DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY AND HOPE, I11

F R A N C I S P. F I O R E N Z A

Munster-in- Westfalen, Germany

In developing his central thesis, ‘ S (Subject) is not yet P (Predicate)’, Bloch provides the anthropological and ontological foundation of hope. The establishment of the anthropological foundation consists in an investigation of the various levels of man’s consciousness in order to determine the root of hope in the appetite of man’s primary instinct and in the orientation and content of man’s dreams. The ontological founda- tion of hope is described by Bloch’s definition of the objective categories of reality’ and the corresponding degrees of possibility. This double founda- tion of hope provides the background for his discussion of the various human utopias and his confrontation of Marxism with Christianity. Our third article is limited to an analysis of Bloch’s anthropological foundation of hope in which he indicates his understanding of the utopian structure of reality.

Das Prinzip Hoffnung begins with a report and analysis of man’s ordinary daydreams.’ Bloch surveys the dreams, desires, and wishes of man from childhood to adolescence, from maturity to senility. The images of these dreams signify the daily hopes of man. However, they are also signs of a deeper experience. For although these daydreams are present in the superficial level of man’s consciousness, they point to a more profound level within the consciousness of man, to the root of man’s desires and drives.’ They indicate that man has an incessant desire for the new, for that which he lacks and needs. They imply that it is precisely man’s emptiness and need which stands at the root of his search for the new and is the moving source of his desire for a better world.4

After presenting a short survey of the daily images of man’s hope, Bloch investigates the roots of hope in man’s consciousness.5 He thereby attempts to provide the anthropological foundation of hope and to demonstrate the utopian structure and orientation of the deepest level of

Cf. S. Paul Schilling, ‘Ernst Bloch: Philosopher of the Not-Yet’, The Christian Century, LXXXIV, 46 (November lSth, 1967), 1455-8, for a brief but excellent presenta- tion in English of the meaning of some of Bloch’s main categories: ‘Front’, ‘The New’, and ‘Matter’.

- -

Prinzip Hoflnung, pp. 21-45. Ibid., pp. 49-223.

Ibid., pp. 96 f. Ibid., pp. 356-64.

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DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D H O P E , I11 27

man’s consciousness. This task is accomplished in confrontation with various psychoanalytical theories, especially those of Freud. For although Bloch relies on many Freudian insights, he differs from Freud on several fundamental issues. The most important of these concern (1) man’s primary instinct and (2) the significance of daydreams.

MAN’S P R I M A R Y INSTINCT

The specification of man’s primary instinct is a much disputed question within depth psychology. Whereas Freud postulated the libido, the sexual desire, as man’s strongest and primary instinct,’ his followers, Adler and Jung, have strongly disagreed. Presupposing that the desire for power is the basic instinct of man, Alfred Adler maintains that sex is only a means for attaining the final goal, namely, the acquisition of power. Carl Gustav Jung’s position, which involves an energetic and vitalistic extension of Freud’s libido theory, makes sex only a part of man’s primary instinct and extends man’s unconsciousness so as to constitute it as collec- tive and archaic.2 Although Bloch also disagrees with Freud, he does not adopt the revisions of these thinkers. On the contrary, Bloch sees in them an extension of the very weaknesses of Freud’s the~r i e s .~ Adler’s affirma- tion of the desire for power as man’s primary instinct indicates the extent for Bloch to which psychoanalysis merely reflects the basic attitudes of bourgeois capitalistic society with its concentration on a~hievement.~

Bloch stresses that sexuality alone is man’s primary instinct for Freud, since the death instinct is only a negative lust. The relationship between man’s primary instinct and ego is discussed by Bloch in detail when he distinguishes between daydreams and night- dreams in order to contrast his position with Freud‘s. For a contrast to Bloch’s interpre- tation see Norman 0. Brown, Life against Death (New York, 1959), pp. 77-86, who stresses the Freudian dualism between the Life (Eros) and Death instincts. Unfortunately Bloch does not discuss the development in Freud‘s thinking on instincts. Freud’s theory affirms at first an antagonism between sex and ego. However, sex is considered as a specific limited instinct. For a short intermediary period Freud assumes that the libido is an all-pervasive narcissist instinct. After this ‘pan-sexualism’ he develops in the final stage of his theory the dualistic notion of the conflict between Life (Eros) and Death. Cf. Freud‘s own survey, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, trans. W. J. Sprott (London, 1933); also Ernest Jones, ‘Psychoanalysis and the Instincts’, British Journal of Psychology, XXVI (1936); Edward Bibring, ’The Development and Problems of the Theory of the Instincts’, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, XXI (1941); Heinz Hartmann, ‘Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of Instinctual Drives’, Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XVII, 3 (1948).

Cf. also Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind ofthe Moralist (New York, 1959; Anchor edition, 1961), p. 220 f.: ‘Jung’s parting with Freud is over the problem of the past, rather than over the “collective unconscious”. For Jung, the source of the neurotic conflict is not the repression of desires but the exhaustion of the historical appropriate- ness of some responses to the neglect of others.’

Prinzip Hofnung, pp. 63-71. Ibid., p. 64: An example of Bloch’s exaggerated polemic which is not untypical in

28 FRANCIS P. FIORENZA

Jung’s revisions exemplify, if in a more radical manner, another weakness of psychoanalysis ; in bringing the unconscious to consciousness he makes conscious the past rather than the future, since the unconscious contains the repressions of man’s past experience. Moreover, whereas the enlight- ened Freud seeks to make the repressed conscious, the ‘reactionary’ Jung seeks to connect what is conscious with what is repressed and so penetrate more deeply into the unconscious and into the past.’ Although Freud and Jung stand in contrast with one another, both conceive of man’s unconsciousness in terms of the past. Bloch’s unfavourable evaluation of the revisions made by Freud’s students indicates two underlying reasons for his criticism of Freudian psychoanalysis in his explanation of the anthro- pological foundation of hope. The first reason, which involves Bloch’s description of the societal-historical limitation of psychoanalysis, is essential to his determination of man’s primary instinct.’ The second, which concerns the Freudian understanding of man’s unconsciousness as a retainer of past experience, leads Bloch to make the important differentia- tion between night- and day-dreams, which is minimized, if not eliminated, in Freudian psych~analysis.~

Bloch maintains that the major weakness of psychoanalysis consists in its failure to grasp the dependence of its results upon socio-economic factor^.^ This failure leads to the error of regarding a specific instinct as

For a discussion of the extent to which Jung’s psychology with its reactionary and obscurantist trends has eliminated many critical insights of Freud, cf. Edward Glover, Freud or Jung? (New York, 1950).

