Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia
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Transcript of Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia
Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia
By Hoshang Noraiee
Abstract
This article look at the process of development of female
madrasasa, particularly in the Deobandi tradition in South
Asia, mainly in India and Pakistan. In reaction to the
process of modernisation, these madrasas started to emerge
from 3-4 decades ago, but they are diverse in their
curriculum and rationales. The impacts they had on Women
students also has been diverse and complex. “Total
institution”, cannot entirely explain the ability of the
women, in manipulating the institutional arrangements and
broadening their traditional tasks both in private and
public spheres.
Key words: Female, Mdrasas, Deobandi, Total institution, Islam
Introduction
1
The Sunni Muslims, in the subcontinent of India, including India,
Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, as well as South Eastern
parts of Iran, are dominantly Hanafi. Hanfis are not homogenous
in terms of understanding Islam and historically have not
remained in static conditions. Because of the pressures imposed
by modernization, as well as demands raised by political Islam
in the whole area, Hanafi interpretations of Islam have moved in
different directions.
In the process of differentiation and competition for
identificatin, the boundaries have sharpened
andsomerespectshave developedinto conflicts. Hanafi in the
subcontinent have been reconstructed in forms of Deobandis,
Barelavis, Aligarah movement of sir Sayed Ahmad khan, and more
recent political Islam represented by Jama’at-e Islami (JI).
Ahl-e -Hadithi (closely linked with Salafism and Wahabbism) also has
roots in Hanafi school in the area.
2
These reformist movements, apart from Barelavi, have inspired
by Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehlavi (1703-1762) and his son Shah
Abdul Aziz (1745-1823). These Scholars intended to strengthen
the power of the Ulama against the influence of Sufism which was
seen as a corrupting force (see Rashid 2001:88; Metcalf 2004,
1982, ). Shah Walli Ullah Dehlavi gave preference to the Hadith
which he believed was more authentic than the dubious rulings by
the jurisprudence (Hardy 1972:29).
In India, the late nineteenth century was a crucial time for
traditional schools of thought to restructure their institutions
and shape their identities by defending their ideas (Metcalf
2004: 58). The Deobandi thoughts were influenced through
encounters with western modern colonial ideas, Indian modernist
religious groups (particularly the “Aligarh” movement), as well
as more traditional groups such as the Sufi “Barelvi” movement
and the “Ahle-al Hadith” (Ahle-e Hadith) (Ibid 2004).
3
After the failure of the Mutiny against the British in 1857,
ideological and educational institutions as a ground for the
cultural struggle against secularism, became more attractive for
Muslim ulama. The Deobandi movement started in 1867 in Deoband, a
town in Uttar Pradesh, Northeast Delhi in India, by a number of
Ulama particularly Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-
1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1817-1899). The movement
emerged with the foundation of a madrasa, which was called Dar ul-
Uloom (House of Science or Knowledge). This madrasa was built
with the purpose of challenging and competing with modern
secular education.
The transformation of organizational structure by absorbing
modern bureaucracy was an unprecedented step in leaving
behind the traditional patterns of organising and teaching
(Metcalf 2004:30). Deobandis adopted the methods employed by
modern secular institutions and initiated by the British and Sir
Sayyed Ahmad Khan. In the same way, Deobandis expanded the
4
number of madrasas using a system of affiliated colleges.
Entering such a competition itself was a new phenomenon and was
based on modern rational elements of the division of labour,
professionalism, uniformity of instructions, assessment of
performance and efficiency.
In respect to ideology and religious practice, Deobandism has
an affiliation with the Hanafi Jurisprudence but is not simply
a continuation of it. The influence of Salafism or Ahl-e Hadith
and Wahabbism can be seen in the way they rejected the
traditional Sufi practices (tariqah) such as music, dance, local
offering, pilgrimage, respect for the saints, funeral
ceremonies, citations (zikr) and dressing codes. They also adopted
a harsher approach towards Shias.
