De Gaulle’s Pursuit of Grandeur: A Visionary

Example of Foreign Policy or an Elaborate

Evolution of the Foreign Policy Adopted by the

Fourth Republic?

Connor Shane Diffley

BA (Honours) Combined Modern Languages

University of Portsmouth

School of Languages and Area Studies

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

April 2015

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements 2

Abstract 3

Abbreviations 4

Main introduction 5

Chapter One: The Foreign Policy of the Fourth Republic (1944-1958): 6-12

1.1 Introduction 6

1.2 The political structures of the Fourth Republic 6-7

1.3 France, US Marshall Aid & the French Economy 8

1.4 France and the construction of Europe 8-10

1.5 The Fourth Republic and decolonisation 10-11

1.6 Conclusion 12

Chapter Two: De Gaulle and Decolonisation: 13-19

2.1 France and the decolonisation of Black Africa 13-17

2.2 The role of Jacques Foccart: 17-18

2.3 The decolonisation of Algeria 18-19

2.4 Conclusion 19

Chapter Three: The Pursuit of Grandeur: 20-25

3.1 Introduction 20

3.2 De Gaulle and the importance of Grandeur 20-21

3.3 The relevance of the force de frappe 21-23

3.4 France, the USA and NATO 23-25

3.5 Conclusion 25

Chapter Four: De Gaulle and European Relations: 26-31

4.1 De Gaulle’s vision of Europe 26-27

4.2 De Gaulle and supranationalism 28-29

4.3 Between Grain and Grandeur 29-31

4.4 Conclusion 32

Main Conclusion 33-35

Bibliography 36-40

Statement1 41

1 (Charles de Gaulle’s face as L’Hexagone on the front page, Ministères de l’éducation

nationale et de la recherche, n.d.).

2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Tempus fugit

The writing of this dissertation would not have been possible without the support and

attention to detail of my dissertation supervisor, Janet Bryant, who always greeted me with a

smile and from time to time, a satsuma. Thank you.

I would also like to thank my housemates and close friends Alice Clement, Hollie

Davies and Ali Simpson who have been a constant source of support and amusement this

year and without whom I would not have laughed half as much as I have done. I am lucky to

have you as my friends and I look forward to the years ahead.

Thanks must also go to Nathaniel Hayward who very kindly read this dissertation in

its entirety and whose knowledge of international affairs was a great deal of help.

I must also thank Jasmine Venton-Nash who personifies the meaning of friendship

and whose honesty and unwavering confidence in me has encouraged me an unmeasurable

amount this year.

Finally, I wish to thank my family whose love, encouragement, faith, patience,

generosity and support have never faltered. You have moulded me into the person that I am

today and for that I will always be grateful.

3

ABSTRACT

The theme of de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic and the foreign policy that came to define it

has been the subject of extensive academic research since its establishment in 1958 and

continues to be a contentious topic of discussion. The establishment of the Fifth Republic can

be described as one of the most defining moments in post-war French history. Consequently,

the significance of de Gaulle’s ambitious foreign policy of grandeur pursued during his

presidency is of paramount importance in understanding how France evolved from a weak

and politically divided country, to one of the leading European powers of the twentieth

century.

This research aims to show that although there were visionary aspects of de Gaulle’s

foreign policy, the belief that the Fifth Republic’s foreign policy resulted in a definitive

‘break’ with that of the Fourth Republic is misleading and inaccurate. On the contrary, it will

be shown that certain aspects of the foreign policy pursued by de Gaulle support the view that

the Fifth Republic’s foreign policy was an elaborate evolution of the foreign policy pursued

by the Fourth Republic.

This research primarily addresses the subject of the foreign policy adopted by Charles

de Gaulle from his return to power in 1958 until the ‘Empty Chair Crisis’ of 1965-1966,

while also examining the most notable aspects of the foreign policy pursued by the Fourth

Republic. The importance of the political ideology of grandeur will form an integral part in

understanding the decisions taken by de Gaulle with regards to foreign policy from 1958

onwards. Moreover, it will be demonstrated that de Gaulle’s pursuit of grandeur and the

protection of the ‘nation state’ were intrinsically linked and formed the bedrock of de

Gaulle’s foreign policy.

4

ABBREVIATIONS

ALN-Armée de Libération Nationale

CAP-Common Agricultural Policy

DOM-TOM- Départements et Territoires d’Outre-Mer

ECSC-European Coal and Steel Community

EDC-European Defence Community

EEC-European Economic Community

FLN-Front de Libération Nationale

MRP- Mouvement Républicain Populaire

PCF-Parti Communiste Français

QMV-Qualified Majority Voting

SFIO-Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière

5

MAIN INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that de Gaulle played a significant role in reaffirming France’s

position as an influential world power from the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1958

until his resignation in 1969, and was arguably the most prominent French political figure in

twentieth century French history (Lalancette, 2013, p. 1). Therefore, the importance of de

Gaulle’s foreign policy cannot be underestimated as France once more became a formidable

force with de Gaulle personifying its quest for renewed French grandeur. In order to fully

understand the significance of de Gaulle’s foreign policy, and therefore the context of this

research, it is imperative that the meaning of grandeur is understood. Grandeur was the

fundamental aspect of de Gaulle’s foreign policy which placed the preservation of the nation

state at the heart of French foreign policy and which could not be compromised. De Gaulle’s

pursuit of grandeur would only be possible upon the realisation of two vital factors: the

stabilisation of the French state and the modification of the balance of power that existed in

the 1950s and 1960s away from American hegemony in Europe (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 35).

This research argues that de Gaulle’s foreign policy of grandeur was a complex

evolution of the foreign policy pursued by the Fourth Republic and that certain aspects of de

Gaulle’s successful foreign policy can, to a certain extent, be attributed to the success or

failure of certain policies adopted by the Fourth Republic.

This research is presented in four chapters which are in chronological order, each

developing upon the previous chapter. Chapter one analyses the political structures of the

Fourth Republic as well as its foreign policy towards the USA, its role in the construction of

Europe and its foreign policy regarding decolonisation. Chapter two examines de Gaulle’s

African foreign policy and the extent to which neo-colonialism replaced colonialism. Chapter

three focuses on de Gaulle’s pursuit of grandeur as well as analysing France’s relations with

the USA and NATO. Chapter four explores de Gaulle’s European policy by examining his

vision of Europe and how it conflicted with that envisaged by the European Commission.

Furthermore, chapter four challenges the belief that de Gaulle’s European policy was

geopolitically based and instead argues that his European policy was in fact politically

economic in nature.

6

CHAPTER ONE: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC (1944-

1958)

1.1 Introduction:

This introductory chapter analyses the main aspects of foreign policy adopted by the

Fourth Republic, while also drawing attention to the motives behind the decisions taken by its

numerous governments from 1944 until its eventual collapse in 1958. The following

questions will be addressed in this chapter:

What was the domestic political situation during the Fourth Republic and how did this

situation pose problems for foreign policy?

Why and by what means did the Fourth Republic adopt the foreign policy that it did?

How and why was the European Economic Community (EEC) created?

And how and why did the Fourth Republic deal with the colonial problems as it did?

A key facet of the Fourth Republic was its relationship with West Germany and the

role that this relationship played in the formation of European structures. The importance of

the Franco-German ‘couple’ in the construction of Europe will be assessed, as will the

motives which lay behind its construction and how these motives influenced the creation of

European institutions. The role of decolonisation in the destabilisation of the Fourth Republic

and the USA’s influence over France will also be examined, and it will be revealed why

France was so unwilling to relinquish imperial governance over its African colonies.

1.2 The political structures of the Fourth Republic:

Following the liberation of France from the Nazi regime in 1944, it was expected that

a single and unified Resistance Party united in democratic socialism would come to the fore

on the French political scene. However, the reality which manifested itself between 1944 and

1945 was the dominance of three competing parties: the Parti Communiste Français (PCF),

the Section Française de l’Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO) and the Mouvement Républicain

Populaire (MRP), also known as tripartisme, which gained the support of three-quarters of

the French electorate (Evans & Godin, 2004, p. 133). Moreover, tension between the parties

and de Gaulle was common and eventually came to a head during the formation of the Fourth

Republic’s constitution. It is important to note that even at the beginning of discussions

regarding the new constitution, de Gaulle insisted that the Assemblée Nationale should not be

sovereign in nature but rather that it be limited in time period; a clear indication of his

fundamental belief that power should not lie with the Assemblée Nationale. De Gaulle

7

believed that a strong executive power was required in order to stabilise France’s political

turmoil. The rejection of such a plan resulted in de Gaulle’s resignation in January 1946 and

subsequently resulted in the approval of the Fourth Republic’s eventual constitution in

October 1946 with 8 million for, 8 million ‘no’ votes and 8 million abstentions; an indication

of the political weaknesses which were to unfold from 1946 onwards (Evans & Godin, 2004,

p. 134).

