Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia

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Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia By Hoshang Noraiee Abstract This article look at the process of development of female madrasasa, particularly in the Deobandi tradition in South Asia, mainly in India and Pakistan. In reaction to the process of modernisation, these madrasas started to emerge from 3-4 decades ago, but they are diverse in their curriculum and rationales. The impacts they had on Women students also has been diverse and complex. “Total institution”, cannot entirely explain the ability of the women, in manipulating the institutional arrangements and broadening their traditional tasks both in private and public spheres. Key words: Female, Mdrasas, Deobandi, Total institution, Islam Introduction 1

Transcript of Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia

Deobandi Female Madrasas in South Asia

By Hoshang Noraiee

Abstract

This article look at the process of development of female

madrasasa, particularly in the Deobandi tradition in South

Asia, mainly in India and Pakistan. In reaction to the

process of modernisation, these madrasas started to emerge

from 3-4 decades ago, but they are diverse in their

curriculum and rationales. The impacts they had on Women

students also has been diverse and complex. “Total

institution”, cannot entirely explain the ability of the

women, in manipulating the institutional arrangements and

broadening their traditional tasks both in private and

public spheres.

Key words: Female, Mdrasas, Deobandi, Total institution, Islam

Introduction

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The Sunni Muslims, in the subcontinent of India, including India,

Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, as well as South Eastern

parts of Iran, are dominantly Hanafi. Hanfis are not homogenous

in terms of understanding Islam and historically have not

remained in static conditions. Because of the pressures imposed

by modernization, as well as demands raised by political Islam

in the whole area, Hanafi interpretations of Islam have moved in

different directions.

In the process of differentiation and competition for

identificatin, the boundaries have sharpened

andsomerespectshave developedinto conflicts. Hanafi in the

subcontinent have been reconstructed in forms of Deobandis,

Barelavis, Aligarah movement of sir Sayed Ahmad khan, and more

recent political Islam represented by Jama’at-e Islami (JI).

Ahl-e -Hadithi (closely linked with Salafism and Wahabbism) also has

roots in Hanafi school in the area.

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These reformist movements, apart from Barelavi, have inspired

by Shah Waliullah Muhaddith Dehlavi (1703-1762) and his son Shah

Abdul Aziz (1745-1823). These Scholars intended to strengthen

the power of the Ulama against the influence of Sufism which was

seen as a corrupting force (see Rashid 2001:88; Metcalf 2004,

1982, ). Shah Walli Ullah Dehlavi gave preference to the Hadith

which he believed was more authentic than the dubious rulings by

the jurisprudence (Hardy 1972:29).

In India, the late nineteenth century was a crucial time for

traditional schools of thought to restructure their institutions

and shape their identities by defending their ideas (Metcalf

2004: 58). The Deobandi thoughts were influenced through

encounters with western modern colonial ideas, Indian modernist

religious groups (particularly the “Aligarh” movement), as well

as more traditional groups such as the Sufi “Barelvi” movement

and the “Ahle-al Hadith” (Ahle-e Hadith) (Ibid 2004).

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After the failure of the Mutiny against the British in 1857,

ideological and educational institutions as a ground for the

cultural struggle against secularism, became more attractive for

Muslim ulama. The Deobandi movement started in 1867 in Deoband, a

town in Uttar Pradesh, Northeast Delhi in India, by a number of

Ulama particularly Maulana Mohammad Qasim Nanautawi (1833-

1877) and Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1817-1899). The movement

emerged with the foundation of a madrasa, which was called Dar ul-

Uloom (House of Science or Knowledge). This madrasa was built

with the purpose of challenging and competing with modern

secular education.

The transformation of organizational structure by absorbing

modern bureaucracy was an unprecedented step in leaving

behind the traditional patterns of organising and teaching

(Metcalf 2004:30). Deobandis adopted the methods employed by

modern secular institutions and initiated by the British and Sir

Sayyed Ahmad Khan. In the same way, Deobandis expanded the

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number of madrasas using a system of affiliated colleges.

Entering such a competition itself was a new phenomenon and was

based on modern rational elements of the division of labour,

professionalism, uniformity of instructions, assessment of

performance and efficiency.