Deobandis have been highly successful in building a widespread
network of madrasas in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan and
India. They had about 30 madrasas by the end of the 19th century,
which increased to about 137 in 1947 when Pakistan was
5
established. In Pakistan there was a total of 401 madrasas in
1960, 893 in 1971, 1745 in 1979, 3000 in 1988 and 10430 in 2003
(ICG 2005:6). It is now estimated that the total number of
madrasas in Pakistan can be as high as 20000, while formal
sources put the estimate at 13500, from which 12000 madrasas
were officially registered in 2006 (see ICG 2007:5, CRS 2008:
5, see also Lawson 2005, Fair 2009), Now the number of only
registered madrasas in Pakistan estimated to be over 20000
(Tribunal Express 2012 )1 . Of these madrasas more than 65 % are
related to the Deobandi network, which is coordinated by a board
called Wafaq al Madaris al Arabia. It is claimed that there are 1800
madrasas in Karachi of which 1500 are from the Deobandi network.
According to some evidence madrasas recruited their students
from economically deprived families and supported them with
food and accommodation (ICG 2007:5 and ICG: 2005:6). Madrasas
like Jamia Darul Uloom in Karachi, Binori Town Madrasa in Karachi and1 -The Express Tribune, “The Trouble With Madrassas in Pakistan”, January 25, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/326941/the-trouble-with-madrassas-in-pakistan/ Accessed 18/09/2014.
6
Haqqanya Madeasa in Akora Khttak near Peshawar have had an
important role in disseminating Deobandi ideas and even in
providing ideological training of Talibans (see Rashid 2001).
Darul Uloom Karachi, for instance, has developed into a vast
residential and educational complex and now science, computer
technology, economics, and Islamic Banking are taught in their
separate departments up to PhD level (see ICG 2007:7).
While for more than a century madrasas remained exclusivly as
male institutions, during last 3-4 decades the religious
authorities have extended madrasas to include female madrasas as
well. The main purposes of this article are understood the
motivations of the authorities to accept female madrasas, and to
assess the impacts these madrasas have had on the power of women,
who studied in these institutions. The main focus will be placed
on Deobandi madrasas as the most influential religious
institution in the area,
Emergence of Female Madrasas
7
Accepting female madrasas by Ulama and expanding male madrasas
in this field was a new phenomenon. Until the 1970s2, it was
inconceivable that conservative Deobandis would establish
female madrasas in Pakistan. Until recently, the media has shown
little interest in the female madrasas in Pakistan, while
male madrasas, which were identified as ground for training and
recruitment of the Taliban, attracted a lot of attention.
An extraordinary role played by female madrasa students in Jamia
Hafsa in the ‘Talibanisation’ of Islamabad, put them under
scrutiny of politicians, researchers and journalists. Jamia Hafsa,
is a Deobandi Madras, which has connections with Lal Masjid (Red
Mosque) in the capital of Pakistan, Islam Abad. At that time,
this madrasa had about 7000 female students who acted as militant
2 -The history of the development of female madrasas has been very much mixed by earlier sporadic, private and home-based female teaching (Farooq 201: 7; Skind 2006). Winkelmann (2005) and also Metcalf (2004) have not found enough evidence to support the existence of a long history of female madrasas in South Asia. Winkelmann identifies Jamiatus Salehat in Malegaon- Maharashtra in India as the oldest female madrasa which was founded by Jamaa’t –e- Islami of Indiain the early 1950s. Twenty years later, in the early 1970s, another madrasa of the same name appeared in Rampur (Winkelmann 2005:33).
8
insurgents when events broke out in early July 2007. The
students took part in violent actions against the government and
the secular institutions in order to enforce Sharia law (the
Islamic law) in the area (see MEMRI 2007)3. During this action,
also known as the Lal Masjid event, over one hundred madrasa
students were killed (Roul 2010)4. Jamia Hafsa highlighted some
serious problems associated with Deobandi female madrasas, but
it would be too simplistic to consider all female madrasas as a
monolithic body which encourage violence and intolerance.
