Did the Roman Army Deserve its Reputation?

Did the Roman Army Deserve its Reputation?Simon Whiteway

Did the Roman Army Deserve its

Reputation?

A Clausewitzian Analysis of the Imperial

Roman Army

A dissertation submitted by Simon Whiteway as part of the

requirements for the degree of BA with Honours in War Studies.

March 2014.

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Word length excluding footnotes: 11,750.

Word length including footnotes: 12,099.

Contents

Abbreviations

2

CHAPTER ONE: Introduction

3

CHAPTER TWO: Events of 69

7

Battle of Bedriacum

9

1 st Battle of Cremona

10

2 nd Battle of Cremona

14

The Batavian Revolt

16

CHAPTER THREE: Analysis

20

Commanders 20

Armies

25

CHAPTER FOUR: Conclusions

30

Appendices 34

2


Bibliography

35

Abbreviations

Cicero, De Republica (Republic)

Cic.Rep.

Sallust, Catilinae coniuratio (Catiline Conspiracy)

Sal.Cat.

Tacitus, de origine et situ Germanorum Liber (On the Origins and Site of Free

Germany) Tac.Ger.

Tacitus, De vita et moribus Iulii Agricolae (On the Life and Character of Julius Agricola)

Tac.Ag.

Tacitus, Historiae (The Histories)

Tac.Hist.

Introduction

The Roman army has a monolithic reputation. They brought the power

of Rome everywhere from the cold forests of Britain to the searing

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deserts of Egypt. It is the army that swept before it the opposition

of every nation it encountered, fearsome barbarians and impenetrable

phalanxes alike. The vast and unprecedented success of the Roman

Republic and Empire was due to the formidable military achievements

of its soldiers. So formidable is their heritage that ever since the

Renaissance, armies have been attempting to emulate them. Maurice of

Nassau's 16th century linear warfare tactics were devised as a

modern retelling of Vegetius' military manual; Napoleon's troops

carried eagles as the true symbol of Imperial power.1 As such, study

of the Roman military has not been in short supply. Thus it is that

the Roman army is one of the most thoroughly studied institutions in

history, particularly that of the Principate, the 'Golden Age' of

Empire.

The effect of all this study has been to produce two distinct

schools of thought on the Roman army. Traditionally it has been

viewed as a vast "military machine" in the manner of a modern army.2

This orthodox view is derived unconsciously from the many aspects

which modern armies have lifted from the legions. Roman innovation

still influences armies today, not least through the very notion of

a standing, professional and non-seasonal army. Standardised

equipment and uniforms provided by the state, wages paid from a

central treasury and a standard force organisation and unit strength

have traditionally been said to be Roman inventions, and are all

defining features of modern war.

Upon this much all agree. Debate stems rather from the areas of

uncertainty that recovered evidence does not cover. For example, a

series of papyri recovered from Roman military bases in Syria and

Egypt indicate that in a cavalry ala, sometimes certain men were sent

1 M.Roberts, Essays In Swedish History (Minneapolis, 1967), p.196.2 J.Peddie, The Roman War Machine (Stroud, 1994), pp.x-xi,147.

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to procure horses for the troop.3 All that is recorded on the papyri

is that the men were sent: we do not know where they were sent, who

they intended to procure horses from or who was paying for it. An

orthodox historian might see in this space another cog in the Roman

"war machine", some sort of procurement system for horses.4 It is a

tantalising notion which fits with the wider perception of the Roman

army. However a revisionist historian might suggest that instead

this implies that a cavalryman was responsible for providing his own

horses and might periodically leave to acquire new ones from a local

trader. No higher organisation or authority is definitively stated

and therefore there is no reason to believe that such existed. As

far as archaeology is concerned, there is no right answer to these

questions, but they serve to highlight the point. Revisionist

historians make a deliberate attempt not to be overawed by Rome's

achievements and not to credit it with something that may not have

been there, while the orthodox view is to assume that if it seems

like a good idea, the Romans probably thought of it first.

Both are reasonable points of view. However, neither school gives a

full analysis of the Roman army as both are based upon an incomplete

perception: the study of the Romans' performance against foreign

foes. The Roman military system was self-evidently the superior mode

of warfare in the ancient world, judging from its enormous conquests

and repeated victories. It follows that the toughest opponent a

Roman legionary could face was another Roman legionary. Therefore,

in order to gain a serious appreciation of how effective they

actually were when faced with an equally capable enemy, it is

necessary to examine the performance of the Roman army in civil

wars. Civil wars necessarily see the Romans fighting their hardest,

as they have the unique characteristic that, by definition, a Roman

3 K.R.Dixon & P.Southern, The Roman Cavalry (London, 1992), p.149.4 Ibid., p.150.

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army must be defeated. In this situation it is possible to clearly

compare the two armies involved, and narrow down what specific

factors caused one side to achieve. AD 69, known to history as the

Year of the Four Emperors, provides an excellent case study for the

early Imperial legions, and was the only major civil war to disturb

the relative tranquillity of the Principate. During the conflict

Roman arms faced each other multiple times, as well as putting down

the ensuing Batavian Revolt against former auxiliary units.

Conveniently, it is superbly well-documented in Tacitus' Historiae,

Plutarch's Lives and corroborating archaeological evidence, further

enabling an accurate study.

In order to complete this study it is necessary first to establish a

frame of reference, that the armies being examined may be assessed

against a set of criteria and held to a certain standard. The Roman

army has previously only been compared to contemporary adversaries

which, although important for demonstrating the efficacy of the

Romans in their own day, does little to examine how effective their

military system was in its own right. An alternative approach is to

apply more modern military theory retroactively to the Romans, to

see how they measure up against the expectations of another

organised professional force. Examining the Roman army in the Roman

era, one's judgement is inevitably caught up in the glory of the pax

Romana. In the light of modern theory these preconceptions are

removed, and analysis can be conducted from a more neutral stance.

Furthermore, by comparing it to a modern army one is driven to

scrutinise it more closely and be critical, rather than laudatory.

This, therefore, is the approach this essay shall take. The

framework used will be the model Prussian army envisaged by Karl von

Clausewitz in his early nineteenth century classic, Vom Kriege (On

War). This text is appropriate for a number of reasons: it has been

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frequently analysed and generally praised for its perceptive remarks

on the enduring nature of warfare and how a commander ought to go

about it. Even today, Clausewitz remains required reading at

Sandhurst, demonstrating its timeless nature and suitability for

this application.5 Furthermore, On War was written before the changes

wrought to military strategy by the mass industrialisation and

technological advances of the twentieth century, so remains grounded

in what are now old-fashioned notions, such as that of an army

operating in a single block rather than across a front. This too

renders it applicable to the ancient period, in which set-piece

battles were the normal method of combat. Finally, Clausewitz breaks

down the anatomy of battle into its constituent components, each of

which can be analysed individually, allowing a greater depth of

study. Respected by military historians and soldiers alike, his work

provides the ideal pole for the Roman army's performance to be

objectively measured against.

Clausewitz's principles are simple enough in essence, and may be

distilled to a series of basic rules. In order to apply these rules

however, we must first understand the nature of battle in

Clausewitzian terms, as follows: every combat, on an individual,

group or battlefield scale, has a 'Decision'. This is the moment at

which the victory of one side becomes inevitable.6 The surest way to

reach Decision is to destroy the enemy's concentration of force.

This is the most important point of the enemy army, at which either

the majority of, or the most elite, units are collected.7 However,

reaching this Decision is difficult, as every campaign and

battlefield is shrouded in the 'Fog of War'; a poetic term for the

5 British Army Doctrine Publication, "Operations" (London, 2010), pp.53,68,176,191.6 K.Clausewitz, On War, M.Howard and P.Paret (trans.) (Princeton, 1984), pp.240-241.7 Ibid., p.204.

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general impossibility of knowing exactly what is going on at any

given time.8 Aside from not knowing the intentions of the enemy, a

commander is hamstrung by not knowing the exact condition even of

his own men. Piercing it is made more difficult still by the effects

of 'Friction'. This is the notion that nothing ever goes to plan.9

An army is made up of thousands of individuals, each capable of

acting unpredictably. When there are so many thousands of things

that could go wrong, it is inevitable that some of them will.