Prinzip Hoflnung, pp. 71-7. Ibid., pp. 7 2 4 . A similar criticism in regard to the reality principle is briefly dis-

cussed by Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (New York, 1955), pp. 31 f.: ‘The external world faced by the growing ego is a t any stage a specific socio-historical organization of reality, affecting the mental structure through specific societal agencies or agents. It has been argued that Freud’s concept reality principle obliterates this fact by making historical contingencies into biological necessities : his analysis of the repressive transformation of the instincts under the impact of the reality principle generalizes from a specific historical form of reality to reality pure and simple. This criticism is valid, but its validity does not vitiate the truth in Freud‘s generalization, namely, that a repressive organization of the instincts underlies all historical forms of the reality principle. ( . . . ) Precisely because all civilization has been organized domination, the historical development assumes the dignity and neces- sity of universal biological development. The “unhistorical” character of the Freudian concepts thus contains elements of its opposite: their historical substance must be re- captured, not by adding some sociological factors (as do the “cultural” Neo-Freudian schools), but by unfolding their owncontents.’ However, for thedifferencebetween Freud‘s position and Marcuse’s understanding of it, see Heide Berndt and Reimut Reiche, ‘Die

Ibid., pp. 86-128.

his writings: ‘Indem Adler derart aus der Libido das Geschlecht austreibt, die individuelle Macht einsetzt, ist seine Triebbestimmung den immer verschiirfter kapitalistischen Weg von Schopenhauer zu Nietzsche gegangen und reflektiert diesen Weg ideologisch- psycho-analytisch.’

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, 111 29

being universally primary, whereas the primacy of any one instinct is in reality limited only to a particular society with its specific conventions. Those instincts which the psychoanalytical school assert to be primary are not at all such, but are very much partial and limited. For Bloch hunger alone has universal primacy as man’s basic instinct. As the root instinct of self-preservation it sets all other instincts in motion.’ Only its frustration is fatal. Freudian psychoanalysts, in contrast, have not come to terms with the primacy of hunger because the majority of their patients have come from the bourgeois middle class and from such a financial situation as to have little worry about hunger. Any generalization made from a particular class is consequently not only inadequate but also unhistorical. It fails to consider the material and social conditions of the patients treated. Bloch’s criticism of the Freudians for neglecting the limiting effect of societal- historical factors must be seen in the context of his philosophical back- ground and intention. On the one hand, he is here merely applying to Freudian psychoanalysis Hegel’s critique of the rationalism of the Enlight- enment and Marx’s critique of speculative philosophy. On the other hand, this criticism should not be understood in isolation (where it appears as somewhat simplistic) but rather in the light of Bloch’s understanding of hunger and his definition of human affects, especially that of hope. Moreover, both aspects of this criticism are related in so far as the Marxist and Hegelian influences on Bloch not only explain the reason for his criticism, but also indicate the direction of Bloch’s own attempt to develop a philosophy of hope.

EXCURSUS: HEGELIAN A N D MARXIST INFLUENCE

Bloch’s criticism of Freudian psychoanalytical theory for its failure to reflect upon the historicity of its own standpoint is similar in certain as- pects to Hegel’s criticism of the Enlightenment. A common, but incorrect, understanding of the Enlightenment attributes to its representatives an exces- sive intellectualism and an abstract rationalism.’ The Enlightenment

Prinzip Hofnung, p. 76: Bloch equates instinct with need. The primary and historical instinct of hunger is painted quite figuratively by Bloch: ‘Sein Bediirfnis nach Bedarfs- deckung ist das Oel auf der Lampe der Geschichte, doch je nach der wechselnden Art der Bedarfsdeckung sieht selbst dies primilre Bediirfnis verschieden drein.’

Cf. Kurt Lenk, ‘Problemgeschlichtliche Einleitung’ in Ideologiekritik und Wissens- soziologie (Berlin, 1961), pp. 17-59, esp. 25 ff.

geschichtliche Dimension des Realitiltsprinzips’ in Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse, ed. Jiirgen Habermas (Frankfurt, 1968), pp. 104-32, esp. 107 f. ‘According to his [Freud‘s] view ‘The principles of lust and of realityappear from the outset not as concepts that have a societal-historical relation, but quite simply as concepts that of themselves should make understandable the actual behaviour of the individual.’

B*

30 F R A N C I S P . FIORENZA

is accused of seeing reality only in the light of a mathematical and technological ‘reason’. Blind to the value of myths, fables and faith, it rejects them as irrational or ridicules them as superstitious.’ In other words, it has no sense for the contingent or historical.’ Sharing these mis- conceptions, Hegel in The Phenomenology of Mind carries on a polemic against the abstract rationalism of the Enlightenmer~t.~ He points out that the Enlightenment incorrectly understands reason and faith as radic- ally opposed. Whereas reason is considered as universal in its pure insight, faith is seen as isolated in its individuality. Against the dualism implied in this rationalistic conception Hegel argues that reason itself is not something abstract or isolated from history, but rather it realizes its reasonableness and universality only in and through its concrete develop- ment and expression in h i ~ t o r y . ~ The pure insight of the Enlightenment is non-existent. There is no pure insight. Reason and its insights are historical in origin, operation, and content. The Enlightenment’s failure to recognize the concrete historicity of reason made it blind to the fact that the En- lightenment itself was just as one-sided and unreasonable as it had accused faith of being. Hegel develops a philosophy of history and proposes an understanding of reason as both universal and concrete. The universality of reason exists in and through its historical concrete expression. Thus Bloch argues in a manner similar to Hegel’s criticism of the Enlightenment when he argues that the Freudian conception of man’s primary instinct is abstract and unhistorical. Strongly influenced also by the young Hegel and by Marx’s criticism of ideology,’ Bloch points out that this one-sided abstractness of Freudianism consists especially in its neglect of the socio- economic conditions of the patients. Finally, the parallelism to Hegel’s ‘concrete universal’ indicates the source of Bloch’s decision to develop the themes of hunger as man’s primary instinct and hope as its affect, expressing