3 -Some interesting materials can be seen in you tube videos and pictures illustrating the militant activities the female students were involved in. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4f89Jg-TnY&feature=fvw, http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/images/2007/05/13/screenhunter_09_may_14_0054.gif&imgrefurl=http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/2007/05/what_next_after.html&usg=__UcBPN14bnjAW49lTJylGtLMLr4A=&h=401&w=600&sz=179&hl=en&start=1&zoom=1&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=h0H-PuyuUdrFCM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=135&prev=/images%3Fq%3DJamia%2Bhafsa%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DX%26rlz%3D1T4RNSN_enGB400GB401%26tbs%3Disch:1
4 - See a brief day by day report on insurgence by a Pakistani newspaper “Daily Times”, 11th July, 2007. [Accessed 4/12/2010].
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-2007_pg7_24
9
Women’s madrasas have rapidly increased in Pakistan (as well as
in India) during the last 2 decades, About 2000 female madrasas
(15% of the total madrasas) are estimated to exist in Pakistan,
all of which constitute about 240 thousand female students (Butt
2009). The majority of these madrasas is affiliated with the
Deobandi network of madrasas.
From the time when Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi (1864-1943) wrote
his well-known book “Bihishti Zewar” (Heavenly Ornaments) in the
early 1900s, it took Deobandis about 80 years to accept the
institutionalization of female religious education. Thanawi
responded to the threats modernization posed to traditional
family structures, and he wrote his book to participate in
education of Muslim women, but in the private sphere of the
family. As a conservative religious scholar, Maulana Thanawi ,
tried to internalize Sharia based rules and instructions among
women in a world where women’s lives were affected by modern
communications and a modern economy.
10
Even though he put emphasis on patriarchal values and the
traditional division of labour, in one sense Thanawi broke the
chain of traditions in terms of understanding the necessity of
addressing women as individuals or as an emerging force, who play
an essential role in the guardianship of Islamic traditions (see
Metcalf 1990). The seclusion of women resulting from the
traditional family structure was an unquestionable issue for
Thanawi, so he did not argue for the creation of madrasas as a
new institutional space for the mobilization and socialisation of
women.
The rapid spread of modern means of communication, urbanization,
further visibility of women and the emergence of strong feminist
movements in Muslim communities toward the end of the 20th
century have been a disturbing issue for the conservative Ulama.
For them, the creation of female madrasas was a strategy to
protect the traditional family structure in the context of
pressure by marketization and consumer cultures. The
11
legitimatization of systematic and institutionalized education
of women by two Islamic states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, further
weakened the previous rigid boundaries that existed between
private and public spheres. Therefore, in this context, the Ulama
found rationales to move in a direction which was not acceptable
a few decades earlier.
The emergence and development of female madrasas and their impact
on the female students in Pakistan and India have been the
matter of speculation for a number of researchers. In a
comprehensive study, Bano (2010, 2007) found that in the
provincial capital cities in Pakistan, female madrasas were
popular among middle income families who paid as much as 400-
1500 rupees (£3.50-£13) per month admission fees to the madrasas
(Bano 2010:10). A larger proportion of these students were
between ages of 16 and 21 (Bano 2010:10).
For Bano, on the demand side, the calculative attitudes of the
middle income, urbanized families played an important role in
12
the development of female madrasas. In her view, the popularity
of the female madrasas is comprehensible under conditions of
economic uncertainties, the marketization of values and failure
of formal institutions. Female madrasas emerged as a complement
rather than substitute for secular education, both for economic
gains and social and religious prestige.
According to Bano, this also took place in a context where the
liberalization of women threatened the structure of
traditional families, including Ulama families themselves
(Bano 2010:8). Bano argues that ideological incentives are not
sufficient to explain the emergence and popularity of the
madrasas (Bano 2010).
Fair (2008) also provides some evidence about madrasas, which are
categorised as “private” . These types of madrasas are mainly
considered as market-oriented and their curriculum is therefore
arranged in a way to respond to the demand of the market.
13
Thus, the curriculum may be designed in a way to include both
Islamic and secular subjects according to the market needs.