In respect to ideology and religious practice, Deobandism has

an affiliation with the Hanafi Jurisprudence but is not simply

a continuation of it. The influence of Salafism or Ahl-e Hadith

and Wahabbism can be seen in the way they rejected the

traditional Sufi practices (tariqah) such as music, dance, local

offering, pilgrimage, respect for the saints, funeral

ceremonies, citations (zikr) and dressing codes. They also adopted

a harsher approach towards Shias.

Deobandis have been highly successful in building a widespread

network of madrasas in South Asia, particularly in Pakistan and

India. They had about 30 madrasas by the end of the 19th century,

which increased to about 137 in 1947 when Pakistan was

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established. In Pakistan there was a total of 401 madrasas in

1960, 893 in 1971, 1745 in 1979, 3000 in 1988 and 10430 in 2003

(ICG 2005:6). It is now estimated that the total number of

madrasas in Pakistan can be as high as 20000, while formal

sources put the estimate at 13500, from which 12000 madrasas

were officially registered in 2006 (see ICG 2007:5, CRS 2008:

5, see also Lawson 2005, Fair 2009), Now the number of only

registered madrasas in Pakistan estimated to be over 20000

(Tribunal Express 2012 )1 . Of these madrasas more than 65 % are

related to the Deobandi network, which is coordinated by a board

called Wafaq al Madaris al Arabia. It is claimed that there are 1800

madrasas in Karachi of which 1500 are from the Deobandi network.

According to some evidence madrasas recruited their students

from economically deprived families and supported them with

food and accommodation (ICG 2007:5 and ICG: 2005:6). Madrasas

like Jamia Darul Uloom in Karachi, Binori Town Madrasa in Karachi and1 -The Express Tribune, “The Trouble With Madrassas in Pakistan”, January 25, 2012, http://tribune.com.pk/story/326941/the-trouble-with-madrassas-in-pakistan/ Accessed 18/09/2014.

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Haqqanya Madeasa in Akora Khttak near Peshawar have had an

important role in disseminating Deobandi ideas and even in

providing ideological training of Talibans (see Rashid 2001).

Darul Uloom Karachi, for instance, has developed into a vast

residential and educational complex and now science, computer

technology, economics, and Islamic Banking are taught in their

separate departments up to PhD level (see ICG 2007:7).

While for more than a century madrasas remained exclusivly as

male institutions, during last 3-4 decades the religious

authorities have extended madrasas to include female madrasas as

well. The main purposes of this article are understood the

motivations of the authorities to accept female madrasas, and to

assess the impacts these madrasas have had on the power of women,

who studied in these institutions. The main focus will be placed

on Deobandi madrasas as the most influential religious

institution in the area,

Emergence of Female Madrasas

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Accepting female madrasas by Ulama and expanding male madrasas

in this field was a new phenomenon. Until the 1970s2, it was

inconceivable that conservative Deobandis would establish

female madrasas in Pakistan. Until recently, the media has shown

little interest in the female madrasas in Pakistan, while

male madrasas, which were identified as ground for training and

recruitment of the Taliban, attracted a lot of attention.

An extraordinary role played by female madrasa students in Jamia

Hafsa in the ‘Talibanisation’ of Islamabad, put them under

scrutiny of politicians, researchers and journalists. Jamia Hafsa,

is a Deobandi Madras, which has connections with Lal Masjid (Red

Mosque) in the capital of Pakistan, Islam Abad. At that time,

this madrasa had about 7000 female students who acted as militant

2 -The history of the development of female madrasas has been very much mixed by earlier sporadic, private and home-based female teaching (Farooq 201: 7; Skind 2006). Winkelmann (2005) and also Metcalf (2004) have not found enough evidence to support the existence of a long history of female madrasas in South Asia. Winkelmann identifies Jamiatus Salehat in Malegaon- Maharashtra in India as the oldest female madrasa which was founded by Jamaa’t –e- Islami of Indiain the early 1950s. Twenty years later, in the early 1970s, another madrasa of the same name appeared in Rampur (Winkelmann 2005:33).