Under these circumstances a commander must seek Decision.10 On the

battlefield this can be gained through any combination of three

means: by capture of enemy-held territory; by causing high

casualties ('Attrition') to the enemy; through possessing superior

'Moral Force' and standing ground for longer. Moral Force is a

catch-all term, similar in meaning to 'morale'. Clausewitz

identifies a further three factors that contribute to an army's

Moral Force: "The Talents of the Commander; The Military Virtue of

an Army; Its National Feeling."11 The first refers to a commander's

ability to lead and inspire his troops. 'Military Virtue'

effectively equates to esprit de corps and a positive mental attitude,

or "the natural qualities of a warlike people", while 'National

Feeling' is an army's emotional state; its enthusiasm, patriotism,

zeal for combat and respect for its leaders.12 These things come

together to fuel an army's self-belief and keep them on the

battlefield.

Whether a commander is attacking or defending, there will be a

'Decisive Point' on the battlefield, at which the Decision will be

reached. It is vital to have superiority at this Decisive Point, be 8 Ibid., pp.117-118.9 Ibid., pp.119-121.10 Ibid., pp.75-77,90-92.11 Clausewitz, War, p.186.12 Ibid., pp.187-189.

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it moral (superior troops) or numerical.13 Indeed, a simple numerical

superiority should always be sought for as, if increased far enough,

it will eventually eclipse the effect of all other advantages.14 If

this is not possible, superiority at the Decisive Point becomes

doubly important. In order to achieve this, two things must be done:

first, an army must concentrate its force in a single battle-group

rather than spread out in smaller occupation forces.15 Secondly, the

element of surprise must be utilised on the battlefield - this

allows a superior concentration of force to be amassed at the

Decisive Point. Surprise is made up of two key elements; "secrecy

and rapidity".16 By ensuring that his army has superior Moral Force

and knowing where and how to seek Decision, a commander can always

be confident of success. This is the essence of Clausewitz's

principles; by applying them to the performance of the various Roman

armies in the battles of AD 69-70 we can see which were followed and

which were not, leading to an objective assessment of the efficiency

of the Roman army. This will allow a twofold analysis, both of the

way in which the Roman army fought, and why it was successful.

13 Ibid., pp.194-195,204.14 Ibid., p.197.15 Ibid., p.204,635.16 Ibid., p.198.

9

Did the Roman Army Deserve its Reputation?Simon WhitewayEvents of 69

The suicide of Nero in June 68 left the Roman Empire with no clear

heir to Augustus' heritage. In this unprecedented situation the

Senate chose to elect a new Emperor. Servius Galba, governor of

Tarraconensis in Spain, was an experienced and well-regarded

aristocrat; a sound choice for Emperor. He was to last only a few

weeks in Rome before his assassination at the hands of one of his

inner circle, Marcus Otho, in January 69.17 So passed the first of

the year's Emperors. However, Otho's inheritance was troubling. Upon

his accession he discovered that in the preceding fortnight the

governor of Upper Germany, Aulus Vitellius, had emerged as a rival

candidate for the Imperial throne. Vitellius had been proclaimed

Emperor in the frontier fortress of Vetera by the legionaries he

commanded, and was marching on Rome with the army of the Rhine

frontier to stake his claim.18

Vitellius mustered to his cause the five legions of the Rhine

frontier and their associated auxilia, which included the élite

Batavian tribesmen. These formidable warriors were fierce,

disciplined and experienced, as well as having the unique

qualification that every tribesman could swim.19 By contrast, Otho

had to hand only a single newly raised legion, the I Adiutrix, the

Praetorian Guard, and the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian fleets.

Accordingly, his first act was to summon the legions of the Danube

frontier to Rome's defence.20 With his modest forces Otho could only

hope to maintain a defensive action until these reinforcements

arrived.

17 Tac.Hist., 1.41.18 Ibid., 1.57.19 Tac.Ger., 29; Tac.Ag., 18.20 Tac.Hist., 2.11.

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Vitellius had split his army into two parts, led by two co-

conspirators and legionary commanders, Aulus Caecina and Fabius

Valens. Caecina's force crossed the Alps through Helvetia, while

Valens passed through southern Gaul in order to travel the Ligurian

coast road.21 This split was a sound strategic decision; it vastly

reduced the burden of supplying the armies, while simultaneously

rendering it impossible for the outnumbered Othonian forces to

prevent their crossing the Alps. However, it also meant that

Vitellius' overwhelming force of numbers could not be brought to

bear until the two armies were united. Thus, Otho aimed to keep the

two armies divided for as long as possible. The Tyrrhenian fleet

sailed north with a small force to the Ligurian coast, where it

skirmished inconclusively with Valens' advance guard.22 Aware that he

could not march down the coast under harassment from the fleet,

Valens was forced to divert north and cross the Alps. As well as

considerably slowing his advance, this crucially forced Valens to

arrive in Italy north of the Po, allowing the Othonians to maintain

the river as a defensible frontier (see Figure 1).23

21 Ibid., 1.61.22 Ibid., 1.87,2.12-2.15.23 W.R.Shepherd, Historical Atlas (New York, 1923), pp.26-27.

11

Figure 1: Northern Italy in AD 69. The bright blue line marks the Via Postumia, along which the major battles in Italy were fought. The black line running perpendicular


By late March, Caecina's army reached these lines. Otho's

Praetorians were dispersed along the Po at various crossing points,

while the I Adiutrix was encamped to its north. Caecina's army

attempted to bypass this legion - the only sizeable resistance - by

forcing a crossing at Placentia. However, two days of furious

resistance from the Praetorian garrison encouraged him to find an

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easier crossing.24 When Caecina's troops returned to their camp from

this venture they discovered that it had been ransacked in their

absence. Smarting from these two defeats, Caecina resolved to

provoke the first sizeable battle of the campaign.25

Battle of 'Bedriacum'26

The I Adiutrix had been marching to the relief of Placentia when it

received word of the success there and halted. It struck camp about

half way between the city of Cremona and the small town of

Bedriacum, from which the battle takes its name.27 Here it was

reinforced by the arrival of four Praetorian cohorts and a

vexillation of the nearest Danube legion. This force now numbered

around 13,000 men, only slightly inferior Caecina's. Thus, Caecina

hoped to gain an edge through ambush. Several auxiliary cohorts were

planted in a copse that straddled the Via Postumia, while a force of

cavalry was sent ahead to provoke battle and then retreat down the

road, whereupon the auxiliaries would fall upon their pursuers.

However, this plan was betrayed to the Othonian commander, Suetonius

Paulinus, who decided to deliberately take the bait. With his own

cavalry deployed as a screen masking the movements of the infantry

behind, he advanced his whole force into battle.28

The battle opened with the Vitellian auxilia losing discipline and

breaking from cover early. At this, the Othonian cavalry split in

half and galloped to encircle the hapless Vitellians.29 The cavalry

reserve joined this manoeuvre and crashed into the Vitellian flanks

24 Tac.Hist., 2.20-2.22.25 Ibid., 2.23-2.24. 26 Ibid., 2.23-2.33.27 Some historians have referred to the later battles outside the walls of Cremona as 'of Bedriacum'; this essay calls those the two 'Battles of Cremona'.28 Tac.Hist., 2.24.29 Ibid., 2.25.

13


while the former frontline wheeled to the rear. Meanwhile, the

legionaries marched into the front to complete the trap. The

Vitellian auxilia, thoroughly outmanoeuvred and surprised to see

legionaries opposing them, began to rout before the infantry

engaged. After it became clear that he had been out-thought, Caecina

hurried forward his own legionaries as reinforcements. But in their

haste to join battle the Vitellians arrived piecemeal, cohort by

cohort, and were swept up in the general disorder of the

auxiliaries' flight.30 The Othonian cavalry's vigorous pursuit saw

the legionaries routing alongside their auxilia, but the chase was

not long continued; Cremona and the Vitellian camp were close and

the Othonians wisely withdrew to their own fortifications.

30 Ibid., 2.26.

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Shortly afterwards, Valens at last arrived in Cremona.31 The

Vitellian force now numbered approximately 50,000 men, representing

almost all the strength of Germany. Caecina and Valens were aware

that time was against them; the majority of their forces were now in

theatre, while their enemy was only growing in strength. Fortunately

for them, Otho had arrived at Bedriacum and was resolved to seek

battle as soon as possible.32

1 st Battle of Cremona 33

Otho and his generals produced a bold plan: Otho himself would march

south of the Po with some 6,000 Praetorians to prevent any Vitellian

troops crossing the river. Meanwhile his generals would march

31 Tac.Hist., 2.30.32 Ibid., 2.31-2.33.33 Ibid., 2.33-2.56.

15


towards Cremona and establish a fortified campsite on the plains

outside the city. From this base they would be able to harass their

numerically superior opponents and hopefully draw them into unwise

action.