Therefore, the following question must be asked: How did the fragmentation of the

French political scene manifest itself in the foreign policy of the Fourth Republic and what

were the consequences?

In effect, although the Assemblée Nationale was the powerhouse in French politics,

political instability has become the defining feature of the Fourth Republic. Foreign policy,

for example the case of Indo-China, was particularly affected as on many occasions political

parties were unable to agree on a set foreign policy and therefore a vote of confidence,

deemed to be a political tool in order to obtain a majority decision, was implemented

regularly; the constant use of which further reduced the credibility and stability of the Fourth

Republic (Hörber, 2006, pp. 60-61). The ineffective ministries resulted in the regular collapse

of governments which created a ‘merry-go-round’ effect of the same faces in different

ministerial positions, the result of which saw twenty two different governments alone from

1945-1958. De Gaulle firmly blamed the 1946 constitution for this situation (Kedward, 2006,

p. 381).

Kedward (2006, pp. 382-383) asserts that the loss of Vietnam and Algeria can be

attributed to the ideological inflexibility and disorganisation of the Fourth Republic, two

factors which could have been avoided had de Gaulle’s proposals been accepted in 1946. The

systemic weaknesses of the Fourth Republic are further exemplified by the existence of a

multipolar political landscape and a proportional representation system, both of which led to

unstable coalition governments. The logic guiding the different political parties was similar to

that in 1939. A series of frail and brief coalitions, which were founded on compromise with

mainstream political parties, became commonplace and thus the ‘revolving door principle’ of

French politics, where coalitions were doomed to failure, became the defining feature of the

Fourth Republic (Atkin, 2005, p. 17).

8

1.3 France, US Marshall Aid & the French economy:

Following the destruction caused by the Second World War, France was a greatly

reduced power and economically exhausted. Seventy-four departments were structurally and

economically ruined in 1945, compared to the thirteen damaged after 1918 and consequently

French industrial production had dropped by 62 per cent in 1945 compared to 1938, resulting

in France requiring considerable reconstruction but without having sufficient credit to finance

the major projects required across France (Gildea, 2002, p. 9). As a result, France relied

heavily upon financial assistance from the USA in the form of the Marshall Plan which was

one of the first examples of increased post-war co-operation between the two states, which

was to be a defining feature of Fourth Republic foreign policy. Marshall Aid, of which

France received $2.7 billion, and the success of Monnet’s economic plan resulted in rapid

modernisation of French industry and economy from 1947 until the 1970s; a period of growth

which has been coined as ‘les trente glorieuses’ (Keiger, 2001, p. 13). However, as a result of

the American economic aid, the influence that the USA held over France was enormous.

America influenced France in a number of key areas such as the construction of a unified

Europe and also prevented Communists from holding positions of power in government

(Sutton, 2007, pp. 28-29).

1.4 France and the construction of Europe:

The division of Europe into two opposing blocs was cemented when the USSR first

reached Berlin in May 1945 and accordingly Europe was to be the focal point of contention

between the two Cold War superpowers of the USA and the USSR (Bache, Bulmer, George

& Parker, 2015, p. 81). In such circumstances, why was Europe such a vital aspect of the

Fourth Republic’s foreign policy and to what extent was Germany the key to a unified post-

war Europe?

France, a very much reduced power and dependent upon the benevolence of Britain

and the USA in the post-war period, perceived the construction of a unified Europe as an

occasion to equipoise the ‘German problem’. These opportunities were possible because it

was believed that France should influence the brokering of European alliances and fashion

the formation of a united Europe (Rioux, 1989, p. 139). There are a multitude of motives

influencing the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) but arguably the

most prominent reason was that the creation of the ECSC enabled France to once more

demonstrate its prowess as a leading world power, while also tackling the question regarding

Germany’s new standing in Europe, and circumventing the USSR’s potential influence over

9

the newly formed state (Hanhimäki, Schoenborn & Zanchetta, 2012, pp. 29-30). As a result

of Germany’s size, potential influence and geographical location in Cold War Europe, France

viewed Germany very much as a threat and thus tied her into the ECSC in an attempt to

control its evolution into a stronger and more independent state. The ECSC would enable

France to adopt a policy of ‘embedded bilateralism’ with Germany which would protect

French economic interests while also promoting cooperation alongside Germany as it evolved

into a stronger state (Krotz & Schild, 2015, pp. 1-15). Between 1951-1958 exports to West

Germany increased by 168% in real time $ values, whereas exports to the USA dropped by

11% in the same time period and thus West Germany proved to be a lucrative new trading

partner for an impoverished post-war France (Milward, 2000, pp. 134-136).

The Fourth Republic, usually viewed as simply part of an ineffective and chaotic

period in French politics, was in fact instrumental in the construction of a united Europe from

1951 onwards. The pioneering “Schuman Plan” proved to be a fundamental step towards a

united Europe and paved the way for further Franco-German rapprochement via greatly

increased communication and cooperation between the two countries. The ECSC created a

coal and steel pool amongst France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg2

with the aim of creating political and economic cooperation amongst the six as opposed to

competing different national interests (Hörber, 2006, pp. 118-119). Given the importance of

steel in waging war, the community in effect made war between the Six virtually impossible,

and greatly relieved French anxiety regarding the outbreak of another world war (Gildea,

2002, p. 16). It is therefore evident that the creation of the ECSC was a defining moment in

the construction of a united Europe and was largely orchestrated by the Fourth Republic

(Kedward, 2006, p. 370, Lappenküper, 2008, p. 152).

The positive outcome for European construction heralded by the creation of the ECSC

was not consistently replicated in all areas: the European Defence Community (EDC) is a

case in point. The French proposal for a an EDC in 1951 was a result of two factors: pressure

from the USA for Europe to rely less on American military protection and France’s fear of

the rearmament of West Germany, which was being proposed by the USA and other states

(Sutton, 2007, p. 65). The plan, had it not been rejected by French vote in 1955, would have

seen the creation of a European army which functioned under European political and military

organisation. The mastery of the plan lay in not rearming the German state but rather in

rearming German men but without creating an individual German army; resulting in France

2 More commonly referred to as simply ‘the Six’ when talking about the countries as a whole.

10

bypassing the debate regarding German rearming (Gildea, 2002, pp. 16-17). Although the

EDC ultimately failed and West Germany was admitted to NATO, it is important to note that

France did not buckle to American pressure regarding the rearmament of Germany. The

Fourth Republic sought its own solution, doomed though it was, to the ‘German problem’ and

therefore demonstrated resistance to the American hegemonic position; a stance which would

come to define certain aspects of de Gaulle’s foreign policy (Gildea, 2002, p. 8, Sutton, 2007,

p. 65).

1.5 The Fourth Republic and decolonisation:

France’s colonial influence was the Fourth Republic’s supreme assertion of its place

as a great-power in the 20th century vis-à-vis Britain, the other great imperial strength at the

time, and the USA which was arguably the largest power in post-war international relations

(Gildea, 2002, p. 20). The Empire was seen as a fundamental instrument for regaining French

influence in the world, but to what extent would this be possible in the Cold War context?

The colonial question can best be described as a combination of wasted opportunities and

extreme heavy handedness upon France’s part which played an integral role in the demise of

the regime (Rioux, 1989, p. 85). Why did France not relinquish control over its Empire when

it was clearly more a hindrance than a help and to what extent did the colonial problem spell

the collapse of the Fourth Republic?

The liberation of countries at the end of World War Two had a domino effect upon

colonies as it gave them the belief that independence was possible and, in fact, an achievable

aspiration. Consequently, in order to placate the hunger for independence, which the

colonised felt they had earned on account of their contribution to the war effort, the Fourth

Republic replaced the empire with the French Union. This resulted in the former colonies

becoming associated with the French Republic, with the aim of granting greater individual

freedom to colonial people (Buchanan, 2012, pp. 91-94). While Britain was granting

independence to its colonies, France was resisting doing just that and therefore it can be

argued that the French Union was a smokescreen used to protect the economic interests of

France when colonialism was deemed to be an outdated concept, a concept which is

supported once economic factors are studied further. The French Union accounted for 52% of

total French exports in 1952; $542 million was invested in West Africa from 1947 until 1957

and hence the empire was France’s primary trading partner until 1960. Therefore, it is clear

that the French Union and France were intrinsically linked together and any attempt to sever

imperial ties created massive political and social uproar in France (Evans & Godin, 2004, p.