This attribution of such blindness to the Enlightenment often neglects certain aspects of its teachings. For example, although the essential importance of schematization for Kant’s theory of knowledge is often recognized, it is also often overlooked in regard to his philosophy of religion.

schaftliche Zeitschrgt der Karl-Marx-Universitat Leipzig, 12 (1963). Cf. Werner Kraus, ‘Franzosische Aufklarung und deutsche Romantik‘, Wissen-

Phanomenologie des Geistes (ed. Hoffmeister; Hamburg, 1952), pp. 366422. Ibid., pp. 350-76. See the critical edition of the introduction to his lectures on the

philosophy of world history: Die Vernunft in der Geschichfe (ed. Hoffmeister; Hamburg, 1955). Note: the various English translations of his philosophy of history are not a translation of the texts in this edition. In this regard see: Walter Kaufmann, Hegel: Reinterpretation, Texts and Commentary (New York, 1965), p. 477. Kaufmann refutes many of the false popular misconceptions of Hegel’s philosophy of history (pp. 254-73).

For a valuable brief presentation of this criticism and its significance, cf. George Lichtheim, ‘The Concept of Ideology’, History and Theory, IV, 2 (1965), reprinted in: The Concept of Ideology and other Essays (New York, 1967), pp. 3-47.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, 111 31

their concreteness in such a way as to emphasize their radical universality and historicity. Bloch’s assertion that hunger is man’s primary instinct is, therefore, not just a reaction to Freudian pan-sexualism, but is his attempt to overcome the neglect of historicity in the psychoanalytical school.

In his development of the philosophical foundations of hope, however, Bloch does not merely imitate Hegel in his conception of the historicity of human nature and of reality. Rather he stands under the influence of Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s speculative philosophy, especially in regard to the questions of the subject of history and the relationship of philosophy to history.’ For Hegel the subject of history is Geist (Spirit). God, under- stood as Geist, is the subject of the process of history and of mankind. Geist moves to its adequate self-understanding in history, which for Hegel has a theological meaning. For Marx, however, the subject of history is not Geist, but human society which is moving towards a unity. The meaning of history is, therefore, purely human. Moreover, Marx does not agree with the Hegelian identification of man with the ‘subjective Spirit’, despite his agreement with the Hegelian understanding of man as being which realizes itself in and through history. This disagreement has theoretical and practical significance in the context of the second question, namely, the relationship of philosophy to history.

The relationship of philosophy to historical reality is not only a (if not the) central point of difference between Hegel and Marx, but also a main issue of controversy in regard to the interpretations of Marxism. It is also a crucial point in Bloch’s revision of Marxism. Hegel maintains in his

For extensive surveys not only of the various problems involved but also of the secondary literature on the subject of the relationship between Marx and Hegel, cf. Iring Fetscher, ‘DasVerhilltnis des Marxismus zu Hegel’, in Karl Marx und der Marxisrnus (Miinchen, 1967), pp. 45-122; Jiirgen Habermas, ‘Zur philosophischen Diskussion um Marx und den Marxismus’ in Theorie und Praxis (Berlin, 1963), pp. 261-335. Whereas Fetscher stresses the Hegelian influence in Marx’s philosophy, Habermas emphasizes Marx’s independence. For more recent literature cf. Giinther Hillmann, Murx und Hegel: Von der Spekulation zur Diatektik (Frankfurt, 1966). Hillmann presents a detailed analysis of Marx’s early writings up to his dissertation. The results of his analysis of the dissertation lend support to the direction of Habermas’s more general interpretation of Marx. The special value of Hillmann’s dissertation lies in his attempt to go beyond general presentations of the development of Karl Marx’s thinking in relation to Hegel. Instead of the usual stages of Marx’s development: Enlightenment (esp. Classical)--to Romantic-to theoretical viewpoint of Hegel-to practice as critique, Hillmann proposes : abitur-essay : opposition between individual and abstract-general; Poetry: opposition between subject and undetermined object; Letter on Father: solution of the above antinomies in the external and internal ‘Vermittlung’ of the individual with the concrete-general of Hegel (note: a similarity to Hegel’s position before any explicit knowledge of Hegel); preliminary studies to dissertation reveal his concern with the idealistic problem of the opposition between ‘thinking’ and ‘vorstellendes Bewusstsein’; dissertation: realization of man possible only through philosophy as critique and practice and only in view of man as subject of history.

32 F R A N C I S P. F I O R E N Z A

Introduction to the Philosophy of Right that the task of philosophy is to grasp the present existing reality and not to propose some speculation about the future which transcends the present age.’ In other words, philosophy grasps that which is, and expresses the reality of its age in thoughts.