On the 14th April the Othonian army duly set out, encumbered with

full equipment for fort construction. The commanders elected to take

the Via Postumia (which cut through the vineyards that covered the

area) in the interests of speed, rather than traverse the smaller

back-roads in hopes of avoiding detection. Thus, it was soon

discovered by Vitellian scouts.34 This led to a brief cavalry

skirmish along the road between the Othonian vanguard and their

hastily-deployed adversaries. The Othonians, well-led and well-

organised, drove off the Vitellians despite the latter's superior

numbers, but in chasing them down encountered the Vitellian I Italica

legion which routed them in turn.35 Meanwhile, the infantry had

reached the point where they had planned to diverge; while the

34 Tac.Hist., 2.40.35 Ibid., 2.41.

16

Figure 3


Praetorian cohorts continued down the road, the I Adiutrix turned south

and the XIII and XIV Gemina wheeled north. However, in the dense

vineyards that surrounded Cremona's suburbs, contact was lost

between these parties. The narrow alleyways and thick forest

prevented the use of hand signals upon which the Romans typically

depended and engendered massive confusion.36 Both legionary

detachments somehow misplaced their supporting auxiliary units and

became completely isolated. The Vitellians, by contrast, had enough

warning to establish a coherent line of battle, concentrating the

bulk of their auxilia to the north where the Othonians had the most

men.

When the I Adiutrix emerged from the vineyards, they were immediately

confronted by the Vitellian XXI Rapax. The untried I initially

performed well, even capturing the XXI's eagle. But the seasoned

Rhinelanders held their ground and counterattacked furiously; in the

ensuing fighting the primus pilus of the I Adiutrix was killed. The

inexperienced men were so shaken by this loss of leadership that

they fell back in disarray.37 The XIII and XIV Gemina were engaged by

the Vitellian V Alaudae and a large number of auxiliaries while still

amidst the vineyards. Fighting was evenly matched between the

experienced soldiers, but numbers told against the Othonians. The

Vitellian auxilia spread along the line and soon outflanked the XIV

legion. These fought almost to the last man but, pressed on two

sides, were eventually routed.38 The auxilia then rolled up the line

of the XIII, setting them retreating in turn. On the Via Postumia

itself, Othonian Praetorians engaged with the I Italica. Although the

Praetorians were outnumbered about two to one, fighting was

36 Ibid., 2.41-2.42.37 Tac.Hist., 2.43.38 Ibid., 2.43.

17


indecisive. The narrow defile of the road and the Praetorians'

determination aided them in their struggle.39

39 Ibid., 2.42.

18


At the same time, about a mile upriver, a diversionary attack was

going ahead. Had the Othonian advance gone undiscovered this would

have served to distract the garrison of Cremona from disturbing

Otho's army in their camp construction. As it was, a detachment of

gladiators crossed the Po aboard galleys and were allowed to

disembark, closely watched by Vitellian scouts. After travelling

some way inland, a unit of Batavian cavalry fell upon them

unexpectedly. Fleeing back to their boats, the survivors were

confronted by the accompanying Batavian infantry. This attack was

intended to be supported by two Praetorian cohorts, but they were

not employed as the Othonian commander suspected them of treasonous

intent.40 Thus the gladiators, lightly armed and without support,

were cut to pieces. Quickly moving on from this action, the

Batavians hurried to support the XXI Rapax, only to discover that

their enemy had already been routed. Thus, they joined with this

legion to crash into the left flank of the Othonian Praetorians,

finally sealing their defeat.41

40 Tac.Hist., 2.43.41 Ibid., 2.43.

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Hampered by the slow-moving baggage train which accompanied the army

and the narrowness of the road, the rout soon became a slaughter

amongst the Praetorians.42 The following day the surviving Othonians

surrendered to the Vitellians. Upon hearing this news, Otho

committed suicide, that he might prevent the spilling of any more

Roman blood.43 Vitellius was proclaimed Emperor by a powerless Senate

and processed towards Rome. Having spent two months touring Italy,

Vitellius was in Rome for just three weeks before news reached the

city of the acclamation in Alexandria of the year's fourth Imperial

candidate, Flavius Vespasianus.44

Vespasian was the governor of Judaea, despatched to put down the

Jewish Revolt that erupted there in 66. He planned to force

surrender from Vitellius by strangling the grain supply to Rome,

which came almost entirely from Egypt and North Africa where support

for him was strong. However, he was anticipated by the actions of

the Danube legions. Upon hearing of Vespasian's acclamation,

representatives of all the legions thereabouts gathered and endorsed

his claim.45 Antonius Primus, the legate of the VII Galbiana, was

selected to lead these legions into Italy and challenge Vitellius

directly.46

42 Ibid., 2.44.43 Ibid., 2.45-2.49.44 Ibid., 2.81.45 Ibid., 3.1-3.3.46 VII Galbiana was renamed VII Gemina in AD 70, after the Flavian victory.

20


Setting out from Rome, by October 12th most of the Vitellian force

was encamped at Hostilia (Ostiglia) on the Po, about 100 miles

downriver from Cremona, to which two legions were posted. Antonius

meanwhile was amassing his forces at Verona on the Via Postumia. At

this point Caecina, feeling undermined in Rome, attempted to bring

his army over to the Flavian cause along with the nearby fleet at

Ravenna.47 The coup was carried out by the fleet, but the land army

proved too devoted to defect; Caecina was imprisoned and a legate,

Fabius Fabullus, promoted to leadership. As the Vitellian host was

encamped on the Po, which was navigable to warships, it was

extremely vulnerable to assault from the now-Flavian fleet. Thus,

they were unable to hold their lines: the only chance at victory was

to bring the Flavian army to a decisive battle and defeat them.

Accordingly, the Vitellians quickly left for Cremona and the rest of

their forces. Antonius, who had been expecting the army's surrender,

was taken by surprise and lagged behind in setting out after them.48

However, due to the curving course of the Po, he had only to march

some sixty miles to Cremona; forty fewer than the Vitellians.

Antonius hoped to arrive first and defeat the Vitellian armies

separately, but he underestimated his enemy who, on October 24th,

marched an astonishing thirty miles to reach Cremona in time.49

Antonius intended to seek battle while he retained his momentum.

However, he did not wish to repeat the mistakes of the Othonians and

be caught unprepared; Antonius therefore resolved to draw the enemy

to him.

2 nd Battle of Cremona 50

47 Tac.Hist., 2.100-2.101,3.12-3.14.48 Ibid., 3.14.49 Ibid., 3.15.50 Tac.Hist., 3.15-3.29.

21


On the morning of the 24th October, Antonius despatched Flavian

auxiliary cohorts to plunder and burn the suburbs and farms around

Cremona. The locals pleaded with the Vitellian garrison in the city

(at this point just two legions) to sally out and limit the damage

being done to their property.51 When they did so, the Flavian auxilia

gathered on the Via Postumia. A cavalry skirmish ended in Flavian

auxilia retreating down the road until the personal intervention of

Antonius stiffened their resolve; the superior numbers of the

Flavians soon told and the pursuit was reversed.52 This chase was

continued back towards Cremona for ten miles, until about four miles

from the city itself. Here the rolling cavalry mêlée encountered

advancing Vitellian legionaries; unable to open their ranks to allow

their own side through, the legionaries were hit hard. Some Flavian

infantry had procured mounts and followed the pursuit; they

participated in this action as foot soldiers, and this joint assault

soon broke the Vitellians, who fled back to Cremona.53 Antonius

called off the chase, the city being dangerously close.

Shortly after this, the bulk of the Flavian infantry arrived. Most

desired an immediate assault upon Cremona, but Antonius restrained

them with bad news; while the opening skirmish was fought, Vitellian

troops from Hostilia had arrived in the city. Their forces now

numbered some 30,000 legionaries. In light of this, Antonius

retreated along the highway, through the area in which the first

battle had been fought. Many men there (the XIII legion and some

formerly-Othonian Praetorians, disbanded by Vitellius and re-

recruited for the Flavians) had been present that day and must have

impressed upon Antonius the importance of an orderly line of battle.

Thus, the Flavians kept retreating until they reached open ground

51 Ibid., 3.15.52 Ibid., 3.17.53 Ibid., 3.18.

22


beyond the vineyards, and here deployed in the traditional Roman

fashion, with one variation: Antonius deployed his élite Suebic

cavalry auxilia in front of the central line of battle to act as a

skirmishing screen and foil any enemy charge.54 The whole line stood

in shoulder-to-shoulder contact.

The Vitellians, despite having already marched thirty miles that

day, soon formed up opposite the Flavian line. They were buoyed by

the proximity of their camp and their superior numbers of

legionaries, although this did not reflect the marked disparity in

auxilia, where the Flavians held a considerable advantage.55 Fabullus

formed his host around a large central block boasting 15,000

legionaries, intended to smash a hole in the Flavian centre.

