997a; 1997b; Venturino

1997). Second, no study of Tibetan refugees has looked at contemporary articulation

of notions of territory.7 There are no in-depth studies that deal with Tibetan cultural

identity in exile from this perspective. Since the late 1970s and 1980s, there has been

a significant increase in academic interest in Tibetan refugee life. Although interested

in studying Tibetan refugees' self-representation as shaped by the existence of the

Chinese 'other', recent scholarship has focused more on the ways Tibetans construct

their identity in exile where new actors and other factors have come into play,

particUlarly the West and western Tibetan Buddhist practitioners. Some like Klieger

(1989, 1992) and Frechette (2002) have focused on the role of foreign aid and

Western patronage; others like Mountcastle (1997) have studied how a Tibetan

identity linked to discourses of democracy, human rights (McLagan 1996),

6 In conjunction with the Exhibition 'Wisdom and Compassion - 100 years of Tibetan Buddhist Art' held in May 1996 at the Kunst-und-Ausstellungsshalle of the Institute of Central Asian Studies, University of Bonn, Germany, the International Symposium 'Mythos Tibet' was attended by the leading Western, Chinese and Tibetan Tibetologists. Since then, this term is commonly found in discussions about Western myth-making of Tibet.

7There is an abundant literature that deals with historical and current notions of sacred place in Tibet and the southern Himalayas (Diemberger 1993,1996,1997,2002; Ehrhard 1999a,1999b; Ramble 1999,1997; Macdonald, A.W. 1994, Blondeau 1996, Karmay 1996; Huber 1990,1994,1997b,1999a,1999b; et. al.) However, those who have dealt with the construction of sacred place among Tibetan communities in Northern Nepal (Gutschow, Michaels, Ramble and Steinkellner 2003; Diemberger 1993,1996,1997), do not deal with Tibetan refugees per se or any recently established Tibetan communities, but rather, deal with Tibetan migrants that have been settled there for a long time (i.e. before 1959).

17

environmentalism (Huber 1997a), and world peace (Mills 2004) emerged in the global

context through the Dalai Lama's international standing. Still others have focused on

the Orientalist discourses produced by Western fantasies about Tibetan-ness and the

way Tibetans have managed to mobilise political support for their cause (Bishop 1989,

1997; Lopez 1997, 1998; Schell 2000); or on the role of education and some political

metaphors in instilling a sense of Tibetan identity and patriotism in the Tibetan

exiled-youth in India (Nowak 1984). Therefore, this thesis serves in great measure to

fill this gap, and contributes, as the edited volumes of Frank Korom (l997a, 1997b)

have done to the process of insertion of 'Tibetan refugees' into the field of diaspora

studies. At a very general level this thesis also contributes to the debates about the de­

territorialisation and re-territorialisation of culture, forced displacement, and identity.

A topic such as the one presented here is by nature interdisciplinary. In trying

to understand the refugee 'experience' I have looked at writings produced in the field

of diaspora and refugee studies in their multiple dimensions: historical, legal,

institutional, anthropological, and sociological. For my discussion of the theoretical

approaches to the study of displacement and ethnic and national identity I rely on the

work of sociologists, anthropologists, and cultural historians (Anderson 1983;

Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Appadurai 1996; Gellner 1997; and Smith, A. 1989,

1997, 1999); as well as on human and political geographers (Cox 2002; Sack 1986;

Muir 1997; and Storey 2002). My theoretical analysis and the 'nationalist' language

used in this thesis draws heavily on Anthony Smith's various works. Likewise,

because of the central role of Tibetan Buddhism in my study, I have been drawn to

comparative religion and works on Tibetan religious history. I have mostly relied on

those that focus on the study of gnas-chen (sacred places) and gnas-ri (sacred

mountains), written mainly by Western and Tibetan historians and anthropologists, as

well as by members of the Tibetan monastic community.

By the same token, for my assessment of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile's

VIew of Tibetan cultural identity, its position in world politics and vis-a.-vis the

People's Republic of China, I rely on the literature produced by government

institutions such as the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (L TW A), and

different departments within the Central Tibetan Administration (CT A) in

Dharamsala, India, as well as the 14th Dalai Lama's speeches and writings in English

translation. This literature is not limited to a particular field but deals with all aspects

18

of Tibetan life in exile and with Tibet's pre-1959 history, society, religion, politics,

economy, geography, and so forth. Therefore, although this dissertation looks at the

issue of Tibetan refugees from the perspective of cultural history, it is highly

interdisciplinary.

The proposed research raises a number of theoretical and practical questions.

What theoretical tools are available to study social and cultural change in landless,

displaced societies, and societies in transition? How should we understand the ways in

which displaced ethnic communities engage in the process of nation-building? More

specifically, how are Tibetan exilic identities legitimised? How is the notion of power

articulated and conceived in the struggle of/for representation in Tibetan diasporic

communities? Does the emergence of new centres of Tibetan culture (i.e. Chinese­

Tibet, Dharamsala, Kathmandu, Zurich, and so forth) affect the legitimacy of different

narratives of the nation?

Ethnographic fieldwork and oral history are two very useful tools in

addressing these questions. While it is by no means ethnography in the strict

methodological sense, this thesis uses data collected through what anthropologists call

participant-observation '[living] with and [living] like' those who are studied; by

using ethnographic tools such as interviewing, participation in everyday routines or

occasional ceremonies engaged in by those studied, the collecting of samples of

native behaviour across a range of social situations, and so on (Van Maanen

1996:263).8 Ethnographic authority enables me as historian 'to apprehend, in

unmediated fashion, historically distant institutions and cultural meanings' (Rosaldo

1986:82).9 Similarly, it allows me to delineate structures (e.g. religious, social,

political and spatial) that have remained unchanged over a long period of time

(' longue duree '), as well as those that have been reproduced in or transplanted into

Tibetan refugees' host countries. Also, ethnography and oral history allow me to

identify the major disruptions in these structures produced by the violent displacement

of Tibetans from their homeland.

8 The tenn 'ethnography' refers to 'a study of the culture that a given group of peopJe more or less share. When used as a method, ethnography typically refers to fieldwork conducted by a single investigator. When used as a result [or product], ethnography ordinarily refers to the written representation of a culture.' (Van Maanen 1996:

263). h' . L R L d ., f h h' h" 9 Renato Rosaldo asserts this about the French Istonan e oy a une s use 0 et nograp IC aut onty In

assessing late medieval peasant life in France and other parts of Europe.

19

I use interviews in two ways: first, as a 'tool for discovering, exploring, and

evaluating the nature of the process of historical memory - how people make sense of

their past, how they connect individual experience and its social context, how the past

becomes part of the present, and how people use it to interpret their lives and the

world around them' (Perks and Thomson 1998:2). Second, as a tool for learning the

different ways in which Tibetan refugees imagine their homeland, in which they voice

their attachment to it, and the role the myth of return plays in shaping ethnic identities

in exile.

Fieldwork was carried out in March-June 2001 (Northern India, and the

Kathmandu Valley,) and in July-August 2003 (Switzerland). In Northern India

interviews were carried out in Dharamsala, the seat of the Tibetan Government in

exile (GIE), and in the Tibetan settlement ofMajnukatilla, in Delhi. In the Kathmandu

Valley interviews were carried out primarily in the Tibetan settlements of J awalakhel,

Boudhanath, Swayambhu, and Tundikhel. In Switzerland, I conducted the bulk of my

interviews in the German-speaking cantons, particularly in cities of Zurich, Saint

Gallen, Uznach, Horgen, and Rikon.

Around seventy interviews In total were conducted in the three sites.

Interviewees in India were chosen on the basis of age and place of birth. The aim was

to interview as many young Tibetans (early 20s) as possible. In this category, both

Tibetans born in India and in Tibet (new arrivals) were included. Furthermore,

priority was given to interviewing lay Tibetans from Central Tibet, as well as Tibetan

intellectuals who have been considered iconoclasts or radicals by the Dharamsala

establishment. In Nepal, by contrast, most of the interviewees were from Eastern

Tibet and their ages ranged from mid-20s to early 80s. Approximately seventy percent

of my informants in the Kathmandu Valley were part of the monastic community.

Moreover, there was no specific criterion in selecting informants in Switzerland. Most

of the interviews there were conducted on the basis of contacts made from the United

Kingdom, as well as on the basis of recommendations and referrals by other

informants. In the three sites, some of my informants were chance encounters. 52

percent of the total of those interviewed were male and 48 percent female. 10

10 See Appendix 2 for the Table oflnterviews.

20

The average length of the interviews was between 30-45 minutes, and 20

percent of the interviewees were met more than once at different locations. Structured

questioning was used only in cases when intellectuals, government officials and

members of Tibetan organisations (e.g. Tibetan Women Association (TWA) and

Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC)) were interviewed, and only in these cases were the

interviews recorded. I I In most interviews semi-structured and informal questioning

strategies were used. 12 In the case of Tibetan refugees born in Tibet, retrospective

questions were introduced in order to get personal historical information (i.e. to

reconstruct their past in Tibet) that could be juxtaposed to their narratives of life in

occupied Tibet and of their lives in exile.

Furthermore, I attended as observer rallies of a political nature such as the

public condemnation of the 1951 17-Point Agreement on its 50th anniversary on 23

May 2001 in Dharamsala. Likewise, during my stay in Nepal and in India I

participated routinely in religious and social rituals. Examples of these were the daily

circumambulations of stupas and sacred places normally performed by Tibetan

refugees at sunrise and dusk (before and after work). These rituals are important in

that they are at the centre of communal life in exile and they play a very important

role in forging Tibetan identity. Participating in such rituals gave me the opportunity

to meet and talk with refugees in a less formal and confining atmosphere, and often

some of the most fruitful conversations emanated from these casual encounters.

Tibetan society as it has developed in exile is highly unsettled and dispersed.

By unsettled I mean that for most Tibetans, at least in theory, settlement and

resettlement alternatives are not definitive, and hence they see their residence in India,

Nepal and Switzerland as temporary. Likewise, geographically speaking the Tibetan

diaspora is gradually becoming more dispersed, and hence much more complex.

Resettlement options and opportunities in North America, Europe and Australia have

been increasing in the past decade. As we shall see, these facts, together with the

unexpected extension of exile have contributed to the emergence of several

II This was a deliberate strategy - largely the result of my experience in interviewing ordinary Tibetans (particularly elderly Tibetans and members of the monastic community) who explicitly requested not to be taped. Therefore, in most cases I only took enough notes to help me with the transcription at the end of the interviews. 12 With this I mean to say that they were casual conversations with explicit research goals and embedded systematized questions (as shown in Appendix 3).

21

generations of refugees with very different experiences of the homeland and levels of

attachment to it.

Furthermore, in the past two decades, the 'Tibetan Question' has become

highly politicised, and new actors have come into play. Of particular importance have

been western Tibetan Buddhism practitioners, politicians and civilians who are

getting involved in the Tibetan cause, scholars studying Tibetan civilisation, and

philanthropist-sponsors of Tibetan religious institutions, as well as primary and high

school children. All of these have made Tibetans very self-conscious about the

potential new role of the international community in shaping their lives. Therefore, it

is very unlikely that ethnographic work among Tibetan exiled-communities could be

carried out along traditional lines where the boundaries between the observer and the

observed tend to be more established. 13 Tibetan refugees, particularly in northern

India where they are more politically conscious, are inclined to participate much more

with western fieldworkers. One of the reasons for this is the common misconception

among Tibetan exiles that see all westerners as potential sponsors and political

supporters. 14 This enhances the perceived necessity of building an image of Tibetan­

ness that fits the political needs of certain groups within the Tibetan diaspora. Hence

the interaction of Tibetans and fieldworkers tends to be intense. Tibetans' self­

consciousness can make interviewing extremely problematic, since refugees often

answer what they think the interviewer wants to hear. Nonetheless, the interaction

between the interviewer and the interviewee is of particular interest to me, because it

can shed some light upon the various ways in which Tibetans construct different

notions of what it means to be Tibetan, according to different social and political

contexts.

In the analysis and interpretation of the observations gathered, as well as of the

interviews, I tried to avoid unnecessary value judgements. Nevertheless, at times it

was difficult to escape the influence of my own cultural programming and of other

anthropologists' experience in the field in the understanding and interpretation of

13 'Traditional ethnography' has been subverted by the work of anthropologists such as James Clifford and George Marcus. They both privilege a more engaged ethnography. See: Clifford, J. and Marcus, G. (eds.) (1986). Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography .. Berkeley ~nd ~ondon: University of California Press. Marcus G. (1998). Ethnography through Thick and Thm. Pnnceton: Princeton University Press. 14 This is a typical assertion in most of the PhD Dissertations or fieldwork accounts that I have come .acros~: Gombo 1985; Novak 1984; Mountcastle 1997; Klieger 1989 and McLagan 1996, and I was able to venfy thiS myse1fin Dharamsala and the Kathmandu VaHey.

22

some of the issues that came out in the course of my fieldwork IS To counter this, I

tried to adopt an 'emic perspective' throughout, that is, to keep in mind as much as

possible the perspective of reality presented by the subjects studied (Fetterman

1998:20). This implied the recognition of the dangers posed by the construction of

essentialised notions of Tibetan refugees and their views. As a result, it became a

prerogative of this study to accept the existence of multiple realities and perspectives,

and to test all my sources against one another by comparing and juxtaposing them. In

this process, I often drew on direct quotations to allow the subjects to speak for

themselves, and only later was the analysis and interpretation of the sources carried

out.

I have used the data collected during the participant-observation process and

during interviews to enrich my research done primarily in archives, libraries and

research institutes in situ, as well as in the United Kingdom, and Switzerland. This

data has allowed the expansion of the understanding of continuity and change within

the Tibetan society as whole, but particularly within Tibetan refugee communities in

Northern India, the Kathmandu Valley and Switzerland in the past forty years.

The first two theoretical questions are addressed by studying the relationship

between cultural identity and soil (land), and the ways in which forcibly-displaced

people use ethnicity and territorial consciousness in their process of nation-building.

Similarly, by studying the contexts and contents of the national narratives that

emerge, we can shed some light on how exilic communities construct their homeland

symbolically, and attempt to recapture it. Here we touch upon the vast array of

symbolic language such people use in their process of defining themselves as

'nations' .

Tibetan refugees have had to engage in a process of imagining the nation, in

which very dissimilar actors participate: members of different generations, living in

extremely different geographic, economic, educational and religious circumstances in

South Asia, Europe and North America. Furthermore, most Tibetans born in exile

have never been to Tibet, nor have they been raised in the same environment as their

parents. They have been greatly influenced by life in the host country and by some

western political ideas and social values; hence they adhere to a notion of the Tibetan

15 The author of this thesis is a Latin American woman (mid-30s), Catholic by upbringing and Buddhist by choice, who has lived away from her native country (Mexico) intermittently for eight years.

23

nation that is basically different from that of an earlier generation. Therefore, loyalty

and attachment of second and third generation Tibetans to the Tibetan homeland, to

the Dalai Lama, and to Tibetan culture manifests itself in entirely different ways.

It is in this context that one can find in Tibetan refugee communities an

official or mainstream narrative of the nation and a variety of alternative narratives,

which I shall refer to as 'oppositional histories', since they often challenge some of

the basic premises on which the official narrative is based. This is not to imply, in any

way, the need to question the legitimacy or veracity of any of these narratives, but it

is to insist upon the need to examine them closely to see what they reveal about the

differences in self-representation in various groups within Tibetan communities in

exile. It is of the utmost importance to understand correctly the processes through

which ethnic identity and difference are constructed.

In the process of development of Tibetan national consciousness, an historical

image of Tibet as a sovereign and limited political community has been created

among the Tibetan elite. It seeks a Tibetan state for Tibetans that encompasses, in an

ideal situation, both political and ethnographic Tibet. In the same vein, the

demographic, cultural, geographical and political boundaries of the Tibetan nation

have been carefully drawn. Tibetan leaders have made a selection of historical events,

cultural values, and a religious legacy to write a national narrative that fits with the

political exigencies of the times. The imagination of the Tibetan nation with its due

selection of historical events, cultural values and religious legacy professes continuity

with the past but in new settings and changed circumstances. These new settings (i.e.

exile in South Asia and Western countries), impose new sets of practices, which are

'governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature'

(Hobsbawm 1983: 1), which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour.

Sectarian and regional differences, which in the pre-1959 Tibetan setting

seemed strong enough to sustain a sense of separateness among Tibetan communities,

in exile, when dealing with the Chinese or in contact with their host societies, often

tended to lose force as the main markers of identity. However, they are still strongly

felt and they point to the difficulty in talking about a coherent, essentialised view of

Tibetan exiled identity.

An important element that serves as unifier of Tibetan refugee communities is

the consensus as to the sacredness of Tibetan territory, expressed and defended by

24

members of different generations and different upbringing. Nevertheless, the content

or assumptions attributed to that sacredness have differed in significant ways from

one generation to the next, and according to differential experiences of Chinese rule.

The territorial claim of the oldest generation of refugees is based on Tibetan cultural

and religious history (which sees Tibet as a sacred country: Tib. gnas-yul) as well as

on popular beliefs on the special bond between the Tibetan people and the Tibetan

land. The Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration's claims are based on a

selective recollection of Tibetan religious and cultural tradition, mixed with modem

principles of self-determination, sovereignty, and nationalist discourses. For the

youngest generation, born and socialised in South Asia and Western countries,

rescuing Tibet from 'the foreign oppressor' is a matter of utmost urgency and national

pride. Theirs is a claim based on the notion that the Tibetan homeland is precious (Tib.

bod lung-pa tsa-chen-po), but in their case, such preciousness derives from kinship

and from the belief that it is their families' right. Thus, their narratives are commonly

founded upon very pragmatic liberal political ideas coloured by a learned pride in

Tibetan culture. These differences, which will be studied in detail, point to a

discontinuity with the past in the articulation of notions of territory and of the

homeland.

Chapter 1 of this thesis establishes the theoretical framework. It locates the

thesis in the wider field of refugee and diaspora studies by conceptual ising 'the

refugee' and the migrant (in historical, legal and anthropological terms). It establishes

the theoretical approaches to the study of sacred and secular geography, and discusses

the relevance of displacement and exile in the deterritorialisation of culture, and the

construction of ethnic and national identities.

Chapter 2 is a descriptive chapter. It focuses on the definition of the 'Tibetan

refugee' as the object of study, and describes Tibetan diasporic communities (their

composition, geographical distribution, livelihood and so forth). It focuses particularly

on the establishment of refugee settlements and communities in India, Nepal and

Switzerland. It explains the role of host countries and international aid organisations

in settlement and resettlement projects, as well as in training Tibetans in different

economic activities in order to become self-sufficient. Finally, it looks at the

administrative strategies employed by the Government-in-exile to control ordinary

Tibetan refugees.

25

Chapter 3 analyses the historical development of religious and secular notions

of space and territory in Tibet, and of the development of Tibetan religious identity. It

uses four main orientations toward territory (namely: religious, primordial, political,

and instrumental) as a methodological tool to assess the historical articulation of

notions of space in Tibet. It deals in detail with the role of Buddhism in the

sacralisation of the Tibetan landscape and analyses five key factors in this process: the

presence of (Buddhist) Tantric yogins and lamas, a rich Buddhist textual tradition, the

projection of the mandala principle into the Tibetan landscape, the notion of 'hidden

lands' (sbas-yul) , and the idea that Tibet is the special field of Chenrezig, and that

Tibetans are his descendants. Finally it discusses the use of pilgrimage practice to

reinforce these notions.

Chapter 4 deals with the establishment of the People's Republic of China

(1949), and the final incorporation of Tibet into the PRC in 1959 as the source of the

Tibetan diaspora. It studies the PRC's minority policies and life in Tibet under

Chinese rule, and analyses the ways in which they have destroyed Tibetan cultural

heritage and have forced a transformation of traditional notions of space. It analyses

the impact of class struggle, the collectivisation of the Tibetan economy, socialist

education, the subsequent modernisation and ethnic tourism in the transformation of

Tibetan cultural identity and the desacralisation of Tibet.

Chapter 5 focuses on the various ways in which the Tibetan leadership in

exile, particularly the Dalai Lama and the Kashag, the executive body of the Central

Tibetan Administration (CTA), have imagined the broad entity referred to as 'the

Tibetan Nation', and the impact of this process on the construction of Tibetan cultural

identity among refugee communities. It analyses the ways in which the Tibetan

leaders have transformed Tibet into a symbolic space and constructed a narrative of

Tibetan-ness based on what I call the 'One People, One Territory' principle,

described as Pan-Tibetan. This chapter also examines the challenges to these official

versions of Tibet and Tibetan cultural identity by various refugee groups: an

iconoclastic Tibetan Buddhist sect, a regional organisation, and a non-Buddhist

religious group. These groups advance a different concept of 'homeland' and national

identity, without feeling that they have betrayed their ethnic and cultural origins.

Chapter 6 focuses on three main questions. How is the Tibetan homeland

perceived in exile? What is the role of the myth of return in the construction of the

homeland in exile? And how are different notions of territory transplanted or 'created'

26

In exile? It uses the methodological tool of the four orientations (views) towards

territory (a fifth one is added, namely, the aesthetic-spatial orientation) to study the

major changes and continuities in the articulation of notions of space and territory in

Tibetan refugee communities. This chapter relies heavily on fieldwork interviews and

on autobiographical testimonials written in Western languages.

Chapter 7 analyses the Western mythologising of Tibet and its impact on the

construction of Tibetan identity in exile. It deals first with the Pre- 1950

mythologizing of Tibet by Western explorer-travellers, envoys of the British

government stationed in India, missionaries, as well as fiction writers who became

quite influential in shaping Western images of Tibet. Second, it touches upon the

post-1950 construction of images of Tibet through the writings of humanitarians,

scholars, tourists and Western Tibetan Buddhism practitioners who due to Tibetans'

displacement had a new access to Tibetans and Tibetan lamas in South Asia and

Western countries. It deals with the development of Tibet as a legitimate field of

study in Western universities and in the establishment of Tibetan Buddhism centres in

the West, as important steps to a new understanding of Tibet and Tibetan culture.

Finally, it analyses the ways in which Tibetan refugees participate in the

representation of Tibet, and the dual process of 'de-mystifying' Tibet and sanctioning

previous essentialised and mystified conceptions of Tibet and Tibetans for their own

political or economic purposes.

27

Chapter 1. Displacement, Exile and Identity: Theoretical Framework

1.1. Displacement and 'the Refugee'

Population displacement can be understood as a 'rupturing of established spatial

norms of demographic distribution, sometimes as a result of deliberate state

engineering, and sometimes as a result of forces over which the state has little or no

direct control and which may indeed contribute to its destabilization, collapse, and

reconstitution' (Baron and Gatrell 2003:60). The most powerful such forces are war

and revolutions which intend to wipe out existing political, social, and economic

system, in order to establish different ones. Baron and Gatrell regard population

displacement as integral to the development and constitution of modem Europe, rather

than as a pathology of modernity (Baron and Gatrell 2003 :55). In the South and East

Asian contexts too, population displacement has played a crucial role in the formation

of modem nation-states, particularly during the decolonisation processes from the late

1940s to the 1960s, as well as during and in the aftermath of communist revolutions.

During this period, there was an intensification of population movement both within

Asia and from Asia to other parts of the world. By the early 1990s the total number of

native South Asians living outside the region (Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal and

Sri Lanka) was about 8.6 million and Chinese living outside China numbered some 22

million (Clarke, Peach and Vertovec 1990).16

The Chinese revolution is a very significant case in point. It was a source of

international population movements claiming refugee status. The first of these was the

flight of the Nationalist Government led by Chiang Kaishek and the Guomin Dang

(GMD) to Taiwan after their defeat by the Chinese Communist Party and the

establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The second was the flight of

thousands of Tibetans due to the violent occupation of their country and their

incorporation into the PRC in 1959.

The term 'displaced person' has come to be used widely as a synonym for

'refugee'; in a legal sense, the two terms are not interchangeable, though they overlap

16 Since Tibet is generally considered part of the PRe, these figures include Tibetan refugees.

28

in substantial ways. 17 When talking about refugees as displaced people, we will be

referring here to people who have experienced a violent separation from their native

cultures through physical dislocation, as well as cultural displacement in the fonn of a

colonising imposition of a foreign culture (Bammer 1994). We then trace the origins

and contexts in which 'the refugee' has appeared as a world phenomenon and the

ways in which such status is granted by the international community. We

acknowledge the different approaches to the study of refugees and we distinguish

between refugees and other forms of migration.

Look at a migrant and a refugee.

Hold on to their commonalities as you witness the measure of compulsion in departures.

Yet it is the very measure which has been blurred by the 'new world order': how do we now distinguish between the dream of opportunity and the search for security?

The difference between the two is marked as it ever was. The difference is blood.

(lma Korjenic, Bosnian refugee quoted in Papastergiadis 1998:169).

The existence of the term 'refugee' emerged in Europe in the seventeenth-century to

refer to religious exiles from France, mainly Calvinists persecuted by the absolutist

ideology of Louis XIV's regime (Zolberg et al 1989; Tuitt 1999). In the twentieth

century, the history of refugees began with the replacement of the multi-ethnic

European empires by the new world order of sovereign states causing those who did

not 'belong' or did not fit the nationalist principle of 'one state one culture' to flee to

other states (Harrell-Bond and Voutira 1992). But, 'the refugee' as a specific social

category and a legal problem of global dimensions did not exist in its full modem

fonn until the Second World War (Malkki 1995a:498-99). The institutional

framework to deal with the flows of refugees developed as a result of new waves of

refugees caused by the two world wars, the ensuing Cold War in the late 1940s and

early 1950s, and the decolonisation process in Asia and Africa, which exerted

pressure on Western European and other Western countries. In this context, a

17 The tenn 'displaced person' was originally employed to describe those persons displaced within their own country (internally displaced person), by the effects of civil war, insurgency, or natural disasters. Later, the tenn was generalized to include those crossing inte~ational borders for the same re~sons as the above plus persecution just as refugees. Although dIsplaced persons are ~lw~ys .hable to international (humanitarian) assistance, not all of them are legally refugees. For the mtncacies of the legal differences between the 'displaced' and 'the refugee' see Goodwin-Gill (1996) and Grahl-Madsen (1966).

29

definition of 'the refugee' gradually emerged, encompassing a view of the refugee as

a victim of some form of persecution.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the Indochinese war, the internecine wars in Africa

and Central America, the rising and consolidation of military and authoritarian

regimes in South America and Asia, as well as economic depression had a significant

effect in deepening the refugee crisis worldwide, in broadening the preoccupation

with the issue beyond Cold War concerns, and in a new flow of displaced people from

the developing (South) to the industrialised (North) countries in search of better lives.

In international law the prevailing definition is the one embraced by the 1951

Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 UN Protocol

which defined the term 'refugee' as 'any person who ... owing to well founded fear of

being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership to a

particular social group, or political opinion, is outside of the country of his

nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the

protection of that country; or who not having a nationality and being outside the

country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or,

owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it' (quoted in Steinbock 1999:14).

The aims of the definition concern the two great paradigms of the post-war

period: the rights of non-discrimination and free expression (Steinbock 1999).

Persecution is thought of as a severe and violent form of discrimination, inherent in

the 'normal' functioning of oppressive regimes as they were known and perceived at

the time of the adoption of the Convention (Sztucki 1999). It reflects the inability of

regimes to protect the basic rights of its citizens. I8 Thus, the definition portrays the

refugee 'as an activist', engaging in some politically significant activity that the state

seeks to extinguish; 'as a target', by misfortune of belonging to a social or cultural

group that has been singled out for the abuse of state power; and 'as mere victim'.

This covers persons displaced by societal or international violence that makes life in

their own country impossible (Zolberg et al 1989:30).

Furthermore, the definition has been premised on the idea that 'as a rule,

people do not abandon their homes and flee from their own country or community

unless they are confronted with serious threats to their life or liberty' and use flight as

30

'the ultimate survival strategy' (UNHCR 1997:11). The UN, through its main refugee

instrument, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) set to

provide a three-fold solution for the refugee issue, that is: settlement of refugees in the

country of first asylum; voluntary repatriation once the threat of persecution has

disappeared; and resettlement in a third country (Stein 1983:190). By 1 January 2003

there were 20.5 million refugees, of whom 9.5 were settled in Asia alone

( www.unhcr.chlcgi -binltexis/vtx/statistics).

In the past decade, one of the most contested areas when dealing with refugees

has been recognizing the genuineness of their claim to refugee status. The migration

flows of recent decades and the 'compassion fatigue' (Grahl-Madsen 1983)

experienced by many countries and international organisations, generated a new wave

of inquiry in the field and the term economic refugee emerged to refer to those people

seeking employment, escaping famine, or misery. Therefore, a distinction was drawn

between 'forced displacement' and 'voluntary migration.' 19 Following the

conventional definition, voluntary migrants would not be entitled to refugee status;

however, they have been liable to international assistance.

Refugees are considered by anthropological theory as people 'who have

undergone a violent 'rite' of separation and, unless or until they are incorporated as

citizens into their host state, find themselves in transition, in a state of liminality. This

betwixt-and-between status may contain social and economic dimensions as well as

legal and psychological ones' (Harrell-Bond and Voutira 1996:1077).

By the same token, the transient nature of exile, and the myth of return have a

direct bearing on the refugees' overall experience in the host country, and on the

preservation of their ethnic identity, while at the same time inhibiting assimilation to

their host societies. It is this experience of refugees and their ways of coping with it

that interests the anthropologist, because 'one of the assumptions behind most

traditional anthropology is that human nature is best served in a sedentary setting'. It

is often assumed that upon losing physical connection to the homeland through a

traumatic experience, uprooted people lose their cultural identity and their nationality

is damaged (Malkki 1996; 1995b).

18 As conceived in the 1948 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 19 Such differentiation often appears to be blurred. 'Almost every movement involves an element of choice. However terrible the circumstances, people frequently have some latitude to decide where to go and indeed, whether to flee at all' (UNHCR 1997:35).

31

Drawing upon the literature on refugee studies, one can distinguish five main

approaches to the refugee phenomenon. Firstly, the dominant approach sees uprooted

people as a humanitarian and emergency issue, as well as victims of human rights

abuses and persecution. Secondly, a foreign policy and international security approach

is based on the premise that 'national sovereignty remains the linchpin of the

international political system, and that while a government may abuse its citizens with

relative impunity, the flood of refugees which result from such actions quickly

becomes the 'business' of other nations' (Ferris 1993:xx; Zolberg et aI1989).

A third approach views refugees as an international system issue. This

approach seeks to predict and measure the impact refugees have on the functioning of

the international system and its ability to respond to common challenges (Ferris

1993). The institutional framework of the United Nations is based on all of the above.

Fourthly, uprooted people are seen as a development issue. This approach is

also concerned with how displaced people become self-sufficient in the host country,

and what will happen to them in the long term. Non-Governmental Organizations

(NGOs) use this approach in their work with refugee communities worldwide.

A fifth approach sees refugees as a challenge to traditional - territorialised -

notions of national and cultural identity. It studies the context of uprootedness and the

refugees' quest for survival, as well as their process of adapting to new environments

as models of social change. This is the approach used by social scientists,

anthropologists, and cultural historians when studying refugees; and it is the one used

in this thesis to study the construction of ethnic and national identities in Tibetan

refugee communities.

The agencies that deal with refugees vary in scope and involvement. The

international refugee regime's instrument par excellence is the UNHCR, but other UN

instruments play significant roles in relief programmes: The UNICEF, The World

Food Program, The Disaster Relief Organisation (UNDRO), as well as other UN

human rights-related instruments. Given that all of these are part of the scheme of the

UN, they are governmental organisations. In this century, however, NGOs have also

contributed to the assistance of refugees. Due to their low level of bureaucratisation

they are able to respond more quickly, they tend to be more flexible in giving

assistance and they often work in coordination with Government Organisations (Ferris

1993).

32

The recipient countries tend to respond in three ways: by ethnic exclusion, by

assimilation policies, and by multiculturalism (Rex 1993). Ethnic exclusion is typical

of richer countries whose populations struggle to accept such people on a basis of

equality, and fear the economic, social and cultural impact of their penetration (e.g.

Great Britain toward some Asian refugees and economic migrants). Assimilation

policies tend to buffer the overall impact by incorporating refugees into the majority's

economic, social and professional world (e.g. France and the U.S. with certain

migrants and displaced people). Finally, multiculturalism involves both the attempt to

ensure the full citizenship rights to minorities and the recognition of their right to

maintain their separate cultures (e.g. India with Tibetan refugees).

1.2. Approaches to the Study of Ethnic and National Identity in Displaced Communities

1.2.1. Culture, Ethnicity and Identity

'The Modern man is not loyal to a monarch or a land or a faith, whatever he may say, but to a culture' (Gellner 1983 :67).

Gellner seems to suggest, as many other anthropologists have done recently (Malkki

1995b, 1996; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Jameson 1984), that culture is not in essence

a territorially-bound concept. In the post-modem world, culture and identity are much

more mobile, malleable and fluid than previously supposed (for instance by Geertz

1973; Douglass 1966).20 Therefore, the deterritorialisation of culture is taken to be a

salient feature of post-modernity, shifting traditional ethnic attachments to territories

defined as 'homelands', 'motherlands' and 'fatherlands' to a less central role in

communal identification. Although mass migration in general does subvert a

territorialised view of culture and ethnicity, some forms of migration such as forced

displacement make this post-modem assumption very problematic. This is particularly

the case of displaced ethnic communities who have been victims of war, or whose

ancestral territories have been violently occupied by a foreign power.

In order to understand how this is so, it is important to look first at the ways in

which ethnicity is constructed. Where there are 'named' communities, with a sense of

20 'Post-modernity' is conceived as the condition whereby social and cultural borders, as well as political boundaries become more porous ~a~s to technological advances~ airplane travel, mass tourism, economic globalization, and mass mIgratIOn (Bammer 1994; Appadural 1996).

33

collective consciousness and solidarity that has developed around shared ancestry

myths, historical memories and cultures, and an attachment to a specific territory,

there are ethnic communities (Smith, A. 1996, 1997). Identity in ethnic communities

entails psychological and sociological processes through which the individual

produces order in his or her life, and more or less self-consciously locates

himselflherself in the social world. Ethnic identity is thus, a 'mode of action and of

representation: it refers to a decision people make to depict themselves or others

symbolically as the bearers of a certain cultural identity. The social dimensions of

identity and identification may be either chosen or imposed' (Cohen, A. 1994: 119).

Moreover, ethnic identity must be understood functionally, that is, with its

primary function of achieving the greatest degree of differentiation from other groups.

It is an aggregation of ethnic variables such as tradition, culture, language, kinship,

and territory. Which of these variables is emphasised more than the other depends on

the nature of the group against whom the difference is being drawn and ethnic

boundaries erected, as well as on the nature of the political struggle. My point here is

that issues of identity - sometimes apparently unproblematic and stable - can be given

a radically new twist by political upheaval, such as war, occupation or resistance.

Therefore, when ethnic communities experience displacement, the ancestral homeland

becomes the centre of the communities' national yearnings. In this way, distinctive

ethnic myths are of particular importance in the process of nation-building.

Such myths can be of two types: those that cite genealogical ancestry and

those which trace a more ideological descent. According to the former, the

community is a network of interrelated kin groups claiming common 'noble' ancestry,

and thereby marking them off from those unable to make such a claim. To the latter,

the basis of the community is a spiritual kinship and a cultural affinity; a sort of

ideological 'fit' with the presumed ancestors. Thus, descent is traced through the

persistence of certain kinds of virtues or other distinctive cultural qualities reproduced

from generation to generation (Smith, A. 1999:58).

According to the American anthropologist and missionary Robert Ekvall

(1898-1978) who lived among nomad communities in eastern Tibet from 1923 to

1938, Tibetan ethnicity before the Chinese takeover was built around five main

criteria. He recognised as Tibetan anyone who identified with them. 'Listed in order

of their importance, as the Tibetans state and rate them: these criteria are: religion

34

(chos lugs gcig); folkways (kha lugs gcig); language (skad lugs gcig); race (mi rigs

gcig); and land (sa cha gcig).21 In both importance and sharpness of definition these

five criteria are not equal. The first (religion) is the dominant one; the last two, (race

and land) are admittedly of lesser importance' (Ekvall 1960:376). Ekvall's assertion is

an extremely useful starting point for my discussion of Tibetan ethnic identity in the

context of displacement. I do not question the criteria listed above, nor the explicit

importance Ekvall ascribed to them.

However, it is important to note, especially in light of the sacred meanings

attributed to the land that in non-threatened stable settings, the significance of one's

homeland and territory is often overlooked or taken for granted. As the following

theoretical discussion of the nation and nation-building shows and chapters 5 and 6

demonstrate, displacement produced by foreign occupation renders territory and

kinship (or land and race, in Ekvall' s terms) much more important. In cases where the

'national' home was not normally conceived in religious terms, in the midst of a

nationalist plight for self-determination, it acquires sacred meanings.

In the (post-1959) Tibetan case, a powerful way of enhancing the religious

significance of the Tibetan land has been by recalling ancestry myths which claim

both genealogical and ideological descent. These myths are based on two important

notions: first, that the Dalai Lama comes from an unbroken lineage of descent that

goes all the way back to the great religious Kings of the Yarlung Dynasty (seventh

and eighth centuries), particularly to King Songtsen Gampo (Srong-btsan sgam-po,

AD 609-649?). Songtsen Gampo is credited for having introduced Buddhism to Tibet,

and considered an incarnation of the Buddhist deity Chenrezig, embodiment of

compassion. Second, it is based on the notion that Tibet is the special field of activity

of Chenrezig, that Tibetans are his descendants, and that the Dalai Lama is his

incarnation. From a Tibetan point of view these not only give legitimacy to Tibetan's

territorial claims, but also to the Dalai Lama's right to exercise political authority over

the Tibetan people.22

21 Chos lugs gcigs refers more specifically to the 'Buddhist Doctrine'. Kha literally means mouth; and kha lugs gcigs refers to eating habits; and according to Ekvall, this compound can be used to refer to general behaviour patterns. He also notes that in another usage, kha is a 'folkloric' term for culture (Ekvall 1960:378). One of the most important Tibetan usages of mi-rigs-gcigs is 'n~tionality' rather than race. It has important blood connotations, that is, of kinship/ family lineage, of bIrth and descent. It is often implied with this compound that Tibetans have a single line of descent of autochthonous origin (Ekvall 1960). One of the sa-cha-gcig usages is propertied-land. 'Tibetans respond too by a feeling of proud proprietorship and sense of belonging there, and there alone' (Ekvalll?60:381). . 22 See chapter 3 for further details on these ideas. Here, it suffices to say that, the belIef that the Dalal

35

Before the politicisation of Tibetan ethnicity by the Chinese occupation of

Tibet, the definition of 'we' vis-a-vis 'others', was a Buddhist differentiation between

believers (Tib. nang-pa, lit. 'insider') and non-believers (Tib. phyi-pa, lit. 'outsiders').

However, since 1959, there has been a growing consciousness about a Tibetan

identity that sharply differentiates itself from rgya-rigs (Chinese people) or rgya-mi

(the Han Chinese). The 'in-group' is increasingly identified as bodpa or bod-rigs

(Norbu, D. 1992:10).

In general, forced displacement has played an important role in the

construction of nations in ethnic communities that, one could say, 'arrived late' to

modernity. This is particularly the case of ethnic communities whose national

histories were shaped either by self-imposed insularity (as in the case of the Tibetans)

or by more powerful nations (as with the Vietnamese, Kurds, and Armenians). The

experience of refugeedom for these ethnic communities has imposed the very difficult

task of forging national consensus/ awareness in trans-national contexts. Furthermore,

crucial to the accomplishment of nationality has been the development of exiled

governments, as in the Tibetan and Armenian cases.23 Finally, the attachment to an

alleged sacred territory, together with ancestry myths and the existence of some form

of religious institution or belief give cohesion and a strong sense of ethnic identity to

exilic communities.

1.2.2. Imagining the Nation, Constructing National Identity in Exile

Benedict Anderson (1983,1991 :4-6) in his famous dictums: 'nation-ness, as well as

nationalism are cultural artefacts of a particular kind' and 'the nation... is an

imagined political community-and imagined as both inherently limited and

sovereign' already implied the creative process in which most of the known ethnic

Lama is the embodiment, and incarnation of Chenrezig was disseminated in the reign of the 5th Dalai Lama in the seventeenth century. In this way, the Gelugpa School claims political legitimacy over the territories ruled by such Kings. 23 The early origins of the Armenian diaspora are found in the division of Armenia (from 1375) between the Persian, and Ottoman empires, and after 1828 the Russian empire. In 1914 around 2.5 million people lived in the traditional, now partitioned home territories. Around 2.5 million others lived in 'intrastate diasporas', that is, in exile communities outside the home territories but still within the boundaries of the three multi-ethnic empires that also ruled the homeland. Finally there was a third exile population whose members moved to diasporas in both the West and Asia (Tololyan 1991: 170). It is in the intrastate diasporas, particularly, the Ottoman Armenian diaspora that we find the developm~nt of different Governments-in-exile. Particularly, during the period from the 1640s to 1914, Armeman elites were able to meet specific needs that declining, inefficient, and supremely indifferent empires had no mechanisms to attend to.

36

communities of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries engaged upon as they

were being transformed into nation-states. He saw nations, as imagined political

communities, imagined in the sense that 'the members of even the smallest nation will

never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear them, yet in the

minds of each lives the image of their communion. [ ... ] In fact, all communities

larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact are imagined'. 'The nation is

imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion

human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations'. 'It is

imagined as sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which

Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely

ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm [ ... ] and nations dream of being free [ ... ] The

emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state. Finally, it is imagined as a community

because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each,

the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson

1983,1991 :7).

In this way, national imagination is conceived as an organized field of social

practices, made possible by electronic mediation (television, cinema, computers and

telephones), and mass migration (Appadurai 1996:31), as well as by print capitalism

(Anderson 1983). The national horizontal comradeship that develops through such

imaginings generates what Appadurai calls a 'community sentiment', that is, a group

that begins to imagine and feel things together (Appadurai 1996:8). In the view of

Appadurai and Anderson, as well as other social scientists and historians such as

Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), the nation is largely a social, modem construct, which

emerged as a result of specific political and technological conditions. In this study, it

is argued that in displaced ethnic communities, the process of nation-building has

been largely stimulated by the conditions described above. Nevertheless, because of

the experience of forced displacement, and the construction of ethnicity vis-a-vis an

essentialised 'other', the nation is rooted in a communal historical consciousness. In

this sense, displaced 'nations' are deeply historical but are at the same time 'fixed' in

the modem.

In any case, the construction of nations and national narratives implies, as

some scholars have argued (Gellner 1983,1997; Eller 1997; Renan 1996 [1882]) two

37

basic elements: one cultural and the other voluntaristic. The former refers to the

sharing of ethnic attributes, and the latter to the fact that members of the same nation

recognise each other as belonging to the same nation; hence nations become 'the

artefacts of men's convictions and loyalties and solidarities' (Gellner 1997:57).

Similarly, it seems that in displaced communities where national memories are

concerned, grief is of more value than triumph; that is, national solidarity is usually

constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices one has made in the past and of those that

one is prepared to make in the future for the sake of the nation (Renan 1996

[1882]:52-53). This sense of shared suffering IS particularly important in the

construction of nationhood in displaced communities.

In short, a 'nation' in the context of displacement will be understood as a

'named' community whose members identify with a set of shared cultural, social and

political values, as well as with ancestry myths and historical memories. Their

members identify each other as part of the same group and tacitly pledge some form

of allegiance to each other. In some circumstances, members of such a national

community may share the ambition of returning to the homeland's ancestral

territories, and claim it as a sovereign nation-state. They also establish (or attempt to

establish) in their host countries political institutions (e.g. Governments-in-exile) that

could administer life in exile. These are also intended to pave the way for an eventual

return to the homeland.

In order to fit neatly into such national community, their members have to go

through a process of selectively forgetting events from their common past history

(Renan 1996 [1882]). 'All profound changes in consciousness, by their very nature,

bring with them characteristic amnesias. Out of such oblivions, in specific historical

circumstances, spring narratives' (Anderson [1983],1991 :204) which are capable of

healing social rifts and of bringing cohesion into apparently heterogeneous groups.

By the same token, Anthony Smith argues that the intellectual elite of an

ethnic community in the process of becoming a nation plays a leading role in

redefining the community by engaging in selective readings of pre-existing myths,

symbols, customs and memories of the ethnic past, and putting forth a new

understanding of history. Similarly, Smith argues that there are two main patterns by

which such 'intellectual-educators' could make the community participate in their

38

moral and political goals.24

The first pattern is the use of landscape, or what he calls

'poetic spaces', that is, a national territory or homeland endowed with poetic and

historical connotations. The second is the treatment of man-made edifices as natural

components of an ethnic landscape, with 'an historical poetry of their own'. The

construction of a 'modem romantic historiography of the homeland turns lakes and

mountains, rivers and valleys into the 'authentic' repository of popular virtues and

collective history. [ ... ] In this poetic history, fact and legend become fused to produce

a stirring symbol of purity and rectitude, and a dramatic myth of resistance to tyranny'

(Smith, A. 1996: 120).

By implying a close link between history and nature, the 'intellectual­

educator' is able to define the community in space. With landscape and history used

in this way, intellectual-educators evoke the type of shared destiny and cultural

uniqueness that not only unifies people, but also turns nationalists' sentiments and

ideologies into political action (Smith, A. 1996: 121). In displaced ethnic

communities, rights to self-determination and statehood are framed, in this way,

within a narrative of attachment to a poetic, yet well-defined territory, a shared

history, and a common and 'unique' cultural identity among inhabitants of the

'country' they used to inhabit. In this context, the presentation and use of what I call

the 'One People, One Territory' principle, responds to a 'One History, One Culture'

principle put forth by the intellectual-educators, which by definition, implies the

drawing of territorial and cultural boundaries with the 'Other'.

The 'Other' is portrayed as the aggressor and transgressor of imagined cultural,

political and national boundaries. Most displaced people, and particularly refugees

struggle with bitter memories of repression, persecution, expulsion from their

homelands and escape. The emphasis on the victimisation of refugees and other

displaced communities vilifies the 'other' in more than one sense, and has given rise to

a set of dichotomies that portray the victims of displacement in a positive light while

ascribing the opposite qualities to the perpetrator. A case in point is the way Tibetans

portray the Chinese. In their national narratives Tibetans are portrayed as

environmentally friendly, advocates of human rights, of democracy, of religious

values, and victims of cultural genocide. By contrast, the Chinese Government, and

often the Chinese in general are portrayed as destroyers of nature, violators of human

24 Anthony Smith also calls them 'political archaeologists' since they recover the pristine ethos of the

39

rights, and imperial, as well as materialistic and chauvinist. Finally, as part of the

construction of the 'Other', many refugees and displaced people commemorate, indeed

celebrate, a battle lost as a great moral victory of the nation deprived of its land.25

The principle of 'One Culture, One History' shared by 'One People, over One

Territory' seems to be applied almost universally by ethnic communities in their

process of nation-building. The exiled and diaspora elites of such communities in their

role of intellectual-educators are not only primarily concerned with the preservation of

their ethnic identity, but also, and most importantly, with creating the necessary

conditions for the translation of political legitimacy into the creation of a state for their

nation. Intellectual-educators create in this wayan essentialist view of the nation - that

as a people they have always and everywhere possessed a core of discernible,

ethnically determined qualities?6

For instance, in the cases of both the Armenian and the Tibetan Diasporas, the

clergy, playing the role of intellectual-educators were the principal actors in the

reconstruction of the national histories, and hence, their narratives reflect a religious

reading. They talk about a people that are essentially the same people that have lived

in the Armenian and Tibetan Plateaux, respectively, since the beginning of their

civilisations in the sixth century, and that in spite of countless adversities; they have

managed to survive with their language, religious institutions and a sense of ethnic

~ast and reconstruct a modem nation in the image of the past ethnic community (Smith, A. 1999:12). 5 For example, Tibetans celebrate the anniversary of the 10 March Lhasa Uprising which triggered the

flight of the Dalai Lama and thousands of Tibetans (see Chapter 5). This event has been interpreted in exile as showing the spirit of the Tibetan nation. Likewise, in the Armenian diaspora, for 1,500 years the 'one great day of the religious calendar has been Vardanants, the anniversary of the defeat and death of the Armenian Saint Vardan and 696 men at Avarayr in a battle against the (Muslim) Persian Army. Though the Persians won on the battlefield, the sacrifice that preserved Armenia for Christianity is seen as a victory' (Suny 1993:9). Because the Armenian Church played a key role in forging Armenian nationalism in earlier stages of the diaspora, this event became significant in Armenian historical narrative. Furthermore, even the experience of genocide along with a renewed identification and attachment to the homeland have become the major themes in the constantly changing national consciousness of diaspora and homeland Armenians (Suny 1993: 11). 26 Through the application of these principles, the Armenian elite, for instance, was able to capitalise on ethnic commonalities to gradually build a sense of Armenian-ness based on a common language, an attachment to territory, and devotion to the Church. In addition, the articulation of a national history that speaks of the continuous existence of the Armenians as a historic people, their origins in the Armenian plateau, arms them with the right of self-determination, nationhood and a historically sanctified claim to the territories that constitute Armenia (Suny 1993:4-5,8). The emergence of such a national narrative within the Ottoman Armenian diaspora is significant considering the fact, that just as in the Tibetan case, the history of the Armenian plateau suggests the existence of a cluster of principalities that fought one another, and who often allied with non-Armenian powers against each other. Thus, the success of the political elites lays in their ability to develop the infrastructure of communal government to satisfy the material and spiritual needs of the intra-state diaspora, as well as in the creation of a mythic community with allegedly common past and clear rights to statehood.

40

identity intact. Because this view of their national histories plays such an important

political role for the Armenian and Tibetan elites, 'any attempt to dispute it, to

decompose the collection of beliefs that make up this reading, must be done with care

and sensitivity, with full awareness that such an investigation may be perceived as an

attack on the very soul of the nation' (Suny 1993 :4-5).

The reconstruction of religious and social institutions III exile is also an

important element in the process of nation-building in displaced communities. These

tend to play the role of unifying symbols in which the collective activity and identity

is focused. This is particularly important as the communities start to disperse all over

the world, and as members of the community, particularly, the younger generations,

become less attached to the homeland. Exiled institutions that illustrate this point are

the 14th Dalai Lama as the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibetans, the Armenian

Church in the period 1740s-1914, and the belief in the Covenant of God with the

People of Israel for the Jewish Diaspora. The focus on a single leader, has given the

Tibetan case a distinctive characteristic.

1.2.3. 'Refugeedom' and the Re-Territorialisation of Culture

We started our theoretical discussion saying that the deterritorialisation of culture as a

salient feature of post-modernity is rendered problematic when we deal with forms of

mass migration which involve violence, such as in the cases of forced displacement.

We also pointed out that displaced communities tend to bring territorial awareness

and attachment to the forefront of their national identity, and that this is usually done

by the intellectual elite (the intellectual-educators, who are often the political leaders

and members of government-in-exiles, in the cases where these develop). Such an

elite takes it upon itself to portray the ancestral land as historically unique and uses

poetic language to imbue the land with sacred meaning. If the national territory was

already conceived in religious terms, intellectual-educators recall and disseminate the

historical and religious significance of the homeland within the national community.

In this way historical memory is territorialized (Smith, A. 1999).

Governments-in-exile thus play an important role in the process of re­

territorializing culture, in putting the issue of territoriality at the centre of ethnic

identity, in constructing national narratives that fit with what their members perceive

to be the political aims of the nation, and in developing an important centre of cultural

production in exile. According to Reisman 'the term 'government-in-exile' is an

41

oxymoron, for the government-in-exile does not control territory and, without that,

does not control the people who inhabit it [or used to inhabit it]. Without those bases

of power, it cannot discharge those international obligations expected of

governments'. Moreover, he argues that in fact, the Government-in-exile is not,

properly speaking, a government at all, but a political and legal technique used by the

exiled elite who identify with a real or mythic community associated with the territory

controlled by the government in situ, to 'influence, undermine or replace a particular

government by trying to challenge and deprive it of its authority' (Reisman 1991 :238).

These arguments seem to point to cases where the government in situ is ruled

by other nationals - as in cases of coup d'etats where the displaced government re­

organises itself outside of its country of origin with the aim of an eventual take-over.

Nonetheless, the experience of displacement and the nationalist task at hand is not the

same in these cases as in that of governments displaced by foreign aggression,

invasion or occupation and reorganised in exile. In order to legitimise their 'rule' over

refugee communities under their imagined jurisdiction, most such governments

possess three features of authority. These are the ability to give a sense of continuity

with the past (establishing institutions and cultural traditions in exile), the expenditure

of considerable resources in claiming rights over ancestral territories for the national

community; and the provision of a range of services that the government in situ did

not provide and the host countries cannot provide for them (Tololyan 1991).

In claiming the land, political leaders and, in the case of Governments-in-exile,

government officials attempt to influence what goes on in the home territories. They

also try to defend it from perceived perils, as well as exclude and include people,

things and events within the homeland. These represent attempts to empower the

dispossessed nation. Clearly, the relationship between territoriality and national

identity is important and multifaceted, for the emergence of a sense of nationhood has

had great effects upon the perception of territory. Whether operating at the local, the

provincial or national level, territorial identification is associated with unique

assemblages of symbols which exert an almost mystical influence over their devotees

(Muir 1997: 14-15). It could be argued therefore, that debates about land and territory

are in fact spin-offs of arguments that are substantially about power, justice and self­

determination (Appadurai 1996:21).

These arguments are justified on the grounds of the convergence of one

coherent and relative homogeneous people sharing the same history and culture, over

42

one territory with apparently clear political and cultural boundaries. Finally, the

contested territory of a displaced community is very often imbued with sacred

meaning, legitimating the arguments about justice and self-determination. However,

this need not be a prerogative of the political elites; where there has been a strong

historical bond between a community and its land, displacement often only re­

enforces notions and attachments that were already there. An important indicator is

the way displaced people tend to create spatial reproductions of their homelands in

their host countries, transplanting notions of secular and religious space. Often this is

done through constructing homes and shrines in the traditional style, using 'home'

names of cities and places to name their businesses in exile, and re-enacting religious

rituals that enhance regional and territorial awareness. In addition, many of these

communities become involved in one way or another in social and religious projects

in the homeland. In brief, it is clear that certain ethnic communities have a

longstanding tradition of articulating notions of place and territory in religious terms.

The next section analyses the ways in which this process occurs and the role it plays

in binding people to place, as well as in constructing ethnic and national identities.

1.2.4. The Establishment of Sacred Geographies

'Every hierophany whatsoever transforms the place where it occurs: hitherto profane, it is thenceforward a sacred area. ,27

(Eliade 1958:367)

The establishment of sacred geographies is an important part of the development of

both religious and secular communities. They are also an important element in the

construction of ethnic identity. Most religions hold certain places as sacred 'because

the divine became manifest there in one way or another, in experiences or traditions

of theophanies or hierophanies, in miracles or in lives of saintly men'. [ ... J 'In the

same way, whole cities were sanctified because either in theory or in actual fact they

were constructed so as to reflect cosmic reality - a kind of microcosmic spatial

reflection of the macrocosm and its divine ground' (Werblowsky 1998:11). Thus,

sacred places as inexhaustible sources of power enable religious individuals, simply

by entering them, to have a share in the power of the sacred (Eliade 1958).

27 The term refers to any manifestation of the sacred (Hinnells 1995: 151).

43

In Buddhism, sacredness has traditionally been understood to be a quality of

truth, a quality fundamental to the teachings of 'Enlightened' beings, such as the

historical Buddha Shakyamuni. In this way, sacred places house relics of those who

embodied 'truth', or have been imbued with its quality by their sheer presence. In the

Saddhamapundarike-sutra it is explained that great stupas (Tib. mchod-rten, reliquary

moulds) should be erected to mark the site where the teachings have either been

'declared, explained, recited or copied out' (quoted in Boord 1994:16).28 In the third

century BeE according to tradition, the Indian King Ashoka recovered, divided, and

dispersed relics of the Buddha by building eighty-four thousand stupas to house them.

This justified the proliferation of stupas throughout the Buddhist world (Naquin and

Yu 1992:5).

'Localised' religions that are characterised by the worship of local gods

provide other means through which space is consecrated. These have historically

bound people to place by encouraging in their devotees a strong sense of the past, of

lineage and continuity in place. Land and religion are here so closely associated that a

family could not renounce one without yielding the other. Exile is considered the

worst of fates, since it deprives a man not only of his physical means of support but

also of his religion and the protection of laws guaranteed by the local gods (Tuan

1977: 152-154). This type of link between land and the individual is typical of nomad,

herder, and agricultural societies which 'not only see the earth as a mother, the

receptacle and producer of all that sustains life, but also as the home of ancestors, the

dreaming place where every incident in legend and myth is firmly fixed in some

unchanging aspect of nature - rocks, hills, mountains. The devotee's identity is not in

doubt; because the myth that supports it is as real as the rocks and waterholes he can

see and touch. He finds recorded in his land the ancient story of the lives and deeds of

the immortal beings from whom he himself is descended, and whom he reveres. The

whole countryside is [the devotee's] family tree' (Tuan 1977:157-58).

28 Stupas owe their origin to the Asian earth mounds used in antiquity for the burial of important persons. Such funerary mounds were a familiar feature of the Gangetic basin the wandering Buddha knew and were worshiped as folk ('pagan') cult objects. At the Buddha's death, in keeping with his reque~t, the funerary mound was chosen as his sepulchre. In fac,t, according to, tradition, his, remains were divided among eight stupas, each erected by a devoted pnnce of the reglOn; the remams were apparently divided at the Emperor Asoka's co~and, At lengt~, ~owever, rather than the relic within, it was the enclosing mould itself that was worshipped as symbohzmg the Buddha (Slusser 1982:150),

44

In the context of this relationship between the individual and the sacred , pilgrimage to sacred places, traditionally conceived as an essential component of

ritualised practice within the major religions, has played an important role in shaping

religious and ethnic communities. The Jewish Encyclopaedia (1964) defines

pilgrimage as 'a journey which is made to a shrine or sacred place in performance of a

vow or for the sake of obtaining some form of divine blessing' (quoted in Turner

1974: 173). Likewise, the Sanskrit word for a place of pilgrimage tirtha, which means

'to cross over' both literally and metaphorically, symbolises the location of the

intersection of two realms, the mundane and the spiritual, the profane and the sacred.

In that respect, the physical journey to the tirtha is instrumental in the spiritual

transformation of the pilgrims (Choudhury 1994:68; Naquin and Yu 1992:4).

Furthermore, Victor Turner sees pilgrimages as 'functional equivalents' partly of rites

de passage and partly of 'rituals of affliction' (rites to cure illness or dispel

misfortune) in preliterate, small scale societies. In any case, it is almost universal to

consider pilgrimage as a ritual of transformation; which brings qualitative changes in

the lives of its practitioners (Turner 1974:65).

Furthermore, pilgrimage as a social practice has the effect of 'bonding

together, however transiently, at a certain level of social life, large numbers of men

and women, who would otherwise have never come into contact, due to feudal

localism and rural decentralisation of economic and political life' (Turner 1974:178).

In this way, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in societies where

pilgrimage was still seen as an important source of religious merit (Muslim, Christian,

Hindu, Jew, Buddhist, and so on), pilgrimage also played a significant role in shaping

the images of national communities. Because 'the members of even the smallest

nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear them'

as Anderson states (1983; 1991 :7), pilgrimage allowed a closer association between

members of the community. It also contributed in making the communion between its

members much more real, since pilgrim trails cut across boundaries of provinces. And

thus, pilgrims are unified in the shared experienced of their revivified faith, for having

arrived at a place where miracles happened and still happen. As well as for having

undertaken a long, not infrequently perilous, journey, having temporarily given up not

only the cares but also the rewards of ordinary life (Turner and Turner 1978:6-7).

Shared experiences of the sacred instil feelings of a shared communal identity. This

transient religious and social exchange has allowed differences of class and other

45

structural divisions to attenuate temporarily, it also reinforces the sense of the

sacredness of the place. The development of a Pan-Islamic identity, for instance, has

been largely the result of global pilgrimages to Mecca.29

In the case of Buddhist pilgrimage, an entire literary genre devoted to sacred

sites developed since the Indian King Ashoka first engraved upon rock a record of his

own pilgrimage to Bodhgaya, the place where Buddha attained enlightenment. Local

pamphlets devoted to the particular legends of their area have for centuries been a

traditional feature of the major sites and these provincial materials in tum have

regularly been taken and incorporated into extensive guidebooks covering the entire

circuit in terms of the history and significance of all that may be encountered along

the way (Boord 1994:20-21). In Tibet, an age-old literary genre chronicles the

religious geography of the land; locating monasteries, temples and pilgrimage routes

(Tib. gnas-bshad, lam-yig, and dkar-chag) (Wylie 1965:17-19; Chan 1994:14).

Monks and nuns from all over Tibet made use of these texts during their pilgrimage

journeys. Illiterate pilgrims, too, had some familiarity with their contents, histories

and legends, which were orally transmitted to them (Huber 1994). This type of

religious literary genre was clearly not unique to Tibetans; the dissemination of the

contents of pilgrimage guides played a crucial role in the Middle Ages in the

popularisation of pilgrimage routes in different parts of Christendom. An important

example of this was the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela in Spain.3o

Anthropologists consider both pilgrimage and exile as liminal experiences.

They are first and foremost transitional and require some form of displacement and

movement. They are transitional in that (at least in theory) they last for a 'short while'.

Similarly, exile and pilgrimage imply a transient homogenisation of the social status

of refugees and pilgrims. Moreover, both situations enhance strong communal

feelings, as well as ethnic awareness, and thus this period is very important in that

images of the collectivity, the ethnic group and or the nation are enlarged. Exile and

pilgrimage also represent situations of ordeal where endurance is tested and refugees

and pilgrims are stimulated to reflect on the meaning of basic religious and cultural

values. Finally, both experiences imply a transformation of the individual at a

29 See Wolfe, M. (ed) (1997). One Thousand Roads to Mecca. New York: Grove Press; and Peters, F.E. (1994). The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. . 30 See for example (1969). Le Guide du Piderin de Saint-Jacques de Compostelle: Texte Latin du XIIeme Siecle. Macon: Imprimeries Protat Freres.

46

personal and religious level, as well as at the economic, cultural and legal levels

(Turner & Turner 1978:34).

Finally, the centrality of discourses of sacred land and territory is part and

parcel of the traditional ethos of some diasporic communities. However, not all

national narratives emphasize the close connection between a people and the land as

strongly as the Tibetan and the Jewish. The source of such emphasis for the latter is

the Bible, which furnished it with a spiritual authority that has no equal. In addition it

makes the notion of the Jewish Land the prime element of Jewish identity. So

important is this, that 'an elaborate system of socialization practices were instituted,

beginning in the pre-state Jewish society, as well as Zionist Israel, to inculcate this

ethos' (Bilu and Ben-Ari 1997:232). Prominent among these practices are the

emphasis placed upon nature and Jewish spiritual and political geography in the

school system syllabus throughout the diaspora. Regardless of the increasing

secularisation of the Jewish diaspora, the centrality of the notion of the sacredness of

the 'Land' has not been challenged yet, and thus continues to be an important part of

Jewish identity of the Israeli and the diaspora Jewish peoples. Orthodox Jews see the

Palestinian occupation of parts of the 'Holy Land', as creating obstacles in the

fulfilment of the Covenant between God and the People of Israel, and this is a source

of national outrage.

The persistence of 'localised' religion in Tibet with its mountain cults centred

on the worship of local deities for the well-being of the local community, the further

consecration of the Tibetan landscape through Buddhist ritual, and the dissemination

of genealogical and ideological myths of descent, all contributed to the establishment

of a sacred geography in Tibet. Pilgrimage practice was important to enhance this

sense of the sacred. The Chinese occupation, forced displacement and exile have

reinforced these notions. This religious legacy has been used by the political elite in

exile to produce a sense of urgency to Tibetan refugees' plea for self-determination.

The following chapter outlines the Tibetan diaspora and the establishment of

refugee communities in South Asia and Switzerland, as well as their composition.

This will serve as the basis for interpreting the spatial and national narratives that

spring therefrom.

47

Chapter 2. Tibetan Diaspora: Refugee Settlement in South Asia and Switzerland

The Tibetan Diaspora is very diverse, consisting of numerous communities dispersed

throughout the world. Although according to the UN Convention definition of 'the

refugee' not all Tibetans who have fled Tibet since 1959 are strictly speaking

refugees, most have been liable to international assistance and all are recognized as

such by the Tibetan Government-in-exile (GIE) and by the international community.

This chapter shows how Tibetan refugees have settled into their host countries,

particularly in India, Nepal and Switzerland. It focuses on the international assistance

received in the establishment of the settlements, as well as on the different ways in

which they earn their living and preserve Tibetan culture and religion. It looks at their

legal standing in the host countries, describes briefly the relationship with the local

communities, and establishes the official mechanisms through which the Tibetan

government-in-exile attempts to control Tibetan communities worldwide.

The Tibetan diaspora consists strictly speaking of both refugees and voluntary

migrants; however, the latter often become victims of forced displacement and

consequently become genuine refugees. This happens when their dreams of migrating

are shattered, and they decide to return home. Once there, they are ostracised and

persecuted by Chinese authorities for having escaped. This condition eventually leads

them to seek refuge abroad.31

According to Grunfeld, the bulk of the refugees left Tibet between 1959 and

1965 (approximately 70,000) (Grunfeld 1987). In this early phase the reasons for

departure were: anxiety over not being allowed to remain practising Buddhists;

rumours of atrocities committed by the Chinese; rumours of Tibetans being prevented

from marrying Tibetans; rumours of Tibetans being compelled to marry Chinese; the

departure of the Dalai Lama; incessant political meetings, insecurity over the future,

the early confiscation of property, and the educating of children to watch and report

the behaviour of their parents (Palakshappa 1978:16).32 Thus, in these years only a

small percentage of those who fled were directly persecuted. The persecuted were

members of the traditional Tibetan aristocracy, of the Dalai Lama's government, as

31 When they are unable to find employment, when they experience so ~any difficulties in ~dapting .to the weather and altitude of their host countries that they get all sorts of allments (tuberculosIs, malana, mouth sores, high fevers, cholera, and so forth), when they fmd that educati~n opportunities are v~ry limited and when there seems to be nothing that can help them overcome therr lack of language skills in a in;reasing multicultural and polyglot setting, the return to Tibet becomes an option some take. 32 Many of those who crossed the 16,OOO-foot Himalayan passes into Nepal or India, particularly

48

well as of the resistance movement, and political riots and campaigns against the

Chinese authorities. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), its aftermath and

the early stages of Deng Xiaoping's rule (1980s), intense violence, insecurity,

political uncertainty, and the suppression of religious life, and pro-independence

movements caused other Tibetans to seek refuge abroad.