If his [the philosopher’s] theory really goes beyond the world as it is and builds an ideal one as it ought to be, that world exists indeed, but only in his opinions, an unsubstantial element where anything you please may, in fancy, be built.2

Marx’s rejection of precisely the Hegelian position represented by this statement constitutes his decisive step beyond Hegel. Whereas Hegel main- tained that philosophy appears only after ‘a form of life has become old’, and that it can therefore provide only a post factum interpretation of history, Marx believed that not only the past but also the future is capable of interpretation, involving not only a passive understanding, but also action with an awareness of its significance and extent. Marx’s criticism of Hegel demands a critical orientation of philosophy to the future and a catalytic character in regard to practical, revolutionary, action. Whereas Hegel taught that only after revolution has already occurred in history can it be understood by philosophy and interpreted as a reasonable revolu- t i ~ n , ~ Marx affirmed in his eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: ‘the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.’4

The assertion by Marx that philosophy is realized in action has been Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (ed. Hoffmeister; Hamburg, 1955) p. 13 f. Ibid., p. 16 (The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox [Oxford, 19421, p. 11). See the debate on this point in general and in regard to the French Revolution

between Joachim Ritter, Hegel und die franzosische Revolution (Frankfurt, 1965) and Jiirgen Habermas, ‘Hegels Kritik der Franzosischen Revolution’ in Theorie und Praxis, pp. 89-107. S e e also Manfred Riedel, Theorie und Praxis im Denken Hegels (Stuttgart, 1965); Hans Friedrich Fulda, Das Recht der Philosophie in Hegels Philosophie des Rechts (Wissenschaft und Gegenwart Nr. 36/37; Frankfurt, 1968). Ritter has emphasized against the traditional image of Hegel as a reactionary thinker in principle and in politics (Haym and Rosenzweig), that there is no philosophy more profoundly a philosophy of revolution than Hegel’s. Habermas rejoins that Hegel made revolution the principle of philosophy for the sake of philosophy which as such overcomes revolu- tion. The issue is not of mere academic or historical interest. There is a tendency not only in the past but also in the present for theologians who are sympathetic to Hegel’s critique of the Enlightenment and of ‘subjectivistic’ theologians of his day to hold that those who accept Hegel’s reconciliation of philosophy and faith are reactionary in political affairs. Those who see Hegel’s reconciliation as unsuccessful are generally in favour of radicalism in politics and consequently of a theology of revolution. Cf Wolf- Dieter Marsch, ‘Logik des Kreuzes: Ueber Sinn und Grenzen einer theologischen Berufung auf Hegel’, Evangelische Theologie, 28 (1968), pp. 57-82, Jiirgen Moltmann, ‘Die Revolution der Freiheit’, Evangelische Theologie, 27 (1967), pp. 595-616.

Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, ed. and trans. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York, 1967), p. 402.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY AND HOPE, I11 33 given various interpretations and is the subject of much controversy. The problem is whether the realization of philosophy in action involves its preservation, elevation or negation. One difficulty of any interpretation of Marx’s position revolves round the ambiguity of his explanatory statements in his work, Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduc- tion. The crucial statements of this text contain the word aufheben. This word can mean ‘elevate’, ‘preserve’ or ‘negate’. The interpretation of the text depends upon the meaning chosen. Marx describes the two ‘parties’ in Germany, a practical and a theoretical party. The practical party ‘rightly demands the Aufhebung of philosophy’, but incorrectly stops at this demand because ‘you cannot aufheben philosophy without actualizing it’. The theoretical party commits a similar error but with a reversal of factors. Failing to see that the demands and results of philosophy ‘can be attained by the Aufhebung of previous philosophy, by the Aufhebung of philosophy as philosophy’, its mistake was that ‘it believed that it could actualize philosophy and yet not aufheben it’.’

DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS

The interpretations of these statements go in two different directions : one stressing the negation of philosophy, the other the preservation and the elevation of philosophy in action. A glance at four different interpretations can easily illustrate this divergence. First: an extreme and positivistic interpretation maintains that Marx rejects all philosophy in favour of a purely pragmatic political position and excludes all speculation for the sake of immediate action and direct change. Such an interpretation was decisively rejected as early as 1923 by Karl Korsch, the teacher of Bertholt B r e ~ h t . ~ He noted that the bourgeois and the Marxist professors of philosophy

Cf. Writings of the Young Marx, pp. 255 ff. See Fetscher ,‘Das VarhBltnis’ (p. 31, n. 1 above), for a survey of the development

of the various interpretations in this direction. Such a pejorative interpretation of Marx as being a mere positivist has recently been strongly asserted by Giulo Preti, Praxis ed empirismo (Torino, 1957), pp. 12 ff. who understands Marx’s theses on Feuerbach as a rejection of every interpretation. A similar understanding is implied in Heidegger’s objection to Marx’s eleventh thesis that the alteration of the world demands a previous alteration of Thinking itself. For Heidegger that means that Thinking must direct itself ‘in das Denkwiirdige’ which is for him Being. Cf. his booklet, Kants These uber das Sein (Frankfurt, 1962), pp. 6 ff.

Marxismus und Philosophie (1923; reprinted, Frankfurt, 1966), pp. 73-136. He writes in his commentary to Marx’s eleventh thesis: ‘Durch diesen Satz wird nicht wie die Epigonen sich eingebildet haben, alle Philosophie fur ein blosses Hirngespinst erklilrt, sondern es wird vielmehr eine schroffe Absage an alle solche, philosophische oder wissenschaftliche, Theorie ausgesprochen, die nicht zugleich Praxis ist, und zwar wirk- liche, irdisch diesseitige, menschlich sinnliche Praxis-und nicht die spekulative TSitig- keit der im Grunde nichts als sich selbst begreifenden philosophischen Idee’ (p. 133).

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too often agreed on this point, the former arguing that the lack of a philosophical content was the greatest failure of Marxism, the latter that it was its greatest merit. Second: an idealistic interpretation, representing the contrary extreme, maintains a basic philosophical identity between Marx and Hegel.’ According to this interpretation Marx did not intend to change the primary principle of Hegel’s philosophy, but only to actualize it and to put it into practice. This interpretation fails to explain those statements of Marx demanding the negation of philosophy, just as the first interpretation failed to explain those statements relating to the preservation and actual- ization of philosophy. Third: a sociological interpretation asserts that Marx rejects not only a positivistic practice that abstracts completely from theoretical reason, but also an idealistic practice, which consists of the mere realization in concrete reality of the truth already contained in the speculative concept.2 According to this interpretation Marx rejects a mere practice that lacks awareness of its own starting-point, presuppositions and possibilities, as well as of the concrete conditions and subject of its develop- ment. Moreover, although Marx rejects a theory that understands itself as a synthesis which completes and reconciles the world in a system, he does not reject theory as critique. Philosophy as critique is aware that philoso- phical contemplation is an expression of the alienation of the philosophical self-understanding with its false conception of its own theoretical character, of its assumed but non-existent theoretical a ~ t a r c h y . ~ Presupposing that the meaning of history can only be theoretically grasped to the extent that man produces, controls, and perfects it, Marx maintains that the correct- ness of a possible revolution is to be empirically and scientifically ascer-

