In What Way is Critical Theory Emancipatory?

Aiden Wylie

ID: w025962b

Student no: 11025962

Submitted on 18 January 2014

3093 Words (without cover or references)

Why study International Relations? The opening chapter of

Introduction to International Relations, Fourth Edition1, with the

above question as its title, is perhaps indicative of perhaps an

academic field in search of an identity. Can one, for example,

open a mathematics or history or psychology text book and read the

same? This question is not merely rhetorical. After all, if the

course of international relations is as deterministic as suggested

by some scholars, it is easy to regard the international sphere as

a closed shop, access to which is granted only to an experienced

elite, and in whose hands the future of the international system

has already been decided. In this case, there seems little point

in studying International Relations as an academic field. It

should instead be regarded as a vocation in which little changes.

At risk of pre-empting the contents of this essay, in order to

justify IR as an academic field, as a form of political science,

or as something worth considering on any kind of elevated

platform, one must demonstrate progress. Otherwise International

Relations becomes another branch of history. If international

politics and International Relations presents the possibility of

1 Jackson, R. and Sorensen, G. (2010) Introduction to International Relations: Theories and Approaches, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford pp2-26

change, development, progress or, if so inclined, redistribution

of equality, then there is an inherent emancipation with the

subject. If by studying the international system, its faults and

successes, its processes and structures and its values and driving

forces, we can identify the potential for emancipation and

therefore justify International Relations as an academic field.

This essay, therefore, represents an attempt to link Critical

Theory to emancipation and by doing so, present an argument that

the international system is no fatalist construct. It is the

premise of this essay that there is no contradiction between what

is hypothetical and what is emancipatory. Just because something

is a theory does not mean it cannot have, in and of itself,

emancipatory qualities. By presenting an overview of Critical

Theory in the shadow of predominant IR theories, this essay will

argue that Critical Theory is inherently emancipatory, and

represents an optimistic divergence from the neo-realist tragedy.

That is not to say Critical Theory is the correct solution for all

the world’s ills, but merely to argue that it represents an

emancipatory turn in IR scholarship. With that said, this essay is

not a defence of Critical Theory per se, but rather it is an attempt

to analyse the extent to which Critical Theory represents the

potential for progress, both for scholars and actors within the

international system.

Emancipation is word which has a multitude of interpretations, but

with specific regards to international relations, it is worth

quoting Spiegele at length.

“…The tern refers to any theory, discourse or approach to

international relations which claims that the principal grounds

for studying international relations is not to obtain scientific

knowledge or understanding of international relations, as in

positivist or realist conceptions of the subject respectively, but

rather to transform [emphasis his] the political communities in

which we live; that is, that our interest in international

relations lies in its potential for liberating individuals, groups

and and peoples from structures or conditions which hinder them

from achieving radical freedom, whether that is understood as

freedom from: self-incurred immaturity; division of labour; the

systems world; the states system; patriarchy; platonised [sic]

Christianity; sovereignty; identity; nationalism; or whatever.”2

2 Spegele, R.D (2002), Emancipatory International Relations: Good News, Bad News or NoNews At All?, International Relations 16, 381-401, p383

Notwithstanding the wooly “or whatever”, Spegele aptly

demonstrates the breadth of scope to which the notion of

emancipation refers, and to the goal which Critical Theory (and

critical theories in a wider sense) have set themselves. Critical

Theory, as well see is an attempt to rebalance the focus of

international relations by adapting the field of study to a number

of theoretical underpinnings from other branches of social

science; namely, ontology, epistemology, and ethics . It

represents, as can be seen above, a direct discourse with both

state-centred realism and scientific approaches to international

relations scholarship.