141).

11

The Brazzaville Conference in 1944 was a wasted opportunity by France to debate the

future of the colonial question as it was unclear whether aspects of the French Union, such as

colonial representation in the Constituent Assembly or the promise to eradicate colonial law,

would lead to assimilation or emancipation (Rioux, 1989, p. 86). The war in Indo-China can

be described as an ideological war which aimed to remove the threat of rising nationalism in

the region but more importantly, it highlighted the fact that France was unwilling to accept

defeat so soon after World War II. Instead, France chose to enter into a ‘dirty war’ in the

hope of retaining its presence in Indo-China at the cost of its international credibility, which

was left ruined once Indochina became independent (Keiger, 2001, p. 64).

The belief that France was dependent on the USA during the Fourth Republic was

very much affirmed during the Indo-China war as the USA provided more than 80% of the

entire military cost of the war, despite France deploying more than 200,000 troops (US

Department of State, n.d., para 2). Why did the USA commit its support to France despite

that fact that it viewed the retention of empire as outmoded? In short, France underlined Ho

Chi Minh’s communism to the USA in order to draw them into France’s costly war effort in

Indochina and the threat of a communist victory in Asia was of greater concern to the USA

than France’s pursuit of retaining its empire (US Department of State, n.d., para 2). In effect,

the cost of the Indo-China war amounted to more than France’s entire share of Marshall Aid

received before 1951, and thus the importance of the empire to the Fourth Republic is

irrefutable (Keiger, 2001, pp. 63-64). In the case of the Algerian War3, it can be said that

France lost the war by not learning from its mistakes in Indo-China as well as failing to

realise the extent of the problem and the support which arose amongst Algerian nationalists.

The use of torture and excessive violence in Algeria, which was considered to be part of the

Hexagon itself, eventually meant that war was no longer credible and irreversibly damaged

France’s image in the world and led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic (Rioux, 1989, p.

88).

3 The Algerian War was only recognised by the French government as a war in 1999, having

previously been referred to as a “peace operation” (“War”, 2011).

12

1.6 Conclusion:

The importance of the role undertaken by the Fourth Republic in the construction of

Europe cannot be stressed enough as without France’s input in the establishment of the

ECSC, it could be argued that the tensions which existed between France and Germany

would not have been overcome and post war developments in Europe might have been rather

different, had their initial step been unsuccessful. The creation of a European community was

fundamental in order for France to begin to re-establish itself on the world stage. The ECSC

enabled France to begin to improve relations with West Germany as well as ensuring that a

certain level of control was exercised over it (Rioux, 1989, p. 139). The establishment of the

ECSC was the forerunner to the EEC, and strongly bound France and West Germany together

as the backbone of Europe while also helping to heal the ‘German issue’. It also enabled de

Gaulle to evolve France’s European policy, as will be discussed in Chapter Four.

Moreover, France’s inability to relinquish imperial rule over its colonies, particularly

in the case of Algeria, led to the inevitable collapse of the Fourth Republic and enabled de

Gaulle to emerge as the ‘saviour’ of France in 1958. The ineffectiveness of the Fourth

Republic’s political body in dealing with the colonial problem was underlined by successive

government’s complete and utter failure to realise the extent of the problem which became a

burden to France and greatly tarred its image as a country with a ‘civilising mission’. Failure

to overcome outdated ideological views of the empire, compared to progressive

decolonisation adopted by Britain, highlighted the extent to which France was unwilling to

enter into a new period of cooperation with the French Union. Therefore, it was inevitable

that de Gaulle would be burdened with the Algerian problem in 1958, a situation which will

be studied, along with an analysis of the decolonisation of Black Africa, in the following

chapter (Grosser, 1984, p. 129).

13

CHAPTER TWO: DE GAULLE AND DECOLONISATION

2.1 France and the decolonisation of Black Africa:

The Algerian situation and the costly war in Indo-China had altered international

opinion regarding France’s colonial position which was viewed as out of date and even

damaging to France’s pursuit of grandeur (Berstein, 1993, p. 155). De Gaulle, having learnt

from the disastrous decolonisation of Indo-China and the continuing Algerian problem, was

aware that the desire for independence held by the colonies was now ingrained and that if

such a desire was ignored, France would forever be funding costly and futile wars of

decolonisation which would not only damage relations with the colonies seeking

independence, but would also damage de Gaulle’s wider pursuit of grandeur. France could

not afford another defeat like Indo-China, as France’s international standing would once

more be greatly reduced as a result (Berstein, 1993, p. 156). This chapter will answer the

following vital questions:

How was de Gaulle to solve the colonial thirst for independence in black

Africa while also maintaining a strong French presence?

Once independence was achieved, to what extent was France’s relationship

with former colonies an example of neo-colonialism?

The need for decolonisation in Africa resulted in de Gaulle realising that the Empire

had become a burden to France which posed more of a threat and a hindrance to the new Fifth

Republic than an asset and, therefore, it was clear to de Gaulle that positive and decisive

action was required (de Gaulle, 1971, p. 39). The colonies granted France a great deal of

influence in Africa and therefore it was vital for de Gaulle that whichever strategy he

pursued, France retained a certain position of power over its former colonies, a situation

which can best be described by the word association. The African colonies were to choose

their own path to eventual independence but while remaining intrinsically linked to France in

a form of “direct co-operation” through which de Gaulle was to have a colonialist

relationship with them, which evolved from the Fourth Republic’s French Union (Berstein,

1993, p. 156). Therefore, de Gaulle’s African voyage in August 1958 was a key moment in

the proposed evolution of France’s relations with its African colonies.

In 1958, de Gaulle proposed that the French colonies choose between complete

independence separate from France and its aid, or association with France, in which the

14

former African colonies would have complete autonomy in which they administered their

own governments in a democratic manner in a French Community (Kedward, 2006, p. 386).

However, those who accepted association with France would not be in control of their

foreign, defence or economic policies nor were they responsible for control of important

primary materials, matters regarding justice, higher education or transport but rather these

areas were influenced and administered by French run institutions (Berstein, 1993, p. 157,

Vaïsse, 1998, p. 94). The result of France’s pervading influence over its former colonies has

resulted in de Gaulle’s foreign policy in Africa being branded as neo-colonialism (Jackson,

2003, p. 104, Lalancette, 2013, p. 2).

By controlling the key foreign policy of former colonies, as detailed above, France

held a great deal of power in Africa which furthered de Gaulle’s wider global pursuit of

grandeur in which France sought to protect its interests, even if that meant interfering in

matters which lay outside of the Hexagon, as will be discussed further in this chapter

(Butland, 2004, p. 15).

Moreover, the Community was presided over by the French president whose

responsibility it was to decide the suitable measures which were to be discussed and

implemented in the Community and it was also the French president who supervised the

arbitral Court, Executive Council and Senate, the latter of which was the heart of the

Community in which the cooperation of member states was organised and encouraged

(Vaïsse, 1998, p. 93). The Community’s Senate consisted of 284 members of which 186 were

French and the remaining 98 were held by former colonies, a distortion of power which

demonstrates that power was very much in de Gaulle’s hands. The composition of the Senate

ensured that it was impossible for the African nations to obtain a majority vote in discussions

because the sheer number of French members in the Senate made such a situation simply

unattainable (Maus, 2014, pp. 56-60). Therefore, although the Community gave the illusion

of equality between France and the former African colonies, the reality was a much more

complicated matter, which can best be seen in the disproportionate number of positions held

by the French in the three institutions as well as the fact that the main areas of policy, such as

defence and foreign policy, were still very much the prerogative of the French president and

his advisors (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 94).

The cessation of the Community was quicker than expected as the thirst for

independence of member states continued to grow unabated. Independence was obtained

peacefully by 1961 (a marked change from the Fourth Republic), the result was an evolution

of the Franco-African relationship from the Community to cooperation agreements which

15

were to be signed by former African colonies upon confirmation of their independence

(Vaïsse, 1998, pp. 97-98). There was still a great amount of influence held by France over

African states as agreements were reached regarding defence, mutual aid and assistance,

information sharing, the continuation of the Franc Zone and, most importantly, France’s open

access to strategic bases in Cape Verde and Diego-Suarez. France also became the global

representation of the newly independent African states in the UN, which also protected

France’s interests in Africa (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 98). The Community evolved somewhat into a

French version of the Commonwealth in which former African colonies enjoyed the freedom

of independence while also receiving the aid and support of France in the form of bilateral

and multilateral agreements, which included direct financial support of 526 million new

francs in 1961 and 405 million new francs in 1961 under the title of “Cooperation and aid

funds”. This therefore demonstrates the continued influence held by France over its former

colonies, a position which supports the Fifth Republic’s evolution of policy from colonisation

to neo-colonialism (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 98).