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insurgents when events broke out in early July 2007. The

students took part in violent actions against the government and

the secular institutions in order to enforce Sharia law (the

Islamic law) in the area (see MEMRI 2007)3. During this action,

also known as the Lal Masjid event, over one hundred madrasa

students were killed (Roul 2010)4. Jamia Hafsa highlighted some

serious problems associated with Deobandi female madrasas, but

it would be too simplistic to consider all female madrasas as a

monolithic body which encourage violence and intolerance.

3 -Some interesting materials can be seen in you tube videos and pictures illustrating the militant activities the female students were involved in. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n4f89Jg-TnY&feature=fvw, http://www.google.co.uk/imgres?imgurl=http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/images/2007/05/13/screenhunter_09_may_14_0054.gif&imgrefurl=http://3quarksdaily.blogs.com/3quarksdaily/2007/05/what_next_after.html&usg=__UcBPN14bnjAW49lTJylGtLMLr4A=&h=401&w=600&sz=179&hl=en&start=1&zoom=1&um=1&itbs=1&tbnid=h0H-PuyuUdrFCM:&tbnh=90&tbnw=135&prev=/images%3Fq%3DJamia%2Bhafsa%26um%3D1%26hl%3Den%26sa%3DX%26rlz%3D1T4RNSN_enGB400GB401%26tbs%3Disch:1

4 - See a brief day by day report on insurgence by a Pakistani newspaper “Daily Times”, 11th July, 2007. [Accessed 4/12/2010].

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C07%5C11%5Cstory_11-7-2007_pg7_24

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Women’s madrasas have rapidly increased in Pakistan (as well as

in India) during the last 2 decades, About 2000 female madrasas

(15% of the total madrasas) are estimated to exist in Pakistan,

all of which constitute about 240 thousand female students (Butt

2009). The majority of these madrasas is affiliated with the

Deobandi network of madrasas.

From the time when Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi (1864-1943) wrote

his well-known book “Bihishti Zewar” (Heavenly Ornaments) in the

early 1900s, it took Deobandis about 80 years to accept the

institutionalization of female religious education. Thanawi

responded to the threats modernization posed to traditional

family structures, and he wrote his book to participate in

education of Muslim women, but in the private sphere of the

family. As a conservative religious scholar, Maulana Thanawi ,

tried to internalize Sharia based rules and instructions among

women in a world where women’s lives were affected by modern

communications and a modern economy.

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Even though he put emphasis on patriarchal values and the

traditional division of labour, in one sense Thanawi broke the

chain of traditions in terms of understanding the necessity of

addressing women as individuals or as an emerging force, who play

an essential role in the guardianship of Islamic traditions (see

Metcalf 1990). The seclusion of women resulting from the

traditional family structure was an unquestionable issue for

Thanawi, so he did not argue for the creation of madrasas as a

new institutional space for the mobilization and socialisation of

women.

The rapid spread of modern means of communication, urbanization,

further visibility of women and the emergence of strong feminist

movements in Muslim communities toward the end of the 20th

century have been a disturbing issue for the conservative Ulama.

For them, the creation of female madrasas was a strategy to

protect the traditional family structure in the context of

pressure by marketization and consumer cultures. The

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legitimatization of systematic and institutionalized education

of women by two Islamic states, Saudi Arabia and Iran, further

weakened the previous rigid boundaries that existed between

private and public spheres. Therefore, in this context, the Ulama

found rationales to move in a direction which was not acceptable

a few decades earlier.

The emergence and development of female madrasas and their impact

on the female students in Pakistan and India have been the

matter of speculation for a number of researchers. In a

comprehensive study, Bano (2010, 2007) found that in the

provincial capital cities in Pakistan, female madrasas were

popular among middle income families who paid as much as 400-

1500 rupees (£3.50-£13) per month admission fees to the madrasas

(Bano 2010:10). A larger proportion of these students were

between ages of 16 and 21 (Bano 2010:10).

For Bano, on the demand side, the calculative attitudes of the

middle income, urbanized families played an important role in

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the development of female madrasas. In her view, the popularity

of the female madrasas is comprehensible under conditions of

economic uncertainties, the marketization of values and failure

of formal institutions. Female madrasas emerged as a complement

rather than substitute for secular education, both for economic

gains and social and religious prestige.