54 Ibid., 3.21.55 K.Wellesley, The Long Year (London, 1975), p.147.

23


The battle opened with the Vitellian centre's charge. Antonius'

cavalry screen proved effective at blunting the charge's momentum

and bogging down the Vitellian troops in prolonged combat. Fighting

there continued furiously for several hours, bounded from spreading

by a deep, steep-sided drainage ditch that ran near the road.56

Smaller engagements occurred all along the line as night began to

fall, to indifferent conclusions. Eventually, the inexperienced VII

Galbiana legion in the Flavian centre began to break, having lost

over half of its centurions and tribunes in the fighting. But

Antonius transferred the Othonian Praetorians from their relatively

quiet spot on the north of the line into the thick of the fighting,

56 Tac.Hist., 3.22.

24


where they replaced the wavering VII and successfully repulsed the

Vitellian centre.57

After this, fighting took the form of an extended artillery and

archery duel. While the Flavian ballistae were distributed evenly

across the line, Fabullus concentrated his in the centre, focussing

fire on the Praetorians and inflicting significant casualties.58 But

the Praetorians' line held throughout the entire night. At dawn of

the 25th the Flavian III Gallica legion, which had previously been

stationed in Syria, followed a local custom there and turned to hail

the rising sun; both sides misinterpreted this as a cheer for the

arrival of Flavian reinforcements.59 Spurred on, the Flavians

attacked without orders, whereupon the Vitellians almost immediately

broke and ran. Exhaustion had taken its toll on the men: a forced

march followed by a drawn-out night battle had rendered a majority

of the army simply unable to fight.60 Those that remained fled into

their fortified camp outside the walls of Cremona.

Antonius was unwilling to assault this camp with an army that had

been awake and fighting for over twenty-four hours, but incredibly

the men themselves could hardly be restrained. The camp was charged

on three sides with tools stolen from nearby farms. Initially the

attackers suffered heavily, as their fellow Romans knew how to break

a testudo.61 But eventually, a tower of the south gate succumbed to

artillery fire and collapsed, while simultaneously legionaries

hacked through the gate itself.62 After the gate fell, the Vitellians

fled headlong into Cremona and the battle was won.

57 Ibid., 3.23.58 Tac.Hist., 3.23.59 Ibid., 3.24.60 Ibid., 3.25.61 Ibid., 3.27.62 Ibid., 3.28-3.29.

25


The city was then invested by the Flavians. Fabullus, aware of

limitations of supply, soon surrendered.63 This ended all effective

resistance in Italy. The Vitellians retreated to Rome, which

witnessed a bitter last stand by die-hard supporters; Vitellius was

murdered on the steps of his palace.64 Vespasian became the fourth

and final Emperor.

The Batavian Revolt65

But even this was not the end of fighting. During all of these

events, a rebellion had been developing among the Batavians, a Roman

subject people on the Rhine frontier and provider of excellent

auxiliary troops.66 They were led by Julius Civilis, a tribal

chieftain who had served with the legions for many years.

Civilis began by wiping out local auxiliary forces in simultaneous

surprise assaults on their forts. The skeleton crew left behind by

Vitellius to garrison the Rhine frontier responded in the

traditional Roman fashion: gathering together all available forces

(less 2,000 men to hold the fort at Vetera (Xanten), from whence

63 Ibid., 3.31-3.32.64 Ibid., 3.82-3.84.65 Ibid., 4.16-5.26.66 Ibid., 4.12.

26

Figure 5


they came), the legionaries marched directly into Batavian

territory.67 Somewhat incredibly, in their search for more troops the

Romans had gathered some Batavian cavalry to their cause and asked

them to fight against their own tribe. The Batavians meanwhile had

deployed around an official Batavian auxiliary cohort, bringing with

them their wives and mothers to stand behind and encourage or berate

the fighters, as was traditional amongst Germanic peoples.68

As might have been expected, the battle began with the defection of

the Batavian cavalry on the Roman side, who wheeled into the flank

of the nearest auxiliary infantry unit.69 Surprised by this

apparently unexpected attack, these auxilia began to rout. At this

the auxilia on the other flank, already shaken by the vastly

superior numbers of their enemies, also turned and fled as the main

Batavian host bore down upon them. The battle would have been an

unmitigated catastrophe were it not for the discipline of the

legionaries, who formed tight squares and held their ground.70 The

Batavians and their allies washed over these strong points, more

interested in sacking the baggage train than attacking a determined

enemy; the two legionary squares slowly retreated off the field.

While the auxiliary units were wiped out, the legionaries took

minimal casualties in the defeat.

67 Tac.Hist., 4.18.68 Ibid., 4.18.69 Ibid., 4.18.70 Tac.Hist., 4.18.

27


After the battle, Civilis summoned the eight other official Batavian

auxiliary cohorts, who were on their way north from Italy. The

commander of the legionary fortress at Bonna (Bonn) on the Rhine

thought to prevent their joining with Civilis, and deployed his

legionaries widely across the road they were to travel. The

Batavians responded by forming their column into a wedge and simply

charging through the Roman ranks.71 The Romans were thoroughly out-

performed by their supposedly supporting troops, who inflicted

serious casualties and continued unimpeded.

When the auxiliary cohorts arrived, Civilis moved his forces to

besiege Vetera, now all that stood between him and unprotected Gaul.

However, while the Batavians were fierce on the battlefield, they

were inexperienced in siege warfare and suffered accordingly.

Several assaults were thrown back by the Roman defenders with heavy

casualties, including an attempt to copy Roman methods and build a

siege tower, which was set alight.72

71 Ibid., 4.20.72 Ibid., 4.23,4.28-4.30.

28


All remaining Roman troops on the Rhine were now gathered together

to march to the relief of Vetera under Dillius Vocula, legate of the

XXII Primigenia, but the army was intercepted by Batavian auxiliary

cohorts despatched by Civilis to hamper their advance. Caught in an

ambush near Gelduba (Krefeld), the Roman column suffered

disproportionate casualties and proved completely unable to maintain

formation or discipline, while its auxiliary formations were

routed.73 The action would have ended in flight were it not for the

timely arrival of legionary reinforcements which attacked the

Batavian rear, prompting their withdrawal. Even in this 'victory',

Roman casualties far exceeded those of the Batavians.

The Romans finally saw success when they arrived at Vetera some days

later. From atop its walls, the garrison could judge the perfect

moment to sally forth and again attack the Batavian rear. By chance,

Civilis was thrown from his horse and the misinformed rumour spread

that he had been killed.74 This proved enough to cause the wavering

rebels to flee.

73 Ibid., 4.33.74 Ibid., 4.34.

29


And yet the revolt continued. Vocula's army withdrew southwards to

procure supplies, leaving a garrison to hold Vetera. Civilis laid

siege to the fortress once again whilst despatching the majority of

his forces to chase the relief army.75 The Romans meanwhile were

forced to march further south to relieve Mogontiacum (Mainz), which

was also besieged. Arriving unexpectedly, they quickly butchered the

attackers.76 The relief army then returned to Vetera to relieve it

once again but, upon drawing near, was deserted by its Gallic

auxiliaries and forced to retreat.77 The situation was dire; the

rebellion had now gripped everything around this force. The soldiers

were reluctant to fight these seemingly impossible odds, especially

since news of the Flavian victory in Italy had arrived. Many of the

men preferred Civilis to Vespasian; Vocula's attempt to bring the

troops to discipline ended in his murder and the whole force of

legionaries defected to the rebels, an unprecedented event in Roman

history.78

75 Tac.Hist., 4.36.76 Ibid., 4.37.77 Ibid., 4.57.78 Ibid., 4.59.

30


The garrison of Vetera was thereby abandoned to its fate. Civilis

had learnt the lessons of the first siege and refrained from

assaulting the fortress. Having consumed all their supplies, the

garrison eventually capitulated, only to be massacred once they left

the fort.79 With that, the entire Rhine frontier fell under the

rebels.

Roman authority in Gaul was at its lowest ebb with the fall of

Vetera, but the situation proved unsustainable. Divisions within the

fractious rebels were exploited by the massive relief army

despatched from Rome by the victorious Flavians. Consisting of seven

legions drawn from Italy, Spain and Britain, these troops were not

the demoralised remnants of the defeated Vitellian army but a fresh

force flush with victory. The approach of Roman reinforcements

caused wavering in the loyalty of the Gallic tribes and the defected

Roman troops (who performed what Tacitus calls "honourable

desertion" and finally swore allegiance to Vespasian), and those who

remained to fight were eventually crushed by sheer weight of numbers

and traditional Roman tenacity.