This interpretation has become especially influential through the writings of Karl Lowith. In 1941 he wrote: ‘From the theoretical point of view, this new kind of philo- sophy does not yet transcend Hegel’s system, but is included within it. Therefore, the new way of philosophizing is aware of itself only in contrast to the complete system; i t does not yet understand that its own dissolution of Hegelian philosophy is the most appropriate realization of the latter. For Hegel’s principle is also Marx’s principle : the unity of reason and reality, and reality itself as a union of essence and existence’. Cf. From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. David E. Green (New York, 1964; Anchor edition, 1967), p. 93. Cf. also Konrad Bekker, Marx’philosophische Entwicklung. Sein Verhaltnis zu Hegel (Zurich, 1940); Heinrich Popitz, Der entfremdete Mensch: Zeitkritik und Geschichtsphilosophie des jungen Marx (Basel, 1953) ; Ludwig Landgrebe, ‘Hegel und Marx’ in Marxismus Studien, I (Tiibingen, 1954), 39-53; Erwin Metzke, ‘Mensch und Geschichte im urspriinglichen Ansatz des Marx’schen Denkens’, in Murxisrnus Studien, I1 (Tiibingen, 1954), 6-25; I. Fetscher, ‘Das Verhaltnis’, pp. 45-122; Dieter Henrich, ‘Karl Marx als Schiiler Hegels’, Marxismus-Leninismus, Geschichte und Gestalt. Verof- fentlichungen der Freien Universitat Berlin (Berlin, 1961), pp. 5-19. See the criticism of the positions of Fetscher, Landgrabe, Popitz, and Motzke by Habermas, Theorie und Praxis, pp. 261-335.

Habermas, ‘Ein Marxistischer Schelling-Zu Ernst Blochs spekulativem Materialis- mus’ in Theorie und Praxis, pp. 336-51, esp. p. 349 f.

Cf. Habermas, loc. cit., and Hillmann, Marx und Hegel.

D I A L E C T I C A L THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, 111 35

tained, whereas its truth becomes evident only in the practical production of its meaning.’ Critique is, therefore, the expression as much of immediate practice as of immediate realization of theory. Philosophy is realized in a critical theory and practice which involves at the same time the negation of speculative philosophy and its presuppositions. This interpretation postulates an essential difference between the theoretical, deductive Hegel- ian dialectic and the empirically orientated and originating Marxian critique.’ Fourth: although Bloch also rejects the positivistic as well as the idealistic interpretation of Marx’s conception of the relationship of philosophy to a ~ t i o n , ~ his own interpretation differs quite decisively from the third. Whereas that interpretation stresses that the realization of philosophy in action involves the negation of the metaphysical presup- positions of philosophy, Bloch emphasizes that a new ontology of the not- yet is called for.4 Therefore Bloch’s interpretation attacks any vulgar pragmatism according to which truth is nothing other than the usefulness of certain ideas for society. Bloch writes: ‘For Marx a thought is not true because it is useful, but useful because it is true.’’ Moreover he points out that the eleventh thesis does not criticize previous philosophy because it has philosophized, but because it has merely interpreted the world.6 Marx directs his polemic not against contemplative philosophy in itself, but against a specific type of contemplative philosophy practised by the young Hegelians of his age.’ Marx does not negate philosophy in itself, but only the previous philosophy.’ In other words: Thesis 11 does not mean that

Habermas, ‘Zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft : Marxismus als Kritik‘ in Theorie undPraxis, pp. 162-214. esp. pp. 179-88.

Hillmann, op. cit., pp. 257-89. Prinzip Hofnung, pp. 288-334 and 1602-28. (Note Bloch’s stress on the humanism

in Marx’s thought which underlies his demand for social revolution. Moreover it is not limited to just the early Marx, cf. p. 1607 f.). See also the selections and articles in his book Ueber Karl Marx (Frankfurt, 1968).

See Giinter Rohrmoser’s discussion of Bloch’s revision of Marxismus in the pro- posal of a new metaphysic. ‘Sfillstand der Dialektik: Grundpositionen expliziter und impliziter Marxismuskritik,’ Murxismusstudien, V. (Tubingen, 1968). pp. 1-84. esp. pp. 30-41.

Prinzig Hoffnung, pp. 321 f. Bloch writes the eleventh thesis as: ‘Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur verschie-

den interpretiert; es kommt aber darauf an, sie zu verandern’ (italics mine). Bloch has deliberately changed the wording of the original text as he himself admits. Cf. ibid., p. 319.

According to Bloch Marx’s statement is directed against those Hegelian epigones of his day whose specific type of contemplative philosophy was really a non-philosophy. They are, for example, Kuhlman and Stirner. See MEG I, 5, p. 216.

See however the argumentation from Korsch. Marx demands the negation of philosophy and not just the negation of the previous philosophy. However, this nega- tion of philosophy does not involve the removal of all philosophy, but is ‘eine trotz aller Absagen an die Philosophie mit philosophischem Denken durch und durch gesat-

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there is no theoretical-practical superiority of the true philosophy before and in the transformation of the world.

This true philosophy is, however, according to Bloch’s interpretation of the basic principles of Marxism not identical with Hegel’s philosophy, as if practice were just the actualization and realization of this philosophy. It is rather a philosophy of revolution directed towards the horizon of the future. The central difference between previous philosophy and Marxist philosophy is that previous philosophy conceived of knowledge as relating to the past, as an anamnesis,’ whereas the Marxist philosophy conceives of philosophy as relating to the future, to what is not yet.’ In so far as Marxist philosophy is a knowledge or science of the future as a knowledge of reality and the objective-real possibilities within reality, it is directly orientated towards action and knows no separation of theory and practice.