Furthermore, Destanne de Bernis (1980, pp. 116-118) reveals that ex-African colonies

were still clearly dependent upon France economically even after they gained independence.

The vast majority of these former colonies south of the Sahara remained highly dependent on

France for imports of food products and consumer goods where the percentage of imports did

not fluctuate a great deal and never fell below 40%. Moreover, the belief that former colonies

were dependent on the French and European market, or so called ‘EuroAfrica’, is

strengthened even further if exports from former colonies are examined as well. In the vast

majority of cases, more than 90% of exports consisted of agricultural products or of products

in their basic and unprocessed form and the variety of exports in 1971-1972 was as limited

and as rudimentary, with the exception of some states exporting raw cotton, uranium, oil and

deforestation, as it was in 1959-1960. Therefore, the European market granted newly

independent African states the necessary platform to offload their surplus products while also

enabling them to import the necessary goods for further development, where the major

provider was France. The privileged position that France held over its former African states is

an example of the type of domination which adds weight to the argument that France’s role in

Africa evolved from that of a colonial power to one of neo-colonialism, the import levels

between France and its former colonies were very much in France’s favour, as is

demonstrated in the following tables:

16

Table 1 (Destanne de Bernis, 1980, p. 128).

Table 2 (Destanne de Bernis, 1980, p. 130).

Table 3 Destanne de Bernis, 1980, p. 131).

17

The tables clearly demonstrate the dependency of the African states on France as an

importer of French goods as, where figures are available; France remained the biggest

exporter to its former colonies both in 1960 as well as in 1972. The range of the percentage of

imports from France in 1971-1972 was 35.6% in Togo’s case (see table 1) to the Central

African’s Republic’s 61.7% (see table 2) which in fact was an increase of 1.2% from 1960.

Moreover, where data is available, five out of the fourteen African states above relied on

France as its biggest export market with the Central African Republic exporting 56.1% of its

goods to France in 1971 and Madagascar (see table 3) with 37.3% in 1973. Therefore, it is

understandable that France’s influence over its former colonies was seen as colonialist. It is

clear to see that a policy of cooperation was implemented which supported France’s need to

legitimise its continued and evolving influence over former colonies in the post-colonial

climate from the Fourth to Fifth Republic (Prisk, 2013, p. 8).

2.2 The role of Jacques Foccart:

A very clear example of neo-colonialism can be seen in the visionary role undertaken

by Jacques Foccart and the great influence that he wielded over former French colonies from

1959 onwards. Holding the post of Secretary General of the Community from 1960, Foccart

was directly responsible for all African matters and French Départements et Territoires

d’Outre-Mer (DOM-TOM), a position which enabled him to mould the fledgling independent

states to best suit France’s interests (Geneste, 2014, pp. 189-190). However, in what ways

did Foccart interfere in African matters and to what extent was his role colonialist?

Geneste (2014, p. 192) reveals that from the moment independence was ceded to

former African colonies, it was of paramount importance to France that newly elected

African leaders were pro-French in their policies. Therefore, the loss of Empire gave greater

impetus to the protection of France’s ‘turf’ in Africa, as is demonstrated in the cases of

France’s involvement in the toppling of Fulbert Youlou of the Congo in 1963 and the

involvement of the French army in Chad from 1969-1972 to guarantee the position of

Tombalbaye. In the first case, France actively engaged in the re-instatement of the deposed

Léon M’Ba as head of the Congo state by providing parachutists and special envoys. The

military overthrow in the Congo in 1964 threatened France’s interests in the country and

therefore France took it upon itself to intervene in ensuring that Léon M’Ba was re-instated

as head of state so that a pro-French leader was at the helm of the government. Moreover,

Bernard Bongo was nominated by an ally close to Foccart, Maurice Delauney, as the

successor to M’Ba in 1967 in an attempt to maintain the pro-French position in Gabon upon

the change of the head of state. This further emphasises France’s intervention in ex-colonial

18

matters in order to preserve France’s privileged position in African affairs, a level of

interference which greatly evolved and increased from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic

(Geneste, 2014, p. 192).

Furthermore, France’s military intervention in Chad between 1969-1972 was justified

by France as the preservation of order under Tombalbaye but, in reality, the protection of

France’s interests in Chad was at the forefront of Foccart’s military intervention as the

attempt to depose Tombalbaye was seen as a direct threat to France’s standing in Chad which

could possibly threaten its foothold in other African states. Thus, the argument supporting

France’s neo-colonialism in Africa is very much the case if Foccart’s actions are taken into

consideration (Geneste, 2014, p. 192).

2.3 The decolonisation of Algeria:

1958 not only marked de Gaulle’s return to power but also highlighted the fact that

the question surrounding the future of Algeria had to be tackled first and foremost. It was

vital to France’s national interests that, whatever the solution to the Algerian problem proved

to be, there would remain a strong French presence in north Africa and the Sahara given that

north Africa would prove vital to France in two ways: France’s pursuit of its own nuclear

deterrent and the abundance of energy resources in north Africa (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 59). Algeria

was a thorn in France’s side which de Gaulle had to remove carefully and slowly while

ensuring that France’s pursuit of grandeur remained the underlying factor of negotiations

with Algeria (Fenby, 2010, p. 432). However, why was solving the Algerian situation vital to

de Gaulle and how did its decolonisation differ to that of sub-Saharan Africa?

The Algerian question was a divisive issue in France which had the potential to reduce

France to a civil war like state, the reality of which would have greatly restricted de Gaulle’s

pursuit of grandeur and therefore it was imperative that however de Gaulle tackled the

growing Algerian problem, the politics of the situation had to be resolved too (Clayton, 1994,

p. 158). Offensive military missions were ordered by de Gaulle in the hope that France would

be in an advantageous position if the possibility to negotiate with the Front de Libération

Nationale (FLN) arose (Clayton, 1994, p. 159). Although the French offensive had by mid-

1959 destroyed the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), it had not improved the focal

point of contention: the need to decolonise. Therefore de Gaulle, seeing that a political

solution was required, proposed self-determination to Algeria in September 1959, an offer

which mirrored the evolutionary proposal offered to African colonies in 1958 (Clayton, 1994,

p. 162). However, the positive reaction to the proposal in 1958 was not mirrored in Algeria,

especially amongst European settlers and hard-line sections of the French army and resulted

19

in violent demonstrations which threatened to spill over into mainland France and culminated

in the Week of the Barricades in January 1960, a situation which underlined once more the

need to decolonise Algeria (Chamberlain, 1985, p. 58). The signing of the Évian agreement in

March 1962 resulted in joint agreements between France and Algeria regarding the

exploitation of oil in the Sahara, the French Navy being allowed the use of Mers-el Kébir for

a duration of fifteen years and, most importantly, France was allowed to use Saharan nuclear

testing facilities which greatly benefitted France’s pursuit of its force de frappe, a key aspect

of de Gaulle’s pursuit of renewed grandeur (Clayton, 1994, p. 173).

2.4 Conclusion:

The granting of independence to former African colonies signalled the necessary

evolution of France’s relations with its former colonies under the Fourth to the Fifth Republic

and, in the case of newly independent African states, allowed France to peacefully establish

personal and privileged relations with its former colonies in the form of cooperation. This

enabled France to be the global voice of the fledgling independent African nations, which

was not the case under the Fourth Republic (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 98). Furthermore, as

demonstrated in the tables above, the trading agreements which were established enabled

France to have a great deal of influence over the African markets as France was by far the

most prominent exporter to the new African nations. Therefore this factor, combined with

the role of Jacques Foccart, adds further weight to the belief that France’s decolonisation of

African states paved the way for the evolution from colonialism to neo-colonialism in

African matters (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 98). Once the divisive and bloody war in Algeria was

concluded, de Gaulle was free of the shackles of colonialism and able to pursue his pursuit of

grandeur on a global scale, which will be the focus of the following chapter.