According to Bano, this also took place in a context where the

liberalization of women threatened the structure of

traditional families, including Ulama families themselves

(Bano 2010:8). Bano argues that ideological incentives are not

sufficient to explain the emergence and popularity of the

madrasas (Bano 2010).

Fair (2008) also provides some evidence about madrasas, which are

categorised as “private” . These types of madrasas are mainly

considered as market-oriented and their curriculum is therefore

arranged in a way to respond to the demand of the market.

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Thus, the curriculum may be designed in a way to include both

Islamic and secular subjects according to the market needs.

While Bano’s findings are very valuable, they, nonetheless, do

not cover the smaller and rural madrasas, or urban madrasas like

Jamia Minhaj Ul Sharia Dar ul-ulum Orangi Town which support

1600 orphan girls free of any charge (Jamia Minhaj Ul sharia

Dar ul-ulum Orangi 2010)..As Fair has also talked about the

diversity of curriculum and madrasas, particularly This

indicates that there is no single pattern of female madrasas

for there is no single incentive to explain their existence .

On the Indian side, there has been more academic research on

female madrasas (see for example, skin 2006, Jefferey et al.,

2004, Alam 2010, Winkelmann 2005). The defensive response to the

modernization of society and liberalization of women has been

considered as a key issue in understanding the motivations of

the “maulanas” (high ranked religious authorities) in accepting

the creation of female madrasas in India as well (Alam 2010).

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Among these researchers, Winkelmann (2005), in her ethnographic

research, has highlighted some important points: Winkleman

provides evidence on diversity and lose curriculum for the

female. While Madrassa is located in a city, the students are

recruited from rural areas and charged a small fee. The

rationales also can’t be easily explained by economic incentives.

Winklemann conducted her research in a female madrasa (Madrastul

Niswan) in New Delhi, which had about 200 students, mainly from

poor and lower middle class families. The students had little or

no pre-madrasa experience in the secular education and only about

10 percent of them were from the same locality, while the rest

came from rural areas and towns far away from New Delhi.

Focusing on students in the age group of 12 to17, the research

revealed that even though only a very small amount of fees was

paid, the students benefited from full boarding facilities.

Additionally, the madrasa in this study was closely affiliated

to the Jamaa’t-i Tablighi (broadly related to Deobandis) movement.

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Madrasas’ authorities believed that female education was

necessary for guiding women to become good mothers and wives.

And by “failing to do this (educating women), the women and their

innocent offsprings will be washed away in the flood of

irreligiousness, ruin their worldly and next lives” (Yunus 1994

quoted in Winkelmann 2005:55).

The curriculum was loosely selected from Dars-i Nizami and was a

shortened and adjusted version of the boys’ curriculum which

was covered or taught within 5 years. Various forms of

madrasas for girls based on the curriculum existed. Madrastul

Niswan had no connection with the central educational boards and

its curriculum was heavily reliant on religious subjects.

Further, the curriculum was designed by male clerics in order to

shape the personality of women in an Islamic manner (Ibid: 58).

As Winkelmann, Alam (2010) also recognizes the different forms

of curricula in Indian girls’ madrasas. She argues that “in the

absence of a central regulating authority, most madrasas

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determine and follow their own curriculum. As such, they

constitute an important site where notions of selfhood, community

and, by extension, the ‘Other’ are created”. The curriculum of

both male and female madrasas catagorised by Winkelmann into

three types, are far more diverse than what is seen in the

Dars-i-Nezami curriculum discussed above (see Wikelmann 2005:12).

Philosophy and logics or Ma’qulat (rational or secular related

subjects), part of the formal Darsi-i- Nezami have been considered,

to a large extent, as insignificant subjects for Deobandis,

and even though these subjects were considered irrelevant by

the founders of the Deobandi movement (see Metcalf 2004: 36).

Winkelmann (2005: 69) also observed that these subjects were

left out of the curriculum of a female madrasa in Delhi.

In their study, Jeffery et al. (2006) found out that in spite of

much stereotyping after 9/11, education in madrasas in the

Bijnor District in western Uttar Pradesh of India was not

promoting radicalism. They also discovered that all moulvis

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(Mowlawis) (religious authority) were promoting girls’

education; however, they had different views regarding the

length and the content of what girls were to study. On one

occasion, one moulvi said: “girls do study with more enthusiasm

than boys. They get higher numbers [grades] than boys” (Jeffery

et al. 2006: 234).