Among the 'new arrivals' (Tib. gsar- 'byor) during the 1990s were pro­

independence political prisoners; those escaping religious persecution; children sent

by their parents to get education in exile; unemployed and uneducated youths between

the age of 14 and 25 seeking employment and education. Most of the new arrivals

come from Kham and Amdo in Eastern Tibet where the Chinese modernisation and

educations programmes have been slower to arrive, or have arrived but have not

benefited ordinary Tibetans. Over a third of all the new arrivals are monks and nuns

(the religious community is estimated to be 13,600) (CTA 1994).

Determining the exact figure of both the population of Tibet prior to the

Chinese occupation and the refugee communities is very difficult. As far as the

Tibetan population is concerned, census statistics prior to 1959 are virtually non­

existent. Chinese censuses estimate the Tibetan population to have been

approximately 3.87 million in 1982 (quoted in Samuel 1993:44) and 4.6 million in

1990 (quoted in Heberer 2001 :113). The Tibetan press in India speaks, however of 6

million (Tibetan Review 1976, quoted in Novak 1984:9). John Powers estimates 7

million (1995) and the first figure given by the Chinese government was of 1.5

million (quoted in Novak 1984:9). Though it is difficult to know what degree of

reliability to attach to the Chinese censuses, they give a detailed breakdown of the

Tibetan population for those dates (Samuel 1993:44). Similarly, the low numbers of

Han Chinese implied for most areas of Tibet - including the highly contested areas of

ethnographic Tibet - suggests a low level of political manipulation of figures.

The issue of counting Tibetan refugees is particularly problematic for various

reasons. On the one hand, in the first two decades the Tibetan Government-in-exile

tended to inflate the numbers as a political strategy. 'The greater the refugee

population the more proof that communist rule in Tibet was oppressive and rejected

by the populace. Emigrating was seen as an example of people voting with their feet'

(Grunfeld 1987:186). On the other, Tibetan agencies make no distinction between

women and children died of exhaustion, starvation or serious frostbites. See Holbum (1975:718).

49

those Tibetans who have actually fled Tibet and those who have been born in exile.

From the Tibetans' own perspective, both groups are refugees (Novak 1984:10).

However, a recent survey conducted by the Tibetan GIE, based on more reliable

information from Reception Centres for newly arrived refugees located in different

parts of South Asia and other relevant official (Tibetan) sources, estimated the exiled

community worldwide to be around 112,000. 33 There are approximately 85,000

Tibetans living in India; 14,000 in Nepal; 1,500 in Bhutan; and 10,000 in Western

Countries. These include refugees born in Tibet as well as those born in exile. If we

take the 1990 Chinese census figure of 4.6 million Tibetans in Tibet and the GIE's

estimate of 112,000 Tibetan refugees as reliable sources, then it means that

approximately 2.45 percent of the entire Tibetan population lives in exile.34

In the early years, when refugees left Tibet, they crossed mainly into Bhutan

and India's North-East Frontier Area (now Arunachal Pradesh). Lesser numbers went

to Nepal, Sikkim and Ladakh (Grunfeld 1987: 186).35 Most refugees thought of their

stay in exile as transient and thus preferred to settle in Himalayan and border towns

where conditions of climate and altitude were similar to those of Tibet, and where

their proximity to Tibet would make their eventual return home faster. In the late

1960s, when it became apparent that there would not be a quick solution to the Tibet

question, many Tibetans began to resettle in Western countries. 36

33 It is important to note, however, that there are mismatches in the figures of settlements and refugees given by different departments of the Tibetan Government-in-exile: the CTA's Planning Council conducted a Demographic Survey in 1998, according to which there are 111, 170 refugees (85,000 in India, 14,000 in Nepal, 1,600 in Bhutan and 10,570 in Western Countries), whereas in various Integration and Development Plans published by the CTA's Department of Information and International Relations (latest with refugee figures was published in 1994) the figure is: 125,700 refugees (of which 104,686 live in India, 15,000 in Nepal, 1,457 in Bhutan, and 4,634 in Western countries). Although the refugee population is aging, clearly, the difference cannot be attributed to 14,000 deaths. It is more likely that the figure presented in Integration and Development Plans were based on estimates, rather than on a reliable survey. Therefore, in the absence of other reliable sources, I use the 1998 Demographic Survey's figure here (See Planning Council 2000). 34 The number of Tibetan refugees is very small compared to other refugee communities worldwide: there are 1 million Hutu refugees, from a population of 12 million (dispersed in Tanzania, Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda and Burundi); there are 995,000 Vietnamese Refugees living in North America from a population of 79 million; there are 3.7 million Afghan refugees from a population of 17,7 million (dispersed in Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan); and 750,000 refugees from El Salvador (250,000 in Central America and Mexico, as well as 500,000 in the USA) from a population of 6 million (http://www.hrw.org; http://unhcr,chJcgi-binitexis/vtx/statistics). 35 See Appendix 4 for Tibetan Refugees in Bhutan. . 36 The best known early studies of Tibetan refugees are the two reports by the InternatIOnal Commission of Jurists (ICJ, 1959 and 1966). These reports were based on interviews with selected groups of refugees in India. They documented several cases of religi?us persecution to~e, forced sterilization, destruction of families and so on, which indirectly occasIOned the forced dIsplacement. These reports appeared at the height of the cold war with which the Tibetan question became entangled and the lawyers' findings exercised considerable influence in the West (Norbu, D. 1993:4).

50

Tibetan refugees received economic assistance from the governments of India,

Nepal and Bhutan (the latter only in the early stages), of the UNHCR, and of foreign

donor agencies. Western governmental and private sources such as CARE, the

International and Swiss Red Cross, the YMCA, Save the Children Fund, Catholic

Relief and Church World Services (Grunfeld 1987:190). The U.S. government

provided an estimated $5.3 million in the first decade and a potential total of more

than $20 million. The Swiss government sponsored the first resettlement to

Switzerland of 1,000 Tibetans in 1961, Canada permitted the resettlement of about

300 Tibetans in the early 1970s (Grunfeld 1987:202-203), and the United States

permitted several hundred Tibetans to immigrate on a case-by-case basis

(Mountcastle 1997:86). Therefore, with all this help, 57 refugee Settlements have

been established in India, Nepal and Bhutan since 1959, comprising 14 major and 11

minor agricultural, 14 agro-industrial and 27 handicraft-based. 37 These settlements

differ greatly in location and circumstances. While certain remote settlements in

Ladakh and northern Nepal closely resemble Tibet in terms of climate and lifestyle,

less than 5 percent of the refugees live under such conditions. A majority of the

settlements are on reclaimed forestland in dry, hot climates, which are the antithesis

of the Tibetan environment (CTA 1992:5-7). One third of the total population is

dependent on agriculture and animal husbandry. Ten percent depend on handicrafts,

especially carpet weaving; twelve percent on selling sweaters; and twenty percent in

other trading activities. Unemployment stands at 18 percent among the adult

population. The unemployment rate among the rapidly growing number of youths

aged between 16 and 25 years is 20 percent (CTA 1994:4).38

2.1. Tibetan Refugees in India

Although India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention, the Government of

India accepts Tibetans as refugees, 'apparently by referring to Indian law and as a

matter of government policy driven at least in part by humanitarian concerns' (Garrat

37 See Map 3: Tibetan Refogee Settlements. . . . 38 The CTA has stressed that the increasing refugee populatIOn and the rapld growth of young Tlbetans in South Asia has caused severe strains to the fragile settlement economy and infrastructure particularly since the amount of land to support the community has not increased proportionately;. employment opportunities are severely limited; additional housing f~cilities to ~us~ain the .~e~ populatIOn are absent and infrastructure, such as sanitation, health, educatlon, and slmllar facIlltIes, has not developed proportionately (CTA 1992, 1994).

51

1997:32).39 Similarly, the Indian government does not recognize the Dalai Lama as

the legitimate ruler of Tibet and the Tibetan Government-in-exile. However, it

deplored China's invasion of Tibet (Mehrotra 1998).40 The government of India

assisted refugees by setting temporary camps in the Indian northern states: in Assam

(East India) a transit camp called Missamari was established with about 12000 , refugees living in 300 bamboo huts. In West Bengal a former prisoner of war camp

was turned into a refugee camp at Buxa Duar. From these temporary transit camps

Tibetan refugees were soon transferred to road construction sites in Himachal Pradesh

the north-western region of Ladakh and the north-eastern regions of Arunachal

Pradesh and Sikkim, where they lived in tents, which skirted the roads they cleared

(de Voe 1987). At this time epidemics such as cholera, dysentery, malaria and

tuberculosis afflicted most Tibetans. Many died as a result. This was due to changes

in diet, climate and altitude, as well as to drinking non-potable water.

By 1960, consultation between the Dalai Lama and Prime Minister Nehru

resulted in plans for a more permanent arrangement in those Indian states which could

accept Tibetans in resettlement projects. In 1961 Nehru selected Dharamsala,

formerly a British hill station in Himachal Pradesh, to be the permanent home for the

Dalai Lama. From there he was able to start building a new base for the Tibetans in

exile. Once resettled in Dharamsala, one of the Dalai Lama's first steps was to

establish a Central Tibetan Administration (CTA, the Kashag), which for all practical

purposes functions as the Government-in-exile.41 Although not formally recognized as

such by the world at large and in particular by the Government of India and the PRC,

most Tibetans both inside and outside occupied Tibet regard the GIE as the sole

39 Since 1979 India is a party of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (lCCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (lCESCR). 40 Nehru frequently stated that his foreign policy was governed by three main factors: the preservation ofthe security and integrity oflndia; his desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and his deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. Nevertheless, the PRC's response to India's granting political asylum to the Dalai Lama was very fierce. In an extremely long editorial in the Renmin Ripao (People's Daily), the Chinese government denounced Nehru as a 'member of a 'counter-revolutionary 'holy alliance' of the Metternich type' which included such members as the US S~te Departmen~ and the British Colonialists' (quoted in Mackerras 1994:180). Therefore, to aVOid further Chinese animosity, Nehru prohibited Tibetans to carry on subversive activities against the PRC from India (Tibetan Review 1969:10). 41 Today it is the Kashag (cabinet), the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Tibeta~ ~eople's Deputies who function as a Parliament-in-exile (a democratically elected body) who admmtster ~e affairs of the Tibetan people in exile. They do so through a number of departments: Home Affarrs, Education, Health, Finance, Religion and Culture, and International Affairs (Barker 1998; CT A 1992; 1994). See Appendix 1 for structure of the Kashag.

52

,

legitimate government of Tibet under the leadership of the Dalai Lama (Gombo 1985).42

For the eTA, one of the most urgent needs was a long tenn rehabilitation

programme that would serve to bring all Tibetan refugees into homogenous Tibetan

communities large enough to allow them to perpetuate their language, traditions and

thus preserve their national identity, and culture, where they could secure food, shelter,

medical care, education, and a means of livelihood to develop economically self­

supporting communities during their period in exile. The Indian government did not

want to scatter Tibetans in small family units. Their envisioned size of three to four

thousand was large enough to sustain Tibetan language and other Tibetan institutions.

This also would allow them considerable internal autonomy by pennitting the GIE to

exercise administrative control over the settlements.43 In this way, the Government of

India worked directly with the GIE instead of with individual refugees. In brief, the

Indian government's policy towards Tibetans was quite liberal but 'non-assimilative'

and delegated authority to the Dalai Lama (Goldstein 1978:398). It tacitly accepted

the Dalai Lama's assumption of leadership over Tibetan refugees partly as a mark of

Indian respect for the institution of the Dalai Lama and partly as a concession for

India's unwillingness to recognise the Tibetan GIE. Therefore, most of the refugee

matters were conducted on a tripartite basis between India, NGO and Tibetan

representatives, nonnally from the Office of the Dalai Lama and the Department of

Home of the Kashag (Norbu, D. 1993:12). This experience of administering

assistance to refugees served to train Tibetan elites in the conduct of politics and

administration.44

The State of Mysore (now Karnataka, South India) donated land for the first

agricultural settlements on a 99-year lease. These were to achieve economic

sufficiency after five years. During the first two years, while Tibetans cleared the land

and constructed housing, they were given food rations and daily salary; in year three

42 This is so regardless of the small opposition that has developed in exile. 43 Dawa Norbu notes that there were only two instances which indirectly questioned the Dalai Lama's right to make decisions on behalf of the refugees. The Swiss Red Cross a~d th~ Canadian ~mmigrat~on authorities sent their own officials to India to select Tibetan refugees to lImrugrate to therr countnes, without going through Dharamsala. Otherwise, most of the refugee matters were conducted on the tripartite basis. 44 This was particularly the case for those Tibetan offi~i~ls who ~ere n~t alrea~~ pa~ of the Ka~~g prior to 1959. Administering assistance as a way of gammg expenence m adm1ll1stratlOn a~d polItics was not unique to Tibetan refugees; other displaced elites have benefited from such an expenence; see Baron and Gatrell (2003) for the case of Latvians and Lithuanians.

53

while cultivation was taking place, their wages and food rations were reduced to half;

in the fourth and fifth years these were cut to a fourth; by the sixth year (1966), the

settlers were on their own (Goldstein 1978:399).

The detailed blueprint of the scheme was prepared by the head of the Swiss

Technical and Agricultural Cooperative in India, with the help of a Tibetan Officer of

the National Christian Council of India, Oxfam, u.S. Aid, the Divisional

Commissioner of the Government of Mysore and the Dalai Lama's representative

(Palakshappa 1976:56). Karnataka state agricultural settlements now cover 11,964

acres of cultivated land, which supports around 30,000 refugees (Barker 1998).

In a land of scarce resources, the influx of Tibetans was potentially a cause of

conflict with thousands of destitute rural Indians who over the years witnessed much

international refugee aid given to the Tibetans. But in the 1960s, when the Tibetans

were moved from transit camps and roadwork areas into settlements, the available

land was viewed as a worthless disease-ridden jungle of little utility to local Indians

(de Voe 1987:56).45 When offered to them, the Tibetans took it, and it proved to be a

great economic success. The settlers were recruited and selected by the GIE from

transit and road camps in Northern India in order to represent all the main regional

and sub cultural groupings and social strata of Tibet. The majority of them had no

prior farming experience (Goldstein 1978:400). They cultivated a variety of millet

called ragi, which was their main food crop (they could not grow barley or wheat

which was preferred by Tibetans due to altitude and weather conditions). Because

millet had a low yield potential they tried more lucrative cash crops: maize, cotton

and tobacco, of which only maize proved successful. Hence millet and maize became

the sources of sustenance of the agricultural settlements.

In these settlements, Tibetans reproduced some of the traditional institutions

such as monasteries that gave cohesion to Tibetan society. The three main Gelugpa

monasteries: Ganden, Sera and Deprung with their colleges and minor institutes have

been re-established there, as well as important monasteries of the other sects:

Nyingmapa, Kagyupa, Sakyapa and Bon. Not all Tibetans have settled in these camps

established through international assistance. Many Tibetan refugees both in India and

45 Partition refugees had been previously offered this land and preferred to abandon it rather than risk the odds in the jungle (Palakshappa 1978 :5).

54

Nepal have settled III the margins of the settlements without any international

assistance.

For administrative, political, and bureaucratic purposes of the Government-in­

exile, refugees are identified according to region of origin and by religious affiliation

(both usually decided by patrilinity). Tibetan refugees have to carry with them a

'green book' issued by the government, which identifies them accordingly and

includes their occupation, age (Mountcastle 1997:123). In India, as a matter of

national pride, most Tibetan refugees have kept their refugee status (instead of

applying for Indian citizenship). Therefore, they have not gained a residency permit

but can obtain a renewable registration card, known as an 'RC', which does not

entitle the holder to permanent residence but renewal of which is usually automatic.

Access to other countries is gained through acquisition of an identification card ('IC'),

which serves as their travel document. Nonetheless, there appears to be no legal

impediment to their applying for naturalisation, as any foreigner may do (Garratt

1997:32-33). Keeping refugee status carries the burden of being unable to purchase

land or housing, of having difficulties obtaining employment outside of the refugee

community, as well as of needing to obtain permission every time one wishes to

travel around in and outside of India.

In general, Tibetan refugees' relationship to the local communities in India has

tended to be cordial. Tibetan hospitals and schools are open to the natives, and many

are hired in the agricultural settlements during harvest time or at other times of the

year. However, some scholars have noted that there is tension among Tibetans and the

local communities in the Himalayan region, particularly in Ladakh and Sikkim. For

instance, some Ladakhis resent that six important monastic institutions in Ladakh are

controlled by Tibetan refugee Lamas, and that Tibetan refugees living in that region

have not learned the local dialect. Other locals are said to resent the apparent

economic disparity between the native Himalayan population and the Tibetans, as

well as the Tibetan obsession with the preservation of their own culture, which

hampers their integration in the local communities (Norbu, D. 1993).

2.2. Tibetan Refugees in Nepal

The Government of Nepal has no official refugee policy and, like India, is not a party

to the Convention. Thus, it does not recognise Tibetans as asylum seekers, nor does it

officially sanction any activities deemed political. Thus refugees must seek care and

55

protection from UNHCR's Kathmandu office, which has, over the years, tended to

regard such Tibetans as having a prima facie claim to refugee status, interpreting

relevant criteria in the Convention extremely liberally when determining their cases

(Garratt 1997:23). The UNHCR has noted that: 'in Nepal, in the absence of any form

of refugee legislation, refugees can only be considered as illegal immigrants, and be

therefore subject to deportation'. Yet most of the 14,000-odd Tibetans settled in Nepal

were accepted as refugees by the Nepalese government. However, it discontinued

issuing identification cards to them two decades ago. Thus they have no legal proof of

residence there, which can cause difficulties with travel abroad (Garratt 1997:33).

Regardless of their legal standing in Nepal, Tibetan refugees have been allowed to

pursue an education, and to carry out social and religious celebrations and all sorts of

economic activities without major interference from the government.

The first refugees (approximately 12,000) crossed the border through the

Mustang area in north-western Nepal and the Solu Khumbu area in the northeast.

Many moved on to India during the following years. A number of refugees remained

there, and because of births during the last 30 years, as well as the resettlement of

some Tibetan refugees from India, the population has increased. By the mid-1990s

they were estimated to be around 14,000 (Planning Council 2000). The Government

of Nepal, however, estimated the Tibetan refugee population in the 1980s to be

18,000, based on the number of refugee families believed to be residing in each

Nepalese district, provided by district census offices (quoted in Gombo 1985:91).46

The main organisations involved in the rehabilitation and settlement of Tibetan

refugees in Nepal include development, Buddhist, refugee assistance, and human

rights non governmental organisations; Swiss and U.S. intergovernmental

organisations; 'friends of Tibet' NGOs; as well as Taiwan's Mongolian and Tibetan

Affairs Commission and the UNHCR (Frechette 2002:8-9). Since the 1960s, the

UNHCR has been actively supporting Tibetan refugees providing for emergency

relief and rehabilitation amounting to over USD$129,000 from 1960-63 and over

USD$500,OOO between 1963-1971 through its Kathmandu Office (Holburn 1975:748).

The bulk of assistance to Tibetan refugees, however, was taken over by the Swiss Red

46 Nepal's ethnic Tibetans comprise nearly one-fourth of the sixty ethnic groups define~ by the 1991 census. Taken together, they constitute approximately 12 percent of Nepal's total populatIon (Frechette 2002:132).

56

Cross, which in tum handed it over to Swiss Aid for Technical Assistance (SA TA) in

1962 and to the Swiss Development Corporation in 1988.

In the early 1990s the Planning Council of the Kashag created the Office of

the Reception Centres, which has branch offices in Kathmandu, New Delhi and

Dharamsala. Since the 1980s Nepal has been the main entry point of Tibetan refugees,

therefore, the Kathmandu branch is one of the most important centres for determining

the settlement of these new arrivals. The Kathmandu Reception Centre is jointly

supported by the UNHCR and the CT A; the UNHCR provides financial support of

Nepalese Rupees 2,250 (approx. USD$29) per refugee; in the case of a family, the

head of the family gets NR 2,250 and each member NR 900 (approx. USD$12),

meant to provide for travelling expenses from Kathmandu to Dharamsala or other

settlements (CTA 1994:45). These centres seek to provide accommodation for 30

days, interview all new arrivals, and seek admissions for them in relevant institutions

such as schools, monasteries or nunneries.

Tibetans settled in the main sites of Buddhist pilgrimage in the Kathmandu

Valley where international organisations helped establish handicraft settlements.

Among these, the most successful in terms of its revenues to Tibetan refugees and its

contribution to the Nepalese economy has been the booming export-oriented carpet

industry.47 The main handicraft settlements are found in Jawalakhel, Boudha and

Jorpati, Swayambhu, Tundikhel. Others, established by the Swiss Red Cross are the

Tarshi Palkhiel Tibetan Refugee Settlement at Hyangja (Pokhara), Delak Ling

Tibetan Refugee Settlement (Solu Khumbu District) and Tibetan Refugee Settlement

(Dhorpatan) (Jha 1992: 19).48 International patrons helped Tibetans to secure land and

business ownership and provided them with the resources they needed including

investment, capital, education, training, material goods, and diplomatic connections to

develop and control the carpet industry (Frechette 2002:viii).

SAT A played a key role in providing the refugees with innovative production

techniques and sales know-how to develop the carpet industry. Since the 1960s most

47 Woollen carpet weaving had been an ancient craft in traditional Tibet. It had two main purposes: to make horse saddle cushions and covers, and coverings for beds and seats for private consumption (Gombo 1985). 48 The lands for these four settlement camps were found and purchased by the Nepal Home Ministry with funds provided by the Swiss government in 1963. In 1964 the land was entrusted to the Nepal Red Cross Society until the Tibetans could become eligible for ownership themselves (through citizenship). They registered Tibetan factories under the Nepal Company Act as private limited companies. Swiss officials served as the financial and political guarantors of all the businesses (Frechette 2002:44-46).

57

of Tibetan refugees in the Kathmandu Valley have been engaged in some aspect of

the industry. Its growth in Nepal has not only benefited Tibetan refugees, but also

poorer sections of the Nepalese society especially in the Kathmandu Valley, Pokhara,

Tserok (Mustang) and Chialsa (Solu Khumbu) (Jha 1992:18). By 1995, the industry

employed an estimated 200,000 Nepali citizens and earned more foreign exchange

than any other industry. By 1993, then at its peak, it comprised more than five percent

of Nepal's gross domestic product and more than half of its total annual export

earnings (Frechette 2002:4).

Those refugees who are not involved in the carpet industry have become owners

of small shops (selling jewellery and semi-precious stones, antiques, old rugs, ritual

objects, Tibetan silks, and woollen clothes to tourists) in Boudha, and Tamel

fundamentally. They also run small restaurants that offer Chinese, Tibetan or Western

food.

Tibetans are found in three types of settlement: entirely homogeneous, formal

refugee handicraft settlements; outside and entirely independent of homogenous

refugee settlements; and partly homogeneous settlements (as, for instance, when some

members of a family work in a corporate factory but live away from it in

independently-rented dwellings). In the settlements, refugees pay no rent, although

officially the complex is 'owned' and registered in the name of the Nepal Red Cross

Society (Gombo 1985:25-26).

It appears that there is no government policy of giving Tibetan refugees

Nepalese citizenship, although, as in India, they can obtain that legal status by

meeting certain prescribed criteria, which generally includes residence, language

literacy, good character and possibly having to renounce any former citizenship, as

Nepal does not appear to accept dual nationality (Garratt 1997:34). This has been the

case with Tibetan entrepreneurs who have given up their Tibetan refugee status to

become Nepalese citizens in order to be able to purchase land, travel abroad without

any difficulties, and become more respected members of Nepalese society. The

majority, however, as in the case of Tibetans refugees elsewhere, have kept their

refugee status.

Although many Tibetan exiles have acquired Nepali citizenship, most have done

so illegally, so that the citizenship status of all Tibetan exiles, even those with a

legitimate legal claim, remains in doubt. There are two principal legal means through

which Tibetan exiles have acquired citizenship in Nepal. The first involves the 200 to

58

300 former Mustang guerrilla fighters to whom the King of Nepal granted honorary

citizenship in 1974 for surrendering to the Nepal army. The second involves 100 to

150 of Tibetan-Newar marriages who acquired Nepali citizenship with the assistance

of Nepal consular officers in Tibet before the exile. Those who are not descended

from Tibetan-N ewar marriages have applied for citizenship under the pretence that

they are. Others acquire it through Sherpa officials who are quite sympathetic to

Tibetan exiles. It is difficult to estimate the amount of Tibetans with Nepali

citizenship, as many use Nepali names when they acquire citizenship documents

illegally (Frechette 2002: 127-29).

In the vicinities of the major Buddhist sacred places such as the great stupas of

Svayambhunath, Boudhanath, and Namo Buddha Tibetans have established the bulk

of their religious communities. By 1995, they had established forty-five Tibetan

monasteries and nunneries (Frechette 2002), most of them in Boudhanath, to house

nearly one thousand Tibetan monks and nuns. Most of these have been funded by

foreign donations made to exiled Tibetan lamas who travel regularly or have settled in

the United States, Canada and Europe. Others have been funded by successful

refugees, and by regular donations of ordinary Tibetans. As in the case of monasteries

in southern India and elsewhere in the diaspora, monasteries in Nepal have allowed

the preservation of Tibetan religious traditions, and have also made Buddhist

teachings available to foreigners, as well as to the local communities. In addition, they

serve as the centre of Tibetan communal life in exile.

Finally, in South Asia (India, Nepal and Bhutan), the Tibetan OlE attempts to

coalesce the different refugee communities, in order to seek to control certain aspects

of refugee life. They do so through various strategies. First, they convene public

meetings in all Tibetan exile settlements to discuss their activities. Second, they

sponsor public events, such as the Dalai Lama's birthday celebration, the celebration

of the anniversary of the 10 March Lhasa Uprising, the Tibetan New Year, and so

forth. Third, as mentioned earlier, they issue a type of identity card ('green book') that

identifies their holders as Tibetan citizens (Tib. yul-mi). Fourth, only those registered

and who hold the green book are entitled to apply for the scholarship and resettlement

opportunities that international assistance organizations make available through their

offices. Fifth, by establishing democratic institutions such as the Assembly of Tibetan

People's Deputies, they attempt to integrate and stimulate the political participation of

all the Tibetan refugee communities. Lastly, they make Tibetan citizenship contingent

59

upon the fulfilment of certain criteria, such as allegiance to Tibet and participation in

the struggle for self-determination, as well as compliance with the laws of the Tibetan

exile administration and payment of 'voluntary taxes' to the GIE (Frechette

2002:27,177). Exile authorities perceive this to be an effective way of making a

stronger case for the Tibetan national plight in the eyes of Western countries (to

which they appeal for political support against the Chinese). However, only central

Tibetans seem to be happy to carry the green book. Everyone else tends to see it as an

imposition. They get one if they want to put their children in a government school. In

addition, because there is an annual 'voluntary tax' attached to the green book, many

Tibetans prefer to go without it.49

2.3. Tibetan Refugees in Switzerland

In the 1960s and 1970s, members of Western NGOs were instrumental in prompting

the resettlement of Tibetan refugees in Western countries. By 1998, approximately

2,400 Tibetan refugees had resettled across Europe, including Scandinavian countries

(110); Germany (146); France (150); United Kingdom (135); and Switzerland (1,538).

Approximately 7,000 were living in North America; and about 220 in Australia and

New Zealand (Planning Council 2000:38).

Switzerland has a reputation for humanitarianism that is recognised worldwide,

and the Swiss people are serious about keeping that reputation intact (McDowell

1996). This has reflected in the number of refugees and asylum seekers who have

been allowed to live and work there. 50 The most numerous Tibetan population in

Europe lives in the various cities in the German-speaking cantons in Switzerland.

Compared to other refugee groups (e.g. 42,000 Sri Lankan Tamils, and 83,000

Turkish Kurds, McDowell 1996:6), the Tibetan community there is tiny. One of the

most important characteristics of this community, which sets it apart from other

refugees living in the country, is the fact that most Tibetans were taken there on the

initiative of the Swiss themselves. This, together with the fact that they constitute a

49 This is based on interviews conducted in fieldwork in India and Kathmandu. 50 At the end of 1992 there were around 1,213 ,463 foreigners resident in Switzerland of which 26,800 were recognised refugees, 31,720 were asylum cases not yet dealt with, 16,030 asylum seekers awaiting an appeal decision on their application and an estimated 17,000 asylum seekers who had gone underground (officially classed as 'disappeared' after their application had been rejected, and a~ound 80,000 people who were allowed temporary refuge in Switzerland. Foreigners constituted a thrrd of Switzerland's total working population of around 3.6 million (McDowell 1996:54-55).

60

relatively small number of immigrants, has influenced the general positive perception

the Swiss have of Tibetans.

The first Tibetans to amve were a group of 156 unaccompanied children,

average age six, brought to Switzerland between 1961 and 1964 through the efforts of

a wealthy philanthropist and entrepreneur named Charles Aeschimann (referred to

hereafter as the' Aeschimann group') and adopted by Swiss families of upper middle

class background. 51 They were encouraged to assimilate and learned to speak, read,

and write German fluently. Although the Swiss families responsible for adopting

these children were asked to sign a contract with the Dalai Lama committing

themselves to provide education in Tibetan language, culture, and religion, such

instruction did not take place. As a result, by the time they were in their teens, many

felt alienated from Tibetan society as they quickly lost their native language, as well

as the connection to their ethnic roots, which would allow them to identify as and feel

Tibetan (McLagan 1996:250,256; Ott-Marti 1976).

The second is referred to as the Pestalozzi group, which was accommodated at

the Children's Village in Trogen where they lived in two Tibetan houses and were

looked after and educated by Tibetans.52 These children received bicultural education.

This fact helped them in the process of integration into Swiss society while learning

about Tibetan culture and history. The goal of the Pestalozzi education was to instil in

the children a sense of Tibetan identity. Such task proved to be extremely difficult

since many of these children became westernised quite quickly and instilling a sense

of Tibetan-ness did not come naturally, even if their parents were Tibetan. Until 1986,

a very small number of Tibetans from India and Nepal continued to arrive under such

scheme. Tibetans from this group have been successfully employed as adults in the

financial and health services. Although they received some training in Buddhism,

most of them do not practise in a regular basis, but all have shrines in their homes and

attend all the religious teachings given by the Dalai Lama or other visiting lamas. In

51 Of these 156 unaccompanied children only a few were orphans; the majority were sons of aristocrats who wanted their offspring to be educated abroad. 52 The Pestalozzi school system developed in the aftermaths of the Second World War for orphan children of European countries. Germany, Austria and England were some of the countries whic~ adopted such system. When they recovered ec?nomicall~ after reconstructi?n some of th~ PestalozZI houses were used to give shelter and educatIon to children from countrIes such as TIbet, Korea, Hungary, India, Albania, and so forth. See http:www.pestalozzi.ch/.

61

St. Gallen, 80 km North of Zurich lives a small Tibetan community of some of the

Pestalozzi children, now in their late thirties.

The third group to resettle in Switzerland from India was sponsored by the

Swiss Red Cross to aid Tibetan refugee families in need (most of these were recruited

from the Kulu-Manali area in northern India). They were resettled in Heimstatten or

'group housing' to preserve their own language and culture. However, while they

built Tibetan Buddhist altars in their homes and continued with their usual religious

rituals, their religious practice was hampered by the fact that there were no local

lamas or monasteries. Most of these Tibetans worked in factories close to the

Heimstatten doing unskilled labour and have had little contact with the Swiss people.

Many of these still lack a fluency in Swiss-German and thus remain in low-income

jobs (Ott-Marti 1976; McLagan 1996).

In 1964, the brothers Henri and Jacques Kuhn, who owned a metal-working

factory producing high quality cookware in Rikon, donated an apartment block in

Rikon to house ten Tibetan families or about two-dozen people (Lindegger 1988

quoted in Van Dyke 1997). The Kuhns also employed the refugees in their factory. 53

By 1993, out of a population of about six hundred in the Rikon area, over one third

were ethnic Tibetans (Van Dyke 1997: 179). In 1967, the Kuhns funded the

construction of the first Tibetan monastery in the West in the same town of Rikon

(with originally five Tibetan resident monks). Furthermore, in 1977, the Tibetan

Geshe Rabten Rinpoche established the Institute for Higher Tibetan Learning and the

Monastery Tharpa Choeling (later renamed Rabten Choeling, in memory of its

founder) in Mt. Pelerin, in the French-speaking city of Vevey. Just as in India and

Nepal, the two monasteries and the institute have permitted the preservation of

Tibetan Buddhism (though in a quite modest setting) and its dissemination in the

West. Rikon in particular has served as the centre of the Tibetan community in the

regton.

The Tibetan exiled-community in Switzerland is characterised as being very

well organised. Most refugees are part of one or a couple of the different active

Tibetan organizations, such as the Tibetan Community of Switzerland, the Tibetan

Youth Association (TYA), the Tibetan Women's Association (TWA), and the Swiss-

53 Although the Swiss authorities had originally intended for Tibetans to farm high valleys, the refugees preferred to work in factories during the more lucrative night and weekend shifts: hours that were unpopular with the Swiss workforce (Van Dyke 1997: 179).

62

Tibetan Friendship Association; there are also branches of the regional organisations

found in India. The Swiss Tibetan community's size, organisation and resources have

helped to make Switzerland not only a key node in the Tibetan diaspora in Europe,

but also in the transnational movement for the self-determination of Tibet (McLagan

1996:268).

Because Swiss citizenship is defined in terms of ius sanguinis, Tibetans and

other immigrants are not regarded as legally Swiss until they apply for citizenship and

are accepted by the local Swiss community in which they live (McLagan 1996:255). It

is much more difficult to capitalise on ethnicity in Switzerland than it is for example

in the U.S. (where it suffices to be born there to be entitled to American citizenship).

Therefore, Tibetans here face difficulties in getting permission to open up Tibetan

shops and restaurants. All the Tibetan refugees from the Aeschimann group have

Swiss citizenship; most of the Pestalozzi and other Tibetans who arrived in the 1980s

and early 1990s have temporary residence permits (known in Switzerland and

elsewhere in Europe as a 'B' document), which allows them to work and have access

to social welfare benefits. Some among these have managed to get Swiss passports.

However, acquiring the citizenship of the host country in Europe, and North America

does not carry the moral weight that it does in South Asia. In South Asia Tibetans

tend to ascribe much more moral responsibility to keeping refugee status; whereas in

Switzerland and in other Western countries, changing citizenship is seen as a practical

thing, rather than a matter of national or ethnic principle.

2.5. Concluding Remarks

Although all Tibetan exiles are recognised as refugees by the Tibetan Govemment-in­

Exile and most of the international community, only a small proportion of them fit

into the 1951 Convention definition of the refugee. The Tibetan diaspora consists,

strictly speaking, of both refugees and voluntary migrants. Voluntary migrants,

however, often become victims of forced displacement when their goals for migrating

are not achieved and they return to Tibet. Once there, many Tibetans experience

persecution in the hands of Chinese authorities, eventually leading them to flee, and

to become refugees. It has to be emphasised that a majority of the refugee population

comes from central Tibet. 54 The configuration of the Tibetan diaspora, and the

problems posed by exile, (as will become apparent in Chapter 6) are important

63

elements in the construction of 'national' narratives, as well as in the construction of

contemporary notions of territory, and in the refugees' imagination of the Tibetan

homeland.

Non Governmental Organisations, Governmental and Intergovernmental

Organisations, and South Asian Governments, as well as individuals have all

contributed to the establishment of Tibetan self-sufficient settlements in South Asia

and to the resettlement of Tibetan refugees abroad, particularly in Europe and North

America. The Central Tibetan Administration and the Office of the Dalai Lama

played a leading role in administering assistance, as well as in the allocation of

housing, schooling and so forth. Similarly, the exile authorities issue the' green book'

which functions as an identity card, as well as a modest means of control. Maintaining

refugee status in South Asia has been one of the key elements for the preservation of

Tibetan identity.

The formation of Tibetan clusters and the reconstruction of religious

institutions in their host countries - the centres of communal life - have allowed the

preservation of Tibetan culture and religion. Finally, the degree of assimilation,

integration, adaptation and westemisation of exiled Tibetans varies from country to

country, as it will become apparent in later chapters.

54 In Tibet, it was noted, the majority of the Tibetan population lives in Kham.

64

Chapter 3. Notions of Territory and Space in Historical Tibet

In their process of nation-building, refugee communities worldwide tend to draw

upon a longstanding tradition of infusing territory with sacred meaning. These

communities also tend to transplant both religious and secular native notions of

territory into their host countries, to maintain, to a certain extent, their traditional way

of life, easing in this way, the sufferings of displacement, and the uncertainties caused

by living in alien environments. To understand continuity and change in the current

Tibetan articulation of territory, we now turn to the study of traditional conceptions of

space. This analysis will allow us to identify the historical, as well as the ethnic

elements in the construction of contemporary national identity in exile.

The emergence of different notions of territory in Tibet was determined in

great measure by a Pre-Buddhist religious lore, the introduction and assimilation of

Buddhism and the establishment of a Lhasa-centred polity in the seventeenth century

which set up a regime based on a combination of religion and politics (Tib. chos srid

gnys 'brel).55 This gave rise to a peculiar social system uniquely tied to the land. The

earliest religious notions of territory in Tibet were shaped by pre-Buddhist mountain

cults centred on the worship of local deities, which were conceived as protective

tribal ancestors or as founders of the Royal lineage. Buddhism for its part introduced

new templates through which the Tibetan landscape could be perceived. I argue here

that this perception was shaped by the unique role of the Tantric yogin and the lama,

by a rich textual tradition, and by the projection of the Buddhist mandala principle

into the Tibetan landscape.56 Other notions - that there are 'hidden lands' (sbas-yul)

and that Tibet is the special field of activity of the Buddhist deity Chenrezig,

55 This is a traditional Tibetan concept and it meant to infuse politics with religious values to ensure that government officials rule keeping in mind society's best interests and to harness corruption and abuses of power. 56 The Therevada Buddhists claim that all the teachings of the Buddha were recorded in the oldest Buddhist scriptures known as the Pali Canon. Tibetans and others say, however, that the wisdom the Buddha acquired was indeed too subtle for the general public and that he taught the de~per and more mystical aspects of it only to those who were spiritually advanced enough to make use of It. Thes~ were not recorded in the Pali Canon but were passed on orally until written down much later. Accordmg to the Dalai Lama these sermons which occupy most of the Tibetan Canon, 'took place in a spiritual , , , dimension that is invisible to ordinary vision-but is as real as the everyday world we normally see (quoted in Bernbaum 1980:14). Theravada Buddhism is still extant in Sri Lanka and parts of Southeast Asia. Throughout this thesis when I use the terms 'Tantras', and '~a~tric ritual', I refer ~o such se~ons as recorded in the Tibetan Canon (translated from the Indian ongmals), and to the ntuals descnbed therein. They should not be confused with pre-Buddhist Indian Tantra, which .is based ?~ entirely different beliefs and practices. Similarly, hereafter when I use the word Yogm or YOgIlli (female yogin) I am referring to great lay Vajrayana (Tantric ritual) practitioners.

65

embodiment of compassion, and that Tibetans are his descendants - added new

dimensions to the conception of territory infused with religious meaning.

Furthermore, the sacralisation of space in Tibet through Buddhist means and

the bounding of political territory were parallel processes that supported and

reinforced each other, and were significant for the development of what Dreyfus

(1994) calls a 'proto-national' identity or incipient ethnic identities. The sacralisation

of space in Tibet has often been related to the exertion of political power and the

establishment of secular political boundaries. This chapter analyses the religious and

secular notions of territory that emerged in Tibet with the assimilation of Buddhism

and the rise to power of the Gelugpa School respectively. It also examines the way in

which attachment to territory was traditionally expressed.

To study the Zionist territorial orientations in Israel, Baruch Kimmerling used

as a theoretical and methodological tool the notion of four common views or feelings

evoked by territorial tracts. (1) The moral or religious orientation which refers to the

sacred meaning of space. This is a geographical space where the supernatural and the

material unite and interact. (2) The instrumental orientation that refers to the land as a

primary source of livelihood and material resources such as property, and strategic

assets, which relate to the environment in terms of the possibility of physical control

from external threats. (3) The political orientation, which is the perception of space in

terms of political control, political boundaries and so forth. (4) The primordial

orientation as the most profound expression of feelings of belonging (usually on the

basis of kinship). Here, places within a space are accorded intrinsic significance

because of the very fact that they serve as a common basis for the community and an

integral part of its very definition (Kimmerling 1982:191-192). I find this a very

useful methodological tool for the study of Tibetan religious and secular conceptions

of space. It is particularly useful for the study of Tibetan constructions of space in

exile. In the following pages I deal first with the religious orientation analysing the

traditional notions of sacred space, and then I proceed to analyse the secular notions,

which are most commonly articulated with the instrumental, political, and primordial

orientations. My use of the four orientations as a methodological tool is based on the

underlying assumption that Tibetan ethnic and proto-national identities are deeply

rooted in the Tibetan land, and that local identities are often expressed in territorial

terms.

66

3.1. The Development of Tibetan Religious Identity and Religious Notions of Territory

Every religious development in Tibet has carried with it the seal of pre-Buddhist

religion. This is due in great measure to the pervasiveness of ancient indigenous

beliefs and practices, which held that local gods (particularly the yul-lha, and gzhi­

bdag) , demons and sprites of all kinds were the main sources of human beings'

ailments and misfortunes. 57 Thus, popular religious practices were aimed at appeasing

the local deities in order to prevent harm to people and their possessions. When

misfortune befell them Tibetans tried to discover the cause through various forms of

divination, and then to prescribe suitable remedies. In this sense, pre-Buddhist

religion seems to be entirely concerned with the affairs of this life. The local gods,

along with the malevolent spirits, and the whole complex of ideas about divination,

spirit-mediums, and good (Tib. bkra-shis) and bad fortune (Tib. bkra-mi-shis),

provided a critical set of symbolic associations through which the Tibetan landscape

was perceived (Samuel 1993: 177).

Since early times, Tibetans have believed mountains, lakes and rivers are the

abodes of such deities, and thus were of utmost importance, to be propitiated by the

local people. In folk tales and legends, the mountain deities are often thought of as

being interrelated with each other in a pattern of family relationships whether at the

village or regional levels. While the mountain deity is viewed as the male spirit that

of the lake situated near the mountain is his consort. Hence, mountains and lakes

personify the 'soul' (Tib. bla) of the country, and assure its perpetuity and protection

for the men living at their feet (Tucci 1980:217-221). By the same token, it is

believed that seven of Tibet's early kings descended to earth via sacred mountains. In

this way, Tibetan scholars have argued that the mountain cult has been an essential

element in Tibetan culture and that it has therefore an important bearing on Tibetan

ethnic identity (Karmay 1996:60). In brief, early mountain cults were associated with

tribal ancestors transformed in time into protective territorial deities, and ancestors of

the royal lineage.

In another phase of early Tibetan religion we find the development of Bon. Its

beginnings are still obscure. Some scholars believe that it refers to a blend of

indigenous beliefs and practices of ancient Tibet with the teachings of gShen-rab

57 Some of these local gods were thought to be tribal ancestors who in time became protective deities of

67

Mibo (lit. 'the man of the lineage of the Shens ') who came from the land the Tibetans

knew as sTag-gZig, south-west of Tibet where India meets the fringes of Iran

(Hoffmann 1956). His doctrines are supposed to have reached Tibet through the

Zhang Zhung language (region of western Tibet, known today as Nga-ri). The oral

traditions of Zhang Zhung belong to the class of teachings known as the 'Great

Perfection' (rdzogs-chen), which are common to the Nyingmapa School of Tibetan

Buddhism (Snellgrove and Richardson 1968:99-103). Therefore, Bon developed as a

separate religion but it borrowed significantly from Tibetan Buddhism. Other Western

scholars like Geoffrey Samuel deny the assertion of the blend of beliefs arguing that

many students of Tibet have confused contemporary popular beliefs with Bon, and

that there are few grounds to apply the term Bon to the cult of local gods and spirits as

they exist today (Samuel 1993:12). However, Tibetan scholars (e.g. S. Karmay 1996,

1998) refer to Bon as a mixture of early popular beliefs and practices with the

teachings of gShen-rab Mi-bo. Since it is not within the scope of my study to resolve

this issue by tracing the origins of Bon, and to avoid confusion, I will refer to the cult

of local deities and spirits as pre-Buddhist beliefs, and to the development of the

teachings of gShen-rab Mi-bo as the 'Bon religion' .58

The influence of pre-Buddhist religion in the deVelopment of Tibetan religious

identity is often overlooked, given that from the eighth century onwards Buddhism

played a crucial role in Tibetan cultural and religious life. Nonetheless, the adoption

of Buddhism did not bring about the total destruction and disappearance of popular

beliefs and practices. On the contrary, it subsumed, used, and incorporated them into

the fabric of the new ethos, albeit superseding them at times. Similarly, the sacredness

of the Tibetan landscape and other places and artefacts constitutes a very important

element of Tibetan religious identity that preceded the introduction of Buddhism.

Buddhism however, reinforced this notion through the presence and religious activity

of prominent spiritual masters, and the 'mandalisation' of space, as we shall see.

their territory (See Stein 1972 and Tucci 1980). . 58 For a discussion on this highly debated issue see: Per Kvaeme (2003). 'The Study of Bon 10 the West: Past, Present and Future'; and 'Extract from Bon and Tibetan Religion " in A. McKay (ed) (2003). The History of Tibet. Volume I. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon; ? Snellgrov~ (1987). 'The Cultural Effects of Territorial Expansion' (extracts from Indian Buddhlsm and Thelr Tibetan Successors). InA. McKay (ed) (2003). The History of Tibet. Volume I. London and New York:

68

3.1.1. First and Second Disseminations of Buddhism (Tib. snga-dar and phyi-dar).

Tibetan historical accounts, such as those of Buton Rinchen Drub (Bu-sTon Rin-chen

Grub) and Go Lotsawa (Gos Lo-tsa-ba) (Obenniller 1932; 1933; Roerich 1949,

1953), place the establishment of Buddhism as the state religion of Tibet soon after

the marriages of King Songtsen Gampo to devout Buddhist princesses of the Chinese

and Nepalese royal courts, in the early to the middle part of the seventh century. 59 By

the late eighth-early ninth century, in particular during the reign of King Trison

Detsen (khri-srong lde'u-btsan, AD 756-797), the teachings of the Buddha (hereafter

Buddha-Dharma) were finnly established. Trison Detsen achieved the greatest

territorial expansion of Tibet. During his reign 'political considerations appeared to

have been subordinated to his vision of making Tibet a Buddhist country' (J ampa

Thaye 2001: 1 0).60 To achieve this end, he sponsored the construction of monasteries,

upon which the successful establishment of Buddhism depended.61

The construction of Buddhist monastic centres, and the later establishment of

Buddhism as the official state religion by the royal edict of 779, met with opposition

from diverse sources. On the one hand, aristocratic families in central Tibet resented

the power of the king and the establishment of an alien religion in Tibet and thus

challenged it.62 On the other, and at a more subtle level, the local spiritual forces of

Tibet attempted to hinder the construction of Buddhist monasteries. It is said that

whatever work was completed during the day would be destroyed at night by the

nagas (Jampa Thaye 2001:10-11).63 This refers particularly to the building of the first

monastic centre at Samye (bSam-yas), thirty-five miles southeast of Lhasa.

Santarakshita (AD 725-788), the philosopher and abbot who had come from India at

RoutledgeCurzon; Samuel (1993); Karmay 1993. 59 According to popular belief, however, Buddhism first arrived in Tibet in the fifth century during the reign of King Lhato Rinyentsen (Lha-tho ri-nyen-tsan) of the Chogyal dynasty (Dargyay 1977: 4-5). Giuseppe Tucci (1980) points out that, though the histories offer accounts of the events, they offer neither proof of the conversion of the king nor his support of the Buddhist faith; he expresses doubts over the Nepalese alliance but confirms the Chinese one. Geoffrey Samuel by contrast, asserts that it is with the reign of King Songtsen Gampo that historical information becomes reliable (Samuel 1993:438). 60 See Beckwith (1987). The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 61 It is important to note that King Songtsen Gampo is credited for having sponsored Thonmi ~ambhota and other Tibetans to travel to India (particularly Kashmir) to learn a northern form of the Indlan Gupta alphabet (around AD 632) from which a Tibetan alphabet was invented and ada~ted to the Tibetan language (Stein 1972:59). The new Tibetan script was then used as the most effective means not only to preserve Indian Buddhism but also to spread it around Tibet.

62 Stein traces this edict to AD 791 (1972:67). 63 Nagas are serpent-like spirits said to inhabit the la~es and rivers of Tibet, which tended to be ill­disposed toward Buddhism, until the arrival of Guru Rinpoche.

69

King Trison Detsen's request, proved unable to overcome these obstacles. Therefore,

the 'saint-yogi' Padmasambhava (known to Tibetans as Guru Rinpoche, 'Pad-rna

'byung-gnas', or 'Pad-rna ka-ra' the 'Lotus-Born') was called upon to defeat the

forces opposing establishment of the Buddha-Dharma in Tibet. In this way, he

'tamed the ground' (Tib. sa 'dul) , subdued the local gods, converted them to

Buddhism and transformed them by oath into protectors of the doctrine.64 Given that

many considered him a second Buddha, he quickly became one of the central figures

in Tibetan Buddhism and his teachings formed the basis of the religious practice of

many Tibetans.

Some remarks on the way ancient beliefs were incorporated into the Buddhist

ethos are in order here. '[W]hen Indian Buddhist ideas entered into and developed the

Tibetan cultural milieu, 'nature' was 'conquered' by 'culture' (i.e. Buddhism), and

this was understood in terms of the powers believed to reside in both the person and

the world' (Huber 1999a:80). In general this means that Buddhism's great

practitioners tamed not only Tibetans, but also the land and the natural forces that

inhabit it.

Legend has it that during King Songtsen Gampo' s reIgn, before Guru

Rinpoche, the construction of temples, stupas (Tib. mchod-rten; reliquaries of

spiritual beings) and other sacred objects served as aids to create harmony and

balance in the environment. One of the most ubiquitous popular myths in this regard

is the one related to King Songtsen Gampo's Chinese wife's ordeal to transport a

statue of Shakyamuni Buddha ('the J owo', jo-bo) from China to Lhasa. According to

tradition, princess Konjo (Ch. Wen-cheng) seemed to face insurmountable obstacles

to get it to Lhasa and to build a temple to house it. She then made this divination:

'I perceive that this Land of Snows, the Kingdom of Tibet, is in the form of an ogress [Tib. Srin mo] lying upon her back. I perceive that the lake of Otang, [ ... ] is the ogress's heart-blood and that the three mountains are the bones of her heart. As this lake is directly above the ogress's heart, it will be necessary to fill it with soil and build a shrine upon it. Here also is a gateway to the lower realms. There is a naga­palace beneath Ramoche, and the nagas will be subdued if the Jowo Shakyamuni is place there. ' [ ... ] 'The so-called Twelve Immutable Nails will restrain the limbs and

64 Through the revelation of a higher understanding of reality, Guru Rinpoche appeased, subjugated and converted to Buddhism the nagas, and all local deities, including those dwelling in the mountains. In addition, according to Rolf Stein, when people are spoken to of as annoying the deities of the ground by their activities (cultivation, building houses or ~tupas), it is said (amon~ other things) ~at. they appl~ moxa (Tib. me-bca '), that they open .'window~' ~ th~ grou~d, and that mstead of sub~Ittmg to. ~elf vengeance (thus making the completIon of butldmg ImpOSSIble), one conquers them WIth a butldmg (Stein 1990:197).

70

hands of the supine ogress '. [ ... ] 'Having accomplished all this, you will be able to build a shrine in Lhasa without hindrance ... The location is directly above the heart of the ogress' (Sakyapa Sonam Gyatsen 1996: 163-165).65

In this way, qualified masters who could perceIve the forces of the

environment and who were versed in Tibetan astrology and geomancy were consulted

before any construction was undertaken to assure that the building in question would

be conducive to religious practice (or any other activity).66 In places where the time

and conditions were inauspicious, proper offering rituals were held and the erection of

temples, stupas and other sacred objects followed.

Furthermore, there is the belief that some mountains came flying or were

brought from another country, in particular from India, to ensure the stability and the

order of the world. According to Katia Buffetrille's revealing study on these

mountains in Tibet, they could flyaway from Tibet in time of calamities, when the

gods forsake human beings, leaving the world in total chaos (Buffetrille 1996:84).

Therefore, the phenomenon of the flying mountains appears to be a variation on the

subjugation of the territory by Buddhism. The wild, demonic and dangerous natural

world are controlled and subdued thanks to the coming of these mountains. In the

same way, the stupas and temples can function to bring territory under subjugation

(Buffetrille 1996:85). During her fieldwork, Buffetrille found that Tibetans identify at

least four flying mountains; namely, rTsib ri in southern Tibet, brought to Tibet from

Bodhgaya mTsho-snying Mahadeva in Amdo; Mount Kailash (Tib. Kang Rin-po-che

or Ti-se) in western Tibet; and A-myes rMa-chen also in Amdo.

From the above one can assert that the dissemination of Buddhism and the

construction of temples, shrines, stupas and monasteries in key geographical points of

Tibetan geography were particularly significant for the development of new

conceptions of space in Tibet for the following reasons. First, they enabled the

emerging Lhasa-centred polity to establish the political boundaries of its empire

which was expanding to the west and to the south (McKay 2003a:32). That is, the

65 The myth of the Srin Mo appears in the Mani bka- 'bum, a fourteenth century text. According to Janet Gyatso, the myth is firmly embedded in Tibetan culture (Gyatso 1987:38-53). 66 Geomancy is an English word used to refer to the Chinese system of divination known as Feng-shui (lit. wind and water), through which celestial phenomena, features of the landscape, and so on of a particular location are analyzed to determine if such location is right for the establishment of religio~s and political buildings conducive to their respective activities. Tibet~n .geomancy seems t~ have Its origins in Chinese systems of divination. It is however, much less sophisticated and systematized. (See for example Stutchbury 1994).

71

construction of temples at what was perceived the centre of the polity, as well as at its

borders (allegedly built on top of the different parts of the body of the female demon

to control it), marked the boundaries between the 'civilised' (i.e. Buddhist) and the

'un-civilised' (i.e. non-Buddhist) world. It also served to project ritual authority

beyond the boundaries of the state (Mills 2004:13).67 In this sense, the sacralisation of

space in Tibet through Buddhist means and the bounding of political territory were

parallel processes that supported and reinforced each other. Moreover, with these two

processes an incipient form of communal ethnic (proto-national) identity began to

develop (Dreyfus 1994). Second, these processes served to pacify the local deities,

and as acupuncture aids, they allowed an unobstructed flow of the earth's positive

energy.68 Finally, they created a new lens through which the Tibetan landscape was

perceived. Thus, as Charles Ramble argues, the subjugation of negative forces can be

seen as a metaphor for the imposition of order on the natural world, and that what is

ordered is not the environment itself but the terms in which it is perceived. The

paradigm of nature thus ordered is constituted as the sacred place (Tib. gnas) (Ramble

1997:163).

Buddhism maintained its dominant position until the reIgn of King

Langdarma (Glang-dar-ma, reigned AD 836-842) who persecuted the Buddhist

monasteries that had begun to place a heavy burden on state finances because of their

increasing political and economic power. 69 As a result, a dark period of political and

moral chaos followed for nearly two hundred years. Langdarma's persecution forced

the remaining Buddhist practitioners to go underground. During this period, the

teachings of Guru Rinpoche were preserved within different families, giving rise to a

number of lay lineages of Buddhist practitioners. In the process of surviving, several

fundamental principles of Buddhism fell victim to misinterpretation and in some

cases even 'degeneration' (Tucci 1980:16-17; Stein 1972:71). As a consequence, in

the late tenth to early eleventh century, successive rulers in western Tibet set about a

67 Martin Mills argues that the authority of the centre was projected far beyond the sovereign'S actual coercive capacity to intervene in the lives of his subjects in either military or financial tenns (2004: 13). 68 See Zangpo (2001:75-115) for an assessment of how the construction of temples at key acupunctural points was carried out under Queen Konjo's (i.e. King Songtsen Gampo's wife) supervision. 69 Langdanna is very often depicted as an impious, malevolent king. However, some scholars have considered him simply a conservative whose main interest was to preserve the native traditions and who in the process developed hostility toward Buddhism as a foreign religion (Bacot 1962:35). Similarly, McKay notes that he is now seen to have been guided by 'economic necessity or pressure from aristocratic factions' intent on restoring the balance between Buddhism and the indigenous traditions' (McKay 2003a:34).

72

refonnation movement by despatching a party of Tibetan translators southward into

northern India for the purpose of studying the Buddhist teachings in its 'pure' fonn.

Most notable amongst these was the translator Rinchen Zangpo (Rin-chen bzang-po;

AD 958-1055) whose translations came to be recognized as the dividing line between

the 'Ancient' and 'New' periods of Buddhism in Tibet, prompting in the eleventh and

twelfth centuries the second dissemination of Buddhism (Tib. Phyi-dar bstan-pa).

Over the next four centuries, a number of schools and sub-schools arose

within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Three of these, the Kagyupa (bka' -brgyud-pa,

lit. 'Transmission of the Oral Teaching'), the Sakyapa (sa-skya-pa, lit. 'Grey Earth'),

and the Gelugpa (dge-Iugs, lit. 'Virtuous One') became known as the gsarma or new

schools. In response to this, and to the translations of new Indian texts, another school

arose which identified itself with the teachings of Guru Rinpoche that had been

practiced before the tenth and eleventh centuries. This was called the Nyingmapa

(rNying-ma-pa, or 'Ancient One') (Dargyay 1977:6). The main distinctions between

these schools lay in the different Tantric texts (Tantras, Tib. rgyud; Skt. samtana)

upon which they depended, the emphasis they placed on particular aspects of the

doctrine, and the manner of classification of those doctrines.

It is important to emphasise that Tibetans became in effect the inheritors of

the whole Indian Buddhist tradition. As Buddhism became virtually extinct in the

Indian subcontinent under Muslim pressure, Tibetan monasteries and lay masters

became the repositories of all the available texts and practices of Indian Buddhism.

These were traditionally divided in the Hinayana or 'Small Vehicle' referred to as

Theravada Buddhism, and the Mahayana or 'Greater Vehicle' (Tib. che-chung thun­

mong theg_pa).70 The Mahayana teachings are divided in tum, in two vehicles:

Sutrayana or textual vehicle and Vajrayana (Tib. gsang-sngags, or Tantra).71 All

three vehicles developed in Tibet but it was Vajrayana, inherited from the great

Tantric lineages of Indian Yo gins (Skt. Siddhas), which was to assume a special role

70 The Theravadins emphasizes personal liberation from the cycle of existence and suffering for the sake of oneself only, and stresses monasticism as the most effective means to achieve it. Mahayana emphasizes the ultimate attainment of enlightenment for the sake of all beings, and recognizes the possibility of lay practitioners to achieve enlightenment. Tibetan Buddhism is Mahayana Buddhism, thus it stresses the development of the resolution to become a Buddha for the benefit of all sentient beings, which is known as bodhichitta (Tib. byang-chub-sems; lit. mind of enlightenment). And considers that once bodhichitta has arisen in one's mind one has entered into the path to buddhahood and one can then be known as a bodhisattva (Tib. byang-chub-sems-dpa ,), a being destined for enlightenment (Jampa Thaye 2001:47-48). 71 Often referred to as the 'Vehicle of the Six Perfections' (Tib. pha-rol tu phyin-pa 'i theg-pa).

73

in Tibetan Buddhist practice as well as in the further development of religious notions

of space and the sacralisation of space in Tibet (Jampa Thaye 2001; Powers 1995).72

3.1.2. The Establishment of Tibetan Sacred Geography

'Towards the north from the east of Bodhgaya. There lies Purgyal, known as Tibet.

She has soaring peaks like ladders to the sky Blue lakes like the mandala of turquoise Snow-white mountains like crystal stupas

Pale grasslands like the golden Meru Aromatic herbs of medicinal incense.

Her autumn is bedecked with turquoise flowers. 0, the lord of snow land, Arya Avalokiteshvara,

Therein lies your celestial realm. Therein are found your disciples. '

(Kadampa poem quoted in Office of Research and Analysis Centre 1991:5) 73

During the second dissemination of Buddhism, the sacralisation of space in Tibet took

new forms. On the one hand, the pre-Buddhist mountain cults were incorporated and

at times superseded by a new Buddhist mountain cult associated now with Tantric

deities. On the other, it was shaped by four main factors, namely:

1. The presence and performance of religious deeds by prominent spiritual

masters (e.g. Guru Rinpoche and Milarepa (Mi- la ras-pa 1040-1123 CE)),

and their subsequent 'opening of the gates' of sacred places (Tib. gnas-sgo).

2. The existence of a rich textual tradition that supported the consecration of such

places and disseminated their 'sanctity'.

3. The 'mandalisation' of space in Tibet through the performance of Tantric

rituals by lamas and yogins (based on Indian cosmology and Vajrayana

principles).

72 'A lineage (Tib. brgyud) or 'tradition of dharma' (Tib. chos-lugs) possesses certain recognizable characteristics, including a central spiritual theme or 'viewpoint' (Tib. lta-ba). [ ... J This view is itself associated with specific practices and symbolic deities. Moreover, the particular teachings are preserved and passed on through a line of accomplished spiritual masters, who themselves embody the actual qualities of the teaching. The major lineages of dharma in Tibet possessed a relatively sophisticated degree of organization, with many monasteries, convents, colleges and meditations centers in which students were trained in a range of studies including philosophy, meditation, ritual, art and astrology' (Stott 1980:22). 73 The Kadampa School developed in the eleventh century; it was based on Atisha Dipankara's (AD 982-1054) teachings and religious synthesis.

74

4. The existence and 'opening' of 'hidden valleys' (sbas-yul) by spiritual masters

as sanctuaries for spiritual practice, for escape from political turmoil, and for

the preservation of the royal lineage (Childs 1999).

Later on, in the seventeenth century, as a result of the Gelugpa rise to power, a fifth

factor contributed in a significant way to the development of the notion of Tibet as

sacred space. That was, the belief that Tibetans have a special relationship with

Chenrezig, who is perceived as the patron deity of Tibet and progenitor of Tibetans.

Before we proceed with the analysis of the above, it is important to note how

the term 'sacred place' should be understood and in what contexts Tibetans refer to it.

According to Gutschow, Michaels, Ramble and Steinkellner sacred place in Tibet

refers to the so-called hidden lands and power places (Gutschow et.a!. 2003:7).

Tibetans use the term gnas and its related compounds (gnas-chen, gnas-mchog, gnas­

ri) to refer to the latter. Gnas, which in Western sources is often translated as 'place'

and used as a spatial referent, in Tibetan usage carries a much stronger sense of

'existence', 'abiding', or 'being'. 'The term gnas and its compounds most often

designate the abodes of deities and spirits and their associated states of being,

variously conceived' (Huber 1999a:75-79). Many of the conceptions Tibetans apply

to mountains and lakes, can also be applied to certain architectural edifices (e.g.

stupa), human-made objects (e.g. religious status and paintings) and particular persons

(e.g. the Dalai Lamas, and Tantric yogins in particular meditative states) because they

are considered to have deities permanently or temporarily in bodily 'residence'

(Huber 1999a:82). Because of their high ontological value, and the powerful blessing

(Tib. byin-gyi-rlabs) they emit, the places thus designated are the 'best parts of the

phenomenal world' (Huber 1999b: 14), and are often referred to in Western religious

literature as 'power places' .74

1. The presence of great spiritual masters has made the most significant

contribution to the notion of the sacredness of Tibet.

The power of Tibetan Buddhism lies primarily in two factors: in its Mahayana

resolve to attain enlightenment for the sake of all beings (Skt. bodhichitta), and in the

elaboration of this resolve in the practice of Tantric rituals. During these rituals, the

74 In fact Charles Ramble notes that the power in question seems to be understood as designating the blessing; emitted from the events that are embodied in the gnas. These gnas both attract and emit. Th~y attract and organise first and foremost divinities, and pilgrims. What they emit is a sort of magnetIc field which causes whatever it attracts to be disposed about it in a certain way. Above all, what the place does is to organise its spatial and temporal environment (Ramble 1997:133-34).

75

yogin first evokes the Tantric deity in question; then he/she recalls the qualities it

represents, and eventually he/she visualises himselflherself to be transformed into the

deity itself. It is thought that through the continuous repetition of such rituals, the

mind of the Tantric practitioner becomes so familiarised with the deity and its

attributes that in time hislher mind becomes one with the deity. In this way, great

lamas and yogins embody the qualities of the Tantric deities, and thus are seen as

Buddhas in their own right. By the same token, as these advanced practitioners

transform themselves into the appropriate Tantric deity during Tantric ritual, they

transfer their 'power' to the disciples who are present, as well as to the environment.

In some cases, it is believed their mere presence imbues the site with their qualities. In

this way, Tibetans regard the places that have been 'touched' by such people as sacred,

be it a mountain, a hut, a cave, or a temple. These Tantric yogins thus, as Rolf Stein

notes, 'open the gates of a place' (Tib. gnas-sgo), transforming it into a sacred place

(Stein 1990: 197). Similarly, monasteries headed by great lamas, the stupas where

their posthumous remains were kept and places related to their lives often became

gnas-chen.

The most revered places in Tibet are perhaps those associated with the life of

Guru Rinpoche and Milarepa. As mentioned above, Guru Rinpoche is credited with

having tamed the local deities of Tibet and transformed them into protectors of the

Buddhist doctrine. He is considered a second Buddha; and thus all the sites thought to

be related to the exploits of his life are considered gnas-chen. Of particular

importance are those where he is said to have hidden spiritual treasures (Tib. gter-ma,

such as texts, religious implements and the like) revealed in later times; as well as

mountains and meditation caves where he stayed. 75

Milarepa is one of the great masters of the Kagyupa School, but his life seems

to appeal to all Tibetans since it shows what it is possible to attain through committed

religious practice. When Milarepa was seven years old his father died suddenly. On

his deathbed, he entrusted the care of his family and affairs to Milarepa's paternal

75 In both of the textual traditions of Mahayana (Sutra and Tantra), 'there is the tradition of concealment and rediscovery of teachings [known as gter-ma, lit. 'hidden treasure'] through the enlightened power of realized beings. The tradition has two aspects. First, appropriate teachings can be discovered by realized beings or they will appear for them from the sky, mountains, lakes, trees and beings. [ ... ] Second, they can conceal the teachings in books and other forms and entrust them to g?ds, nagas and other powerful beings to protect them and hand over to the right person at the p~oper. tIme. Other realized persons [Tib. gter-ston; lit. 'Treasure discoverer'] will rediscover these teachings m the future' (Tulku Thondup 1986:57).