While Bano’s findings are very valuable, they, nonetheless, do
not cover the smaller and rural madrasas, or urban madrasas like
Jamia Minhaj Ul Sharia Dar ul-ulum Orangi Town which support
1600 orphan girls free of any charge (Jamia Minhaj Ul sharia
Dar ul-ulum Orangi 2010)..As Fair has also talked about the
diversity of curriculum and madrasas, particularly This
indicates that there is no single pattern of female madrasas
for there is no single incentive to explain their existence .
On the Indian side, there has been more academic research on
female madrasas (see for example, skin 2006, Jefferey et al.,
2004, Alam 2010, Winkelmann 2005). The defensive response to the
modernization of society and liberalization of women has been
considered as a key issue in understanding the motivations of
the “maulanas” (high ranked religious authorities) in accepting
the creation of female madrasas in India as well (Alam 2010).
14
Among these researchers, Winkelmann (2005), in her ethnographic
research, has highlighted some important points: Winkleman
provides evidence on diversity and lose curriculum for the
female. While Madrassa is located in a city, the students are
recruited from rural areas and charged a small fee. The
rationales also can’t be easily explained by economic incentives.
Winklemann conducted her research in a female madrasa (Madrastul
Niswan) in New Delhi, which had about 200 students, mainly from
poor and lower middle class families. The students had little or
no pre-madrasa experience in the secular education and only about
10 percent of them were from the same locality, while the rest
came from rural areas and towns far away from New Delhi.
Focusing on students in the age group of 12 to17, the research
revealed that even though only a very small amount of fees was
paid, the students benefited from full boarding facilities.
Additionally, the madrasa in this study was closely affiliated
to the Jamaa’t-i Tablighi (broadly related to Deobandis) movement.
15
Madrasas’ authorities believed that female education was
necessary for guiding women to become good mothers and wives.
And by “failing to do this (educating women), the women and their
innocent offsprings will be washed away in the flood of
irreligiousness, ruin their worldly and next lives” (Yunus 1994
quoted in Winkelmann 2005:55).
The curriculum was loosely selected from Dars-i Nizami and was a
shortened and adjusted version of the boys’ curriculum which
was covered or taught within 5 years. Various forms of
madrasas for girls based on the curriculum existed. Madrastul
Niswan had no connection with the central educational boards and
its curriculum was heavily reliant on religious subjects.
Further, the curriculum was designed by male clerics in order to
shape the personality of women in an Islamic manner (Ibid: 58).
As Winkelmann, Alam (2010) also recognizes the different forms
of curricula in Indian girls’ madrasas. She argues that “in the
absence of a central regulating authority, most madrasas
16
determine and follow their own curriculum. As such, they
constitute an important site where notions of selfhood, community
and, by extension, the ‘Other’ are created”. The curriculum of
both male and female madrasas catagorised by Winkelmann into
three types, are far more diverse than what is seen in the
Dars-i-Nezami curriculum discussed above (see Wikelmann 2005:12).
Philosophy and logics or Ma’qulat (rational or secular related
subjects), part of the formal Darsi-i- Nezami have been considered,
to a large extent, as insignificant subjects for Deobandis,
and even though these subjects were considered irrelevant by
the founders of the Deobandi movement (see Metcalf 2004: 36).
Winkelmann (2005: 69) also observed that these subjects were
left out of the curriculum of a female madrasa in Delhi.
In their study, Jeffery et al. (2006) found out that in spite of
much stereotyping after 9/11, education in madrasas in the
Bijnor District in western Uttar Pradesh of India was not
promoting radicalism. They also discovered that all moulvis
17
(Mowlawis) (religious authority) were promoting girls’
education; however, they had different views regarding the
length and the content of what girls were to study. On one
occasion, one moulvi said: “girls do study with more enthusiasm
than boys. They get higher numbers [grades] than boys” (Jeffery
et al. 2006: 234).
Another moulvi declared that “education [ta’lim] is essential. And
it is absolutely essential for a girl because she is going to
have to run a home. She will rear her children in her lap [god].