The first step in this refocussing process is, as Linklater

suggests, a move away from the anarchic international system (the

justification and explanation of much realist thought) towards the

internal and the social. For Critical Theorists, emphasis must

necessarily be placed upon the existing forms of hegemonic

dominance and the resulting forms of political action both beneath

and incorporating state level.3 As a general form of emancipation

therefore, actors are no longer bound to the immutable

3 Linklater, A. (2007), Critical Theory, in Griffiths, M. (Ed), InternationalRelations Theory For The Twenty First Century: An Introduction, Routledge, Oxon, p55

international system. Rather, as a result of societal forces

manifest as a counter-hegemonic movement, direct challenge can be

made to the realist perception of the nature of states, in which

“the future will always be like the past.”4 To put it briefly, for

Critical Theorists, the behaviour of states is not dictated by the

immutable nature of the international system, but comes as a

result of sociological interaction of internal agents, which in

turn were the result of changing historical conditions.5

In order to draw a distinction between rhetoric and theory, Cox

identifies the essential tenets of this interaction, and

demonstrates where and how counter-hegemonic movements come to

fruition. By adapting Gramsci’s hegemonic theories and placing

them into the realm of what he identifies as “Civil Society”, Cox

attempts to demonstrate the potential for international

emancipation. For Cox, civil society is distinct from the state

and represents;

4 Cox, R.W. (1981), Societal Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 10, 126-154, p1315 Roach, S.C. (2013), Critical Theory, in Dunne, T. et al (Eds), InternationalRelations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p175

“… A mobilised participant citizenry juxtaposed to dominant

economic and state power…[incorporating] a ‘top-down’ process in

which the dominant economic forces of capitalism form an

intellectual and cultural hegemony which secures acquiescence in

the capitalist order among the bulk of the population… [and]… a

‘bottom-up’ process led by those strata of the population which

are disadvantaged and deprived under the capitalist order who

build a counter-hegemony that aspires to acquire sufficient

acceptance among the population so as to displace the erstwhile

hegemonic order.”6

Two things should be highlighted from this. Firstly, there is a

distinctly subtle use of hegemony which ensures cooperation

without the need for physical coercion (which, of course, is at

the heart of much neo-realist international relations), and

secondly, it is the extent to which this civil society is capable

of revolutionising international policy which proves the merit or

failings of Critical Theory.

6 Cox, R.W (1999), Civil Society At The Turn of the Millennium: Prospects For An Alternative World Order, in Review of International Studies 25, 3-28, pp4-5

With reference to this latter issue, it is necessary to identify

examples of international movements which could be classified as

existing within civil society. As Farrands and Worth state,

failure to do this would mean Critical Theory is “emancipatory in

hope more than substance.” 7 In other words, how does this

transformation take place, and where can it be seen to have

happened?

To answer the first question, we must turn from the international

relations writings towards other forms of social science, and to

answer the latter, we must examine clear and demonstrable examples

of policy transformation and decide, much like classical realism,

the difference between accountability and applicability.

We have already seen how Critical Theory is centred upon change to

ends deemed more equal. If this change is truly emancipatory, it

has to be made without coercion, otherwise all that has happened

is one form of power structure has been replaced with another.

Because Critical Theory is concerned with existing power

structures yet denies the immutability of those structures, it

7 Farrands, C. and Worth, O. (2005), Critical Theory in Global Political Economy: Critique? Knowledge? Emancipation?, Capital and Class, Volume 29, 43-61, p43

falls upon Critical Theorists to demonstrate how radical change is

possible without leading to what Linklater terms “un-necessary

social confinements or constraints”8 This is not to argue, of

course, that there are no constraints, merely that they are

eliminated as much as possible. Critical Theory in that sense,

rejects the early utopianism of international relations.