76

uncle, who proceeded to seize the estate for his own use and pressed Milarepa and his

family into humiliating domestic service. Later on Milarepa wreaked vengeance

through sorcery by killing thirty-five members of his uncle's family and causing

major harvest destruction. Upon feeling remorse, he searched for appropriate masters

and vowed to practise in solitude the Buddha-dharma without repose. Eventually, he

was able to attain enlightenment (Jampa Thaye 1990:45-52). For years, Milarepa led

an austere life in caves and huts in the mountains of southern and western Tibet.

These places, in time became, in the same manner as those associated with Guru

Rinpoche, important gnas-chen (Aufschnaiter 1976).

Furthermore, there is another class of greatly revered sacred objects. These are

stones whose surfaces are imprinted with the handprint or footprint of a master. These

are often found in caves where Guru Rinpoche, Milarepa and other masters are said to

have meditated. And finally, there are the 'self-arising' or 'self-manifesting' objects

(Tib. rang-byung). These are objects that are believed to have formed spontaneously

with no apparent intervention by man; they are often stones with images of Tantric

deities, are also considered crystallizations of mystic processes (Chan 1994:38). The

activity of such spiritual masters is thus the most powerful means through which the

perception of space is transformed. This is in tum reinforced by a rich textual tradition,

by religious ritual, and by popular practices such as regular pilgrimage.

2. The Tantras or Vajrayana texts translated during the first and second

dissemination of Buddhism associated with different Tantric deities, used by all the

Tibetan Buddhism traditions; and more specifically the gter-ma (,hidden treasures'),

in the form of Tantric texts revealed by incarnations of Guru Rinpoche and his

disciples (normally of the Nyingmapa School); and pilgrimage guides (Tib. gnas-yig),

are all part of a bountiful textual tradition that Lamas and Yo gins used in their

spiritual practice. From the twelfth century onwards, this textual tradition became a

very important device for the further sacralisation of space in Tibet. As it will become

apparent in the next point, during Tantric ritual their contents are projected into the

Tibetan landscape.

The Tantras, particularly the Chakrasamvara Tantra (Tib. IKhor-lo Dam-chog),

are popular amongst the Kagyupas and Gelugpas; the gter-ma are primarily used

within the Bonpo and Nyingmapa Schools, and their legitimacy is often recognised by

the Kagyupa as well. The biographies of Guru Rinpoche and gShen-rab Mibo, and

77

their cosmological and historiographical content, are important here as building

blocks from which other gter-ma define various holy sites. 76

A significant corpus of Tibetan literature deals with the history of sacred

places and objects, and their geographic location. It describes pilgrimage routes, the

places, sacred objects, and the hermitages of former religious holy men. Turrell Wylie

divides the corpus of this geographic literature into four general types: Dkar-chag

('Register'), limited to the description of a single pilgrimage place with an account of

the various sacred objects to be found there; gnas-bshad ('Guide-book'), which

describes more than one pilgrimage place and offers brief directions how to travel

between them; Lam-yig ('Passport'), which is a guide-book for pilgrims whose

pilgrimage involves travel between two or more countries; and Go-la 'i kha-byang

('global-description'). The latter is unique and represented by a single text: Dzam­

gling chen-po 'i rgyas-bshad snod-bcud kun-gsal me-long by Bla-ma btsan-po Simin­

grol sprul-sku (1789-1838), which is a description of the known world, and all regions

of Tibet (Wylie 1965:17-19). Of these, gnas-bshad is the most common. Unlike the

huge bulk of Tibetan literature, which was consumed mainly by monks; guide-books

enjoyed a wide public audience in traditional Tibet. Illiteracy was no obstacle for

pilgrims, as guides were often read or recited for them by their literate companions at

sacred places (Huber 1994; 1997a, 1997b).77

These guides contribute greatly to the sacralisation of space in Tibet because

they actively advertise the sanctity of sites and promote the powers and beliefs that

play a significant role in controlling and shaping the lives of individual pilgrims

(Huber 1997b:235). They are also meant to disseminate the Buddhist doctrine and

ethos, taming the land by fixing the Buddhist pantheon onto the landscape and as the

following section will show, transforming it into a mandala (Tib. dkyil- 'khor, 'divine

residence') of a particular Buddhist deity (Buffetrille 1997; Huber 1994, 1997b,

1999b; Diemberger 1997). Therefore, as Ehrhard argues, it is the text that, in the

Tibetan cultural sphere, brings forth the mandala and sacred landscape (1997:336).

76 Toni Huber, October 2003, in personal correspondence with author. 77 This type of religious literary genre was clearly not unique to Tibetans; the dissemination of the contents of pilgrimage guides played a crucial role in the Middle Ages in the popularization of pilgrimage routes in different parts of the Christendom. An important example of this was the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela in Spain. See for example Le Guide du Pelerin de Saint-Jacques de Cornpostelle: Texte Latin du Xl/erne Siecle (1969), Macon: Imprimeries Protat Freres.

78

3. The 'mandalisation' of space through ritual practice based on Indian

cosmology and Vajrayana principles (Skt. mandala, Tib. dkyil- 'khor).

'Wheel of great bliss and perfect cognition Called glorious Tsari, shining upon everything

Mandala of gods and goddesses of the three bodies, Shrine of the triple world-space, I bow down to you! '

(Nineteenth-century Tibetan pilgrim's guide to Tsari, quoted in Huber 1999b:39)

In Tibet, special attention was given to Indian cosmology's model of the

universe, based on the well-known scheme of Mount Meru, as the axis mundi,

surrounded by the four 'continents' and eight 'subcontinents'. The material world as

the Tibetans knew it formed part of the Southern Continent of Dzambuling (Skt.

Jambudvipa). From the summit of Mount Meru upwards stretched the heavens where

the gods dwell, and below where the hell-beings dwell. This model of the universe is

significant in that Mount Meru is believed to be in western Tibet in the summit of

Mount Kailash. Hence Tibet is considered the centre of the universe from which the

main streams of life flow. 78

With the growing influence of Vajrayana ideas, Indian cosmology, the

architectural forms of the stupa and the Tantric mandala, considered as a 'map' of the

state of enlightenment and dwelling of deities, began to converge.79 In Tantric rituals,

the mandala's main function lies in the notion of a mystic place where the officiating

master communicates with the principal divinity and where the neophyte is

empowered and initiated into the practice. In this sacred sphere the divinities are

invoked in order that they may come down from their celestial residences, be offered

meals, made to listen to confession and requested to give blessings. However, on

another level, the mystic himself takes the place of the principal divinity in the

mandala (Karmay quoted in Macdonald 1997: v-vi).

This whole process involved envisaging the palace of the deity as a feature of

the Tibetan landscape, most commonly a sacred mountain, a temple or a stupa. Its

peak is considered as Mount Meru, the centre of the universe, and the actual abode of

78 In fact, nearly all the great rivers of Asia flow from this area of Tibet; among them are the Sutlej, the Indus, and the Brahmaputra. 79 According to Huber, the mandala 'is one of the most significant hierarchical and replicative spatial organizing principles to be introduced into Tibet and the rest of Asia from India. In various forms and applications throughout Asia, mandala have served as archetypes of the ideal city, models of the cosmos, blueprints for centers of royal power, templates for the operation of polities, networks for the distribution of resources, plans for sacred architecture, representations of the divine palace or mansion, and schemes for the distribution of vital energies within the human body' (Huber 1999b:26).

79

the deity. The surrounding landscape was understood as being within the power

radiating forth from the central deity to the extremes of the mandala. The landscape

itself is envisaged as being literally empowered. Lamas and yogins were not only

believed to have gained enlightenment due to the power of gnas, but according to

Tibetan thinking, their own empowerment (Tib. byin-rlabs) generated at the peak of

their yogic performance, fused into the physical substance of the mountain's already

very potent natural environment (Huber 1999b:84).

Moreover, this projection of the Tantric Buddhist mandala into the Tibetan

landscape implied the previous subjugation of the existing local deities (yul-lha and

gzhi-dag) and their conversion into protective deities (McKay 2003b; Buffetrille

1997; Huber 1997a, 1997b; Ramble 1997). Although in general these pre-Buddhist

mountain cults were incorporated into the new Buddhist mountain cult centred on a

Tantric deity and embedded in a rich textual tradition, some of the mountain cults

related to tribal ancestors continued to be practised until the late 1950s. The mountain

conceived in Buddhist terms became a gnas-ri, a sacred mountain. And its worship

had both, a secular and a religious component, that is, gnas-ri could be worshipped as

the abode of local deities by ordinary Tibetans, who also believed in the residence of

the powerful Tantric deities. Nevertheless, both cults required different sets of ritual

practices.

Finally, the sacralisation of space in Tibet through the mandalisation process

had a significant impact on sectarian power struggles, particularly with regards to the

opening of sacred mountains (gnas-ri). Historically, as Huber notes, the establishment

of major gnas-ri throughout Tibet 'marked a consolidation of newly formed,

monastically based sectarian interests and territory. Symbolically this process also

legitimated the superior powers of Tantric lamas and their systems of Buddhism or

Bon by claiming control of apparently ancient Tibetan places of power and a

conversion of their divine residents in the natural landscape' (Huber 1999b:29). In

this way the symbolic control over gnas strengthened the social, religious, and

economic position of these lamas.

4. The existence and 'opening' of sbas-yul. 80 These hidden lands are places

set aside by Guru Rinpoche as refuges to be discovered at an appropriate time. Sbas-

80 According to Childs, one well -accepted Tibetan tradition acknowledges the existence o~ seven sbas­yul: Bde-Idan Skyid-mo-Iung, Sbas-pa Padma-tshal, Rol-pa Mkha' -' gro-gling, Rgyal-kyi Mkhan-pa­lung, Lha-yi Pho-brang Sdings, Sbas-yul 'Bras-mo-shong, and Gro-mo-khud. However, he notes that

80

yul, along with the hidden treasures (Tib. gter-ma) and the discoverers (Tib. gter-ston)

of such treasures are central to the Nyingrnapa School; other schools however, have

also taken to these ideas and practices. Some of the sbas-yul are supposed to be quiet

refuges reserved for spiritual practice (e.g. sbas-yul mkhan-pa-Iung in Bhutan and in

Shar Khum-bu, Eastern Nepal), places where lay people could settle to escape

political turmoil (e.g. Sikkim and Padma-bkod) (Samuel 1993:517), and sanctuaries

where the descendants of King Trison Detsen and his patrilineal kin could seek refuge

when there was a threat to the continuity of their biological line. In any case, they are

conceived as settlement destinations, as 'fertile landscapes' where society could

function with a king as a legitimate ruler, and where an idealised version of Tibetan

society could be sustained remote from deteriorating conditions in Tibet (Childs

1999: 127-128).81

There are still legends among Tibetan populations all along the Himalayas

about such places, as well as guidebooks that explain how to find them and narrate

their marvellous properties. These are described in such texts as places of

overwhelming beauty; real paradises on earth where miraculous phenomena happen

all the time: 'springs which can keep people from ageing and illness and can give

fertility to women, wonderful self-growing crops, places for immediate spiritual

realization' (Diemberger 1997:294). As the following quote from a guide to sbas-yul

mkhan-pa-Iung suggests, sbas-yul are often equated with Tantric deities' pure-lands

(Tib. zhing-khams) that exists on earth - a special kind of paradise reached through

intense spiritual training, and a hidden country where the golden age of the future is

even now ripening in secrecy. 82

'[S]outh-west from here, there is the so-called Beyul Khenbalung (sbas-yul mkhan­

pa-Iung). It is similar to the Shinkham (zhing-khams) of Dewachen [bde-ba-can, the

there are others which present different lists (Childs 1999:fi1.9:130). 81 In fact, sbas-yul were conceived as a sort of 'Noah's Are' in the sense that they were intended to preserve not only the royal lineage who would be able to establish a new administration there, but also Tibetan society as whole. Therefore, the main settlers were supposed to be members of the royal lineage, and blessed Tantric lamas. 82 Jamgon Kongtrul defines the body of ultimate enlightenment's pure land as 'the absolute expanse, the fundamental nature that pervades all animate life and every environment throughout the wheel of life and states of transcendence. Although this pure land appears differently to different perceivers, its essential nature remains unchanging: radiant luminosity within the great, primordially existent sphere of vital essence'. [ ... ] 'Persons with supreme spiritual acumen experience these as pure lands; persons of moderate acumen, as sacred places; and those of ordinary acumen, as impure, inert forms, such as earth, rocks and hills' (Kongtrul translated in Zangpo 2001: 171).

81

field of great bliss where Buddha Amitabha resides] and to the Mountain Potala [the

'Heavenly abode' ofChenrezig] ... ' (quoted in Diemberger 1997:fn.23:322).

The existence of hidden valleys plays an important role in popular imagination

and in people's relationship with the Tibetan landscape, since it is believed that saints

of the past such as Guru Rinpoche, foreseeing an age of degeneration and hence

difficulties in the practice of the Buddha-dharma, provide, even today, safe refuges

for them when needed. Hence, the popularity of the valleys has always been linked to

crisis or impending crisis (or at the least the fear of them).83 The sole existence of

such places elevates the status of Tibet in popular imagination.

Scholars such as F. Ehrhard have noted that Western understanding of the

phenomenon of hidden lands is still in its infancy, particularly since the greater part of

the literature that deals with sbas-yul is in the form of 'prophecy' (Tib. lung bstan),

and thus is subject to various interpretations from the outset. Therefore, 'only when

we have analysed in greater detail the history and influence of such genres as 'guides

to sacred places' (Tib. gnas-yig) and 'travel guides' (Tib. lam-yig), as well as those of

'route lists' (Tib. lam-byang) and introduction lists (Tib. Kha-byang) and have

compared with one another the gter-ma cycles from which they derive, can we hope

to come to an understanding of the phenomenon of hidden lands in its functionality

and complexity' (Ehrhard 1997:341). That analysis is therefore yet to emerge.

The nearest equivalent to such a belief in the New Schools (Sakyapa, Kagyupa,

Gelugpa) is the hidden realm of Shambhala (Tib. bde- 'byung, lit. the 'source of

happiness,).84 Originally it was thought that this was the name of an actual country,

lying north of the Sita River (Tucci 1949 quoted in Wylie 1962:xviii), or the capital of

Bactria (Das quoted in Wylie 1962:xviii). According to tradition, the texts and

teachings of the Dus-kyi- 'khor-lo (Skt: Kalachakra Tantra) provide the basis for the

Tibetan belief in Shambhala. It is said that these teachings were revealed to the people

of the kingdom of Shambhala, a place ruled by a succession of wise Buddhist kings,

the last of whom would emerge at some future date to liberate the world from its

oppressive and evil rulers and bring a golden age in which the world will become a

place of peace and plenty, filled with the riches of wisdom and compassion (Samuel

1993:517, Bernbaum 1980:4). The inhabitants of such a kingdom supposedly live in

peace and harmony, free of sickness and hunger. Their crops never fail and their food

83 Remark made by Toni Huber in a letter to author, October 2003.

82

is wholesome and nourishing. They all have a healthy appearance, speak Sanskrit, and

have great material wealth, which they never need (Bernbaum 1980:9).

The oldest volumes concerning Shambhala were written down in Tibetan in

the eleventh century as translations from older works in Sanskrit. According to the

texts, the kingdom provides the conditions under which one can make the fastest

possible progress toward Enlightenment, through the study and practice of the highest

wisdom encapsulated in the Kalachakra Tantra. 85 The most popular and widely read

guidebook to Shambhala, entitled Shambhala 'i Lamyig or The Description of the Way

to Shambhala, was written in 1775 by the 3rd Panchen Lama, Lobsang Palden Yeshe.

When speaking about the journey to the hidden kingdom, Tibetans usually refer to

this text, which has tended to supersede all others (Bernbaum 1980: 181-82). 86

Commentaries on the Kalachakra place Shambhala somewhere in the northern part of

the Indian subcontinent, the North Pole, Siberia or in Northern Tibet. The remoteness

of Shambhala, the uncertainty of its location, and the difficulties in going there are all

sufficient to keep it hidden from the outside world.

The Bon religion also has a myth, similar to that of Shambhala, that of the

hidden country of Olmolungring. This country holds the highest of mystical teachings

and is inhabited by people who are well on the way to enlightenment. It too lies

hidden north of Tibet behind a great wall of snow mountains. gShen-rab Mibo is said

to have been the king of Olmolungring when he taught in Tibet. According to their

prophecy, some twelve thousand years from now, when religion has died out in the

world outside, a great king and teacher of Bon will once again come forth from

Olmolungring to bring to mankind a new and revitalised form of the old spiritual

teachings (Bernbaum 1980:80-81).

The myths of Shambhala and hidden valleys share a number of interesting and

potentially meaningful features. Although the kingdom of Shambhala belongs to a

different tradition that has little to do with Guru Rinpoche, some lamas consider it a

84 It is believed that the western idea of Shangri-La derives from the Tibetan notion of Shambhala. 85 Just before this death and final entry into Nirvana, the Buddha took on the form of the Kalachakra deity and gave this highest of mystical teachings to a great assembly of sages and gods in southern India. King Sucandra of Shambhala, who was there, took the teachings back to his kingdom where he wrote it down and composed commentaries on it (Bernbaum 1980:14). 86 According to Bernbaum, the most moving and beautiful description of the journey appears in Rigs-pa Dzin-pa 'i Pho-nya or the Knowledge-bearing Messenger, a long poem composed in the ~orm of a l~tter by a sixteenth-century Tibetan prince named Rinpung Ngawang Jigdag. In any case, ~lbetans bel~e.ve that the Panchen Lamas have a special connection with Shambhala that makes them umque authontles on the Kingdom (Bernbaum 1980: 182-185).

83

hidden valley. Like the valleys, Shambhala contains vanous kinds of treasures , ranging from objects of material wealth to books of wisdom and the ideal conditions

for attaining enlightenment. The myths share prophecies about difficult times to come

and spiritual masters who would make access to such places available to the faithful.

In addition, guidebooks describe similar kinds of journeys to both Shambhala and the

sbas-yul. The instructions they give for rituals and meditation to be performed along

the way suggest that these journeys imply a spiritual as well as a physical dimension

(Bernbaum 1980:76). Though Childs points out that the scale of the sbas-yul tends to

be more modest than that ofShambhala (1999:128). In any case, these lands, whether

real or imaginary, accessible to the lay person or to the initiated, played an important

role in the sacralisation of space in Tibet and as a vital device of religious practice in

the face of calamity. Likewise because they were perceived as a sort of 'exile

sanctuary' (Childs 1999: 147), they were key to the possibility of preserving

endangered Tibetan religion and Tibetan society in general.

5. The belief that Chenrezig is the patron deity of Tibet and progenitor of

Tibetans. Chenrezig has been for centuries the most commonly revered Tantric deity

in Tibet. This is based on three very important elements. First and foremost, in the

bodhisattva qualities he embodies; that is, the compassionate and unwavering resolve

to benefit all sentient beings. Second, in the belief that Chenrezig is the patron deity

of Tibet. And third, in the belief that the first of the Ancestral Religious kings,

Songtsen Gampo descended from Chenrezig.

Tibetans' ascription of Tibet as the special field of Chenrezig, and their claim

of descent from such a deity has been at the centre of Tibetan religious and cultural

identity since the eleventh century. It is believed that through the unwavering activity

of Chenrezig suffering can be dispelled, and Tibet transformed into a land where

Buddhas dwell. What makes this a very powerful idea is the belief that this

transformation of Tibet is truly possible, and is already a reality for some people.

Therefore, Chenrezig's presence grants Tibet a special character, and a special place

in the world.

The first great figure to promote the practice of meditational techniques

(Tantric ritual) focusing on Chenrezig was Atisha Dipankara (AD 982-1054)

(Kapstein 1992). From then on, this practice became widespread. 87 Meditation

87 While the cult of Chenrezig has Indic origins, its manifestation in Tibet can also be seen as a Tibetan

84

required the repetition of a six syllable 'mantra' (Tib. sngags; lit. 'that which protects

the mind') to evoke the presence of the deity. 'That repetition, undoubtedly the most

common single religious act in Tibetan society, is explained in terms of developing

the compassionate qualities of [Chenrezig] , directing that compassion towards the

sufferings of [all sentient beings], not toward worshipping an external deity' (Samuel

1993:248).

The belief that Chenrezig is the patron deity of Tibet and that King Songtsen

Gampo was his incarnation are found in a famous fourteenth-century text known as

the Mani bka '-bum. According to one passage the Buddha himself assigns Chenrezig

to Tibet:

'In former times, when the Lord Buddha dwelled in Veluvana, from the whorl of hair between his eyebrows shone forth a multicoloured rainbow-like ray of light. The ray extended to the snowy kingdom of Tibet in the north. [And said]:

'Son of your race! In this place where no being has been a candidate for conversion by the Buddhas of the Three Times, a barbaric snow realm filled with multitudes of demons and ogres, at some future time the Holy Dharma will spread and flourish like the rising sun, and sentient beings will be led to the enlightenment path of liberation. The spiritual guide who will tame this barbaric land shall be the sublime Lord A valokiteshvara. [Who had made] the following supplication: [ ... ] Until I have brought [all sentient beings in the barbaric Land of Snows] to the path of liberation and enlightenment, though I be fatigued and weary, may I contemplate neither rest nor happiness for a single moment' (taken from the Mani bKa '-bum by Sakyapa Sonam Gyatsen 1996:52-53,63).

Furthermore, according to popular belief, Chenrezig is not only the patron of

Tibet but also the progenitor of the Tibetan race. After Chenrezig was thus 'assigned'

to Tibet, the story goes, he was dispatched there to meditate in the form of a 'monkey­

bodhisattva', when a rock-ogress who had carnal desires for him threatened to slay ten

thousand living beings if he did not marry her. To avoid such carnage, the monkey

agreed to marry her. The Buddha then blessed the marriage in order that 'the snowy

kingdom' might possess three qualities: 'that at some future time, the teaching of the

Buddha might spread, flourish and endure; that spiritual friends might arise in

unbroken succession; and that precious treasures might be discovered, so that benefits,

happiness, virtue and goodness might increase in all ten directions' (Sakyapa Sonam

Gyatsen 1996:75-77). Their offspring became the Tibetan race, and in time,

Chenrezig gave them agriculture and taught them to cultivate barley, wheat, peas,

manifestation and development of the earlier understanding of the Chakravartin, the Buddhist ideal of the Universal Emperor (a role often associated with the great Indian emperor Asoka (third century Be) (McKay 2003b:fil.20, p.31).

85

buckwheat and rice. In this way, Songtsen Gampo, supposedly the first Buddhist king

became one of the first descendants of Chenrezig.

Subsequent spiritual and political leaders of different Tibetan Buddhist

schools, such as the Gyalwa Karmapa of the Karma Kagyu sub-school and the Dalai

Lama of the Gelugpa School, were later regarded as emanations (Tib. trulku; sprul­

sku) of Chenrezig. 88 These ideas were disseminated during the reign of the 5th Dalai

Lama (Nga-dbang blo-bzang rgya-mtsho, 1617-1682) when the notions of Tibet as

being the special field of Chenrezig, the Dalai Lamas' embodiment of Chenrezig and

their association with the Yarlung Kings (particularly Songtsen Gampo) were inserted

in the main body of the Legal Code of 1653. The Code describes the land and its

intimate association with the deity and identifies the Dalai Lama with it. In addition,

the dissemination of the Great Fifth's autobiography in which his connection and that

of Tibet with Chenrezig are clearly stated also contributed to its dissemination and

legitimising processes (Yumiko 1993). Thereafter the Dalai Lamas' were often

referred to as 'jig-rten dbang-phyug (lit. 'Lord of the world'), an epithet of Chenrezig.

To the assertion that the 'Snowy kingdom of Tibet' is Chenrezig's special

field, the 'Mani bKa '-bum has lent a semblance of canonical authority' (Kapstein

1992:86). These ideas, as part of the written as well as the oral folk tradition have

been so pervasive that they are central to the Tibetan national consciousness and form

and inform the notions of Tibet as sacred space.

3.1.2.1. Sacred Place and Pilgrimage

'Pilgrimage in its various manifestations is one of the most widespread ritual ensembles practised in the Tibetan cultural world. Its universality as a major form through which persons and places or sites are ritually related is beyond doubt. [ ... ] Tibetan pilgrimage is certainly a complex phenomenon, being motivated by various goals, employing multiple dimensions of ritual activity and directed towards a huge

range of gnas '. (Huber 1994a:82). At the centre of Tibetan religious life is the practice of the two accumulations of merit

(Tib. bsod-nams ki tsog) and wisdom (Tib. shes-rab). Merit is accumulated by

virtuous actions to 'ensure' a good rebirth and to prevent obstacles such a sickness,

short life, poverty, and so forth from preventing the fulfilment of the possibilities

offered in this life. Pilgrimage is seen as one of the most effective means to

88 To say that a particular person is an emanation of a particular deity implies that '~uch a person epitomizes the qualities of [such deity] or, better, serves as a channel through whtch the mode symbolized by the deity can be active within society' (Samuel 1993 :248).

86

accumulate merit since it is believed that at gnas-chen one has an encounter with

Tantric deities, a source of great blessings and power (Tib. bYin-gyi-rlabs). The notion

of accumulation of merit is based on the doctrine of karma (Tib. las; lit. action; cause

and effect), one of Buddha's central teachings. It teaches that everything one

encounters in one's life is the result of one's actions in this life or in previous ones.

Thus, the misfortune that one encounters in one's life is the result of actions ,

commited in the past, that caused or intended harm and suffering to others (Tib. sdig­

pa, evil deeds). Similarly, good fortune is the result of virtuous and compassionate

actions. In this sense, one's unhappiness is of one's own doing. To embark on

pilgrimage is believed to be one of the best ways of purifying negative deeds and of

having their religious consciousness expanded. This would sow the seeds for a better

rebirth during the next lifetime so that the privations of the present life may be

exchanged for a better future. Pilgrimage can also be undertaken to bring about the

attainment of physical well being; begetting an offspring; have good harvests, and so

forth. In this sense, pilgrimage is very often worldly. In any case, most pilgrims set

off wishing some form of transformation, whether in the near future and in this life, or

in the next.

Pilgrimage, as the above quote from Huber suggests, establishes the basis for a

relationship between people and the gnas. On accessing these gnas through

pilgrimage, offerings and ritual practice, one addresses the three types of powers that

prevail at such sites: 'beings that liberate, beings that protect, and a place that purifies'

(Huber 1999b: 1 09). In this way, the qualities that have been infused into gnas can be

realized in the pilgrim. Hence, pilgrimage becomes a liminal experience through

which pilgrims are transformed. The relationship that develops between the gnas-chen

and the pilgrim is based on a number of ritual activities performed while on

pilgrimage. These involve, among other things, a 'direct encounter and interpreting of

the landscape', 'ingesting place substances', collecting substances such as stones and

the like, offering personal possessions (e.g. such as yak butter lamps, incense, food

and/or money), the recitation of prayers and mantras, and a physical

acknowledgement of the ontological value of the place, most commonly through the

performance of full length prostrations (Tib. phyag- 'tshal) to the ground facing the

gnas and its repeated circumambulation (Tib. skor-ba) (Huber 1999a).89 The

89 Prostrating is a way of paying respect, and the restating of one's commitment to uphold the 'three

87

recitation of Chenrezig's six syllable mantra while circumambulating a sacred place,

be it a temple, a simple shrine, a rock, a mountain or a lake is, as some scholars have

suggested, the most common single religious act in Tibetan society (Samuel 1993),

regardless of which Tantric deity or 'Saint' the gnas is associated with. It is explained

in terms of developing the compassionate qualities of Chenrezig.

The action of taking a substance from the gnas (Tib. gnas-rdo) is part of the

same process of sacralization of space, involving this time the pilgrim's home.

Because everything in and around the gnas is imbued with its sacred qualities, it is

believed that by taking some of its substance (a stone, water or the like) back home,

one takes its qualities into it. Similarly, the stones represent a souvenir, a relic, but

also a means of bringing prosperity and abundance to the community (Buffetrille

1997:111).

For 'pilgrimage', Tibetans commonly use the terms gnas-skor (lit. 'going

around a gnas') and gnas-mjal (lit. 'to encounter/meet a gnas '). A Tibetan pilgrimage

then is generally a circular journey around a gnas, which constitutes and/or involves

'encounter(s), of some kind (Huber 1999a:83). By circumambulating gnas, the

pilgrim encloses the sacred, and separates it from its surroundings. In some Tibetan

areas, particularly in agricultural settlements, circumambulation serves as a way of

protecting the land (Guts chow and Ramble 2003:157).

The Tibetan guide-book for Mount Kailash written by the 'Bri gung Lama

bsTan-'dzin Chos-kyi Blo-gros (AD 1869-1906) says something similar to Kongtrul's

idea about the perception of Pure Lands: that is, that different beings see different

things according to the level of purity of their minds. For example, to the bodhisattvas

who are completely pure, Mout Kailash appears as 'a mountain made of precious

substances and a heavenly mansion of the gods inside it'; to the sight of mediocre

people it appears 'as a splendoured, massive mountain and the self-created body of a

deity'; to the sight of inferior people 'it appears as nothing but just ordinary earth and

rock' (Huber and Rigzin 1995:46-47). Although clearly most pilgrims do not have the

vision ofbodhisattvas, they try to see the mountain as bodhisattvas would. In this way,

they enter into a state of liminality in which spiritual transformation is possible.

jewels' (Tib. Kon-chok gsum), that is, the Buddha (Tib. sangs-rgyas ), the Dharma (Tib. Chos, ~e doctrine as the means to achieve enlightenment) and the Sangha (Tib. dge-dun, the Buddhist community from whom one can get inspiration) close to one's heart until one attains enlightenmen~. !t consists of bowing down until the knees, chest, arms, hands and forehead touch the ground) and It IS

traditionally accompanied with prayers and visualizations.

88

The most important sacred mountains and thus the most popular pilgrimage

destinations are Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar (mTsho Ma-pham) in Ngari,

western Tibet; rTsa-ri in the south-eastern end of the Himalayas, La-phyi in southern

Tibet, A-myes rMa-chen in the eastern province of Amdo, and Bon-ri in Kongpo,

Southern Tibet. 90 All of these are believed to be the abodes of the Tantric deity

Cakrasamvara (Tib. 'Khor-lo Dam-chog) and his consort Vajravarahi (Tib. rDo-rje

Phag-mo). They are all located in regions of exceptional spirituality. rTsa-ri, in

particular is considered 'the Tantric place par excellence' and a testing ground for

yogins since 'Sky Dancers' (Tib. mka'- 'gro-ma) are said to dwell there and put yogins

through all sorts of trials (Dowman 1997: 177).91 Mount Kailash is the centre of the

universe for Buddhists, Hindus and Bon practitioners alike. 92 Sacred La-phyi Kang is

also intimately associated with Milarepa (Huber 1999a). Likewise, Guru Rinpoche

who had seen rTsa-ri in a vision went there to subdue the local demons (Chan

1994:46). Pilgrimage on a small scale to these mountains is a frequent occurrence.

One major pilgrimage to each mountain takes place every twelve years according to

the Tibetan calendar cycles. This constitutes a major religious and social event, and an

incredible opportunity in the eyes of the pilgrim to accumulate merit.

The list of pilgrimage sites and routes is endless, as one can attest by the size

of sacred geography literature available in Tibetan (dKar-chag; gNas-bshad; and

Lam-yig) and now in Western languages. Good examples of these are the nineteenth

century 'Dzam-gling-rgyas-bshad 93 by Bla-ma Btsan-po (died around 1839); The

Seed of Faith: A Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet94 by Mkhyen brtse (AD

1820-1892), and the Ti-se gnas bshad (Guide to Tise) by 'Bri-gung Chos Kyi Blo­

gros (AD 1869-1906). 95 Likewise, Lhasa is the single most visited city in Tibet for it

90 A-myes nna-chen is worshipped as the chief of all the gods of the region (gzhi-bdag) of A-mdo. The mountain is closely linked to Gesar of Ling, the hero ofthe great Tibetan epic. For further reference see Buffetrille 1997:75-132. For reference to Bon-ri worshipped mainly by Bonpos, see: Ramble 1997: 133-232. 91 Sky Dancers are female wisdom beings who are particularly associated with the transmission of secret teachings to Tantric practitioners (Powers 1995:450). 92 For Bonpos Kailash is the place of the Bon mountain god Gekho, and for Hindus it is the abode of Shiva Mahadeva. 93 Short for 'Dzam gling chen po'i rgyas bshad snod bcud kun gsal me long zhes bya ba ("The Mirror which Illuminates all the Inanimate and Animate Things and explains fully the Great World") (trans. Wylie 1962). 94 Tib. Dbusgtsan gi gnas rten ragsrim gyi mtsha byan mdor bsdus dad pa 'i sa bon zes byaba bzugs so.

(Transl. Ferrari 1958). 95 Short for Gangs ri chen po ti se dang mtsho chen ma dros pa bcas kyi sngon byung ~i 10 ~gyus "!dor bsdus su brjod pa'1 rab byed shel dkar me long ('The Crystal Mirror: An analYSIS WhICh bnefly explains the chronicle of past events at the Great Snow Mountain Ti-se and the Lake Ma-dros-pa ')

89

contains first and foremost the Jokhang temple which dates back to king Songtsen

Gampo's reign and houses Tibetans' sanctum sanctorum, the Jowo statue of

Shakyamuni Buddha; and the Potala palace, the seat of the Dalai Lamas. As

mentioned earlier, these guidebooks contributed to the 'popularisation' of sacred

places, and shaped the beliefs and perceptions of the pilgrims.

Although pilgrimage is foremost transitional and, at least in theory temporal;

there are a number of wandering yogins who have made of pilgrimage a way of life;

hence, they wander from one gnas to the other. Furthermore, pilgrimage is a pan­

Tibetan practice. Tibetans from all regions, social status and walks of life engage in

pilgrimage, regardless of doctrinal, sectarian, linguistic and regional differences, and

political rivalries. At the social level, the existence of a national pilgrimage network,

whose routes extended throughout the length and breath of ethnographic Tibet, helped

to maintain communications among even the most far-flung areas, which in tum

enhanced a sense of a larger ethnic community. In this sense, pilgrimage as liminal

experience implies a homogenisation - albeit transient - of social status. As stated

earlier, it enhances strong communal feelings, as well as ethnic awareness, helping to

enlarge images of the collectivity and the ethnic group. In this way, one could say that

Tibetan pilgrimage contributes, and perhaps even to some extent engenders the

cultural unity of Tibetans. Pilgrimage also represents situations of ordeal where

endurance is tested and pilgrims are stimulated to reflect on the meaning of basic

religious and cultural values. And finally, pilgrimage implies a transformation of the

individual at a personal and transpersonallevel.

By way of conclusion, we can say that the Tibetan notion of sacred space

started to develop with ancient beliefs on the existence of local deities, demons and

spirits, and the sacredness of their dwellings, such as mountains, lakes and rivers, and

their connection to local tribal ancestors and the royal lineage. Furthermore, with the

introduction and dissemination of Buddhism, this notion became much more complex

as new meanings were attached to it. The development of a sacred geography in the

early period was intimately intertwined with the exercise of political power and the

establishment of secular political boundaries. Furthermore, the increase in spiritual

activity of Tantric masters, the emergence of a rich Tantric textual tradition, the

projection of the mandala spiritual principle unto the Tibetan landscape and territory

(Transl. Huber 1994b).

90

through Tantric ritual and religious architecture shaped not only the physical

environment but the ways in which it was perceived by Tibetans.

Similarly, the view of Tibet as the special field of Chenrezig, the popularity of

the meditational practice focused on 'him', and the belief that he is the progenitor of

the Tibetan race were key in enhancing the view of the special-ness of the Tibetan

land. Also, Tantric ritual and the presence of Tantric masters enhanced the sense that

to a certain degree the environment is controllable; or at least that religion can help in

creating not only an inner balance, but also a balanced environment. Religious

artefacts of all sorts support that process.

3.2. The Rise to Power of the Gelugpa Sect: Toward the 'Unification' of Ethnographic Tibet?

From the eleventh century onwards, at the centre of Tibetan history were the

monasteries and religious orders, as well as the heads of noble houses who became

both benefactors and partisans of one ecclesiastical establishment or another (Stein

1972:70). By the thirteenth century, rivalries and internal feuds between the most

powerful monasteries and the noble houses for temporal power had become

commonplace. With the intervention of the Mongols in Tibetan affairs, an age of

political intrigues, intense factionalism and even armed conflict emerged. In 1247,

Sakya Pandita (sa-skya kun-dga' rgyal-mtshan AD 1182-1251), head of the Sakyapa

School restored an ill-defined form of political unity in central Tibet, with the help of

the Mongols who had established the Yuan dynasty in China. The Mongols invested

first Sakya Pandita with authority over the regions of V-Tsang and Yar-'brog and

later his nephew Bla-ma 'Phags-pa (AD 1235-1280) with authority over the Three

Provinces (Tib. Chol-kha gsum): V-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. In this way, the

Sakyapas became the first rulers over all of ethnic Tibet and marked the beginning of

a unique form of government where secular authority was held by a religious figure

(Wylie 1965:22).96 During the next two centuries other schools and sub-schools

became major powers as the fortunes of the Sakyas began to fade. 97

96 The so-called 'patron-priest' (Tib. yon-mchod) relationship between the Sakyapa leaders and the Mongols developed as a result of the above. It implied the Mongol protection of Tibet against foreign threats, and the Sakyapa commitment to act as the spiritual preceptors of the Mongol Khans. The unity achieved under Sakya rule was largely due to the imposition of Mongol overlords hip (McKay 2003b:16). 97 The Kagyupa phag-mo gru-pa sub-school held power over Dbus province. Gtsang province was under the area of influence of Karma Pakshi, the Second Karmapa, and Head of the Karma Kagyupa

91

Meanwhile, the leaders of the Gelugpa School (which began to develop in the

first half of the fifteenth century) gained favour with the Mongols as Altan Khan was

converted to Buddhism by the Gelugpa monk Sonam Gyatso (bSod-nams rgya-mtsho,

AD 1543-88). The Khan conferred upon him the title of 'Dalai Lama' (Mongolian for

'Great Ocean' lama; i.e. 'priest with ocean-like wisdom'). Sonam Gyatso then raised

his predecessors Gedun Dru (dGe-'dun grub, AD 1391-1475) and Gedun Gyatso

(dGe-'dun rgya-mtsho, AD 1475-1542) retrospectively, as heads of the Gelugpas to

the same dignity (Tucci 1980:41). This meant that he was taking the custom of

'succession by reincarnation', developed in the twelfth century within the Kagyupa

Schoo1.98

The Dalai Lama, portrayed as an individual who, having broken the cycle of

birth and death (Skt. Samsara, Tib. 'khor-ba) through spiritual practice, selflessly

decides to take a new life in a body, time and place where his activity would most

benefit other beings. Moreover, as stated above, during the time of the 5th Dalai Lama

(known to Tibetans as 'The Great Fifth') the Dalai Lama began to be widely regarded

as an emanation (Tib. sprul-sku) of Chenrezig. 99 Accordingly, the Dalai Lama's

spiritual and political seat was constructed and named the Potala palace, alluding to

the name given in the scriptures of the heavenly abode of Chenrezig. Therefore, his

political power coupled with a perceived selflessness attached to his 'ancestry'

became the basis for much of the respect and faith attached to him by the common

people. 100

sub-school who had made a great impression on the Mongol court (Wylie 1978 quoted in Samuel 1993:494-495). 98 This refers to the conscious manipulation of the rebirth process by a dying head of a monastery, expected to predict his rebirth and give some details of where it was to take place and in what family. On the basis of these indications and various divinatory procedures, the officials of the monastery were sent to find the child two or three years after the lama's death. The child was supposed to show certain signs, such as partial memory of his previous life (Samuel 1993). 99 The Great Fifth was a renowned scholar with a prolific writing career. In his biography of his predecessor, the 4th Dalai Lama, the understanding that he embodied Chenrezig was articulated. Its propagation was possible thanks to the emergence of wood-block printing. Alex McKay suggests that even contemporary artistic representations similarly preached the Dalai Lama's alleged divine ancestry and that a series of rituals around the cult of Chenrezig were instituted during his time (McKay 2003b: 17-19). 100 The Dalai Lamas were considered enlightened and benevolent, because they had been carefully selected, trained and brought up according to the strictest Buddhist standards, literally from childhood; and the result was the closest approximation to the Buddha possible to Tibetans (Norbu, D. 1997:192). In addition the innovation of succession by reincarnation allowed peaceful and orderly transitions of power. S~ilarly, it was a way of securing a recognized successor to a celibate monk while avoiding the perpetuation of hereditary rule practiced for example in the Sakyapa School (Samuel 1993:494-495; Grunfeld 1987:38).

92

Another important development during the time of the Great Fifth for the topic

that concerns here was the establishment of a basis for lasting intersectarian tolerance

as a principle of government, albeit that strong rivalry continued to exist at local and

individual level (McKay 2003b:20). Therefore, the Nyingmapa and Sakyapa schools

flourished under his rule. Although the rival Karma-Kagyupa School was deliberately

weakened during his time, it was tolerated, and only a minor school, the Jonangpa

was completely banned - on the grounds of heretical philosophical views.

The Mongols were instrumental in re-establishing Tibetan unity under the rule

of the Great Fifth. Lhasa, which had been the capital of the Tibetan kings from the

seventh to ninth centuries, became the capital of the new office of the Dalai Lama.

The Lhasa government incorporated substantial parts of Kham in the east, and N gari

in the west as well as the whole of central Tibet. It was nevertheless based in central

Tibet. It was staffed by lay officials from families of aristocratic status and by monk

officials from the three great Gelugpa monasteries near Lhasa. 101

Between 1757 and 1887 the head of the administration was a Gelugpa lama

regent who reigned until the Dalai Lama gained his majority, with the assistance of

monk officials of his order and lay officials of the Gelugpa nobility. Four Dalai

Lamas died young, allowing the regents to exercise considerable power. It was not

until the 13th Dalai Lama (AD 1876-1933) that a Dalai Lama exercised real personal

authority. Indeed, the system of government, which had been founded by the 5th Dalai

Lama, lasted with little change beyond the middle of the twentieth century (Jigme

Norbu and Turnbull 1969). During this time there was no real central (Lhasa) control

over all of Tibet; in fact, 'the influence of local and regional elites was a more

constant factor than any centralizing political tendencies. Amdo remained largely

outside of central Tibetan political control throughout, and Kham retained its own

specific identity. It was therefore a millennium of contested political authority'. 102 In

Eastern Tibet in general there was a lack of long-term stable political entities. Kham

101 The three are: Ganden (Dga-'ldan) some twenty miles east of Lhasa, Se-ra three miles north of Lhasa and 'Bras-spungs some five miles to the north-west ofthe city. 102 It seems to have been widely accepted in Tibetan studies the notion that Western political theory has lacked the appropriate methodological tools to gauge the essence of Asian polities. Therefore alternative analytical tools, largely based on S.l. Tambiah's theory of the 'Galactic polity' model developed in his (1976) World Conqueror and World Renouncer: A Study of Buddhism and Pol~o: in Thailand Against a Historical Background, have been applied to understand the prevalent pohtlc~l decentralization and the development of multiple centres of political, social, cultural and econOlll1C activity in Tibet. Geoffrey Samuel (1993) was the pioneer Western scholar to use Tambiah's model to explain the Tibetan polity and others have followed since, see for example Huber 1997b, Dreyfus 1994.

93

for instance, was divided into numerous small principalities of shifting alliances

(McKay 2003b:29-30).

Moreover, in the eighteenth century Chinese suzerainty over Tibet was

strengthened into a protectorate with a substantial degree of control. This was largely

possible due to political intrigues within the Tibetan court, which caused great

political instability, the traditional decentralisation, and Tibetans' inability to cope

with foreign incursions such as the Jungar in 1720 and the Gurkha in 1769. 103 To

face these incursions, Tibetans called for Chinese assistance. The Chinese then seized

the opportunity to strengthen their position in Tibet through the permanent presence

of a Chinese official in Lhasa called the Amban (created earlier in the century) to

safeguard Chinese interests in Tibet. This, together with the marriage of King

Songtsen Gampo to the Chinese Princess Wen-cheng in the seventh century and the

patron-priest (Tib. yon-mchod) relationship established between the Mongols and

Tibetan Sakyapa court in the thirteenth century gave the Chinese historical

justifications to claim rights over Tibet in the twentieth century.

The nineteenth century was characterised by a series of Western, particularly

British attempts to open Tibet for trade and exploration. Having been quite

inaccessible to westerners by natural barriers and entry restrictions, Tibet was placed

at the centre of western fantasies about the 'exotic-spiritual East'. At the tum of the

twentieth century, stirred by geopolitical concerns and fear of Russia's increasing

power, Britain pressed to transform Tibet into a buffer state in Asia. In this way, the

fate of Tibet was greatly shaped by foreign hands, of which the British and the

Chinese proved to have the strongest impact.

The 13th Dalai Lama who came to full power in 1895, enjoyed a reasonably

long reign. As the British began their encroachment on Tibet, the Dalai Lama lauched

his famous '1901 Proclamation'. Chhodak suggests that such proclamation was

intended to show Westerners the general upholding of moral discipline and religious

practice in Tibet, as well as the fairness of the Tibetan social system. He also notes

that there is no evidence that indicates that the document was ever distributed, nor

that it was enforced (Chhodak 2003). However, it is significant in that it shows some

of the values the Tibetan elite of the time found as essential to Tibetan identity. The

103 The Jungars or Dzungars were Mongol nomads from Jungaria, today's Northern Xinjiang Pr~vince of the PRe. The Gurkhas were relatively powerful Hindu tribes which had conquered Nepal m the early seventeenth century and which were interested in Tibetan gold.

94

most significant aspect of the proclamation for the topic that concerns us is the

attempt to institutionalise patterns of social and religious behaviour, and the

preservation of the sacredness of the Tibetan homeland. This was done through the

enactment of codes of ritual duties, temple restoration, and the prohibition of hunting.

In the early 1920s, the 13th Dalai Lama embarked on an ambitious and, in the

short term at least, effective campaign to create a more modem, centralized and

powerful state. British influence provided the impetus for the short-lived

modernisation policies implemented by the Dalai Lama's government. Among these

were those that aimed at creating the first Tibetan standing army and an effective

police force, instituting Western-type schools, establishing a modem

telecommunication system, and even at opening a goldmine and a small hydroelectric

plant in Lhasa (Goldstein 1989; Shakya 1999). In the religious domain, the 13 th Dalai

Lama supported efforts to convert non-Gelugpa monasteries in eastern Tibet to the

Gelugpa School, by force where necessary straining further the relationship with the

other schools (Samuel 1993).

The 13th Dalai Lama's modernisation policies were strongly opposed by the

religious establishment; particularly the three biggest Gelugpa monasteries who felt

their power over the Dalai Lama threatened and resented the influence of the British.

The great monasteries of Lhasa had their own army and strongly opposed the growth

of a lay army. Many were against social and economic change of any kind, on the

grounds that it had the potential to undermine Tibetan religion. Eventually, the 13th

Dalai Lama's modernisation policies were suspended, not only because of lack of

substantial support, but also because of the weaknesses inherent in the Tibetan

political system which made any significant transformation almost impossible to

happen. Similarly, the changing international circumstances began to press on Tibet

as never before, leaving everlasting imprints.

3.2.1. The Ris-med Movement in Eastern Tibet

Tibetan religious history has been characterised by marked sectarian differences

which have often been drawn along political lines. However, amidst sectarian

differences two very important attempts to synthesise the whole of the Buddhist

cannon and practice took place in two different periods of Tibetan history that reflect

the social and political processes of the time (Samuel 1993: 499-552). The Gelugpa

95

master Tsongkhapa (1357-1419) carried out the first in central Tibet. Roughly, it was

quite a clerical approach, which insisted on a single path to enlightenment. In time, it

became the religious orthodoxy of the Gelugpa School.

The ris-med Movement (often translated as 'unbounded', 'all-embracing' and

'impartial '), took place predominantly in eastern Tibet during the nineteenth-century

partly as a reaction against the sectarian abuses between the non-Gelugpa schools and

against the religious hegemony in many parts of Tibet of the Gelugpa School

(Dreyfus 1999). It was led by a number of respectable lay Tantric masters, among

them Jamyang Kyentse Ongpo (1820-1892), Jamgon Kongtrul Lodro Thaye (1813-

1899), and Patrul Rinpoche (1808-1887). These masters insisted on a return to Indian

original texts to solve century-long controversies. Furthermore, a central aspect of the

ris-med movement was the bringing together and transmitting of the numerous

diverse traditions of Vajrayana that had developed in Tibet over the preceding ten

centuries within all schools of Tibetan Buddhism. Rather than representing a unique

method for attainment, they made as many different methods as possible available, in

a way that was unique to Tibetan Buddhism. Hence, it helped to break down the

sectarian divisions that had developed over the centuries between the different

traditions (Samuel 1993: 533-542).

One of the most important dimensions of the ris-med movement was its

impact on the sacralisation of 'new' areas in Eastern Tibet. Some of the guides to

sacred places in use before 1959 in Kham, for instance, originally believed to be

buried by Guru Rinpoche in the eighth century were unearthed only in the late

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by treasure discoverers of the Nyingmapa School

or great ris-med masters. These guides proposed validating eastern Tibet as space

sacred to Guru Rinpoche and his followers at the same level as central Tibet (Zangpo

2001:96-97). Of these perhaps the most important was Jamgon Kongtrul's Pilgrimage

Guide to Tsadra Rinchen Drakl04 (tsa-'dra rin-chen brak) in the Derge area in Kham,

revealed soon after Chogyur Dechen Lingpa had unearthed The Location List of the

Twenty-five Major Sacred Sites of Amdo and Kham in 1857/°5 This was significant

104 Tsadra Rinchen Drak literally means 'Jewel Cliff like Tsari', the main gnas-ri in south-central Tibet. In it, Jamgon Kongtrul draws parallels between rTsa-ri and Tsadra as to the blessings, qualities, and so forth, and relates the greatest masters of the time to the region (e.g. Tai Situ Rinpoche, the 14th Karmapa, Jamyang Kyentse Ongpo, among others). . 105 The correct name for this text is: The Location List of the Major sacred Places of TIbet, Composed by the Scholar from Oddiyana, Padmasambhava [Guru RinpocheJ (Tib. Bod kyi gnas chen rn~ms ,?,i mdo byang dkar chags 0 rgyan gyi mkhas pa padma 'byung gnas kyis bkos pa); however, smce Its

96

in that it brought important changes in the spiritual geography of Tibet by legitimating

and empowering Kham as a sacred ground, thereby helping to boost local identities.

3.2.2. Secular Notions of Territory under Gelugpa Hegemony

The development of secular notions of territory in Tibet is intertwined with the

development of political communities, administered by and under the jurisdiction of

some form of regional lords. The most powerful of these was the Dalai Lama, but he

was never able to rule over the whole of Tibet. Key to the understanding of secular

notions of territory is the religio-political system that emerged in Tibet with the rise

to power of the Gelugpa School, which combined religion and politics, and the

hegemony it shared with different factions of the aristocracy. Roughly, it implied the

sharing of political responsibilities between monk and lay officials of the Kashag or

central government who served the Dalai Lama, he being the nominal head of the

Tibetan government, the spiritual leader of Tibetans, and the nominal owner of all the

land in Central Tibet. Similarly the Tibetan social structure and political institutions

were premised and based on Tibetan Buddhism. Thus, religion penetrated and

permeated both the state and society (Norbu, D. 2001 :216).

Everywhere in Tibet the land was considered to belong to the ruler, i.e. the

Dalai Lama, and individuals were granted the right to hold land on the basis of their

service to the ruler, who had the right to resume it at will. 106 In this way, the social

status of the individual was not only marked by his political and religious status, but

also by his relationship to and control over large estates (particularly the productive

agricultural lands). 107 There was no class of landowners not engaged in government,

and there was no group of officials that did not also have a privileged economic

position. Thus, the same people who controlled the land also controlled the state

(Carrasco 1959). The social structure the developed from such a system from the mid­

seventeenth century up to 1959, consisted thus of the Dalai Lama, the Regent (in case

of dealing with a Dalai Lama under the age of eighteen), the ruling elite, and ordinary

Tibetans (Tib. mi-dmangs), that is, peasants (Tib. zhing-pa) who were subjects (Tib.

content is heavily weighed toward Kham, it is most often referred to by this other name (Zangpo 2001: 124). 106 In Eastern Tibet, i.e. Kham, most of the land belonged to the regional kings (Tib. rgyal-po), rather than to the ecclesiastic elite as in Central Tibet. 107 Agricultural estates were thus, either held by officials (demesne land) or by peasants (tenement land) who owed service (corvee labour) and tax to the central government or to the local estates (held by the aristocracy).

97

mi-ser) of the land-owning elite; peasants who maintained herds of animals alongside

their agricultural base (Tib sa-ma- 'brog); and the pastoralists (i.e. nomads, Tib.

'brog_pa).108

The Regency became the prerogative of a small number of six lines of

incarnate Gelugpa religious lamas. The Regent became the head of a 'religious

corporation' called labrang (bla-brang, 'lama's house') a property owning

corporation. Its control was transmitted through a line of incarnate lamas, who, due to

their learning or spirituality acquired reputation and a large following who gave them

numerous gifts. Gradually their wealth grew and with it the number of associated

monks. Many of these labrangs became holders of huge estates (Goldstein 1973:448-

49).

The ruling elite can in tum be subdivided into four groups according to their

relationship to the land: the territorial chiefs, the bureaucratic nobility, the Dalai

Lamas' families (Tib. yab-gzhis) and the monk officials. The territorial chiefs were

local government officials whose property and political position were inherited to the

family. The bureaucratic nobility consisted of approximately 200 families who were

endowed with hereditary family estates which were subject to their service to the

state. Their posts in the government were not hereditary, and because they usually

occupied various positions during their life, no office was attached to any particular

estate. Historically, the families of the Dalai Lamas became part of the highest

stratum of the Tibetan aristocracy and received substantial estates and peasants to

work their agricultural lands. Lastly, the monk officials did not inherit their position

nor could they receive any estates for their services (Carrasco 1959:215-16).

However, many of them did possess estates, and their households were perpetuated

by the adoption of a close relative's son or an unrelated boy who inherited all the

family's property upon the death of the head of the household (Goldstein 1989:9).

Monk officials were either the sons of the Lhasa middle class or members of the

families of existing monk officials.

108 According to Dawa Norbu, in pre-1959 Tibet there were three ways for a commoner to climb the social ladder. First, if he became an abbot or high lama (implies that he would get many gifts and offerings); second, ifhe was a servant capable of combining fidelity and diplomacy, his master might promote him to the most coveted post of treasurer; and third, through trading. For instance, Nepali Buddhists and Kashmiri Muslims were the richest and most progressive section in Sakya (Norbu, D. 1997:21).

98

Over the centuries, many monasteries became significant estate-holders due to

their close relationship to the government, and to the aristocracy. According to

Carrasco, in 1917 the monasteries held 42 percent of the land, the government 37

percent, and the aristocracy 21 percent (1959:86). A good example of the power of

the monasteries was Drepung monastery in the environs of Lhasa which reputed to

have held 185 estates, 20,000 peasants, 3,000 pastures and 16,000 nomads (Goldstein

1989:34). The Tibetan monastic system adhered to a mass monk ideology, supporting

a staggering number of monks. Assuming a population of about 2.5 million in Central

Tibet and Kham in 1733, about 13 percent of the total population were monks

(Goldstein 1989:21).109 Although the Dalai Lama was the nominal owner of all lands

in Central Tibet, there never seemed to be a concerted effort of his government to

control the lands under his jurisdiction. In general, his efforts were concentrated more

on control of the population rather than of the land itself (Samuel 1993), and the

means through which this was achieved was the sponsoring and control of religious

rituals and ceremonies. Hence, this was 'the arena in which the dynamic constitution

of complex political formations was worked out'. Nonetheless, the Dalai Lama was

not alone in this effort, powerful incarnate lamas (Tib. sprul-sku), members of the

aristocracy and the Lhasa government in general all competed or shared in the costs

of creating symbolic and ritual institutions of religio-political significance (Huber

1999b: 154,156).

Another way of achieving control of the population was by introducing

administrative policies that ensured the respect of important local customs (religious

and otherwise), particularly with regards to areas that fell within the orbit of power

places. For instance, the local inhabitants of rTsa-ri, considered all life in rTsa-ri and

the material substance of the local environment as sacred. Because they believed they

would fall foul of the local gods of the country if they set about disturbing the

environment without taking particular care, the Lhasa government introduced policies

to regulate the economic activity of the area to avoid such disturbances (Huber

1999b). 110 Hence the support ordinary Tibetans perceived to be getting from the

109 There were a number of reasons why parents decided to make their sons monks: out of deep religious belief, to have fewer mouths to feed, or to ensure that their sons would not experience the hardships of village life (Goldstein 1989). 110 For instance, up to and during the 1950s, there was a local ban on all cultivation for agriculture and a prohibition of hunting or killing of any living thing around the mountain. 'The clearing of any land for pasture development by burning scrub and forest was also forbidden, as was the polluti~n o~ lakes and springs. In addition, localized restrictions applied to the village areas. No domestIc pIgS or

99

Lhasa government through this type of policies, added to their annual sponsoring of

major religious ceremonies and rituals, increased in significant ways the symbolic

capital of the government. This guaranteed them a certain amount of political loyalty.

Thus, secular territorial control (of some areas within the jurisdiction of the Lhasa

government) has been predicated upon relationships to particular sacred places.

As far as the agricultural communities are concerned and their relationship to

their land, it should be noted that the boundaries between their communities up to the

1950s were drawn through the use of religious rituals such as the chos-skor (lit.

'circling the teaching of the Buddha' or 'scripture circumambulation'). Roughly,

participant villagers carried out a procession around the cultivated and settled areas

carrying sacred books on their heads (Gutschow and Ramble 2003:148-149).111 This

was not only used to establish the boundaries of the four directions of the village but

it was also used to symbolise the village's loyalty to the local deities and ensure that

they would protect the village from external threats, ensuring in this way good crops.

This fact reinforced the local beliefs that local clans and their villages had their own

protective deities. Thus, an intimate relationship was established between the land,

the clans of the village, and the forces of the environment, conceived as yul-lha. Their

livelihood was perceived to depend in this way, upon the harmonious relationship

between them. Hence, one can see that here overlap the primordial (based on

kinship), instrumental (livelihood) and political orientations toward the Tibetan land,

generating strong feelings of attachment to it. Lastly, another important example of

the close relationship between the land-holders and the land (whether peasant or

noblemen) is attested in the fact that the individual holder used to take the name of

the land. If he acquired a vacant holding he normally took the land's name (Carrasco

1959:210).

chickens were allowed to be kept as they disturbed and dug up the holy ground and were considered unclean animals; no local butchery of livestock was pennitted. [ ... J These restrictions applied to ~e whole upper mountain and its adjacent valleys with their settlements and lands right up to the sunumt s ofthe passes' (Huber 1999b: 197). . III A short description of the ritual as it was practiced in central Tibet in the 1940s and. 1 ~50s IS. found in Gyatso 1987:9. For the significance of this ritual and a detailed description of how It IS carned out by Tibetans in the Himalayan region and particularly in the district of Mustang in northern Nepal, see: Gutschow and Ramble 2003.

100

3.3. Concluding Remarks

Tibetan ethnic and cultural identity has been deeply rooted in the Tibetan land and

even in exile; national and local identities are often expressed in territorial tenns.

Tibetan ethnic identity has developed under the strong influence of Tibetan Buddhism

and the various perceptions of land that arose as a result of the peculiar social,

political and religious system in place. As the above analysis suggests, the attachment

to territory was traditionally articulated in secular and religious tenns. Furthennore, it

was often assumed that although the lamas' spiritual prowess was achieved through

the blessings of their teachers and their own application of the spiritual tools at hand,

the Tibetan landscape played a big part in it. The particular qualities of the

environment in Tibet, which were considered 'naturally powerful', allowed spiritual

processes to crystallise. Likewise, the persistence of mountain cults based on local

deities (particularly the tribal ancestors-cum-protectors) also contributed to the

development of identities based on a strong sense of place. This was to provide

Tibetan refugees with a critically important means of reflecting upon the range of

meanings attached to population displacement after 1950.

101

Chapter 4. The People's Republic of China: Displacement of Tibetans and the Transformation of Tibetan Cultural Identity

The demarcation of 'national' borders is a prerogative of the state which delineates

the spatial limits to its power, and defines the identity of its core territory and

population. Boundary-formation is a direct result of the way nationalist elites imagine

their nation to be. In the process of nation-building, Chinese authorities drew arbitrary

territorial boundaries to include peoples of the south and west of China on the basis of

presumed historical rights. Therefore, in delineating the territorial and cultural

boundaries of the new Chinese state, the minority-nationalities (Ch. shaoshu minzu) of

the south and west of China were displaced.

Displacement in Tibet involved the dislocation of thousands of Tibetans and

the displacement of Tibetan culture within Tibet through the imposition of Chinese

Han culture. As a result a substantial amount of the material basis of Tibetan religion

was destructed; traditional notions of territory were transformed; the Tibetan

landscape was desacralised; and the Tibetan economy and traditional ways of life

were changed. In the process, Tibetan cultural and religious identities have been

greatly transformed. Therefore, this chapter analyses the ways in which the policies

on minority nationalities and on religion have displaced Tibetans and Tibetan culture.

It is argued that these policies are an integral part of the social, political and

intellectual practice of imagining the Chinese nation.

4.1. Imagining the Chinese Nation

'One man's imagined community is another man's political prison'

(Appadurai 1996:32).

By the time of the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the idea of

a new Chinese society and nation had been three-and-a-half decades in the making.

Mao Zedong was the prime architect of a communist discourse that was to shape the

representation of China as a modem, multi-national, anti-imperialist state. Mao

inherited Sun Yatsen's political ideology, and thus continued with an intellectual,

social, and political exercise that had started in the 1910s and 1920s. Centred on a

recently developed nationalism, it was based on the existence of an 'imagined' ethnic

and cultural majority, i.e. the Han Chinese who were tired of foreign (Manchu) rule

102

and of both Japanese and Western imperialism (Gladney 1994). Similarly, it was based

on the notion that China was a multinational state, which should be led by the Han

(Mackerras 1994).112

In the 1930s, archaeological discoveries suggested that in the North China

plain of the Yellow River the origins of Chinese civilisation and culture could be

traced. Chinese communists took this to be the origin of the Han civilisation, which

had 'civilised' neighbouring barbarian peoples of the south and west, and brought

them into the Han Chinese cultural world. In this way, the Han began to hold an

ideology of both 'cultural superiority and inclusivist expansionism', conducting a

'civilizing project' (Harrell 1994; 1996:6_7).113 Mao generated a powerful political

discourse to bind such a huge and diverse population in favour of a new 'national'

project defining revolutionary obligations to China as a nation and to the peasantry as

its class representative (Apter and Saich 1994:37).

The rationale for Han superiority can be found not only in the Confucian

notion of 'cosmic inequality', that is, the natural hierarchical structure of the universe

and social relationships, and in what Friedman calls the 'Maoist mythos of national

genealogy', but also in the Stalinist theory that the national problem can only be

solved by drawing the backward nations and peoples in the common stream of a

higher culture (Friedman 1994:68; Dreyer 1976). Mao, in the same spirit as its

counterparts in the Soviet Union saw this as the only progressive solution.

The idyllic Chinese communist nation was conceived thus as a 'deep,

horizontal comradeship', where the interests of the majority were safeguarded by the

CCP. It was conceived as a limited political community with newly defined political

boundaries (allegedly) legitimised by history. It was also imagined as sovereign

because Sun Yatsen's revolution of 1911-12 destroyed the legitimacy of the kingship

tradition of the dynastic age and the new China was purportedly built on Western

ideals of freedom and universal representation. Thus, Mao claimed to be the lawful

1I2 Sun Yatsen spoke of China as a country peopled by five main nationalities: the Han (which he considered the most numerous and enlightened), the Mongol, the Manchu, the Tibetans and the Muslim Turks (who live in Xinjiang). See Mackerras 1994:55. 113 This mythos of national genesis was used throughout the Maoist Era (1949-1976) but became quite unpopular since the implementation of the Open Door Policy in 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. Recently, scholars have discredited traditional Maoist views with the argument that Chinese civilization also grew from the intermixing of cultures from diverse parts of China, and with the help of the international exchange across both the Silk Road and the South China Sea (Friedman 1994:68). In this way, the prior National chauvinism that celebrated the Han people is re-experienced as a fraud (Friedman 1993:4).

103

heir of these ideals and, regardless of the seemingly international approach of his

communist revolution, he kept to himself and claimed the right to exercise his power

as he pleased.

Furthermore, m imperial China, 'membership' to the Chinese nation was

defined by participation in a ritual order that embodied allegiance to Chinese ideas and

ethics centred on the Chinese emperor (Duara 1993:4-7; Watson 1993: 81-84). In

communist China, and above all during Maoist era, membership to the PRC was

defined by participation in a revolutionary ritual order that embodied allegiance to a

communist ethos based on Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and centred on

Mao Zedong himself. 1 14 In this sense, as Duara asserts, the communist version of the

nation was built upon a conception grounded in the imperial idea of political

community (Duara 1993:4).

When faced with the challenge of provmg China's historical 'multi­

nationality', that is the claim to historical rights over non-Han territories and people of

western and southern China (e.g. Tibet); PRC scholars such as Wen Dujian argue that

everything which happened in the past in what is now Chinese territory is part of

Chinese history:

'On the question of borders, we are a united multinational country, so the history of our country is the common creation of the peoples of each nationality. It is the history of every nationality's people, no matter what the position or the circumstances occupied in history. No matter whether belonging to the territory ruled by the dynasty in the central plains or independent of the dynasty in the central plains, in all cases it was a component part of Chinese history. It can perhaps be said that all the regions where the various nationalities' peoples carried out their historical activities may account as within the borders of our country at different periods ... Territories did not remain fixed throughout history, but changed according to the times. So this should be the general principle in our understanding of the historical frontiers of our country , (quoted in Mackerras 1994:22).