Children are flowers. Their supervision and care [dekh-bhal] is
the woman’s work” (Ibid: 237). Many others believed that “the
mother’s lap is the first madrasa” (ibid). Most moulvis in
Bijnor even regarded the continuation of girls’ education beyond
puberty as crucial element which would finalise the training for
becoming good mothers and wives. However, this was something that
traditional families were not comfortable with (Ibid: 248).
Jeffery et al. argue that “marriage, motherhood and domesticity
18
are still central in girls’ destinies, and girls’ education
should not serve to overturn gender politics at the domestic
level” (Ibid:248). Moreover, the teacher’s role in a local
girls’ madrasa was seen as a “civilizing mission”, because it was
not about providing women with economic independence. By
denigrating villagers as uneducated, ignorant, unclean and poor,
most moulvis in Bijnor reflected the behaviour of the urban middle
class which gave importance to education. In this way, Jeffery et
al. Explain the moulvis’ behaviors on the basis of gender and
class.
Methodology and Theory
The research cases available, mostly are based on ethnographic
methods and provided some detailed evidence about rationales and
behavior of the women inside madrsas. However, most of the cases
have reached come to some kind of universal conclusions
particularly in feminist arguments. While the researchers have
recognized the complexity and contradictory process of
19
modernization with regards to emancipation, regulation,
discipline and agency, they have applied different theoretical
analysis to explain their findings. On the basis of their
methodologies, various social and economic settings, different
forms of madrasas and curricula, researchers have reached
different conclusions.
Bano, on the basis of her findings used a rational choice,
demand side economic analysis. Her findings were more limited to
urban, prosperous areas, where madrasasa were used as
complementary institutions.
Many commentators and researchers have analysed the phenomenon
of female madrasa, by applying gender relations theories,
particularly the Focauldian approach of body control and “total
institution (see Lughud 1998; Mahmood 2001, 2005; Alam 2010;
Farooq 2010),
20
Similar to Winkellman, Farooq (2010 ) argues that female
madrasas are seen as close communities in which men act as
patrons who design the curriculum with a particular mindset aimed
at ‘crafting’ a receptive mind in order to inculcate certain
values or ‘colonize’ the mind and discipline the body.
Following Focault, the body is the target of power. In this
sense, the ““docile body” is subjected, used, transformed and
improved” (Farooq 2010: 67, see also Winkelmann 2005:77-78,
Mahmood 2001) and docility is achieved through the action of
discipline in accordance with the men’s design.
According to Farooq and Winkelmann, the curriculum of Dars-i
Nizami was developed in India, in the 19th century, to explain
the ways men took the role of decision makers with the view to
instilling self –discipline among women. This is seen as
“selective inclusion in the public and restrictions in the
educational domain” by Winkelmann (2005:24). Winkelmann
believes that in the “closed communities”, discipline is
21
cultivated in a way that the prospect for empowerment and
emancipation remain very limited.
In spite of limitations imposed in madrasas, some researchers
have seen potential for integration and modernaization among the
students in the female madrasas. Alam believes that “the
creation of a gendered self that finds its knowledge of Islam at
odds with societal and familial expectations or in the fact that
though the madrasas positioned against the nation, are
sometimes aspiring to become a part of it” (Alam 2010). Following
Skind (2006), Farooq argues that female madrasas promote
“Islamosity” which eventually leads to “unintentional”
modernization (Farooq 2010:66).
The line of argument on the exclusion of women from public life
has been highlighted in a more critical language by women's rights
activists in Pakistan. For example, in reference to the Hafsa female
madrasa, Tahira Abdullah argued that the madrasa’s aim is “to
promote a narrow, intolerant world view. It stifles the spirit of
inquiry, it stifles the powers of reasoning and logic (…) just like
22
these girls look like ninja turtles - in that all encompassing veil,
just like they look like that, their brains are like that. They're
atrophied. Totally rusted” (quoted in Jalil 2005).