The whole affair marked a drawn-out and embarrassing end to an

uncomfortable year for the Roman Empire. The legions that propped up

the Imperial system had been defeated both by themselves and by

foreigners, auxilia had triumphed over legionaries, who had fled

from battle and disgraced themselves on the field. The contrast

between their formidable reputation and the events of the year could

hardly be more distinct.

79 Ibid., 4.60.

31


Analysis

The Year of the Four Emperors showed the Roman army both at its best

and at its worst. In some instances it functioned like the 'war

machine' it is commonly held to have been, but in others it suffered

catastrophic reverses and displayed a total lack of the military

qualities that have come to define it. In order to determine what

factors contributed to these great victories and defeats, this essay

shall employ Clausewitz's principles of warfare to break down the

anatomy of the battles and assess each component individually. This

will enable an establishment of which elements were the Roman army's

greatest strengths and weaknesses, allowing an assessment of how it

fought, and why it was or was not successful. Clausewitz's work was

written in the form of an instruction manual for an aspiring

general, meaning that a degree of interpretation is required to

reapply these concepts to an historical force. However this can be

achieved by splitting his instructions into two main areas: what a

commander must do, and what the army itself must do.

Commanders

A commander has, according to Clausewitz, four main roles to fulfil

on the battlefield. First, he must have an appropriate plan which

aims to achieve Decision through either attrition, capture of ground

or having superior Moral Force. Second, he must recognise Decisive

Points on the battlefield and seize his opportunities to exploit

them in order to win the battle. Thirdly, the commander must himself

contribute to the Moral Force of his army by rallying and inspiring

the troops on the field. Finally, he must do all this whilst

managing the effects of Friction and the Fog of War, which will

naturally come together to frustrate his efforts. Off the

battlefield, a commander must also manage his campaign and the

32


movements of his army so that the decisive battle might be sought at

a time and place of his choosing.

Seeking Decision

'Seeking Decision' effectively amounts to having a determined battle

plan which aims at some useful goal, such as the destruction of

enemy forces. It is a commander's most fundamental role to ensure

that his troops act in such a manner. Yet despite its obvious

importance, the Roman army's commanders showed a remarkable

inconsistency in this field. At Bedriacum, Paulinus pursued a

decisive plan to encircle and eliminate his Vitellian opponents.

Unlike Caecina's plan for the same battle, which relied on his

ambuscade remaining undiscovered (ill-advised in a civil war, in

which desertion and defection are rife at all times), Paulinus'

troops were unaware of their planned actions prior to the fact and

therefore had no means to betray them. The Othonian counter-ambush

relied instead on battlefield factors, such as the cavalry screen,

for the success of its surprise. Just as Clausewitz would advise,

secrecy and rapidity were brought together to bring a concentration

of Othonian force against the unsuspecting enemy, causing a rapid

and total victory. This is the essence of a Decisive engagement. By

contrast, the Othonian performance at 1st Cremona was extraordinarily

shambolic. This was due in part to the army's command being left to

a disunited committee of generals rather than one man, and in part

to the fact that said council was not expecting to fight in this

manoeuvre. Still, the Othonians proved completely unable to craft a

plan once they were detected and attempted only to form a line of

battle, which proved beyond them. This lack of direction led to the

Othonian force separating and being defeated piecemeal by their

numerically superior Vitellian opponents without any serious efforts

being made to prevent this. In other battles every shade of

33


competence in between these two examples was demonstrated. This

inconsistency demonstrates that, in this respect at least, it was

not Rome's selection methods that gained results, but individual

ability.

The Othonian campaign, therefore, would suggest that a Decisive plan

was a vital precondition for success. However, the 2nd Battle of

Cremona paints a different picture. Here Antonius was able to win

the battle decisively for the Flavians despite having no clear plan

after drawing the enemy upon him; he fought the battle simply by

reacting to the movements of his opponent. Fabullus meanwhile had

created a concentration of force within his army and used it in

assault; a sound plan as far as Clausewitz is concerned. And yet,

the attack failed and the Vitellian army collapsed. This

demonstrates that although a strong plan is useful to a battle's

successful conclusion, it is not necessarily essential, nor is it an

isolated factor; the success of a plan, as we shall see, depends

very much on the success of other factors in a battle.

Decisive Points

It is not enough, therefore, for a commander to go into battle with

a plan to seek Decision. He must also be able to enact this plan on

the field and adapt it to suit changing circumstances. Clausewitz

expresses this in terms of 'Decisive Points'; these are the

important areas of an opponent's line of battle, either weak spots

to be broken through or a concentration of force to be destroyed. A

commander must first identify and then exploit these points. This

area was by far the weakest of Roman commanders. While at Bedriacum

Paulinus was able to identify the Decisive Point of the Vitellian

line, he held back his troops for some time, busying them with

clearing the battlefield of obstructions, before committing. This

meant that the opportunity to exploit the enemy's disarray was lost 34


and, were it not for the prompt action of the Othonian cavalry the

Vitellian ambush force might well have escaped entirely. At 1st

Cremona, Valens' army intercepted the Othonians on the march and

held every advantage. Yet the battle was still allowed to take place

in a series of discrete and relatively even skirmishes, any of which

the Vitellians could plausibly have lost. This demonstrates a

fundamental inability to control the flow of the battle and use

effectively the numerical superiority that the Vitellians enjoyed.

These examples represent the more valiant efforts of Roman

commanders in 69; little can be said about the defeated armies in

these battles and others.

Although the near total lack of ability in this department would

suggest that it is singularly unimportant to the outcome of battles,

in fact the opposite is true. When Romans faced Romans in 69, they

usually encountered an opponent equally lacking in this ability and

therefore cancelled one another out. However, the battle outside

Bonna saw the Batavian auxiliary cohorts quickly identify and attack

the Roman line's Decisive Point (as ever, the legionaries) and make

a concerted effort to break through it. When this was achieved

through an overwhelming local superiority in numbers, the rest of

the Roman line immediately took flight. This example highlights this

weakness in the Roman system and demonstrates how effective

identification and exploitation of Decisive Points could have a

profound effect on the course of a battle.

There is one redeeming example; at 2nd Cremona, Fabullus successfully

identified the Flavian Decisive Point and did his best to exploit

it, focussing multiple attacks on the area. This demonstrates two

things; first, the Roman system was not completely incapable of

producing leaders who understood how to exploit a Decisive Point,

but it was clearly very dependent on the prowess of an individual

35


commander. Secondly, the fact that for all his efforts Fabullus

proved unsuccessful demonstrates that while this understanding can

impart a serious advantage if held by only one side, success is

wholly reliant on the quality of the troops executing a commander's

instructions. If, as at 2nd Cremona, an army is has a moral or

numerical inferiority, the identification of a Decisive Point alone

cannot carry a battle.

Rallying

As well as planning for success, a commander must also cope with

reverses. Clausewitz identifies 'The Talents of the Commander' as

one of the three principal elements contributing to an army's Moral

Force, and this is expressed largely in said commander's inspiring

presence on the battlefield. Here, through speeches and harangues

before and during the fighting, a commander can steady wavering

troops and even reverse a rout. By and large, Roman leaders were

talented in this regard. 2nd Cremona provides good examples of

successful leadership on both sides. Near the battle's opening,

Antonius' presence with a military standard was enough to rally his

routing cavalry into a cohesive unit which subsequently repulsed

those they had been fleeing before. Later in the night he berated

his formerly-Othonian Praetorians into withstanding the fearsome

artillery bombardment that the Vitellians showered upon them.

Although there is no literary evidence for the actions of Fabullus

in this battle, the very fact that the Vitellian line not only held

but constantly attacked throughout the night must at least in part

be testament to his ability to inspire them. The importance of

commanders acting in this way is demonstrated by the relief of

Vetera; when Civilis was thought to have been killed, his army broke

and ran without his inspiring presence.

36


Roman society directly influenced the prowess of her generals in

this area. Although there was variation in ability, this is

representative of commanders' individual rhetorical skill. Overall,

Roman leaders were skilled at inspiring their troops to

extraordinary feats; this was due to the social norms of ancient

Rome, which venerated gloria (military glory) and virtus (manliness) to

the highest degree. 80 This had a two-fold effect: firstly, it

ensured that both soldier and commander were seeking the same goal.