Persuading all of the non-Han peoples that they had a stake in the fate of the

Han majority did not come at a small price. In the Soviet Union, the thesis of the

'convergence and fusion of the nations under socialism' produced a policy of

denationalisation, putting the non-Russian nationalities under heavy pressure (Heberer

1989:5). Nationalities were homogenised; distinctions between them and within them

were underplayed; and political repression and economic development with little

attention to ethnocultural mediation were common place in the Soviet system (Suny

114 See Appendix 5 for the basis of Marxism-Lenin ism-Mao Zedong Thought.

104

and Martin 2001 :4), in spite of the central government's initial 'affinnative action

empire' (Martin 2001) which attempted to safeguard and develop nationality culture

by creating large national republics ruled by trained national elites, promoting the use

of national languages and so forth. The Stalinist regime discriminated against non­

Russians who remained nationality-conscious and refused to embrace Russian ways.

Mao, on his part, tried at all costs to present the communist project to the

Chinese people (Han and non-Han) as a much-needed liberation from the shackles of

feudalism, from the exploitation of bourgeois capitalist institutions and aristocrats, and

from Western imperialism. In this way, the CCP hoped to instil among the non-Han

nationalities, a sense of the new, and modem Chinese-ness, as well as to enhance their

participation in the communist revolution. The use of class struggle, pennanent

revolution and its war against religion were the mechanisms through which the party

tried to wipe out loyalty to nationality culture. Party officials thought that by exposing

the exploitative elements of every nationality, the poor and the victims of local

'feudal' institutions, would begin to feel a sense of comradeship with the exploited of

other nationalities and then participate in the larger Han project. Nonetheless, upon

realising the strength of the cultural, social, political and religious ties of some of the

non-Han people, a high degree of denationalisation proved to be indispensable, and

just as in the Russian case, cultural homogenisation became a prerogative of the Han

Maoist Empire.

These notions of the Chinese nation became the Maoist orthodoxy. In its

heyday (1966-1976), questions of cultural identity were muted, that is, as far as the

Chinese authorities went, everyone living in the territories ruled by the People's

Republic of China was Chinese, no matter what their ethnic and cultural origin was

(Harrell 1996:16). Thus, the heyday of Maoist orthodoxy was the heyday of the

sinicisation or denationalisation of non-Han nationalities, which implied the

destruction of significant amounts of their material culture, and endless indoctrination

meetings that targeted local nationalisms (Ch. difang minzu zhuyi). In addition, the

territories of the minorities were desacralised by, among other things, the imposition

of a new nationwide 'sacred' geography associated with the socialist revolution. In

this way, the bases of the cultural displacement of Tibetans within their own territory

were laid. Likewise, the violence and destruction involved in the Maoist national

project also laid the basis for the forced, physical displacement of Tibetans.

105

Nevertheless, the CCP's national narrative was contested openly and privately

by non-Han nationalities and since the late 1970s by southern and coastal Chinese

intellectuals (Friedman 1993; 1994; Gladney 1994). 115 Although Deng Xiaoping's

regime (1978-1997) discredited many of the policies on which Maoism was based

such as class struggle, and the anti-imperialism discourse, the notion of multi­

nationality and China's territorial integrity have remained political priorities. Thus, the

way in which both regimes dealt with issues of territory was one and the same.

The two most important tools for the dissemination of the Maoist orthodoxy

were the policy for minority nationalities as laid down in Article 3 of the 1954

Constitution, and the policies implemented to deal with religion both in China proper

and in the minorities' regions such as Tibet. Here I asses the different ways in which

these policies have affected Tibet and Tibetan cultural identity.116

Policy on minority nationalities is based on two assumptions. First, that the

regions inhabited by minorities are unquestionably part of China. 117 Second, that their

economies and cultures were so backward (Ch. luohou) before 'liberation' that their

future could only lie in integrating themselves culturally and economically to the rest

of China. ll8 Likewise, minority policy has not been uniform in its content or degree

of implementation and it has not been applied universally. It has nevertheless,

important general features, which can be summarised as follows: it stresses the

115 Of all the minority nationalities, only the Uyghurs from Xinjiang and the Tibetans have openly challenged the PRC's notions of the nation. It should be made clear, however that Uyghur loyalties rest more in the locality rather than in notions of ethnicity and cultural identity (Mackerras 1998). This means that although they are practicing Muslims, their loyalty is not necessarily with Islam and its cultural heritage, but with their local communities, local leaders, and kinship. 116 It proscribes discrimination against or oppression of any nationality, and any acts, which undermine the unity of the nationalities. It sanctions the use and development of their spoken and written languages, and the preservation of their own culture. It also lays down the basis for minority regional autonomy (Ch. zizhi), which applies only to areas where the minority lives in a compact community, and prohibits any attempts at secession. Likewise, it stipulates that the Chinese state will help the autonomous regions accelerate their economic and cultural development, to boost production and improve their living standards (PRC Constitution quoted in Ma Yin et al 1985:13; Mackerras 1994: 14S). In this way, bodies of self-administration were established in the minority areas, and by the late 1980s, there existed 141 areas with regional autonomy (five Autonomous Regions at the provincial level: Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, and Ningxia; 31 autonomous prefectures and lOS autonomous counties). Together the autonomous administrative regions cover a total area of6.1 million square kilometres (64% of the area of the country) and comprise a population of 142.5 million people, of which more than 62.S million are members of national minorities (Ma Yin et aI198S:8).

117 The CCP believed that the threat of international imperialism and the inability of China's minorities to exist or to develop independently of China was a sufficient reason why no nationality could be allowed to separate from the Chinese state. Even Xinjiang and Tibet, according to this belief, are ill­prepared for secession (Chang Chiyi quoted in Smith, W. 1996:349). 118 Historically, the Chinese have located minority nationalities on the lower stages of a linear evolution of societies and were considered 'barbaric' (Ch.yeman) and 'backward' (Ch.luohou) (Gladney 1991).

106

development of infrastructure in the minority areas to modernise the economies of

those areas and link them with the Han economy; the use of minorities' vernacular

languages in propaganda and education so as to encourage allegiance to the Chinese

state; the development of a uniform common culture through education; the downplay

of the historical connection of minorities with other countries and their periods of

relative independence; the use of the theory of class struggle to explain such

nationality antagonisms; and the encouragement of minorities' participation in the

Chinese state through the development of mass organizations (Dreyer 1976:63).

Historically, minority nationalities have been sparsely populated, and

constituted the majority of the population in the regions they inhabited. Many of their

communities live in mountainous areas far away from urban centres and depend on

pastoral lands, herding and high altitude agriculture for their livelihood. From the

1950s onwards however, a population transfer of Han Chinese began to occur,

changing the population balance. This population transfer has been the result of the

PRC policy to exploit the natural resources of North and Western China; to relieve

some of the population burden from the densely populated provinces of Eastern

China; to buttress military security in the border regions and facilitate the integration

of minorities and their regions into the Chinese mainstream; and finally, to create an

industrial base in these regions (Heberer 1989).

In order to train loyal minority cadres for employment in the regional

bureaucracies, in June 1951 the government established the Institute for Minority

Nationalities (IMN) in Beijing, as well as a network of large regional institutes at key

points throughout China. 119 The institutes were under the supervision of the

Nationalities Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Education. It included Uyghur,

Kazakh, Mongol, Hui, Korean, Zhuang, Miao, Yi, Tibetans, and other minorities, as

well as Han Chinese. Warren Smith argues that in the 1950s and 1960s, the regional

institutes to which minority children were sent were located in China's central

provinces in order to remove them from local cultural and political influences and to

initiate assimilation into Chinese culture (Smith, W. 1996:357).

119 There are ten such institutes (including the one in Beijing called Central Institute for Minority Nationalities) located in Langzhou (called Northwest IMN); Chengdu (Southwest IMN); Wuchang (Central-south IMN); Kunming (Yunnan IMN); Guiyang (Guizhou IMN); Guangzhou (G~gdong IMN); Nanning (Guangxi IMN); Xining (Qinghai IMN); and Hanyang (Tibetan IMN) (Ma Ym et al 1985: 123).

107

In the minority regions the timing for the implementation of policies that were

being carried out elsewhere in China was considered on an individual basis.

Furthermore, minority nationalities policy, at least in theory, protected minority

culture, language and customs. Nevertheless, with the anti-rightist campaign of 1957

and particularly with the Cultural Revolution the distinctiveness of minority culture

was denied and the policy of national regional autonomy was condemned for dividing

the country. Similarly, during the Cultural Revolution, all agencies of the minorities

were disbanded, and the regional IMN closed. Henceforth all minorities were to be

treated the same as the Han. National languages and scripts, customs and manners

were condemned as backward. As in the rest of China, the campaigns against the

'Four Olds' (Ch. si jiu: old thinking, culture, morality, and customs) brought

enormous destruction to minority areas. However, their effects were more far­

reaching in the minority regions than in Han areas.

In the reform period, under the ever-watching eye of the Party, religious

revival was allowed in minority areas. This period can be best understood as 'a

paradox of alternating currents - interludes of what the Chinese refer to as fang,

loosening up, and shou, tightening down' (Schell 1998:ix). In this way, political

relaxation has often led to the genuine expression of nationalist sentiments among

minority nationalities, particularly among Tibetans, causing an immediate backlash by

the Chinese government and a reversal of trends leading to political persecution and

religious repression. In the early 1980s, attempts were made to translate the idea of

autonomy for the minority nationalities into law. Accordingly, the Law on Regional

Autonomy for Minority Nationalities was adopted on 31 May 1984. It stipulates the

right of the minorities to carryon and develop their cultural traditions and to use their

own spoken and written languages in education, and even in government and law. It

also stipulates that they have the power to administer their own finances and to have

their own plans for economic construction in accordance with local conditions and

needs (Ma Yin 1985:10-13). In the late 1980s and early 1990s it came under strain

when attempts at secession were made in the minority areas, particularly in Tibet.

Our understanding of the de-sacralisation of Tibet and the transformation of

Tibetan cultural and ethnic identity is incomplete without a proper understanding of

the way Chinese authorities have dealt with religion everywhere in China. Equally

important is to assess the role of the secular rituals that have developed in place of

traditional religious ones in forging a revolutionary identity and in the process of

108

denationalisation in the PRC, as well as of establishing a new 'sacred' geography

sanctioned by the state.

'The gods? Worship them by all means. But if you had only Lord Guan and the Goddess of Mercy and no peasant association, could you have overthrown the local tyrants and evil gentry? 120 The gods and goddesses are indeed miserable objects. You have worshipped them for centuries, and they have not overthrown a single one of the local tyrants and or evil gentry for you! Now you want to have your rent reduced. Let me ask you how will you go about it? Will you believe in the gods or in the peasant association? ' (Mao quoted in Cohen 1994a: 151 )

During the Maoist era religion was considered 'the oppressing instrument of

the exploiting classes' and the 'opium of the masses'. Therefore, the religious clergy

was considered a burden to society since it depended on the lay community for its

livelihood. Consequently, monastic estates were confiscated and redistributed as part

of the land reforms; monks and nuns were apprehended, forced to marry, work in

factories or the countryside, and were targets of the thought reform and rectification

campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s. Similarly, there was a substantial distrust of the

subversive potential of unsupervised religious activities like sect formation or

pilgrimages and thus these were banned. Furthermore, families were encouraged to get

rid of home shrines and to bum religious scriptures and Confucian texts. During the

Cultural Revolution the Red Guards denounced parents and relatives who still

possessed any and took it upon themselves to destroy them.

During this period, efforts were made to match the religious structure with

revolutionary institutions, that is, old gods were replaced with new notions (e.g. Class

Struggle, or Revolution), old buildings by new centres, and the new state authorities

established new cults (Wagner 1992). The main established cult of this time was the

cult of Mao. Because authority in China came from the top down, once the CCP had

taken power, its leader became sacrosanct, above the rest of mankind, not only the

object of a cult of veneration but also the acknowledged superior of everyone in the

organization (Fairbank and Goldman 1998:385). Thus, rituals of this type were

concerned only with the perpetuation of Mao's personal power system. In this sense,

the most outstanding ritual was the performance of gigantic parades by Red Guards

chanting, reciting and waving their copies of Mao's Little Red Book in their own mass

pilgrimages to Beijing.

120 Chinese for Tib. Chenrezig.

109

With the establishment of the PRC, the new state created a new 'sacred'

geography associated with revolutionary activities or with revolutionary leaders to

replace or compete with the traditional pilgrimage and tourism centres (Wagner

1992:378). The new political discourse only sanctioned visits to places that could

imbue revolutionary spirit into the masses. In the 1960s, Beijing, viewed as the central

seat of the world revolution, became the most popular destination for Party members

and Red Guards from all over China. To see Mao Zedong, who embodied the highest

revolutionary virtues was a privilege most Chinese yearned to have, especially the

young. 121 Because the journey to Beijing required months of hardship and exhaustion,

and study of Mao's works, 'revolutionary pilgrims' were transformed into 'new

acolytes [who] could claim the nobility, high purpose, and purity of the new convert

and tum into obedient political propagandists'. Hence, the implied pilgrim's attitude

was one of belief, obedience and affinnation (Wagner 1992:380-383).

Other important revolutionary pilgrimage sites were Shao-shan In Hunan

province (Mao's birth place); Jiangxi where the first Chinese Soviet was established

in the 1930s; Yenan in the north-western province of Shaanxi where a new communist

base was built after the communist suppression campaign of the GMD forces; and the

Yangzi River near Wuhan where the 1911 Revolution first erupted.

As the refonn period gave way to the denunciation of the Cultural Revolution

and the end of the class struggle frenzy, the cult of Mao naturally waned. Moreover, at

the beginning of Deng's regime religious institutions were permitted to reopen, and

reforms to the Chinese constitution were made to give stronger guarantees of religious

freedom. The term zongjiao was chosen to refer to the officially recognized religions,

such as Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, and Christianity. In this way, zongjiao is applied to

the institutions of these religions organized under state control. All else, according to

this notion, is feudal superstition (Ch.fengjian mixin).122

121 See for example lung Chang'S (1992) account of her pilgrimage to Beijing and the elation or frustration seeing or not seeing Mao produced in the Red Guards who had risked everything on the journey to see him. 122 E.g. ancestor worship, mountain and underworld spirits, fortune telling, shamanistic trances, astrology, exorcising evil spirits, geomancy, and so forth; though no formal listing was ever produced. They were forbidden since they were considered exploitative - that is, they were felt to be manipulated by a class of 'superstition trade' practitioners to exploit the masses financially (Goldstein 1998:2). What is well known to be the basic traditional religious system of the Chinese people and a major component of the cultural arrangement providing them with national identification, is, in contemporary China excluded from the domain of officially tolerated religion (Cohen, M. 1994b:108), though this does not mean that they did not make their way back into Chinese life, particularly in the countryside.

110

Although religious freedom was established in Article 36 of the Constitution ,

limitations could be applied when the 'safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental

rights and freedom of others' are threatened (PRC White Paper 1996). In general, in

the new context, religion is seen as a necessary evil. Most officials still hold the view

that the doctrines and the rites of religion present the objective world in distorted form

and thus are contrary to Marxism and that although religion does have a narcotic

effect on the people, its practice must be permitted in a socialist society. However,

they hope that through reinforcing atheistic education the influence of religion would

decrease (Heberer 1989:113-114). The way these regulations have been phrased has

allowed substantial laxity in implementation and interpretation, and thus, religious

persecution in the 1980s and 1990s was justified on the grounds that some activities

were conflicting with Party policies, threatening the unity of the country and

encouraging subversive movements. The most typical cases in this respect are the

Falun Gong, considered by the government as a cult, and the Tibetan clergy's

involvement in political rallies and demonstrations in Lhasa, both of which have led

to massive religious repression and persecution. 123 However, it must be stressed that

often what the Chinese government has tried to suppress is the separatist tendency of

some of the movements that have developed within the religious establishments, not

religious practice per se.

Furthermore, in the late 1980s and 1990s temples, shrines, and historical

monuments, which had been completely or partially destroyed during the Cultural

Revolution, began to be restored, or at least placed under government protection to

avoid further damage. Likewise, the Chinese government promulgated the

'Regulations on the Administration of Sites for Religious Activities' to protect the

rights and interest of such sites. 124

123 The Falun Gong (lit. 'the practice of the Wheel of Dharma') refers to the practice of movements and exercises similar to Qi Gong, which incorporates Buddhist meditation and Daoist elements. The religious movement that practices this is called Falun Dafa. It was founded by Li Hongzhi in 1992. Basically, it aims at reestablishing health, living a moral life, and attaining enlightenment. It became very popular and from the outset was a source of concern for the government. In 1999 it was banned from China on the grounds that their 'massive congregations' are a threat to the country. Thus an arrest warrant was issued against Li who had fled China in 1996, many other leaders of the movement have been imprisoned and massive repression against practitioners has been commonplace since 1999. As a result, the government issued regulations preventing large meetings, limiting the size and range of activities or groups of this kind (Ownby 2000). 124 It stipulates that religious activities should conform to certain laws and regulations, that is, 'all individuals and religious organizations must safeguard the people's interests, the sanctity of the law, ethnic unity and unification of the Chinese nation'. This, according to the government, is in conformity with the relevant clauses of the UN documents and conventions on human rights.

111

In the refonn period, as religious freedom became one of the cornerstones of

the new regime, pilgrimage was gradually re-established. The new generation of

Chinese has been raised in a secular environment highly critical of religion, in which

being modem and being part of the 'getting rich first' or 'to get rich is glorious'

aspect of the refonn is highly attractive. In many parts of China, traditional sites of

pilgrimage have become more a tourist commodity of the economic trend than places

of real communal and religious life. Although the revival of religious activity is an

indisputable fact, pilgrimage in contemporary China has lost in great measure its

traditional religious nature and even its modem secular revolutionary character. It has

been transfonned into 'tourism pilgrimage' in search of experiences of 'the exotic'

and of historical roots.

4.2. The Displacement of Tibetans and Tibetan Culture under Communist Rule

Tibet has been very valuable for the People's Republic of China not only for its

strategic position in Asia but also, as its name in Chinese Xizang (lit. 'Western

storehouse') suggests, as a source of wealth and raw material for its modernization

programmes. However, with its relative isolation from China, its unique culture, its

geographical proximity and cultural affinity to India, as well as its occasional

demonstrations against Chinese rule, Tibet provided the CCP with its severest

problems in national integration. Therefore, since 1959, the implementation of policy

in Tibet has responded to the different political needs, and thus has not been very

consistent. Nonetheless, the transfonnation of Tibet and Tibetan society under PRC

rule has been significant. The traditional link between politics and religion, which

gave rise to a distinctive political and social system, was eradicated with the

abolishment of the Dalai Lama's government in 1959.

The CCP held the view that Tibet needed to be liberated from foreign

imperialism and domestic feudal, exploitative institutions. Thus, the PLA troops

captured Tibet late in 1950. The Dalai Lama, who had fled from Lhasa, appointed

someone to negotiate on his behalf with the central government. On 23 May 1951, the

Tibetan representatives and those of the PRC signed the Agreement of the Central

People's Government and Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful

Liberation o/Tibet referred to by Tibetans as the' 17-Point Agreement' .125 It declared

125 Tibetan and Western sources allege that Chinese authorities threatened to use force if the Tibetan representatives did not comply with Chinese conditions; thus the agreement was signed under coercion

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Tibet as part of the PRC, with Chinese authorities handling Tibet's external affairs. It

entitled the PLA to enter Tibet, and granted the Tibetans religious freedom and the

right to exercise national regional autonomy under the leadership of the Central

People's Government, that is, within the confines of Chinese sovereignty (Smith, W.

1996).

The Chinese defined Tibet, as only that territory of central and western Tibet

Tibet (V-Tsang and Ngari respectively) under the direct authority of the Dalai Lama's

government, which was to be constituted as the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). 126

Thus, the' 17-Point Agreement' would only apply to that area. The eastern Tibetan

provinces of Kham and Amdo were to be divided into several autonomous prefectures

and counties within Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan provinces. 127

By excluding Kham and Amdo from the Chinese definition of Tibet, more

than half of Tibetan territory and two-thirds of its population were excluded from the

TAR. This is the most contested issue between the Chinese authorities and the

Tibetan Government-in-exile. Even if Tibet is to be permanently occupied by the

PRC (the exiles' argument goes) and ruled by the Chinese, at least they should have

kept all Tibetans under the same political jurisdiction so as to be able to preserve

Tibetan heritage and land intact. Although Tibet was never fully ruled from Lhasa,

the division of ethnographic Tibet has been seen in exile as arbitrary, as well as an

expression of the 'divide and rule' principle of Chinese policy toward Tibet. Thus it

has made the Tibet Question not only one of self-determination, but one of territorial

and cultural integrity_

(Smith, W. 1996; Norbu, D. 1979; Shakabpa 1967; Shakya 1999). See Appendix 6 for the full document. 126 This area is also referred to as 'Outer Tibet', Ch. Wai Zang in official documents. U-Tsang consisted of two territorial expanses: dBus at the north, an area controlled from Lhasa by the Dalai Lama and gTsang at the south, controlled from Shigatse by the Panchen Lama, second in the spiritual and political hierarchy. The Chinese call these areas Qian Zang and Hou Zang respectively. The TAR included Lhasa and the six prefectures (Ch. Xingshu) of Shigatse, Lhoka (Ch. Shannan), Nyingtri (Ch. Linzhi), Qamdo (Ch. Chamdo), Nagchu (Ch. Naqu) , and Ngari-all together seventy-six counties covering an area of more than 1.2 million square kilometres (Yan 1998). 127 Eastern Tibet is referred to as 'Inner Tibet', Ch. Nei Zang, by the Chinese and as Dotoe (Kham) and Domed (Amdo) by Tibetans. In Qinghai Province there were Tsochang (Ch. Haibei), Malho (Ch. Huangnan), Go10g, Yushu and Tsolho (Ch. Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures, and in Tsonub (Ch. Haixi) the Mongo1-Tibetan-Kazak Autonomous Prefecture; in Southern Gansu Province-Kanlho (Ch. Gannan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture and Pari (Ch. Tianzhu) Tibetan Autonomous County; in Western Sichuan Province-in Ngaba (Ch. Aba) and Kanze (Ch. Ganze) Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures and Muli Tibetan Autonomous County; and finally, in Northwestern Yunnan Province-in Dechen (Ch. Diqing) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Yan 1998).

113

With the arrival of the PLA to Lhasa on 9 September 1951, the return of the

Dalai Lama and his tacit acceptance of the Agreement, Tibet's legal case for political

independence was shattered. Once the Dalai Lama had re-settled in Lhasa, the Work

Committee of the CCP for the Tibetan area was established, and Beijing authorized

the dispatch of Han soldiers and civilian cadres to Tibet (Grunfeld 1987). In light of

this situation, Tibetans tried to get foreign support but without avail. The Americans

and the British had decided not to get involved, and India, who feared further clashes

with the PRC, had already expressed its reluctance to support Tibet's claims for

independence.

From 1951 to 1959 Tibetan religion continued to flourish, and most

importantly, the Chinese allowed the Dalai Lama to rule the TAR, without putting any

pressure to expropriate the estates of the great landlords, including those of the

monasteries, or to foment class struggle, as they were doing elsewhere in China.

Likewise, the central government began to establish a network of transportation and

communications facilities that proved to be of economic benefit to Tibet. China's

Tibet policy at this time sought to win over Tibet's political and religious elite, and

through them to persuade Tibetans to embrace socialism voluntarily (Goldstein

1998:6-9). Zhou Enlai and Mao himself are said to have reassured the Dalai Lama that

a transition to communism would not be imposed against his will (Grunfeld 1987:116;

Dalai Lama 1990a:89-90).128 Things changed however, in the late 1950s as a result of

the hardening of the CCP policies all over China, and the decision was made to

introduce further reforms in Tibet.

Because restrictions of the 17-Point Agreement did not apply to Kham and

Amdo, they were treated as Chinese provinces. Reforms there began to be imposed in

1952. Not surprisingly, the source for the greatest dissension against the Chinese

came from Khampa nomads who resented Han rule. From 1956 onwards there were

clashes between the Chinese and these nomads because of Chinese interference in

their religious activities and the confiscation of weapons (Smith, W. 1996; Shakya

1999). In 1958, Tibetan rebels began to organize themselves in the 'Four Rivers, Six

Mountains Movement' (Tib. Chu-bzhi gang-drug, an ancient name for Kham) and to

recruit members in central Tibet. In 1957 some of them collected funds to offer a

golden throne to the Dalai Lama. This was a way to express and strengthen the bond

128 Zhou Enlai was the Chinese Premier (until 1958) and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

114

between them and their leader. This was also an attempt to reaffirm the power of the

Dalai Lama over the land of Tibet; land that according to Tibetan traditional

narratives belonged to him by virtue of his being the embodiment of Chenrezig

(Dreyfus 2002:41).

These rebels generated a wave of revolts that culminated in the 10 March

1959 Lhasa Uprising. The immediate cause of such an uprising was the PLA's

irregular procedure in inviting the Dalai Lama to attend a theatrical performance at a

PLA camp near Lhasa. He had been specifically requested to attend with unarmed

bodyguards and to keep the invitation secret (Dalai Lama 1990). The rumour spread

that he was to be kidnapped and that sweeping reforms in Tibet would follow. Thus,

the revolt aimed at forestalling this alleged Chinese plot. 129

In 10 March 1959 revolt broke out renouncing the 17-Point Agreement and

calling for the expulsion of the Han from Tibet. On 16 March the Dalai Lama and his

retinue fled to India, and on 20 March the PLA intervened militarily to quench the

remaining revolt. Within months, as word spread of the Dalai Lama's flight, 70,000

Tibetans followed him into exile. A State Council directive in March 1959 ordered the

dissolution of the Local Government of Tibet. Henceforward the Preparatory

Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCAR T) would exercise its

functions (Dreyer 1976: 169). In general, the revolt facilitated the integration of Tibet

into the administrative system of China, which was the opposite of what it intended.

The transition to socialism was to be achieved in two stages: the first stage

would be democratic reforms, which consisted of the redistribution of land, the

suppression of 'enemies of the revolution' and the beginning of class struggle; and

then the socialist transformation, which involved the fully-fledged collectivisation of

society (in cooperatives, communes and the like). To achieve this it was crucial that

Chinese authorities acquired a high degree of domination and control of Tibetan

129Tibetans accused the CCP of planning the revolt to justify its repression, its entrance into Tibet and the implementation of further reforms. The Chinese allege that members of the local government who had entered into a conspiracy with Indian and u.s. imperialists to sever Tibet's connection with China planned the revolt. Dreyer argues, however, that the evident embarrassment of the Chinese government, the fact that it was deemed necessary to move additional troops into Tibet after the revolt began, and the lack of a concrete plan for Tibet's future until several weeks after the revolt began, all indicate that the Chinese were taken by surprise. Similarly, the Tibetan anti-Chinese faction heard of the rumors that the Dalai Lama was to be abducted and, though realizing that their preparations for an uprising at some future date were still inadequate, decided on an act of desperation (Dreyer 1976: 1 ~7-68). Ginsburgs and Mathos conclude that it occurred essentially accidentally and that actIve participants constituted a minority of the population. Sympathy for the rebels was, however,

115

society which they did through a tight and systematic organizational control reinforced

by the PLA, the People's Armed Police (PAP), and the local militia. The methods of

control used were based on a combination of Leninist organisation networks and the

threat or actual use of organised force (Norbu, D. 2001 :228-29).

4.2.1. Democratic Reforms and Socialist Transformation of Tibet

The Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCAR T), which

replaced the Dalai Lama's government in 1959, was responsible for the launching of

reforms in the TAR, for deepening the administrative changes and creating an

infrastructure that could better connect Tibet with the rest of China. I30 The PCAR T

was thus the official government of Tibet until the formal founding of the Tibetan

Autonomous Region in 1965. To help with its administration, Han cadres were sent to

Tibet to take over important administrative positions and the first Tibetan students

who had gone to study at some of the Institutes for Minority Nationalities elsewhere

in China came back to take on jobs at the lowest level of the administration.

As part of the democratic reforms monastic estates, the property of rich

landlords and of those who had fled Tibet from 1959 onwards were confiscated and

redistributed. This gradually put an end to traditional ownership of land and serfdom,

which was according to the CCP, the basis for the exploitation of the poor. The

suppression of 'enemies of the revolution' and the beginning of class struggle took a

very distinctive form in Tibet. In the years under the 17-Point Agreement, the CCP

had used sectarian and regional animosities, as well as fissures within the secular and

religious aristocracy to its own advantage, by playing one faction against the other. I3)

In the post-1959 context, the Party continued to do so. In this way, a number of

Tibetan collaborators (from the lower class) were financially bought, economically

widespread (quoted in Dreyer 1976). See also Norbu, D. 1979; 2001. 130There were altogether twelve departments that took over all areas of administration and policy implementation: from public security, religious affairs, finance, communications, to agriculture, animal husbandry, and so forth. In addition, the TAR was reorganized into 72 rural counties, seven special administrative districts, and one municipality. See for example Grunfeld 1987:161-162; Smith 1996. As far as infrastructure is concerned, the main significant work undertaken in the early years was the construction of roads to link Lhasa to Beijing and other parts of the PRe. By 1965 two highways effectively linked Lhasa with interior China. And by 1975 China had completed 91 highways totaling 15,800 km with 300 permanent bridges in the TAR alone, effectively connecting 97 percent of the region's counties by road (Norbu, D. 2001:231). 131 Particularly effective in this respect was the use of the differences between the Panchen Lama (The second highest spiritual leader of the Gelugpa sect, based in Shigatse, Southwest of Lhasa) and the Dalai Lama. The Chinese attempt to get close to the former goes back to the beginning of the century and has been an important card the Chinese have played to sow divisions among Tibetan society.

116

looked after and politically directed by the Chinese. They were labelled the 'patriotic

few' and enjoyed a comparatively comfortable life, and were given ranks in the TAR

(Tsering Dorje 1980:82). These assisted the Chinese authorities in collecting data

about the economic situation of the different social classes, upon which class divisions

and class struggle (Tib. thamzing) would be based (Smith, W. 1996:401). Vigilance

and investigation teams were equally set up to keep watch on any dissidence

developing against the Chinese government, and those who were caught instigating

were sent to forced-labour camps or prisons. 132

It has often been asserted by exiled Tibetan scholars and politicians that

Tibetans were very unreceptive to communism that resistance to Chinese rule was

widespread since the 1950s and that it intensified in the 1960s (Norbu, D. 1997,2001;

Shakya 1999). However, evidence suggests that some Tibetans, particularly members

of the younger generation of the nobility, and Tibetans from poor backgrounds who

had suffered greatly under the old system, saw the Chinese presence in Tibet as an

opportunity to make some positive changes. 133 Many who had been studying in

British-style schools in India voluntarily transferred to the Central Institute for

Minority Nationalities in Beijing, thus eagerly cooperated with Chinese authorities

(Grunfeld 1987; Goldstein, Siebenschuh, and Tsering 1997). Nevertheless, during the

Cultural Revolution, their social origin worked against them, and they suffered

immensely as a result.

Moreover, thought reform, socialist study groups, and a number of political

campaigns were carried out in the rural and urban areas against undesired elements of

society, particularly those who had participated in the anti-Chinese rebellions of the

1950s. Such campaigns were meant to induce class awareness, propagate the Party

line, and to stimulate the spontaneous denunciation of 'the exploiter elements' .134 In

addition, there were campaigns that were specially targeted to Tibet, which aimed at

eradicating the 'three pillars of Tibetan feudalism', that is, the Tibetan government,

the monastic system, and the aristocracy (Smith, W. 1996). These campaigns were

132 Dawa Norbu argues that even before 1959 many ofthe lower classes already regarded the aristocrats as social parasites and were well aware that the aristocrats' wealth was the fruit of their sweat and toil (1997: 167). Therefore they were often eager to pass on information to Chinese authorities. 133 See the autobiography of Tashi Tsering in Goldstein, Siebenschuh and Tsering 1997. Dawa Norbu asserts that predominantly orphans and beggars joined the Chinese (Norbu, D. 1997:112). 134 Tibetans in the TAR were divided into three primary classes according to property holdings or hired labour. These distinctions were important because only the lowest class was considered free of all implications of exploitation and thus were not subject to criticism, struggle or arrest unless charged as politically reactionary (Smith, W. 1996:475).

117

particularly violent and traumatic since it involved turning against people who were

highly respected in traditional Tibetan society. Resistance to these campaigns,

expression of nationalistic feelings and criticism of CCP policies were considered

'sins' of local nationalism, and were also dealt with in forced-labour camps and

prisons. In this sense, this was a terrible period for Tibetans because their values,

norms, and system of morality and meaning were deliberately overturned, and the

way Chinese officials and cadres contradicted and ridiculed everything they

understood and felt created severe 'cognitive dissonance'. The government attempted

to reduce Tibetan ethnic identity to language alone (Goldstein and Beall 1989:622).

The Chinese government prided itself of doing Tibetans an immense favour by

destroying the old society, which was based on Tibetan Buddhist institutions. It

expected gratitude, compliance and obedience. According to the PRC, Chinese rule in

Tibet was a communist panacea. This, at first glance seemed true. With the

abolishment of the Dalai Lama's government, his flight from Tibet and the eradication

of the religious nobility the apex of the traditional social structure disintegrated. The

lay aristocracy either followed the Dalai Lama into exile, or stayed behind and thus

were dispossessed of their estates and assets, or they 'joined the revolution'. In

traditional Tibetan society, the Dalai Lama and other members of the ecclesiastical

elite had lordship over agricultural and pastoral lands (estates/fiefs), which were

'managed' by aristocratic officials to whom they paid taxes and labour services

(Goldstein and Beall 1990). 135 Therefore, with the dismantling of this regime, in

theory, peasants and nomad pastoralists (i.e. semi-nomads, Tib. sa-rna 'brog) became

free.

Upon closer examination one can see, however, that although Tibetan peasants

and farmers were freed from serfdom, they were put under yet another form of

slavery: the production teams and the established production quotas, as well as taxes

imposed by the Party (to feed PLA soldiers, and Han cadres), which meant that goods

135 E.g. The Panchen Lama, one of Tibet's greatest incarnate lamas, second in stature only to the Dalai Lama himself was said to own, among other lands, the pasture areas of the Northern Plateau were the Phala nomads of Changtang lived. Nevertheless, in the case of these nomads, for instance, being 'bound' to the estate of a lord did not mean that one could never leave one's village or encampment. 'So long as the obligations to one's lord were fulfilled, and families could hire others to. acco~plish this, members of the household were free to go where they liked. [ ... ] To be a subject ( serf), moreover, did not imply poverty'. Many 'subjects' owned several thousand sheep and goats. Though there were the poor who served as servants to these wealthy subjects. (Goldstein a~d Beall 199?:~2-54). In addition, their only economic obligation to the Panchen Lama consisted mainly of provldmg butter for the tea and butter lamps for his monastery (Goldstein and Beall 1989:622).

118

and food for their own consumption were often cut to the level of starvation (Smith,

w. 1996). Similarly, many of the Tibetan nomadic pastoralists and herders

particularly, those of the north-eastern Tibetan plains were forced to settle in

agricultural settlements; and those who remained with their traditional way of life saw

their grasslands being significantly diminished due to erosion, deforestation or

pollution caused by Chinese irrational exploitation of the land. Furthermore, the

shutting down of monasteries meant that thousands of monks and nuns were

incorporated into the economic life of Tibet, with many dying as a result of harsh

conditions and maltreatment under the Chinese.

The socialist transformation of the Tibetan Autonomous Region began first

with the classification of all households (urban, rural and nomad alike) into a formal

class structure in 1960 and with the creation of mutual-aid teams (Tib. Ro-gre) formed

of tens of households who worked the land together. These were meant to inculcate a

spirit of cooperation among the poor as a modest first step toward communal

production (Goldstein and Beall 1990:137). The 'wealthy class' was not permitted to

join the ro-gre and were forced to pay higher taxes. In addition, political-education

meetings were introduced to propagate the new communist ideology. Later in June

1966 the first rural commune was established in the Lhasa area as an experiment and

gradually extended outward. As of June 1970, only 34 percent of Tibetan villages had

communes (Dreyer 1976 :231). The failure to advance the collectivisation process at a

more rapid pace was, in great measure, the result of the continued resistance to

communist rule from members of different social strata, for which the Dalai Lama

was constantly blamed. 136

In the case of the TAR's semi-nomads, only the ro-gre were introduced in

1961, and full-fledged reforms did not take place until 1968-1970 when the private

ownership of livestock was replaced by people's communes, when they lost the right

to work and trade wool, salt, and livestock as they saw fit, and when their freedom of

religious belief and practice was lost. The nomads were transformed from private

owners of animals to holders of a share in the commune's property, and the quality of

their lives deteriorated tnarkedly in comparison to the previous decade in the

136 From the mid-1960s onwards, the Dalai Lama intensified actions that infuriated the Chinese government. Among them, his alleged support of anti-Chinese activities in and outside the ~R~; his support of India in the 1962 Sino-Indian border clash, the publication of his clearly antI-Chinese autobiography (My Land and My People, 1962 and a later more detailed one: Freedom, in Exile ,19~O), and the Tibetan Government-in-exile's promulgation in 1963 of a Tibetan (democratIc) ConstItutIon

119

traditional society. 'From the nomads' point of view, they had become an exploited

subject class treated far worse than they had been under the 'serfdom' of the old

society' (Goldstein and Beall 1990:142-44).

The most consistent lamentation and cause for bitter attacks to the so-called

communist panacea was the acute shortage of food. 137 As everywhere else in China,

when collectivisation was taking place, meagre food ratios were established; peasant

families paid taxes in grain to the Chinese and were often left with little food to make

it through the rough winters. The 1950s and 1960s famines, which were widespread in

China, were particularly bitter in Tibet, causing no only discontent but also revolts. 138

The Great Leap Forward, which intended to accelerate China's industrialisation at an

incredible cost, has been to blame. As part of this mistaken economic policy, it was

ordered, for example, that certain types of rice be planted regardless of the area's

special agricultural conditions. This not only led to a waste of arable land in terms of

the food shortage it generated, but also to an ecological disaster, causing soil erosion,

deforestation and water shortages (Heberer 1989).

The Maoist pride on the alleged successes of the communist revolution in

Tibet crumbled after the fact-finding delegations made up of Tibetan exiles were

allowed to travel around Tibet in 1978-1979 and 1980. They reported to the Chinese

authorities the appalling state of poverty in which most Tibetans in the TAR and in

eastern Tibet lived and the amount of destruction of the Tibetan cultural heritage they

found (Norbu,D. 1991). As a result, another, this time Chinese fact-finding delegation

led by Hu Yaobang and Vice Premier Wan Li, set out to Tibet to corroborate the

exiles' report. To their dismay, they found it to be true. This prompted Hu to launch a

six-point directive, which set the economic policy for Tibet for at least the next ten

years. It first of all recognised that Tibetan economy lagged behind the rest of China,

and introduced the major economic programme in Tibet known as the 'system of

complete responsibility' (Tib. gen-dzang). This abolished the communes everywhere

in Tibet, exempted Tibetans from paying taxes and meeting purchase and production

quotas. In addition, it called for the revival and development of Tibetan culture,

particularly annoyed the government causing the hardening of Chinese policy on Tibet. 137 See Goldstein, Siebenschuh and Tsering 1997; Norbu 1987, 1997; Jigme 1998; Tsering Dorje 1980. 138 The most important one was the Nyemo Revolt in 1968 in the west of Lhasa, spreading to other regions. Food shortages and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution had led to a widespread discontent, which manifested in a series of revolts. Because of their nationalist content, the Chinese put it down brutally (Smith, W. 1996:550).

120

education, and science (Goldstein and Beall 1989:624-25).139 The new policy had the

effect of improving the overall standard of living of Tibetans. However, analysis of

the 2000 statistics from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in China suggests that

economic conditions in the TAR still lag significantly behind the rest of China

(Fischer 2003).

Likewise, the first few generations of Tibetans who graduated from the IMN

in Beijing and in other IMN elsewhere in China, complained that upon returning to

Tibet they were sent to villages as mere interpreters, that Chinese were always

suspicious of Tibetans, and that qualified Tibetan youths were not given jobs

commensurate with their qualifications. Likewise, in the 1950s and 1960s Tibetans

seldom occupied posts that carried power and responsibility. In this way, they were

not given any effective say in the running of Tibet, not because they were

incompetent but simply because the Chinese did not trust them (Tsering Dorje 1980;

Jigme 1998). During the reform period, things began to change gradually, but never at

the pace or degree the autonomy-hungry Tibetans expected. According to a Chinese

survey of Tibet carried out in 1988, while the proportion of Tibetans in local CCP

organizations at all levels was generally high, the lower the administrative level, the

higher the proportion of Tibetan employees' was likely to be. The Chinese allege that

in the 1990s, two-thirds of the total cadres employed in the TAR were Tibetan cadres

(Mackerras 1994: 158).140 This estimate has been questioned by the Tibetan exiled­

authorities based on their fact-finding delegations to Tibet (Environment and

Development Desk 2000).141

4.2.2. Tibetan Religion

Although the CCP stood firmly against it, the persecution of the clergy and closing

down of monasteries in the TAR and eastern Tibet was not complete until the Cultural

Revolution. From 1959 to 1966 some monasteries continued to operate, and only

139 The gen-dzang returned the responsibility of production, marketing and trading to the (family) households. Furthermore, everything except for the tax exemption was implemented everywhere in China (including the regions of other minority nationalities), in this sense, it responded to very specific circumstances prevalent in the TAR which were not necessarily the same everywhere el~e. 140 In any case, Paljor argues that Tibetan cadres fitted into one of three categones: . those who supported Mao, usually the poorest and largely CCP members; those opposed to feudal TIbet but n?t fully convinced of the virtues of communism, and those 'silently' opposed to Han presence (m

Grunfeld 1987:166) . . ," 141 These were allowed and monitored by Deng XIaopmg, and were part ofthe PRC s dIalogue WIth the Dalai Lama. For more details in this regard see Norbu, D. 1991.

121

those that were clearly involved in the Lhasa Uprising were brutally closed, and their

monks killed or imprisoned. The estates adjacent to the monasteries, which usually

belonged to them, were confiscated from the outset. According to Grunfeld, in 1959

there were 2,469 monasteries, with 110,000 monks and nuns within the TAR, but only

a year later the clerical order had diminished to 1,700 monasteries with a population

of 56,000 clerics. Since only about ten percent of the monks and nuns making up the

difference fled into exile, we can speculate that the remainder either left the

priesthood or were imprisoned (Grunfeld 1987:167). In this sense, before 1966 the

Party used monetary rewards and the granting of attractive jobs for the clergy who

voluntarily renounced religious life. After 1966, the Chinese exercise violence against

them, and any expression of religious beliefs or activities was severely punished.

'Religion has given us neither to drink nor to eat. On the contrary tsampa and butter have to be wasted as offerings to images of mud and bronze. Prayers and prostrations before mud and bronze images has not helped the individuals who pray and prostrate let alone benefiting the masses '. [ ... ] 'The fruits of the labours of the broad masses are given without reason to the yellow robbers and red bandits who bear names like lama and only eat and sleep' (quoted in Tsering Dorje 1980:26).142

This was the sort of phrase uttered by destitute Tibetan youths, who being

disillusioned with traditional Tibetan society, developed faith in communism and

were used as scapegoats to attack Tibetan institutions. In eastern Tibet during the

1957 'anti-rightist' campaign and in the TAR during the Cultural Revolution, Tibetan

Buddhism was perceived as an exploitative tool of the clergy. The idea of karma in

particular was singled out as the most deceitful and blinding religious teaching, which

had made ordinary Tibetans subservient to all forms of exploitation. Likewise, monks

and nuns were pointed out as liars, exploiters and lazy good-for-nothings. They were

sent to forced-labour camps, and forced to marry. Nuns were raped and beaten in

public. Monasteries were sacked of their treasures and relics, dynamited, and their

remnants used to build latrines or government buildings. Sacred caves were bombed,

religious scriptures burned, and frescoes destroyed on the spot. The Jokbang and the

Ramoche temples in Lhasa, the two holiest temples of Tibet were invaded and

portraits of Mao Zedong replaced images of the Buddha and Tantric deities. It is said

that out of the whole religious infrastructure mentioned earlier, only eight monasteries

and I 000 monks survived the Cultural Revolution intact (Smith, W. 1996:561). ,

142 Tsampa is Tibet's food staple, and it is made of roasted barley flour and water.

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Portraits of Mao of gigantic proportions were distributed in the major cities of the

TAR and pasted on the walls of public buildings and family homes. Tibetan prayer

flags usually found everywhere in Tibet, which are said to bring protection, were

replaced by the PRC flag. Although there are no reliable figures, many young

Tibetans joined the Red Guards in the TAR, and participated both in the destruction of

material things and in punishing' guilty' Tibetans.

Pilgrimage was forbidden not only by prohibiting all fonns of religious

practice (and by the actual destruction of sacred places), but also by imposing

restrictions on population movement. Pennits were required then, and are still

required, to move within and beyond the TAR. Some areas of eastern Tibet are still

off-limits, and both Chinese and foreigners require a special pennit to visit, and even

then, they are often under close supervision. In short, the Cultural Revolution was a

direct assault on Tibetan Buddhism; a deliberate attempt to destroy Tibetan identity

and the notion of the distinctiveness and sacredness of Tibet, in order for Tibetans to

show allegiance to the Chinese 'motherland'. The effect of the campaign was

devastating. It left the poor without the religious elements that provided them with

comfort and hope for a better life and the rich without the only ideology that gave

their life meaning (Norbu, D. 1997:xvi,144). In this way, for many Tibetans the

Chinese became the epitome of all that was despicable in human nature.

During the refonn period, the new leadership allowed a 'controlled' religious

revival, particularly from 1979 to 1987 in Tibet. This meant that the Party established

a set of rules to harness any political dissidence within the monasteries. Roughly,

these were: the establishment of entrance examinations, the setting of low annual

quotas of monks and nuns to be accepted per monastery; the allocation of a limited

stipend to sustain the accepted monks, and the establishment of a secular curriculum

(socialist education) to be taught alongside the religious one. Likewise, it allowed

some relaxation of population movement, by granting pennits to Tibetans who

wished to go on pilgrimage to Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet. Furthennore, an

unknown quantity of statues, paintings, associated ritual items, and the literary corpus

of Buddhism which had been buried in eastern Tibet to save them from destruction

123

during the Cultural Revolution have slowly been excavated, generating a significant

religious fervour (Gennano 1998:53).143

During these years, the PRC allowed Tibetan refugees to return to Tibet for

periods of up to one year. They were under no obligation to remain in Tibet, and

could return to their land of exile at will. Similarly, PRC Tibetans were allowed to

visit refugee settlements in South Asia (Klieger 1989). All of this was a very

significant development for Tibetans not only because it allowed the renewal of

family ties, but also because it mirrored the complexity of the contemporary Tibetan

world. It retlected how Tibetan religious and cultural identity was becoming even

more heterogeneous and diverse as Tibetan culture was reconstructed in a secular

Tibet after almost three decades of religious stalemate.

Tibetan experiences of contemporary China are very diverse, and religious

expression has manifested in many different ways in different areas of the TAR and

eastern Tibet. Tibetan religious communities in Sichuan (Kham) are for instance,

somewhat less coercively controlled by Chinese political authorities than are their

counterparts in the TAR (Gennano 1998:56). By the same token, monasteries located

in the Lhasa environs are not only much more politically conscious than those further

away, but are also much better infonned about what goes on in the world and the

Dalai Lama's whereabouts.

In this way, in 1987 a nationalist pro-independence and pro-Dalai Lama

movement began to develop within the monasteries in the vicinities of Lhasa. 144 The

question monks were facing, in essence, was whether religious practice took

precedence over the political struggle to wrest Tibet from Chinese control, and in

particular, to support the Dalai Lama. Based on fieldwork in Drepung monastery,

Melvyn Goldstein asserts that all monks believe in the sanctity of the Dalai Lama and

want him to return to Tibet, and that all support his efforts to secure Tibetan

independence. Nevertheless, older monks believe these efforts are hannful to the

revival of religion. For the young monk activists the incorporation of notions of

universal human rights has infused their plight with new meanings (Goldstein

1998b:42-46). In general monks find themselves embroiled in constant political

tension and contlict.

143 This responds to a very old Tibetan tradition of burying Dharma treasures in face of persecution, which goes back to Guru Rinpoche and king Langdarma's persecution of Buddhism. 144 Such as Sera, Drepung and Ganden.

124

When major demonstrations took place in Lhasa and elsewhere, they were

violently suppressed by Chinese authorities. In addition, because many foreigners

witnessed the events, it brought the question of Tibet into the international arena as a

foreign policy issue. It hardened the Party's Tibet policy by restricting Tibetan

refugee visits, restricting permits to move around the TAR and eastern Tibet,

imprisoning and beating religious and lay people who carried with them pictures of

the Dalai Lama, or who aired any nationalistic sentiments; and launching a series of

campaigns reminiscent of the 'democratic reforms'. The most important of these was

the new 'Patriotism Education' campaign of the 1990s to instil patriotism toward

China, and implant in the monks the need to comply with the government's demand,

that they devote themselves entirely to religion and eschew all antigovernment

political activity. If they did not adhere to Chinese law and Chinese version of

Tibetan history, if they did not condemn the Dalai Lama and his Western supporters,

they could not remain in the monastery (Goldstein 1998b).

Furthermore, it was suggested above that the Chinese government has been

very skilful in using sectarian and regional animosities to its own advantage by

playing one faction against the other. One area in which the government has been

very successful in dividing Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet is in sponsoring

monasteries and the building of temples for monks who engage in the practice of a

Tantric ritual related to the deity Dorje Shugden. It is in essence a sectarian practice,

which is seen as harmful, and thus the Dalai Lama has continuously requested people

not to engage in such ritual. Among the refugee communities it has been the chief

source of disunity. By sponsoring supporters of this practice in Tibet the Chinese

government hopes to cause further schisms within Tibetan societies, and to enhance

opposition to the Dalai Lama. 145 This in tum would (it is hoped) weaken current

separatist tendencies and engender a gradual acceptance of Chinese rule.

In brief, the Chinese takeover of Tibet in 1959, the Cultural Revolution and

the renewed repression in the 1980s expressed in the 'get tough' policy toward Tibet

from 1987 onwards (with political and religious persecution at its centre) have caused

the displacement of Tibetans in more than one sense. The lack of employment and

education opportunities for the common Tibetan people, Han chauvinism, and the still

very low living standards of many Tibetans, have generated a sense of hopelessness

145 See Department of Religion and Culture 1989, 1998; Dreyfus 1998; Bonting 1996; Brown 1996.

125

among Tibetans and thus have caused a constant flow of refugees seeking better lives

in India, Nepal, and the West. This has intensified the feeling among Tibetans in

Tibet, those in exile, the Dalai Lama and Westerners that the 'real' Tibet is no longer

in Tibet, since the authentic culture of Tibetans is only maintained in an uncorrupted

form among refugee groups (Germano 1998).146 For young Tibetans who are

genuinely interested in religion this is a source of despair since they feel they cannot

get a decent religious education in China's Tibet.

4.2.3. Ethnic Tourism

From the 1980s until today, two new factors are contributing to the transformation of

Tibetan identity and traditional notions of territory: ethnic tourism, and the

degradation of the environment. Chinese authorities and business people involved in

the development of tourism infrastructure in Tibet are gradually 'appropriating' some

of the sacred sites of Tibet and are playing an important role in the commodification

of Tibetan culture.

Van den Berghe defines ethnic tourism as the type of tourism that searches for

the 'ethnically exotic', the 'unspoiled natives', 'untouched, pristine, and authentic', as

well as a first hand and sometimes intimate contact with them. 'The greater the

otherness of the other, the more satisfying the tourist experience' (1994:8-9). He

considers the 'prime tourees', as he calls the 'subjects' of ethnic tourism, the 'Fourth

World peoples', that is, the marginal communities who live in the fringes of their

respective 'national' societies, who have been able to preserve their otherness only

through geographical isolation in what the Mexican anthropologist Gonzalo Aguirre

Beltran (1979) has called 'regions of refuge' (remote mountain areas, jungles, or

deserts of difficult access). 'In a sense, ethnic tourism represents the last wave of

exploitative capitalist expansion into the remotest periphery of the world system' (van

den Berghe 1994:10). Fourth World peoples who were first pushed back into 'regions

of refuge' are now being rediscovered as a tourist resource. Their prior isolation from

the mainstream of their respective dominant societies has transformed them into

See Chapter 5.2.1. for a more detailed analysis of the controversy. . . 146 I have often heard the same remarks about China. Hong Kong, Taiwan and Western countnes which became home to many fleeing Chinese (intellectuals, politicians, artists, religious figures, and so forth) in the 1950s 1960s and after the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown have been instrumental in preserving , Chinese culture.

126

objects of curiosity and nostalgia for the affluent in search of the exotic (Riley 1988 in

van den Berghe 1994: 1 0).

One of the main goals of the reforms of the 1980s for Chinese policy makers

was to open the country to the educational and economic exchanges that will allow

China to benefit from the increasingly integrated world economy. Hence, ethnic

tourism is now vigorously promoted for just such a purpose, as part of the policy to

'develop tertiary industry' (Ch. Jazhan disan chanye). Increasingly, the state has

turned to the advertisement of the exotic appeal of "ethnic others" within its

boundaries to attract domestic and foreign tourists to minority areas (Yuan and Ding

in Makley 1999:350). As a result, Tibetans in common tourist areas are providing a

sort of 'folkloric entertainment' for Chinese and Western tourists alike (Peng

1998:195). If in earlier times, Han imperialism manifested in the displacement of

Tibetan culture, nowadays it manifests by appropriating it and using it to its own

(economic) advantage. Also, young Chinese often refer to Tibet as a 'fascinating and

intriguing place', and express the desire to have the opportunity to go there in their

lifetime. 147 In this way, those Chinese who seem to be interested in some form of a

spiritual life, or influenced by the government's characterisation of Tibet, have

constructed their version of a modem Shangri-La, a notion so important for the

Western imagination of Tibet. Attached to this however, are often still old labels that

portrait Tibetans as 'barbaric' and 'backward'.

The ancient and ubiquitous practice of circumambulation of sacred places

reciting the Chenrezig six-syllable mantra, and spinning the traditional prayer wheel,

which is now a tolerated practice, is one of the contemporary rituals that carry the

weight of traditional religious identity. In everyday life the Chinese are consistently

trying to instil and reinforce Tibetans' Chinese-ness, that is, their identity first and

foremost as Chinese, and then as Tibetans. This is reflected in the typical answer

given in Tibet (particularly in the TAR) by Tibetans when asked about their identity

(Ch. Wo shi zhonguoren zangzu; 'I am a Chinese of Tibetan nationality'; instead of

simply Wo shi zangren; 'I am a Tibetan'). The liminality of pilgrimage in

contemporary Tibet is of particular significance since Tibetans are transformed back

into Tibetans. That is, pilgrimage is one of the very few instances in which Tibetans

are allowed to be fully Tibetans in a now predominantly Chinese environment. As

147 This was a common remark made to me by different Chinese in Asia (1998) and in England.

127

they play out this role, then the religious aspect of pilgrimage may be more fully

experienced.

Both nature and Chinese authorities deny the Western lay pilgrim and the

tourist access to most of Tibet's sacred places. The fact that these are often found at

very high altitudes (over 4,500 metres), that are covered with heavy snow for most of

the year, and that heavy winds blow at very low temperatures makes it impossible for

people other than Tibetans to travel around during the winter. In addition, Chinese

authorities limit the tourist season to the summer months, and require foreigners to

travel in official land rovers with prearranged itineraries. Some areas require special

permits for financial rather than political reasons. Access permits to sacred places are

a good source of revenue for the Chinese government, and failure to comply with

these restrictions may result in fines. The rituals and practices that hedge in the sacred

are being dispensed with under the ultimate sanction of an authority other than

Tibetan officials themselves (Makley 1999:358-59). Furthermore, the intrusion of

ethnic tourism within sacred places, particularly temples and monasteries, is

threatening yet again, the desacralisation of place in Tibet.

4.2.4. Ecological Degradation

China's economic and defence policies from 1949 onwards, which have focused on

industrialisation, modernisation, and the development of nuclear technology, have

been in great measure responsible for significant ecological imbalances in Tibet, and

for the resulting transformation of the Tibetan landscape. In general, China faces a

double threat. On the one hand, there are the problems typical of an underdeveloped

and overpopulated agricultural society such as soil erosion, deforestation and

desertification. On the other are the pollution problems caused by rapidly developing

the industrial sector (Edmonds 1994:2). Therefore, widespread environmental

destruction has taken place due to logging of virgin forests, uncontrolled mining,

water pollution and nuclear dumping, resulting in the degradation of grasslands,

extinction of wildlife, desertification, floods, soil erosion and landslides. In Tibet,

given the high altitude and the extreme climatic conditions, the damage caused to the

environment and the fragile mountain ecosystem seems to be irreversible.

This is worrisome not only for the long-term damage to the environment but

also because it touches upon very sensitive religious issues. China's policies of

development, industry, resources extraction and population transfer in the Tibetan

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plateau have allIed to massive disturbances to Tibet's rivers and lakes, among which

are a few that have been considered sacred for centuries. The lake Yamdrok Tso 754 ,

square km, (Ch. Yangzhuyong), 90 km from Lhasa, and about 9.5 km to the south of

the Yarlung Tsango (Brahmaputra, Ch. Yarlung Zangpo) River in central Tibet, for

instance, has special spiritual significance. It is believed that this lake supports the

life-spirit (Tib. lha) of the Tibetan nation; should its waters dry, Tibet will no longer

be habitable. In addition, Yamdrok Tso has nine islands, one of which houses a

monastery that is built around a cave where Guru Rinpoche is said to have meditated,

as well as leaving his footprint in a rock. The lake has been an important pilgrimage

place for all Tibetans and for southern and central Tibetans in particular. Yet a

pumped-storage plant to supply Lhasa's electricity needs - a project whose design is

now judged to be faulty and leading to lowering water levels, is destroying its pristine

ecology, increasing salinity, and causing habitat loss for the diverse and rich wildlife

(Cheng 1994:22-33). In general, over fishing, pollution, human intervention and

shrinkage due to climate change are all endangering the purity and ecological survival

of Tibet's legendary lakes, which cover 25,000 square km of the plateau (Ecology and

Development Desk 2000: iii).

Furthermore, one of the largest sites of hydropower potential in the world has

been identified by Chinese scientists at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo River,

also in central Tibet. This is also considered a sacred place. China plans further large­

scale schemes to harness water to supply Mainland China's growing need for power

and to provide for the further industrialisation and urbanisation of Tibet. The Yarlung

valley area is often referred to as the cradle of Tibetan civilisation for the line of

Tibetan kings that reigned in this region in the seventh century. This whole area is

replete with temples, monasteries, the first caves in which Guru Rinpoche is said to

have meditated, stupas and important mountain peaks where local deities dwell. These

projects may also contribute to the further destruction of the sacredness of an

important area, which dates back to the beginnings of Tibetan civilisation.

One of the areas of the utmost concern for exiled Tibetans is the extraction of

uranium for the development of nuclear weapons in Tibet, as well as nuclear testing

and radioactive waste in the Xinjiang and Tibetan Autonomous Regions. 148 Since

148 Tibet's mineral deposits are very rich, including some of the world's most significa~t deposits of uranium, chromium, lithium, boron, borax, copper and iron (Ma Yin et al 1985; Envlfonment and Development Desk 2000).

129

1964, nuclear and hydrogen bomb testing has occurred often in Malan, in the Xinjiang

Autonomous Region; thus people living within 150 km of the site are showing

symptoms of radiation pollution similar to those found amongst Japanese near

Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Edmonds 1994:223). Because since 1971 the first nuclear

weapon installed at Tsaidam Basin in northern Amdo, eastern Tibet, and China's own

nuclear programme was partially pioneered on the Tibetan Plateau at the Northwest

Nuclear Weapons Research and Design Academy (the "Ninth Academy") 100 km

west of Amdo's capital, Siling (Ch:Xining), exiled Tibetans fear that if the trend is not

reversed, it could have irreparable human and ecological damage in Tibet as well

(Environment and Development Desk 2000: vii), much more serious than the trials

and tribulations of the Cultural Revolution.

4.3. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has established that the building of the Chinese nation has been a

political and intellectual exercise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) elite, and

particularly of Mao Zedong from the 1930s until his death in 1976. It has been

imposed from above upon the Han Chinese masses, as well as upon the minority

nationalities (Ch. Shaoshu minzu). The nation thus imagined, is multi-national in

essence, with a clear Han supremacy and anti-imperialist and revolutionary in

character. The occupation of territories of the south and west of China, such as Tibet,

the policy for minority nationalities, class struggle and the anti-religion policy were

instruments used in the imposition of such notions of the nation, which have been

contested both, openly and privately, from the outset. In addition, the occupation of

Tibet caused not only the forced displacement and exile of thousands of Tibetans, but

also the displacement of Tibetan culture within Tibet, by imposing Han Chinese

( communist) culture.

Within only a few years of the establishment of the People's Republic of

China, it became quite clear that the government was at haste to reach advanced levels

of socialist transformation, economic development, and national integration. Likewise,

from the outset, the Party leadership showed zero-tolerance toward dissidence and the

expression of alternative paths to socialism. In this way, haste and intolerance

produced a series of short-sighted policies, which had high social costs. The minority

nationalities policy is one such policy. In principle, it was meant to integrate

minorities to the Chinese mainstream through the linkage of their economies to the

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Chinese economy, and through a subtle cultural and political colonialism. In addition,

it was meant to allow them enough room (autonomy) to preserve their minority

identities within a framework of manageable cultural boundaries.

However, the Cold War, the Party's obsession with anti-imperialism, and its

need to prove to the world the extraordinary potential of the Chinese people under

communist rule, as well as domestic difficulties in coping with the complexity of the

minorities' issue, further aggravated the already impatient leadership. As a result, the

implementation of economic policies, such as the Great Leap Forward, the democratic

reforms, and the Minority Nationalities Policy was clumsy and contradictory, causing

the polarisation of society and the failure to achieve aspired economic goals.

This clumsiness in handling minority nationalities' affairs, proved to be

particularly devastating in Tibet. China's 'historical mandate' to liberate Tibetan

society from the fetters of the evil-duo of feudalism and imperialism justified in the

eyes of the CCP, the apparent wanton destruction and the high levels of violence

inflicted upon Tibetans, and the displacement of Tibetan culture. The execution of

democratic reforms and the policies leading to the socialist transformation of Tibet,

together with the modernisation programme of the reform period, changed the face of

Tibet forever. They destroyed a considerable amount of the material basis of Tibetan

religion, transformed the traditional notion of Tibet as sacred space, altered the

economic and social life of Tibetan society, and in the process transformed Tibetan

cultural and religious identity. As a result, thousands of Tibetans seeking a freer

environment to practise their religion, escaping political persecution or simply,

looking for better living conditions fled to India, Nepal, Bhutan and Western countries.

The traditional perception of Tibet as a sacred place has been undermined by

three decades of ecological degradation, material destruction and human loss. In

addition, the recent reconfiguration of Tibet's sacred geography is under a new threat,

that is, the new trend of ethnic tourism, and the Han appropriation of Western

fantasies and Tibetan land and culture. The disposal of nuclear waste on Tibetan soil

is another threat to Tibet, with the potential of having global implications.

Finally, the presence of Han Chinese in Tibetan life has been so pervasive that,

now more than ever before, Tibetan identity is defined primarily in terms of a Chinese

'other'. Nevertheless, the Chinese government and Chinese business men are using

the notion of the minorities as exotic 'ethnic others', which is attached to previous

notions of minorities' backwardness and barbarian-ness to advance their economic

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goals. Furthennore, in the last decade, the revival of pilgrimage has allowed Tibetan

identity to be expressed and re-negotiated. It has also allowed Tibetans to be

transfonned 'back into' the people they had been for centuries, and the people they

are becoming through experiences of alienation, and loss. These experiences have

inevitably produced a strong reaction within Tibetan refugee communities.

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Chapter 5. The Tibetan Nation 'Imagined' in Exile: Pan-Tibetanism and Oppositional Histories

This chapter focuses on the various ways in which the Tibetan leadership in exile,

particularly the Dalai Lama and the Kashag, the executive body of the Central

Tibetan Administration (CTA), have imagined the broad entity referred to as 'the

Tibetan Nation', and the impact of this process on the construction of Tibetan cultural

identity among refugee communities. My argument is that by conducting the social

and political exercise of imagining the Tibetan nation, and advancing claims for

statehood, Tibetan leaders have transformed Tibet into a symbolic space and

constructed a narrative of Tibetan-ness based on what I call the 'One People, One

Territory' principle. This principle may be described as Pan-Tibetan.

This chapter also examines the challenges to these official versions of Tibet

and Tibetan cultural identity by various refugee groups: an iconoclastic Tibetan

Buddhist sect, regional organisations, and a non-Buddhist religious group. These

groups advance a different concept of 'homeland' and national identity, without

feeling that they have betrayed their ethnic and cultural origins.

In the previous chapter, it was argued that the origin of the post-1959 Tibetan

diaspora and the main source of territorial contention lay in the Chinese exercising of

'nationhood', which marked the beginning of a long and difficult journey in the

definition of Tibetan ethnic and territorial boundaries, the re-enactment of sacred

space, and the preservation of Tibetan cultural identity. Therefore, imagining the

Tibetan nation as a contemporary social project does not take place in isolation; it is a

response to China's own narratives of the nation and to the Tibetan experience of

exile. The 14th Dalai Lama and the OlE have led a sustained and visible struggle to

fashion both a nation and government, as well as to return to Tibet as the legitimate

government. They have served as a reminder of the lost past and the 'captivity' to

which Tibetans in occupied Tibet are subject. They have also consistently claimed

that they represent the authentic interests and aspirations of the Tibetan nation'.

5.1. Imagining the Tibetan Nation in Dharamsala

Imagination here is again conceived as an organized field of social practices, made

possible by electronic mediation (television, cinema, computers and telephones), and

mass migration, as well as by print capitalism. In the context of the contemporary

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global dispersion of the Tibetans, electronic mediation, migration, travel, and print

capitalism have made possible the generalisation of imagination as social practice.