The difference between the previous interpretation (Nr 3) and Bloch’s is significant not only for the sake of historical accuracy, but also for the evaluation of the specific intention and method of Bloch’s philosophy. Whereas the previous interpretation stresses that Marx rejected philosophy as philosophy in favour of a critical theory based upon scientific empirical analysis and the results of practical action, Bloch maintains that Marx intended a new philosophy, an ontology of the n ~ t - y e t . ~ Bloch’s interpre- tation, however, runs into historical and systematic difficulties? As an historical interpretation of Marx’s position, Bloch can only maintain his position by ignoring certain statements. For example, the text quoted above from Marx’s Toward the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law: Introduction, reads: ‘by the negation of previous philosophy, by the negation of philosophy as philo~ophy’.~ Bloch stresses in his interpretation that Marx intends the negation of previous philosophy, but not the negation of philosophy as such. Bloch writes : ‘ “Negation” refers to philo- sophy pursuing truth for its own sake, to an autarchic-contemplative philosophy which interprets the world with merely “antiquarian” interest ; it does not refer to a philosophy which changes the world by revolution.’6 However, Marx’s full text refers not only to the negation of the previous philosophy, but also to the negation of philosophy as philosophy. Bloch’s

Subjekt-Objekt, pp. 473-88. (Note: This chapter, ‘Hegel und die Anamnesis; Contra Bann der Anamnesis’, is to be found only in the second, enlarged edition. [Frankfurt, 19621).

Philosophische Grundfragen, I: Zur Onlologie des Noch-Nicht-Seins (Frankfurt, 1961). Cf. Habermas, ‘Ein marxistischer Schelling . . .’, pp. 336-51. See above, p. 33, n. 1 .

Prinzip Hofnung, pp. 328-34.

Prinzip Hofnung, p. 325 f.

tigte Theorie der als lebendige Totalitat gesehenen und begriffenen gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung, genauer : der als lebendige Totalitilt begriffenen und betatigten sozialen Revolution’ (cf. above p. 33, n. 3), p. 98.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, I11 37

interpretation fails to explain explicitly the extent to which philosophy as philosophy is negated in his understanding of Marxism as a philosophy of the not-yet, This difference between Bloch’s interpretation and Marx’s position has a significant systematic relevance. For Bloch the critique of the existing ideology has its foundation neither in science nor in an empiri- cal sociological analysis nor in the retroactive effect of practice upon theory, but in the discovery of the utopian core within the ideological shell of society and in the detection of the transcending element of truth within the false consciousness of man. This diverging accentuation explains why Bloch emphasizes so strongly the anthropological foundation of hope as a condition of the possibility of a radical change of society into a better world, and fails to discuss the concrete sociological conditions and the specific political possibilities of such a change. The significance of this weakness will become clear in our final and critical article, where Bloch’s relationship to the demands of the Kantian limitation of human know- ledge and to the requirements of empirical scholarship will be discussed.

H U N G E R A S MAN’S P R I M A R Y I N S T I N C T

Bloch’s criticism of Freudianism for its unhistorical conception of man’s primary instinct and for its orientation to the past demanded by its con- ception of the dynamics of the unconscious are therefore to be seen from the perspective of this Hegelian-Marxist influence. Bloch’s affirmation of hunger as man’s primary instinct and of hope as a central human affect is his attempt not only to develop a concrete historical understanding of man, but also to present a Marxism in which man is not only the subject of history, but also one whose dreams provide him with that transcending anticipatory knowledge that acts as a critique of man’s ideological chains and as a catalyst of a revolutionary action for a new future.

When Bloch affirms hunger as man’s primary instinct, he does not understand it solely as a categorical biological instinct. Hunger is rather the most obvious and concrete expression of man’s desire for self-preser- vation. Bloch understands it as a transcendental appetite which expresses the radical openness of man’s being, the ground of his orientation, and the intentionality of his consciousness.’ Hunger is not some part of man that can be packaged and labelled once and for all, but it is rather man’s most authentic appetite which develops and expresses itself in various ways depending upon his historical culture and situation. Hunger is, therefore, man’s radical appetite in se. It is that which drives man on. The explanation of hunger given by Bloch indicates not only its ontological implications

Cf. Heinz Kimmerle, Die Zukunftsbedeutung der Hofnung (Bonn, 1966). pp. 28 f.

38 FRANCIS P. FIORENZA

and context but also reveals the mystic influence of thinkers like Jakob Bahme and Schelling. Just as Bohme writes: ‘Das Nichts hungert nach dem Etwas und der Hunger ist die Begierde als das erste Verbum Fiat’,’ so too does Bloch emphasize that ‘Nicht’ is the source of man’s striving and desire.2 However, Bloch distinguishes very carefully between ‘Nicht (Non, not)’ and ‘Nichts (Nihil, nothing)’. Whereas it belongs to ‘Nicht’ that it hungers and wants to fill itself in so far as it is not (nicht) something, not an actuality, but is related to actuality only as to what it does not have, ‘Nichts’ is, on the contrary, related to actual things as to things strange and hostile to it.’ In the explanation of this distinction Bloch expounds the meaning of ‘Nicht’ in three steps.4 First: ‘Nicht’ is a ‘not- having’, a lack. ‘Nicht’ is the notion of the nil-in-having which is present in man. As such it is the that of hunger, of unsatisfied seeking and desiring. Second: ‘Nicht’ is not something existing in itself, but it exists only in relation to something, i.e. ‘Nicht’ or ‘not’ is always a lack of something. ‘Nicht’ is always related to a having that does not have. In other words ‘Nicht’ does not signify a ‘pure Nicht’ because then it would not be hunger or desire. But rather it signifies that there is a having in the not- having which constitutes the ‘not’ in distinction to ‘nothing’. This dialec- tical understanding of ‘Nicht’ is to be understood in the context of Bloch’s conception of matter as movement and as the open possibility of stuff in which ‘not’ is a ‘not-having’. Third: the last step brings to the fore the historical or temporal context. ‘Nicht’ is further defined as ‘Nicht-Erschein- ung’ (‘Not-Actualized’). All the future is ‘not-actualized’ in the sense that it is not yet, and perhaps will never be. However, even an actualization which is no longer present contains a ‘not’ which is distinct from a ‘nothing’ because even in a ‘no-longer’ there can be a ‘not-yet’ hidden. That which was not finished and which remained uncompleted can be remembered. It is not nothing. In short, ‘Nicht’ or ‘Not’ is a not-having. It is therefore related to a something and to an actualization (in the future) of something. ‘Nichts’ or ‘nothing’, however, stands in relation to something as an opposi- tion. ‘Nothing’ and ‘everything’ are in complete opposition and hostility to one another. ‘Nothing’ is not just a negation of something, but of any- thing. The meaning of hunger as man’s primary instinct, therefore, be-