Another moulvi declared that “education [ta’lim] is essential. And

it is absolutely essential for a girl because she is going to

have to run a home. She will rear her children in her lap [god].

Children are flowers. Their supervision and care [dekh-bhal] is

the woman’s work” (Ibid: 237). Many others believed that “the

mother’s lap is the first madrasa” (ibid). Most moulvis in

Bijnor even regarded the continuation of girls’ education beyond

puberty as crucial element which would finalise the training for

becoming good mothers and wives. However, this was something that

traditional families were not comfortable with (Ibid: 248).

Jeffery et al. argue that “marriage, motherhood and domesticity

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are still central in girls’ destinies, and girls’ education

should not serve to overturn gender politics at the domestic

level” (Ibid:248). Moreover, the teacher’s role in a local

girls’ madrasa was seen as a “civilizing mission”, because it was

not about providing women with economic independence. By

denigrating villagers as uneducated, ignorant, unclean and poor,

most moulvis in Bijnor reflected the behaviour of the urban middle

class which gave importance to education. In this way, Jeffery et

al. Explain the moulvis’ behaviors on the basis of gender and

class.

Methodology and Theory

The research cases available, mostly are based on ethnographic

methods and provided some detailed evidence about rationales and

behavior of the women inside madrsas. However, most of the cases

have reached come to some kind of universal conclusions

particularly in feminist arguments. While the researchers have

recognized the complexity and contradictory process of

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modernization with regards to emancipation, regulation,

discipline and agency, they have applied different theoretical

analysis to explain their findings. On the basis of their

methodologies, various social and economic settings, different

forms of madrasas and curricula, researchers have reached

different conclusions.

Bano, on the basis of her findings used a rational choice,

demand side economic analysis. Her findings were more limited to

urban, prosperous areas, where madrasasa were used as

complementary institutions.

Many commentators and researchers have analysed the phenomenon

of female madrasa, by applying gender relations theories,

particularly the Focauldian approach of body control and “total

institution (see Lughud 1998; Mahmood 2001, 2005; Alam 2010;

Farooq 2010),

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Similar to Winkellman, Farooq (2010 ) argues that female

madrasas are seen as close communities in which men act as

patrons who design the curriculum with a particular mindset aimed

at ‘crafting’ a receptive mind in order to inculcate certain

values or ‘colonize’ the mind and discipline the body.

Following Focault, the body is the target of power. In this

sense, the ““docile body” is subjected, used, transformed and

improved” (Farooq 2010: 67, see also Winkelmann 2005:77-78,

Mahmood 2001) and docility is achieved through the action of

discipline in accordance with the men’s design.

According to Farooq and Winkelmann, the curriculum of Dars-i

Nizami was developed in India, in the 19th century, to explain

the ways men took the role of decision makers with the view to

instilling self –discipline among women. This is seen as

“selective inclusion in the public and restrictions in the

educational domain” by Winkelmann (2005:24). Winkelmann

believes that in the “closed communities”, discipline is

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cultivated in a way that the prospect for empowerment and

emancipation remain very limited.

In spite of limitations imposed in madrasas, some researchers

have seen potential for integration and modernaization among the

students in the female madrasas. Alam believes that “the

creation of a gendered self that finds its knowledge of Islam at

odds with societal and familial expectations or in the fact that

though the madrasas positioned against the nation, are

sometimes aspiring to become a part of it” (Alam 2010). Following

Skind (2006), Farooq argues that female madrasas promote

“Islamosity” which eventually leads to “unintentional”

modernization (Farooq 2010:66).

The line of argument on the exclusion of women from public life

has been highlighted in a more critical language by women's rights

activists in Pakistan. For example, in reference to the Hafsa female

madrasa, Tahira Abdullah argued that the madrasa’s aim is “to

promote a narrow, intolerant world view. It stifles the spirit of

inquiry, it stifles the powers of reasoning and logic (…) just like

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these girls look like ninja turtles - in that all encompassing veil,

just like they look like that, their brains are like that. They're

atrophied. Totally rusted” (quoted in Jalil 2005).