Moreover, it has allowed the development of a horizontal comradeship and

'community sentiment', (Appadurai 1996:8) among Tibetans, which has been crucial

in the construction of Tibetan nationhood. The Tibetan nation conceived by the exiled

authorities consists of disparate communities and a 'transformed' territory. These

communities include Chinese Tibetans (living in occupied Tibet in the confines of

ethnographic Tibet within the PRC and beyond), stateless exiled Tibetans born before

1959, and born-in-exile Tibetans. Tibetan territory consists of ethnographic Tibet

comprising territory of central Tibet conceived by the PRC authorities as the Tibetan

Autonomous Region, and the eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo which are now

part of other Chinese provinces.

Dharamsala, the capital in exile, became the seat of the 14th Dalai Lama's

government in the early 1960s. Here the official narrative of the nation is produced by

the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan elite within a variety of governmental and non­

governmental organisations and institutions. The Dalai Lama who is the spiritual and

political leader of Tibetans, is the key figure in this process.

The Dalai Lama and the Dharamsala elite have played a leading role as

intellectual-educators, in redefining Tibetan communities by engaging in selective

readings of pre-existing myths, symbols, customs and memories of the ethnic past,

and putting forth a new understanding of history. They have produced a poetic history

in which fact and legend have become fused 'to produce a stirring symbol of purity

and rectitude, and a dramatic myth of resistance to tyranny' (Smith, A. 1996:120-121).

With landscape and history used in this way, they have evoked the type of shared

destiny and cultural uniqueness that not only unifies people, but also turns

nationalists' sentiments and ideologies into political action. The Tibetan leadership

conduct what Keila Diehl (1997) has called a 'tutored mindfulness', that is, a selective

and collective remembrance of the past to reconstruct and redefine Tibetan-ness or

Tibetan national and cultural identity. Because of the traditional importance of

religious practice in the conception of space in Tibet and the pervasiveness of oral

traditions that attest to the existence of ubiquitous myths of origins, creating a

'historical poetry' for the sake of the nation was not a difficult task. The experience of

colonisation, displacement and loss furnished the exiled leadership with a new

political language. Once this language was incorporated into the 'romantic

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historiography', traditional notions of space, both sacred and secular, acquired new

and emotionally-charged meanings, creating in this wayan exceptionally poignant

narrative of the nation.

The fact that the Tibetan national project emerged in Dharamsala is significant

since it is considered by many Tibetans and Westerners as the 'Little Lhasa in India' ,

a temporary home preserving a historical culture in its pure form, prior to an

inevitable return to the original homeland (Anand 2002:13).

It is important to note here that imagining the nation (particularly in cases

where territory and political legitimacy are contested) requires the simultaneous

construction of narratives of the past and present which combine to create a narrative

for the future of the nation. The dual necessity of preserving Tibetan culture in exile

and advancing the exiles' plight for the independence of Tibet forced the Dalai Lama

and his GIE to embark on the difficult project of reconstructing Tibet's past, whilst

creating an image(s) oftoday's Tibet.

In the construction of modem nations, the reconstruction of the past has been

usually based on social memory, historical reconstruction (through knowledge of

evidence/traces; i.e. unwritten sources: archaeological material) and the re­

interpretation of the available written sources (Connerton 1989:13-15). In this respect,

oral traditions of a religious and secular nature, new archaeological evidence and

ancient texts found in the Dun-huang caves in China's Gansu Province, and

genealogies and religious texts provided the Dalai Lama with a wealth of material

from which to extract the fundamentals for the reconstruction of Tibetan past. Hence,

the Dalai Lama has encouraged painters, musicians, performers, writers and craftsmen

to record what they had learned in Tibet and to pass this on to the new generations

born in exile (Harris 1993: 1 06).

Furthermore, today's Tibet IS largely built on Tibetan refugee accounts,

official readings of Chinese accounts, the Government-in-exile fact-finding

delegations to Tibet during the 1970s-1980s and the incorporation of Western tourist

and academic accounts. In the construction of past and present narratives in exile, the

dream of a future 'free Tibet' plays a crucial role.

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5.1.1. The 14th Dalai Lama and the Construction of a Pan-Tibetan Identity

The main feature of the Dalai Lama's narrative and on which his whole political

edifice is based is what I call the 'One People, One Territory' principle, that is, a Pan­

Tibetan discourse that speaks of the dBus-pas, gTsang-pas, Khams-pas, and A-mdo­

bas, as 'One People' (Tib. 'bod-pa '), and of U-Tsang (central Tibet) plus Kham,

Amdo (eastern Tibet), as 'One Territory' (Tib. bod), comprising 2.5 million square

km and six million people under the temporal and spiritual leadership of the Dalai

Lama ruling from Lhasa, in Central Tibet.

This is perhaps the most contested issue of his whole political discourse. It

was stated earlier how problematic it is to view the Dalai Lama's regime and the

societies he ruled from Lhasa as representative of all Tibetan societies. As Samuel

points out, 'the Dalai Lama's regime was only one, if in recent times the largest, of a

variety of state formations within the Tibetan region' (1993 :39). In addition, there is

in fact no indigenous term that includes all the populations denoted with the word

'Tibetan' in Western literature (Tsering Shakya 1993).

Two questions thus arise: On what basis does the Dalai Lama stake his claim

to historic rights over these lands? And how does he seek to depict Tibetans as a

homogeneous and unified people? Any attempt to answer these questions from any

one point of view can be misleading and partial. I contend that the answers lie (1)

partly in ethnographic considerations; (2) partly in a mythico-historical narrative that

goes back to the eighth century and its re-enactment in the mid-seventeenth century;

(3) partly in geopolitical issues which have to do with China's territorial expansion in

the eighteenth century and the Tibetan reaction to Western imperial and commercial

interests in the area; and (4) partly in the political struggle for independence (or real

autonomy).

The ethnographic assessment rests on the perception of Tibet as the area

throughout which are found populations sharing a manifestly high degree of linguistic

similarity, cultural and social patterns, and historical experience (Huber 1999b).

Although this remains a highly contested issue, it is one which Western and Tibetan

scholars have relied upon. In brief, the language shared by these populations is the

written language used in governmental and religious establishments. Similarly, and

regardless of sectarian differences and the existence of small groups of Tibetan

Muslims the influence of Tibetan Buddhism within the areas considered is all ,

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pervasive. In addition, the social patterns examined in Chapter 3 seem to be a general

feature in the various regions, and though there are minor differences in dress and

other cultural practices, there are many cultural traits that are shared by all. However,

it is important to note that some other areas populated by ethnic Tibetans, such as

Ladakh in the North-west frontier and the southern Himalayas, are not claimed by the

Dalai Lama.

Moreover, the 14th Dalai Lama has voiced his appreciation for and

identification with the 5th Dalai Lama's political project, which he has described as 'a

master plan for building Tibet into a nation able to take part in the history of the

region rather than a marginal state governed by religious hierarchs mostly

preoccupied with the power of their monasteries and estates' (Dalai Lama 1987 cited

in Dreyfus 1999). The 'Great Fifth', who assumed power after 1642, attempted to

build a broadly-base rule legitimised by a claim to establish the early Tibetan empire

(eighth century), and supported by an elaborate ritual system, including religious

practices of the other Buddhist sects. 149

The Dalai Lama's adherence to the Great Fifth's political project has several

implications. First is the desire to insert a national project into a broad territorial base

with actual administrative and political control over territories beyond central Tibet,

as fully achieved only in the eighth century.150 Second, it implies the political and

spiritual leadership of the (Dalai Lamas') Gelugpa sect but with a non-sectarian view

of religion. Finally, it implies the acceptance of a diverse religious lore that has its

own set of central figures, myths, doctrines and ritual practices. In short, it calls for

the unification of ethnographic Tibet into a uniform political entity, and calls for

political loyalty, as well as religious tolerance within a framework of Gelugpa

hegemony.

What is interesting to note here is that in exile, various policies implemented

by the GIE itself have contributed to the strengthening of regional identities that in

practice contradict the Pan-Tibet discourse. First, refugees' regional origin and

sectarian affiliation are indicated in the refugee identification cards issued by the

149 When the Tibetan kings achieved 'Tibet's greatest territorial, military and political expansion, ruling eastern Tibet (Kham and Amdo), Ladakh and other territories in northern India and Nepal. 150 Many scholars argue that this territorial expansion which had political consequences was never achieved again due to the pervasive influence of Buddhism which is clearly non-violent (Stein 1972; Snellgrove and Richardson 1968; Shakya 2003 (personal communication). The military weakened as result of the complete dissemination of Buddhism in the tenth and eleventh centuries (phyi-dar, second dissemination), and thus power became increasingly decentralised.

137

government. Likewise, in the Parliament-in-exile, the seats are distributed by region,

and religion. Hence, regional and sectarian affiliations are not only recognized but

actually built into the system (Nowak 1984). In addition, Tibetan Bonpos and

Muslims are represented and participate in this way in the political processes. At first

sight these policies seem rather superficial. 151 However, Tibetan critics of the system

such as Lhasang Tsering believe that they are self-defeating in that they have only

exacerbated regional factionalism. He believes that exile renders such divisions

completely unnecessary and can only be harmful to the Tibetan cause. 152

In the mid-eighteenth century the Tibetan government lost political control

over Eastern Tibet as a result of political intrigues within the Tibetan court, foreign

incursions (the Jungar in 1720 and the Gurkha in 1769), which called for Chinese

assistance. Consequently, the political involvement of Qing China increased in Kham

and Amdo, and thus the modem Sino-Tibetan borders in these regions were drawn.

Melvyn Goldstein argues that while the Tibetan government has never accepted the

loss of these regions as permanent or de jure, the Dalai Lama did not react to the

occupation of Kham and Amdo in 1949 when the People's Republic of China was

established. This indicates, according to Goldstein, that there was no question where

the authority of the Dalai Lama's state ended (Goldstein 1994:87). The Tibetan

government's position nonetheless started to change, as it perceived the early

implementation of communist policies in these territories which were beyond the

scope of the 17-Point Agreement. Goldstein also contends that Kham and Amdo, by

and large, were not only outside the rule of Lhasa, but also experienced political,

legal, and economic histories different from those of the people of central Tibet.

The Tibetan intellectual Tsering Shakya argues that although the political

situation in the whole area covering ethnographic and political Tibet was historically

decentralised, in Amdo for instance, Central Tibet exercised political control of a

symbolic nature, that is, through alliances and the political loyalty of various

chieftains to the Lhasa government. 153 However, this did not stop their pledging

151 Out of its forty-seven seats, thirty are reserved for regional communities (ten each for people who represent Khams, Amdo, and U-tsang) and ten are reserved for religious communities (two each for people who represent the Sakyapa, Gelugpa, Kagyupa, and Nyingmapa schools of Buddhism as well the Bon religion). They emphasize the interests for the people they represent. In theory all share a common commitment to the Tibetan nation despite their regional and sectarian differences (Frechette 2002: 184-185). 152 Personal Communication, Dharamsala May 2001. 153 Personal Communication, London, November 2003.

138

religious allegiance to their local monasteries. In any case, the Tibetan government

has been adamant for decades not to let go of its perceived historical and cultural right

over these lands, as they are perceived to be central to the Tibetan question, and to the

preservation of Tibetan cultural identity.

Lastly, the definition of the GIE political stance vis-a.-vis the Chinese

occupation has been greatly influenced by Western political thought and the

international law regime which developed within the context of the modern nation­

state system. Key to this was the general acceptance of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights and the recognition of the rights of ethnic communities to self­

determination. In the aftermath of Wodd War II, the decolonisation process that

generated a new wave of nation-states encouraged the Tibetan exiled authorities to

claim their rights to statehood. In order to do so, it was imperative that their claim be

legitimate and their case strong.

Judging by the political discourse of the Dalai Lama and the GIE, legitimacy

has been largely understood in historical, territorial and ethnic terms. Thus, it is not

surprising to find a national rhetoric drawn along these lines. This means that rights to

self-determination and statehood are framed within a narrative of attachment to a

well-defined territory, a shared history, and a common and 'unique' cultural identity

among inhabitants of the four regions of Tibet. In this way, the presentation of 'One

People, One Territory' principle, responds to a 'One History, One Culture' principle

put forth by the Tibetan exiled elite, which by definition, implies the drawing of

territorial and cultural boundaries with China. 154 It portrays Tibetan people as

different and separate race in appearance, language and culture with no 'ethnological

connection with anyone else in our part of Asia' (Dalai Lama 1990a:l03).

Although the Dalai Lama sees similarities with other refugees' experience like

the Palestinians and the Afghans, he believes the advantage Tibetans have is that 'that

all six million Tibetan people remain as one' and that they do not fight among

themselves like the Afghans or the Palestinians do (Dalai Lama 1994a:237).

Thus, the claim to 'One Territory' based on political jurisdiction IS

problematic, and difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, such a claim based on historical

154 It is important to note that in the history of the European empires, and even today, the drawing of geographical boundaries through the chartering of maps has been a useful weapon in larger political projects such as the claiming of territory or in the maintaining of control over it (Storey 2001: 17). Therefore, it seemed an obvious prerequisite for Tibetan's territorial claims to chart and define the borders with its neighbours.

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and cultural arguments, regardless of the economic and legal differences noted by

Goldstein, is a legitimate one. The construction of difference within the Tibetan

cultural world is not of an oppositional nature, that is, cultural difference has not

entered the existing common cultural space to compete or displace (Derrida 1978).

Differences among Tibetans are not profound as is the case, for instance, of Tibetans

vis-a-vis the Chinese, or in the context of exile with their host countries' societies

such as the Indian and Nepali. The construction of difference in the Tibetan world can

be thus understood as emblematic of the shifting political fortunes and religious

loyalties, as well as of the economic activity, all of which are not clear cut, and hence

have not entailed demarcation of rigid or exclusive cultural and linguistic boundaries.

Now that the main elements of the Tibetan authorities' imagination of the

Tibetan nation have been established, we proceed with the analysis of its constituent

parts and the mechanisms and tools that GIE officials have used to disseminate it.

Here, I intend to present the main elements that shape the narrative into a uniquely

Tibetan phenomenon. With this I mean to imply that the Dalai Lama is not alone in

framing a nationalist discourse. As shown earlier, the Armenians and the Jews share

in great measure the use of 'One Country, One Territory' and 'One History, One

Culture' principles. It is in the enhancement of particular national characteristics and

the incorporation of Western discourses that the Tibetan elite's national imagination

stands out as unique.

The first element of the Tibetan leadership's imagination of the Tibetan nation

is the idea that Tibetan Buddhism is the central ingredient. The Dalai Lama has been

unequivocal in his appeal to an essential Tibetan identity based on a necessarily

Buddhist Tibetan spirit and a 'birthright' springing from the physical Tibetan

homeland, the cradle and homeland of Tibetan Buddhism itself (Venturino 1997:99).

In doing so, the Dalai Lama appeals to something that is uniquely Tibetan, and

privileges Tibetan Buddhism over the other religious affiliations (Bon and Islam), as

well as over other cultural manifestations. Similarly, in doing so the Dalai Lama

attempts to maintain the articulation of notions of space and territory in purely

traditional religious terms. In private interviews and public talks the Dalai Lama

constantly enjoins Tibetan refugees the need to behave as and be 'good Tibetans'.

This notion of being a 'good Tibetan' is equated with being a 'good Buddhist' and

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with the upholding of the official views of Tibetan-ness and the political struggle. A

good Tibetan not only acts out the rituals and moralistic teachings of the Tibetan

Buddhist faith, but he 'feels' Tibet in his blood and is willing to sacrifice his life for it

(de Voe 1987:62).

Because of the materialistic nature of communism, the particular events

(notably the Cultural Revolution) that destroyed substantial amounts of Tibetan

cultural and religious heritage, as well as the Chinese commitment to socialist

education in Tibet, the Dalai· Lama's emphasis on being 'good Tibetans' and 'good

Buddhists' is particularly relevant. It is conceived as a means to keep alive the

religion of Tibet.

The Dalai Lama conceives the territorial integrity of the Tibetan homeland as

key to the preservation of Tibetan religion: 'With the occupation of Tibet, Tibetan

Buddhism has been robbed of its cradle and homeland, not only violating the Tibetan

people's right to freedom of religion, but also endangering the very survival of this

spiritual and cultural tradition in Tibet and Central Asia. The Tibetan entities outside

the so-called TAR comprise a larger portion of the Tibetan area and roughly four of

the six million Tibetans. A solution to the question of Tibet cannot be found without

these parts of Tibet being incorporated into one Tibetan entity. This is essential to the

survival of Tibetan culture' (Dalai Lama 1998a:448).

Likewise, his sense of preservation and the need to reinforce a Tibetan

religious identity for the Western public, makes the Dalai Lama hold the view, at least

in discourse, that Tibetan Buddhism is still vibrant among the new generations, both

in exile and in Tibet: 'Today the faith, the feeling of being Buddhist is very strong,

even among members of the younger generation. I think it is stronger than in the

previous generation' (Dalai Lama 1990a:48). 'The Chinese state machinery had an

unopposed run, but, still the young in Tibet are not only strongly nationalistic, much

more so than their elders, but also more religious than some of us living in India. [ ... ]

[T]he Chinese efforts to suppress religion create a reaction. Look at the persecution of

Jews and the results. The more suppression, the higher the awareness' (Dalai Lama

1982: 141). These statements are significant in that during fieldwork in Tibetan exile

communities in the Kathmandu Valley, Dharamsala, Delhi, and Switzerland, and after

a short trip in central Tibet, my observations, which have been confirmed by others,

and as next chapter will prove, were of a different kind. Statements such as this

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should be seen in the context of the whole national narrative and of the Tibet Question

itself.

The centrality of Tibetan Buddhism in the development of Tibetan identity,

and the strengthening of religious identity as a result of Chinese repression are views

echoed by leading exiled Tibetan scholars such as Samten Karmay (1994). This is

also confirmed by the involvement of the religious community (monks and nuns from

the main monasteries in the Lhasa environs) in pro-independence demonstrations.

The second element of the Tibetan leadership's imagination of the Tibetan

nation holds that Tibet had been sacred in the past, and that the Chinese colonisation

of Tibet started a process of desacralisation. This process has occurred as a result of

modernisation policies, which reduced sacred buildings to rubble, limiting religious

practice and enrolment in monasteries, polluting lakes and rivers, and allowing the

mass migration of Han Chinese into the Tibetan plateau.

The argument is that in the name of industrialisation and more development

the Chinese have deforested significant areas of south-western Tibet, constructed

hydroelectric plants which have transformed the landscape at sacred areas such as

lake Yamdrok Tso, and demolished the old part of Lhasa. For instance, before 1959,

the Dalai Lama notes, the old part of Lhasa where most of the sacred buildings are

located, was three-square kilometres in size. Now it has shrunk to one square

kilometre (Dalai Lama 1998b: 186; Environment and Development Desk 2000). Thus,

the sacredness of Tibet and the desacralisation under Chinese irrational and

exploitative hands are important elements of the Tibetan narrative of the nation.

The third and related element is the notion of Tibet as being occupied by a

foreign power, that it has been victimised, and that the relationship with its occupier,

the People's Republic of China is 'colonial' (www.tibet.netlglance.html). The

generalised fear among the Tibetan exiled elite is that under Chinese occupation there

is a real threat of transforming Tibet into a 'veritable Chinese land' with the massive

influx of Chinese settlers. According to the Dalai Lama, this is creating the 'natural

conditions for Tibetans to think like the Chinese, use their language, and behave like

them' (Dalai Lama 1998c:85-86). The Chinese look down upon youngsters who speak

Tibetan, thus encourages them to speak Chinese rather than Tibetan. The cultural

displacement - conceived of in exile as cultural genocide - being carried out in Tibet

can still be reversed if the international community supports the Tibetan cause and the

Chinese authorities agree to end the transfer of Han Chinese to Tibet and to give

142

Tibetans real autonomy, if not independence. This shows his fears of the disruption

of traditional primordial and instrumental ties to the Tibetan land that the Chinese

occupation of Tibet entails.

The fourth element is the portrayal of Tibetans as environmentally friendly, or

having what Toni Huber calls a 'Green Tibetan Identity', that is, 'a set of essentialist

representations of Tibetan peoples, their culture and lifestyle which depicts them as

being in harmony with nature, non-exploitative of the natural world and its resources ,

and consciously sensitive to the complex ecological processes inherent in the physical

environment' (Huber 1997a: 1 03). In his autobiography, the Dalai Lama states that

there is nothing particularly sacred or holy about caring for nature, since taking care

of the earth is like taking care of our homes, and thus caring for the environment is

not a matter of religion or ethics or morality (Dalai Lama 1990b:269). However, in

later writings Tibetan Buddhism is rendered as the main source of Tibetan

environmental awareness.

Huber argues that the incorporation of this element to the official account of

Tibetan identity is a relatively new phenomenon, largely the result of 'strategic

positioning for social, economic and political advantages, as well as competition for

scarce resources within the contemporary world system', that is, as a means to attract

international support for their cause rather than a mere response to the global

environmentalist craze of these decades (Huber 1997a:l06-108).155 Such an image

was created by a very small circle of persons in Dharamsala, and disseminated from

there to the rest of the world. Nonetheless they claim to represent all Tibetans in and

out of Tibet (Huber 1997a:l03).

The newness and nature of such a discourse is proved by the facts that many

of government's documents that deal with environmental issues appeared in Western

foreign languages before appearing in Tibetan, and that its productions are not printed

on recycled paper (a strong and almost obligatory symbolic indicator of ecological

commitment) (Huber 1997a:111-112). Clearly, Buddhism has generated in Tibetans a

strong sense of respect for the natural world (and all its sentient beings, particularly

animals) and sacred places. Moreover, their relationship to the environment was, in

155 1986 marks the beginning of a politicised Green Tibetan identity linked with Buddhism ~nd nature with the publication of the Dalai Lama's landmark statement: 'An Ethical Approach to Envlfonmen~l Protectionism' and the participation of the GIE in an interfaith ceremony sponsored by the W~rld WIld Fund (Huber 1997a:ll1). But it did not become institutionalised until 1992 when the Envlronment

143

the pre-1951 context, similar to pre-modem societies, which traditionally only took

from the environment what they needed for their own subsistence. At a local level, I

could not help but noticing during my fieldwork trips in some of the Tibetan

settlements, for instance, the damage that littering was causing on the environment.

Concern for this situation has been voiced frequently by Richard Gere since the late

1990s, and some of the efforts of the Gere Foundation have been geared toward the

enhancement of environmental awareness. 156 Ecological awareness has thus become,

in exile, a political necessity. In this sense, it seems that the Dalai Lama and his GIE

are blending skilfully traditional values with modem global concerns to shape Tibetan

identity into one that fits the political struggle of the Tibetan people.

At another level, the Dalai Lama's espousal of the 'Green' discourse has a

significant implication for Tibetan cultural identity: it roots Tibetans to their land even

further. That is, 'new strands of 'green politics' literally sacralise the fusion of people,

culture, and soil on 'Mother earth' perpetuating the notion of displacement as an

anomaly that damages nationality (Malkki 1996:440). By implying a close link

between history, nature, and Tibetans, the Dalai Lama in his role of intellectual­

educator has been able to define the Tibetan communities in space. Therefore, saving

the environment in Tibet and freeing Tibet from the Chinese are seen as key to the

survival of Tibetan cultural and national identity.

Likewise, the Tibetan government has gone to great lengths to create an image

of a progressive and democratic Tibetan nation. This particular (fifth) element of

Tibetan imagination has been attributed to the 14th Dalai Lama, who has been a

restless advocate of political change, democracy and human rights. Although his

democratic vision did not originate in the past, it was fuelled by the failed

modernization projects of the 13th Dalai Lama (1876-1933), as well as by the

powerlessness of his own government to cope with the Chinese intrusion in Tibetan

affairs and to deter the total annexation of Tibet to China; and without doubt by the

example of the Indian experience, so close to home now. By the same token, China's

blatant attacks and criticisms to the alleged Tibetan resistance to progress and the

despotic nature of the Dalai Lamas' governments, and the Tiananmen massacre of

Desk, now the Environment and Development Desk within the Department of Information and International Relations (DIIR) of the Central Tibetan Administration was established. . 156 As part of the Tibetan Nun Project, for instance, which aims at assisting the spiritual, and matenal needs of monastic communities in exile, particularly of nunneries in Dharamsala, nuns have been involved in 'Cleaning-up Dharamsala' campaigns, and other similar activities.

144

1989, convinced the Dalai Lama of the need for change. Thus, the exigencies of

modem times and of exile have been crucial in the development of such a democratic

and progressive vision. In fact, so important did the human rights discourse become in

Dharamsala's policy making that in the late 1980s the Central Tibetan Administration

set up a Human Rights Desk within its Department of Information and International

Relations. In 1996, it was replaced by the Centre for Human Rights and Democracy.

Renan's emphasis on the 'spiritual' principle of the nation, that is, the sense of

a 'large-scale solidarity' constituted by shared feelings of past (and future) sacrifices

experienced in the name of the nation (Renan 1996 [1882]:52-53) is echoed in the

Dalai Lama's democratic spirit. Democracy - although 'imposed' from above - has

been the Dalai Lama's way of enhancing this sense of solidarity, and an attempt to

engage all members of the diaspora in the future of Tibet.

The Tibetan leaders see their experiment with democracy as a preparation for

the reconstruction of Tibet when freedom is restored. 157 As part of this exercise, a

parliament was instituted in 1960 and has gradually evolved into a full-fledged

legislative body known as the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies. The Assembly

issued the exile Tibetan constitution under the title of The Charter of the Tibetans in

Exile, which since 2001 provided for direct election of the Kalon Tripa (the highest

executive authority) by the exile populace (www.tibet.net/cta.html).158 In brief, the

Charter is the supreme law governing the functions of the Central Tibetan

Administration.

As for the institution of the Dalai Lama, since 1969 the Dalai Lama himself

has often stated his will to leave it to the Tibetan people to decide whether or not to

retain such an institution (Dalai Lama 1998d:270) and that he will not occupy any

157 It must be noted, though, that the CTA is not designed to take power in Tibet. In his manifesto for future Tibet, entitled 'Guidelines for Future Tibet's Polity and Basic Features of its Constitution', the Dalai Lama stated that the present exile government would be dissolved as soon as freedom was restored in Tibet. The Tibetans currently residing in Tibet would head the government of free Tibet. He said that there would be a transitional government in Tibet, which would be headed by an Interim­President, elected or appointed by him, to whom the Dalai Lama would transfer his political power. The Interim-President, in tum, would hold a general election within two years and then hand over the fower to the popularly elected government (www.tibet.netlcta.hml).

58 Before the Charter came into being, the GIE functioned roughly along the lines of the draft democratic constitution for future Tibet, promulgated by the Dalai Lama on March 10, 1963. 'It guarantees everyone equality before the law and equal enjoyment of rights and freedo~ without discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, race, language and social origin. [And] it prOVIdes for a clear separation of power between the three organs of the government: judiciary, legislature and executive' (www.tibet.netlcta/charter.html).

145

position in the future government of Tibet (Dalai Lama 1998e: 136). 159 Furthermore, it

can be argued that his attempts to democratise Tibetan exiled communities with the

establishment of the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, also responds to his

quest for legitimacy. The Green Tibetan identity, democracy and the constant

denunciation of human rights abuses all fit very neatly with Western liberal political

discourses, and thus, helped construct an image of Tibetans as being 'worthy' of

Western patronage, and adds a global dimension to Tibetan identity (Mountcastle

1997; McLagan 1996).

Consequently, this whole process has contributed to the exacerbation of the

existing, real or imagined, differences with China. The emphasis on the victimization

of Tibetans under communist rule has vilified the Chinese in more than one sense, and

has given rise to a set of dichotomies that portray the Tibetan Government and by

extension Tibetans in general as environmentally friendly, advocates of human rights,

democracy, religious values, and victims of cultural genocide, versus the Chinese

Government, irrational destroyer of nature, violator of human rights, repreSSIve,

imperial, and the promoter of materialistic values and chauvinist attitudes.

The following quote from the Dalai Lama is representative of such discourse:

'On the 10th March 1959, the Tibetan people's uprising in Lhasa was crushed brutally

by the Red Chinese Army. So why do we commemorate this day - a day of defeat

when thousands of our people died and when Communist China proved her utter

ruthlessness and her total disregard for human values? We celebrate this day as a day

of victory. For it was on this day that the failure of the oppressive system of Red

China in Tibet became apparent and that the Chinese in their frustration to cover up

their deficiencies had to use violence to promulgate what is essentially the reverse to

Communist ideals; colonialism. On the other hand, for us, it was no defeat. Rather, it

was a proof of the Tibetan courage and their determination never to live under alien

rule' (Dalai Lama 1998f:378).

Finally, the sixth element in the Tibetan elite imagination of the Tibetan nation

is the construction of an image of a future free or truly autonomous Tibet, and ruled

by the Tibetan people and for the Tibetan people. In the eyes of the Dalai Lama a free

159 In fact, the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile passed a resolution on 20 September 2003 that will pave the way for the transferring of some of the political powers of the 14th Dalai Lama to the Assembly, and to the fIrst Prime Minister ever elected democratically by the Tibetan exiled communities (in 2001) (http://www.tibet.calwtnarchive/2003/9/21_2.html).

146

Tibet would be a religious sanctuary that could serve all of humanity. In 1987, the

Dalai Lama received an invitation to address the Human Rights Caucus of the United

States' Congress (Capitol Hill) in Washington D.C. in which he delivered (21

September) an outline for the proposal of a peace plan which become known as the

Five-Point Peace Plan (Dalai Lama 1990b:247). The Dalai Lama's vision for a future

Tibet has been articulated as part of the Peace Plan. Therefore, most of the Dalai

Lama's writings, speeches, and even religious teachings, as well as those of the CTA,

all manifestly speak or refer to them:

1 Transformation of Tibet into a peace sanctuary;

2 Abandonment of China's population transfer policy;

3 Respect for the Tibetan people's fundamental human rights and democratic

freedoms;

4 Restoration and protection of Tibet's natural environment and the

abandonment of China's use of Tibet for the production of nuclear weapons

and dumping of nuclear waste; and

5 Commencement of earnest negotiations on the future status of Tibet and of

relations between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples (Dalai Lama 1998g:28). 160

The first point blends the Gandhian philosophy of passive resistance, and the

Buddhist and Jain notion of Ahimsa (non-violence), with Western myths of Tibet

('Mythos Tibet'), and aims at creating a Buddhist country. Central to this is the

creation of de-militarised zone, based on Buddhist values and Ahimsa. A country

based on these values could serve, according to the Dalai Lama, all people seeking

'the true meaning of peace within themselves, away from the tension and pressures of

the rest of the world. Tibet could become a creative centre for the promotion of world

peace. Tibet's unique history and profound spiritual heritage render it ideally suited

for fulfilling the role of sanctuary of peace in the heart of Asia. It would also be in

keeping with Tibet's historical role as peaceful Buddhist nation and a buffer region

separating the continent's powers' (Dalai Lama 1998h:35-36).

In conjunction with this point, in the following year (1988) the Dalai Lama

presented the Strasbourg Proposals at the European Parliament in which the Tibetan

government officially relinquished its claims for complete independence and settled

for real autonomy within the People's Republic of China. This was done in the hope

160 This change in discourse toward the environment, democracy, blended with the three-decade long

147

that the Chinese government would consider the Dalai Lama's stand less

confrontational and would be willing to resume the negotiation talks with the exiled

Tibetans, as well as to respond to the discourse of non-violence. This development

was extremely significant since it generated a major reaction within the different

refugee communities.

A true modem panacea could only be achieved through the establishment of a

government elected by the people, 'where the rule of law, human rights and

democratic freedoms are guaranteed in a constitution adopted by the people; and

where the environment is protected and all forms of life respected' (Dalai Lama

1998i:42). A future Tibet with such characteristics would have not only a regional

impact by enabling India to withdraw her troops and military installations from the

Himalayan regions bordering Tibet, but would also be of global significance. In de­

militarising the Himalayan region, the potential military threats between India and

China would disappear, contributing to international security. In addition, an

ecological reserve the size of the Tibetan plateau would have a positive impact on the

world as a whole.

Nowhere is the incorporation of Western myths about Tibet so strikingly by a

Tibetan than in the following statement by the Dalai Lama:

'Sometimes I jokingly tell people that when Tibet will gain freedom, it will become a

public holiday resort for the whole world! In the big cities where the environment is

polluted, physical ailments abound. Due to the various mental tensions, there are

emotional problems. In Tibet, besides the land being clean, the natural good moral

character will produce a noble feeling which together will give the holiday-makers

peace of mind. And for those who are interested, specialized trainings can be given

just as the ancient Indian Yogic system is today widely practiced in the world for a

healthy body. We can also do likewise. If Tibet becomes a zone of peace, it will not

only benefit the six million Tibetans, but has the potential and the ideal conditions to

contribute to the metal peace and physical health of the world as a whole. So I feel

that if the Tibetan culture of nobility of character which is linked to Tibetan Buddhism

can be preserved and promoted, it will benefit not only the six million Tibetan people

but even the animals and the insects including the ants which exist in Tibet. This will

further extend not only to the areas of the Himalayan range, inner and outer Mongolia,

stress on human rights won the Dalai Lama the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.

148

Tuva, Kalmykia, etc., but the minds of millions of the Chinese themselves can be

greatly benefited by us' (Dalai Lama 1998j: 298-99, emphasis added).

The fact that the Dalai Lama first presented the Five-Point Peace Plan in

Washington, D.C., the capital of the United States is quite significant. It is an

indication of his desire to make the Tibetan Issue an international one, and to involve

powerful countries, such as the U.S. in the Tibetan struggle. It also points to his

seeking international legitimacy for his national project.

In the fourth point of the Peace Plan, the Dalai Lama incorporates for the first

time in such an important document his newly developed 'Green Identity', by

declaring the government's stand vis-a.-vis the restoration and protection of the

environment of Tibet. The last point seeks to re-establish a fruitful dialogue with the

Chinese authorities in which the GIE's representatives are treated in equal standing.

A short analysis of the tools and mechanisms the Dalai Lama and the GIE

employ in their capacity as intellectuals-educators in conducting a tutored­

mindfulness to recapture the homeland, and to reproduce and disseminate the values

stressed in the official narrative of the nation, suggests the following:

• The education system in Tibetan settlements in India, Bhutan and N epa!.

• Major public events of a purely religious nature (such as Tantric initiations

and other Buddhist teachings bestowed by the Dalai Lama); secular events

with a clear political intent such as the commemoration of the March 10 Lhasa

Uprising everywhere in the world where there are large groups of Tibetans;

and semi-secular events, such as the celebration of the Dalai Lama's birthday

on July 6.

• Public and private audiences (interviews) with the Dalai Lama.

• The display and use of nationalist paraphernalia, such as a flag and a national

anthem.

• The use of the Lhasa dialect (central Tibetan dialect) as the lingua franca of

Tibetans, i.e. it is the language taught in schools, used in public events, and in

government dealings.

In exile, the Dalai Lama has played the role of unifier, and in the education system he

serves as a 'summarizing symbol of the Tibetan ideological system as a whole'

(Nowak 1989:55). The view of his personification of the Bodhisattva of Compassion,

Chenrezig is all pervasive and is enhanced in the textbooks in relation to the myths of

149

ongms and Tibetan religious history. 161 In this way, the traditional notion of the

sacredness of Tibet is perpetuated through the dissemination in exile of the belief of

Tibet being the prime field of Chenrezig, and of Tibetans being his descendants, as

told in the legend of his marriage (in the fonn of a monkey) to a Tibetan ogress,

explained in chapter 3. Likewise, the 'One People, One Territory' principle is

transmitted and reproduced while children learn the geography of Asia.

In addition, since 1959, the Dalai Lama has made a point of meeting and

chatting with all refugees upon their arrival to Dharamsala. 162 By doing so, he gets a

first hand account of the exiles' lives under communist rule, reasons for their flight,

and their experience of escape. By the same token, most exiles, whose devotion to the

Dalai Lama is total, see this opportunity as a dream came true, and in this way, a

sense of comradeship and loyalty to the Dalai Lama is strengthened.

The Tibetan education system developed within the Department of Education

(established in 1960) of the Central Tibetan Administration. There are three different

categories of school organizations: The Tibetan Children's Village schools, the

Central Tibetan School Administration (Shambotha schools run directly by the

Department of Education) as well as the autonomous Snow Lion Foundation Schools

III Nepal, and the Tibetan Homes Foundation Schools In Misoorie

(http://www.tibet.net/educationlenglschools/). 163 It is mainly sponsored by the

government of India and by Western relief agencies, and thus it follows the basic

curricula of the Indian schools. Nevertheless, there is ample room for the inclusion of

purely Tibetan subjects such as language courses, calligraphy, and history. Since the

Indian education system stresses secular education, religious education, so important

for the preservation of Tibetan cultural identity, must be included in the after-school

programmes.

In Dharamsala, the Tibetan school system developed very early on with the

establishment of the Tibetan Children's Village in the early 1960-61 by the Dalai

161 When asked if he believes that he is the reincarnation of each of the previous thirteen Dalai Lamas of and the manifestation of Chenrezig, the seventy-fourth in a lineage that can be traced back to a Brahmin boy who lived in the time of Buddha Shakyamuni, the Dalai Lama answers that when he considers his experiences during this present life, and given his Buddhist beliefs, he has no difficulty in accepting that he is spiritually connected both to the thirteen previous Dalai Lamas, to Chenrezig and to the Buddha himself (Dalai Lama 1990b:ll). 162 In Tibetan tradition, the Dalai Lamas were never so accessible to the people; thus this is clearly an unprecedented act and one which has borne a lot of fruit. 163 In Dharamsala 'with branches in Bir, Bylakuppe, Gopalpur, Ladakh and Patlikuhl. There are sixteen Shambota schools in India and four in Bhutan

150

Lama's elder sister, Tsering Dolma, (now headed by his youngest sister Jetsun Perna).

One of its most important functions has been an orphanage for the children of

Tibetans who did not survive the escape into exile. It was set up as a group of family

homes, each with house parents, who looked after the two-dozen or so children living

in their house. This provided them the opportunity of bringing up the children with

Tibetan values and giving them the semblance of family life. Many adults offered

their services as teachers and between them they managed to set up a syllabus based

on the Indian model, but tailored to suit Tibetan children with emphasis on Tibetan

studies (Russell 2000:79,83).

For the Tibetan administration the Tibetan school system serves to transmit

traditional Tibetan knowledge and a modem, diversified curriculum to help the young

generation in their acculturation. There are three primary Tibetan values and attitudes

that are cultivated in school: snying-rje ('compassion'), ya-rabs spyod-bzang

('respectful behaviour'); and rgyal-zhen (,patriotism', a recent version of the older

virtue of ethnic or local-group pride) (Nowak 1984:53).164 The first is essential to the

development of a 'good heart' (Dalai Lama 1999a) and by extension to the breeding

of 'good Tibetans'; and the last for development of an early political and national

awareness in the young Tibetans. Developing a school system, which aims at the

establishment of universal education, is an unprecedented break-through, since

education in traditional Tibet was almost designed for members of the monastic and

secular elite and its children. In the new context of exile, education became a need of

the utmost importance. In the early stages, the OlE set out to prepare a series of texts

books to be used in all the Tibetan primary schools. This, without doubt has been the

most effective way to disseminate the official narrative of Tibetan history, the official

myths of origin of the Tibetan nation, its political geography, and notions of cultural

and national identity.

Now we tum to the use of public events as a tool to disseminate the official

notion of Tibetan-ness. In the early twentieth century pilgrimage, conceived as a

religious and social practice, played a crucial role in the development of Tibetan

identity. In exile, major public events that have become ritualised by force of

repetition and official promotion, have assumed the role pilgrimage played in pre-

164 In the Tibetan Buddhism context cultivating compassion means the development of sensitivity towards the suffering of others, so that a heartfelt desire arises that all sen!i~nt bein.g~ be free from suffering and the causes of suffering, and that eventually, through proper spmtual trammg, one could

151

diasporic Tibet. This is not say that pilgrimage has been superseded, or that it has

ceased to be a cultural signifier for the Tibetan diaspora, but being cut off from their

main pilgrimage routes, Tibetan exiles who continue to embark on pilgrimage

journeys, do so now in India and Nepal, enhancing a global Buddhist identity rather

than a Tibetan one. Other pilgrimages places such as the residence and monastery of

the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala have developed in the post-1959 context and stand out

as enhancing Tibetan identity. The stupa of Boudhanath in the Kathmandu valley,

though an ancient pilgrimage site for Tibetans has played the same role in the past

decades. 165

Having assumed a ritualised character, public events like the commemoration

of the 10th March Lhasa Uprising allow Tibetans to identify with one another. As

Lhasang Tsering points out, in such events Tibetans can see that they are' all suffering,

one might say, from the same disease' .166 Therefore, the strongest national feelings

are produced with the awareness of the sacrifices Tibetan refugees have made in the

past and of those that they are prepared to make in the future. In the 10th March

Uprising commemoration in particular, the Dalai Lama, and other representatives of

the GIE give speeches which draw attention to religious, political and cultural

moments/ events of great significance to Tibetans. These enhance the idea of the

uniqueness of Tibetan culture and religion, and the need to fight for what is perceived

as lawfully theirs. In this way, these events serve as powerful remembrance tools, and

by force of repetition, they automatically give the sense of continuation with the past

and become a 'cult enacted'. In the exile context, they are intended to shape 'a

communal memory' (Connerton 1989:44) and produce feelings of belonging and

meaning to the whole experience of exile. In public events of this nature, the national

anthem is sung and the Tibetan flag is waved with enthusiasm or pinned in a badge to

one's jumper, chuba (Tibetan dress), or shirt and worn with great pride. Hence the

Tibetan community is reminded of its identity as represented and told in a 'master­

narrative' designed by the Tibetan elite. Similarly, the Dalai Lama as a symbol

provides Tibetan diaspora with a focus on a single leader (Shakya 1993 :9).

help to bring that about. 165 Obviously, Boudhanath as a pilgrimage site for Tibetans predates 1959; however, it has ?een o~e. of the preferred areas for resettlement for many Tibetan refugees, and its circumambulation recltmg mantras as well as other social activities within the compound stimulates a sense of Tibetan identity. 166 Pers~nal Communication, The Book Worm Bookstore, Dharamsala, India, May 2001. Lhasang Tsering was the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Tibetan Youth Congress from 1986-1990.

152

Lastly, the use of the Lhasa dialect as the lingua franca in exile, again, is a

strategy to play down regional differences and identities in favour of a national

identity, to homogenize the second and third generations of Tibetans, and to reduce

the obvious communication difficulties among refugees. Therefore, the Lhasa dialect

is used in education and all official matters and regional dialects at home and in social

events.

5.1.2. Breaching Religious Differences: The Ris-med Movement in Exile

The significance of the ris-med movement for the topic that concerns us here is that

the 14th Dalai Lama, though head of the Gelugpas, in exile, and particularly since the

1970s, has made a conscious and deliberate decision to adopt ris-med attitudes toward

religion. This responds largely to his identification with the 5th Dalai Lama's political

project and religious leanings, broad in their geographical scope and religious content;

to the perceived dangers of sectarian attitudes, and to the particular conditions of exile.

It could be argued that at present, the 14th Dalai Lama has been waging ris­

med ideology at three levels:

• Political: to generate a sense of harmony and unity among all the schools of

Tibetan Buddhism to avoid further polarization of Tibetan societies, in a

context that already, as it is, can well play against them. Moreover, the Dalai

Lama is trying to present to the international community a unified Tibetan

diaspora, in order to legitimise their 'plead' for political and financial support;

• Territorial: to expand the limits of political Tibet (central Tibet) into the early

Tibetan empire that suits his perception of the Tibetan nation; and

• Religious: to benefit from an eclectic approach to religious practice, by sharing

in the wealth of knowledge available within all schools of Tibetan Buddhism.

As the following section shows, his engagement with such a discourse,

however beneficial it might be, has generated a chain of reactions among orthodox

Gelugpa practitioners (both, members of the monastic and lay communities) that has

reached astounding proportions.

153

5.2. Contesting Official Narratives and Policies

Forced displacement, exile and geographical dispersion have added new variables to

the Tibetan understanding of 'Self, and ways of dealing not only with the experience

of exile, but also with the 'will' to return and the political struggle it entails. Because

the voicing of oppositional histories threatens to bring instability to an already fragile

environment in exile, Tibetan authorities have often tended to silence them by

questioning their legitimacy, or by mere persuasion (through the spiritual and political

clout of the Dalai Lama). Nonetheless, their existence points to the diversity and

complexity of Tibetan exiled communities and the obvious difficulties in containing

them in such diverse environments.

The most common oppositional narratives have sprung from regional

factionalism, exacerbated by dialect differences; from sectarianism fuelled by

differences in the choice of ritual practices and philosophical interpretations; and

from disagreements over the methods to apply in order to achieve self-determination.

An example of the disagreement over the methods latter is the Mustang

Guerrilla, which became an 'international embarrassment' for the Tibetan GIE

(Shakya 1999:363). Its origins lay in the Khampa resistance movement against the

Chinese invasion of Tibet known as the 'Four Rivers, Six Ranges'. This movement

received aid from the US CIA for its operations throughout the 1950s and 1960s. As

the occupation of Tibet became total, its members were persecuted, and thus were

forced to flee the country. Some disbanded and others formed a clandestine guerrilla

resistance movement in Mustang, northern Nepal, still with CIA support. Originally,

their constant raids to southern Tibet were sanctioned by the GIE, but in the early

1970s, as the Tibetan government became much more exposed to international

attention, and having engaged in a predominantly non-violent discourse, the Mustang

Guerrilla had the potential to damage the Tibetan government's credibility (N orbu, J.

1987; Shakya 1999). Therefore, the Dalai Lama withdrew his support and persuaded

them to disband. The US had also withdrawn its military and financial support as a

result of its rapprochement with the PRC. Furthermore, King Mahendra of Nepal,

who had been a sympathiser of the Tibetan cause died in 1972. The succeeding

government partly under pressure from the Chinese forced the Mustang Guerrilla to

disarm. Without the support of the CIA and the Dalai Lama, and having been rejected

by the Nepalese government, the fighters found it hard to continue with their

operations. The majority put down their weapons. Others who felt betrayed by the

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Dalai Lama and the Tibetan GIE committed suicide, still others (less than a hundred,

according to the Dalai Lama (1 990a: 191-193), ignored the Tibetan and Nepalese

governments' plea and continued fighting for the liberation of Tibet, with the result

that they were killed in an ambush by the Nepalese army in 1974.

The Tibetan Youth Congress, a radical organization established in 1970 in

exile, which aims at achieving the total independence of Tibet is another clear

example of the disagreements over the methods to apply in order to achieve

independence (www.tibetanyouthcongress.org). In its early days, it was composed by

many of the young former Mustang Guerrilla fighter and the younger members of the

first generation of exiles who were trying to voice, besides their commitment to Tibet

and their loyalty to the Dalai Lama, their impatience with the alleged passivity of the

Tibetan leadership, and disagreement over the Ahimsalnon-violence and passive­

resistance principles of the Tibetan struggle. As the Sino-Tibetan dialogue was

reaching a stalemate in the mid-1980s, members of the Youth Congress advocated a

more radical approach suggesting the use of violence, and hence the need of foreign

(military) support, as well as more radical actions such as hunger strikes, self­

immolations in front of United Nations' buildings and the like. 167 The rationale for

violence was expressed by Lhasang Tsering in these terms:

'We have to move China out of Tibet. To move China, we have to move the

world. To move the world, we first have to move Tibet. If we destabilize Tibet enough,

we can tip the scales in our favour. If there is violent action inside Tibet, the world

will pay attention, the Tibetan issue will be discussed, Tibet will feature among the

world's urgent problems and people will be forced to pay attention. Our intention is

not to Idll people; we want only to blow up bridges, power stations and

communication lines' (Tsering L. 1993:33). Therefore, violence in Tibet was meant to

create enough noise to be heard and involve the West in the Tibetan issue by putting

pressure on the Chinese authorities to leave Tibet.

Margaret Nowak notes that many members who took Tibetan Buddhism for

granted in elementary and secondary school turned to a less devotional, more

intellectual study of Buddhism, seeking to find precedents and justifications for the

167 . I.&: .. I In 1995 the Tibetan Youth Congress claimed a membership of 10,000 TIbetans. ts J.our pnnClpa objectives, as outlined in its constitution, are: To promote national unity and integrity by giving up all distinctions based on regionalism, status or religion; to work for the preservation of the Tibetan religion, culture, and tradition; to struggle for the total independence of Tibet and to follow the guidance of the HH the Dalai Lama (cited in Frechette 2002:178).

155

use of violence. The standard ideological (textual) justification was found in a Jataka

story according to which the Buddha, in the fonn of the bodhisattva Sarthavaha

Sattvavana, killed a wicked ferryman who was about to murder and rob the

passengers on his vessel out of compassion for both the passengers and the

ferryman. 168 In doing so, the Buddha was sparing the ferryman from the inevitable

suffering such a negative act would bring upon him (Samdong Rinpoche in Novak

1984: 133). Nevertheless, the content of the TYC's discourse is essentially Pan­

Tibetan and faithfully holds the 'One People, One Country' principle by advocating

the notion of 'One History, One Culture'.

Although neither the TYC nor the Mustang Guerrilla had a chance to generate

sufficient support to make their call for violence bear fruit (i.e. the liberation or

independence of Tibet), their actions and discourse did challenge an important

element of the Dalai Lama's imagination of the Tibetan nation, that of a non-violent

movement toward self-detennination, and the portrayal of Tibetans as essentially

peace-loving people. It also challenged Tibetan Buddhism as the main source of

Tibetan identity.

It is nonetheless very important to note that since 1988 the Tibetan Youth

Congress, and many other Tibetan intellectuals and even fonner government

representatives have blatantly rejected the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Proposals,

according to which the Tibetan exiled authorities renounced their claim of

independence of Tibet and express their willingness to accept 'real' autonomy for

Tibet within the People's Republic of China. 169 For members of the TYC this was the

same as denying historical rights over Tibet, which contradicts the Dalai Lama's 'One

People, One Territory' (Tsering L. 1993:37). In this sense, both, the Mustang Guerrilla

and the TYC have regarded themselves as fierce defenders of the integrity of Tibetan

territory, more so even than the Dalai Lama himself and the Tibetan GIE. However,

TYC actions have not generated any visible violence. This is, in many ways due to the

fact that, since 1974, the Dalai Lama has often stated that if more blood is shed he

168 Jataka tales are a collection of stories of heroes and legends which Buddhist missionaries adopted and adapted as they worked to convert people to Buddhism. These local tales were transformed into stories of the Buddha's previous lives, before his historical existence around 500 BeE. Jatakas are moral stories that tell of the deeds and misdeeds of the Buddha on his long path toward enlightenment. 169 I . L . th Among them stand out: Phuntsong Wangyal, former representative of the Da al ama m e London-based Tibet Foundation and member of the second Tibetan Delegation to Tibet (Wangyal 1991:25); the Tibetan scholar Samten Karmay (Karmay 1991:11); Jamyang Norbu (Norbu, J. 2001:377), Lhasang Tsering (Tsering 1991) and others.

156

would give up his role as political head of Tibetans in exile. In this sense, his power is

so overwhelming that it is hard to counter, in any significant way, his narrative of the

nation. As the following pages will show however, sectarian controversies have left

I . . . 170 Th h more astIng Impnnts. ey ave not only challenged most blatantly the Dalai

Lama's discourse, but have also have caused one of the most serious rift within the

Tibetan diaspora yet.

As far as the democratic element within the official discourse is concerned , many Tibetans in exile do not see democracy as the best way forward. Many believe

that an 'enlightened monarchy' is the most convenient form of government for

Tibetans, with a good king with the interests of his people at heart and the power to

command. Similarly, there are many politically-minded refugees who see the Dalai

Lama's play with democracy as another way of winning Western favour. This they

see as a dangerous tactic, since the fickle, elected governments of the West change

their policies with each election. I 71

An example of regional factionalism that has caused headaches to the Dalai

Lama and the GIE is the case of the Khampa refugee community organised around the

association that took the name of the Khampa resistance movement of 1950s: 'Four

Rivers, Six Ranges'. In 1994 the association signed an agreement with some

representatives of the Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs Commission of Taiwan, without

consulting the Tibetan leadership. What made this a sensitive issue is the fact that the

Taiwanese government, following Chiang Kaishek's stand, has territorial and

sovereignty claims over Tibet. In Guomindang (GMD) authorities established the

170 The two major sectarian controversies have been the Shugden Controversy, which has had the strongest impact in the Tibetan refugee communities (in terms of people involved, violence experienced, and effects on the Dalai Lama and the GIE); and the controversy over the naming of the successor of the head of the Karma-Kagyu School, the 17th Karmapa. In 1981, the 16

th Karmapa,

Rangjung Rigpay Dorje died and a couple of years later a major controversy arose when two of three main Tibetan masters of the Karma Kagyu School: Shamar Rinpoche and Situ Rinpoche, who historically had the task of finding the successor of the Karmapa, differed over the candidate. Shamar Rinpoche named Trinlay Thaye Dorje who is being trained now in Kalimpong, West Bengal; and Situ Rinpoche named Urgyen Trinlay Dorje who escaped from Tibet in 2000 and has now settled in Dharamsala. The Dalai Lama, who traditionally had no official say in the matter, has de facto recognised Urgyen Trinlay Dorje. As a result, a schism has developed within the Karma Kagyu School, and many Tibetans, in loyalty to the Dalai Lama, or Situ Rinpoche have sided with Urgyen Trinlay Dorje. This has also been a tremendous blow for the continuance of the Karma Kagyu tradition. In this thesis, I concentrate on the former controversy. In doing so, I do not intend to imply in any way that the Karmapa controversy is less important, rather, that it has not had effects at the level we are discussing here (i.e. narratives of cultural identity, challenges to the official version, and so forth). 171 These statements are based on fieldwork interviews in Nepal and Switzerland. 172 Some members of the Taiwanese government have considered the Dalai Lama and other Tibetan OlE representatives, and religious figures as 'overseas Chinese'. (E.g. the chairman of the OMD's

157

Tibetan and Mongolian Affairs Commission in 1914 presumably to make decisions

regarding those two nations. 173 This signing of an agreement was interpreted by the

Dalai Lama and the exile government as tantamount to treason and a challenge to the

Dalai Lama's authority as the premier representative of the Tibetan people/nation vis­

a-vis other nations and countries. The incident resulted in the Dalai Lama's calling for

a referendum among Kham people in which they were asked to choose their

allegiance (Mountcastle 1997:54). Most Khampas supported the Dalai Lama, and as

result, the leaders of the organization were ousted. The Dalai Lama also interpreted

this act as a ploy by some Tibetans to get financial support from richer nations (Dalai

Lama 1998k:307-308).

At the beginning of the chapter it was argued that the Dalai Lama and the

Tibetan GIE's imagination of the Tibetan nation has responded to the PRC's own

narrative of the Chinese nation. It was also noted that the modem source of such a

practice in China was Sun Yatsen's Three Principles of the People and his notion of

Han supremacy and the subordinated minorities that were part of the Chinese nation.

Taiwanese territorial and sovereignty claims over Tibet are based on such a discourse.

Although no apparent permanent damage was caused to the Tibetan leadership by the

above incident, it shows just how vulnerable the GIE feels when a group of Tibetans

decides to act on their own accord. With this I am not implying that by signing such a

document, the Khampa association was accepting de facto the Taiwanese notion of

the Chinese nation, which clearly contradicts the Dalai Lama's 'One People, One

Territory' principle. Since then, the Dalai Lama has made a couple of trips to Taiwan

to clarify exactly who rules the Tibetan refugee communities and to try to divert

relations with Taiwan to religious matters, especially since the number of Taiwanese

interested in Tibetan Buddhism has increased substantially in the past ten years.

Finally, it is interesting to note here that the exile administration has excluded

the Tibetan guerrilla fighters who surrendered to the Nepal government in 1974 from

all assistance, and has also excluded the Khampa organization suspected of accepting

funds from Taiwan (Frechette 2002: 155). This is a significant way of discouraging the

emergence of groups that intend to challenge either the Dalai Lama or the Central

Tibetan Administration.

Mainland Affairs Council, Mr. Chang Ching-yu, referred to the Dalai Lama in such terms after the Dalai Lama's visit to Taiwan in 1997 (http://www.taiwandc.orgltwcoml75-no6.htm.) 173 The Commission was replaced by the Taiwan-Tibet Exchange Foundation in January 2003.

158

5.2.1. Sectarian Differences: the Shugden Controversy

In the early days of exile, the unprecedented proximity of Tibetans of different

regions and religious affiliation, as well as the scarce financial resources available to

most Tibetans put them under a lot of pressure. This pressure coupled with Western

assistance, and the increasing influence and interference of Western devotees of

Tibetan Buddhism in Tibetan affairs, has given sectarian differences a new dimension.

Although the origin of the Shugden controversy was a purely Tibetan affair, its

development has been shaped by non-Tibetan sources, which have also been partly

responsible for its intensification.

The Shugden controversy has generated the polarisation of the Tibetan

diaspora as no other issue. It has challenged the Dalai Lama as spiritual and political

leader, as well as his whole narrative of the nation. 174 It developed as a result of the

worship of a controversial deity called Gyel-chen DOlje Shugden (rgyal chen rdo rje

shugs ldan, 'the Great Magical Spirit Endowed with the Adamantine Force') which

started as minor practice in the sixteenth century within the Sakya School of Tibetan

Buddhism.175 It developed into a highly controversial deity only in the late nineteenth

and early twentieth century during and in the aftermath of the reign of the 13th Dalai

Lama, as a result of Gelugpa patronage.

There are different narratives as to the on gIns and powers of such deity,

Georges Dreyfus, who looked into the origins of the practice within the Gelugpa

school, found that the deity has a close regional connection with the area of the

Tsang-po and Yarlung valleys in Southern Tibet and that it was a potentially

troublesome spirit, which was propitiated in some of the monasteries of the area as a

minor protector. If properly propitiated, it had the power to bestow wealth, food, life

and good fortune, to protect the teachings of the Buddha, prevent their destruction

and repel the external and internal enemies, as well as serve as an oracle. Dreyfus

notes that the ritual practice for the propitiation of this minor deity within the Gelugpa

174 Because the controversy is a highly charged one, not many scholars have ventured to study it. Most of the literature available has been published by advocates of the deity, the GIE reacting against it and proscribing its practice, the Chinese using it to 'prove' the 'repressive' nature of the Dalai Lama's exiled regime, and media articles in newspapers. The most well-informed, critical but impartial a~c.ount that I came across is by the Western scholar and former Gelugpa monk, Georges ?reyfus of W tlha?Is

College, Massachusetts (1998, 1999), so this section will greatly rely on the matenal presented by hIm, and will analyse the reaction of the Dalai Lama, and others involved. 175 Dreyfus traced the first ritual text related to this practice in a collection ~f. rituals tex~ for the protectors of Samye monastery used by the Sakya School. In this text, he notes, It IS only conSIdered as a minor worldly deity (which can not lead its practitioners to enlightenment) (Dreyfus 1999:

159

establishment dates back only to the middle of the eighteenth century. Between the

mid-eighteenth century and late nineteenth century the practice was disseminated. By

the reign of the 13th Dalai Lama, such practice was quite widespread within this

school (www.tibet.comldhogyal/shugden-origins.html).

The contemporary controversy has its roots in the great Gelugpa master

Pabongka Rinpoche (1878-1941) and his main disciples Trijang Rinpoche (1901-

1983) (tutor of the present Dalai Lama) and Tobden Lama, all of whom were fierce

advocates of the practice. Pabongka presented his teachings as embodying the

Gelugpa orthodoxy. However, the focus on Shugden as protector and Vajyayogini as

the main Tantric deity was not part of the great master Tsongkhapa's religious

synthesis of the fourteenth century, discussed earlier, which had become the religious

orthodoxy for the Gelugpas.

Rather than targeting members of the other Buddhist schools for not following

the Ge1ugpa orthodoxy, this deity targets Ge1ugpa practitioners who incorporate ritual

practices of the other traditions, particularly those of the Nyinmapa School to which

the 5th, 13th, and 14th Dalai Lamas had affinity. Therefore, Shugden's anger against

the Dalai Lamas is clearly not directed at the institution per se, but at their non­

sectarian leanings, in order to enhance the ritual 'purity' of the Ge1ugpa tradition.

Dreyfus argues that some other masters may have been uncomfortable at the

promotion of such a deity but there was no reason to engage in a controversy with

Pabongka and Trijang Rinpoche who were respected spiritual teachers of many

(Gelugpa) members of the post-1959 Tibetan diaspora, especially in light of the

commitments, vows and pledges that many disciples had made by receiving teachings

from them (www.tibet.com/dhogyal/shugden-origins.httnl).

The 14th Dalai Lama's early religious education was mainly based on the

Gelugpa orthodoxy, thus DOlje Shugden was one of his - though minor - practices. In

1975, he decided to change his position towards this practice as a result of the

pUblication of a book (referred to as the Yellow Book) about Shugden by the Ge1ugpa

monk Dze-may Rinpoche (dze smad rinpoche, 1927-1996), which is a praise to the

deity and enumerates all the Gelugpa lamas whose lives had been endangered or

shortened for practicing Nyingmapa rituals. This book made the Dalai Lama realise

the dangers of the practice. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama took this book as a personal

www.tibet.comldholgyal!shugden-origins.html).

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affront to his role as Dalai Lama, a rejection to his religious leadership by the

Gelugpa establishment, and a betrayal of his efforts in the struggle for Tibetan

freedom (www.tibeLcoln/dhogyal/shugden-origins.html). The threat to the Dalai

Lama's political edifice is serious since it could crumble first, by threatening his own

life for advocating non-sectarian (Tib. ris-med) attitudes toward religion; by de­

legitimising his political and territorial claims to the early Tibetan empire as

advocated by the 'Great Fifth' who had a spiritual inclination toward the Nyinmapa

School; by denying a significant part of the Tibetan religious and historical heritage,

which is part and parcel of the other Tibetan Buddhist schools; and by further

polarising Tibetan societies. Denying, for instance, the spiritual legitimacy of the

Nyingmapa School, discredits Guru Rinpoche, whose presence and activity

contributed to the sacralisation of space in Tibet, and to the dissemination of

Buddhism in the eighth and ninth centuries so important for the development of

Tibetan historical religious identity.

The Dalai Lama therefore began to put pressure against such practice,

applying restrictions within the Gelugpa monasteries to the public performance of the

Shugden ritual, advising lay Tibetan refugees to stop its practice, and stating that

those who were willing to go against his word, should not seek spiritual teachings

from him (Department of Religion and Culture 1989; 1998). 176 He stopped

propitiating it himself, since he could not perform it, now that he was much more

aware of the dangers, while he was also propitiating Nechung, which is the state

oracle and protector associated with Guru Rinpoche. The CTA's basic policy on this

issue was spelled out in a resolution passed unanimously on 6 June 1996 by the

Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies (Parliament-in-exile).

The devotion many Tibetans developed, first and foremost toward their

teachers who transmitted them the practice of this deity, and the devotion they feel

toward the Dalai Lama, has made this a very sensitive issue. Most Tibetans decided

immediately to follow the Dalai Lama without any second thoughts. Others, however,

176 This particularly refers to Tantric initiations where the disciple develops a strong connection to the teacher through vows and pledges. Thus, if the disciple is not willing to abide by the spiritual commitment implied, there is no use in receiving teachings from him in the ftrst place. This is more harmful for the disciple than for the Dalai Lama since, by going against one's spiritual teacher and against the vows taken in a Tantric initiation, the disciple creates the conditions for suffering in future lives. See for example: a thorough explanation of the teacher-disciple relationship in Tibetan religious practice by A. Berzin (2000). Relating to Spiritual Teachers: Building a Healthy Relationship. New York: Snow Lion Publications.

161

are tom between what they see as conflicting spiritual advice, their loyalty to the

Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause. Furthermore, the whole issue caused outrage

among loyal Tibetans against those Tibetans living in refugee settlements in Delhi,

South India, and Switzerland, who have continued unabashedly to hold on to their

religious practice of Shugden. Since 1996, when the Dalai Lama and the GIE issued

an official statement banning the practice, communal violence has broken out in

South India and Delhi, resulting in several deaths (Deccan Herald September 11,

2000; Brown 1996).

Consequently, a Dorje Shugden Society was formed among the Tibetan

advocates in India with branches in different parts of the subcontinent where there are

practitioners. This society and other isolated Tibetans have not put forth an alternative

narrative of the nation. Leaders of the society have, nonetheless presented their own

views of the controversy, including their readings of the historical and religious

circumstances that brought it about, in order to justify their commitment to the

practice. Most of them, particularly ordinary Tibetans who have not taken to public

protest, tend to see this as a mere religious issue, and continue to propitiate this deity,

not to bring the Dalai Lama down or cause him harm, but to keep their relationship

with it in good terms for their own protection and good fortune. Unfortunately,

because the Dalai Lama took the Yellow Book as a personal attack upon his spiritual

and political leadership, the whole thing has become a question of political loyalty,

one that implies adherence to the Dalai Lama's political project. However, for the

many Tibetans who preferred to be called disloyal rather that give up their devotion to

their teachers who transmitted them the practice, or to the deity itself, their Tibetan­

ness has not been compromised in any way. Some of them even believe that they had

been betrayed by the Tibetan leadership even before the Shugden controversy

appeared on the scene as a major issue, when the Tibetan GIE decided to give up the

goal of total independence, and settle only for real autonomy when negotiating with

the Chinese. 177 Therefore, it seems, the Shugden issue only continued a process of

their falling out with the GIE.

In addition, what has complicated the issue even further is the involvement of

Western Buddhists followers of the Tibetan monk Kelsang Gyatso who runs the New

Kadampa Tradition (NKT) in the West based in England with branches all over the

177 This is based on interviews conducted in Delhi and in Mount Pelerin, Switzerland in July 2003.

162

world. Their religious practice revolves around mainstream Gelugpa teachings

(including Dorje Shugden). Thus, they have taken to dismiss the Dalai Lama's

position by accusing him of being a dictator or for what they perceive as religious

repression. Since 1996, they have organised demonstrations against him whenever he

travels to Europe, and have written a number of articles to de-legitimise the Dalai

Lama's plea. In this way, Westerners are getting involved not only in a purely

religious issue, but in the political, social and cultural processes of the Tibetan

diaspora. However, this controversy may be read as an attempt by the Tibetan

devotees of the deity to return to 'some sense of the ancestral and the regional, the

orthodox and the local, to something uniquely Tibetan, which Westerners, despite the

effort of English disciples ofShugden, cannot share' (Lopez 1998:201).