Emancipation is not tied to a notion of universality, merely it

accepts the existence of some limitations whilst strenuously

rejecting any notion of immutability.9

As previously stated, the International Relations branch of

Critical Theory adopts concepts from other social sciences, whilst

at the same time rejecting the idea that the positivist turn of

international relations was value-free. For Critical Theorists,

there is no such thing as neutral theory, and like much Critical

Theory, this represents both a freedom and a constraint - a theme

which will become important when considering the possibility that

Critical Theory is not as emancipatory as its proponents may

suggest. Cox’s axiom, “all theory is for someone and for some

purpose,” summarises this Critical Theory stance neatly.10

8 Linklater, A. (1996), The Achievments of Critical Theory , International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Smith. S. et al (Eds), 279-298 p2819 Linklater, A. (1996), p28010 Cox, R.W (1981), p128

Critiquing directly the positivist movement in International

Relations, Critical Theory argues that analysis of the world

comes, always, from a certain standpoint which is restricted by

time and place - and always suggestive of a certain bias. One

form of emancipation which Critical Theory offers to scholars is

not the removal of all value judgements, but replacing those

theories which advocate immutability (and thus by extension

supporting dominant structures of power) with transformative

analysis which promotes an emancipatory future. To return to

Cox’s axiom, this is the purpose for which Critical Theory

exists. For Critical Theorists, it is not possible to separate

the subject from object of study, which is the ostensible premise

of positivist advocates with International Relations. Rather, the

analyst must begin by addressing his or her own circumstances, the

imbalances of justice which exist at the time of conducting

analysis, and incorporate those circumstances into any theory

resulting from that analysis. 11

Immanent Critique accordingly holds that all analysis comes from a

certain space and time. International Relations scholars and

policy makers must take into account the existing biases and

11 Devatek, R. (2013), Critical Theory, Theories of International Relations, Third Edition, Burchill et al (Eds), Palmgrave McMillan, New York pp 169-170

injustices in order to construct a theory which does not merely

justify the status quo. To this end, Critical Theory offers

emancipation to scholars as much as it does to recipients of

political policy - the ability to accept one’s own placing within

the constructed world and be free of a false sense of value-

neutrality. Cox describes this dichotomy between two distinct

types of research as a contrast between problem-solving theory and

critical theory. Problem-solving theory, says Cox, serves merely

to maintain power-structure by using pre-existing perimeters as a

framework, while Critical Theory presents the opportunity for a

self-reflexivity, which in turn presents the opportunity to “open

up the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective, from

which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative

world.”12

Knowledge, as may be evident at this stage, is for Critical

Theorists, a contested sphere. Rationality can be both a

controlling structure and a means of emancipation. The

enlightenment was, for Critical Theorists, a misnomer. No

knowledge can be seen as truly objective, yet at the same time, an

awareness of this can allow agents to overcome pre-existing power

structure. One such example of the contest for knowledge comes 12 Cox (1981) p182

from the work of Jürgen Habermas, generally regarded as the

figurehead of the second wave of Frankfurt School philosophy. 13

Habermas focuses on the use of discursive ethics14 in order to

attain rational consensus.15 Rational consensus can be be defined

(in opposition to the assumed rationale of the enlightenment

period) as a truth achieved on the basis of argument leading to

consensus. However, as is self-evident, if this was to hold in

every case, every argument would lead to truth. Habermas

therefore argues that only when what he terms “the ideal speech

situation”16 exists can truth, and by extension emancipation exist.

By examining ideal speech in the context of a conflict between

rationality and emancipation, we can see how the enlightenment

presents both freedom and constraint to the Critical Theorist.

Giddens proceeds to list a number of characteristics of the ideal

speech situation, which when met would enable, ideally, a rational

consensus, or in other words, an agreed validity. These

13 Brown, C.(1994), Turtles All The Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 23, 213-233 p21814 Roach, S.C.(2013) p177-17815 Brown, C. (1994) p21916 Giddens, A. (1990), Jürgen Habermas, The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences, Skinner Q. (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 123-139 pp128-129

characteristics amount to an assessment of how logical reasoning

has come about. For Habermas, claims Giddens, truth is reached

when all available and relevant evidence is considered and nothing

other than logical reasoning is involved in the decision making

process. If both of these are held to exist, and when a full case

is presented, what results is rational consensus. When put into

the international relations sphere, rational consensus leads to,

as Giddens puts it, “warranted conclusion” capable of being spread

across borders.