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CHAPTER THREE: THE PURSUIT OF GRANDEUR

3.1 Introduction:

As chapter one has demonstrated, the Fourth Republic’s inability to effectively pursue

a set foreign policy because of domestic political instability was a fundamental reason for its

eventual collapse; thus de Gaulle sought to establish a new constitution which would

guarantee that the president was at the heart of international relations in the defence of French

national interests. Consequently, the visionary Constitution of the Fifth Republic evolved

from the failings of the Fourth Republic and mirrored the need for greater presidential power,

as demonstrated in the new Articles 5 and 16. Article 5 of the constitution stipulated that the

president was “the guarantor of national independence, of the integrity of territory and the

respect of treaties” which is strengthened further by Article 16 in which the president is

given, in the event of a threat to national sovereignty, extraordinary powers to protect French

national interests (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 41).

The result of the new constitution therefore greatly increased the executive power by

establishing greater presidential functions, as demonstrated above, to the detriment of the

influence and power of the Assemblée Nationale (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 41). Furthermore, the

organisation of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution differed to that of the Fourth in which the

section detailing the presidency was detailed in the sixth section, whereas under de Gaulle,

the presidency section was the first section of the new constitution, emphasising the

importance of presidential powers to de Gaulle (Gaffney, 2012, p. 31). This chapter will

answer the following key questions:

Why was grandeur such an important factor in de Gaulle’s foreign policy?

And how effective was his foreign policy in reaffirming French independence on a

global scale?

3.2 De Gaulle and the importance of Grandeur:

De Gaulle considered foreign policy to be the prerogative of the President, with the

pursuit of grandeur, which placed the state at its centre, one of its defining characteristics.

However, why was the nation state such a vital aspect of Gaullist foreign policy? The

importance of the nation state and the necessity to assert national independence cannot be

underestimated with regards to de Gaulle’s actions internationally. It was his overriding

conviction that ideologies were temporary sentiments, whereas nation states and national

interests were imbedded into the fabric of a country’s foreign policy and thus were to be at

21

the forefront of all policies regarding France’s pursuit of grandeur (Evans & Godin, 2004, p.

155). Consequently, the assertion that France be recognised as an equal and major world

power became a fundamental aspect of de Gaulle’s foreign policy (Treacher, 2002, p. 29).

De Gaulle’s vision of an independent France could only be realised if certain

conditions were met: France could not be so intrinsically immersed in the security structure

of NATO, France’s defence had to be French and there could not be a bipolar world but

rather a world which would evolve to consist of independent states (Warrington, 1994, p. 3).

Independence, in the case of de Gaulle’s image of France, is best described as a form on non-

dependence of the United States in which de Gaulle did not seek to isolate France from

NATO, but rather he pursued a policy by which France was isolated from the hegemonic

sphere of influence which was associated with the protocol of NATO. Therefore, non-

dependence on the USA symbolised an evolution of the foreign policy from the Fourth to

Fifth Republic as, under the former, France was very much dependent on the support of the

USA (Treacher, 2002, p. 32).

3.3 The relevance of the force de frappe:

The 1950s witnessed the advent of greater and more deadly nuclear weapons

culminating in the thermonuclear fusion bombs which were held by the USSR, as well as the

United States. The development of deadly ballistic missiles led de Gaulle to believe that

armed confrontation between the two superpowers was now unlikely and if war were to arise,

it would be a nuclear war and thus it was glaringly obvious to de Gaulle that France’s defence

was left in a very vulnerable position (Gordon, 1999, p. 223). How, therefore, was France to

defend itself independently from potential external attacks on its sovereignty?

Once the Algerian question had been resolved, de Gaulle was able to implement

France’s new and evolved defence policy; a policy which placed the independence of French

defence matters as its core objective which de Gaulle clearly outlined in November 1959:

“France’s military defence must be French…her effort must be her own effort…it is

indispensable that France defend herself on her own, for herself, and in her own way…we

have to be able to acquire…a force capable of acting on our behalf…it is evident that a

nuclear arsenal will be at the base of our force” (Messmer, 1994, pp. 351-352).

Therefore, national defence was deemed by de Gaulle as being a primary factor of an

independent French state, and hence, the possession of a French nuclear deterrent was a

necessity if France was to reclaim its place as a world power. In order to promote a greater

sense of national independence, de Gaulle envisaged two main factors: the rejection of

NATO’s integrated military system and the development and possession of a French force de

22

frappe. These two factors were a direct evolution of international events at the time e.g. the

Cold War and Russia’s possession of nuclear weapons. A defining feature of de Gaulle’s

foreign policy was the rejection of military integration as, in view of the importance of the

nation state, he believed that the matter of a country’s defence should be its own priority for

two main reasons: defence is a primary concern of a state and regardless of the opinions

between states, their interests can never truly align as national interests vary from state to

state (Vaïsse, 1998, p. 45). In addition, it was de Gaulle’s belief that a French nuclear

deterrent would result in greater caution on the part of potential aggressors as France would

be able to retaliate with significant destruction to the aggressor. As de Gaulle succinctly

states, “For to attack France would be equivalent, for whomever it might be, to undergoing

frightful destruction itself” (de Gaulle cited in Gordon, 1999, p. 225).

De Gaulle perceived the possession of the force de frappe as an evolution of the

Fourth Republic’s former symbol of grandeur: the Empire. The force de frappe was also a

buffer between the two Cold War blocs (Evans & Godin, 2004, p. 155). In the Cold War

context, the United States, having lost their nuclear monopoly to the USSR, would be less

willing to retaliate to an attack on European states and thus ‘extended deterrence’ was not

assured by the United States. Neither the United States nor the USSR would risk the threat of

destruction to their territory which would be a result of nuclear attack and thus de Gaulle

believed that Europe would bear the brunt of nuclear war as the two superpowers would seek

to contain the destruction to the European theatre, so as to deflect any damage to their own

nations (Gordon, 1999, p. 231). February 1960 marked the first explosion of France’s fission

bomb in the Sahara, an event which made France the fourth nuclear power behind the USA,

Britain and the USSR, and affirmed that de Gaulle was intent of furthering France’s world

position vis-à-vis the USA and the USSR through the force de frappe, a feat which further

emphasises the evolution of foreign policy from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic (Zoppo,

1962, p. 9).

In addition, the modification of the USA’s nuclear doctrine from ‘massive retaliation’

to one of ‘flexible response’ further enhanced de Gaulle’s belief that Kennedy’s main

concern was the protection of American soil if nuclear war with the USSR were to occur.

Therefore, de Gaulle perceived the protection of Europe as being very much a secondary

consideration in Kennedy’s nuclear considerations and hence it was vital that a French

deterrent was pursued (Vanke, 2001, p. 120). The nuclear deterrent under the Fourth

Republic was deemed to be a vital component of France’s bid for greater military decision

making within NATO (see below). Conversely, de Gaulle envisaged that the deterrent would

23

evolve to play an important political role separate from NATO in the form of an independent

French foreign policy. De Gaulle perceived France as having the ability to be the voice of a

“European” Europe in which France was granted an influential position due to the fact that it

was an independent nuclear power; a claim which was not afforded to Britain because of its

dependence on American support and technology. Furthermore, Germany was unable to

achieve nuclear power status as a result of the restrictions placed upon its ability to develop

nuclear warheads, and therefore it was unable to compete for a leading position in Europe,

thus paving the way for France’s ascension to the head of an independent Europe (Pierre,

1994, p. 280).

3.4 France, the USA and NATO:

The chains of colonialism had shackled France to costly and destructive wars of

decolonisation which had greatly restricted the upgrading of the French army, a necessary

requirement for the renewal of French grandeur on a global stage. In 1958 France had an

army of just over one million soldiers of which just over half were stationed abroad, mainly

in Algeria, whereas the remaining numbers were predominantly allocated to NATO forces

and by default, were under American authority (Messmer, 1994, pp. 351-352). What is more,

the vast bulk of French weaponry, such as tanks, ships and airplanes, were constructed from

American engineering as well as having been purchased with American financial support

under the Fourth Republic; a position which was at odds with de Gaulle’s belief that France

had to be free of the American hegemonic influence (Messmer, 1994, pp. 351-352). How

therefore did grandeur affect de Gaulle’s bid to seek to free France from American influence

and how did such actions affect relations with NATO?

Upon de Gaulle’s accession to the presidency in 1958, Europe was under the

supranational American protectorate umbrella, which is best described as Europe being very

much under the influence of and dependent on the USA for defence. This was unacceptable

to de Gaulle and thus he pursued a formidable policy against the American position of power

over France, a situation which was not possible under the Fourth Republic (Gildea, 2002, p.

246).