In the light of all this, concerned Tibetans from all sects, particularly the Dalai

Lama himself, are engaged in a public relations campaign to stress harmony and unity

among the sects. One of the most obvious signs of this effort has been the attendance,

upon request of the Dalai Lama, of the heads of the other schools of Tibetan

Buddhism in major religious teachings given by the Dalai Lama (e.g. the massive

Kalachakra initiations) held in western countries. This is clearly more a political

strategy than a religious one. It is a way of patching things up and of demonstrating to

the international community than even amidst the storm, Tibetans stick together and

support each other. Because, the Shugden controversy is essentially religious but with

clear political implications, healing the rift needs to take place in religious settings to

make an even more powerful statement.

5.2.2. Religious Diversity: The Case of Bon

The beginnings of Bon are still quite obscure. However, Tibetan historical tradition

views its origins in the native tradition existing in Tibet before the introduction of

Buddhism, which was associated with the myth of the first Tibetan king, and the

sacred character of the early kings (Karmay 1998:532). Some scholars believe that it

refers to a blend of indigenous beliefs and practices of ancient Tibet with the

teachings of gShen-rab Mibo who came from the land the Tibetans knew as sTag­

gZig, south-west of Tibet where India meets the fringes of Iran (Hoffinann 1956). His

doctrines are supposed to have reached Tibet through the Zhang-zhung language

(vaguely identified in the region of western Tibet, known later as Nga-ri). The oral

traditions of Zhang-zhung belong to the class of teachings known as the 'Great

163

Perfection' (rDzogs-chen), which are common to the Nyingmapa School of Tibetan

Buddhism (Snellgrove and Richardson 1968 :99-1 03). It surely is true that Buddhism

and Bon developed, particularly between the ninth and fourteenth centuries, both 'in

conjunction with and in opposition to each other' (Samuel 1990:323).

Geoffrey Samuel, however, disputes this view, arguing that many scholars and

students of Tibet have confused contemporary popular beliefs with Bon. He maintains

that there are few grounds to apply the term Bon to the cult of local gods and spirits,

as they exist today and which mayor may not necessarily have its origin in pre­

Buddhist Tibet (Samuel 1993:12). He also admits that the use of Bon as a label for

'original' Tibetan religion, though inappropriate, is used by both Buddhists and

Bonpos (Samuel 1990:326).

It has often been asserted by vanous scholars and historians of Tibetan

Buddhism that Buddhists very early on tended to differentiate between Buddhists and

non-Buddhist by using the compound phyi-ba (outsiders) to refer to the latter, and

nang-pa (insiders) to the former. Bonpos were considered among the phyi-ba

outsiders, mainly because they do not accept Shakyamuni Buddha as the founder of

their religion, and they perform some religious practices counter to Buddhist

prescription. By the same token, they were often considered as rivals, and thus

developed a religious identity that contrasted with the Buddhist (Samuel 1990:326).

In the early days of the adoption of Buddhism as the state orthodoxy in the

eighth and ninth centuries, Bonpos were persecuted. During the second dissemination

of Buddhism after a long period of darkness, religious revival allowed for the

development of different Tibetan Buddhist schools as well as for the organisation of

the Bonpos around monastic centres. The most important of these, the, sMan-ri

monastery, was built in the fifteenth century in Central Tibet. The Bonpos suffered

occasional persecution at the hands of the orthodox Gelugpa government, from the

fourteenth century onwards. There are many accounts of how they were forcibly

converted and their monasteries destroyed (Cech 1993:40). It is however, worth

pointing out that many celebrated masters within the four Tibetan Buddhist schools

had Bonpo backgrounds, having received significant training from great Bonpo

teachers. Even the 5th Dalai Lama, who was exceptionally eclectic, is said to have

consulted Bonpo diviners and ritual experts. Furthermore, the main Bonpo

monasteries were in Central Tibet, but the largest Bonpo groups were found in the

164

eastern province of Amdo and small communities could also be found all around

ethnographic Tibet (Karmay 1998:533). Although they constituted a religious

minority, it is hard to estimate the number of adherents to the Bonpo religion since no

census was ever carried out. Their role in the development of Tibetan religious

identity should not be however underestimated.

Within the exile community of approximately 112,000, it is known that today

avowed Bonpos comprise about 1 percent of the total refugee population. About half

of them reside in the settlement of Dolanji, in the foothills of the Himalayas in North­

west India (Cech 1993:39). In the early days of exile, when the settlement and

resettlement projects were being implemented, little attention was given to the Bonpos,

who had scattered around India and Nepal, and the Tibetan administration seemed to

have ignored them when further plans were being made about the construction of

monasteries for each of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism, and it was until

Western aid agencies began to give attention to the Bonpos that Dolanji was

established as a centre for Bonpos in 1967. Since the Bonpos were not represented as

a group in the Tibetan administration, they did not receive aid from the CTA.

In the conception of Tibetan religious identity, the Bon religion did not figure.

What is more, its significance even as part of Tibetan culture has often been

overlooked by the Tibetan OlE in their representation of the Tibetan nation. Samten

Karmay argues that early Western interest in the Bon religion was regarded with

suspicion. Only after Western and some Tibetan scholars became seriously interested

in searching for purely Tibetan roots without any Indic origins or influence in the

early 1980s, that Dharamsala began to notice the contribution of Bonpos to Tibetan

civilisation (Karmay 1998:535). This lack of respect for Bonpos in the first decade of

exile was partly due to the Buddhist clergy's denial of the early historical primacy of

the Bon religion in Tibet, and that there ever was any organised religion (besides the

rather primitive worship of local deities or demons) - or even culture - in pre­

Buddhist Tibet (Cech 1993:42).

Likewise when the first Constitution was drafted in 1963, Karmay notes, its , article on religion was not explicit concerning non-Buddhist faiths in Tibet, namely,

Bon and Islam. It was not until the late 1970s that Bon was recognised by the OlE as

a religion of Tibet on the same footing as the other Buddhist schools, and no Bonpo

representative had a seat in the parliament-in-exile (i.e. the Assembly of Tibetan

165

Peoples' Deputies established in 1960) until 1977 (Kannay 1998). In this way,

Buddhists in exile have tended to control all the major offices of religious and secular

power in the Tibetan government. It is said that the Tibetan Youth Congress was

instrumental in making a case for the representation of Bonpos in exile (Cech

1993:39-46). This step was significant for the reconstruction of the GIE's historical

memory. The application of the 'One Culture, One History' principle in the

articulation of Pan-Tibetan identity based on the 'One People, One Territory' is

obviously partial, and hence illegitimate without universal representation. In light of

the Buddhist claim that over the centuries, elements of the early native religion were

incorporated into the Buddhist ethos, the inclusion of Bon could have been considered

redundant. However, recent scholarship on Zhang Zhung, the early Tibetan empire,

has generated a lot of interest in the origins of Bon; and this contemporary trend is not

primarily Western but Tibetan, and, interestingly, from both sides of the border. 178

Zhang Zhung is gradually being considered as 'the source of Tibetan culture and

history', and its study fundamental for the understanding of 'the antiquity, unique

nature and universal importance of Tibetan culture, past and present' (Chogyal Norbu

cited in Belleza 1997). Therefore, it is in Bon and not necessarily in Buddhism that

some Tibetan scholars detect the uniqueness of Tibetan civilisation. Although remains

of the Zhang Zhung civilisation have been found in Western Tibet, its culture had

spread to the east, gradually being subsumed by Bonpo communities. Embracing

Zhang Zhung as the source of new myths of origins does not seem to give any sense

of contradiction as far as the 'One People, One Territory' principle is concerned, since

it is not as if there were any substantial ethnic differences with this early civilisation

and with later Bonpo communities. What it does, however is to question the Buddhist­

centred conception of Tibetan identity.

178 In the latest (10th) Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies held in ~xford in September 2003, of the 14 speakers presenting papers related to Bon and Zhang Zhung, ,rune ,~ere Tibetans. I was surprised to see that two of the nine were Tibetans living in ,Lhasa and o~e m BeIJm~, and three were Tibetan monks living in Kathmandu. This suggests that this re-evaluatIon of Bon IS becoming much more widespread, not only as a result ofWest~rn i~tere~t and th~ Tibetan e~iled e,lite~s acknowledgement of the significance of Bon, but also of the dIverSIfication of Tibetan studies which IS no longer centred exclusively on Tibetan Buddhism.

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5.4. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has shown that the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan GIE imagination of the

nation has been based on what I call 'One People, One Territory' principle which is

basically the portrayal of a Pan-Tibetan identity. This is drawn from an official

narrative that talks of a largely homogeneous culture with a similar historical

experience over the areas of the Tibetan plateau referred to as ethnographic Tibet. It

has been argued that important constituent elements of such narrative are the portrayal

of an essential religious Tibetan identity (which does not incorporate the Bon religion

or Islam, and is based on Tibetan Buddhism), the centrality of the notion of Tibet as a

sacred land, the idea that they have become martyrs due to aggressive and repressive

Chinese occupation and rule, their embracing of environmental concerns as a key

element of their Buddhist identity, as well as their democratic vision, which dreams of

a free Tibet that could be transformed into a peace sanctuary capable of benefiting all

of humanity.

Furthermore, it was stressed that the Tibetan leadership has presented a

somewhat partial account of Tibetan identity due mainly to very specific political and

social needs imposed by refugeedom. In addition it was argued that the Dalai Lama

and the GIE who assumed the role of intellectual-educators have conducted a tutored

mindfulness to preserve their version of Tibetan culture and history. Likewise, in order

to promote their narrative of the nation their most efficient mechanisms have been the

establishment of a Tibetan education system in India, Nepal and Bhutan, the various

forms of public events and use of nationalist paraphernalia, the private and public

interviews with the Dalai Lama and the use of the Lhasa dialect as the lingua franca of

Tibetans.

It has been a feature of both refugee and immigrant communities around the

world that they organise around 'homeland politics' (Bousquet 1991:1). Some of the

political alliances that are formed often predate the departure from the homeland, and

only in exile become political parties organised around particular national projects. In

the cases of the Vietnamese communities in France and the US and the Armenian

diaspora in the late 1880s until 1918, the emergence of political parties has almost

always entailed political divisions among their members. These divisions have been

often based on the groups' alliances with different homeland political parties or

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ideologies. 179 These political groups have tended to compete with each other for

membership and community financial support, and to ally themselves with host

country political parties to advance their own political agenda, as well as lobby to

influence their host country's policy toward their homeland. In the case of the

Vietnamese parties, although their political discourse has tended to have a common

theme of resistance to foreign domination, their divisions are reflected in the way they

interpret their history (Bousquet 1991: 4, 22).

By contrast, the Armenian diaspora political parties, particularly the most

important which gained strength after the 1880s (Dashnak: Armenian Revolutionary

Federation, and Hnchak: Armenian Social Democratic Party), consistently opposed

foreign domination and had similar historical narratives but differed in political

strategies and choice of government. The Dashnag (the majority party) had a secret

membership in the thousands and was supported by tens of thousands of non­

combatants (Tololyan 1991: 176). Their divisions did not seem to have caused the

polarisation of Armenian society to the same extent as in the Vietnamese diaspora.

This type of political pluralism is non-existent in the Tibetan diaspora. The

Dalai Lama (with his spiritual and political prestige) has made almost impossible the

emergence of alternative political projects. The Tibetan Youth Congress, conceived in

its early days as a radical organisation, was the only exiled organisation that has

questioned the Tibetan leadership'S choice of strategies. However, it is far from being

an independent party, and it is sanctioned by the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan GIE. In

light of the sectarian controversies and regional factionalism existing in the Tibetan

diaspora, a clear advantage of this lack of political pluralism is the further polarisation

of Tibetan exiled society along political lines. Nonetheless, the creation of democratic

institutions such as the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies (Parliament-in-exile)

counterbalances the lack of such pluralism since it attempts to provide for a universal

representation of Tibetan exiled communities.

By analysing a few cases of challenges to official narratives and policies, this

chapter has shown that Tibetan identity in exile is still in the toils of labour. It is

constantly being negotiated between Tibetans from the three regions, and often with

179 Since 1975 the Vietnamese community has been polarized into two major political factions: pro­Hanoi and anticommunist. In France, the pro-Hanoi faction dominates the political arena, whereas in the United States the anticommunists organizations are the most visible and powerful faction (Bousquet 1991:5-6). In Armenia, after 1887, trans-national political parties came into being in the diaspora (among students in the diaspora in France, Switzerland, and Russia, (Tololyan 1991).

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Westemers and the host societies. Furthennore, regardless of the non-sectarian, Pan­

Tibetan narratives of the 14th Dalai Lama and the exiled political elite, our

understanding of the construction of identity in Tibetan refugee communities remains

incomplete. It is therefore of utmost importance to allow the narratives of ordinary

Tibetan refugees to speak for themselves. In this way, we will be able to see that

though politically correct, the official narratives depart in substantial ways from the

'national' perception of many Tibetans, particularly from that of Khampas and

Andowas of non-Gelugpa affiliation. To show how this is so is the purpose of the

following chapter.

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Chapter 6. Tibet in Refugee Imagination: The Construction of Space and Territory in Exile

This chapter analyses the ways in which the ordeal of displacement, as well as

historical memory bear on the construction and articulation of notions of space amd

territory among ordinary Tibetan refugees. It seeks to answer three main questions.

First, how is the Tibetan homeland perceived by those in exile? Second, what role

does the myth of return play in constructions of the homeland in exile? Third, how are

different notions of territory transplanted into or created in exile?

In order to answer these questions, I have relied first and foremost in data

collected in fieldwork through interviews and participant-observation in everyday

routines and occasional ceremonies taking place in Delhi, Dharamsala, the

Kathmandu Valley, as well as in various cities in the German-speaking cantons in

Switzerland. Second, I have drawn upon testimonials and Tibetan autobiographies

which 'represent the emergence of a new form of Tibetan consciousness in exile, one

which is sophisticatedly deployed in a number of intercultural arenas' (McLagan

1996:181).180 These testimonials and autobiographies can be grouped into three

categories: the first group comprises autobiographies of refugees who made their way

out of Tibet in the 1950s, and who did not experience life in Tibet under the PRC

during the period of its tightest and most severe rule (Norbu, D. 1974, 1997; Sakya

and Emery 1990; Yudon Yuthok 1990; Dolma Taring 1970). These include members

of the Khampa resistance movement (1950s) who fled Tibet after 1959 (J. Norbu

1979, 1986; Dewatshang, K.S. 1997). The second category compnses

autobiographies of Tibetans who were in their early twenties and thirties during the

Chinese takeover. Many of these authors were either monks or nuns, members of

chieftain or wealthy peasant families, who had been imprisoned and tortured for more

than two decades, and fled Tibet upon their release from prison in the late 1980s

(Pachen and Donnelley 2000; Gyatso 1987; 1997; Adhe 1997). The third group

180 These autobiographies in exile, some authors argue, have followed the traditional Tibetan literary genre of nam-thars, which are biographies of spiritual masters written either by their disciples or by members of their lineage a few generations later. The making of Tibetan autobiography in English emerges from a tangled and complex set of circumstances, conventions, and expectations. In some ways, the autobiographies come out of a deeply Tibetan impulse to tell life stories; in some ways the phenomenon is one of diaspora. [ ... ] The making of Tibetan autobiographies in English is inevitably a mixed phenomenon, one that is intertwined with both Western expectations and with some Tibetans' desires to represent what might be seen as the authenticity of their experience (McMillin 2002: 156).

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consists of autobiographies of Tibetans who were babies or young children in 1959.

These individuals were targets of the socialist education campaigns and sent to study

at the Central Institute for Minority-Nationalities in Beijing or in other Chinese cities,

such as Xining, Kunming or Chengdu. Upon graduating they experienced the

frustration of being discriminated against in their 'own land', which led them

eventually to flee Tibet (Jigme 1999; Tsering Dorje 1980).

6.1. The Construction of the Tibetan Homeland in Exile

In Chapter 3, four different orientations towards territory (religious, primordial,

instrumental, and political) were advanced as a methodological tool for the study of

Tibetan religious and secular conceptions of space. I propose to adopt this approach

again. However, I now add a fifth orientation, which I term the 'spatial-aesthetic

orientation', to convey the attachment to land generated by the natural conditions and

beauty of the landscape itself. My use of this tool here is based on the underlying

assumption that Tibetan ethnic and cultural identity is deeply rooted in the Tibetan

land. In exile, national and local identities are very often expressed in territorial terms

(Korom 1997a). This section seeks to expose the differences within refugee groups in

articulating the five orientations toward the Tibetan homeland. The source of such

differences arises first and foremost in age, in closeness to the main centre of Tibetan­

ness in exile (i.e. Dharamsala, whether physical or spiritual), and in the depth and

length of experiences of ordeal under Chinese rule.

The analysis also seeks to establish the continuities and disruptions in

traditional conceptions of space (as presented in chapter 3) caused by forced

displacement and refugeedom. In exile, as the following pages will show, the

expression of feelings of attachment to the Tibetan homeland evokes a powerful

imagery of idealised landscapes, of human encounters as well as encounters with the

sacred, outstanding tales of lineages of clans and spiritual masters that contrasts with

an equally powerful and painful imagery of Chinese colonisation, oppression,

persecution, and exploitation. The dislocation expressed in the narratives of exiled

Tibetans not only entails the obvious uprootedness and disruption of their lives in

Tibet, but also a threat to the survival of Tibetan cultural and religious heritage and

the violation of the perceived pristine character of the Tibetan landscape. The Chinese

occupation is thus seen as a source of pollution disrupting the 'natural' relationship

between Tibetans and the Tibetan land.

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6.1.1. The Religious Orientation toward the Tibetan Land

Earlier it was established that the keys to the construction of religious notions of

territory in traditional Tibet were the subjugation and pacification of the Tibetan land

through the introduction of Buddhism, the religious endeavour of Tantric yo gins and

lamas, the projection of the mandala principle onto the Tibetan landscape, the belief

in the existence of spiritually-powerful hidden lands, the existence of a rich textual

tradition that supported all of the above, and the idea that Tibet is the special field of

activity of Chenrezig. Each of these elements contributed to the widely accepted

assumption that Tibet possessed special qualities that made it a sacred land.

I introduce this section by using autobiographies written by Tibetan refugees

in relatively recent years. This corresponds to my belief that they are important

reflexive instruments, which provide insights into the social construction of the

mother country and its re-interpretation. In my view, nowhere is the narrative of the

religious orientation of the Tibetan land more clearly and poignantly articulated than

in the testimony of Tibetan refugees. The sanctity of Tibet and Tibetan culture in

general is enhanced by a stark perceived contrast between the condition of the Tibetan

land and Tibetans before and after the Chinese occupation. Although these narratives

were written with the purpose of making a foreign audience aware of the suffering

inflicted upon the Tibetan people, they reveal a great deal about how refugees

perceived the world around them. I examine the autobiographies of Ani Pachen

(Pachen and Donnelley 2000), a 'warrior-nun' and chieftainess of Lemdha (Gonjo) in

Kham (born in 1933); Palden Gyatso (1987;1997), an elderly Gelugpa monk from

Central Tibet from a semi-nomadic, relatively wealthy family (born in 1933); and

Ama Adhe (1997) from Nyarong in Kham (born in 1932). The three of them

participated in one way or another in the resistance movement against the Chinese

occupation in the 1950s, and remained adamant to yield to the Chinese; consequently

they were all imprisoned and tortured for more than two decades.

What these narratives have in common is the general assumption that Tibetans

are the descendants of Chenrezig, that life in 'independent Tibet' was a happy one,

and that their birthplace embodied great sanctity. Similarly, they all describe hard­

working and family-oriented communities whose members lived in harmony with the

environment and in which religion played a central role. Pilgrimage to their region's

mountains was an important part of their lives, as was pilgrimage to the 'holy city of

Lhasa'. Thus Ani Pachen laments being forced to leave Tibet and all its sacred places,

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and bemoans the fact that her pilgrimage to Lhasa had of necessity been interrupted so

that she can defend her country. She longs for a time when she could return to live a

life of prayer in its many caves and hermitages. The prospect of a life of freedom and

of meeting the Dalai Lama in person eased the ordeal of escape and the pain of exile.

The Tibetan land is generally perceived as having a 'soul' (Tib. lha), and

giving up part of it is seen as surrendering part of the soul of the Tibetan people.

Therefore, the Chinese occupation is perceived as having taken away, figuratively­

speaking, the soul of the nation. Likewise, the Chinese are thought to have desecrated

Tibet in ways that are not only humiliating but excruciatingly painful. During the

Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards forced Tibetans at gunpoint to destroy their local

shrines and to urinate on their remains (Adhe 1997:223). Everywhere, the Chinese

used Tibetan thangkas to sit on and clean themselves after defecating. I81 Mani stones

(carefully-carved stones with the mantra of Chenrezig) that were traditionally found

on the roads leading to sacred places were used to construct latrines and roads.

Tibetans were then forced to step on them. In the name of modernity and communism,

the Chinese abused the 'majesty of the Tibetan mountains' and left Tibet's once­

abundant forests and once-fertile lands barren, and their once-pure sacred lakes

contaminated. Lastly, Tibetans' cherished lamas have been denunciated, tortured,

humiliated and killed in public. In sum, the narratives complain that the Chinese

attempted to destroy everything that has meaning for Tibetan people. Their' glorious,

sacred Tibet' seems to have become a 'desolate place', with 'suffering written down

now in [her] valleys and mountains'. 'Every village and monastery in the Land of

Snows has its own stories of the cruelty inflicted on our people. And that suffering

will go on until the day Tibet is free' (Gyatso 1997:232).

These written testimonies have added to the great number of unwritten

accounts by the exiled authorities' fact-finding delegations to Tibet, confirming the

stories of suffering, poverty, destruction and pollution. All of these have a huge

impact on the ways in which the Tibetan homeland is imagined and even idealised in

exile.

In order to see the religious underpinning of Tibetan refugees' notions of their

homeland, in the course of fieldwork, I tried to interview Tibetans from very different

backgrounds, occupations, and age groups. I was particularly interested in looking at

lSI These are religious icons and paintings of Buddhist deities used as aids for meditation, which

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young 'refugees' born in exile (in South Asia and Switzerland), who have learned 'to

be' and 'act Tibetan' in foreign contexts far removed from Tibet. Hence, I asked three

fundamental questions of all my informants: What does Tibet mean to you? Is Tibet

special in any way to you? And, if so, what makes it so? Since most of my interviews

where conducted in English or in Tibetan and German with a translator, I made sure

that they understood what I was asking by always introducing the following standard

phrase in Tibetan (for the second question): bod lung-pa tsa-chen-po re-pas? (Do you

think the Tibetan homeland is precious?). In most cases, the answers I got provided

enough material to look at all of the elements of traditional conceptions of sacred

space. 182 However, with young Tibetans (in their twenties and thirties) and with

many Tibetans in Switzerland, I had to be much more specific and address each of the

topics separately. 183

The older the informant the more traditional was the answer, except when

dealing with young, largely illiterate Tibetans among the 'new arrivals' (Tib. gsar­

'byor) who came from very small agricultural (Tib. zhing-pa) and semi-nomadic (Tib.

sa-rna 'brog-pa) villages in remote areas in Kham and Western Tibet, away from the

urban areas controlled by the Chinese, and who left Tibet in the mid-1990s in search

of education and employment opportunities. Surprisingly, they too tended to describe

their lives in Tibet and their views of their homeland in traditional terms. I

interviewed a dozen new arrivals in Dharamsala and Kathmandu, and two in St.

Gallen, Switzerland. In most cases, however, my young informants were born in exile.

Many of them spoke the Lhasa dialect, but some among them had very limited writing

and reading skills in Tibetan, and the majority of them had never been to Tibet.

My eldest informants (now in their 60s, 70s and 80s) in the four sites were

unequivocal in describing Tibet as a sacred place. Most of them attributed its

sacredness to its being the special field of activity of Chenrezig, to its principal

embodiment, the Dalai Lama, whom they refer to with the epithets: 'skabs-rngon'

('protector' or 'saviour'), and 'rgyal-ba rin-po-che' ('the precious victorious one'),

Tibetans treat with the utmost respect. 182 When I use the word 'traditional' in this context it is meant to imply that the answer given follows the pattern described in chapter 3. 183 The following questions are a few examples: Why are mountains sacred in Tibet? What is the significance of the story of the marriage of Chenrezig (embodied in a monkey) and an ogress? Do you believe in such story? Do you know what a sbas-yul is? Do you think they existed in the past? Do they exist today? What is a Pure Land?

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and to the numerous mountains in Tibet which are the abodes of important deities. 184

Likewise, many felt they needed to refer to India as the holiest of all places on earth

(Tib. 'phags-pa'i yul, lit. 'the land of the noble-ones'), because it was the birth-place

of Shakyamuni Buddha and the cradle of many important world religions. Tibet was

second only to India in 'holiness', and was commonly referred to as gnas-yul (sacred

country). Implied in this type of comments is the belief that it was Buddhism that

made Tibet sacred.

Although it is not something that Tibetans tend to discuss among themselves, I

found the significance and meaning of the idea of Chenrezig being the progenitor of

Tibetans and Tibet his special field to be a contested issue. It is seen in very different

light across generations and in different parts of the world. Tibetan children who grew

up in India, Nepal, and Bhutan and who attended the schools run by the Central

Tibetan Administration or the Pestalozzi schools in Switzerland in the 1970s and early

1980s seemed to believe that because Songtsen Gampo, the Dalai Lama and the

Karmapa (head of the Karma-Kagyu School) have all been considered embodiments

of Chenrezig, Tibetans do have a special relationship with such a deity. Likewise,

most of them acknowledge that the cults of Chenrezig and the rituals that focus on

him as a Tantric deity have been central to Tibetan religious practice since the

eleventh century, and especially from the seventeenth century onwards. One

informant in Switzerland ventured to say that 'no civilisation on earth has focused so

one-pointedly in the development of the spiritual qualities that Chenrezig embodies'.

These beliefs have been fostered in exile by the Central Tibetan

Administration through the Tibetan school system. A clear example of this is seen in

the dissemination of the story of the monkey and the ogress through the Tibetan

textbooks produced by the Education Department of the CT A. In lesson one of a

sixth-grade textbook, for instance, it is said that 'the enlightened father monkey, the

Great Bodhisattva Chenrezig, and a rock demoness mated in a cave in the area of

Yarlung Tsethang. From their union were born the first six Tibetans who became the

heads of the first six Tibetan clans. These clans gradually multiplied and became the

ancestors of the Tibetan people' (Department of Education 1993: 1). My informants

who learned this at school think that it has become for them so natural to speak of

184 Rgyal-ba (,victorious one' or 'conqueror') is commonly used in the religious literature to refer to the Buddha, or to all the Buddhas of the past, present and future, as in the phrase: dus-gsum rgyal-ba­

rnams.

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Tibetans in terms of their 'divine origin' that it is often taken for granted. Thus, they

see themselves as descendants of such a special deity, even if it is not articulated in

such terms.

Although this story received particular attention with the dissemination of the

Mani bka '-bum in the fourteenth century, Gelugpa monks in exile believe that this

particular story about Tibet is found, in one form or another, in texts of the four

schools of Tibetan Buddhism that deal with the origins of Buddhism in Tibet and the

Tibetan race. They acknowledge that it has been the most pervasive story of all. It is

one that, according to many Tibetans, reveals a lot about the Tibetan mind, blending

savage-like nature with the basic quality of compassion. Regardless of the fact that

many sceptical Tibetans (in their 30s and 40s) believe this to be nothing more than a

children's tale, revealing little about Tibetan identity, most do believe that it is part of

Tibetans' religious heritage to teach children to be compassionate and always find

ways to do good to other people. A successful Tibetan businessman in his fifties (who

has lived in Switzerland for thirty years) put it in the following terms: 'In some ways

Chenrezig is a symbol of what Tibetans are. And it is the representation of one of the

most important attributes that we consider crucial for anyone on the spiritual path. But

one must also develop other qualities. I do believe that Tibet is a sacred place, not

only for its natural beauty, but because its environment and its people are different.

Tibetan people over the centuries have developed very impressive spiritual qualities'.

Before carrying out my fieldwork I came across the following quotation in

Margaret Nowak's Tibetan Refugees: Youth and the New Generation of Meaning: 'A

youth leader told me that: 'Tibet produced saints the way Ford produces cars.' [And

that] 'If Tibet were free' [ ... ] 'the whole world could profit by the religious activities

of such spiritual giants' (1984:138). To my surprise, similar remarks were made to

me by several of my informants regardless of their age group. This seemed to always

be framed in their new political context. For instance, most of my informants asserted

that every Tibetan loved Tibet because for centuries it was a 'free country', and that

this freedom allowed them to practise 'their' religion at will in 'their' many

monasteries and sacred mountains. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that for them

Tibet's religious life was so prolific, and that 'Rinpoches' ('precious ones', i.e.

spiritual masters, lamas) abounded there. Very often a whole list of names of saints

and masters was recited in order to validate their claim (e.g. from Songtsen Gampo,

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Guru Rinpoche, Milarepa, Marpa, Tsong-khapa, Atisha, Sakya Pandita, the

Kannapas, and so forth). Many maintained that some of these saints lived and

meditated in some of the hermitages found in the mountains around the villages from

whence they came. Thus, refugees of all ages agreed that one of the main elements

that made Tibet a special place throughout history was the uninterrupted emergence

of saints. Nevertheless, the environment, the nature of the Tibetan landscape itself,

they all seemed to agree, plays a significant role in this process. In the words of a nun,

'Tibet is a land like no other, in that it allows great spiritual development'. This is to

say that spiritual practice is considered to be enhanced or supported by the

environment. The qualified masters in tum project the 'enlightened mind' to the

environment and to their disciples. According to this view such a process has the dual

effect of sacralising the space where the masters practise and teach, and of planting

the seed of enlightenment in their disciples.

One factor that has supported this VIew IS the publication in Western

languages of a number of histories of the different spiritual lineages of the four

Schools of Tibetan Buddhism and Bon by exiled masters and scholars. 18s Although

these are primarily intended for the general knowledge of Westerners now interested

in Tibetan Buddhism and to generate confidence in the teachings, they serve to

legitimate their claim to be holders of centuries-old teachings of unbroken lineages of

teachers. In the same way, they authenticate such teachings by linking them to an

ancient tradition now lost in Tibet and largely preserved in exile.

When asked what exactly is there in the environment that makes it particularly

suitable for spiritual practice, the oldest refugees, monks and nuns born in Tibet, and a

couple of the new arrivals replied that it is the quality [thinness] of the air (which

allows you to see very far), the altitude, the vast expanse of the land, and the blue

skies. They believed these necessarily had an impact on one's consciousness, that is,

there is almost a spontaneous expansion of one's mind when one is in Tibet. Two men

I interviewed in Delhi in their fifties also said that the combination of those qualities

with the roughness of the weather, and the natural environment of Tibet made

Tibetans quite strong and sturdy both physically and mentally. Many believe that not

185 See for instance: Thinley, K. (1980). History a/the Sixteen Karmapas a/Tibet. Boulder, Color~do: Prajna Press; Chogay Trichen Rinpoche (1983). History a/the Sakya Tradition: A Feas.t/or the A!mds a/the Fortunate. Bristol: Ganesha Press; Kannay, S. (1972). A Treasury a/Good Saymgs: A Tibetan History 0/ Bon. London: Oxford University Press; Jikdrel Yeshe Dorje (Dudjom ~npoche) (1993). The Nyingma School a/Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History. Boston: Wisdom.

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even the Chinese can change or destroy this. Even though the Chinese have decimated

a lot of sacred Tibet by destroying monasteries, polluting lakes, rivers, controlling the

way one practises Tibetan religion, and so forth, in another sense, the argument goes,

sacred Tibet is there and will always be there. One cannot destroy enlightened

'energy' with guns. 186 Lastly, an older woman in Dharamsala replied that if the

Tibetan land did not have very special qualities, deities would not have chosen to

dwell in its mountains.

However, two members of the Tibetan Youth Congress I interviewed in

Dharamsala, as well as three women in their forties in Switzerland believe that every

exile or immigrant considers hislher motherland special in one way or another, but

that they did not consider Tibet particularly special. They do believe, of course, that

there were sacred temples and some other special places in Tibet, but in their view

this did not necessarily make it a sacred place. In addition, they tended to be sarcastic

about the way older Tibetans exaggerated the role Tibetan religion plays in the

construction of Tibetan identity, and the attributes of the Tibetan land. One of them

recounted to me a time when she was travelling with other fellow Tibetans in America.

She described how after seeing the Great Canyon from many different angles and

many different views, they noted in certain places one could see some rock formations,

or mountainous formations that resembled stupas. Seeing this, some of the young

Tibetans of her group joked about how old Tibetans think every mountain in Tibet is

sacred, and that mountains in other parts of the world remind them so much of Tibet

that they make offerings to them.

Many of the young refugees sceptical about Tibetan religion blame the

conservative religious elite of the Tibetan government for the loss of their country,

holding them responsible for blocking the reforms that the 13th Dalai Lama tried to

bring about in the 1910s and 1920s. Moreover, the new arrivals among the young who

have been raised in a more secular environment speak Chinese, and are quite sinicised.

They argue that religion made the generation of their grandparents quite 'gullible,

superstitious, and old-fashioned', and thus were incapable of reacting in an effective

way to the early signs of the Chinese occupation. Their view of Tibet is not of a

sacred country (Tib. gnas-yul), but of a precious homeland (Tib. lung-pa tsa-chen-po),

186 All my infonnants of the monastic community told me that when talking about g~~s o~e has. to remember that ultimately it is the mind that is the holiest of all. A mind with a pure VISIOn IS a mmd that has the power not only 'to see' things in their pure, most authentic fonn, but to create sacred

178

whose preciousness derives not from traditional religious notions of territory but from

kinship and land rights.

The belief in the existence of sbas-yul played some role in the construction of

images of the homeland only in my older informants who came from south-eastern

Tibet (e.g. Kyirong, Nyalam, Tsetang) and in older members of the monastic

communities. Furthermore, Bernbaum (1980) and Diemberger (1997) record that

Tibetan lamas in Kathmandu, India and various Western countries maintained that the

Chinese occupation and the recent tragedies in Tibet are a sign that the most secret

part of some of the sbas-yul (e.g. mkhan-pa-Iung in eastern Nepal), and of the

Kalachakra Tantra (which deals with the Kingdom of Shambhala) is yet to be

revealed. Nevertheless, all the third generation refugee informants (in their twenties)

were sceptical about their existence and questioned that if they really existed, then

why - in the face of such a threat as the invasion of Tibet - did not a single one of

them 'open' as a 'real' refuge for all Tibetans, instead of which refugees had to flee to

India and Nepal.

In general, my informants conveyed the impression that everything about

these places is greatly misunderstood, and that many Tibetan refugees, particularly

those Tibetans in South Asia who speak various languages and who have contact with

Western tourists, are mixing whatever they have heard from other fellow Tibetans

with the Western construct of Shangri-La (so much in vogue) and all its

misconceptions. This is one of the areas about the imagination of the Tibetan land in

exile that bears further inquiry and research, in view of the revival of the gter-ma

tradition in some areas of eastern Tibet, and the emergence of some Nyingmapa and

other monastic communities there that are attracting the attention of some Tibetan

refugees and Westerners alike. 187

In recent years other factors have contributed to the reassessment of the

spiritual significance of Tibetan territory in exile. One is the emergence of a number

of printing houses (particularly in Kathmandu and Dharamsala) committed to the

preservation and dissemination of a number of old editions of pilgrimage guides and

other extant religious texts of great historical and spiritual value. Secondly, the

Chinese are increasingly permitting access to and re-opening pilgrimage routes in

Central and Western Tibet to Western tourists and only slowly to Tibetans holding

places. In this view, 'sacred mind' sees every place as sacred.

179

foreign passports and other Tibetan refugees who wish to go to the famous gnas-ri

Mount Kailash in N gari, Western Tibet. A third factor is the emergence of a new and

active generation of Tibetan scholars (both in Tibet and in exile) in contact with one

another in Western forums such as that provided by the International Association for

Tibetan Studies (IATS). Fourthly, in recent years there has been a proliferation of

Western and Tibetan works on the subjects of sacred place (gnas) , pilgrimage and

pilgrimage guides (gnas-bshad and gnas-yig), the 'mandalisation' of space in the

Tibetan cultural areas, and sbas-yul or hidden lands in the Himalayan region. A final

factor has been the increasing Western interest in Tibetan Buddhism, and the

resulting involvement of Western Buddhist centres in sponsoring large Tantric

initiations in the West bestowed by great Lamas, particularly the Dalai Lama. As the

next chapter suggests, the introduction of the 'myth of Shangri-La' into the field of

Tibetan studies has generated heated discussions among Tibetans in exile about the

origins of the myth, its contents, and the notions of hidden lands and spiritual

sanctuaries.

In conclusion, one could say that the existence of Tibetan refugee

communities across the world, with very different experiences of their motherland,

with different experiences of ordeal and loss, and differences in their processes of

socialisation and education have generated multiple religious perceptions of Tibet.

The new generation of Tibetans, which is increasingly more removed from Tibet by

experience and socialisation no longer expresses feelings of attachment to land in

traditional ways. In the pre-1959 context, Buddhism provided a template through

which the landscape could be perceived. As the above analysis has shown, the

younger generations of exiles have in general less religious understanding, due in

great measure to their new inclinations and aspirations provided by their contact with

their host countries which are in most cases, the only home they have ever known. In

this sense, exile has given them a fresh lens through which to perceive Tibet. As the

older generations pass away, and as their return to Tibet is postponed until certain

conditions are met, the lack of first hand experience of spiritual life under the

influence of the Tibetan land means that the traditional notions of space are at risk.

What seems to be the only 'real' and 'living' element of sacred Tibet in exile is that

187 See for example Childs 1999; Terrone 2000; Germano 1998; and Ehrhard 1999a, 1999b, 2003.

180

the Dalai Lama and other cherished incarnate lamas are living among the other

refugees.

6.1.2. The Instrumental Orientation

The instrumental orientation was defined earlier as the feelings of a community

towards a tract of land that serves as their source of livelihood, as a property or

strategic asset. It relates to the environment in tenns of the possibility of protecting it

from external threats. It was asserted that everywhere in Central Tibet the land was

considered to belong to the ruler, namely, the Dalai Lama, and individuals were

granted the right to hold it on the basis of their service to the ruler. The social status

of the individual was not only marked by his political and religious status, but also by

his relationship to and control over large estates, most importantly, the productive

agricultural lands. Traditional Tibetan society from the mid-seventeenth century up to

1959 consisted of the Dalai Lamas and his families (Tib. yab-gzhis), the powerful

landowning Regent households (Tib. bla-brang), the ruling elite (monk and lay

officials), the large and powerful monastic communities, and ordinary Tibetans (Tib.

mi-dmangs), that is, peasants (Tib. zhing-pa) who were subjects (Tib. mi-ser) of the

state and to the 'land-owning' elites; peasants who maintained herds of animals

alongside their agricultural base (Tib sa-ma- 'brog) also called semi-nomadic

communities; and the pastoralists (i.e. 'full-time' nomads, Tib. 'brog-pa).

Historically, agricultural communities as well as the 'brog-pa had an intimate

relationship with the land they held, worked and grazed. Boundaries between them up

to the 1950s continued to be drawn through the use of religious rituals such as the

chos-skor (lit. 'circling the teaching of the Buddha') described in Chapter 3. Offerings

were made to the local deities to ensure protection to the households, nomads and

their herds, as well as good crops. This was based on the perception that their

livelihood depended on a harmonious relationship between the clans, the land and the

local deities. In addition, the land-holders took the name of the land. Therefore, the

instrumental orientation toward the Tibetan homeland that has developed in exile has

to be seen in light of the Chinese occupation, and the abrupt disruption of Tibetans'

traditional relationship with their land.

As a result of the final incorporation of Tibet to the People's Republic of

China after 1959, the Dalai Lama's government was dismantled. The estates of the

aristocracy and the monasteries were confiscated and then redistributed, communes

181

and collective work units were gradually established, and religious practice was

banned. These policies eradicated the basis of the Tibetan political and social

systems, as well as traditional forms of land tenure, and represented a blow to Tibetan

religion and cultural heritage. In this way, most Tibetans in exile see the presence of

the Chinese as having disrupted in fundamental ways the apparent balance that was

maintained for centuries between the land, the Tibetan economy and society.

In the new communist system, criticism of Tibetan society as 'feudal and

superstitious', was commonplace. This criticism exposed the mi-ser system, through

which peasants owed labour service and taxes to the state or the land-holding elite, as

well as the monastic system. It drew attention to the spiritual master-disciple

relationship as the basis of the cynical exploitation of the masses. This notion served

to legitimate the communist 'liberation' of Tibet, and in exile it has been at the centre

of Tibetan probing of the mishaps caused by the decadent and corrupt political and

social system. Tibetan intellectuals such as Dawa Norbu (1974; 1997), have attributed

its failings to a largely conservative aristocracy that opposed any changes that could

have saved Tibet from within. He is critical of the system prevailing at the time, and

the lack of real social mobility in Tibetan society. He acknowledges the fact that a

number of young Tibetans were driven by their idealism, their enchantment with 'the

miracles of machinery and the promises of a proletarian paradise' toward the Chinese.

Nonetheless, he accuses the PRe of having carried out a 'peaceful liberation' of Tibet

that was anything but peaceful, of implanting a system that lacked real contact with

the masses, of imposing a Maoist social utopia upon Tibetans, and of having

devastated the Tibetan land that once sustained even the poorest of Tibetans (Norbu,

D. 1997:111-125).

All my sources indicate that Tibetans believe that even if the pre-1959 social

system was unjust, the Tibetan land managed to provide for everybody, however poor

they were. And even the poorest among the poor still could spare a little of what they

had to offer to their lamas and to local deities (Tsering-Dorje 1980; Jigme 1999). This

belief seems to be based on the idea that the Tibetan land had remained quite pristine

until the Chinese occupation, because Tibetans never took more than they needed for

their subsistence, creating throughout the centuries a rather unique balance between

the individual and the environment.

In Tibetan exile narratives are often made allusions to the mistaken economic

policies implemented in Tibet by the Communist Party that caused unprecedented

182

food shortages in most of the Tibetan households, as well as pollution and

deforestation.188

All of these were considered the result of the extensive development

that is so central to communism. As Adhe puts it, 'Tibetans consider the earth a living

being. The deities of the soil, mountains, water, and sky protect it and give

nourishment. Our culture had always existed in perfect balance with our

surroundings. We grew only what we needed and it was always enough. In the

communists we saw only greed. Now it seemed they were planning to cultivate all the

available land in order to feed their armies' (Adhe 1997:65). This abuse of the land is

believed to have enraged the local deities. Some older Tibetans in Dharamsala told

me that the calamities that struck China itself could have well been the result of their

offending these local deities.

In Delhi I encountered two nomad families from Western Tibet, settled in

Kathmandu since the early 1970s, who were on their way to Dharamsala. Both

families make a living in the Kathmandu Valley from selling handicrafts to tourists in

Boudhanath, and selling woollen socks and jumpers to retailers in Tamel, the tourist

quarter. The men of the families, who spoke a little English, voiced their anger over

having been forced to leave Tibet. Their grief was clearly not related to a lack of

money, since both of them have a house in Kathmandu, support poorer relatives living

in different parts of India, and still manage to give regular offerings to a couple of the

monasteries in Boudhanath. Rather, it is a lament for a cherished but lost way of life.

This was echoed by two of my younger illiterate informants (new arrivals, 22 and 26

years old) of nomad and semi-nomad origins respectively who came from 'a small

village fourteen hours on horseback north of Chamdo in Kham'. Their accounts also

speak of happier times tending animals, going on pilgrimage to the local mountains,

bartering yak milk, cheese and wool in the nearby villages and so forth. They have

experienced more hardships in exile than they ever did before in Tibet and therefore

regret having made their way out of Tibet in the first place, but they are afraid to go

back. 189

188 Examples of these were the Great Leap Forward in the late 1950s, the failed attempt to produce more arable land in Tibet, and changes in the patterns of production (introducing new crops that were not suitable for the particular climate of Tibet), and massive population transfers that put enormous ~ressure on the Tibetan economy.

89 They note that there were no Chinese in their village and that only once a month Chinese officials from Chamdo went to their village to impart 'Socialist Education' to remind the local people to not show any signs of allegiance to the Dalai Lama or other exiled Tibetans. They left their homes hoping to get an education in India. After being accepted in the CTA's transit school for one year (where they learned to read and right in Tibetan), they had to look for jobs. They work long shifts for little money

183

Some of the narratives reveal important gender differences. For instance,

many of my female informants from eastern Tibet talked about the hardships women

went through in Tibet. It was common practice for two or more brothers of a family to

take the same wife to avoid dividing the land. In this way, all the women of the

household had an extraordinary number of chores inside and outside the house,

attending their family and sometimes many husbands, grazing the animals or helping

with the harvests (Goldstein, Siebenschuh and Tsering 1997). Many felt that their

'liberation' really occurred in exile by taking the vows of a nun and moving into the

nunneries in Tibet or in South Asia.

In Dharamsala a young informant who knew I had just been travelling in Tibet

and that I had conducted interviews in Lhasa asked me if I would be willing to talk to

some women who worked at the Tibetan Women Association, to which I agreed. The

aim of such an interview was to ask me if I had witnessed any Chinese maltreatment

of Tibetan women in public, any Tibetan prostitutes, drug abuse, and children beggars,

and if I had heard of any cases of forced abortions or sterilisations. My interviewer

was a young Tibetan in her early twenties, who was raised in India in a rather

traditional way, and so her outlook was in many ways shaped by her schooling in

Tibetan schools and her early involvement in the Tibetan cause. She had never been

to Tibet, is unconditionally loyal to the Dalai Lama, and seemingly a Buddhist. What

was interesting about the interview was to hear the current views that are being

circulated about what the Chinese are doing to Tibetan women. Apparently, a source

of major concern for this particular Tibetan organisation is that the Chinese are

corrupting Tibetan women by championing prostitution, even in minors. Prostitution

in Lhasa and some of the other big cities in Tibet is seen as the direct result of

Chinese rule. It is blamed on the appalling unemployment rates prevalent in the TAR,

and discrimination of Tibetans in the workforce, forcing destitute Tibetan women to

make a living prostituting themselves. Chinese cadres allegedly are their main clients.

This type of report enhances an image of occupied Tibet where victimised Tibetans

are obliged to earn their livelihood in humiliating ways. The dissemination of these

reports, particularly in Dharamsala often produces an idealisation of pre-1959

Tibet. 190

and they have suffered all sorts of physical ailments keeping one of them in the hospital for months. 190 Robert Barnett warns that this type of reports, which are not uncommon in Dharamsala have a tendency of 'representational distortion', that is, they can sometimes be based on overstated human

184

Finally, there is no evidence that I am aware of that Tibetans have continued

with the practice of taking the name of the land where they live and work. Not even in

Southern India, where immense tracks of lands have been given to individual Tibetan

households, does this seem to be the case. The phrase sa skyes, rdo skyes - 'born from

the earth and the stones' - is often still heard in everyday talk among Tibetans and is

an emphatic expression of the territorial nature of a person's origin (Diemberger

2000:34). Nonetheless, some Tibetan refugees, particularly in Nepal, have adopted

Nepali names for more practical reasons, that is, to apply for citizenship, to open up

businesses without so many administrative obstacles, or to fit in better into Nepali

society (Frechette 2002; Mountcastle 1997; Gombo 1985). However, their names do

not show in any way, attachment to, or an intimate relationship to the locality in the

traditional sense.

In short, the instrumental orientation toward the Tibetan land in exile clearly

shows an idealisation of traditional ways of life in Tibet, except in the case of women

of peasant and semi-nomadic backgrounds. Furthermore, it is in this area where the

most evident 'forced' transformations have occurred, in terms of their relationship to

the land and their livelihood. Most refugees believe that it is 'better to be poor in your

homeland than beggar in a foreign land'. However, the widely disseminated reports

by word of mouth of the Dalai Lama's governments' fact-finding delegations to Tibet,

the new arrivals, and tourists have generated the feeling among many exiles that

Tibetans have indeed become beggars in their own land. This is believed to be largely

due to the discrimination Tibetans are subjected to in the workforce in the TAR and

other Tibetan autonomous prefectures, as well as to the increasing pressure that

continued transfers of Chinese Han to Tibet has put on the Tibetan economy and the

Tibetan land.

6.1.3. The Political Orientation

Political orientation refers both to the control of territory and to political boundary­

formation and awareness. The Dalai Lama and other spiritual leaders (e.g. the

Panchen Lama in gTsang) had rights over all of the lands under their political

jurisdiction. Older Tibetan refugees believe that the unlawful occupation of their

country did not change that situation. From their point of view the Dalai Lama retains

rights abuses reports, which are not universal (Barnett 2001 :287).

185

his rights over the Tibetan land by virtue of his being the embodiment of Chenrezig,

of his direct descent from King Songtsen Gampo, and from an unbroken lineage of

Dalai Lamas. Therefore, for most of the older Central Tibetans the Dalai Lama

remains the 'lawful' heir to Central Tibet.

The legal status of Tibet for Tibetan refugees is quite clear: Tibet was an

independent country for centuries. Even in the eastern provinces of Kham and Amdo

where the Chinese presence was felt almost uninterruptedly since the eighteenth

century, the argument is that the Chinese did not exercise any real political authority.

Most Tibetan scholars and young militants in exile agree that the 13th Dalai Lama's

declaration of independence in 1913 was consistent with the political and social

reality of Tibet, including Kham and Amdo (Shakabpa 1984; Norbu, D. 2001; Tsering,

1. 2001; www.Tibetanyouthcongress.org). 191 The circumstances of exile and the

struggle for independence have generated an unprecedented political awareness

among ordinary Tibetans. This often implies, as some Western scholars of Tibet have

noted (e.g. Goldstein 1994), the presence of a collective amnesia or rather, a selective

remembrance of the past in order to present a consistent narrative that would serve the

claim for independence. Because the Dalai Lama is viewed as the lawful political

ruler of Tibet, more militant Tibetans have embraced the notion presented by the

exiled authorities that political Tibet should include U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo, even

though this means accepting the fallacy that the Dalai Lama's government ruled all of

ethnographic Tibet until 1959. In any case, the articulation of the political orientation

towards the Tibetan homeland is an essential component of the Tibetan struggle for

independence. As such it has to be understood as part of a nationalist, i.e. Pan-Tibetan

discourse, which although 'imposed from above', serves all the Tibetan communities

in exile. It is constantly reasserted by the Tibetan Youth Congress in their constant

pleas for independence, by the Tibetan Women Association and by ordinary Tibetans

as they participate in the annual worldwide celebration of the anniversary of the 10th

March Lhasa Uprising, and occasional events such as the denunciation of the 17-Point

Agreement (on its 50th anniversary, 23 May 2001) that I witnessed in Dharamsala.

As the control of the Tibetan land was taken away by force, the political

orientation towards Tibet is articulated in terms of political rights. Hence, most of the

narratives in exile, particularly those of members of the Tibetan Youth Congress all

191 Personal Communication, The Book Worm Bookstore, Dharamsala, May 2001.

186

over the world, other non-militant young, Tibetan intellectuals, former Mustang

Guerrilla fighters (e.g. Lhasang Tsering, and Jamyang Norbu) use the above discourse,

and their own attachment to their homeland, to validate their claims to statehood as

their or their families' birth-right. Nevertheless, local identities and loyalties in exile

have often eroded or weakened the imagination of a neat Pan-Tibetan political entity.

The notion of a concrete geographical territory of Tibet may be contested,

since very few Tibetans, even among the youth, are able to relate to a map of Tibet or

locate an area according to the four directions. This indicates that their notion of the

Tibetan territory is not based on geographical knowledge (Strom, 1997:fn9:37). As

the Tibetan issue is largely one of contested territory, a major area of intellectual

inquiry for Tibetan scholars and young militants has been that of Tibetan human and

political geography. All the books published by Tibetans in western languages include

a number of maps that show all the areas claimed as Tibet by the Tibetan authorities,

the areas contested between China and India, the history of Tibet's boundaries, and so

forth. A good example of this is the Shakya Tsering's book The Dragon in the Land

of Snows (1999). However, I tend to agree with Strom's assessment that for many

Tibetan refugees, particularly the aged, and illiterate (young and old alike), the notion

of Tibet is not concretely grounded in geographical knowledge. All of my informants

who attended Tibetan schools in India and Nepal could locate Tibet on a map. I was

surprised to see how many could point to Tibet's neighbours, yet could not locate

their hometowns on a map. Of these, a few could roughly locate Kham or Amdo in

relation to India and U -Tsang.

The Norbulingka Institute printed in 1994, a beautiful (95cm by 60cm)

illustrated map of ( ethnographic) Tibet, which portrays Tibetans with traditional dress,

nomads, peasants and aristocrats doing their own traditional activities, Gelugpa

monks sounding horns, Lhamo opera characters, vegetation and wildlife, major

monasteries and sacred mountains and lakes, architecture styles by region, and Tibet's

principal protectors (see Map 4).192 I found copies of it hanging in the walls of a

couple of Tibetan homes in Switzerland and Dharamsala, as well as in various cafes

and guesthouses there. An informant in his 30s told me that a Western tourist offered

one to his family and that he has noticed that all the older family friends who visit

192 The institute was formally founded in 1995, but started operating much earlier. It was established near Dharamsala as a result of the Dalai Lama's commitment to the preservation of Tibetan arts and culture in exile.

187

them always utter some comment about it, and that sometimes it has become the

subject of long conversations when they are shown where they came from and

compare it with places they had been to on pilgrimage, and others they always

dreamed of visitng. Thus, Strom is correct that the imagination of Tibet and the

articulation of political feelings toward the Tibetan land do not necessarily entail a

concrete knowledge of geography (Strom 1997). These attachments are based on the

notion of Tibetans' political rights over Tibet, which in tum reflect a generalised

acceptance among politically-conscious Tibetans of the 'One People, Territory' and

'One Culture, One History' principles championed by the exiled authorities.

6.1.4. The Primordial Orientation

The primordial orientation, referred to as the most profound expression of feelings of

belonging, is fundamentally based on kinship ties. Here, places within a space are

accorded intrinsic significance because of the very fact that they serve as a common

basis for the community and an integral part of its very definition (Kimmerling 1982).

Thus, primordial orientations towards territory are generally based on kinship

genealogies rooted in specific locales where their histories unfolded. Throughout

Tibetan history the decentralised character of the Lhasa polity and the existence of a

series of principalities in eastern Tibet under the rule of local kings (Tib. rgyal-po)

allowed the development of strong local ties and identities. These were primarily

defined by kinship, the relationship between the land, the local clans and their local

deities (Tib. yul-lha and gzhi-bdag), their loyalty to the local lords, and their religious

affiliation.

Although in exile the Tibetan authorities have been very keen on playing

down the schisms produced within the Tibetan communities by sectarian and local

differences, and have been very successful in disseminating a political discourse

based on Pan-Tibetanism, local identities are still key to the construction of images of

the homeland and of Tibetan identities in exile. The exception is Switzerland where

the Pan-Tibetan narrative has superseded factionalism. 193 All of my informants in

Switzerland openly expressed the view that their loyalty is first and foremost to Tibet,

and only secondly to their families' region of origin. Although regional organisations

193 The exception is the Shugden controversy. Even in this case, many Tibetans in Switzerland believe that although it is a serious matter, it has become worst due to Western ultra-sectarian ~te~fer~nce .. For them, Tibetans practise religion in a very simple way and that the idea of sectarian affihatIon IS neIther

188

do exist, as in other parts of the diaspora, in Switzerland they are basically designed to

stimulate social bonding through leisure activities. There are for example, regional

clubs for practising different kinds of sports, or other activities, but they are not

perceived to hamper the Tibetan cause, or to exacerbate localised factionalism.

Most of my informants in Switzerland did not articulate feelings of attachment

to Tibet in traditional religious terms. However, they do consider Tibet 'their precious

homeland' (Tib. lung-pa tsa-chen-po) and derive its preciousness from the fact that

Tibet is their ancestors' cultural heritage. Those who hold Swiss passports and have

had the chance to travel to Tibet hold the view that the Chinese presence has not been

felt evenly everywhere. Outside of the main towns Tibet remains quite 'Tibetan'.

Hence, there is still the chance to 'restore and relive' whatever has been lost

deliberately or through the ravages of time.

Kinship and local identities in exile have been enhanced by the creation of a

number of regional organisations in India and Nepal. These tend to be non-kin mutual

aid societies (Tib. kyi-duk). They are composed of approximately fifty households that

join together for many different purposes-to celebrate happy events, such as

weddings, births and holidays; to assist each other through unhappy events such as

deaths and illnesses; to pool resources for investments, loans, or insurance; and to

settle disputes (Frechette 2002: 185). Some Tibetans in Nepal have organized their kyi­

duk primarily on the basis of religion and place of origin (e.g. Bonpo Foundation,

Muslim Society, Ngari, Dingri Nyalam, Shigatse Societies). In some cases these

organisations have transcended their South-Asian setting to become 'trans­

nationalised'. They are at the centre of their social lives in their host countries, as well

as cross-borders. This is to say, they are often engaged in reconstruction and

development projects in their regions of origin, as well as in the preservation of local

knowledge, arts and so forth. These communities tend to enhance yearnings for their

life in Tibet; they play an important role in the local reconstruction of memory, and

local identities in exile.

One example of a well organised kyi-guk in exile based on region of origin is

the Porong community (from a largely nomad community in South-western Tibet) in

Nepal studied by Hildegard Diemberger (2002) and Charles Ramble (2002). This

community settled in the Kathmandu Valley after 1959 with a core group of ninety

as clear-cut, nor as exclusive as it is for many Western Buddhists.

189

families, centred on the monastery Porong Perna Choling (Spong rong Padma chos

gling). They have developed a tightly connected network of members from all over

the world (India, Switzerland, USA, Canada and other countries) (Diemberger

2002:47-48), and are engaged in significant reconstruction projects in Porong (with

assistance of international aid organisations) and the preservation of local traditions

such as the performance of 'the Victory Song' (Tib. rgyal gzhas). Written by Ngari

Panchen Perna Wangyal (Mnga' ris pan chen Padma dwang rgal, 1487-1542), this

song has become emblematic of this diaspora group, and is performed on occasions of

major importance for exiled Tibetans, evoking feelings of the lost homeland (Ramble

2002:64, 81).

Khampa refugees' pride seems to be based on three beliefs. First, that their

region of origin was the source of the highest spirituality in Tibet. This was attested, in

their view, by the fact that many of the most reputed exiled lamas came from Kham,

and by the un-corrupted state of religious life within the numerous monasteries found

there in the decades previous to the Chinese takeover. In many interviews the town of

Derge was often mentioned as an important centre of Khampa religious life. Lay

Khampas often criticised the alleged corruption of the religious institutions in central

Tibet. Second, they pride themselves on belonging to a brave breed of people. That is,

they believe that without Khampa bravery, there would have never developed such a

fierce and brave resistance to the Chinese occupation in the 1950s. For them, the

failure of the resistance to stop the total annexation of Tibet to the People's Republic

of China was fundamentally a consequence of the relatively small number of fighters,

the unsophisticated weaponry and the lack of time to organise themselves properly

(Norbu, J. 1984; Pachen and Donnelley 2000; Dewatshang 1997). Their pride in

Khampa identity often translates in indifference toward the GIE's nationalist and

democratic projects. Apolitical Khampas (ordinary Tibetans from nomad and peasant

backgrounds, as well as some Khampa aristocrats) tend to think that the Pan-Tibetan

discourse is mostly embraced by central Tibetans. However, many of my informants

believe that to maintain their regional identity in exile it is better for them not to

oppose the government, nor make any fuss about political issues. In this way, they are

left alone to do as they please.

Some Tibetan intellectuals among the refugees in India subscribe to the idea

that this type of organisation, though important at a local level, tends to weaken

190

feelings of belonging to a greater entity, and that Tibetans cannot survive for long in a

foreign environment. This is based on the belief that because Tibetan civilization and

culture have been shaped through their history by the land, the loss of contact with it

inevitably leads to their gradual erosion and final extinction. Thus, crucial to the

preservation of Tibetan culture is the preservation of the Tibetan land. The origin of

Tibetan-ness, or of a 'Tibetan essence' is the accumulation of shared experiences

during a long period of time in Tibet. Attachment to the Tibetan homeland, according

to this view, is not founded on Buddhism or the Buddhist templates through which the

landscape is perceived. This is because there was a Tibet - precious to its inhabitants -

before there was Buddhism; its preciousness derives from the development of a

civilization, regardless of the nature of its religion. Tibet is precious for these Tibetans

because that is where their roots are.

In exile, uprooted Tibetans are forced to enact the rituals that enhanced kinship

ties in Tibet. Nevertheless, because the newer generations are less and less religious,

rituals of a religious nature have a very limited effect. The intellectual and former

Mustang Guerrilla fighter Lhasang Tsering believes that the enactment of secular

rituals of a political nature with the potential to make all members of the community

identify with one another is of crucial importance. In events like these, Tibetans are

likely to identify with one another because they are all suffering, one might say, from

the same disease. 194 And there is the idea that one cure is needed to cure all Tibetan

woes. Tsering told me of his belief in the possibility of breeding a generation of 'born­

again Tibetans' through the constant enactment of such rituals. That is, Tibetans who

have settled everywhere in the world, and who have become quite westernised, can

still become in touch again with their own sense of being a Tibetan by participating in

rallies and other political events organized by Tibetan organizations and western

supporters. Upon hearing the stories of the many Tibetans who have struggled and

suffered under communist rule, Lhasang Tsering notes, their Tibetan essence has the

potential of coming forth. However, this is just a starting point to rekindle and

preserve in the younger generations the sense of kinship and belonging to the Tibetan

land, which goes well beyond the more superficial markers of Tibetan identity such as

eating tsampa (the basic staple of roasted barley flour) and wearing a chuba

(traditional dress). Here, kinship acquires a less confining sense, that is, it does apply

194 Personal Interview, Dharamsala, India, May 2001.

191

neither to a single family lineage, nor to a single locale. It is instead understood in a

much wider and symbolic sense, the lineage of the whole Tibetan race (conceived in

ethnic terms), where the suffering of one Tibetan, however distant he may seem, is

conceived as the suffering of the entire Tibetan race. In this sense, these rituals

constitute the enhancement of a renewed sense of belonging, rooted in the awareness

of shared experiences of suffering and loss.

In everyday life in exile instilling such a sense of belonging to a larger

community, among the young new arrivals, those born in exile and older Tibetans in

their 60s who left Tibet in the 1950s, presents important obstacles. Western

anthropologists such as Strom (1997:37) and Yeh (2002:244) have noted how new

arrivals in Dharamsala, who are crucial to the exile community as sources of the latest

information about the situation in Tibet, are often distrusted by refugees born in exile

for their highly corrupted and sinicised ways. Hence, Chinese-Tibetans are perceived

by many Tibetan refugees as having been brainwashed by the Chinese. In the context

of an increasingly plural and diverse Tibetan diaspora, the development of a sense of

comradeship based on the principle of 'One People, One Territory' and 'One Culture,

One History' is very problematic. Therefore, many Tibetans still derive their strongest

sense of belonging from a more traditional and more localised orientation toward the

Tibetan homeland.

6.1.5. The Spatial-Aesthetic Orientation

The spatial-aesthetic orientation is the attachment to territory generated by the natural

conditions and beauty of the landscape itself. Even though at first glance this seems

like a rather superficial view to enhance strong feelings of attachment to the homeland,

in many ways it supports and adds new dimensions to the four other orientations,

particularly to the religious one. Old and young Tibetans, new and old arrivals,

religious and lay people, all referred to the beauty of the Tibetan landscape with a

sense of awe. Many of the most currently used epithets of Tibet and its different

regions make allusion to the general awareness of both, the landscape itself, and its

impressive aesthetic qualities: 'gangs-can gyi yul', 'gangs-can ljongs', or 'bod-yul

gangs kyi ra-ba' (Tibet, the 'Land of Snows'), ''jig-rten gyi thog-rtse' (the 'Roof of

the World '), 'me-tog-yul' ('the flower country' epithet of Kham), to mention only a

few. Tibetans even use the term 'bod-mthing' to refer to a particular tone of blue

(azurite), which alludes to the special tone of blue of the sky in Tibet. In exile,

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Tibetan refugees' narratives are filled with allusions to the cleanliness of the air, lush

of the grasslands and forests, the purity of the water, the snowy mountains, the

turquoise lakes, the flowers in Kham, the scent of the herbs in the mountainous areas , the immensity of the space, the variety of wildlife, and so forth. Even in the narratives

of Tibetans who have never been to Tibet these descriptions are commonplace. This

orientation supports the notion put forward earlier that the particular characteristics of

the Tibetan landscape are conducive to religious practice. In the narratives of those

Tibetans who experienced life before and after the Chinese occupation memories of

the pristine landscapes of Tibet, and religiosity of Tibetans are always juxtaposed to

the sites of destruction and ecological degradation, with its resulting desolate and

hopeless atmosphere. 195

Although this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it does reveal a great deal

about how experiences of persecution, displacement and uprootedness play in the

construction of memory, and in the reconfiguration of images of homeland. It shows

that identities tightly built on connections to territory, when displaced, struggle

acutely to redefine themselves. Contemporary Tibetan exiles' imagination of the

Tibetan land has been thus shaped by a new, more secular environment in host

countries, experiences of tremendous suffering, and by the existence of various

generations of refugees living all over the world with different levels of attachment to

their homeland. Traditional conceptions of territory that were commonly articulated in

religious terms have, in some instances been superseded by secular discourses based

on Western liberal ideas. Furthermore, the Chinese occupation has provided Tibetan

exiles with a set of values against which they tend to measure themselves and their

homeland. The resulting idealisation of the homeland, the yearnings for home, and the

myth of return which is analysed below, have nurtured and defined their struggle for

independence.

195 There is a large literature - for example, on Italian emigrants to the USA an? Britain. -. that demonstrates the importance that is attached by migrant communities to these affective aSSOCIatIOns. See for example: Tomasi, S. (ed) (1970). The Italian Experience in the United S~ates. S~al~n IsI~nd, N.Y.: Center for Migration Studies; Juliani, R. (1998). Building Little Italy: Phzladelphw s It~lzans before the Mass Migration. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press; and MedaglIa, A. (2001). Patriarchal Structures and Ethnicity in Britain. Andershot: Ashgate.

193

6.2. The Myth of Return and the Tibetan Nation

'Immigrants, in the process of ethnitization, preserve strong emotional and transactional ties with their country of origin, while fostering an illusory (almost never to be fulfilled) desire to return. The pledge to return is particularly typical of involuntary migrants such as political refugees where nationalism has been inculcated in childhood socialization. [ ... ] Migrants

elaborate expectations of return that are consistent with deeply internalised patriotism. [Similarly,] they consistently define their diaspora status as temporary. [ ... ] While

aspirations to return to their homeland are not regarded by the migrants as a myth, they become a social myth because they never materialize despite the fact that they are commonly

expressed by many migrants of different ethnic origins' (Cohen and Gold 1997:374-375).