In feminist analyses, there is a tendency to overestimate the
role of structures, and underestimate the role of agency. To a
great extent, it has been ignored that women in madrasas have
not been passive, but they have been active and able to
manipulate the rules and regulations (see Scott 2010).
Different form rational choice analysis used by Bano and “body
control” analysis used by many researchers on Indian female
madrasa, Jeffery et al. (2006), in their has not been explained
just as a male project, for controlling body or to respond to
he market demands. They have looked at education as a mission of
the middle class educated moulavis, who consider rural life,
unclean and associated with ignorance. This is in some way a
modernising mission to improve women's lives in rural areas,
however, there is a strong traditional element that madrasa
23
education is used to make women better wives or sisters in the
private sphere. This, obviously limits women's engagement with
public life.
Conclusion
Female madrasas developed in South Asia, particularly both in
India and Pakistan, have been diverse in terms of rationales and
roles. Some madrasas have been established, mainly in prosperous
urban areas, as replacement of, or complementary institutions to
secular education. In such cases, completing similar curriculum
to secular education, or widening the experience of the female
students and their access to further cultural capital, and even
economic gains, have been the most important aims.
Many authorities, either from a middle class point of view to
bring education to women, or control the women, have reacted to
“risk society” (Beck 2000), in which there are many unpredictable
risks to traditional ways of life. To challenge these risks
24
defined in religious and traditional ways, they promote awareness
of of mothers or sisters to play more effective role in primary
socialisation. This is more about widening the domestic tasks
of the women by education while in pre modern-traditional
contexts, there was no question about the efficiency of the
mothers’ roles.
Some other madrasas, mainly in more traditional and rural areas;
and also among urban poors, have been developed as charities,
and also institutions to strengthen control over the females in
the face of what have been considered as the corrupting
influence of western cultures and secularisation of the
society.
Whatever the rationales are, this is a process of ’de-
traditinalisation’ in which exclusion and inclusion of women
have simultaneously developed. The “total institution”,
particularly in the form of more traditional madrasas, has not
been able to impose a total control on women students. These
25
women have been included in terms of gaining further capacity
to act as individuals as well as entering a field which
previously monopolised by the male authorities (moulvis). Through
the madrasa routes, the talaba, particularly those with state
educational backgrounds, found more opportunities to expand
their power through manipulating the structures in an intra-
institutional ways.
But these women, particularly in more traditional madrasas, have
also been excluded in terms of access to the opportunities,
such as level of curriculum, qualifications and status, available
for the male students and clerics Physically, the women students
have also been secluded by burqa, considered by Deobandis as an
Islamic identity of pious women. Control of the talba’s body and
behaviour through certain methods of teaching and a selective
version of the curriculum have been intensified.
While the processes of control and further disciplinary
measures have internalised a particular form of an Islamic
26
womanhood, it has not abolished the capacity of her as agency
to act as an individual (Winkelmann 2005: 78). This is a process
of modernisation, in a sense of breaking away from traditions
and increasing individuals’ capacity to realize their own
“interests against the weight of customs, tradition,
transcendental will (…) even if unintentional” (Mahmood 2001: 206
quoted in Winkelmann 2005:99).
Defensive mechanisms adopted by maulanas, no matter how hostile
they may be to the empowerment of women and the liberal aspects
of modernity, they are inevitable ways of further engagement
with the modern phenomena.
Author:Doctor Hoshang Noraiee (Ayub Hussein Bor) has taught political economy sociology, organizational behaviour, at the Universities of Warwick, London, London Metropolitan and Westminster. Now, in collaboration with other university colleagues, works as an independent researcher, on a number of projects on political economy, particularly, on the process of globalization, Islam and nationalism in the Middle East. He had his undergraduate education in Mathematics and economics in Iran. Then he Completed his MA in Political Economy in University of Middlesex and his PhD in sociology
27
at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom he has written manyarticles written in Persian and also English. In the early 1990s he founded the Journal Shohaz (Research) in London and worked as its chiefeditor. Email for correspondence: [email protected]
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Notes:
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