The quest for gloria would equally inspire both parties, and enabled

leaders to bridge the gap between aristocrat and plebeian.81

Secondly, political success in Rome was intimately tied to gaining

gloria in the field; this meant that Roman commanders, who were drawn

from the politically active Senatorial class, were motivated to act

in a manner to achieve this.82 Gloria and virtus combined together to

compel a Roman aristocrat to act in an inspiring manner. Roman

society drilled into its aristocrats the qualities that make an

inspirational leader by its very nature. The relationship between

gloria and the actions of a commander was probably largely

subconscious, but would nonetheless have informed his behaviour.

This was exemplified by Antonius at 2nd Cremona, who actually killed

a fleeing standard-bearer to acquire the standard with which he

rallied the rest of his men. Antonius deliberately placed himself at

the centre of the action and was subsequently involved in personal

combat as a result. His actions were evidently successful in

inspiring his army, and his desire to act in this fashion was

informed by Roman military culture. Ultimately, Roman society

institutionalised acts of bravery as a precondition for social

standing and this was reflected on the battlefield.

80 Sal.Cat., 7; Cic.Rep., 5.9; W.V.Harris, War And Imperialism In Republican Rome (Oxford, 1991), pp.17-34.81 Harris, Imperialism, pp.28-30,43,47-48.82 Ibid., pp.20-22.

37


Managing Fog & Friction

The effects of Friction and the Fog of War (together referred to as

F2) have dogged every campaign ever undertaken. The essence of them

is that "war is very simple, but the simplest thing is

difficult...action in war is like movement in a resistant element."83

Fundamentally, this means that a commander's role is to expect

unpredictable chance happenings and adapt his plans when they occur.

It is understandably difficult to judge with accuracy whether a

commander has successfully negotiated the pitfalls of chance,

although it is simple enough to see where they have not. Clausewitz

makes the point that although training provides some remedy, by far

the most effective way of teaching competence in this area is real

combat experience.84 Accordingly, Roman leaders displayed widely

variant levels of ability, as military commands were usually granted

on a political rather than meritocratic basis, and only lasted a

relatively short time. For example, at Bedriacum Paulinus, who had

been the governor of Britain during Boudicca's rebellion and had

evidently learned the dangers of under-preparation, took the time to

have his troops fill in small ditches and watercourses that they

might have a clear battlefield on which to fight. Though he was

subsequently criticised for not moving fast enough, there is no

doubt that he intended to prevent anything unexpected from

happening. This is the only clear example of successful management

of F2, though there are many of unsuccessful attempts. For example

Caecina, also at Bedriacum, had no plan in place in the event that

his ambush was discovered. At 1st Cremona, the Othonians were unable

to discern the movements of the Vitellians in time to react to them.

On the march to the relief of Vetera, ineffectual scouting allowed

Vocula's army to be ambushed at Gelduba. In other battles there is

83 Clausewitz, War, pp.119-120.84 Clausewitz, War, p.117.

38


little evidence of anything untoward happening and it is therefore

impossible to suggest how the generals might have coped, but it

seems that overall the ability to manage F2 stemmed entirely from

individual ability and experience. However, it is worth noting that

the Roman system did give commanders the greatest possible number of

opportunities to gain this vital experience. Although acquisition of

commands did indeed rely on political appointment, it was also an

essential prerequisite in the normal course of events that the

holder had several years of military experience as a tribune,

prefect and legate before being appointed to the governorship of

important military provinces. The Roman state was, as Clausewitz

would advise, almost constantly in a state of war and furthering the

experience of its troops. Given this, there was little more that the

Romans could have done to ensure ability in this area.

In all the examples given above where Roman commanders failed to

anticipate problems, their troops suffered accordingly and the

battle was lost. The only exception is Gelduba, at which the

Batavian auxiliary cohorts also betrayed a lack of preparation when

they were in turn surprised by Roman reinforcements arriving in

their rear. Thus it seems that correct management of F2 and the

ability to adapt a plan to changing circumstances was an essential

prerequisite to victory, in the event that something unexpected did

indeed happen.

Picking Battles

Before any of the above can come into play, battle must first be

joined between two opposing armies. It is a commander's final duty

to plan his campaign in such a way that the Decisive battle he seeks

may be fought where it is most to his advantage. The Roman approach

39


to this seems to have varied with the circumstances. Throughout AD

69, all commanders sought to seize the initiative of the campaign on

a macroscopic scale. However, many commanders seemed content to

allow the precise location of the battlefield to be dictated by the

enemy and trust in their own and their troops' abilities to carry

the day regardless. This belief was not without a degree of

justification; the Batavian auxiliaries at Bonna were rightly

confident in their ability to break through the legionaries

stationed there to oppose them, while Bedriacum provides the perfect

example of a commander using other factors to turn the battlefield

not of his choosing to his advantage. However, generally speaking

the side that brought on the battle tended to be the side that won

it, as at both battles of Cremona. In the first, the Vitellians

intercepted the Othonian force on the march in unfavourable terrain

which restricted their ability to function cohesively and

effectively lost them the battle. By contrast, Antonius in the

second battle forced the attacking Vitellians to meet him on open

ground where the contest would be even. Roman commanders seem to

have been generally aware of this trend and, even in the scenarios

where they were not able to do so, at least attempted to choose the

ground of the fighting. This was obviously the intent of both the

Othonians at 1st Cremona and Fabullus at the second battle. This

suggests that some peculiarity of the Roman state encouraged this

quality in their generals, and this may be true; certainly the key

concept of virtus centred on offensive military action, encouraging

aggression in the field. However, it is perhaps unwise to ascribe

too much credit to Rome here, as non-Roman leaders also displayed an

awareness of the need to fight in a place beneficial to them; famous

examples such as Vercingetorix's attack at Alesia or the Battle of

Carrhae show the truth of this. Thus, it seems that some ability to

dictate a battlefield was common among Romans, but was also common

40


amongst their enemies. The Romans were simply the latest inheritors

of the long tradition of warfare in classical antiquity.

Given this, it is safe to conclude that choice of an appropriate

battlefield was a very important factor in ensuring success. If a

commander could reliably expect his enemies to do this then he could

not himself fall behind, or disaster would likely be the

consequence, as at 1st Cremona and Gelduba.

Armies

The role of the soldier is less conscious than that of a commander,

but equally important. Fundamentally their role is to be superior in

combat prowess and morale to the troops of the enemy so that, if a

commander does his job correctly, victory can easily be achieved.

Clausewitz expresses this in terms of Moral Force, for which a

commander is responsible for one sub-category and the troops

themselves for the remaining two; these are National Feeling and

Military Virtue. Further, the troops must also endeavour to possess

what Clausewitz loosely terms a 'moral superiority'. This is a

catch-all term for all the many factors that can negatively affect

an army's performance, such as inferior equipment, lack of training,

indiscipline, tiredness or poor logistical support to name but a

few.85 Although regular soldiers can hardly be blamed for some of

these things, it is their performance which is affected and thus

they are discussed in this section.

National Feeling

Clausewitz, methodical as ever, breaks down National Feeling into

four constituent components: 'Fanatical Zeal', 'Enthusiasm' (for

fighting), 'Faith' (in the cause) and 'Opinion' (of the

85 Clausewitz, War, pp.205-209.

41


leadership).86 The only example of fanaticism, i.e. fighting beyond

hope of success, was witnessed upon the Flavian entrance into Rome,

where determined Vitellians fought to the last man. Other than this,

Roman armies seem to have shown remarkable good sense in recognising

defeat and reconciling with their opponents during AD 69. However,

this was peculiar to civil war; Romans were loathe to come to terms

with foreign enemies.87 The unusual rationality displayed in civil

wars did not reflect a lack of commitment to the cause; examination

of other factors shows that, broadly speaking, Roman National

Feeling was extraordinarily high. Certainly the soldiers seem to

have displayed enthusiasm for fighting in every engagement; even the

Vitellians at 2nd Cremona, fighting a war not of their choosing in

unfavourable circumstances, were eager to bring on the battle.

Similarly, all Roman arms seem to have held faith both in their

cause and in victory at all times. Notable examples include the

Othonians at 1st Cremona, who fought on valiantly despite

increasingly insurmountable odds, both sides at the second battle

who refused to give up all night, and legionary troops on the Insula

Batavadorum, who fought through the overwhelming numbers of the

Batavians. Indeed, opinion of the leadership seems to be the only

factor to have fluctuated at all, and this only slightly; Herennius

Gallus, commander at Bonna, seems to have had no military reputation

whatsoever, while Vocula suffered from his unpopularity at Gelduba.

Other than this, however, Roman troops seem to have invested

considerable faith in their leaders, even when said leaders were

circumstantially or hastily chosen, such as Antonius (who gained

sole command through other potential leaders being accused of

treachery) and Fabullus (Caecina's emergency replacement). Overall,

Roman National Feeling was extremely high during the year 69.