The interplay of the Dalai Lama's discourse and narrative of the Tibetan Nation, the

Tibetan struggle for independence, and ordinary refugees' personal memories as well

as their ongoing construction of the Tibetan homeland play an important role in

forging the Tibetan myth of return. It is oriented toward the Tibetan past (i.e. pre-

1959) but it clearly points to the distant future when Tibet is freed from Chinese

occupation and Tibetans are able to return to their homeland. The myth as a social

construct serves the Tibetan diaspora against assimilation, and as such is a

fundamental component in the formation of Tibetan ethnic communities. For most

Tibetan refugees, returning to Tibet is a dream that they hope to realise in the near

future. Many of them engage with the government and other non-governmental

organisations in trying to produce grassroots support all over the world. They intend

to press the PRC government to concede independence or real autonomy to the TAR

and all the Tibetan Autonomous Prefectures within Chinese provinces.

The Tibetan exiled authorities' design of the Tibetan education system, their

content, and the narratives that inform their political project analysed in detail in

Chapter 5, create 'a collective social fantasy' based on the re-creation of an authentic

past, the preservation and dissemination of the Lhasa dialect as the lingua franca of

Tibetans, the reproduction of cultural symbols, reinforcement of shared biographies,

the development of distinctive ethnic organizations, and the intensification of 'us

versus them' stereotypes (Cohen and Gold 1997). In this way, Tibetans are constantly

reminded of their Tibetan-ness. Refugee children, particularly those who attend

schools ran by the Central Tibetan Administration in India, Nepal, Bhutan, and the

Pestalozzi children in Switzerland have been socialised since the 1960s to feel

Tibetan, and key to this feeling of belonging is the idea that they have a 'home' to

return to if only they fight together hard enough. It was argued earlier that Tibetan

officials have managed to advance a very specific image of a future Tibet, which has

194

given Tibetan refugees hope that in returning to Tibet they will get the opportunity to

re-construct Tibetan cultural heritage under a more secure setting.

In the course of my interviewing in the four sites, Kathmandu Valley,

Dharamsala, Delhi and various cities in the German-speaking cantons in Switzerland,

the following questions were raised: 'What changes would you like to see happening

in Tibet in the near future?' 'Would you return if these changes occur?' and 'Why is it

so important for Tibetans to return to Tibet?' Most of the answers I got to the first

question from all my informants were related to the establishment of a reliable

government that could generate an environment suitable for a 'real' revival of Tibetan

religion. 196 That implies the construction of more monasteries and further restoration

of other derelict religious institutions, end of socialist or any other political

indoctrination within monasteries, freedom to re-establish traditional religious

curricula, and no (political) restrictions to the number of monks and nuns to be

enrolled in the monasteries.

Although most refugees readily acknowledge the great generosity of their host

countries, many Tibetans in Switzerland (primarily those over 50) lament that they

cannot make public display of their religion, that is, they feel they can not mumble

prayers in public or hold their rosaries in their hands to count the repetition of mantras

in buses or other public places without feeling uncomfortable. Three of them asserted

that as they grow older, the need and desire to practise Tibetan Buddhism in its

original environment has become stronger; and that the sense of cultural and religious

isolation generated by so many years of exile has gradually become harder to bear.

All of my informants view the idea of returning as their chance to restore Tibet

to its former glory. Some talked about a free Tibet under a democratic government,

which would be ready to establish universal education, freedom to choose one's

livelihood, and a fairer society. My oldest informants were, however, most concerned

about religious freedom, and the maintenance of the religious leadership of the Dalai

Lama.

The constant report and dissemination by the exile authorities of the ecological

degradation, deforestation, and pollution of Tibet's sacred lakes and rivers under

196 Most of my informants often mocked the so-called spiritual revival in Tibet, particularly in ~~ TAR saying that Chinese authorities still have the last word of everything that happens WIthin the monasteries and that most of the funds that are being used to restore the damaged and destroyed monasteries have come from Tibetans of both sides of the border, and that it is the Tibetans who carry out most of the labour. The Chinese however, often brag that it is the government who is carrying out

195

Chinese rule has generalised the view even among ordinary Tibetans, that the sooner

they are able to return, the sooner this trend could be reversed and the pristine nature

of the Tibetan environment preserved. I did not get any statements, anywhere that

contradicted this view.

Entreprising refugees from central Tibet in their thirties and forties who had

the chance to get an education in India and Switzerland in areas of business

management, tourism, finance and medicine see Tibet as 'a land of opportunities'

where they would be able to develop businesses of all sorts that would give jobs to

many local Tibetans who are now unemployed and destitute. They feel confident that

they have the tools and necessary qualifications to benefit the Tibetan economy, and

thus are thrilled with anticipation at the thought of returning to Tibet. In Switzerland,

the myth of return plays a very significant role in the professions Tibetans choose to

engage in. During their school years, they were encouraged to take on professions

which would be useful in Tibet and that could benefit other people. In this spirit,

many Tibetans have developed their professional careers in the health and social

services. All my informants who work in the geriatric and mental health departments

remarked that when the Dalai Lama visits Switzerland he always encourages them to

make the most of their stay in Switzerland by educating themselves, and getting

different qualifications that they will eventually be able to put in the service of

Tibetan society. As the Dalai Lama says: 'To the thousands of my countrymen in

India, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, I want to say that a heavy responsibility devolves

on all of us to prepare ourselves for the day when we can return to our country and

build a happier and greater independent Tibet. 197 The new Tibet will need thousands

of trained and skilled men and women, necessary to bring Tibet in consonance with

the spirit of democracy without losing our cultural and religious heritage or our soul'

(Dalai Lama 1998L:350-51).

In the view of many exiles, Western medicine has been largely neglected by

Chinese authorities, and medical attention is in great demand in the TAR and other

Tibetan prefectures, and thus they see this as the area in which they could make their

biggest contribution. Therefore, with this in mind, Tibetans in Switzerland go to great

lengths to study and qualify as nurses and doctors. For all ofthem, having a career in

the work and that the funds corne from the provincial government. 197 Switzerland is not mentioned here because it is taken from speech given in 1961 before resettlement to the West became an alternative. It is however, a cornmon component of his address to the Tibetan

196

such a community-based environment has allowed them to integrate to Swiss society.

Since they speak German, behave in many ways like the Swiss, and care for the old

and sick they tend to be well accepted in their communities, and all of them lead quite

comfortable lives financially speaking. 198

Furthermore, most Tibetans hold the view that the Chinese have not done

enough to develop areas in Tibet which are clearly of no economic significance to

them. Therefore, as soon as many Tibetans have some money to spare they try to get

involved in development projects in their region of origin. The most popular area of

concentration of exiled-funds and efforts is education, and the reconstruction of

monasteries. Most Tibetans subscribe thus to the idea that without education there is

no hope for Tibetans and for the preservation of Tibetan culture both within Tibet and

in exile. Their involvement in these projects, paves the way for their eventual return.

Likewise, Tibetans in exile have been socialised to believe that Tibet is their

families' birthright; hence it is their right to return to a free Tibet. To this statement

some added (particularly older Tibetans in India and Nepal) that because the Dalai

Lama, is the embodiment and incarnation of Chenrezig, he has the right to drive the

Chinese away from it. The young, nevertheless, phrased this in quite different terms

saying that Tibet rather than being the Dalai Lama's sole right, is the right of all the

Tibetan people. Theirs is a claim based on the principle of self determination, as well

as historical and ethnic rights over the land. Few of my informants from aristocratic

Kbampa families believe their families have historical rights over lands in Kham.

Furthermore, most of the refugees who have received degrees from Western

universities, particularly in the U.S., have gone back to Dharamsala to work for the

Tibetan Government in exile, or now serve as representatives of the Dalai Lama in

Western countries, hoping that their expertise can be used in exile to prepare for a

future return to Tibet. 199 In brief, to the question: 'Why is it SQ important for Tibetans

to go back to Tibet?' all my informants answered unanimously that it is their

families' birthright, and that they do not want to see their heritage completely

communities everywhere in exile. 198 A few Swiss and foreign husbands of Tibetans in Switzerland remarked that Tibetans are the favourite refugee group of the Swiss since they tend to behave in a civilised manner, respect local laws, make the effort to learn the local language quickly and are seen as holders of a great civilisation, which has been appealing to many of them. Also, and in contrast to other refugee communities in Switzerland like the Kurds from Turkey and Yugoslavs, Tibetans are seldom involved in crimes (McDowell 1996). 199 For instance, Lobsang Sangay notes that since 1988, 237 scholars or students from the Tibetan community in exile have gone to the U.S. on Fulbright grants and scholarships. Of these, more than 95 percent have returned to hold posts in the exile government (Sangay 2003: 128).

197

destroyed by the Chinese. Returning to Tibet is thus seen as a way of redeeming

themselves, and restoring their sense of dignity after more than forty years of national

h '1" 200 umttatIOn.

Even though forty-five years of exile for Tibetans does not seem like a long

time, especially if compared with other refugees' experience (e.g. Jews, Annenians

and Kurdish refugees); it has nevertheless already produced three generations of

refugees, who have been gradually dispersed throughout the world, holding different

notions and feelings about the myth of return. The oldest Tibetans who are now well

into their sixties and beyond are the most willing to return. Many of them even

confess to have their suitcases packed and ready in the event of a sudden change of

fate. This was particularly the case in the early years of exile when most Tibetans saw

their stay in their host countries as truly temporary, and thus preferred to stay in the

Himalayan region, with 'one foot in Tibet', with rather mobile living arrangements.

Regardless of the fact that these same people are well settled into their homes in India

and Nepal, they still say they would like to go back to Tibet and die there, where all

their ancestors have lived and died.

Tibetans engaged in branches of Tibetan organisations such as the Tibetan

Women Association, the Tibetan Youth Congress and others in Switzerland, are fully

aware of the situation in Tibet, closely follow the whereabouts of the Dalai Lama, the

development of the Tibetan struggle for independence, and avidly participate in the

building grassroots support at a local level in Switzerland. As soon as their legal

standing there is settled (i.e. when they get a permanent resident pass and Swiss

passport) they go to Tibet on holiday. I interviewed six couples in Horgen and Saint

Gallen and in Kathmandu who had been involved in fundraising to finance the

building of primary schools in South-central and Western Tibet. They were all quite

outspoken about their readiness to return.

Tibetans of all ages in Northern India and Nepal and even in Switzerland tend

to be very patriotic. At the slightest provocation they talk about Tibetan independence

and all the things they would do when the time came to return. In Switzerland, most

Tibetans in their forties and early fifties with children who are themselves Swiss

nationals talk about their willingness to return. However, they accept the possibility

200 The fusion of dreams of independence with visions of an idealised national landscape is comm~~ in displaced people's narratives. They tend to see the return to their ideal~sed home1an~ a~ a ~recondltIOn for their future happiness. See for example, translated extracts from a dIsplaced LatvIan s dIary (Goba),

198

that in the event of their return to Tibet their children might not accompany them and

might choose to stay in Switzerland. Most of the children of this generation attend

with their parents all the events organised by the Tibetan society there, whether of

religious (teachings given by the Dalai Lama or other great lamas), social (Tibetan

New Year and the Dalai Lama's birthday celebrations), or political nature (celebration

of the anniversary of the 10th March Lhasa Uprising). But most of them go to Swiss

schools now, often speak in a mixture of Tibetan and German with their siblings and

other Tibetans of the same age, they are well westernised, and do not have much

chance to learn about Tibet and Tibetan culture aside from these special occasions and

what their parents transmit them. My informants tended to reassure me that their

children felt more Tibetan than Swiss.

Some families in the same situation as the above openly admit that they would

never give up their life in Switzerland nor would they ever consider putting their

children in the predicament of having to choose to return to Tibet or stay in

Switzerland. For instance, in Horgen I interviewed a young Tibetan couple with three

children. Both husband and wife were born in India and settled in Switzerland in the

1970s (wife) and 1980s (husband). He works for a Swiss clothing factory and she

works as a social worker, and are quite well off: they have their own new dream

house, with lake-views in a beautiful area of Horgen, drive a new Mercedes, and get

to travel often within Europe and India. When I inquired about their lifestyle in

Switzerland the husband smiled and said, 'Oh, this is like heaven, you know. Tibetans

in India always think of Switzerland the way Indians think of Kashmir, that is, 'it is

heaven on earth', and so many Tibetans want to come here to live. Of course the

beginning was difficult for most of us, but once you learn High German (as opposed

to the local Swiss-German dialect), you can do some studies and after that you can get

very decent jobs ... we love our life here and we would not give it up for anything'. In

addition, although they also participate as a family in all the events of the Tibetan

community, they acknowledge the fact that they do not know much about Tibetan

history, geography or religion, and still feel Tibetan. Their children however, say they

feel 'Tibetan' and speak also in a mixture of Tibetan and German amongst themselves,

but they say they are Swiss and could not imagine themselves living anywhere else. In

these cases, it seems that the myth of return and the participation in the events that

(to the Russian interior 1997-1924), in Baron and Gatrell (2003:61-68).

199

tend to enhance it, is really a myth, and does not generate any significant feelings of

yearning for the lost land.

One informant in Uznach, near Zurich told me that many Tibetans spend their

lives in Switzerland working very hard to save money hoping that someday they

would be able to return to Tibet and to buy a big piece of land to build a family house.

The big irony, in her view is that by the time that happens, and if it happens, it is

likely that their children will not want to join them. In these peoples' mind, the myth

of return plays a very significant role. Most respondents like her think the question of

returning is an extremely difficult one to answer because nobody knows what the

conditions will be when the opportunity comes. Similarly, most Tibetans distrust the

Chinese and so the idea of returning is considered feasible only after real

independence is gained. Many would be very frightened to go back under a negotiated

autonomy since they would be giving up so much to return to an uncertain future.

They feel there is nothing to guarantee that the Chinese will not change their minds

and attack or claim control over Tibet again. In addition, it is very unlikely that any

Western power would get involved by making the Chinese honour whatever

agreement is reached with the exiled authorities.

Other informants in Switzerland expressed a different view. They were all in

the health profession and were raised in India, two in Southern India in the Tibetan

settlement of Bylakuppe, and the other in Darjeeling, West Bengal. They said they

would not go back to Tibet, partly because they have never been there, and would find

it extremely difficult to leave behind their comfortable lifestyles in the West, and

partly because they do not feel attached to the notion of the Tibetan Nation. All of

them however, agreed that there is something about the Tibetan culture that they

deeply value and that makes them want to go back to India where they were raised,

and where members of their families still live. They expressed their concern that

although Western medicine has done so much to prolong people's life, they did not

think old age in industrialised countries like Switzerland is particularly happy.

Nonetheless, they are extremely lonely and it is as if they remained sedated for many

months before they die and do not seem very aware of how their life is slowly

extinguishing. By contrast, they believe that in India and Tibet, although people die

relatively young (60s-70s) most old people know when death is approaching and

somehow seem much more in touch with their process of dying. Very significant also

is the fact that they never die alone, that is, immediate family, relatives and friends are

200

always there for them. So they would definitely prefer to live their last days in such an

environment. These statements are quite relevant since they deterritorialise Tibetan

culture, and in doing so, play down the role of the myth of return in forging Tibetan

identity in exile. This also means that given the existence of multiple locations of

settlement and resettlement of Tibetan exiles, the myth of return can also mean

different places for different people. The majority of my informants do place Tibet at

the centre of their yearnings of return, regardless of the fact that many of them have

never been there.

In the Tibetan settlement of Majnukatilla in Delhi and in Mount Pelerin, in

Switzerland I interviewed Tibetan monks who have opposed the Dalai Lama's

government's religious policies (related to the sectarian controversy explained in

Chapter 5), and the change in the political standing of the government, (from

negotiating independence to real autonomy).201 These Tibetans still stand for nothing

less than independence, and thus accept the increasing unlikelihood of a return to

Tibet. They believe the government's new position is a tricky one since, as many

others believe, the Chinese are not renowned for delivering their domestic promises or

honouring their international commitments. They doubt that they would ever go back

and are resigned to the idea of embracing their current places of residence as their

permanent homes.

For many Tibetans whose venture into exile has been disappointing due to

unfulfilled aspirations (such as their failure to get a good education and decent job

opportunities), their return to Tibet is a reality they would rather forget. When the

Chinese authorities find out that a Tibetan has fled, they tend first to harass and

ostracise hislher family, reduce their food supplies, and dismiss them from their jobs.

When Tibetans are caught fleeing or upon returning, they are imprisoned, sent to

detention camps, sometimes tortured, and after they are finally released they are kept

at close watch by Tibetans who are loyal to the Chinese, and by the Chinese

themselves, who obstruct their finding any jobs. As a result, such Tibetans leave

Tibet for good in the hope that they would be able to return to a free Tibet in the

future.

In Nepal and India, I found a deep fear of return particularly among the young

new arrivals whose life in exile has been miserable due to shattered dreams; that is,

~l P 1 As a result of the 1987 Strasbourg roposa s.

201

difficulties in finding employment, their lack of proficiency in English and

opportunities to learn it, their lack of knowledge of Hindi or Nepali, their weak health

with illnesses of all sorts, including tuberculosis, malaria, different stomach ailments , constant fevers, mouth sores, and so on. Most of my young informants in this

category of refugees in the Kathmandu Valley, and particularly in Dharamsala and

Delhi had left Tibet without a word to their families (to avoid their stopping them and

turning them into their accomplices, which could really damage them) and were very

homesick. However, although they wished to return to their families, horror stories

told by other returnees deter them from attempting the journey back. Hence, they

reluctantly stay put and try to deal with their situation the best they can and search for

Western sponsors to fund their education or Western travellers to teach them English

for free whilst they are in India or Nepal, or they try to join a monastery.

Furthermore, there are the views of other militant Tibetans who believe that

no real change will ever happen in Tibet under the auspices of the current communist

Chinese government, nor the efforts of the exiled authorities are enough to gain the

independence of Tibet. Lhasang Tsering, former Mustang Guerrilla fighter and

former president of the Tibetan Youth Congress quoted earlier, believes that no real

changes will occur unless thousands of ordinary, but politically minded refugees

(thoroughly educated in Tibetan history, Chinese history and policy, democracy,

methods of non-violent resistance, and communications) return to Tibet to instil

changes from within. He supports concrete steps to link up with the freedom

movements in Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang) and Inner Mongolia so as to initiate

simultaneous uprisings in all three countries; and cooperate with the Chinese

democracy movement to overthrow the Communist regime (Tsering, L. 1991 :8). His

radical views have been dismissed by the exiled authorities on the grounds that they

induce provocation and violence, ultimately damaging the Tibetan cause. However,

they are important in that they intend to shift the idea of the return to Tibet from a

myth to a reality made possible from within rather than from without. Significantly,

these ideas have been often echoed by many members of the Tibetan Youth Congress.

Unfortunately, without a concerted effort and a minimal legitimacy (sanctioning from

Tibetan authorities), such ideas end up as part of the plethora of utopian ideas about

'home' generated in exile, which give another dimension to the myth of return.

Finally, the function of myths is essentially cognitive, that is, they are meant

to resolve fundamentally contradicting categories of the mind. In the case of refugees,

202

their belief that they will eventually return to their homeland 'represents a practical

cognitive solution to a cognitive contradiction [ ... ] between their nationalist ideology

and the fact that they are living in [exile]. The myth of return provides them with a

legitimate cognitive framework within which they can simultaneously maintain

memberships in both homeland and the diaspora. Although mythical, it is a very

practical solution to the dilemma of being part of two, often conflicting, social and

cultural contexts' (Cohen and Gold 1997:376). This cognitive solution is particularly

significant for the older generation of Tibetans, whose wish to return seems to be

highly uncompromised by their lives in exile. It has served many Tibetan refugees

against assimilation into their host countries, and thus, has become a key ingredient in

the reconstruction of Tibetan ethnic identity in exile. However, the pervasiveness of

such a myth is clearly not universal, and in some cases (such as second generation

Tibetans resettled in Switzerland and third generation of Tibetans now Swiss

nationals) the myth of return is only a reminder of family heritage which evokes little

yearning for the homeland. Similarly, the existence of multiple locales of 'home'

associated with Tibetan-ness, points to the increasing deterritorialisation of Tibetan

culture under the pressure of continued displacement.

6.3. The Transplantation of Tibetan Notions of Space into their Host Countries

It was argued above that the experience of displacement and exile has produced a

major discontinuity with the past in the articulation of traditional notions of the

homeland. However, there has been an evident transplantation of these notions into

their host countries as well as partial recreations of Tibet in exile. These have allowed

Tibetan refugees to maintain, to a certain extent, their 'traditional' way of life, easing

in this way, the sufferings of displacement, and the uncertainties caused by living in

alien environments. The host countries, for instance, have been 'domesticated' by the

creation of a Tibetan sacred geography, populated by a variety of spiritual beings and

marked by a gossamer net of small wayside shrines, prayer flags (Tib. rlung-rta),

mani-wheels, stupas, mountain-cairns (Tib. lha-rdzas) , and engraved mani stones.

The monasteries, built in more or less traditional style, are focal points in this sacred

geography, as they are conceived as the abodes of lamas and Buddhist deities who are

the objects of the highest veneration (Strom 1997:35; Samuel 1993:159). Hence, for

older Tibetans the new sacred geography and the transplantation of traditional notions

203

of territory in exile bring certainty to their highly uncertain lives; and to the younger

generations they bring an important point of reference.

The transplantation of traditional notions of territory has been both religious

and secular. As suggested above, the former has focused on three main areas: the

domestication and pacification of local deities (of the gzhi-bdag and yul-lha type

described in chapter 3), which in Western terms can be described as 'chthonic

numina' or 'telluric forces' (Mills 2003:17), and their propitiation for protection; the

projection of the Buddhist mandala principle in host countries by means of Tantric

ritual, and the construction of temples, monasteries, stupas, and the placing of prayer

flags, as well as other religious devises at places of spiritual and social significance.

Amy Heller witnessed the performance of Tibetan ritual ceremonies for the

appeasement of anonymous gzhi-bdag in Basel Switzerland and in a hill overlooking

Lake Geneva facing Mont Blanc by Tibetan refugees (Heller 1994:139-140). In

noting migrations of Tibeto-Burmese people to Nepal several centuries earlier who

were said to have been followed by their local gods to their new place of residence,

Heller raised questions that are relevant here. Did the appeased gzhi-bdag in Basel

and Mont Blanc followed Tibetans into exile in Switzerland? Were the protective

gods of particular sites from Tibet transferred to a new 'home' abroad? Or were they

'foreign gods' adopted by the Tibetan population in their new place of residence?

And, can one determine how, and with what materials Tibetans have created new

deities in their pantheon?

I will use these questions as a starting point for my analysis of ordinary

Tibetan refugees' perception of how the pacification of the environment is carried out

in exile. First, it should be noted that the appeasement of the environment has been an

important characteristic of Tibetan settlement in exile. Michaels has observed that

wherever Tibetans have settled around the world they have first performed all the

necessary rituals to 'tame' the new environment (2003: 16). This need to appease the

environment is - according to my informants in India, Nepal and Switzerland - based

on two general assumptions: first that all Tibetan families, particularly those of semi­

nomadic, nomadic, and peasant origins, have a protective deity, which follows them

wherever they gO.202 Therefore, to ensure their continual protection, Tibetans believe

that it is necessary to keep them happy through ritual offerings of incense, butter

202 It is worth recalling here that these protective deities are believed to be tribal ancestors who became

204

lamps, food and/or money. Second, successful human settlement in new places

requires the natural forces of the environment to be in proper balance. These natural

forces are understood to be composed of the five natural elements (earth, fire, water,

air, and space) and the local deities. An unbalanced environment and angry local

deities, it is believed, could bring about misfortune in the form of sickness infertility , ,

bad weather, poverty, social strive and so forth, thus they demanded constant care and

propitiation.

To understand how Tibetans VIew these local deities, a Tibetan monk in

Switzerland told me the following well known story about a gzhi-bdag who dwelled

in a mountain pass in Tibet and used to kill or hurt any person who did not dismount

his horse before crossing the pass or failed to make some kind of offering. One time, a

man who did not know about the gzhi-bdag passed riding on his horse and the horse

died soon after; the man got so angry that he went back to the pass and fired many

shots in the sky with his rifle until he is said to have hurt it. For a short while after the

incident the gzhi-bdag stopped harming others crossing the pass while on horseback,

but soon after it went back to its old ways. Tibetans know that the environment is full

of such forces and thus they see them as a threat; so to avoid illness or other

unfortunate circumstances they try to keep them on their side by obeying and making

offerings. From a Buddhist point of view, the monk continued, these local deities are

sentient beings just as any other (i.e. animals, humans and so forth), and thus are

treated with the attention and compassion that it is required. Because Buddhists work

for the benefit and happiness of all sentient beings, the offerings to these deities could

also be seen as a way of procuring their happiness in this live, however transient it is

thought to be, and ensuring their protection for one's practice of the Buddha-dharma.

Most of my monastic and older informants asserted that many Tibetan

refugees believe that there are local (Tibetan) deities that followed them into exile,

and that they have not necessarily taken new and foreign deities into their already

extensive pantheon. What they do, as is suggested above, is to be particularly aware

of the features of the environment they inhabit. Gutschow and Ramble have also

noted that in the Himalayan region inhabited by Tibetans it is quite normal that after

the desertion of a site its gods are still venerated (2003: 174). In this context, the

erection of stupas, and temples serves 'not only to remind them of their Buddhist faith

protective deities to safeguard the continuation of the family lineage.

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but rather for specifically apotropaic reasons: they are khag-gnon - ritual objects

designed to suppress malevolent powers (Mills 2003: 149).

This assumption implies the domestication of the environment by Buddhist

means, just as in the case of the appeasement of the supine demonness (Tib. Srin-mo)

in Tibet through the building of Buddhist temples and stupas at key points of the

demonness, in the seventh and eighth centuries. However, in the context of exile, the

use of these aids obviously does not have any political significance in the sense that it

is not used to mark political boundaries, as was the case in Tibet in the eighth century.

Examples of rituals of this kind are found in the foundation of many of big

monasteries built in the Tibetan settlements in Southern and Northern India Nepal , ,

and Switzerland.

A case in point is the foundation rituals performed for the erection and

opening of the Rikon (Gelugpa) Monastery built in the Turbenthal area in the German

Canton in Switzerland in 1967 described in Van Dyke (1997). It was built under the

auspices of the Swiss Kuhn brothers and the charity Tibet-Hilfe, and was the first

Tibetan monastery ever built in the West. Its design incorporates a few unmistakable

motifs from Tibetan tradition, but many of the elements belong to both Tibetan and

Swiss modernist traditions (Van Dyke 1997:183). The foundation rituals were

performed by the 14th Dalai Lama's two tutors. These centred on the making of food

offerings and prayers to the earth-goddess (Tib. sa-yi fha-rno), which is perceived as

the soil owner (Tib. sa-bdag rdo-rje; fto- 'phye), which had three main aims: to ask

her permission for the use of the land to build the temple, to dispel the negative

influences, and to increase the beneficial aspects of the site and encourage the

implantation, nourishment and well-being of the new foundation (Van Dyke

1997:185). Once these rituals were finished, the monks proceeded to bless and

sanctify the site by projecting the Tantric mandala, that is, the residence of a Buddhist

Tantric deity into the landscape through the performance of Tantric ritual. In this way,

the Tantric deity is invoked, and once the prayers and recitation of appropriate

visualisation and mantras concluded, the Tantric deity's presence was established in

the site. Thus the 'divine power' was transferred to the religious symbols (e.g. the

statues and the pinnacle), and to the environment (Van Dyke 1997:207-8). Similarly,

in the subsequent foundation of other monasteries and Buddhist centres and stupas in

other countries in Europe and America, the Kalacakra Tantra (referred to in Chapter

3.1.2.) has been used as a Tantric device for the pacification of the environment and

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the sacralization of space. In fact, the Dalai Lama has conferred the initiation to the

Kalachakra mandala thirty times in eight countries since 1981 (Mills 2004:4).

Although in exile these religious rituals have been performed as in traditional

Tibet, as effective means for the pacification of the environment, the sacralisation of

space, and for the ultimate aim of spiritual enlightenment, they have also acquired

some political overtones. We saw in Chapter 5 how the Kalachakra initiations

bestowed by the Dalai Lama to Western audiences and attended (at his request) by the

heads of all the schools of Tibetan Buddhism have been used as a means to heal

sectarian rifts, and to demonstrate to the international community than even amidst

apparent problems Tibetans stick together and support each other. The fact that this

takes place in religious settings makes such 'implied' statements more powerful.

Likewise, Martin Mills argues that in the late 1980s and 1990s a series of four main

ritual projects have developed in exile in accordance with the Dalai Lama's political

emphasis on world peace (Tib. dzam-gling zhi bde), which have been carried out by

senior Tibetan lamas closely allied to the interests of the Government-in-exile. The

first is the Kalachakra initiations already mentioned. Another is the World Peace

Ceremonies performed under the auspices of Tarthang Tulku in India and Nepal.

These were initially carried out by the Nyingmapa School at Bodhgaya, India, the site

of Buddha Shakyamuni' s enlightenment, and now include large scale prayers for

world peace at four pilgrimage sites associated with the Buddha's life, hosted by each

of the four schools during the Tibetan New Year celebrations (Yeshe De quoted in

Mills 2004:4). The third project is the World Peace Vase Project under the auspices of

Dilgo Kyentse Rinpoche and Dzongsar Kyentse Rinpoche. These involved the

consecration of 6,200 'peace vases' filled with medicinal substances and a mandala, in

Bhutan. They were designed to be buried across the globe at astrologically and

geomantically-determined sites of major mountain ranges and water bodies; sites of

conflict and warfare; sites of environmental fragility and destruction; and principal

human capitals and indigenously-recognized sacred places (Tib. gnas-chen). The

fourth project is Stupas for World Peace constructed under the auspices of Akong

Tulku Rinpoche and Penor Rinpoche, which are held to bring peace to their immediate

environment and the world as a whole (Martin 2004:4).203 In general, these rituals

were meant to heal and pacify the local spirits, to avert misery and bring happiness to

203 The fIrst of which was erected in Scotland, in Samye Ling Retreat Centre in 1990.

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their surroundings, through the use of traditional Buddhist devices. Moreover, they

derive their authority and efficacy from the fact that they have been consecrated by

qualified Tibetan masters and contain relics from Tibet itself. 'Consecrated texts,

priestly clothes, ritual implements, even the ashes of high Buddhist teachers, had been

relocated and placed within the stupas and vases of the various world peace projects in

order to ensure their ritual power' (Mills 2004:7). In this sense, the implantation of

traditional religious notions of space from Tibet to the Tibetan refugee communities,

and the resulting emergence of a sacred geography, has developed in recent years

alongside the Tibetan elite's political agenda. It supports the government-in-exile's

political discourse, which is based on human rights, environmental, democratic and

non-violent principles, now articulated in terms of world peace. All of these are meant

to bring about grassroots support for the Tibetan plight for self-determination. In

addition, in a more symbolic sense, and in basic continuity with the past, it projects the

Tibetan elite's sense of ritual authority beyond its 'imagined' political and spiritual

jurisdiction (Mills 2004).

It was argued in the first section of this chapter that the only living element of

sacred Tibet in exile was the presence of qualified Tantric yogins and Lamas who

have, through their own spiritual practice, maintained Tibetan religious traditions alive

in their host countries. Therefore, the monasteries where they live, practise and teach,

as well as other sites where they perform Tantric rituals have become important sacred

places (Tib. gnas-chen) and henceforward centres of pilgrimage for exiled Tibetans.

The most obvious example of this are the residences and temples of the Dalai Lama in

Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh; of H.H. Sakya Trinzin, the Head of the Sakya School

in Dehra Dun, Uttaranchal Pradesh; of the two recognised incarnations of the 16th

Kannapa in Dharamsala and Kalimpong, West Bengal; of Bonpo Masters in Dolanji,

Himachal Pradesh, and of many other great Tibetan masters of all traditions in Nepal,

all of which are circumambulated by Tibetan lay and monastic pilgrims.

Dharamsala, the Tibetan capital-in-exile was formerly a British hill station, in

the North-Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. It comprises the Kotwali Bazaar area or

the Lower Dharamsala, which is predominantly Indian; Mcleod Ganj or Upper

Dharamsala, and the Gangchen Kyishong (the complex of the Central Tibetan

Administration). It has become sacred because it serves as the spiritual and political

seat of the Dalai Lama and the government-in-exile. It has also been projected as the

'Little-Lhasa' in India (not only by Westerners, but by Tibetans themselves). In fact,

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the Dalai Lama's palace on top of the hill, with Namgyal Monastery and the

Tshulhakhang nearby, with the people's village down the road, neatly reproduce the

landscape of Lhasa itself. Circular paths around important Tibetan exile institutions

model the great Ling Khor and Bar Khor of the Tibetan capital (Klieger 2000:3).

Dharamsala is also portrayed as the most important centre of Tibetan culture in exile,

as 'a symbolic nerve centre from which articulations of Tibetan-ness emerge' (Anand

2000:14), and as the centre of the Tibetan struggle for independence.

Another way in which Tibetans have transplanted religious notions of territory

into their host countries has been by prompting the revival of derelict or long

forgotten centres of ancient spiritual power in their host countries. Two cases stand

out: one is the case of Pharping in Nepal, and the other of Rewalsar (Tib. Tsho pad­

rna) in Himachal Pradesh. The mountain village of Pharping is located above the

Bagmati River some forty miles southwest of Kathmandu. In medieval times it was

the centre of thriving Buddhist communities, but its significance waned from the

fifteenth century onwards until the 1960s when the Tibetan refugee communities re­

established its spiritual significance, as the site where Guru Rinpoche is said to have

attained ultimate enlightenment, and the abode of the Tibetan Tantric deity, Vajra

Yogini, the embodiment of pure awareness (Dowman 1995:92). Here there are a

number of caves where stone imprints of Guru Rinpoche's feet and hands, and a 'self­

arisen' (Tib. rang-byung) stone with the image of the Tantric deity Tara (Tib. 'Drol­

rna, the female aspect of Chenrezig) are to be found. Thus, the whole area is

considered extremely auspicious for spiritual practice. In recent years, Tibetan

refugees, particularly abbots from the main monasteries of the Kathmandu Valley

pertaining to the different schools of Tibetan Buddhism have been building minor

monasteries and retreat centres there to support the spiritual practice of their monastic

communities.

The lake in Rewalsar (referred to by Tibetans as mtsho padma) is identified as

the lake which Guru Rinpoche created in transforming the fire in which the King of

Zahor had attempted to bum him to death (Cantwell 1995:3). Tibetan pilgrimage was

well established there before 1959, but at that time there was only one small temple

with a few monk caretakers. It is the post-1959 context that Tibetan settlers have

revived the area as a place of pilgrimage. The temple became a small Nyingmapa

monastery, and other larger monasteries of the Drigung and Drugpa Kagyu schools

have been recently established with the help of Western patronage, and some Tibetan

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lay people have also settled in the vicinities. Since it is not a thriving village it has not

attracted more Tibetans to settle there, but has remained for three decades an

important centre of Tibetan pilgrimage in Northern India. Tibetan pilgrims

circumambulate the lake with its small island representing Guru Rinpoche and one of

his spiritual consorts, the princess Mandarava. There is also a cave overlooking the

mountain where they are said to have meditated (Cantwell 1995:4-7).

Because India, Bhutan, and Nepal were historically considered spiritually

'kindred spirits', Tibetan exiles' settlement in these areas has been much less traumatic

than it would have been in more alien countries. In many ways, and in the greater

Indian context, the entire Kathmandu Valley is seen as major source of sacred places

(gnas-chen). Included among the twenty-four most sacred places of pilgrimage in the

subcontinent for devotees of Shiva, Devi, and Tantric Buddhism, the valley has always

been a major destination of pilgrims from India, the Himalayas, and Tibet. It has the

geomantic qualities of sacred geography, it has been sanctified by the divine presence

of the deities and myth, and it has been hallowed by the gathering of the sages and

yogis of legend. The mountain peaks of the rim, the isolated hills within the valley, the

river confluences and gorges, and the caves on the valley sides provide the most potent

geomantic sites and are the preferred abodes of the principal gods of the valley

(Dowman 1995:11). Therefore, Tibetan refugees have chosen to settle in the vicinities

of the major Buddhist sacred places such as the great stupas of Svayambhunath,

Boudhanath, and Namo Buddha, recognised as the 'three kinds of stupas' (Tib. mchod

rten rnam gsum) (Ehrhard 2003: 1 02). In these areas they have established the bulk of

the religious communities. Indeed, by 1995, they had established forty-five Tibetan

monasteries and nunneries, most of them in Boudhanath, to house nearly one thousand

Tibetan monks and nuns, most of which are funded by foreign donations made to the

Tibetan lamas in exile who travel regularly or who have settled in the United States,

Canada or Europe (Frechette 2002:111-113). Most of these monasteries have been

built to preserve local Tibetan architectural traditions. The sprouting of Tibetan

religious institutions has contributed to the already prolific religious geography of

Nepal.

Finally, other notions of territory have also been transplanted into exile. The

reproduction of the Tibetan inner world in Tibetan dwellings in exile is shocking.

During my fieldwork in the spring of 2001 and summer of 2003, I visited a few

Tibetan homes in the old part of Lhasa a couple of blocks away from the Jokhang

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temple; in Boudhanath in Kathmandu, in Dharamsala, all of which showed astounding

similarities in arrangement, religious implements and icons, display of photographs of

their root spiritual masters, decoration and so forth. The only differences seemed to be

in the choice of deities and spiritual masters (though the Dalai Lama and a

representation of Chenrenzig, seemed to always be found amidst others), and size and

quality of the implements. Even in Switzerland, the homes of the older Tibetans living

in Turbenthal near the Rikon monastery seemed like a reproduction of a home in

Tibet, with the obvious additions of a big-screen T.V., audio set, and other electronic

appliances.

Refugees use traditional Tibetan names in their commercial and non­

commercial establishments to recreate a familiar environment in exile. In the

performing and decorative arts reflect a strong emphasis on notions of place related to

the homeland. For instance, in popular songs, showpiece rugs, and cotton textiles

motifs of Tibetan geography and architecture are incorporated. This was not

necessarily a common practice in Tibet, but has appeared as a result of displacement

and the Tibetan yearnings for home. Therefore, concrete places have become a central

metaphor for the construction of Tibetan identity in exile. The intentionality behind

these emergent craft forms seems to suggest a purposeful attempt to locate the

homeland at the centre of the refugee discourse (Korom 1997a:5).

6.4. Concluding Remarks

This analysis of the articulation of notions of territory in Tibetan refugee communities

has pointed to the complexity of the Tibetan exilic experience. The differences in the

experiences of suffering in the hands of the Chinese, the time and age of escape, their

place of birth and education (socialisation), their place of settlement and degree of

assimilation all influence the sense of attachment to the Tibetan land. Tibetan ethnic , and national identity in exile is still largely articulated in territorial terms. This is true

both for the (strictly speaking) refugees (subjects of political and religious persecution)

and the voluntary migrants. However, Tibetan physical and cultural displacement has

changed the meaning that is attached to territory. For most Tibetan exiles, their

homeland - often conceived in local rather than national terms - is either a sacred

country (Tib. gnas-yul) or a precious land (Tib. lung-pa tsa-chen-po). The difference

is generally based on their level of religiosity, as well as of national consciousness.

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In the context of an increasingly plural and diverse Tibetan diaspora, the

development of a sense of comradeship based on the principle of 'One People, One

Territory' and 'One Culture, One History' is very problematic. Therefore, many

Tibetans still derive their strongest sense of belonging from a more traditional and

more localised and. regional orientation toward the Tibetan homeland.

Similarly, this chapter has stressed that the myth of return has served to deter

many Tibetan refugees against assimilation into their host countries. This myth has

become a key ingredient in the reconstruction of Tibetan ethnic identity. Nevertheless,

for many other refugees the myth is only a reminder of family heritage which evokes

little yearning for the homeland. Similarly, the existence of multiple locales of

'home' associated with Tibetan-ness, points to the increasing deterritorialisation of

Tibetan culture under the pressure of continued displacement.

It is clear that while the majority of refugees seldom return to their homeland,

the myth of return, and the idealization of home produced by the experience of

refugeedom all serve in the strengthening of the notion of its sanctity. Return to the

homeland is almost always related to certain changes in the country's political system.

For instance, Tibetan refugees in India, Nepal and Switzerland, from the Dalai Lama,

Government representatives, intellectuals, down to ordinary Tibetans; Armenian

refugees living in the USA, Lebanon, and elsewhere (Kirakossian 1992; Suny 1993;

Tololyan 1991), Kurds in the UK and Finland (Wahlbeck 1999), Vietnamese in Paris

and the US (Bousquet 1993), all talk about returning to their homelands only if basic

conditions are met: first, that a safe environment is generated for them to return;

second, that a government with the capacity to protect the basic rights of the individual

be installed; and finally, that some kind of autonomy or independence is achieved for

the nation.

Finally, the way traditional notions of space and territory have been

transplanted into exile through ritual practice of a religious or a more secular nature,

attests to a significant continuity with the past in the perception of territory among

refugees who were born in Tibet and members of the monastic community whether

born in Tibet or in exile. However, this transplantation has been influenced by the

political context in which the Tibetan diaspora is set, and thus has acquired political

overtones.

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Chapter 7. 'Mythos Tibet': Tibet in Western Imagination

The tenn 'Mythos Tibet' has been employed since 1996 to refer to the Western

construction of myths about Tibet. Although for decades these Western constructs had

the effect of displacing the 'real' Tibet and Tibetan culture, from the 1980s onwards,

some of the features of such myths have been appropriated by the Tibetan elite to

reinforce the West's perception of the uniqueness of Tibet. This self-representation

has served the Tibetan political cause in constructing a national historical narrative

that contradicts Chinese imperial justifications. 'Mythos Tibet' has not added any

significant templates through which the Tibetan land could be perceived in exile.

Nonetheless, it is significant in that it shapes the relationship between Tibetan refugee

and Westerners in their interactions in South Asia, as well as in Western countries. It

also contributes to the shaping of Tibetan exiled identities.

7.1. Pre- 1950 Imagination, Explorer-Travellers, Conquerors and Missionaries

A gap of two hundred and fifty years separates Athanasius Kircher's (SJ) first

descriptions of Tibet in the encyclopaedia China Monumentis Illustrata (1667) from

James Hilton's Lost Horizon (1933), and Alexandra David-Neel's With Mystics and

Magicians in Tibet (1931). During that long interval the basis was laid for the West's

mythologizing of Tibet as the last living bastion of spiritual wisdom, and a sacred

paradise full of mystery and contradictions. Western imperialist and commercial

ambitions, the West's exploration of uncharted territories, as well as the decline of

'Christianity's spiritual hegemony in Europe, the mid-nineteenth-century world wars,

with the resulting spiritual doubt and social anxiety', all played a crucial role in the

Western yearning for Tibet (Bishop 1989: 11). By the 1930s Tibetan authorities still

restricted access to Tibet and very few Westerners had broken in illicitly. These facts

exacerbated the sense of mystery. It also forged images of Tibet as an intriguing

fortress land whose inscrutability Westerners were detennined to penetrate and

unravel.

The development of Mythos Tibet was clearly an 'Orientalist' enterprise, and

thus must be placed within the wider context of Western Colonialism in Asia and its

general fascination with the East as an essential, and exotic 'Other'. Both positive and

negative early representations of Tibet should be seen as part of this Orientalist

enterprise since these representations were imposed upon what Said would call, a

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'silent other [Tibet]" having sprung from positions of power and a Eurocentric

worldview.

In the seventeenth century, the Portuguese Padroado, the Society of Jesus (SJ),

and mendicant orders such as the Capuchins; and in the eighteenth and nineteenth

centuries, the British East India Company, the British government in India, together

with the Crown's various institutions, such as the Royal Geographical Society, and

The Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal produced the earliest accounts of Tibet for an

European audience. Jesuit and Capuchin accounts of Tibet reflected not only religious

intolerance, and the theological arrogance characteristic of the Counter Reformation ,

but also an air of European cultural chauvinism that portrayed Tibetans as barbaric,

unrefined and uncivilised.204

Imperial rivalry, global geopolitics, the consolidation of the empire through

exploring, mapping and surveying, in addition to concerns of trade, were uppermost

in the British imagination of Tibet (Bishop 1989).205 In addition, the European

spiritual crisis, which prompted the questioning of the perils of industrialisation

204 The first account of Tibet was found in the China Monumentis Illustrata, an encyclopaedia compiled by the Jesuit scholar Athanasius Kircher (1601-1680) of Propaganda Fide (The Roman College for the Propagation of Faith) published in 1667. It was based on the Austrian Jesuit Johann Grueber's travel records in Tibet in the 1660s, who had found Tibetan Buddhist practices strange and offensive. See for example: Van Toyl, C. (ed) (1987) Athanasius Kircher's China Illustrata. New Delhi: Indian University Press. Furthermore, the Italian Jesuit Ippolito Desideri (1684-1733) was the first missionary to stay in Lhasa for a longer period of time (1716-1727); he attempted to study the differences between Buddhism and Christianity; and openly rejected the common practice of polyandry, the belief in the 'transmigration of the soul', and, above all, the refusal of Tibetans to acknowledge a Supreme Being as a divine creator (Schell 2000:125-128, 130). His writings are considered to mark the beginnings of Western Tibetology, since he provided the first comprehensive and accurate account of the geography of Tibet and the life of its people. He was the first European to learn the Tibetan language, discuss religion with Tibetan lamas and translate some Christian texts into Tibetan. See for example: De Fillippe, F. (ed) (1995). An Account of Tibet: The Travels of Ippolito Desideri. Columbia, MO: South Asia Books; and Hosten, H. (ed) (1998). A Missionary in Tibet: Letters and Other Papers of Fr. Ippolito Desideri. New Delhi: Cosmo Publications. Missionaries working in other parts of Asia, particularly in Goa, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), China and Japan often held the same views about the natives. The Italian Jesuit Alessandro Valignano (1539-1606) who worked in Japan and Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) in China were perhaps the most notable exceptions. Their writings reflect and admiration of the native cultures and they accommodated to local customs in ways that often shocked more orthodox members of the Catholic Church. See for example: Ronan, c., and Bonnie, O. (eds.) (1988). East Meets West: The Jesuits in China, 1582-1773, Chicago: Loyola University Press; and Ricci, M. (1942). China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583-1610, translationL. Gallagher, S.l New York: Random House.

205 During the nineteenth century, the British Indian Empire expanded until its northern border extended from east to west for more than two thousand miles. To the north of that border were five states: Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, China and Tibet. By 1900, Tibet was the only one of those powers to which the British India government did not have access, which they wished to have to protect British interests in the region (McKay 1999:305). During this time the pioneer European scholars to concentrate on Tibet were Brian Henry Hodson and Alexander Csoma de Koros (1790-1842). Although none of the two ever travelled to Tibet, their writings served as the starting point for Western

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among British and European thinkers, coincided with the founding of the Royal

Asiatic Society of Bengal founded by Sir William Jones (1736-1794). Sir William

had been appointed Judge at the British India Supreme Court in 1783. His work

within the society marks the beginning of the 'scientific' study of Oriental art and

philosophy, and his Asiatik Researches constitute the first systematic essays in

comparative religion and mythology. His translations of Indian texts found a great

audience not only in Britain but also in America (Fields 1981 :34).206 The emergence

of Eastern religion and philosophy as a field of study was significant for Mythos

Tibet because Buddhist institutions, monasteries and texts had become virtually

extinct from India due to Muslim persecution and destruction from the twelfth

century onwards. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, therefore, Tibet

became an invaluable source of Sanskrit texts in impeccable Tibetan translation.

These texts, even in translation, were valued as the authentic documents of Mahayana

Buddhism (Lopez 1998:4). Eventually, this generated scholarly interest in Tibet and

Tibetan religion.

The British discovery and exploration of Tibet occurred in the shadow of the

Royal Geographical Society'S hegemony (founded in 1830), which exerted its control

by means of funding, co-ordinating, training and publishing; its extensive network of

connections among the leaders of British imperialism. During this time, word spread

of the amazing beauty of Tibet and of the existence of plenty of unexploited gold

mines there. In fact, during the 1904 Y ounghusband Expedition British officials were

instructed to keep a lookout for any signs of gold mining (Bishop 1989:133, 181).207

The transformation of Tibet into a sacred landscape, to which, this latter fact

contributed significantly was, according to Peter Bishop, a response to the general

acceptance of the evolutionary theory (Social Darwinism). It depicted 'all the

landscapes of the world, with their associated races, fauna and flora, into a deep

relationship with each other'. [ ... ] 'Tibet and the Himalayas suddenly became

positioned on a trajectory that involved fantasies about sources and origins, missing

links, evolutionary directions and goals, and about the survival of the fittest' (Bishop

1989: 118-119). In this way, as the nineteenth century drew to a close, the Tibetan

scholarship on Tibet. 206Sir William Jones is also credited for having discovered that Sanskrit and the European languages had a common origin in an earlier Indo-European language. . 207 This expedition aimed at opening Tibetan markets to Indian and European traders, and to tum TIbet into a 'buffer state' between Russia and British India.

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exclusion policy remained in place, and Russian imperialism in Northern Asia was

threatening British interests in the region, Western fascination with the Himalayan

landscape increased, and Tibet became almost a fixation in the minds of the British

Raj and Western explorers.

As a result of the 1904 Y ounghusband Expedition to Tibet, Britain gained the

right to establish three Trade Agencies in Tibet: one at Gyantse, one at Yatung in

south-central Tibet and the last one in Gartok, nearly eighty miles from Mount

Kailash in western Tibet (no British officials were stationed here) (McKay 2001). In

1905 Charles Sherring, a Deputy Commissioner for the British Raj, made an

inspection tour to Gartok. In 1906 he published Western Tibet and the British

Borderlands, which focused on the sacred nature of Mount Kailash and Lake

Manasarovar as the abode of great gods, the holy site for all Hindus (of different

castes), Buddhist and Bonpos alike; on the myths and legends surrounding the site;

and on the description of local religious observances. Regardless of the inaccuracy of

some of his religious interpretations, his account was the first European work to focus

on the religious significance of the region. Sherring's book played a major role in the

process of romanticisation that resulted in the modem European understanding of that

site, and particularly of its framing in largely mythical terms (Mckay 1999:309-313).

Access and European travel to Tibet were not only restricted by Tibetan

authorities, but also by the British Raj. It feared the outpouring of unofficial

information on Tibet that could trigger unwanted attention, and in time hamper its

interests in the region. In this way, British authorities controlled travel and scholarship

on Tibet from British India. The only scholar officially allowed to go, for instance, to

Kailash-Manasarovar in the first half of the twentieth century was the reputed Italian

scholar Giuseppe Tucci (McKay 1999:317). Tucci's writings became then, and are

still now very important for the understanding of Tibetan religion. He was not,

however, the only European to travel to Western Tibet during this time. Others broke

in both from India and via China, and their travel records to the sacred mountain and

lake inspired the next generation of explorers. 208

208 The most famous of these were the Japanese monk Ekai Kawaguchi (1866-1945) and the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin (1865-1952) who travelled to Tibet illicitly around the time of the Yo~nghusband Expedition (1904). Both Kawaguchi's account entitled Three Years in Tibet ~nd Hedm's !rans­Himalaya: Discoveries and Adventures in Tibet, published in 1909, attracted conSIderable attentIOn. A couple of decades later the writings of the Austrian American botanist and ex~lorer J~seph Rock followed. Rock was honorary research associate in the Far Eastern and RUSSIan InstItute at the University of Washington and at the Harvard Yenching Institute (1940s-1950s), and member of the

216

Western relationship with Tibetan Buddhism, nevertheless, remained quite

ambiguous until the advent of the Theosophical Society with Madame Helena

Blavatsky late in the nineteenth century, and more particularly in the 1930s with the

translation, dissemination and wide acceptance of the Tibetan Book of the Dead and

the utopia of Shangri-La described in James Hilton's 1933 novel Lost Horizon.

Western disapproval of Tibetan Buddhism during this period revolved around the

alleged irrationality of its practices, the superstitious nature of its practitioners, and

the autocratic power of its lamas, whose role was believed to be so significant that

Westerners generalised the use of the term Lamaism as a synonym of Tibetan

B ddh· 209 'L ., L . u Ism. ammsm was seen, opez pOInts out, as 'a deformity unique to Tibet,

whose parentage was denied by India (in the voice of British Indologists) and by

China (in the voice of the Qing empire)' (Lopez 1998:16; 1997). The use of the term

Lamaism is unmistakably part of the Orientalist enterprise, in which superficial

comparisons, and ungrounded genealogies were drawn that misguidedly pointed out

Lamaism as having its origins in Christianity and that it degenerated into what it was

understood to be then. According to early British and American scholars such as

Austin Waddell, Lamaism stands at the nadir of a long process of contamination and

degeneration of the original Indian Buddhism textual tradition (Lopez 1998:17, 36-

39).

Later in the 1930s when the first Western explorers converted to Buddhism,

allegedly practised Tibetan 'mysticism' and then wrote about their journeys with

Tibetan masters, this view of Tibetan Buddhism was to change and have a profound

effect in Mythos Tibet as repository of ancient, but living spiritual wisdom. Although

the term 'Lamaism' has almost disappeared from scholarly works, it is still frequently

encountered in non-academic and travel writing in a non- derogatory fashion, and is

National Geographic Society, he was the leader of the Society's 1927-1930 expeditions to Tibet. Mo~t of his travelogues were published in the National Geographic Magazine. He was best known for hIS decipherment of the Naxi (a minority living in the south of China) pictographs and his compilation of maps of North West and North East China. His two most important works are: The Amnye Ma-chhen Range and Adjacent Regions: A Monographic Study published in 1946 and The Life and Culture ~fthe Na-khi Tribe on the China-Tibet Borderland, published in 1963, which contemporary scholarship on such subjects have relied on. 209 The word 'lama' became only in the ninth century equivalent to Guru. From !ibet, the te~ travelled to Mongolia and to China, where it eventually came to signify not simply. a TIbetan Buddhist teacher but also his teaching. It was perhaps from Mongolia, perhaps from China, that. Europeans derived the abstract noun 'Lamaism'. In 1775 during the reign of the Manchu Emperor Qlanlong we find perhaps the first official usage of the Chinese term lama jiao (lama, guru; jiao, teac~~). As the term Lamaism gained currency in Europe, it would gain further implications and assoclatlOns from other imperial projects (Lopez 1997: 19-37; 1998: 19-20).

217

even used by some Tibetans to describe a religious system largely based on the

spiritual prowess of the lamas.21o

In 1877 Russian born Mme. Helena Blavatsky (1831-1891) claimed in her

monumental writings published under the titles Isis Unveiled: A Master Key to the

Mysteries of Ancient and Modern Science (1877) and the Secret Doctrine: The

Synthesis of Science, Religion and Philosophy (1895), that the Tibetan Himalayas

were the abode of spiritual masters who were the guides of the destiny of the world.

She, and her many followers believed that these were the keepers of the wisdom of

Atlantis who congregated in a secret region of Tibet to escape the increasing

nuisances of modem civilization. 211 By the 1930s, the Theosophical Society had

opened branches not only in Asia (India, Ceylon and Japan), but also in Europe and

America. Theosophy was based on the idea that the mystery cults and occult teachings

of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, of the Incas and Mayas, India, China and Tibet, were

all connected and had common origins. Therefore, they were devoted to a synthetic,

occult, mystic, non-denominational and non-sectarian view of world religion. Most of

the early twentieth century explorers and scholars had been for a time, or were still

members of the society, and their translations of Eastern texts failed to escape this

universalistic view of religion and are infused with theosophical language. The

theosophical movement had an immense influence in furthering the image of Tibet as

the land of great sages, and was the cradle of the Myth of Shangri -La.

On 12 August 1927 one of the many Buddhist texts known by the Tibetan

name Bardo Thodo! (Bar-do thos-gro!; lit. 'liberation in the intermediate state

[through] hearing') was translated and published in the West by Walter Evans-Wentz

with the title of The Tibetan Book of the Dead. It has since become a spiritual classic,

serving wide-ranging agendas in various fields of use and having far more to do with

the twentieth-century cultural fashions of Europe and America than with the uses to

which the text has been put internally in Tibet over several centuries (Lopez 1998:47;

Bishop 1997).

210 For instance the Tibetan scholar Dawa Norbu uses the tenn 'Lamaist culture' to refer to the culture , . that developed as a result of the peculiar way in which Tibetans adopted and adapted Buddhism; the way they blended and transfonned indigenous beliefs into the new official religion. He calls it 'Lamaist culture' because the lamas were the representatives of this culture and their views, which are uniquely Tibetan, have been taken and absorbed by the masses, though their expression and manifestation differs from it (personal communication, Dharamsala, India, May 2001). 211 See for example: Cranston, S. L. (1993). The Extraordinary Life and Influence of Helena Blavatsky, Founder of the Theosophical Society. New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons.

218

The Tibetan work seemed to be the textbook for the science of death so , popular then among occultists and scientists. The instructions in this text seemed to

confirm the fantasy that Tibet was indeed the last home of an exemplary wisdom;

among its lamas and magicians there was indeed knowledge beyond Western dreams,

knowledge that was 'both occult and scientific' (Bishop 1989: 237-238). Since its first

appearance in English the Tibetan Book of the Dead has been translated four times in

the West: In 1964 it was translated by Timothy Leary, Ralph Metzner, and Richard

Alpert under the title The Psychedelic Experience: A Manual Based on the Tibetan

Book of the Dead; in 1975 by Francesca Fremantle and Chogyam Trungpa; in 1992

by Sogyal Rinpoche under the title the Tibetan Book of Living and Dying; and in 1994

by Robert Thurman.212

One of the most complete embodiments of Tibet as a sacred place in the

Western imagination was the utopia of Shangri-La described in James Hilton's

famous 1933 novel Lost Horizon (Bishop 1989; Lopez 1998; Schell 2000; Mathiassen

1996). Lost Horizon was not only the world's first paperback book but also a

monumental best-seller in Britain and the United States. When it was first published

in 1933 during the depths of the Depression, it attracted virtually no notice. Only after

critic Alexander Wolcott enthused about it on the radio some time later did this novel

finally begin to attract notice (Schell 2000:241).

The term 'Shangri-La' is a deformation of the term Shambhala, derived from

the Buddhist Kalachakra teachings of Shambhala explained in Chapter 3. Briefly,

according to Tibetan tradition, the Dus-kyi- 'khor-lo (Sansk. Kalachakra Tantra) was

revealed to the people of the hidden realm of Shambhala, a place believed to be

somewhere to the north of Tibet, ruled by a succession of wise Buddhist kings, the

last of whom would emerge at some future date to liberate the world from evil

212 . ' For members of the Beat Generation such as Alpert, LSD was a very lmportant means to expenence 'mystic visions'. In this way, they claimed that psychedelics changed the rules of the game, and that visions once enjoyed only by saints could now be had by anyone. Many of this generation turned to meditation after having had acid experiences (Fields 1981 :249). Donald Lopez argues that throughout the time of the four publications (nine decades), the text has served different spiritual agendas. For Evans-Wentz he contends the Tibetan Book of the Dead embodies Madame Blavatsky's Secret Doctrine. Fo; Chogyam T~gpa, a renowned Tibetan lama who settled in America in the 1970s, it contained the tenets of transpersonal psychology, so popular in the 1970s and 1 ~80s; for Sogyal Rinpoche, another popular Tibetan lama, it embodied the language of self-help ID. the Ne,,:, Age movement of the 1990s' and for Robert Thurman (a Columbia University Tibetoiogist and TIbetan Buddhism practitioner) ~he text which is in its origin a Nyingma text was forced into a Gelugpa template (Lopez 1998:85).

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(Samuel 1993:517, Bernbaum 1980). Such a place, attainable through spiritual

practice, is said to be a place without hunger, suffering, hatred, and delusion.213

'In these days of wars and rumours of wars-have you ever dreamed of a

place where there was peace and security, where living was not a struggle but a

living delight? [ ... J One man had such a dream and saw it come true. He was Robert

Conway-England's 'Man of the East', soldier, diplomat, public hero. '

These are the opening lines of Lost Horizon, which director Franz Capra and

Columbia Pictures turned into a film in 1937. It won not only two Academy Awards,

but also became a box-office hit. The Shangri-La portrayed therein is a lamasery

placed at the top of the 'Valley of the Blue Moon', which is very fertile and rich in

gold mines. This valley is hidden somewhere in the Kun Lun mountains that formed

the northern boundary of Tibet. It is a place without crime, where all the wisdom and

beauty of the world (East and W est alike) is preserved from the perils of society:

'greed, brutality and the frantic lust for power'. The people that live there live very

long lives and share a brotherly love, which they spread to the entire world. They

avoid excesses of all kinds, and live with 'moderate strictness, moderate disciple and

are moderately chaste and moderately happy'. They have no uncertainty whatsoever

about the future.

The leading character, Robert Conway, is led up to Shangri-La in 1935 by

some monks who had found him, and other three people after their airplane had been

kidnapped in Baskul, China, and crashed into the mountains. Upon arriving at this

strange place, Conway fitted right in, and felt all the questions of his life seemed to

have been answered. The 'High Lama' of the lamasery, is Father Perrault, a more than

two hundred year-old former Capuchin friar missionary who had found inspiration in

Buddhism, is about to pass away and entrusts Conway with the future and destiny of

Shangri-La. Before the dies, he predicts that in a future age Christian ethics will

prevail.

213 • b fi' E S 11" ' F. Korom differentiates these notions (Shangn-La and Shambhala) y re emng to . u Ivan s distinction between the Greek Ou tapia (no place) and eu tapia (good place) in the work ?f S~ Thomas More. He argues that while both Shangri-La and Shambhala are mentalscapes, Sha~gn-La IS an au­tapia and Shambhala an eu-tapia (Korom 1997a:fn.31,90). This is important smce Shambhal~, according to Tibetans is unequivocally 'a real place' attainable through spiritual ~ractice~ and S~angn­La as a Western construct has no real locale and it has multiple meanings ascnbed to It by different people.

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The portrayal of Shangri-La is yet another Orientalist enterprise. What is

striking is the imagery with which Valley of the Blue Moon is constructed. Hilton's

Shangri-La is a deliberate mixture of elements from both worlds. The architecture,

decoration and ambiance are refined, simple, orderly, apparently comfortable and

extremely clean. Delicious banquets are served in Western fashion and Chinese dress

is worn. Nature outside the Valley is depicted as being at its wildest form, keeping at

bay any intrusion from civilisation. Inside the Valley, nonetheless, is a paradise: mild

temperatures, with waterfalls, lakes, and eternal spring-like scenery everywhere. The

people in the valley are Tibetan and children are portrayed playing with each other in

great harmony. Although within the compounds of the lamasery the main characters,

including the High Lama are Westerners, their demeanour and words are a humble

show of strength, peace, love, contentment and wisdom. All of which are

characteristics of spiritual power, attributed often to Buddhist masters. In brief, as

Orville Schell remarks, Shangri-La is a distillation of a borrowed piece of Tibetan

mythology overlaid with a Western dream of dreams that was two centuries in the

making. It is the mythic embodiment of the idea of sanctuary - a place where all

civilized yearnings are satisfied (Schell 2000:245).

Finally, the French author Alexandra David-N eel (1868-1969) was one of the

most influential figures in the representation of Tibetan Buddhism to the West. Her

works too sustained Western reverie. David-Neel was an independent and

adventurous woman, who left for India at the age of thirteen in order to study Sanskrit.

After having been urged by the thirteenth Dalai Lama, she studied Tibetan in Sikkim

(1914-1916), and then travelled to Tibet where she stayed for more than a decade,

living in caves and monasteries practising Tibetan Buddhism. She travelled with a

Tibetan companion through the Tibetan border regions and, disguised as a pilgrim, to

Lhasa. Upon her return to Europe (1928) she published 28 books in French, of which

the most famous in English were: My Journey to Lhasa (1929), With Mystics and

Magicians in Tibet (1931), Initiations and Initiates in Tibet (1931), the Magic of Love

and Black Magic (1938), and the Secret Oral Teachings in Tibetan Buddhist Sects

(1951, 1961) - 'these formed a corpus of work that soon gained cult status' (Schell

2000:236). Her books are full of stories about astral projections, of lamas who had

mastered the ability to fly while in meditative trances; oracles who could predict the

future; lamas who could perform disappearing acts; charms that could ward off evil

spirits; and monks who practiced tun-rno the arcane art of controlling one's body

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temperature while virtually naked in sub-zero weather. Her writings are full of praise

for Tibet, Tibetan culture and Tibetan Buddhism. Hence she presents an image of

Tibet, which is highly idealised, and yet extremely effective in generating yearning

for her experiences.

Other explorer-converts were to follow. A prominent example is the German

Anagarika Govinda whose autobiography The Way of the White Clouds (1974) was

also a bestseller. He travelled extensively in Tibet, from India where he had been

living in the 1930s. In Tibet he spent some time sketching Tibetan art and Buddhist

paintings in mountain caves and remote monasteries, and made the pilgrimage to

Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar. L.A. Govinda did not learn Tibetan nor did he

escape the influence of his involvement with the Theosophical Society, to which he

contributed by writing in several theosophical journals. Throughout his career he

seems to have drawn on a wide variety of Western-language sources but never on

original Buddhist texts. He represents himself as a spokesman for Tibetan Buddhism

in ways that are reminiscent of the Theosophy of Evans-Wentz (Lopez 1998 :61-62).

However, his contribution to the imagination of Tibet should not be overlooked. His

descriptions, for example of his pilgrimage to Mount Kailash and of his stays at

mountain caves copying mural paintings, are full of powerful imagery. If Govinda's

writings are not all, strictly speaking valuable sources of accurate historical and

religious information about Tibet, at least they are as travel accounts; which in the

final analysis playa weightier role in the process of myth making.

Throughout the first few decades of the twentieth century, amidst two world

wars and economic depression, the disillusionment with the failures of Western

culture was all embracing. In this state of affairs, as Western travellers were searching

for answers, Tibet seemed to offer them. In this sense, the Buddhist metaphor of

seeing oneself as the sick patient, the Buddha as the doctor, the Buddha-Dharma

(teachings) as the medicine, and the Sangha (Buddhist community) as the nurses who

assist one in getting better seemed to acquire meaning for many Westerners at the end

of the 1950s?14 Therefore, in the 1960s many of such Westerners - indulging in a

search for a spiritual sanctuary - flocked to India, Thailand, Burma and Japan to 'take

refuge' in the Buddhist doctor, the Buddhist medicine and the Buddhist 'nurses'.