Consequently, in September 1958, de Gaulle proposed a tripartite directorate for

NATO consisting of France, the United States and Great Britain in which all three states

would have joint control over NATO’s nuclear arsenal, planning and decision making, a

proposal which de Gaulle viewed as befitting to France given its nuclear status. As a result,

de Gaulle sought to restrict the influence that the USA held over Europe as well as ensuring

that NATO acted in the best interests of France and was not wielded as a tool for the strategic

24

interests of the United States vis-à-vis the Soviet Union (Gildea, 2002, p. 246). De Gaulle’s

proposal in 1958 was a clear challenge and proposed evolution to America’s strong grasp

over NATO and its protectorate position over France, a challenge which shocked the

Americans but enhanced de Gaulle’s image as the leader of an independent and evolving

France seeking its place in international politics via a path of grandeur (Costigliola, 1992, p.

123). Although de Gaulle’s proposal was rejected, he did withdraw the French Mediterranean

Fleet from NATO command and thus the process of removing French forces from American

control was begun (Gildea, 2002, p. 247). It is important to emphasise that de Gaulle’s issue

with NATO lay not in its institutional framework but rather in the actual system of NATO, a

system which was very much in American control both with its military might in Europe and

the fact that the duty of defending Europe lay very much in American hands (Tractenberg,

2011, p. 184).

Elsewhere, by the 1960s the stances adopted by France and the USA regarding

nuclear proliferation were in stark contrast, and disagreement between the two was also

present regarding the matters of arms control and the doctrine in relation to the use of nuclear

weapons. Robert McNamara, the US Defence Secretary, saw the force de frappe as

“dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility” (McNamara cited in

Pierre, 1994, p. 285). Kennedy feared that the presence of many nuclear powers posed a

threat to peace because of increased instability in the world order. De Gaulle viewed

America’s attempt at arms control with wariness as he deemed them to be a way of ensuring

the hegemonic positions of the USA and the USSR in the world order vis-à-vis less powerful

states, such as France. Consequently, de Gaulle rejected the signing of the Test Ban Treaty of

1963 which barred countries from undertaking nuclear tests both in open air as well as

underwater, but permitted tests underground. De Gaulle was aware of the fact that had he

signed the treaty, he would be unable to pursue the force de frappe which would have, in his

eyes, reduced French national independence and stalled his pursuit of grandeur (Pierre, 1994,

p. 288).

However, de Gaulle’s announcement in March 1966 has widely been accepted as the

low point of Franco-American relations during de Gaulle’s presidency. The announcement

stipulated that all French forces were to be removed from NATO’s integrated command and

that all non-French NATO personnel and bases, including NATO headquarters, would have a

year to vacate France, after which time France’s army would be solely under French control

(Nuenlist, 2011, p. 227). As already discussed, de Gaulle believed that NATO could no

longer adequately defend the interests of Europe and the stability of European states had

25

greatly increased thus reducing the necessity of NATO in de Gaulle’s mind. Furthermore, as

France was now a nuclear state, it was no longer such an integrated player in the organisation

as, by simply being in possession of nuclear arms, the need for military integration was

greatly reduced as it was deemed that France had evolved from the Fourth Republic to defend

itself independently through its force de frappe. Accordingly, the March 1966 declaration can

be seen as the pinnacle of de Gaulle’s insistence that France was to act independently from

the USA as such an action, the expulsion of foreign NATO personnel, would not have been

an option under the Fourth Republic and thus the evolution of France’s increased desire for

grandeur is clearly highlighted in de Gaulle’s bold actions in 1966 (Pierre, 1994, pp. 288-

299).

3.5 Conclusion:

De Gaulle’s foreign policy can be summarised by two fundamental ambitions: firstly,

to ensure that France was an independent state, able to defend itself and secondly, to ensure

that France became a major global power. Overall, de Gaulle achieved his first goal but was

very much less successful with regards to the second. Unilateral actions combined with an

unwavering and formidable stance, such as the 1966 announcement, resulted in situations in

which compromise was impossible and so de Gaulle greatly increased France’s own

independence from the USA, with the example of withdrawing from NATO’s military

command evidence of this assertion. By withdrawing France from NATO, de Gaulle was able

to pursue an independent and evolved foreign policy which differed to that of the Fourth

Republic, and which did not require the approval of fellow NATO states. Moreover, the force

de frappe evolved to become the personification of France’s pursuit for grandeur and was

strongly linked to de Gaulle being able to withdraw France from the military structure of

NATO. De Gaulle was able to pursue a policy in NATO which was clearly defined, and

which varied to that pursued by the USA and which signalled a definite evolution from the

Fourth Republic’s relationship with NATO (Warrington, 1994, pp. 6-7). The importance of

grandeur and the role of the nation state in the context of de Gaulle’s European foreign

policy will be demonstrated in the subsequent chapter.

26

Chapter Four: De Gaulle and European Relations

4.1 De Gaulle’s vision of Europe

The origins of the EEC that de Gaulle inherited upon becoming the French President

in 1958 were a result of the visionary policies undertaken by the Fourth Republic under the

tutelage of Monnet and Schuman, both of whom were instrumental in founding the ECSC in

1951 and the signing of a common market for these two resources in 1953 as well as the EEC

in 1957. Their visionary plan was an attempt to overcome a divided post-war Europe which

Schuman believed to be “anachronistic” (Kedward, 2006, pp. 369-370). Four main questions

can be asked about de Gaulle’s foreign policy in Europe:

What was de Gaulle’s vision of Europe?

Was de Gaulle’s foreign policy in Europe geopolitically based or rather did

commercial economic reasons guide his foreign policy?

What were de Gaulle’s motives with regards to Germany and Europe?

And to what extent was de Gaulle’s European foreign policy driven by his

understanding of the ‘Nation State’?

In order to comprehend de Gaulle’s conception of Europe, or his foreign policy as a

whole for that matter, a key aspect of his political ideology must be explored. The idea of the

‘Nation State’ was the main element of de Gaulle’s political philosophy in the sense that a

country had to act in its national interests and for its own independence, a belief which is

strongly demonstrated in de Gaulle’s formidable handling of Common Agricultural Policy

(CAP) matters in the EEC.

De Gaulle sought to create a strong and independent France, capable of standing up

for its national interests (Cerny, 1980, pp. 78-79). He viewed the superpowers as hindering

France’s pursuit of greater national independence as well as inhibiting France’s evolution

towards becoming a global power (Jackson, 2003, p. 98). Consequently, de Gaulle viewed the

European project inherited from the Fourth Republic as a malleable organisation which could

be used in France’s best interests (Berstein, 1993, p. 170). De Gaulle sought a Europe which

was quintessentially ‘European’ in structure and free from Anglo-Saxon hegemony (Jackson,

2003, p. 99). Moreover, he envisaged a Europe consisting of nation states which would look

towards France as its natural voice and leader, which in turn would enable France to grow as

a strong and independent country whilst furthering its national interests (Vanke, 2006, p.

142).

27

However, the foundations of the EEC were very much supranational in nature in the

form of the Commission, which had the power to instigate policy proposals over the EEC

states and therefore de Gaulle viewed the Commission with suspicion as it posed a significant

threat to his pursuit of a French-led, state-centred Europe, as will be discussed further in this

chapter (Buchanan, 2012, pp. 193-197).

A Europe which existed independently from the ideologies of the two Cold War Blocs

lay at the heart of de Gaulle’s vision of Europe and it was this independence which,

according to de Gaulle, would enable France to evolve into a world power at the helm of

Europe (Berstein, 1993, p. 170). De Gaulle, like the government of the Fourth Republic,

believed that positive Franco-German relations were a fundamental aspect enabling the

development of Europe and thus, from 1958 onwards, he aimed to improve France’s

relationship with Germany through diplomacy with Chancellor Adenauer and successive

chancellors. The invitation extended to Adenauer in September 1958 to visit Colombey, de

Gaulle’s personal residence, started the beginning of improved Franco-German relations and

de Gaulle’s tour of Germany in September 1962 emphasised the growing unity between the

two countries (Gildea, 2002, p. 257).

However, what form would the European Economic Community take? De Gaulle

envisaged a Europe which was cultural, military and economic in nature but not political

(Jackson, 2003, p. 98). De Gaulle strongly opposed attempts which aimed to increase the

European Commission’s power over the EEC states as, in doing so; the nation state would be

greatly compromised, as illustrated below (Evans & Godin, 2004, p. 156). Furthermore, de

Gaulle sought a Europe which was not technocratic, artificial nor supranational in structure

(Vaïsse, 1998, p. 175). The importance of de Gaulle’s antipathy towards supranational

institutions cannot be emphasised enough and his hostility towards supranational institutions

will be discussed further in the subsequent section.