86 Ibid., p.186.87 For example, during the 2nd Punic War.

42


In most battles, auxiliary troops seem to have been equally

committed to the fight as their legionary counterparts. However,

Insula Batavadorum provides a different example; while the legionaries

seem to have been infused with the notions of gloria and virtus which

kept them on the field, these did not translate to the freshly

levied auxiliary troops. The National Feeling instilled in all Roman

troops evidently could apply to auxilia, but was not immediately

present. This example therefore demonstrates that heightened

National Feeling was partly the result of the Roman military system

and the training it imparted. Complementing this were the values

promoted by Roman society, such as the notion of military service as

central to a man's self-image. The unique situation of civil war, in

which the combatants were tied inextricably to the success of their

preferred candidate both politically and emotionally, inevitably

heightened the National Feeling of all soldiers involved. However,

this does not invalidate the stress which the Roman system placed

upon strengthening National Feeling; rather, it serves to highlight

it and emphasise the high levels of National Feeling that must have

been inherent in the Roman army.

Military Virtue

According to Clausewitz, the Military Virtue of an army roughly

equates to "the natural qualities of a warlike people," such as the

Batavians. These qualities are 'Aptitude' (skill at arms),

'Bravery', 'Enthusiasm' (for military duties) and 'Endurance'.88 It

can fairly be assumed that all Roman legions, drilled in the same

fashion, shared a similar level of Aptitude for combat. However, the

same cannot be said of the Batavian auxiliary cohorts. They

displayed exceptional martial prowess in their slaughter of the

Othonian diversionary force of gladiators at 1st Cremona, and in

88 Clausewitz, War, p.188.

43


their defeat and near-defeat of legionaries at Bonna and Gelduba

respectively. Similarly, legionary troops on the Insula Batavadorum

showed themselves to be the superiors of their untrained Germanic

opponents, who could not break their formation. However, largely

speaking Roman troops did not display significantly greater ability

than other Roman troops during AD 69. The display of Bravery was

somewhat more varied; there were some failures of Roman courage. At

Bonna the Roman troops, despite outnumbering their Batavian

opponents, fled once their lines were broken. Bedriacum saw

Caecina's auxiliaries begin to rout before battle was even joined,

while the performance of the auxilia on the Insula Batavadorum was

equally shameful. However, there are also several redeeming

examples, not least of which are the legionaries on the Insula, who

held fast against overwhelming numbers. Similarly, the Othonian

Praetorians at 1st Cremona showed exceptional determination to

resist. The ambushed Romans at Gelduba demonstrated their Bravery by

fighting back rather than routing, whilst at 2nd Cremona the

Vitellian army showed remarkable courage by continuing to fight long

after their main attack was repulsed. The Flavians at this battle

also proved their mettle, resisting the focussed bombardment of the

Vitellian artillery. Tacitus tells an anecdote of two Flavian

soldiers who sacrificed their lives to cut the sinews of one

particularly large ballista, demonstrating both the fury of their

fire and the valour of the soldiers withstanding it.89 Therefore it

seems that Bravery was not a virtue in which Roman soldiers were

lacking.

Conversely, the soldiers' Enthusiasm for their duties fluctuated

wildly, depending on the fortunes of the campaign. The Othonians at

Bedriacum engaged in battlefield clearance without complaint, whilst

those at 1st Cremona were willing to build their camp under the eyes 89 Tac.Hist., 3.23.

44


of the enemy. After the 2nd Battle of Cremona, Flavian troops were so

enthusiastic that they began the assault of the Vitellian camp

against Antonius' orders. However, when a campaign seemed less

certain this commitment could readily drop; the ambush at Gelduba

doubtless owed its successful launch to unenthusiastic scouting by

Roman troops, while Vocula was forced to withdraw from attempting to

relieve Vetera a second time as his troops refused to leave their

camp to fight. This was due to the same sense of self-importance in

the legions that first gave rise to the wars of 69; Roman troops had

come to expect nothing less than unmitigated success, and setbacks

prickled their pride into stubbornness. This, then, was not the

Roman army's strongest asset. This title should instead go to their

Endurance. Throughout the year, Roman troops performed several

impressive feats of stamina. The best example is undoubtedly 2nd

Cremona, at which both sides showed phenomenal fortitude. Although

tiredness eventually got the better of the Vitellian army, their

achievements are no less incredible for it; after four days of

forced marches, they marched more than thirty miles on the fifth day

(about 150% of a good day's march) only to immediately march out to

battle in full gear and participate in prolonged fighting for over

twelve hours. The Flavians were hardly less impressive, having

already fought an engagement before the bulk of the Vitellian army

arrived and storming their camp immediately after the battle proper

had ended. Alongside physical stamina, the soldiers also exhibited

mental fortitude; to stay in battle so long, and to hold formation

despite furious attacks and bombardments demonstrated the utmost

discipline. These examples show the extraordinary heights of mental

and physical Endurance that Roman soldiers could reach. Although

there were some exceptions, overall Roman armies demonstrated a high

level of Military Virtue.

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Moral Superiority

To have a Moral Superiority in battle is of the utmost importance;

it can very easily decide the outcome of a battle. Indeed,

Clausewitz assigns it almost as much importance as numerical

superiority, and even more when a numerical advantage is

unattainable. Unfortunately, it is extremely hard to accurately

define what actually constitutes a Moral Superiority. Certainly it

includes the effects of Moral Force, yet as the above examples show,

this is not the whole picture. There remain a number of factors

which, through chance and circumstance, can change the course of a

battle. Sometimes it is a relatively minor effect, such as at Bonna

and Bedriacum. At the former, the recently recruited legionaries

were overawed by the fearsome reputation of the Batavians, which

must have contributed to their fragile morale. At the latter, the

indiscipline of the Vitellian auxilia caused them to give away their

ambush positions much earlier than they needed to, which would

likely have ruined the success of the ambuscade even if it had not

already been discovered. At other times, the effect could be

catastrophic, as for the Vitellians at 2nd Cremona. Here Fabullus

held all the necessary qualifications for command; an achievable and

not overcomplicated plan, executed with determination between

otherwise equal armies. He was able to amass a numerical superiority

at the Decisive Point and used it against the main Flavian

concentration of force. But for all this, the troops, though they

were as enthusiastic in their National Feeling and consistent in

their Military Virtue as they could be expected to be, were not able

to convert these circumstances into victory. The only remaining

explanation is a Moral Superiority belonging to the Flavians. This

came in two forms; first, the Suebic cavalry screen which Antonius

deployed before his frontline. This successfully blunted the

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momentum of the Vitellian charge, which Fabullus had doubtless hoped

would sweep through the Flavian line. Secondly and more importantly,

the Vitellian troops were simply overtired. For all the fortitude

they demonstrated, they had still marched an exceptionally long

distance and then proceeded straight into battle under arms, and it

proved critical.

All this serves to demonstrate the potential importance of a Moral

Superiority. However, generally speaking Roman armies were unable to

establish one over their fellow Romans, except when circumstances

conspired against one party. This is somewhat unsurprising in the

context of a civil war, as fundamentally Clausewitz is offering the

simple advice that one's troops ought to be better than those of the

enemy whenever battle is joined, so that the inevitable vagaries of

chance (Friction) become more likely to benefit one's own forces.

Although history demonstrates that this was something Roman armies

regularly achieved over their foreign opponents, the same cannot be

said of domestic conflicts.

47

Did the Roman Army Deserve its Reputation?Simon WhitewayConclusions

The Roman army has always enjoyed a superior reputation, above

others of its period. By analysing it in the context of Clausewitz's

laws, it becomes possible to compare dispassionately the force that

lay behind this reputation to the high standards of another

professional force, in order to see if the reputation is justified.

This case study has shown that, although not perfect, the Roman army

generally performed admirably and deserves its professional repute.

Unsurprisingly, given that Rome offered no formal command training,

Roman leaders were often inconsistent in their ability. However, in

this sample at least, they were more competent than not. Despite

notable examples of failure, such as Caecina at Bedriacum and the

Othonians at 1st Cremona, other leaders (and those same leaders in

other battles) demonstrated a general trend of living up to the

standards that Clausewitz sets a commander. This is no small task,

as Clausewitz's targets are intended to be almost unattainably high.

Therefore, it is fair to conclude that although Roman commanders did

suffer from an occasionally catastrophic inability to recognise and

exploit Decisive Points, they overall performed well, especially

given their lack of formal training. Most leaders seem to have

understood, if only intuitively, the fundamental principles that lay

behind Clausewitz's laws; always seeking to hold the initiative and

destroy the enemy's military potential by acquiring some kind of

advantage or superiority at a Decisive Point. Similarly, Roman

soldiers showed exceptionally high levels of Military Virtue and

National Feeling throughout all the year's campaigns, with very few

exceptions. Although they were notoriously fickle in their support

of leaders and often had to be coaxed and cajoled into action, when

Roman soldiers fought they did so extremely well. This was why it

proved extremely difficult for any army to establish a Moral

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Superiority over another, as both were of a high quality. Civil wars

often sap the morale and discipline of the combatants, and AD 69 was

no exception; for example the Flavian army, in the run up to 2nd

Cremona, disposed of three commanders with whom they were unhappy

before settling on Antonius. Yet despite this they exhibited

extraordinary devotion to their various causes and were enthusiastic

to fight for them. In the normal course of events, this enthusiasm

would have been directed outwards against the enemies of Rome and

would likely have been a significant part of what made the Roman

army so successful.

Of course, the Roman army was far from perfect. Although it was

indeed a formidable force, it benefitted substantially from the

circumstances of its creation. Ancient Rome was a highly militarised

society that produced an extremely martial culture. This entailed

that many of the qualities which Clausewitz looks for in both a

commander and a soldier - bravery, enthusiasm for fighting, belief

in the 'honour of arms' - were already present in many people. It

was this military predisposition, combined with the Roman system of

gradual progression between military posts, which ensured that most

commanders possessed at least a degree of ability, and soldiers a

belief in their own strength. Notably, the three strongest aspects

of the Roman army's performance are the three that together make up

'Moral Force'. This was certainly the most consistent area of Roman

achievement, and the Batavian auxiliary cohorts demonstrate

conclusively that this martial culture and the high morale it

entailed was not confined to legionary troops. Overall, it is clear

that despite a number of flaws, the Roman army was an extremely

effective fighting force, and that it owed this as much to its

military culture as to its training and institutions.

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The usefulness of On War as an analytical framework must also be

assessed. Using the laws of Clausewitz naturally presents some

difficulties in its execution, stemming primarily from the fact that

he wrote in the nineteenth century. By this time, warfare was

understandably very different from the Roman era. The main

difference was that all developed European armies, for whom

Clausewitz was primarily writing, had attained a measure of equality

between them. Differences in tactics, training and equipment were so

negligible in importance that Clausewitz disregarded them entirely,

in favour of his focus on moral factors.90 This could be perceived as

a weakness of On War, as tactics, training and equipment have often

been regarded as the key areas in which the Romans held an advantage

over their opponents. Furthermore, when Clausewitz wrote technology

had greatly simplified logistics through the increasingly common use

of the railway and the invention of canned food. Thus, On War deals

only briefly with logistics, which was one of the Romans' greatest

strengths. However, all this is largely negated by focussing on a

civil war. As both sides were Roman-trained, both possessed the same

ability to deal with logistical issues and they therefore did not

affect the outcome of the campaigns of 69. Similarly, although the

Roman army's equipment was not completely uniform and varied between

individuals, it was certainly comparable enough to fall in with

Clausewitz's description. Furthermore, because of the

historiographical tendency to focus on Roman equipment, moral

factors have often been overlooked in analysis of the Roman army.

Thus, the use of On War is actually instructive in focussing on a

less well-known area of study. It is also worth noting that this

study has been far from exhaustive with regards to Clausewitzian

principles. For reasons of space, analysis has been restricted to

only those points deemed most important and most applicable to the

90 Clausewitz, War, p.195.

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Roman army; there are dozens more categories which could be included

in a more extensive study.

The use of On War has enabled a better understanding of the way in

which the Roman army fought. Having broken down the various armies'

performances into their constituent strengths and weaknesses,

several observations can be made: firstly, the Roman army excelled

in the strength of its Moral Force. Exceptionally high levels of

National Feeling and Military Virtue generally tended to be

reinforced by the talents of a capable commander, allowing the Roman

army to typically outlast its opponents on the battlefield.

Secondly, this case study suggests that the prowess of the army was

more important than the abilities of the commander. Although a

capable commander could take a Roman army to great successes, such

as Caesar in Gaul, an overmatched army often could not be rescued by

such a man, like the Vitellians at 2nd Cremona. It is possible that

this conclusion is corrupted by the context of a civil war, in which

the impact of Moral factors is necessarily heightened and a

commander's influence therefore proportionally lessened, but this is

the conclusion supported by this sample. Finally, one factor draws

all the battles together; the army that was on the offensive on the

campaign consistently achieved victory. Although Bedriacum appears

to be an exception to this, in fact Paulinus was leading the

Othonian troops to a counter-offensive; by the time of 1st Cremona,

the main Vitellian forces had arrived and were resuming aggressive

movement. This was symptomatic of the Romans' peculiar national

trait of aggression. Conducting offensive warfare was central to the

concept of virtus and Roman self-image.91 In a civil war, where the

various claimants sought to portray themselves as the most typically

Roman and therefore acceptable candidate, this was doubly important.

This showcased itself both as a strength of the attacking force - 91 A.K.Goldsworthy, The Roman Army At War (Oxford, 1996), pp.141-142.

51


take the steadfast legionaries on the Insula Batavadorum as an example

- and as a weakness of the defenders, such as at 2nd Cremona.

Furthermore, analysing the Roman army with Clausewitz's laws has

also aided in the understanding of why it was generally successful.

That the Roman army frequently exhibited extremely high Moral Force

was one of its greatest strengths, but has been relatively

understudied. Across all the battles in this sample, the resolve of

the armies was a defining and often decisive factor. However, aside

from this unifying trait, other areas of Clausewitz's instruction

were inconsistent at best. The use of the Clausewitzian framework

emphasises these inconsistencies in a way which a more general study

would not. The approach of systematically reducing an army's

performance to its constituent components reveals the weaknesses

that a macroscopic overview would hide. These inconsistencies are

indicative of a wider trend within the Roman army; throughout the

majority of the historiography, the Roman army has been viewed as a

single contiguous entity. This generalisation is inappropriate.

Indeed, the very term 'Roman army' is somewhat misleading; although

it was a standing, professional force, each legion and auxiliary

unit was distinct in its particular equipment, skills and

traditions. The Romans themselves never referred to "the Roman

army"; they spoke of milites (the soldiers) and the armies of

particular provinces, but no exercitus Romanorum ever existed.92 To

generalise between Roman armies diminishes their individual

differences, whereas a Clausewitzian analysis highlights these

distinctions. By focussing on each individual element, each unit,

army, commander and battle can be considered in its own right. This

approach has demonstrated that each element of the Roman army varied

according to circumstances. With this is mind, it is clear that the

success of the Roman military was largely based on individual 92 S.James, Rome & The Sword (London, 2011), p.22.

52


ability and the favourable circumstances of a martial culture. In

retrospect, this investigation necessitates further comparative

study of individual elements within the Roman military.

Appendices

Legions and commanders involved in significant battles

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Battle Allegiance

Commander(s) Legions

Bedriacum Othonian

Suetonius Paulinus; Marius Celsus

I Adiutrix; XIII Gemina

Bedriacum Vitellian

Aulus Caecina Alienus

I Italica; XXI Rapax

1st Cremona Othonian

Paulinus; Celsus; Lucius Salvius Otho Titianus; Licinius Proculus;Flavius Sabinus

I Adiutrix; XIII Gemina; XIV Gemina; Praetorian Cohorts

1st Cremona Vitellian

Caecina; Fabius Valens; Arrius Varus

I Italica; XXI Rapax; V Alaudae

2nd Cremona Vitellian

Fabius Fabullus I Italica; XXI Rapax; XVI Gallica; I Germanica; XXII Primigenia; V Alaudae; IIAugusta; IX Hispana; XX Valeria Victrix; IVMacedonica

2nd Cremona Flavian

Marcus Antonius Primus

III Gallica; VIII Augusta; XIII Gemina; VII Galbiana (Gemina); VII Claudia; Praetorian Cohorts

Insula Batavadorum

Roman Munius Lupercus V Alaudae; XV Primigenia

Insula Batavadorum

Batavian

Gaius Julius Civilis

N/A

Bonna Roman Herennius Gallus I GermanicaBonna Batavi

an? N/A

Gelduba Roman Dillius Vocula I Germanica; IV MacedonicaGelduba Batavi

an? N/A

Vetera Roman Dillius Vocula I Germanica; IV Macedonica; V Alaudae; XV Primigenia

Vetera Batavian

Civilis N/A

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