All of which seems rather wooly. Defenders of Critical Theory are

quick to place emphasis on what is possible, rather than what

currently is. 17 Nonethless, some attempt has at least been made to

give practical examples of international relations being modified

on a Critical Theory basis. For Roach, Critical Theory can be

used to highlight the change in power structure caused by the Arab

Spring18 The uprisings across the Middle East represented a

counter-hegemonic, cross-border movement by the civil societies of

several states, in the face of long-standing, non-democratic

regimes.

17 Cox, R.W (1999) p28,29; Linklater, A (1996) p29518 Blight, G. et al, (2012) The Path of Protest, http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-protest-interactive-timeline, The Guardian, last accessed 18 January 2014

“The collective identity of the Arab people provided a common

framework for the solidarity that the dictators had sought to

suppress. It had, in other words, been turned against these

dictators by the people’s demands for new democratic political

leaders and the rule of law.”19

At this point, it is perhaps worth recalling the self-reflexive

nature of Critical Theory, as Critical Theory can, in fact, be

used as a tool to question itself. One might choose to ask at

this stage, for example, the extent to which emancipation really

has occurred following the Middle East. One might also choose to

question whether the rule of law is in fact compatible with

emancipation or whether, like liberal democracy, it is merely a

substitute form of power structure.

Cox, whilst identifying the restrictions placed upon possible

emancipation identifies a series of developments within civil

societies which, he claims, represent emancipatory, counter-

hegemonic movements, not always with what might be deemed positive

outcomes, it must be said. The “covert world”, a term Cox uses to

describe a multitude of non-governmental agents, has blossomed as 19 Roach, S.C (2013) p181

a result of widespread alienation and shifts of identity away from

existing power structures. Right wing movements in particular can

be seen as an international counter-hegemony. Their actions, which

are often regarded as extreme, have resulted in policy changes,

which in turn, claims Cox, legitimises the existence of these

agents which are generally regarded as illegal. Whether for good

or for ill, Cox argues that;

“The political space between constituted authority and the people

is the terrain on which civil society can be built. A weak and

stunted civil society allows free rein to exclusionary politics

and cover powers. And expansive participant civil society makes

political authority more accountable and reduces the scope for

exclusionary politics and [somewhat contradictorily] covert

activity.”20

This neatly summarises the aims of Critical Theory; not a

revolution (which was the focus of the early Frankfurt School,

from which much Critical Theory draws its inspiration) but a

utilisation of existing structures in order to create new policy

aimed at correcting current injustices.

20 Cox (1999), p15

Unlike the predominant International Relations schools -

liberalism and realism and their neo- offspring - it is not

necessary to critique Critical Theory’s emancipatory elements by

looking to the polar opposite school. Returning to the self-

reflexivity identified earlier in, say, discussions of immanent

critique, we can see how Critical Theory necessarily forms the

basis of its own critique.

Farrands and Worth identify what is a common criticism of Critical

Theory.

“The term has become ambiguous, so much so that it can do violence

to the English Language. ‘Critical’ theory was one of the great

achievements imagined by Kant and developed in Marx’s writing, and

intended by both - in different ways - to be radical. But it has

increasingly become a form of orthodoxy. Alternatively, it may be

a code for a kind of radicalism; but a radicalism that is grounded

in a liberal position, as Beate jahn has argued, indistinguishable

from more or less radical internationalist utopianism. And, when

it retains a radical edge, critical writing often still lacks

coherence about its radical purpose; falling to define the

conditions for ‘emancipation’, it is emancipatory in hope more

than in substance.”