In feminist analyses, there is a tendency to overestimate the

role of structures, and underestimate the role of agency. To a

great extent, it has been ignored that women in madrasas have

not been passive, but they have been active and able to

manipulate the rules and regulations (see Scott 2010).

Different form rational choice analysis used by Bano and “body

control” analysis used by many researchers on Indian female

madrasa, Jeffery et al. (2006), in their has not been explained

just as a male project, for controlling body or to respond to

he market demands. They have looked at education as a mission of

the middle class educated moulavis, who consider rural life,

unclean and associated with ignorance. This is in some way a

modernising mission to improve women's lives in rural areas,

however, there is a strong traditional element that madrasa

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education is used to make women better wives or sisters in the

private sphere. This, obviously limits women's engagement with

public life.

Conclusion

Female madrasas developed in South Asia, particularly both in

India and Pakistan, have been diverse in terms of rationales and

roles. Some madrasas have been established, mainly in prosperous

urban areas, as replacement of, or complementary institutions to

secular education. In such cases, completing similar curriculum

to secular education, or widening the experience of the female

students and their access to further cultural capital, and even

economic gains, have been the most important aims.

Many authorities, either from a middle class point of view to

bring education to women, or control the women, have reacted to

“risk society” (Beck 2000), in which there are many unpredictable

risks to traditional ways of life. To challenge these risks

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defined in religious and traditional ways, they promote awareness

of of mothers or sisters to play more effective role in primary

socialisation. This is more about widening the domestic tasks

of the women by education while in pre modern-traditional

contexts, there was no question about the efficiency of the

mothers’ roles.

Some other madrasas, mainly in more traditional and rural areas;

and also among urban poors, have been developed as charities,

and also institutions to strengthen control over the females in

the face of what have been considered as the corrupting

influence of western cultures and secularisation of the

society.

Whatever the rationales are, this is a process of ’de-

traditinalisation’ in which exclusion and inclusion of women

have simultaneously developed. The “total institution”,

particularly in the form of more traditional madrasas, has not

been able to impose a total control on women students. These

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women have been included in terms of gaining further capacity

to act as individuals as well as entering a field which

previously monopolised by the male authorities (moulvis). Through

the madrasa routes, the talaba, particularly those with state

educational backgrounds, found more opportunities to expand

their power through manipulating the structures in an intra-

institutional ways.

But these women, particularly in more traditional madrasas, have

also been excluded in terms of access to the opportunities,

such as level of curriculum, qualifications and status, available

for the male students and clerics Physically, the women students

have also been secluded by burqa, considered by Deobandis as an

Islamic identity of pious women. Control of the talba’s body and

behaviour through certain methods of teaching and a selective

version of the curriculum have been intensified.

While the processes of control and further disciplinary

measures have internalised a particular form of an Islamic

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womanhood, it has not abolished the capacity of her as agency

to act as an individual (Winkelmann 2005: 78). This is a process

of modernisation, in a sense of breaking away from traditions

and increasing individuals’ capacity to realize their own

“interests against the weight of customs, tradition,

transcendental will (…) even if unintentional” (Mahmood 2001: 206

quoted in Winkelmann 2005:99).

Defensive mechanisms adopted by maulanas, no matter how hostile

they may be to the empowerment of women and the liberal aspects

of modernity, they are inevitable ways of further engagement

with the modern phenomena.

Author:Doctor Hoshang Noraiee (Ayub Hussein Bor) has taught political economy sociology, organizational behaviour, at the Universities of Warwick, London, London Metropolitan and Westminster. Now, in collaboration with other university colleagues, works as an independent researcher, on a number of projects on political economy, particularly, on the process of globalization, Islam and nationalism in the Middle East. He had his undergraduate education in Mathematics and economics in Iran. Then he Completed his MA in Political Economy in University of Middlesex and his PhD in sociology

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at the University of Warwick in the United Kingdom he has written manyarticles written in Persian and also English. In the early 1990s he founded the Journal Shohaz (Research) in London and worked as its chiefeditor. Email for correspondence: [email protected]

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