* Quoted from Habermas, ‘Ein marxistischer Schelling. . , .’ p. 336. ‘Einsichten in den Nihilismus und die Identitiit’ in Philosophische Grundfragen, I,

op. cit., pp. 41-81. Marxists have accused Bloch of esotericism and mysticism in his attempt to dis-

tinguish ‘not’ from ‘nothing’ and to indicate that ‘not’ is a positive lack of something. Cf. Manfred Buhr, ‘Kritische Bemerkungen zu Ernst Blochs Hauptwerk ‘Das Prinzip Hoffnung” ’, Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie, 8 (1960), 367 f.

‘Einsichten . . .)) loc. cit. Cf. also Prinzip Hoffnung, pp. 356-364.

DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, 111 39

comes clearer when seen in the context of this distinction between ‘Nichts’ and ‘Nicht’ and in the light of Bloch’s understanding of ‘Nicht’. Man hungers for something, for something which is not yet in appearance. This hunger means that man’s being is on the one hand incomplete and open. On the other hand it is not empty but there is a ‘having’ hidden in man of what he does not yet have.’ Thus, Bloch investigates the levels of man’s consciousness or of his unconscious and seeks to find the anthropological foundation and intentional content for the utopian desires of man.

Bloch complements his analysis of hunger with an investigation of the structure of human affects so as to specify those particularizing affects set in motion by man’s hunger.’ His polemic with Freudian psychoanalysis is extended to the question of the classification of human affects. Disagreeing with the Freudian classification as too ‘external’, Bloch proposes an ‘internal’ classification of human affects into ‘filled’ affects (gefiillte) and affects of expectation or anticipation (Erw~rtungsuffekte).~ The filled affects (as envy, greed, veneration) are such that their objects are at least already in reality. Although these objects might not be within the reach of the individual, they are existent in the world. On the other hand, the affects of expectation or anticipation (such as anxiety, fear, hope, and faith) have objects that are not only beyond the individual’s reach, but also beyond the present existing world. Moreover, the affects of expectation differ from the filled affects precisely in regard to the greater anticipatory character of their intention, content, and object. All affects are related to the horizon of time, i.e. to the future, but whereas the filled affects only have an in- authentic future in which nothing new happens, the expectation affects have a genuine future in so far as they relate to the not-yet, to what has never been. For Bloch the most important and authentic of the human affects of expectation or anticipation is hope. Whereas anxiety and fear are negative

This dialectical and historical relationship between having and not-having is expressed in Bloch’s central thesis: S is not yet P. Our treatment of his philosophy of religion will discuss this relationship on the level of man’s deepest experience (Dunkeldes gelebten Augenblicks) and his highest utopian goal. Cf. Prinzip Hoffnung, pp. 334-49.

Ibid., pp. 77-86. See the Marxist critique of Bloch in regard to the utopian function of human affects: Johannes Heinz Horn, ‘Kritische Bemerkungen zur Philosophie Ernst Blochs’, pp. 245-352, esp. pp. 305 ff. and Rugard Otto Gropp, ‘Ernst Blochs Hoffnungsphilosophie-Eine Antimarxistische Welterlosungslehre’, pp. 9 4 9 , esp. pp. 36 ff. Both are to be found in Ernst Blochs Revision des Murxismus (Berlin, 1957). Their criticism points out that Bloch‘s statements are beyond any sort of scientific verification. They are therefore irrationalistic and mystical in character for these Marxists. Gropp writes, (p. 36) ‘Eine Erkenntnislehre, die das Erkennen aufs Gefiihl, auf Affekte griindet, statt auf das Denken, die sich gegen die wissenschaftliche Forschung ausspricht, ist irrutionulistisch. Fiir die Richtigkeit des Gefiihls gibt es kein Kriterium. Was Bloch hoffend aus der Natur herausfiihlt, kann nicht bewiesen werden. Wer es nicht mitfuhlt, bleibt von der Erkenntnis ausgeschlossen.’

Prinzip ffo$kmg, pp. 81 fF.

40 FRANCIS P . FIORENZA

affects that are forced and unfree, hope alone is free and authentically human. It is orientated to the furthest and brightest horizon of the future.

Bloch brings to light the significance of hunger and hope in his analysis of man’s dreams. They more clearly indicate the societal involvement and dynamic openness of man’s structure and being.’ The non-satisfaction of man’s hunger leads him to recognize as evil those societal conditions causing his hunger, his non-possession of the fulfilment of his deepest desires and needs. It also moves him to strive for the abolition of those situations in which he is oppressed and for the removal of those relation- ships in which he is exploited. Man’s hunger and openness for what he does not yet have does not provide immediate action against the evil of society, as if his actions, like those of an animal, were without forethought or planning. It is first necessary for man to become conscious of his deepest needs and desires and to become aware of the oppressing conditions hindering the achievement of his goal, the satisfaction of his hunger, and the fulfilment of his wishes. For Bloch the spark of this awareness is en- kindled in man’s dreams. The images of man’s dreams, which mirror his wishes for a better life, activate his hope and motivate his revolutionary action. These dreams are not just a flight from reality (although they could be) or an opium enabling man to live with the present evil. They are also the source of hope and the catalyst of revolutionary action.