Certainly, as we have seen, there is a utopian element. Where,

for example, can ideal speech be seen to exist? Giddens attempts

to respond to this particular criticism. Habermas rejects notions

of utopianism by accepting the restrictive nature of ideal speech

and uses it not as an idealist construct, but rather as a gauge as

to existing imbalances, and thus a means of critically analysing

any presumed consensus “based either on the sheer weight of

tradition, or on the use of power or domination.”21

The charge of a liberal bias is perhaps a legitimate one, although

one which Critical Theorists may not necessarily dispute. As

Giddens states,

“According to Habermas, the West alone is marked by the pre-

eminence of ‘post-conventional’ cognitive domains. ‘Post-

conventional’ forms of institutional order are those which have

not only freed themselves from the dominance of traditional codes

of conduct, but have become organised according to warranted

21 Giddens, A. (1990) p131

principles…. For Habermas, therefore, there is a real sense in

which West is best.”22

This criticism of Critical Theory - that emancipation is merely a

leftist, Western term - is addressed directly by Cox, who

identifies a number of barriers to the creation of a civil

society, namely competing identity. For Critical Theory to be

truly emancipatory, those viewpoints and stances which are

regarded to be subservient or excluded must somehow be unified.

This, for Cox, is problematic. The role of Trades Unions, he

states, is significantly different in Japan, where they represent

an extension of corporate loyalty, and in the West, where they

represent a bottom-up movement, often competing against

traditional power sources. Likewise, the non-state agents which

Critical Theorists identify as being key actors are often regarded

as the enemy of the people.

In identifying the emancipatory nature of Critical Theory, the

very nature of Critical Theory often proves to be its own undoing.

The self-reflexive nature of knowledge means that writers such as

Cox and philosophers such as Habermas are duty bound to identify

their own failings, or at the very least, highlight potential 22 Giddens, A. (1990) p133

obstacles. Critical Theory - and indeed the plethora of critical

theories - must be viewed as being a necessary dialogue with the

pre-eminent ‘neo-neo’ schools of International Relations. As a

result of their essentially non-conventional nature, critical

theories are at once subject to a greater degree of scrutiny, and

forced to demonstrate theory-as-practice where other schools are

perhaps not, or can rely on a deliberate obfuscation between

causality and applicability. However, as has been shown, key

Critical Theorists have attempted to identify non-realist

emancipation in action in the Middle East. Booth23, by linking

emancipation to security, has raised the notion of Critical

Security theory. Ultimately, if something is emancipatory merely

in hope it is, nonetheless, emancipatory.

23 Booth, K. (1991) Security and Emancipation, Review of International Studies 17 313-326

REFERENCES

Blight, G. et al, (2012) The Path of Protest,

http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2011/mar/22/middle-east-

protest-interactive-timeline, The Guardian, last accessed 18 January 2014

Brown, C.(1994), Turtles All The Way Down: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and

International Relations, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 23, 213-

233

Booth, K. (1991) Security and Emancipation, Review of International Studies 17

313-326

Cox, R.W. (1981), Societal Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations

Theory, in Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 10, 126-154

Cox, R.W (1999), Civil Society At The Turn of the Millennium: Prospects For An Alternative

World Order, in Review of International Studies 25, 3-28,

Devatek, R. (2013), Critical Theory, Theories of International Relations,

Third Edition, Burchill et al (Eds), Palmgrave McMillan, New York

Farrands, C. and Worth, O. (2005), Critical Theory in Global Political Economy:

Critique? Knowledge? Emancipation?, Capital and Class, Volume 29, 43-61

Giddens, A. (1990), Jürgen Habermas, The Return of Grand Theory in the Human

Sciences, Skinner Q. (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 123-139

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and Approaches, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford

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Positivism and Beyond, Smith. S. et al (Eds), 279-298

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Routledge, Oxon,

Roach, S.C. (2013), Critical Theory, in Dunne, T. et al (Eds), International

Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 3rd Edition, Oxford

University Press, Oxford,

Spegele, R.D (2002), Emancipatory International Relations: Good News, Bad News or No

News At All?, International Relations 16, 381-401,