28

4.2 De Gaulle and supranationalism

This dissertation has already demonstrated that de Gaulle held the ‘Nation State’ as

the bedrock of his political ideology and believed that a nation had to be independent in order

to pursue its national interests (Ludlow, 2011, p. 66). Therefore, given the fact that the EEC

was headed by a supranational Commission, in what ways did the EEC’s framework conflict

with de Gaulle’s defence of the ‘Nation State’? (de Gaulle, 1971, pp. 184-185).

Not only was the EEC led by a supranational European Commission but the USA

believed that it was vital that the EEC was supranational in nature in order for it to be a

strong organisation (Giauque, 2002, p. 127). Consequently, we can begin to understand why

de Gaulle sought to reduce the extent to which the EEC was influenced by supranational

institutions. Walter Hallstein, the German President of the Commission, believed in a

European ‘Super State’ which acted as a unified community with common goals and

purposes (de Gaulle, 1970, p. 195). This subordinated position to the Commission was seen

as wholly unacceptable to de Gaulle as relinquishing national imperatives to a supranational

institution was in stark contrast to de Gaulle’s belief that the independence of the Nation

State was the foundation for any foreign policy undertaken by a nation (de Gaulle, 1970, p.

196).

Therefore, de Gaulle sought to reduce the influence of the European Commission. De

Gaulle’s most evident opposition to the power of the European Commission can be seen in

the highly controversial “Empty Chair Crisis” between 1965-1966 in which he strongly

opposed the Commission’s plans to augment the use of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV)

with regards to foreign trade, transport and agriculture. In short, the Commission could pass a

law if a majority vote had been achieved on a matter, regardless of the reactions of the

minority voters, effectively resulting in states losing their veto power, a clear example of how

the defence of the ‘Nation State’ would be infringed. For that reason, it is clear why de

Gaulle was opposed to such a condition in Europe and as a result, French ministers boycotted

European meetings and advancement in European policy was made extremely difficult

because of de Gaulle’s actions. Eventually a national veto was established in order to protect

the national interests of a country (Troitiño, 2008, p. 147).

The Luxembourg Compromise established the ‘right’ of member states to veto

another in the event that they did not agree with a new proposal and therefore the use of the

veto, would prevent the proposal from being implemented, thus ensuring that the national

interests of a country were protected while also proving to be a major setback for Hallstein’s

vision of an EEC which was federal in design. The Luxembourg Compromise is best seen as

29

a concession by the Commission which reduced the supranational nature of the EEC. This

marked an evolution of France’s European policy from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic as de

Gaulle was able to demand more from the EEC, which was not possible under the Fourth

Republic (Buchanan, 2012, p. 196).

4.3 Between Grain and Grandeur

Historians still continue to debate how one should interpret the policy de Gaulle

pursued towards the EEC and, in particular, the CAP (Knudsen, 2009, p. 77). The commonly

held view is that de Gaulle’s foreign policy in Europe was based on geopolitical factors

which aimed to increase European power in a French led EEC. However, a revisionist

interpretation has arisen over the last fifteen years which challenges the validity of the

accepted view, and proposes a re-evaluation and reinterpretation of existing evidence. The

revisionist interpretation argues that de Gaulle’s European foreign policy was in fact not

guided by geopolitical factors, but rather evolved to prioritise political economic matters.

This view is most obvious in certain domestic and economic factors, primarily the state of

French industrial and agricultural sectors upon de Gaulle’s ascendency to the Presidency in

1958 (Moravcsik, 2012, p. 56). Therefore, to what extent was de Gaulle’s European foreign

policy driven by political economic factors?

Upon becoming president in 1958, de Gaulle faced a challenging domestic situation in

the form of the stability of France’s agricultural sector. The agricultural problem had plagued

the Fourth Republic and would be of concern to de Gaulle also (Evans & Godin, 2004, p.

158). Agriculture was the second most prominent sector employing one-fifth of the total

French population and it could therefore not be ignored by any politician. However, lower

wages were common because farming was not competitive in a number of regions in France,

and when combined with the massive rural exodus which occurred in France, created a great

deal of disgruntlement amongst farmers. This posed a worrying problem for de Gaulle

(Knudsen, 2009, p. 80). The importance of agriculture in the French economy during de

Gaulle’s presidency reduced a significant amount as a result of the high increase in household

expenditure in the tertiary sector compared to a very slow increase in the farming sector, the

result of which led to vast surpluses of arable products and a reduction or limited increase in

the price of agricultural goods. Consequently, where incomes in secondary and tertiary

sectors were increasing dramatically, there was a stagnation in farmers’ incomes which was

worsened by the fact that farmers had accumulated large debts in an attempt to modernise the

farming industry. Therefore, farmers were uneasy as the government was not forthcoming

30

with providing a clear strategy as to how to tackle the agricultural situation (Berstein, 1993,

p. 111).

Thus farmers, a powerful proportion of the French electorate, initiated a succession of

riots at the beginning of the 1960s which brought the agricultural problem to a very public

level. Farmer’s debts had dramatically increased from 20% to 50% of output over ten years

and therefore de Gaulle realised that expensive subsidies given to farmers were no longer a

viable option to the unsteady French economy (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 180). Moreover, French

exports were not competitive on the world market but this was the opposite in Europe where

their products were much more competitive and thus Europe was seen as a perfect market for

the vast French agricultural surpluses. Furthermore, France had half of the total arable land of

the six EEC states and thus de Gaulle looked towards Europe and in particular towards

Germany in order to relieve France of the burden of her surplus agricultural products. If the

agricultural problem was not to be resolved, de Gaulle compared it to “. . . another Algeria on

our own soil” (de Gaulle cited in Moravcsik, 1998, p. 180). The enormous surplus

agricultural products were sold on the international market at a loss and as a result, France’s

balance of payments was severely affected and thus Europe was the only viable option

available to de Gaulle to improve the troubling situation (Troitiño, 2008, p. 146). De Gaulle

was acutely aware of the political significance of farming and therefore he sought new outlets

for French agricultural goods (Milward, 2000, p. 225).

Germany was viewed as the ideal trading partner to absorb surplus French agriculture

products given that it only produced a third of its required domestic produce (Vanke, 2006,

pp. 150-151). Consequently, from 1961 onwards, de Gaulle pursued a ruthless European

policy in order to implement the CAP, the implementation of which would result in a

significant evolution of the EEC. Vital concessions were signed in January 1962 which

ensured that EEC member states would purchase surplus agricultural produce and thus the

beginnings of the CAP were taking shape (Vanke, 2006, pp. 150-151). Moreover, in order to

increase the overall efficiency and concentration of agriculture, over 150,000 small farms

were merged by the government in order to create larger farms, an example of the hand of the

state in improving France’s economic position. Furthermore, over two million hectares of

arable land were created from the land vacated by small farms which in turn created a more

effective and solid agricultural industry as well as allowing France to deal with farms on an

economy of scale instead of on a piecemeal basis (de Gaulle, 1971, pp. 345-346).

However, how did de Gaulle further ensure that the CAP was integrated into the

EEC? Two major examples of the revisionist stance regarding the CAP and EEC are the

31

‘Empty Chair Crisis’ from 1965-1966 and de Gaulle’s twice refusal to admit Great Britain

into the EEC, despite the angry protests from the fellow five EEC states. The ‘Empty Chair

Crisis’ saw de Gaulle remove France’s permanent representative in Brussels and order a

French boycott of meetings regarding new EEC matters in the light of the European

Commission’s proposal to increase QMV in EEC matters of agriculture, foreign trade and

transport; a proposal that would have threatened the implementation of the CAP had it been

successful. Additionally, the attempts by the Commission to push for a reform to the way in

which the CAP was financed, essentially this would involve the Commission funding the

CAP and not individual EEC countries, further explains why de Gaulle ‘withdrew’ France

from meetings in Brussels. He viewed the proposed changes as an attempt to further increase

the supranational nature of the EEC which would have greatly threatened the value of the

CAP to France (Buchanan, 2012, p. 196).

Furthermore, de Gaulle threatened to leave the EEC if his conditions were not met, in

turn threatening the very existence of the Community (Moravcsik, 2000b, pp. 35-36). It is

this point of reference which challenges the belief that de Gaulle’s European policy was

geopolitical in nature and further enhances this research’s aim in demonstrating the evolution

of foreign policy from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. If de Gaulle’s foreign policy were

geopolitically based, one would expect him to follow actions which would increase the

relationships which existed between the EEC states. However, de Gaulle’s persistent threats

to remove France from the EEC defy this logic, and contradict the steps which one would

expect a geopolitically based foreign policy to adhere to. Thus, one can begin to understand

why there has been debate regarding the political economic motives of de Gaulle’s foreign

policy as de Gaulle was willing to gamble the EEC in order to realise the CAP (Moravcsik,

1998, p. 183).