214 This metaphor is found in many Buddhist texts; see for example Trinlay Chodron, A:K. (ed) (1998). Gampopa's Jewel Ornament a/Liberation: The Wish-fulfilling Gem a/the Noble Teachmgs. Translated by Konchog Gyaltsen Rinpoche. Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications.

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What is significant is the fact that this was occurring as Tibetan refugees were in

search for another kind of sanctuary for themselves to preserve their cultural heritage.

During this time, as Tibetans fled Tibet and settled in northern India, Nepal and

Bhutan, Westerners began to make unprecedented contact with Tibetan masters who ,

in the spirit of preserving Tibetan culture and religion from extinction, were willing to

'pass on' their 'medical knowledge' to the ailing Westerners. In this way, a new phase

in the history of Mythos Tibet commenced.

7.2. Post-1950 Imagination: Humanitarians, Scholars, Tourists and Western Practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism

'When the iron bird flies, the Dharma will spread to the West' (Guru Rinpoche's prophecy, quoted in Shakya 1991 :21)

For the sake of analysis, I divide this new phase of Mythos Tibet into various phases.

It is important to note, nonetheless, that they overlap and are by no means exclusive.

In the first phase (1950s and 1960s) fantasies about Tibet continued to be created

under the enduring influence of the Theosophical Society and of new travel accounts,

as well as of very imaginative fiction novels. In addition, the Cold War and the

persistent vilification of communist regimes contributed to the Western conceit vis-a­

vis the Chinese and the increasing allure of Tibet.

Among the travel accounts, an outstanding example was the Austrian Heinrich

Harrer's best-selling Seven Years in Tibet (1943-1950) published in 1952, and

translated into 48 languages. The book is based on his difficult trek to Lhasa from

India, across the Himalayas, his general experiences with Tibetan culture, and his

relationship with the then young Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Written in the rising tide of

the Cold War, Seven Years in Tibet perfectly embodied the Western fantasy of escape

to a Tibetan Shangri-La. What gave Harrer's story a poignant touch and made it

particularly persuasive was the fear of the potential destruction of Shangri-La under

the hands of the Chinese Communists. Going to Tibet, and having first hand

experiences of Shangri-La suddenly became a matter of utmost urgency to spiritual

seekers and modem explorers. Similarly, the 1930s and 1950s Western expeditions to

Mount Everest contributed to this trend.

Furthermore, Cyril H. Hoskins' fiction novels were the most influential of the

1960s. Hoskins was born in 1878 in Plymouth, Devonshire, and wrote under the name

of T. Lobsang Rampa. His books about Tibet have sold more copies than any other

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author on the subject. Rampa claimed to be an initiate into the secret cults of

'Lamaism', to have been possessed by a Tibetan lama, and in the course of seven years

'to have actually become a Tibetan, not just in his dress but in his molecules' (Lopez

1998:86-113, emphasis added). His first and most famous book of a sequel was The

Third Eye, which was published in Britain in 1956. Lobsang Rampa is regarded as the

biggest hoaxer in the history of Tibetan studies, and the publication of his books

produced outrage among the leading Tibetologists and Western explorers of Tibet.

Out of a mixture of Mme Blavantsky's Theosophy and Alexandra David­

Neel's highly coloured accounts of Tibet, Rampa created a picture of Tibet which

entranced millions of Westerners. 'In the fetid imagination of the author Tibet was a

land in which spiritual enlightenment was obtained through the drilling of a small

aperture in the front of the skull' (Jampa Thaye 2001 :96). Similarly, his books are full

of astral journeys, crystal ball gazing, reading of auras, prehistoric visits to earth by

extraterrestrials, predictions of war, and a belief in the spiritual evolution of humanity.

Lobsang Rampa's writings represent the apex of Mythos Tibet, and have left a

significant legacy of misunderstandings and false assumptions about Tibet and Tibetan

Buddhism that have been very hard to eradicate.

The second stage (late 1960s and 1970s) is when the West meets Tibet in

Indian and Nepalese territory and humanitarian work in the Tibetan refugee

settlements set the stage for a close relationship between Westerners and Tibetans to

develop. During this phase Tibetan lamas began to travel to Europe and North

America, started teaching at European and American Universities and opened Tibetan

Buddhism Dharma centres. As the West became much more aware of Tibet, and as

original Tibetan texts made their way to Western university libraries, Tibetan Studies

became a legitimate academic field of study.

During this stage many international organisations were established in India

and Nepal, where refugees had settled. The ubiquitous tales of horror added a new

dimension to the ways Tibetans and Tibet were perceived: as martyrs of a tremendous

cultural and religious catastrophe and as victims of the political injustice inflicted by a

vilified China. By the same token, for some members of these organisations Chinese

Tibet now became a poignant symbol of a paradise lost.

In the 1960s, many Tibetan lamas made their way to the U.S. under different

auspices. The Rockefeller Foundation and the United States Department of Defense

for example, funded the Sakya scholar Deshung Rinpoche's stay at the University of

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Washington in Seattle where he worked with prominent scholars, such as Turrell

Wylie (Fields 1981 :289).215 Moreover, one significant event that supported all this

process was that under Public Law 480, the government of India agreed that its huge

debt to the United States for shipments of American wheat provided for famine relief

would be repaid in the form of books. Specifically, beginning in 1961, a designated

number of copies of every book published in India were to be provided to the Library

of Congress, which then distributed them to regional depository libraries (Lopez

1998:165). In this way, original Tibetan texts became available in university libraries

in the United States.

The dissemination of Tibetan Buddhism and the establishment of academic

programmes on Buddhist and Tibetan studies during this time revolved around four

main figures in Europe and five in North America; all of them respected Tibetan

lamas: the Kagyupa lamas Akong Tulku Rinpoche and Ato Rinpoche in Great Britain,

the Nyingmapa lama Namkhai Norbu Rinpoche in Italy, and the Gelugpa monk Geshe

Rabten in Switzerland. At the same time, Western scholarship at this early time

revolved around Rolf A. Stein and Marcel La10u in France; David Snellgrove and

Hugh Richardson in England, and Giuseppe Tucci in Italy. In North America in the

1960s it revolved around the Gelugpa monk Geshe Wangyal (New Jersey); The

Nyingmapa lama and scholar Tarthang Tulku (Berkeley); and the Gelugpa monk

Geshe Lhundup Sopa (Wisconsin); and in the 1970s around the Kagyupa master Kalu

Rinpoche (mainly in Vancouver, Canada); and the unconventional Chogyam Trungpa

Rinpoche (Boulder, Colorado).216 Some of the disciples of such masters; often the

first generation of graduates of these programmes, became in time what in Tibetan is

called 'scholar-adepts' (Tib. mkhas-grub), that is, scholars who are also Buddhist

practitioners (Lopez 1998: 173). Some examples are Robert Thurman (Columbia

University), Jeffrey Hopkins (Virginia University), Alexander Berzin (Harvard

University), and Geoffrey Samuel (Newcastle University, Australia). Their close

relationship with Tibetan masters, including the Dalai Lama, their translations of

215 State officials had suddenly realized the potential usefulness of languages, such as Vietnamese, Chinese and Tibetan. 216 As interest in Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism in particular rose, in addition to Dharma ~entr~s and academic institutions some of these lamas founded presses to publish books about Buddhism III general, Tibetan Buddhism and Tibetan culture in particular (Trungpa Rinpoche founded Sha~bhala Publications in 1969; Tarthang TuUm founded Dharma Publishing in 1971. Others followed.; ~lsdo~ Publications was founded in 1975 by the Gelugpa tullm Thupten Yeshe; and Snow Lion PubhcatIOns m 1980. See Samuel (1993:336-355) for the biographies of some of these great lamas.

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Tibetan texts and their scholarship in general have played a very important role in the

new understanding of Tibetan Buddhism and of Tibet in general in the West.

The most significant phenomenon that occurred as a result of the major events

during this phase was the beginning of a process of demystifying Tibet, in which the

major actors were Tibetans themselves, and gradually Western Tibetologists, as well

as Westerners that become lamas in their own right. With this phenomenon, more

respectful representations of Tibet appeared, and Tibetans ceased to be the passive

silent other upon whom ideas of Tibet and its people were imposed. Hence Tibetans

have been given a voice, and in the demystifying process, they have chosen to back

some of these ideas to serve their own national project. In this sense, Mythos Tibet is

not only a thing of the West or the past but has become part of present Tibetan self­

representation. Likewise, the search for the real Tibet, its appropriation and

'objective' representation by academics, Buddhists and even tourists is an important

characteristic of this and the next phase of thinking about Tibet.

The third phase commenced in the 1980s and continues to the present. In 1987

the Dalai Lama made an historic visit to Washington D.C. As a result of the Chinese

government's liberalisation policies his visit was aired in Lhasa. This triggered a

number of anti-Chinese and pro-independence demonstrations that called for the

return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet and the overthrow of the Chinese government.

These took place in the main monasteries of the Lhasa environs, particularly in

Drepung and Sera monasteries. Western Tourists and many other Westerners through

unprecedented American media coverage witnessed the violence with which the

People's Liberation Army responded. About two dozen tourist witnesses organised

themselves into a sort of clandestine 'co-op' to collect and collate accurate

information about the demonstrations and the aftermath to transmit it to the outside

world (Schwartz 1991588-604). In this way, the so-called 'Tibet Movement' emerged

as an ad hoc response to the riots (McLagan 1996:321). Consequently, a considerable

amount of Western pro-Tibet organisations appeared run by celebrities (such as

actors, musicians, artists, politicians, and famous Tibetologists) attracting a lot of

followers.

One of the most far-reaching international organisations created as a result of

the 1987 events has been the International Campaign for Tibet (lCT). Founded in

1988 in Washington, D. C., (with branches in Amsterdam and Berlin) ICT is a non­

profit membership organization, which works to promote human rights and self-

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detennination for Tibetans and to protect their culture and environment. It conducts

fact-finding missions to Tibet, India and Nepal; provides witnesses and victims of

human rights abuses to testify before the U.S. Congress, the United Nations and other

international bodies; monitors human rights conditions and works with organizations

(Asia Watch, Amnesty International); establishes networks with exiled Chinese

democracy and overseas Chinese organizations; works with Chinese language media

and conducts research on Chinese rule in Tibet; promotes news coverage of issues in

Tibet; publishes two newsletters, the Tibet Press Watch and Tibetan Environment &

Development News; and finally, speaks to academic, civic and community groups

(http://www .savetibet.org). ICT receives approximately half of its funding from large

private foundations and donors such as Richard Gere who currently chairs the

organisation. The rest is divided between money from Switzerland (which is

channelled from the Government-in-exile in Dharamsala); and from small donors who

pay $25 a year as members of ICT (McLagan 1996:348). Its incumbent president is

John Ackerly, one of the witnesses of the 1987 Lhasa crackdown.

As organisations such as ICT have succeeded in refonnulating the Tibet issue

in new ways, Tibet activism has become increasingly professionalized, moving from

consciousness-raising through direct action and letter writing to institution building,

network building, and negotiation (McLagan 1996:337). Furthennore, the Internet has

been an incredible agent for network building. According to one of such networks,

more than three hundred Tibet Support Groups in over fifty countries are working

actively to pressure the Chinese government and the international community to find a

peaceful resolution of the conflict between China and Tibet (International Tibet

Support Network, http://www.tibet.org/itsnlindex.html). Similarly, Robert Barnett, a

Cambridge-educated journalist and actor organised the earliest and most influential of

such networks, the Tibet Infonnation Network (TIN), an independent news and

research service reporting on Tibet based in London. Upon witnessing the 1987

crackdown, Barnett and other Western witnesses stayed in Lhasa several months to

help and gather first hand infonnation about the Tibetans injured and imprisoned. He

was part of a core of committed foreigners who continued to maintain contacts within

Tibet, and have been a crucial channel through which infonnation about conditions in

Tibet is disseminated abroad after the Chinese government restricted access to Tibet

for journalists, tourists and human rights groups (McLagan 1996:309-310). Upon

returning to the UK, he founded the TIN to handle the flood of infonnation he was

227

receIvmg from Tibet, which he distributed to media outlets and human rights

organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

In spite of their commitment to present to the international community only

factual evidence, some of these organisations and infonnation networks have

contributed to the further vilification of Chinese rule in Tibet, and the creation of a

martyred Tibet. With this statement I do not, in any way intend to underestimate all

the violence, destruction, and suffering endured by Tibetans. However, I contend, that

with the appearance of such diverse new actors in the portrayal of Tibetans and Tibet

under Chinese rule great scope has been opened for the re-emergence of wild and

unfounded generalisations. These include the suggestions that all Chinese are evil,

that Tibetans have been historically the peace-loving people that everybody loves and

respects, that all Tibetan lamas are accomplished Buddhist practitioners, that all

Tibetans are very religious, that nothing has been gained from Chinese rule in Tibet,

and that poverty still remains the condition of all Tibetans in Chinese Tibet. These

suggestions have played an important role in the Mythos Tibet. In the contemporary

context nonetheless, a number of factors contest a romanticised image, including

serious scholarship and reporting on Tibet by Tibetans and Westerners, the increased

access to Tibet and Tibetans, and the militant Chinese counter-discourse with its own

mythologising and portrayals of Tibetan-Chinese Shangri-La.

In response to this trend, in 1997, the Chinese government announced that 'a

committee of experts' had found Shangri-La in the Diqing Tibetan Autonomous

Prefecture (Chinese Yunnan province). Since then Diqing has been preserved as a

national ecological reserve and transfonned into a lucrative tourist destination for

both Chinese and foreigners. In addition, a growing number of Shangri-La hotels,

Shangri-La restaurants, and even a Shangri-La airport have opened to cater to the

growing demands of Shangri-La seekers (Kolas 2003). By claiming Diqing as the real

Shangri -La the government aims at appropriating Tibetan sacred places. The fact that

it is using a foreign tenn (Shangri-La), product of Western Orientalism suggests a

new Chinese Orientalism with its own share of myths, and stories. Likewise, the use

of Western j argon to evoke such powerful imagery and fantasies is a means to attract

Western capital to China. In this way, the PRC can claim political legitimacy and

prove its efforts to preserve Tibetan culture and the special attributes of its land.

Furthennore, it is a continuation of the Maoist process of establishing a new sacred

geography, sanctioned by the State.

228

In the contemporary reconstruction of sacred Tibet, not only Tibetans in and

outside of Tibet participate, but also the Chinese government, ordinary Chinese

people, and Westerners. The government's involvement has gone much further than

the simple promotion of tourism. It has constructed a very peculiar notion of what it

means to be a Tibetan and the limited, politically-correct forms in which this Tibetan­

ness can manifest. The wearing of traditional clothes, the eating of tsampa, and the

like, appear to be completely disassociated from a distinctive cultural, religious and

political past, and are seen as harmless manifestations of the' ethnic other' .

By the same token, two other institutions have contributed significantly to the

contemporary Tibet-West romance. One such institution is Tibet House founded in

1987 in New York City by 'actor-adept' Richard Gere and 'scholar-adept' Robert

Thurman. The other institution is Hollywood, with its importance as a source of films

and documentaries about Tibet.217

Tibet House is an institution committed to the preservation and restoration of

'Tibet's unique cultural and spiritual heritage' and to the presentation of Tibet's

ancient traditions of art and culture to the West by means of creating a permanent

Cultural Centre, with a gallery, a library, and achieves; as well as developing

travelling exhibitions, print publications, media productions; a Web site on the

Internet for the wide distribution of information, and providing support to

conservation activities both inside and outside of Tibet. Furthermore, it promotes

Tibetan 'practical systems of spiritual philosophy and mind sciences, and its arts of

human development, intercultural dialogues, non-violence, and peacemaking, by

means of innovative programmes in cooperation with educational and other cultural

institutions' (http://www.savetibet.org). Its Patron is the Dalai Lama, its President

Robert Thurman, Vice-President the musician Philip Glass. Among the members of

its Board of trustees are Melissa Mathison (former wife of actor Harrison Ford and

script writer of the film Kundun) and actress Vma Thurman (daughter of R. Thurman).

A good example of the type of events sponsored or organised by Tibet House

and the Tibet image it promotes was the International Year o/Tibet (10 March 1991-

10 March 1992), which aimed at staging a series of cultural events and religious

teachings around the world during twelve months in some thirty-six countries to

217 Gere was the first to introduce the Tibet Issue in Hollywood. At the 1993 Academy Awards ceremony, he used his time at the microphone to protest China's occupation of Tibet. Since then he has used any opportunity to further the Tibetan cause (Schell 2000).

229

'promote understanding and appreciation of this beautiful yet endangered culture, and

to create widespread awareness of the situation in Tibet'. It was seen as 'possibly the

last opportunity to work together in a global effort to save the Tibetan people before

they and their culture disappear' (Tibet House brochure pUblicising the event, quoted

in McLagan 1996:371). The co-founders of Tibet House are devoted Buddhists , followers and close friends of the Dalai Lama. They both hold the view that Tibet is

crucial 'for our own time and for the survival of Earth itself [ ... ] Being our most

vibrant link to the ancient wisdom traditions, Tibet, and the sanity she represents,

must not be allowed to disappear' (The Sacred Art of Tibet, Exhibition Catalogue

quoted in McLagan 1996:379). Such portrayal of Tibet has served the Tibetan cause

quite powerfully. On the one hand, it attracts support for Tibetan refugees directly,

attracting for example sponsors for the education of monks and primary school

children. On the other hand, it reduces the odds of the disappearance Tibetan

civilisation by acknowledging the risks posed by displacement and cultural genocide,

and disseminating Tibetan culture in the West. Furthermore, Tibetans have monitored

and organised various events, and have participated in the actual performance of

public religious rituals, sanctioning in this way, the images produced by such

institutions.218

Finally, in 1989 The Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace Prize. The fact that

from 1959 until today he has worked incessantly for the self-determination of the

Tibetan people, the defence of human rights worldwide, and for the well-being of

Tibetan refugees in South Asia and Western Countries has won him international

acclaim. Since his first visit to the West in 1973, a number of western universities and

institutions have conferred Peace A wards and honorary Doctorate Degrees to the

Dalai Lama in recognition of his writings in Buddhist philosophy and for his

leadership in the solution of international conflicts, human rights issues and global

environmental problems. Clearly, the most outstanding of thesehas been the Nobel

Peace Prize. 219 The Norwegian Nobel Committee recognised the Dalai Lama's

218 The fact that Tibetans oftentimes cannot attend some of the activities organised by Western organisations such as Tibet House is noteworthy. The main reason being their goal of attracting high profile individuals, in order to raise funds for the 'movement', which clearly makes such ~vents co~t1y for the average Tibetan. This has not gone without its due criticism and resentment by Tibetan extled organisations (McLagan 1996). . . . 219 Others include: the 1979 Special Medal conferred to the Dalai Lama by the ASI~ BuddhIst Councl~ for Peace (Mongolia); the June 1989 Raoul Wallenberg Congressional Human Rights Award (USA), the September 1989 Recognition of Perseverance of Times of ~dversity by the World Management Council (USA); the April 1991 Distinguished Peace Leadership Award by the Nuclear Age Peace

230

consistent opposition to the use of violence in the struggle for the liberation of Tibet

from Chinese rule; and his advocating peaceful solutions based upon tolerance and

mutual respect (http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureateslindex.html).This fact, together

with the commonly held belief that he personifies Tibetan living wisdom, that he is

the embodiment Chenrezig, the devotion Tibetans have for him and his political

leadership have made him a highly esteemed figure worldwide. This special aura

surrounding the Dalai Lama persona has also attracts followers to Tibetan Buddhism

and humanitarian activists.

In exile the Dalai Lama periodically gives the Initiation of Kalachakra (Tib.

Dus-kyi- 'khor-Io, Skt. Kalachakra Tantra), which according to tradition the Buddha

himself bestowed upon the Kings of Shambhala. The Dalai Lama bestows this

initiation upon thousands of participants both in India (commonly in Bodhgaya) and

in Western countries.220 During the teachings that preceded the 1999 "Kalachakra for

World Peace" Initiation held in Bloomington, Indiana, two Americans who claimed to

be atheistic and without a professed religion, and who attended the teachings out of

sheer admiration for the Dalai Lama, told me a joke, which I find (though extremely

offensive to Christians) representative of the contemporary Mythos Tibet and of the

qualities projected onto the Dalai Lama as the sine qua non of Tibet. The joke went:

'Standing on a boat in the middle of a lake there were the Dalai Lama, Jesus and the Indian guru Sri Satya Sai Baba. In the spirit of the famous New Testament parable where Jesus walks on water and transforms bread into fish and water into wine as a clear proof of his sainthood, Jesus attempts to walk on water and immediately drowns and passes away. Then Sai Baba goes, walks on water and reaches the other side of the shore, and so does the Dalai Lama. Upon reaching shore, Sai Baba tells the Dalai Lama: 'It's a pity we didn't tell Jesus about the rocks he could have stepped on to cross' and the Dalai Lama replies: 'What rocks?'

This sort of spiritual prowess combined with its distinctive humility and acute

sense of humour is without question the most commonly alleged attributes of the

Dalai Lama and Tibetan lamas in general. When interviewed by Orville Schell,

Richard Gere noted that the West's main projection is that just by proximity to the

Foundation (USA); the August 1991 Peace and Unity Award by the National Peac~ .Conference .(India); the March 1993 International Valiant for Freedom Award by the Freedom CoalItIOn (AustralIa); and the April 1994 World Security Annual Peace Award by the New York Lawyer's Alliance (USA)

(http://www.tibet.net!eng/hhdl/ awards ). 220 In the West the audience tends to be quite diverse: Tibetan and Western monks and nuns; lay Tibetans resettl~d in the U.S. and Canada; Western lay Buddhists and Tibetologists; Westem,New-Age spiritual seekers; Dalai Lama admirers; security guards; and of course West~m VIP. s.: actors, musicians, politicians and others involved with the Tibet question either as Buddhist practItIoners or

humanitarian activists.

231

Dalai Lama one will get spiritually healed. Similarly, because of him, of what he is

and represents, Tibetans are thought of as good people and are thus granted spiritual

authority by Westerners (quoted in Schell 2000:56). In this way, just as his words are

taken as those of the Tibetan people, so his personal history is seen as the story of an

exiled, religious people, even though 97 percent of Tibetans remain in Tibet and many

may not be religious (Barnett 2001 :299-300).

Some Tibetans have taken advantage of this VIew, and having seen the

financial potential of supplying to the increasing Western spiritual demand, they have

used and often exploited the maroon robes, Tibetan spiritual jargon, and their own

suspected suffering to make some money. Hence, contemporary mythologizing of

Tibet, which has the Dalai Lama at its centre, has served not only the Tibetan plight

for self-determination through Western grassroots support, but also the personal

interests of common Tibetans. The 'specialness' granted to Tibet through the Tibetan

appropriation of Western myths, helps Tibetan refugees in drawing a more rigid

demarcation of cultural, ethnic and historical boundaries with the Chinese; further

legitimising in this way, their political cause.

The image of the Dalai Lama, the increasing allure of Tibetan Buddhism, the

threat of loss of Shangri-La under Chinese rule, and the contemporary mountaineering

trend that has made Everest and the Himalayas a popular destination for the so-called

eco-tourists all played a role in the generation of Hollywood's new interest in Tibet.

In 1997 two large-budget films about Tibet were produced. The first was

directed by Jean-Jacques Arnaud based on Heinrich Harrer's Seven Years in Tibet.

The second Kundun, directed by Martin Scorsese, was based on the Dalai Lama's

autobiography. Due to Chinese and Indian restrictions which interfered with the

filming of both films in Tibet or northern India, the former was filmed in the Andes in

Argentina and the latter in the Atlas Mountains in Morocco. What is significant about

these films is that many Tibetans participated as (unprofessional) actors and extras,

and in so doing they were helping to create a Tibet aimed at Westerners and Tibetan

refugees who have had little contact with Tibet. Members of the Dalai Lama's family

acted in both films.221 In this way, the views contained therein about Tibet, China,

221 The Dalai Lama's own sister Jetsun Perna plays their mother (The Great Mother) ~ Seve~ Years i.n Tibet and his niece that is Jetsun Perna's daughter plays their mother in Kundun. An mterestmg fact IS

that ietsun Perna led in 1980 the last of the three Government-in-exile fact-fmding delegations to Tibet approved by the Beijing government under Party General Hu Yaobang (Schell 2000:218).

232

their history and the Dalai Lama himself are sanctioned indirectly by their presence.

Similarly, the fact that Tibetans had to transport themselves to Argentina or Morocco

to help demonstrate their history and culture is significant in that it shows a different

kind of cultural displacement.222

In short, it seems that the 'Go East' fashion of the New Age spiritual

movement that has been developing worldwide since the 1980s has given Tibet a very

special place. In the contemporary representation of Tibet 'natives' have played a

crucial part in encouraging a view of their country that is still reminiscent of the

nineteenth and early twentieth century Mythos Tibet. This however, has been

coloured by the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the forced displacement of thousands of

Tibetans and the contemporary appeal of Tibetan Buddhism. In addition, the increase

in scholarship and information about Tibet and contact with lay and religious Tibetan

refugees has put the current Mythos Tibet under a magnifying glass. As a result, new

interest on the representation of the real Tibet has triggered serious questioning of the

modes of both Chinese and Western appropriation of Tibetan culture and their claims

of legitimacy.

Furthermore, not all Tibetan refugees' responses to Mythos Tibet have been

compliant. Many Tibetans living in the West, as well as Tibetan scholars see it as yet

another form of cultural displacement, and as hampering the Tibetan political cause.

For instance, a Tibetan living in Los Angeles argues that 'Tibet and its people,

religion, and culture have been ravaged over the last forty years by Chinese

communists. As we and our tradition have sought refuge and hope of a new life in the

West, we face another, far more subtle threat. When 'experts' with limited

understanding take it upon themselves to define our culture and experience for us, to

intrude their beliefs and agendas where ours should be, then they have ravaged us as

222 In addition, by 1996 many documentaries and new feature films were in development. Actor Steven Seagal was reputedly producing Dixie Cups, an action epic centreing on the CIA's efforts to aid Tibetan guerrillas in the 1950s and 1960s. The Buddha from Brooklyn, the story of a Jewish-Italian cosmetologists who is designated the reincarnation of a high lama, had reportedly been bought ?y Turner Films. Windhorse, a low-budget feature about a contemporary 'nationalist' Lhasan family which experiences tensions with the Chinese was about to be secretly shot in Tibet and Nepal by the documentarian Paul Wagner. Mystics and Magicians in Tibet, a historical drama about Alexandra David-Neel's explorations in Tibet, was also in development, to be produced by Ismail Merchant. ~d finally a script based on Blake Kerr's book Sky Burial, about a 1987 Chinese .police crac~down m Lhasa, had been bought by Merchant-Ivory Productions (Schell 2000:33-34). This sudden Tlbet craze was frequently remarked in other forms of media such as magazines and newspaper~; and w~s accompanied by charity events which had the Dalai Lama as the guest of honour, cel~bnty coc~aIl parties, congressional gatherings, concerts, experimental theatre productions orgamzed by Tlbet

support groups, and so forth.

233

surely as those with guns ' (quoted in Frechette 2002: 117). Similarly the Tibetan

intellectual Tsering Shakya believes that the constant mythologisation of Tibet has

obscured and confused the real nature of the Tibetan political struggle. For him,

whereas issues like the Palestinian problem are seen as real political concerns, Tibet is

seen as a lost cause, which from time to time pricks one's conscience. Unmistakably,

Shakya argues, the Tibetan political problem has been conflated with the myth of

Shangri-La. Therefore, 'issues about Tibet are often treated as a question of

sentimentality versus political expediency. If the Tibetan issue is to be taken seriously,

Tibet must be liberated from both the Western imagination and the myth of Shangri­

La' (Shakya 1991 :23).

7.4. Concluding Remarks

Mythos Tibet has undergone many changes since its beginnings in the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries. Missionary and colonial accounts of Tibet were Orientalist

in their description of a quasi-barbaric 'other'. With the founding of the Theosophical

Society in the late nineteenth century and with the beginning of a fuller scale

exploration of the Himalayan region in the midst of Victorian uncertainty in England,

what Lopez calls a complexio oppositorum emerged. 'It saw Tibet as a mixture of the

pristine and the polluted, the authentic and the derivative, the holy and the demonic,

the good and the bad' (Lopez 1998:4). This complexio oppositorum has in many ways

characterised the relationship of the West to Asia. From the 1930s onwards, however,

with the birth of the myth of Shangri-La, the romanticisation of Tibet was unleashed

on an unprecedented scale. This mythologizing responded to Western historical and

spiritual forces, which often had nothing to do with Tibet itself. In this sense, Tibet

was transformed from a geographical place into an utopian paradise, which became a

metaphor for everything that Westerners yearned for. That is, the myth of Shangri-La

could be seen as a subtle criticism of the failures and excesses of Western civilisation.

For a few decades, this orientalist enterprise had the effect of displacing Tibetan

culture in very subtle ways, and of replacing it with a projected metaphor of a spiritual

sanctuary.

In the contemporary order of things as Tibetans have been given a voice, they

have contributed, along with Tibetologists and Tibetophiles in the representation of

234

Tibet in ways that demythologise some of the earlier assumptions about Tibet. At the

same time, they have reinforced the notion of Tibet as the last living bastion of

spiritual wisdom. From the late 1980s onwards this representation has served the

Tibetan struggle for self-determination and has attracted financial and political

support. It has also provided the exiled authorities with unique elements to enhance

the distinctiveness of Tibetan ethnic and national identity vis-a.-vis the Chinese.

Because the myth of Shangri-La has no concrete spatial-referent, and there is no

substance to it, it has had no significant impact on ordinary, non-intellectual,

apolitical refugees (other than providing them with a popular name for their

businesses). Therefore, Mythos Tibet has not added any templates through which the

Tibetan land could be perceived in exile in the way for example, the imposition of the

imagination of the Chinese nation in Tibet and the existence of sbas-yul have done for

Tibetan refugees everywhere.

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General Conclusions

This thesis has revolved around two main constructs, 'displacement' and 'identity'.

Our starting point was the notion that displacement is a multifaceted phenomenon and

that it can be understood both literally, as the physical dislocation of a people from

their homeland; and metaphorically, as the colonising imposition of a foreign culture.

One of the central premises of this thesis is that the violent occupation of Tibet by the

Chinese from 1950 onwards produced the forced displacement of thousands of

Tibetans who settled as refugees in neighbouring South Asian countries and in

Western countries, and the displacement of Tibetan culture within Tibet through the

imposition of Han Chinese culture.

Our main purpose was to study the ways in which displacement and the

experience of exile affect the articulation of notions of territory, especially the notion

of 'homeland' in refugee communities, and the construction of ethnic and national

identities in their new settings. Our case studies were the Tibetan refugee

communities in Northern India, in the Kathmandu Valley and in various towns in

eastern Switzerland. From the outset, a number of questions were raised in relation to

the methodological tools available to study social and cultural change in landless,

displaced societies, and in societies in transition, and to understand the ways in which

displaced ethnic communities engage in the process of nation-building and identity

formation.

The theoretical framework advanced in this thesis suggested the use of an

'ethno-symbolic' approach to the topic which sees the nation as a modem social

construct, but deeply rooted in a sense of a historical ethnic identity. It was argued

that in displaced ethnic communities the process of nation-building has been largely

stimulated by specific material and socio-political conditions normally attributed to

modernity. Nevertheless, because of the experience of forced displacement and the

construction of ethnicity vis-a-vis an essentialised 'other', the nation is rooted in a

communal historical consciousness. Therefore, displaced 'nations' are deeply

historical but are at the same time embedded in the modem. ,

Furthennore, to understand the use of ethnicity and historical consciousness in

the construction of national narratives in exile, I examined the experience of

displacement as generating the dual process of the de-territorialisation of culture by

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depriving refugees from access to the homeland; and its re-territorialisation, through

the intensification (where it already existed) or the development (where it did not exist)

of a territorial consciousness among refugees. It was argued that such processes have

the effect of inserting the issue of territoriality at the centre of both refugees' plight

for self-determination and of their self-representation. This point was based on the

assumption that the territorial consciousness of displaced communities worldwide

reflects an understanding of culture as a highly naturalised phenomenon; that is, as

intimately tied to the soil that nurtures it. In this way, refugees have tended to see their

condition as pathological, and thus the urgency of their plight.

Key to the process of reinserting territory, and more specifically the alleged

ancestral homeland at the centre of refugees' ethnic and national identities is the role

of the intellectual-educators often played by the political elites of the diasporas. They

are instrumental in redefining the community by engaging in selective readings of

pre-existing myths, symbols, customs and memories of the ethnic past, and putting

forth a new understanding of history. As part of this process, intellectual-educators

define the community in space by implying a close link between the nation's history

and its landscape. 'In doing so, they are able to evoke the type of shared destiny and

cultural uniqueness that not only unifies people, but also turns nationalists' sentiments

and ideologies into political action' (Smith, A. 1989:120-121).

In displaced ethnic communities, rights to self-determination and statehood are

framed within a narrative of attachment to a poetic, yet well-defined territory, a

shared history, and a common and 'unique' cultural identity among inhabitants of the

'country' they used to inhabit. In this context, I suggested the use of what I have

called the 'One People, One Territory' principle to understand the pan-national

discourse which privileges the notion of a coherent, and relatively homogeneous

community, who share one historical and cultural experience over the ancestral

homeland. This principle, by definition implies the drawing of territorial and cultural

boundaries against the 'Other'. The exiled and diaspora elites of such communities in

their role of intellectual-educators are not only primarily concerned with the

preservation of their ethnic identity, but also, and most importantly, with creating the

necessary conditions for the translation of political legitimacy into the creation of a

state for their nation. Intellectual-educators create in this wayan essentialist view of

the nation - that as a people they have always and everywhere possessed a core of

discernible, ethnically determined qualities.

237

A central argument in this thesis has been that Tibetan ethnic and cultural

identities have been deeply rooted in the Tibetan land and that attachment to territory

was historically expressed in both religious and secular terms. Displacement and

refugeedom have produced, however, some discontinuity with the past in the

articulation of contemporary notions of territory, as well as the transformation of

Tibetan identities. In order to analyse this discontinuity we looked first at the

emergence of notions of territory and space in historical Tibet. It was asserted that a

Pre-Buddhist religious lore centred on the worship of local deities and the

introduction and assimilation of Buddhism provided important templates through

which the landscape could be perceived. Furthermore, I argued that the religious

perception of territory was shaped by the unique role of the lama, by a rich textual

tradition, and by the projection of the Buddhist mandala principle into the Tibetan

landscape. Other notions - that there are hidden lands and that Tibet is the special

field of activity of Chenrezig, and that Tibetans are his descendants - added new

dimensions to the conception of territory infused with religious meaning. The

particular qualities of the environment in Tibet, which were considered naturally

powerful, also played a role in this process. All of this provided Tibetan refugees with

a critically important resource to reflect upon the range of meanings attached to

population displacement after 1950.

Next, we focused on the Tibetan intellectual-educators namely, the 14th Dalai

Lama in his role of head of the Government-in-exile and spiritual leader of Tibetans,

and officials of the Central Tibetan Administration. They have led a sustained and

visible struggle to fashion both a nation and government, consistently claiming to

represent the authentic interests and aspirations of all the Tibetan people. Thus, the

'One People, One Territory' principle was particularly useful to assess the Pan­

Tibetan narratives of the Dalai Lama and the GIE. The constituent elements of this

narrative were the portrayal of an essential religious Tibetan identity (which seldom

incorporates the Bon religion and the minority of Tibetan Muslims), the centrality of

the notion of Tibet as a sacred land, the idea that Tibetans have become martyrs due

to the Chinese occupation and rule of Tibet, their embracing of environmental

concerns as a key element of their Buddhist identity, as well as their democratic

vision which dreams of a free Tibet that could be transformed into a peace sanctuary , that could benefit all of humanity. The establishment of the Tibetan education system

in India, Nepal and Bhutan, the various forms of public events and use of nationalist

238

paraphernalia, the private and public interviews with the Dalai Lama and the use of

the Lhasa dialect as the lingua franca of Tibetans in exile, have served the Dalai Lama

and the GIE as efficient mechanisms for the dissemination of their narrative of the

nation.

In the case of the Tibetan GIE, it is important to note that it was able to

maintain continuity with the past, not only in terms of the cultural institutions

reproduced in exile under its auspices, but also in terms of leadership and social status.

The majority of exile government officials were from the traditional secular or

religious aristocracy (mainly from Central Tibet), from wealthy Khampa families, or

monks or reincarnate lamas. Similarly, the Tibetan leadership took old institutional

structures as the templates for both the preservation and recasting of their social

system, but with new institutions that could advance their goal to statehood in their

eventual return to Tibet. Thus, the structure of the Government-in-exile followed that

of the former government but with greatly increased accessibility, accountability,

democratisation and some modernisations. Therefore, as in the case of the pre-1914

Armenian Governments-in-exile, the legitimacy of the Tibetan OlE rests on its ability

to coordinate settlement and resettlement projects, to provide education for a basically

illiterate exiled-society; and to articulate a national narrative that transcends regional

and local loyalties and sectarian differences.

However, the regional configuration of the Tibetan diaspora is not

representative of the situation of pre-1959 Tibet. This is to say that the majority (70

percent) of the refugee population comes from Central Tibet, 25 percent from Kham,

and only 5 percent from Amdo; in contrast to the 20 percent of central Tibetans; 53

percent of Khampas and 27 percent of Andowas in pre-diaspora Tibet. This

configuration is reflected in the Gelugpa and Central Tibetan religious and political

hegemony, as well as in the choice of language (Lhasa dialect, instead of the Khampa

or Andowa dialects) for the refugee communities. These facts are often resented by

eastern Tibetans and translate if not in antipathy, in indifference toward the Dalai

Lama's political project.

'Every generation fashions its own interpretations of national identity in the

light of its reading of the ethnic past or pasts. The fund of ethnic elements, the ethno­

historical heritage handed down through the generations, is always being reinterpreted

and revised by various social groups in response to internal differences and external

stimuli' (Smith, A. 1999:17). In response to this, I examined not only the 'official'

239

narratives, but also a variety of alternative narratives, which I referred to as

'oppositional histories', since they stand in opposition to some of the basic premises

on which the official narrative is based. In looking at these oppositional histories, we

realise the frailty of the national project as presented by the exiled authorities.

In her seminal study on Hutu refugees in Tanzania, Liisa Malkki stresses the

differences in the articulation of notions of national identity, and historical memory,

as well as of notions such as 'home' and 'homeland' in refugees of camp and town

settlements. She points to the construction of rather conservative narratives of the

nation among camp refugees which portray themselves as the rightful heirs to their

homeland in Burundi. Their claims are based on their alleged preservation of

'traditional' Hutu ways of life (Malkki 1995b). In claiming legitimacy, Tibetan

narratives of the nation are not necessarily categorised along the rural/urban

settlement divide. Rather they are differentiated on the basis of the originality of their

experiences of the homeland, and of experience of suffering under Chinese rule, and

on age gaps, as well as refugees' processes of socialisation, and on the refugee's

closeness (whether physical or spiritual) to one of the main centres of Tibetan cultural

production in exile, i.e. Dharamsala. This is proved by the differences in the

articulation of notions of the homeland, as well as on the various roles the myth of

return plays in different refugee communities.

Our study of the articulation of notions of space and territory showed that the

Chinese occupation of Tibet is seen as a source of pollution, which disrupted the

'natural' relationship between Tibetans and the Tibetan land. There is widespread

feeling among exiles that Tibetans have become beggars in their own land. This is

believed to be largely due to discrimination in the workforce in the TAR and other

Tibetan autonomous prefectures, as well as to the increasing pressure that continued

transfers of Chinese Han to Tibet has put on the Tibetan economy and the Tibetan

land.

The new generation of Tibetans, which is increasingly more removed from

Tibet (by experience and socialisation) no longer articulates feelings of attachment to

land in religious ways. These Tibetans tend to have fewer religious inclinations due in

great measure to new aspirations influenced by their contact with the host countries.

In this sense, exile has given them a different lens through which to perceive Tibet.

Although this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it does reveal a great deal

about how experiences of persecution, displacement and uprootedness inform the

240

construction of memory, and in the reconfiguration of images of homeland. It shows

that identities tightly built on connections to territory, when displaced, struggle

acutely to redefine themselves. Contemporary Tibetan exiles' imagination of the

Tibetan land has been thus shaped by anew, more secular environment in host

countries, experiences of tremendous suffering, and by the existence of various

generations of 'refugees' living all over the world with different levels of attachment

to their homeland. For most Tibetan exiles, their homeland - often conceived in local

rather than national terms - is either a sacred country (Tib. gnas-yul) or a precious

land (Tib. lung-pa tsa-chen-po). The difference is generally based on their level of

religiosity, as well as of national consciousness.

The myth of return has served many Tibetan refugees against assimilation into

their host countries, and thus, has become a key ingredient in the reconstruction of

Tibetan ethnic identity in exile. However, the pervasiveness of such a myth is clearly

not universal, and in some cases, the myth of return is only a reminder of family

heritage which evokes little yearning for the homeland. Similarly, the existence of

multiple locales of 'home' associated with Tibetan-ness, points to the increasing

deterritorialisation of Tibetan culture under the pressure of continued displacement.

Therefore, on the one hand we have an obvious process of de-territorialisation of

Tibetan culture, which occurs almost naturally with the passing of time and the

physical and spiritual disassociation with the homeland. And a conscious re­

territorialisation produced by the also natural yearnings for home and the construction

of national narrative that intends to recapture the ancestral homeland for the nation.

In the context of an increasingly plural and diverse Tibetan diaspora, the

development of a sense of comradeship based on the principle of 'One People, One

Territory' and 'One Culture, One History' is very problematic. Many Tibetans still

derive their strongest sense of belonging from a more traditional and more localised

orientation toward the Tibetan homeland. Moreover, the fact that Tibetan refugees

constitute only 2.4 percent of the entire Tibetan population, that within the 2.4 percent

significant differences exist, and that there are no indications that the majority of

Tibetans in occupied Tibet (both within the TAR and eastern Tibet) espouse

unanimously the Dalai Lama's project, points to the limits of representation by a

single group in such a diverse and complex Tibetan world. By analysing a few cases

of challenges to official narratives and policies, this thesis has shown that Tibetan

identity in exile is still in the toils of labour; that is, it is constantly being negotiated

241

between Tibetan refugees from the three regions, with Tibetans in occupied Tibet, and

with the host societies and often Westemers. In brief, Chinese, Tibetans, Tibetophiles,

and Tibetologists all playa part in the process of authentification and representation

of Tibetan-ness and in the process of contesting Tibetan territory. 223

223 As can be attested by the information presented in chapter 4, since the 1980s there have been a number of sporadic demonstrations against Chinese rule in Tibet and in support of the Dalai Lama; however most of these have only been in the greater urban centres in Central Tibet. Under a political system that hinders politicalliberalisation and represses opposition, such as the Chinese; it is extremely difficult to gauge the true nature and weight of opposition to Chinese rule in Tibet. Therefore, one cannot safely assume that there is a generalised Tibetan desire for independence, nor a generalised acceptance of the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama's government. See Barnet, R. and Akiner, S. (eds.) (1994). Resistance and Reform in Tibet. London: Hurst and Company.

242

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Settlements

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Appendix 2 Table of Interviews

India 12 May - 30 June 2001

Name Date Place Duration Age Occu~ation Gender Origin Religion Transcript

Karma 15.5.01 Majnukatilla 105 min 50s Sweater retailer M Kham not Yes stated

Jampa 15.5.01 Majnukatilla 105 min 50s Sweater retailer M Kham, not Yes stated

Ama-Ia 15.5.01 Majnukatilla 30 min 70s retired F Central Tibet Gelug Yes Thubten 15.5.01 Majnukatilla 30 min 30s Hotel Attendant M Central Tibet Gelug Yes Lhasang 31.5.01 Mcleod Ganj 45 min 40s Intellectual M Central Tibet not Yes Tsering stated Dawa 22,23,2 LTWA 3 hrs 40s Scholar M Sakya Sakya Yes Norbu 4.5.01

Dechen 27.5.01 Mcleod Ganj 150 min 28 Rest. Attendant F Born Bhutan Kagyu Yes

Lhamo 23,26. Mcleod Ganj 90 min 39 Business F Born India Gelug Yes

5.01 Tashi 19- Guest 4 hrs 26 Student M Kham not Yes

29.5.01 Housel other stated Konchok 18,23,2 Guest 2 hrs 24 Hotel Attendant M kham not Yes

8.5.01 House stated

Wangyal 17,18,2 Guest 190 min 23 Student M Born in India Gelug Yes

2.5.3 House

Sangye 27.5.01 Mcleod Ganj 40 min 47 Cook F Gyantse Gelug Yes

-Ia Pema 27,29.5 Restaurant 80 min 32 Waitress F Dehra Dun Sakya Yes

.01 Rinchen 26.5.01 shop 30 min 29 Shop keeper M born in India not Yes

stated

Tsering 28.6.01 Taxi 90 min 33 taxi driver M Born in India Gelug Yes

Official 23.5.01 Department 20 min 40s official M not stated not no

of Home stated

Pema 6.01 TWA 1 hr 20s TWA F born in India not Yes stated

P. 2.6.01 Nunnery 30 min 60s Nun F Amdo Gelug Yes

Kandro Gelug Yes D. 2.6.01 Jogibara Rd 30 min 52 Nun F Nyalam

Dolma not Yes A 6.01 Guest 45 min 29 TYC M Born in India

House stated

B 6.01 Guest 45 min 27 TYC M Born in Gelug Yes

House Nepal

Urgyen 4.6.01 LTWA 35 min 39 Monk M Kyirong Gelug no

C 8.6.01 LTWA 30 min 26 CT A secretary F Born in India Gelug no

D 6.01 Cantine 35 min 32 CTA clerk M Lhasa not Yes stated

Dawa 12.6.01 Home 70 min 72 retired F Lhasa Gelug Yes

Tenzin 12.6.01 home 70 min 77 retired M Lhasa Gelug Yes

Lobsang 14.6.01 Home 40 min 45 Artist M Tsetang not Yes stated

244

Nepal 1 April - 24 April 2001

Name Date Place Duration Age Occupation Gender Origin A 2- Nunnery 30 min 22

Religion Transcript

20.4.01 Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No

B 2- Nunnery 35 min 24 Nun F Sakya

20.4.01 Kham Kagyu/ No

C 2- Nunnery 30 min 36 Nun Sakya

20.4.01 F Kham Kagyu/ No

o 2- Nunnery 30 min 35 Nun Sakya

20.4.01 f Kham Kagyu/ No

E 2- Nunnery 30 min 28 Nun Sakya

20.4.01 F Kham Kagyu/ No

F 2- Nunnery 30 min 28 Sakya

20.4.01 Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No

G 2- Nunnery 40 min 32 Sakya

Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01

H 2- Nunnery 30 min 38 Sakya

Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01

I 2- Nunnery 30 min 42 Sakya

Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01

J 2- Nunnery 30 min 23 Sakya

Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01 Sakya

K 2- Nunnery 30 min 54 Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01 Sakya

L 2- Nunnery 30 min 27 Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01 Sakya

M 2- Nunnery 30 min 22 Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01 Sakya

N 2- Nunnery 30 min 34 Nun F Kham Kagyu/ No 20.4.01 Sakya

o 4,9.4. Nunnery 45 min 82 Retired M Kham Kagyu/ No 01 Sakya

P 1,12.4 Nunnery 60 min 72 Monk M Kham Kagyu/ No .01 Sakya

Q 5.4.01 Nunnery 40 min 35 Monk/manager M Kham Kagyu/ No Sakya

D. W- 6.4.01 Boudha 30 min 34 Student M Born in Nyingma Yes Nepal

R 7.4.01 Gompa 30 min 30s Monk M Born in Nyingma Yes Nepal

Jamyang 9.4.01 Jawalakhel 45 min 41 Carpet Factory M Central Tibet Not Yes stated

Samten 9.4.01 Jawalakhel 30 min 32 Carpet Factory F Amdo Not Yes stated

Nyima 9.4.01 Jawalakhel 25 min 67 Retired F Amdo Gelug Yes

Lhamo 9.4.01 Jawalakhel 30 min 28 Carpet Factory F Born in Not Yes Nepal stated

S 12.4.01 Tundikhel 30 min 21 Student M Born in Kagyu Yes Nepal

T 12.4.01 Tundikhel 30 min 25 Student F Born in Kagyu Yes Nepal

U 12.4.01 Tundikhel 20 min 30s Handicraft F Central Tibet Not No

Centre stated

Nyima 11.4.01 Boudha 45 min 50s Shop Keeper M Central Tibet Nyingma Yes

V 11.4.01 Boudha 45 min 50s Shop Keeper F Central Tibet Gelug Yes

W 15.4.01 Swayambhu 20 min 34 Monk M Not stated Sakya No

X 15.4.01 Swa~ambhu 20 min 24 Monk M Not stated Sak~a No

245

Lhasa 25 April - 10 May 2001

Name Date Place Duration Age Occupation Gender Origin Religion Transcript

Tashi 29.4.01 (Home) 1 hr 73 Scholar/ M Guchok, C- not Yes Tsering Tibet stated

Namling School Project

A 1.5.01 (Home) 1 hr 68 retired M Kham Kagyu No B 1.5.01 (Home) 1 hr 67 retired F Kham Kagyu No

Switze rland 1 July- 15 August 2003

Name Date Place Duration Age Occupation Gender Origin Religion Transcript

A 20- Uznach 6 hrs, 42 Nurse F South India not yes 23.7.03 (informal stated

talks) B 12- Zurich 8 hrs 39 Nurse F Born in Gelug yes

19.7.03 (informal Nepal, talks)

Pema 14.7.03 St Gallen 1 hr 47 Pestalozzi M Central Tibet Gelug yes School 'Father'

Tselha 14.7.03 St Gallen 1 hr 47 Runs Restaurant F Central Tibet Gelug yes

Kelsang 14.7.03 St Gallen 45 min 24 Waitress F Born in Gelug yes Lhasa

Karma 15.7.03 St Gallen 75 min 39 Nurse M Born in India Gelug yes

Tenzin 15.7.03 St Gallen 90 min 29 Former monk M Kham not yes stated

Tashi 15.7.03 St Gallen 90 min 32 Former monk M Kham not yes stated

D 17.7.03 Zurich 120 min 44 Nurse F Born in Gelug yes India,

D's son 17.7.03 Zurich 30 min 22 Dancer M Born in Swit Gelug yes

D's 18.7.03 Rikon 45 min 71 retired F Central Tibet Gelug yes

mum D's 18.7.03 Rikon 45 min 69 retired M Central Tibet Gelug Yes

father E 18.7.03 Rikon 30 min 73 retired M Amdo Nyingma yes

Couple 22.7.03 Horgen 2 hrs 42/4 Social worker/ F/M Born in not yes

A 3 India, stated

Clothing Factory

Couple 22.7.03 Horgen 40 min 50s Finance/ M Born in

B Central Tibet

Social worker F Born in not No Kham stated

Couple 22.7.03 Horgen 40 min 40s Finance/ M Amdo not No stated

C Home F Central Tibet

Couple 22.7.03 Horgen 30 min 40s Nurses F/M Kham not No stated

D F 22.7.03 Horgen 30 min 39 TWA F Lhasa not yes

stated

G 22.7.03 Horgen 45 min 54 Bussiness M Central Tibet not yes stated

H 26.7.03 Mt. Pelerin 1 hr 40s Monk M South India Gelug yes

246

Appendix 3 Interview Brief Approximately seventy interviews were carried out in India (Dharamsala and Delhi), Nepal (Kathmandu Valley) (April-June 2001), and Switzerland (Zurich, Horgen, Rikon, St. Gallen, Vevey) (July-August 2003). Most of the transcripts of the interviews conducted in India and Nepal are in notebooks; only five interviews conducted in India and Nepal and all interviews conducted in Switzerland have been transcribed in full in a word processor (Approx. 9,000 words).

20 percent of the interviews were carried out in English; the rest were conducted in Tibetan with English translation. In the case of Tibetans in Switzerland, the bulk of the interviews were carried out in German or Tibetan with English Translation.

From England, contact was made with a Nunnery in Boudhanath, Nepal where I stayed for a total of 21 days. The Nunnery's Abbot and some of his relatives were interviewed, as well as 14 of the 18 resident nuns. I met formally in one occasion with each of the 14 nuns for no more than 40 minutes and twice informally for no more than 20 minutes. Record of these informal talks was not kept. At their request all their names have been kept anonymous. 1 Other interviews in Boudhanath were conducted on the basis of recommendations and referral by the nunnery's Abbot's attendant and family. Contact with my informants in Tundikhel and Jawalakhel was made thanks to a referral from the CTA's Kathmandu Reception Centre. In Delhi, I conducted four formal interviews and had half a dozen of informal conversations with members of the interviewees' families in the Majnukatilla Settlement where I stayed for four nights; only sketches of these informal talks were kept. In Dharamsala I stayed for 45 days in Macleod Ganj in the Ladies Venture Guesthouse where many of the interviews took place. In Zurich I stayed with a Tibetan family for 12 days and with another in Uznach for 7 days. Most of the other interviews in Switzerland occurred on the basis of their recommendations and referrals.

Interview Questions The questions asked to my informants were divided in five categories: 1. Life in Tibet 2. Notions of Territory and Homeland 3. Religiosity and Myths of Origin (e.g. Chenrezig) 4. Tibetan Identity (regional, national, and 'generational') 5. Myth of Retum

It is important to note however, that my questions were refined continuously and were only gradually systematised as I became more skilled at interviewing.

Sample Questions: 1. Life in Tibet What was your family'S occupation in Tibet? Can you describe your life there?

I All my informants in the three sites who wished to remain anonymous are referred to with letters, e.g. Informant A, informant B, and so forth.

247

2. Notions of Territory and Homeland What does Tibet mean to you? What is Tibet like? What are the most vibrant memories you hold of Tibet? What are the first thoughts that come to mind when you think about Tibet? When one mentions the word 'home' what place comes first to mind? Is Tibet special in anyway to you? (Tib. bod lung-pa tsa-chen-po re-pas?) What makes it so?

3. Religiosity and Myths of Origin (e.g. Chenrezig) Do you practise any religion? What type of religious practice do you carry out on a regular basis? Do you have a spiritual master? Where do Tibetans come from? Why do Tibetans worship local spirits and deities? What do they represent? Why do Tibetans engage in Pilgrimage? Why are mountains sacred for Tibetans? What is the significance of the story of the marriage of the monkey and the ogress? Do you believe in such story? Do you know what a sbas-yul is? Do they exist today?

4. Tibetan Identity What makes a Tibetan feel Tibetan? What differentiates dbus-gtsang-pas, khams-pas and andowas? Do you hold a Green Book? Would you consider becoming a Nepal, Indian or Swiss national? Why or why not? Is there a difference in the 'Tibetan ways' between the new arrivals, those born in India and Nepal, and older Tibetans born in Tibet? What is the political struggle represented by the Dalai Lama and his government? Do you identify with it?

5. Myth of Return Do you want to return to Tibet in the present circumstances? Would you prefer to have some conditions changed? What changes would you like to see happening in Tibet in the near future? Would you return to Tibet if these changes occur? What would you do in Tibet? Do you have contacts now with family or other fellow Tibetans in Tibet?

248

Appendix 4 Tibetan Refugees in Bhutan

In 1959, when a large influx .of Tibetans p.oured int.o India, the G.overnment .of India

suggested that th.ose refugees wh.o were c.oming thr.ough Bhutan sh.ould be resettled there t.o

lessen the pressure .of rehabilitati.on burden in India. The refugees themselves would find it

easier to adapt t.o the conditi.ons there because of the similarity in geographical situation and

common cultural and social links with the Bhutanese. In 1962 the Government of Bhutan

granted land, the Indian g.overnment financed these projects, and provisions were made for

the settlement of 4,000 Tibetans in Bhutan. The majority were settled on agricultural sites at

Paro, Bumthang, Thimphu, Jigme-Nang, Kmje and Bodgar, which were begun in 1963 and

completed in late 1974 (The Tibet Office 1979:1). Tibetan refugees in Bhutan became self­

sufficient and at times were wealthier than locals, a fact that created animosity.

In the 1970s, the situati.on became very tense due to clashes with Bhutanese

authorities. In 1974, more than one hundred Tibetan refugees were arrested and found guilty

without trial Dr proof .of planning acts of sabotage and plotting to assassinate the King of

Bhutan (The Tibet Office 1979:3). The Government of Bhutan imposed strict censuring of

mail and ban .of travel to Tibetans. Later that year, around 80 Tibetans were expelled from

Bhutan, and the remaining ones were pressured to accept Bhutanese citizenship and be

dispersed into small gr.oups. The Government .of Bhutan also declared that it would allow

Tibetan refugees to cross into Bhutan on humanitarian grounds but would not grant them

asylum and would send them directly t.o India. Similarly it refused to allow the Dalai Lama to

maintain a liais.on office in Bhutan; it disqualified Tibetans to join governmental service, and

discouraged any manifestati.on of traditi.onal Tibetan customs such as public rituals and dress

(ibid: 7-8). As a result, many Tibetans p.oured into India for resettlement. Nowadays, there are

seven scattered c.ommunities with approximately 1,400 Tibetan refugees in Bhutan.

249

Appendix 5

Marxist-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought

The PRC's national and international projects were based on Marxist-Leninism and Mao

Zedong's Thought. Its primary goal was the socialist transformation of Chinese society and

culture necessary to modernize the country, and to improve the PRC's international standing.

These were to be achieved through changes in the means of production, and in the social

superstructure (Le. the system of laws, government, religion, philosophy, and the arts, which

determines the consciousness of any given society, which were meant to transform the way the

Chinese and all minority nationalities living within the confines of the PRC saw themselves

and the world (Chambre 1960). Likewise, changes in the economic structure and

superstructure were meant to be anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist in nature.

The basis of Mao's thought is encapsulated in three articles (Ch. lao san pian: "In

Commemoration of Bethune" Ch. Jinian baiqiuen; "Serve the People", Ch. Wei renmin fuwu;

and "The Foolish Old Man who Removed the Mountain", Ch. Yu gong yi shan); the

Quotations from Chairman Mao, compiled in the 'Little Red Book'; and Mao's poems.

Furthermore, Mao's thought was shaped by four main interrelated topics, which, when

implemented had significant impact on Chinese society as a whole: the notion of permanent

revolution and class struggle; the need for thought reform, rectification campaigns, socialist

education and the adequate use of literature and the arts to create individuals loyal to the

socialist revolution; and the need to achieve the right combination of effective leadership with

broad participation (Womack 1982).

The transition to socialism was intended to be implemented in two stages: the first

stage would be democratic reforms, which consisted of the redistribution of land, the

suppression of 'enemies of the revolution' and the beginning of class struggle; and then the

socialist transformation, which involved the full-fledged collectivisation of society (in

cooperatives, communes and the like).

Upon establishing the PRC, the CCP started to reassess Chinese history. Mao stressed

the need to take the class struggle view as a starting point, and the need to base historical

criticism on scientific evidence. For Mao, Chinese history, as most of world history, is the

history of the dominance of one class over another; hence it had to be re-written accordingly.

In the process of doing so, he became skilled in selective remembrance of historical facts and

through it reconstructed Chinese history. Nevertheless, he seems to have perpetuated the

imperial tradition of writing history in order to justify its rise to power and actions, as well as

to voice opposition within the Party (Schwarcz 1994). This is significant in that history

conceived in this way provided the CCP with an additional rationale for the integration and

assimilation of minority nationalities.

250

In the late 1950s, rapid collectivisation, the establishment of the people's conununes

(Ch. renmin gongshe) in the rural areas, the development of heavy industry and the Great

Leap Forward began to transform the economic structure, Chinese society and the Chinese

landscape in general. This was based on the notion that China could leap over the normal

stages of economic development through extraordinary effort. The masses possessing great

latent productive power can, by dint of effort and organization, transform their labor into

capital. Thus, great pressure was put on the peasants to provide for themselves without

drawing resources from the urban economy and in addition to provide food, industrial crops,

and even steel for the urban economy (Lieberthal 1995). It was as Spence (1990) notes, a

fantastic dream, but it led to catastrophe for millions of people as famine stroke everywhere.

It is important to note that all such policies were implemented at huge social and ecological

costs.

As far as social organisation is concerned, the most outstanding policy implemented

at this time was the organisation of the Chinese people in local work units (Ch. dan wei) to

which all individuals had to report and consult for major decisions such as work, living

arrangements, marriage, childbearing, and the like (Link 1995). As a result, the danwei

became the most efficient means of social control and indoctrination, and facilitated the

transfer of authority from the family to the Party. The danwei assumed in this way, significant

functions of the traditional Chinese family system.

251

Appendix 6.

'The 17-Point Agreement' 23 May 1951

The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet

The Tibetan Nationality is one the nationalities with a long history within the bound· f h· d l·k anes 0

C ma, an I e many other nationalities, it has performed its glorious duty in the course of the creatio~ and. d~velopment of our great Motherland. But over the last one hundred years or ~ore, lmper:ahst forces ~enetrated into China, and in consequence also penetrated into the Tlbe~an reg10n and carned out all kinds of deceptions and provocations. Like previous rea~t1Onary gove~ents, the ~uo~ntan~ reactionary government continued to carry out a p?hc~ of oppressmg ~nd sowmg dissens10n among the nationalities, causing division and ?lsuru~y .among t~e TIbetan people: And the local government of Tibet did not oppose the lmpenahst decept10ns and provocat1Ons, and adopted an unpatriotic attitude toward our great Motherland. Under such conditions, the Tibetan the Tibetan nationality and people were plunged into the depths of enslavement and suffering.

In 1949, basic victory was achieved on a nationwide scale in the Chinese People's War of Liberation, the common domestic enemy of all nationalities-the KMT reactionary government-was overthrown, and the common foreign enemy of all the nationalities-the aggressive imperialist forces-was driven out. On this basis, the founding of the PRC and of the Central People's Government was announced. In accordance with the Common Programme passed by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Central People's Government declared that all nationalities within the boundaries of the PRC are equal, and that they shall establish unity and mutual aid and oppose imperialism and their own public enemies, so that the PRC will become a big fraternal and cooperative family, composed of all its nationalities, that within the big family of all nationalities of the PRC, national regional autonomy shall be exercised in areas where national minorities are concentrated, and all national minorities shall have freedom to developed their spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their customs, habits, and religious beliefs, while the Central People's Government shall assist all national minorities to develop their political, economic, cultural and educational construction work. Since then, all nationalities within the country, with the exception of those in the areas of Tibet and Taiwan, have gained liberation. Under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government and the direct leadership of higher levels of People's Government, all national minorities are fully enjoying the right of national equality and have established, or are establishing, national regional autonomy.

In order that the influences of aggressive imperialist forces in Tibet might be successfully eliminated, the unification of the territory and sovereignty of the PRC accomplished, and national defence safeguarded; in order that the Tibetan nationality and people might be freed and return to the big family of the PRC to enjoy to enjoy the same rights of national equality as all the other nationalities in the country and develop their

Political economic cultural and educational work, the Central People's Government, when it , , ordered the People's Liberation Army to march into Tibet, notified the local gover:nment of Tibet to send delegates to the central authorities to conduct talks for the conclUSIOn of an agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet. AS a result of these talks, both parties agreed to conclude this agreement and guarantee that it will be carried out into eff~t.

1. The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tlbe~; the Tibetan people shall return to the big family of the Motherland-the People s

Republic of China. .., . . 2. The Local government of Tibet shall actIvely aSSIst the People s LIberatIon Army to

enter Tibet and consolidate the national defence. 3. In accordance with the policy toward nationalities laid down in the co~on

Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the TI etan

252

people ~ave the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadershIp ofthe Central People's Government.

4. The ce?~ral autho~ties will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The Central authontIes a~so WIll n~t alter the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama, OffiCIals of vanous ranks shall hold office as usual.

5. The establi~hed status, functions and power of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen N goerhtehni shall be maintained.

6. By the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama and of the Panchen Ngoerhtehni are meant the status, functions and powers of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama and the Ninth Panchen Ngoerhtehni when they were in friendly and amicable relations with each other.

7. Th~ policy of fr~edom of re~igious belief laid down in th~ Common Programme of the Chmese People s ConsultatIve Conference shall be carned out. The religious beliefs, customs, and habits of the Tibetan people shall be respected, and lama monasteries shall be protected. The central authorities will no effect a change in the income of the monasteries.

8. Tibetan troops shall be reorganised by stages into the PLA and become part of the national defence forces of the PRC.

9. The Spoken and written language and school education of the Tibetan nationality shall be developed step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

10. Tibetan agriculture, livestock raising, industry, and commerce shall be developed step by step and the people's livelihood shall be improved step by step in accordance with the actual conditions in Tibet.

11. In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord, and when the people raise demands for reform, they should be settled by means of consultation with the leading personnel of Tibet.

12. In so far as former pro-imperialist and pro-Kuomintang officials resolutely sever relations with imperialism and the Kuomintang and do not engage in sabotage or resistance, they may continue to hold office irrespective of their past.

13. The PLA entering Tibet shall abide by all the above mentioned policies and shall also be fair in all buying and selling and shall not arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people.

14. The Central People's Government shall conduct the centralised handling of all external affairs of the area of Tibet; and there will be peaceful coexistence with neighbouring countries and establishment and development of fair commercial and trading relations with them on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and mutual respect for territory and sovereignty.

15. In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the Central People's Government shall set up a military and administrative committee and a Inilitary area headquarters in Tibet, and apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG, shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the Inilitary and administrative committee may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet, various districts, and leading monasteries; the list shall be drawn up after consultation between the representatives designated by the CPG and the various quarters concerned, and shall be subInitted to the CPG for appointment.

16. Funds needed by the Inilitary and administrative committee, the military area headquarters, and the PLA entering Tibet shall be provided by the CPG. The local government of Tibet will assist the PLA in the purchase and transport of food, fodder,

and other daily necessities. 17. This agreement shall come into force immediately after signatures and seals are

affixed to it.

Signed and sealed by:

253

Delegates with full powers of the Central People's Government: Chief Delegate: Li Wei-Han

Tibetan Chief Delegate: Kaloon Ngabou Ngawang Jigme

Beijing, May 23, 1951.

(Source: Sen, C. (ed) (1960). Tibet Disappears: A Documentary History of Tibet's Internationl Status, the Great Rebellion and Its Aftermath. London: Asia Publishing House.)

254

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