DAYDREAMS VS. NIGHTDREAMS

Bloch’s development of the anthropological foundation of hope is essentially dependent upon his analysis of the difference between day- dreams and nightdreams.2 This difference provides the key to the utopian revolutionary structure of man’s consciousness and reveals the basis of man’s anticipatory knowledge of that which is not-yet. Since the basic structure of reality is for Bloch so much characterized by its not-yetness that the ‘not-yet’ is understood as a determination of being itself, then this ‘not-yetness’ should reveal itself not only in the deepest instinct of man’s nature, but also in his consciousness. Therefore, whereas Bloch’s analysis of man’s primary instinct attempted to indicate the basic openness of man’s very nature, his analysis of man’s daydreams intends to penetrate the superficiality of man’s everyday consciousness so as to reach its hidden utopian content and structure.

Bloch accepts Freud’s basic thesis that every dream is a fulfilment of wishes. However, the consequences which he draws from this thesis differ because of the distinction that Bloch makes between daydreams and night-

Prinzip Hoffnung pp. 84-6. Ibid., pp. 86-128.

D I A L E C T I C A L THEOLOGY A N D HOPE, I11 41

dreams. He protests that psychoanalysis evaluates daydreams and night- dreams identically. As a matter of fact it sees the daydream as a preliminary stage or as a beginning of nightdreams. For Bloch not only is the daydream not a preliminary stage to the nightdreams, but the latter are rather inferior to the daydream, which excels the nightdreams because of its relationship to reality and because of the utopian possibilities of its function, though man is not yet conscious of them.

Bloch illustrates these differences by a phenomenological description of the contrasting characteristics of daydreams and nightdreams. No empiri- cal, clinical evidence beyond his own descriptions is given by Bloch to support his disagreement with Freud.‘ Bloch lists three major contrasts between daydreams and nightdreams: First: Whereas the ego is weakened in sleep so that nightdreams are less censored and more hallucinated, the ego has a ‘free trip’ in daydreams since it is not so weakened. The result is twofold: on the one hand, the images of daydreams are less hallucinated. They thereby do not misrepresent reality as much as in nightdreams and they are less of a flight from reality. On the other hand, the ego, being less divided and censored, is more personally and directly involved in the wishes which transcend the present reality. The daydreams which contain uncensored wishes for the future are therefore more strongly utopian in character than nightdreams. Second: whereas the nightdreams mainly consist of a private internal assimilation of the remaining contents of previous experience during the day or one’s earlier life, the daydream is more directly related tothe external word and the future improvement of it. The human person is more isolated from the world in his sleep and more introverted in the nightdreams which he often forgets. The most private daydreams are in contrast more communicable and social. The changes and improvements of the world are not wanted for one’s own sake only, but also for that of others, for the happiness of friends and loved ones. The communicability of the content of these dreams comes especially to the fore in the phantasy of poetry, music, and art which extend the limits of man’s nature and broaden the horizons of his world. Third: Whereas both daydreams and nightdreams begin with wishes, the daydream alone carries the wish to its radical consequence, to its place of fulfilment. Owing to the weakening of the ego in sleep the nightdream is more strongly separated from the concrete realities of the external world. Its content is not only

Cf. the criticism from a Marxist psychiatrist, Dietfried Miiller-Hegemann, ‘Zur Trieb- und Traumproblematik in Ernst Blochs ‘Winzip Hoffnung”’, Ernst Blochs Revi- sion des Murxismus, pp. 93-101. Hegemann argues not only from the empirical results of the research of Pavlov and Kehrer, but also from Th. L. Smith’s investigation in Ameri- can Journal ofpsychology, 15 (1904), 465 ff. The evaluation of this criticism is reserved to the final article of this series.

42 FRANCIS P. FIORENZA

more hallucinated, but also lacks practical goals and concrete intentions for realization. The daydreamer, however, refuses to be satisfied with the fictitious fulfilment of his wishes in mere dreams. The human person is not content to spiritualize his wishes, but seeks to realize them in the future. Thus, whereas the content of nightdreams is hidden and regressively dis- arranged, the content of daydreams is open and anticipatory. It brings to light the hidden tendency of man’s orientation toward a not-yet future and toward a still unknown final goal.

The above analyses are Bloch’s re-functionalization of Freud’s theories on man’s unconscious.’ According to Freud the present represses the past and thereby comes up against the defences of the past. The repressed is as such present. According to Bloch the past and present within man’s unconscious reveal themselves, on the contrary, as the not-yet of the future. The depths of man’s subjectivity contain that which man and his world are not-yet. Bloch‘s re-functionalization of Freud’s theory concerns the relationship of man’s unconscious to time and history.’ For Freud the content of man’s unconscious is that which has been of which man is no longer conscious. It consists of past forgotten and repressed material which is the stuff of man’s nightdreams. For Bloch the content of man’s day- dreams is that which is not yet and of which he is not yet conscious. This not-yet-conscious is therefore the psychic birth-place of the future, of the new. The not-yet-conscious is the psychic re-presentation of that which has not-yet-come-to-be in an age and its world, in the ‘Front’ of the world.3 Bloch continues this analysis of the not-yet-conscious by relating it to its ontological correlations in the objective world and by explaining how societal-ideologicai factors (rather than psychic factors arising from the no-longer-conscious) prevent the deepest and most authentic utopian con- tent of man’s subjectivity from coming into universal awareness and realization. After discussing the inauthentic and inadequate witnesses of man’s hopes with his literary and cultural history, Bloch confronts the religious and the Marxist positions, which as expressions of the deepest level of man’s being are ‘eschatological’ in character, in order to demonstrate the superiority of Marxism. This confrontation and the reaction to it by Moltmann and others remain to be discussed in our concluding and critical section.

Cf. Rohrmoser, op. cit., pp. 34 f. Ibid., pp. 1414.

Prinzip Hoffnung, pp. 129-32.