Additionally, the double veto of Britain’s application to join the EEC in 1963 and

1967 is another example supporting the evidence of a political economic foreign policy as

opposed to a geopolitical stance. De Gaulle twice vetoed Britain’s entry into the EEC as he

believed that admitting Britain into the EEC would weaken the vital economic relationship

which existed between Germany which as we have seen, was paramount to France’s pursuit

of grandeur (Jackson, 2003, p. 100). The French vetoes angered fellow EEC members as they

could not understand de Gaulle’s opposition to Britain’s entry and in fact de Gaulle’s refusal

to negotiate regarding Britain’s admission pushed Germany closer to America and increased

her dependence on her Atlantic ally (Ludlow, 2011, p. 77).

32

4.4 Conclusion

De Gaulle accepted supranationalism from the European Commission and even

cooperated with the body in order to implement the CAP and to tackle the animosity of

French farmers (Ludlow, 2011, p. 69). Therefore, de Gaulle’s actions above provide further

evidence to the belief that his European policy was politically economic in nature as he was

willing to renounce a degree of independence to the European Commission so that the CAP

could be enforced. Moreover, de Gaulle dismissed the anger shown by fellow EEC members

which contradicts the geopolitical stance adopted by the majority of historians. It could be

argued that the CAP was France’s ‘price’ for EEC membership. De Gaulle was suspicious of

the supranational foundations of the EEC and therefore demanded the CAP in order to

improve France’s economic position, reduce the domestic pressure from farmers as well as to

balance the industrial potential of West Germany, which posed a real threat to France’s

standing in Europe (de Gaulle, 1971, pp. 185-186). This chapter has demonstrated that the

EEC established by the Fourth Republic enabled de Gaulle to evolve France’s European

policy in order to best defend France’s national interests and therefore, the nation state. The

unyielding position adopted by de Gaulle’s vetoes to British membership to the EEC would

not have been possible under the Fourth Republic and therefore is a case in point of the

evolutionary nature of de Gaulle’s European policy.

33

MAIN CONCLUSION

The aim of this research was to analyse the extent to which de Gaulle’s foreign policy

evolved from the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy. The research question was: De Gaulle’s

Pursuit of Grandeur: A Visionary Example of Foreign Policy or an Elaborate Evolution of

the Foreign Policy Adopted by the Fourth Republic? The overall conclusion that can be made

from this research is that de Gaulle’s foreign policy can best be described as an evolution of

the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy, a conclusion which is most evident in the resolution of

colonial problems as well as ensuring that France became a major European power. This

research has further demonstrated that domestic political stability was a vital component in

the realisation of de Gaulle’s foreign policy.

One of the most significant differences between the Fourth and Fifth Republics was

the composition of the political structures, which had a direct influence upon the

effectiveness of the foreign policy of both Republics. The Fourth Republic’s ability to

effectively pursue a fixed foreign policy was greatly hindered by the political weakness of its

unstable multiparty system and weak executive power (Evans & Godin, 2004, p. 134).

However, the visionary Constitution of de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic established a strong

executive power which greatly enhanced de Gaulle’s ability to pursue a clearly defined

foreign policy which best served France’s national interests as well as de Gaulle’s quest for

grandeur.

However, to simply describe de Gaulle’s foreign policy as ‘visionary’ would be an

extreme oversimplification and inaccurate as this would ignore the fact that the international

context in which the Fifth Republic was established starkly contrasted that of the Fourth

Republic. This research has demonstrated that the Fourth Republic was weak and very much

dependent on American aid after the Second World War and therefore its political influence

as a global power was greatly diminished (Gildea, 2002, p. 9). Conversely, the evolution of

the international context from post-war France to the establishment of the Fifth Republic in

1958 enabled de Gaulle to pursue a much more ambitious foreign policy. The political

importance of the force de frappe evolved into an independent political tool and symbol of

grandeur under the Fifth Republic, whereas it was used as a symbol of NATO military

integration under the foreign policy of the Fourth Republic (Pierre, 1994, p. 280). De

Gaulle’s March 1966 announcement to NATO is therefore best viewed as an expected

evolution of French foreign policy as a direct result of France becoming a nuclear power, as

well as also being able to defend itself. Military integration was therefore no longer as

34

necessary nor in France’s best interests, as it had been under the Fourth Republic. Hence, de

Gaulle’s foreign policy evolved and adapted to best defend French national interests while

also reducing France’s dependency on the USA. Moreover, the force de frappe evolved to

become France’s international symbol of grandeur under de Gaulle and thus replaced the

Fourth Republic’s own sign of prestige: the Empire. Therefore, this emphasises the belief that

de Gaulle’s foreign policy was an evolved version to that of the Fourth Republic.

The peaceful decolonisation of Black Africa and the eventual decolonisation of

Algeria further support the overall conclusion of this research. As Chapter Two

demonstrated, de Gaulle’s African policy is best viewed as an inevitable evolution from the

costly and destructive wars of decolonisation of the Fourth Republic, to a policy of

cooperation under the Fifth Republic. This resulted in increased French involvement and

influence in the African economy and newly independent states, as is demonstrated in the

visionary role played by Jacques Foccart. However, this research would argue that as the

defence of the nation state was vital to de Gaulle’s pursuit of grandeur, increased influence in

Africa was to be expected. De Gaulle’s African foreign policy evolved into one of neo-

colonialism to best serve French national interests and therefore increased French influence

was only a natural additional aspect of the evolutionary process.

With regards to the evolution of European foreign policy from the Fourth to the Fifth

Republic, the talisman of the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy was its visionary European

policy which placed Franco-German cooperation at the heart of a unified EEC. The creation

of the organisation presented de Gaulle with the opportunity to act in France’s best interests

in his pursuit of grandeur from 1958 onwards. De Gaulle envisaged a Europe in which

positive Franco-German relations were to play a fundamental role, as was also the case under

the Fourth Republic. France evolved into a powerful European power under the Fifth

Republic and exerted a great deal of influence over its European allies, as is most evident in

the implementation and ruthless defence of the CAP.

As demonstrated in Chapter Four, French European policy evolved very much from a

geopolitical focus under the Fourth Republic to a definite prioritisation of political economics

under the Fifth Republic. De Gaulle’s unyielding defence of French economic interests is

therefore a case in point of this research’s aim to demonstrate the evolution of foreign policy

from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. The priority of the Fourth Republic’s European policy

was the establishment of a unified Europe in order to prevent the outbreak of another world

war as well as to contain a defeated Germany (Hanhimäki, Schoenborn & Zanchetta, 2012,

pp. 29-30). The realisation of such geopolitical aims thus resulted in a natural evolution of

35

priorities in order to best protect the French nation state. Consequently, French European

policy evolved from one of geopolitics under the Fourth Republic to one of political

economics under de Gaulle as the French agricultural problem posed a direct risk to the

stability of the Fifth Republic and, by default, a direct threat to the nation state itself. By

pursuing the implementation of the CAP as indefatigably as he did, de Gaulle not only

threatened relations with fellow European states, but he also threatened the whole stability of

the EEC. Therefore, this research strongly supports the view that de Gaulle’s European policy

was very much an evolution of the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy as de Gaulle’s pursuit of

the CAP, and the threat that it posed to the stability of the EEC, does not support the view

that de Gaulle’s European policy was based upon geopolitical factors.

Although this research has reached a strong conclusion to the original research

question, it is predicted that the debate regarding the extent to whether de Gaulle’s foreign

policy was visionary or not will continue unabated. The sheer extent of published work

regarding de Gaulle’s foreign policy is extensive and will only continue to increase as

confidential documents become public and a new generation of historians offer their

interpretations. It is important to note that that for future research on de Gaulle’s foreign

policy, and in particular his European policy, the symbolic interpretation of de Gaulle’s

memoirs can be interpreted in a variety of ways and at times inaccurately. Therefore, this

research suggests focusing on more concrete sources where symbolic interpretation is less

prevalent and therefore less prone to misinterpretation in order to fully ascertain the extent to

which de Gaulle’s foreign policy was an evolution of the Fourth Republic’s foreign policy.

Word count: 10987

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Statement

I hereby declare that the text of this Dissertation is substantially my own work.

Signature: Date: