Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233660

Abstract In this paper two hypotheses derived from Social Theory of International Politics and explaining the

failure of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 are operationalized and put to a plausibility probe.

The results are discussed. In the final section Two-Level Game Theory is proposed to integrate Social

Theory and it is discussed how this could increase explanatory power. Existence of outright and

broad support of Iran’s nuclear efforts among the country’s populace is proposed as an explanation

for the empirical puzzle.

Keywords: Iran, P5+1, negotiations, nuclear, plausibility probe

Author David Eickhoff is a graduate student of Political Science at Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg,

Germany. He has worked on theories of civil war onset in relation to Iran

(http://tinyurl.com/c378bmu) and can be contacted under david.eickhoff@pluto.uni-freiburg.de.

Constructivism and the bomb

Social Theory of International Politics and Two-Level Game Theory applied to

the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme

Introduction This paper is based on a group work in the seminar “Cooperation and Compliance Beyond the

Nation-State” (Prof. Dr. Diana Panke, WS 2012-13). The work was presented in class on January 29th,

2013. The title of the presentation was “The NPT, Iran, and the P5+1”.

In this paper I focus on mainly methodological questions and try to shed light on the thought and

reasoning processes that led to our testing the hypotheses. May this serve to justify the group’s

choices. Primarily I put two hypotheses, which I derive from Social Theory of International Politics

(Risse 2000), to a plausibility test. Additionally I speculate on the implications of a second theory,

Putnam (1988)’s Two-Level Game Theory, for our empirical puzzle.

1 Empirical Puzzle Since the revelation of questionable nuclear facilities and equipment in 2002 in Iran and the

country’s subsequent acknowledgement of advanced nuclear power and enrichment activity,

attempts to negotiate a clear and efficient outcome have continuously failed.1

1 For reference see e.g. “Iran signalisiert Bereitschaft zu Gesprächen mit USA.” Süddeutsche Zeitung 3 Feb. 2013 (http://www.sz.de/1.1589941, accessed February 5, 2013).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233660

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1.1 Research question Why have negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1, regarding Iran’s nuclear

program, not been naturally efficient?2

1.2 Dependent variable As follows logically from our research question, our dependent variable shall be negotiation

outcome. We operationalize it as the change in the efficiency of negotiations, i.e. mathematically

spoken we do our plausibility probe with the derivative of the observed “function”3 of negotiation

outcome. This is to account for the processual character of negotiations and to make sure there is

appropriate variation in our dependent variable. We will present codings for both the principal and

its derivative.

1.2.1 Issues with “measuring” a dialogue?

A puzzling implication of dealing with negotiation outcome as dependent variable is the question of

how to measure a dialogue. One might conjecture that it is about length or tone or the medium used,

but these are merely tentative approximations. Content certainly plays a role, too, and so does

location. The challenge, then, is to find those aspects to negotiations that can be measured, or in

other words operationalized.

1.2.2 Mapping the dependent variable

Where an agreement is reached, negotiations between the parties were efficient; therefore we code

Agreement = 1

When one party simply submits a proposal to the other, this does not point to a substantial

commonality of interests, yet purportedly indicates readiness of the party to engage in efficiency-

oriented negotiations. Therefore we coded

Proposal = 0

A resolution by the UN Security Council (UNSC) means there is dissent and hence is negative one,

sanctions that sometimes come along with the resolutions are negative two:

Parameter Value

Agreement 1 Proposal 0 Resolution -1 Sanctions -2 Table 1: Parameter values of the dependent variable

We selected 18 cases that occurred between 2003 and 2011, of which 11 are proposals and 7

resolutions (without or with sanctions imposed):

2 The definition of “naturally efficient” is given by (Moravcsik 277): “How would we know whether negotiations are efficient, since successful decisions tend to look deceptively efficient in retrospect? I seek to show that no participants complained that the outcomes were suboptimal, no subsequent commentators identified significant gains ‘left on the table,’ no major interest of an important government was left unconsidered, and there was considerable redundancy, with a very large number of alternatives, even those that were patently unrealistic, being considered.” 3 The mathematical simile should clearly not be overstrained, yet to be precise we should add that the function of negotiation outcome clearly is a discontinuous function.

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# Date Item Parameter

value observed Change in parameter

value observed

1 01-05-2003 Proposal (Iran) 0 0

2 17-01-2005 Proposal (Iran) 0 0

3 23-03-2005 Proposal (Iran) 0 0

4 29-04-2005 Proposal (Iran) 0 0

5 18-07-2005 Proposal (Iran) 0 0

6 01-08-2005 Proposal (EU3) 0 0

7 01-06-2006 Proposal (P5+1) 0 0

8 31-07-2006 Resolution 1696 -1 -1

9 23-12-2006 Resolution 1737 -2 -1

10 24-03-2007 Resolution 1747 (w/ sanctions) -2 0

11 03-03-2008 Resolution 1803 (w/ sanctions) -2 0

12 20-05-2008 Proposal (Iran) 0 2

13 01-06-2008 Proposal (P5+1) 0 0

14 19-07-2008 Proposal (Iran-None Paper) 0 0

15 27-09-2008 Resolution 1835 (w/ sanctions) -2 -2

16 01-09-2009 Proposal (Iran) 0 2

17 09-06-2010 Resolution 1929 (w/ sanctions) -2 -2

18 09-06-2011 Resolution 1984 (w/ sanctions) -2 0 Table 2: Cases

This gives us the following mapping of our dependent variable:

Figure 1: Dependent variable mapped | 1 = Agreement; 0 = Proposal; -1 = Resolution; -2 = Resolution with sanctions

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2 Theory Specified We propose examining the empirical puzzle (the failure of negotiations over Iran’s non-compliance

with the NPT Safeguards Agreement) in the light of the Social Theory of International Politics as

outlined in Risse (2000).

The theory of argumentative action is based upon Habermasian theory of communicative action

(Habermas). It introduces the “logic of arguing” as the actors’ mapping of action plans, and

establishes argumentative rationality as the mode of interaction between actors. The goal of action is

to “figure out ‘the right thing to do’ in a commonly defined situation” (Risse 2000: 12). Actors’

identities are not set once and for all, but subject to change. Processes of “argumentation,

deliberation, and persuasion” (Risse 2000: 1) occur.

Scope conditions that need to be met in order for the causal mechanism of this theory to unfold are:

the existence (or emergence) of a common “lifeworld”4 (i.e. shared collective interpretations

and definitions of situation)

the ability to empathize

the substantial equality of actors

2.1 Explicate causal mechanism The causal mechanism in this theory is the “power of the better argument” (Risse 2000: 20).5 The

process we would expect to see if negotiations were to be efficient is best described as follows:

Domestically pre-constituted actors convene over a shared definition of a problematic situation. At

this point, accounts of the situation and of how it is to be resolved may diverge considerably. Shared

is only the minimum perception that there is a “problem” and that it needs to be dealt with.

Actors then engage in meaningful interaction, i.e. communication, mapping out their action plans.

Initially they do so on the ground of their own “uncontaminated” positions, later increasingly

including the other party’s action plans and arguments into their own cognitive processes. At this

stage “face-to-face communication increases the likelihood of cooperation drastically” (Risse 13).

Little by little, then, actors stop pointing to their rank when trying to make arguments (Risse 18–19)

and get closer to what Risse calls “a collective definition of the situation and of the underlying

principles and norms guiding the interaction (the ‘rules of the game’)” (Risse 20). Such is “truth-

seeking behaviour.”

2.2 Observable implications Were the afore-mentioned process of arguing to occur, we would be able to observe it through its

major practical implications four of which are outlined below. Arrows indicate whether the expected

correlation with negotiation efficiency is positive (↗) or negative (↘):

1. Processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion (↗)

Actors meet repeatedly over time and modify their positions

2. Substantial inequality (↘)

“actors point to their rank to make an argument” (Risse 2000: 18)

4 “Lifeworld” is a calque from German “Lebenswelt” Habermas . 5 Cf. “der zwanglose Zwang des besseren Arguments” Habermas

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3. Rhetorical behaviour (↘)

Argumentative inconsistencies: “[using] arguments in a strategic mode in order to

justify [one’s] identities and preferences.” (Risse 8)

4. Common “lifeworld” (↗)

Actors give similar accounts of situation

All four are potential independent variables for our plausibility probe. However, for reasons of

operationalizability we focused on numbers 3 and 4 (cf. section 3.2).

2.3 Why Social Theory? We hold that Risse (2000) is able to account for some important features of the nuclear dispute and

the failure of negotiations so far. Compared with neo-realism, for example, Social Theory clearly

turns its focus away from structure to the actors; how they are constituted, and – importantly – how

they change over time. Social Theory traces processes of arguing and therefore processes of identity

change.

It would judge the actors’ behaviour not by looking at consolidated interests and identities, but

rather by tracing identity-formation processes at the micro-level of state interaction, i.e. negotiations

in our case. It asks: Who are those actors? How do they behave vis-à-vis one another?

Risse acknowledges that those “processes of argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion” naturally

occur on both the international and the domestic level. The mere existence of two arenas in which

the same actors must engage in communicative action with essentially different partners already

poses a challenge to Social Theory. What it means for the range of possible reasoned consensus if

those two arenas differ, as they do in nearly any international negotiations and as they do drastically

in our empirical example6, simple Social Theory might not be able to explain.7

For the time being, however, we keep our theory intact and with this and the previous in mind are

ready to formulate our hypotheses.

3 Hypotheses Drawing on our theory we formulate two competing hypotheses:

(HSoc1) If actors adopt strategic rhetorical behaviour, there will be deterioration of

negotiations.

(HSoc2) If actors share a common “lifeworld”, there will be improvement of negotiations.

3.1 Explication of independent variables Of the potential explanatory concepts outlined above we chose

(IVHSoc1) strategic rhetorical behaviour, and

(IVHSoc2) common “lifeworld”.

6 This is a reference to cultural, religious, ideological cleavages that might have a bearing on negotiations. 7 This statement only refers to Risse (2000). Other writings by the same author might have bridged the gap.

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3.2 Operationalization The nature of our independent variables is rather suggestive; it points us to a certain research

methodology when doing our plausibility probe. Since we are looking for speech acts and other

textual evidence (cf. section 4) our method of choice will be document, content, and discourse

analysis.

3.2.1 Criteria for knowing an arguing situation

Drawing on (Risse 18–19) table 3 identifies suitable indicators that point to the presence/absence of

an arguing process.

Concept Indicator Operationalized

Expected correlation with

negotiation efficiency (↗ or ↘)

Rhetorical behaviour

Argumentative inconsistencies

Diachronic comparison of speech acts and other textual evidence: if contradictions are revealed, this points to the presence of rhetorical behaviour

↘

Common “life-world”

Actors give similar accounts of situation

Synchronic comparison of speech acts and other textual evidence: if accounts of situation are alike, this points to the existence of a common “lifeworld”

↗

Table 3: Operationalization of independent variables

4 Case Selection Our units of analysis are individual instances of negotiations (cf. section 1.2.2) including concomitant

events. Concomitant events are speech acts and other textual evidence that directly or indirectly

refer to the case and occur immediately before or after it.8

In our case selection we consider 18 instances of negotiations. More precisely it is 11 proposals and 7

resolutions occurring from 2003 till 2011, i.e. from the signing of the Additional Protocol9 to the

latest UN Security Council resolution (#1984).

5 Data Collection & Coding Our data set is textual in kind. As stated above it consists of documented speech acts and other

textual evidence (e.g. joint statements by the actors). We draw our data from the archives of the

IAEA10 as well as the UNSC11.

8 We find a precedent for this definition of case in (Moravcsik 277): “The predictions concern the process, not the outcome [and] each negotiation involved successful and unsuccessful proposals; each episode can thus be thought of not as a decision, but as a decade in which a series of proposals was considered and some were accepted.” 9 The Additional Protocol is “a legal document complementing comprehensive safeguards agreements [enabling] the IAEA not only to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material but also to provide assurances as to the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State.” (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html, accessed on February 6, 2013) Iran signed the Additional Protocol in December of 2003, yet by means of a parliamentary vote rejected its ratification in November of 2005.

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For testing (HSoc1) we examined the text of individual proposals and looked for self-contradictions.

When we found any we coded “1”, otherwise “0”.

For testing (HSoc2) we examined statements by actors given in close adjacency to the negotiation

round under analysis. When we found shared accounts we coded “1”, otherwise “0”.

6 Data Analysis Before presenting the complete table of our plausibility probe, I will briefly give an example of an

individual case we analysed. This is to illustrate our coding procedure:

6.1 Shared accounts – a negative example Three years after the beginning of our observation period we found that actors were still not in a

common “lifeworld”. On January 22, 2006 (Case #7) the Permanent Mission of Iran to the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a note verbale saying that:

“It is of great concern and disappointment that the more Iran did cooperate and took additional steps, transparency measures, beyond its legal obligations, the more stringent Safeguards were applied, the more outstanding questions were resolved, language of the proposed resolutions by US and EU3 became tougher.” (Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA 5)

This statement clearly points to the absence of shared accounts of the situation, which in turn causes

one actor, Iran, to abandon voluntary suspension of nuclear enrichment activities that had improved

the overall efficiency of the negotiation situation:

“After more than two and a half years of voluntary suspension [...] there is no reason for [the] Iranian government to further deprive its nation from its inalienable right in doing research.” (Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA 7)

More instances of such behaviour can be found in the same time frame:

“Paragraph I of the resolution is in contravention of the generally recognized principle of International Law. In accordance with the principle of international law and also the provisions of 1969 [sic] Vienna Convention, joining, ratification and acceding to the international treaties should be done with clear consent of the states and also [states cannot be] forced to join the international legally binding instruments. Furthermore ratification of a legally binding instrument is a time-consuming process and thus the phrase ‘promptly’ is [an] unacceptable condition in that paragraph.” (Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the IAEA 5)

Both sides continue to justify their positions by referring to standards of behaviour (read:

appropriateness). However, these standards do not coincide. This leads us to believe that the parties

do not share a common lifeworld. And we believe that this is due to some fundamental difference in

underlying policy narratives at work at the domestic level.

In the latter statement we can also observe an instance of the “discourse of independence”

(Moshirzadeh 521) so dear to Iranian politicians. We will come back to this in section 9. What is of

10 Accessible at: http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/iran_timeline10.shtml (accessed February 7, 2013) 11 Accessible at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml (accessed February 7, 2013)

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concern for our coding is that after years of negotiations one party is still pointing to a basic matter

of course such as the procedural characteristics of international law. I take this as evidence that the

logic of arguing has not been at work and consequently code:

(IVHSoc2(#7)) = 0

Had the logic of arguing been at work one would have expected some far more matter-of-fact talk

instead of strategic identity mapping.

6.2 Shared accounts – a positive example A completely different estimation is derived from a look at the following statement from 2003 by the

soon-to-be Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi:

“As far as the Additional Protocol is concerned, I must say that the Protocol has not been properly introduced to our society. The Protocol has not been drawn up only for Iran or Third World countries. This is an international protocol and all the countries that are members of the agency will accede to it sooner or later. […] The international climate is such that everyone will move in this direction in the future. Now, 80 countries have accepted the Additional Protocol and 33 countries have managed to get their parliaments to ratify it. In fact, they are implementing the protocol. [If] a number of key countries accede to the Additional Protocol, then international pressure will increase on the issue and this will definitely lead other countries to accede to it as quickly as possible. Indeed, the American Congress is currently studying the issue…” (Ali Akbar Salehi, later Iranian Forein Minister, quoted in Farhi 40)

The conciliatory tone of this quote caused me to code:

(IVHSoc2(#1)) = 1 .

“Sticking With the Double Z” – A Digression If our empirical puzzle was to be an empirical pizza, selecting cases would translate into cutting the

pizza into slices and picking the ones we like best; data collection would be about taking those slices

from the various trays they are served on, and into our cold analytical hands; data analysis, then,

would equal eating, chewing, swallowing and saying what it tastes like; we don’t need to go into the

ugly details of digestion and, eventually, waste disposal.

From this short glimpse it becomes clear that when engaged in a task like this we need (1) a sound

sense of taste in picking our slices, and a rather precise idea of what the slices will taste like, i.e.

some preceding experience as an eater, and (2) some sophisticated taste buds (again eater

experience is valuable). As an insight from everyday experience we might add that eating in company

is always more fun than eating alone though sometimes it can put you under real pressure when the

setting is such that you feel obliged to promptly give some witty comment on the quality of your

supper.

7 Plausibility Probe Our plausibility probe yields the following results:

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HSoc1 HSoc2

Total correct predictions: 2 1

No. of predictions: 15 11

Percentage correct predictions: 13% 9%

Table 4: Summary plausibility probe results

See Annex 1 for full results.

8 Notes on Explanatory Power The percentage of correct predictions is markedly low for both hypotheses. There seems to be

something wrong either with our theory or the way we operationalized it. I will now discuss these

issues.

8.1 What’s wrong with the theory? The results of our plausibility probe are unsatisfactory. Even where predictions are correct, there is

still no reason why actors were not able to enter a process of arguing. In spite of the theory being

process-oriented the operationalizations we chose do not convey an understanding of where the

obstacles to discourse may lie. Why do actors contradict themselves? Why have Iran’s and the P5+1’s

negotiators not gradually narrowed the gap that divided them back in 2002, the time of the first

allegations?

Can it be that there were other relevant, but unobserved factors? Is the theory’s scope broad enough

to capture those? In our group discussions we did have an intuition as to the nature of those

unobserved, yet relevant factors. I will discuss them in section 9.

8.2 What’s wrong with the data? A major setback of having to rely nearly exclusively on documents as data is that we can only infer

the actors’ intentions. When analysing official documents we are moving about on the surface of

well-orchestrated and several-times revised statements (explicit intentions) and there are few means

of actually catching a glimpse of the actors’ implicit intentions.

This is a major restraint of most constructivist theories and limits the possibilities to put them to test

since the processes of actor and interest constitution are not satisfactorily displayed through official

documents.

8.3 What’s wrong with our coding? Another shortcoming originates not in the theory itself, but in the way we coded. We had enormous

trouble attributing meaningful and consistent values to our independent variables. (IVHSoc1) is “0”

throughout, indicating there are no self-contradictions in the official proposals. But are there really

none? (IVHSoc2) assumes value “1” in two instances, indicating that in two instances there actually was

a common “lifeworld”. But what does that mean? That actors in that particular moment in time were

residing in a common “lifeworld”? And why would that be a dichotomous variable?

Granted, the matter is tricky, but in what follows I would like to make a viable proposal how to

remedy these shortcomings, the idea being to examine the discursive processes by which actors are

constituted domestically and combine the Social Theory of International Politics with Two-Level

Game Theory as outlined by Putnam (1988).

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9 Theory Revisited – Proposals for a Remedy Clearly both (IVHSoc1) and (IVHSoc2) point to the existence/absence of an arguing process. However, we

have to admit that in order to have a truly Rissean (and eventually Habermasian) account of the

empirical puzzle, we shall have to go into deeper detail. Ultimately that would imply looking at

personal interactions between negotiators, compare their statements, and ask them questions (!).

It is probably safe to assume that the “logic of arguing” as conceptualized by Risse (2000) has not

been at work. Social Theory alone struggles to explain this absence. The one question we felt needed

answering during our group work was: What does it mean for the range of possible reasoned

outcomes of negotiations when the actors come to the negotiating table from markedly different

cultural, religious or ideological backgrounds?

Putnam’s Two-Level Game Theory may be able to account for such potential incompatibilities,

because it usefully reminds us that “each national political leader appears at both game boards”

(Putnam 434). Processes of “argumentation, deliberation, and persuasion” are at work in the

domestic arena, too, and actors enter the international arena with identities pre-constituted through

domestic discourse.

The crucial proposition is that the logic in the international arena may at times differ drastically from

domestic logic:

"The unusual complexity of this two-level game is that moves that are rational for a player at one board (such as raising energy prices, conceding territory, or limiting auto imports) may be impolitic for that same player at the other board." (Putnam 434)

9.1 What is special about Iran? Iran has – from a Western viewpoint this is to say the least – a very special domestic discourse arena.

It has been shaped by a host of forces, prominent among which are the 1979 revolution and the

subsequent installation of the institutions of the Islamic Republic. Also there is Shiite Islam with its

influence especially on popular beliefs, and in the political arena there is Third-Worldism.

Moshirzadeh identifies “three main discourses – independence, justice, and resistance – that

constitute the identity of the Islamic Republic” (Moshirzadeh 523); independence from foreign

domination, justice between the peoples and resistance to “the forces of evil” and any attempt by

outside powers to interfere with national matters.12

“Rationalist explanations – Moshirzadeh asserts – cannot provide a fully consistent account of Iran's

nuclear policy.” (Moshirzadeh 521). For our empirical puzzle this means that whenever Iran’s

negotiating behaviour seems irrational (e.g. standing up to the greater powers, resisting sanctions

from the UNSC, etc.) explanations need to be sought at the domestic level. Rationality – from a

constructivist point of view – can be defined as “the expression of the temporary hegemony of a

particular political discourse” (Larsen 1997: 22 quoted in Moshirzadeh 523). Working with this

definition it becomes immediately clear how there can be two simultaneous, competing rationalities

in the two arenas.

Instead of only looking at how actors mutually constitute each other in the international arena, we

therefore also consider the way those same actors are “pre-constituted” domestically. We hold that

12 In fact, the accuse of conspiring with foreign powers is often used to discredit domestic players.

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the socially shared ideas that actors carry with them to the negotiating table may impede an

effective unchaining of the process of arguing.

Nevertheless observing interaction between the actors in the international arena, as we have tried to

do in our plausibility probe, remains fundamental. Putnam himself proposes that “in subsequent

work on the two-level model, the strategic implications of direct communication between Level II

players should be explored” (Putnam 459), which is an exact paraphrase of what Social Theory

actually does. Therefore we are confident that the two theories proposed are indeed compatible.13

9.2 Argumentative self-entrapment Risse (2000) conceptualizes the process of “argumentative self-entrapment”14. He writes:

“[Sometimes] governments do not enter the process of arguing voluntarily but are forced into a dialogue by the pressures of fully mobilized domestic and transnational networks. They might also face economic or political sanctions by the international community. (Risse 32)

Iran does face both economic and political sanctions by the international community. Might it be,

then, that what it lacks is a fully mobilized domestic opposition to nuclear production that would

force the government into a dialogue? Upon pursuing this line of thought we find that the media,

conventionally believed to be the means by which dissenting opinions spread, in Iran do generally

not oppose the government’s decisions in the nuclear question. Newspaper editorials, e.g., are often

found to be supportive of the government’s standing up to the great powers (Farhi 34), depicting it

as a necessity in the struggle against imperialism.

This, of course, can easily be shown to be a tautology because anyone who has the least familiarity

with Iran’s political system knows that newspapers are subject to strict censorship.

However, “even in the very vibrant and open oral culture of Iran, there is almost a total acceptance

that Iran is not pursuing a nuclear weapons program” (Farhi 34). This is totally in keeping with “the

repeatedly stated position of the Iranian government that nuclear weapons are un-Islamic and do not

constitute a part of Iran’s military and strategic doctrine” (Farhi 34).

This observation confirms my above proposition that there is no consistent domestic opposition to

Iran’s nuclear programme (at least not to its peaceful use). The nuclear option within Iran assumes a

different meaning, it is

“discussed either as a deterrent or as a bargaining lever in possible future negotiations [...] as an asset by a few people when dealing with Washington—the only way of forcing the United States to adopt a more cautious approach accompanied with respect.” (Farhi 36)

The discourse pattern cited above has it that

“even decisions made and measures taken by international institutions such as the IAEA or the United Nations Security Council are represented as being against what Iran sees as its independence and interpreted as being the result of pressures imposed

13 For a conceptualization of how different theories can be combined see Annex 2. 14 “Argumentative self-entrapment” in Risse refers specifically to the internalization of HR norms, not to any customary norms of international law. However, as a model of conditioned government behaviour we are confident that it suits our case as well.

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by the same actors that have no respect for Iran’s sovereignty and independence” (Moshirzadeh 532).

9.3 “Domestic rationality” and win-set size “Domestic rationality” inside Iran thus explicated we may look at its implications for the negotiations.

I will do so with special focus on the proposition of “winset”. Putnam writes:

"[T]he lower the cost of 'no-agreement' to constituents, the smaller the winset. (Putnam 442)

If no domestic opposition calls for a halt to uranium enrichment and the domestic constituency will

readily put up with “no agreement”, then it is clear that negotiators are not exposed to the impellent

need of finding an efficient solution.

9.4 Issues with domestic rationality The one central and nearly insurmountable question is: How can we know the demands of the

domestic constituency? Farhi (2010) acknowledges that

“there is a dearth of independent and scientific polling in Iran. The only poll of the Iranian public’s view was conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland in partnership with the Search for Common Ground and the United States Institute of Peace in October-December 2006 and involved about 1,000 respondents in Iran’s 30 provinces.” (Farhi 17)

However poor the data record, results were unambiguous. The poll reported “public support for

Iran’s full fuel cycle nuclear program to be an astounding 91 percent” (Farhi 17). Considering that

every proposal made by the EU3 or P5+1 included putting the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle under some

kind of external supervision15, it is clear how costly accepting such conditions becomes for

negotiators who are encouraged by their constituency to defy the other side. Iran’s win-set is

considerably narrow with this respect and it does not come as a surprise that there has not been an

efficient outcome so far.

10 Conclusions We set out suggesting that strategic rhetorical behaviour by the actors and the absence of a common

“lifeworld” had caused negotiations to be inefficient. Through the rejection of our hypotheses we

understood that our predictions were bound to fail so long as we looked only at Level II interactions.

Therefore we integrated our theory with the core assumption of simultaneous, interconnected two-

level games and found that the absence of a consistent domestic opposition pushing for a halt to

uranium enrichment (for weapon capacity) had increased the government’s power to withstand

international pressure in multilateral negotiations.

By now we have seen that not only has a consistent domestic opposition been absent, but, what is

more, there has even been outright and broad support for Iran’s nuclear efforts. This contributes to

augmenting the Iranian government’s bargaining capital, but it also exposes them to major risks, one

of them being, eventually, foreign military intervention.

15 Some would even call for a complete relocation of fuel fabrication abroad, see e.g. www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc651.pdf.

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11 Annex

11.1 Annex 1 – Plausibility probe results

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11.2 Annex 2 – Combining theories – an excursus In this paragraph we would like to point out how theories can be combined in a meaningful and

methodologically sound way. The examples we chose have no bearing on our empirical analysis, but

will – as we hope – clarify the conceptual implications.

Traditional realism considers states as unitary actors. Liberal theory defies this view: “[It] is wrong to

assume that the executive is unified in its views.” (Putnam 431) This key difference, however, does

not imply that all liberal theory is incompatible with realism; there are some elements that retain

importance, albeit to a different extent, in both realist and liberal theories. Such is the assumption

that actors are rational.

In our empirical puzzle we found that a realist explanation has some plausibility in explaining Iran’s

strategy of ambiguity. With offensive realism, as we will see, it is crystal clear. Defensive realism,

however, needs integrating with Two-Level Game Theory before it can account for Iran’s behaviour

regarding its nuclear policy. The following example illustrates how this is done:

11.2.1 Offensive realism

Offensive realism (Mearsheimer) argues that “the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a

hegemonic position in the international system. States, according to this view, always desire more

power and are willing, if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution of power even if such

an action may jeopardize their own security.” (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 94) Thus, offensive realism

does not need integrating in order to be able to explain Iran’s negotiating strategy. It can – by itself –

account for Iran’s ambiguity: A strategy that clearly earns Iran some negotiating power on the

international level makes perfect sense in this perspective, where power maximization is the

imperative for a state. Imagine Iran let inspectors visit sensitive sites and they wouldn’t find a thing:

how quickly would Iran be off the agenda of international politics?! And there are few things that –

all the more so in a realist perspective – are more humiliating for a leader than to lose their face,

cred, and power vis-à-vis the electorate!

11.2.2 Defensive realism and two-level theory

According to defensive realism (Waltz) states seek to maximize their security:

“Defensive realists such as Waltz argue that states have security as their principal interest and therefore seek only the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival. According to this view, states are profoundly defensive actors and will not seek to gain greater amounts of power if that means jeopardizing their own security.” (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 94)

Thus, defensive realism cannot account for Iran’s behaviour in the international arena because

ambiguity exposes the country to a major security threat. The possibilities for US or Israeli invasion

have been widely discussed within the scholarly community and among politicians. Since power,

according to this view, is only a means to an end, the power gain due to increased concern and

attention by major international players cannot remedy the security loss.

But if we widen our perspective and include the domestic level in our consideration the panorama

changes: It might be true that there is no definitive gain for Iran on the international level, but there

certainly is a domestic reward for the Iranian leadership for standing up to the imperialist bogeys

and the “Great Satan”.

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Thus we must conclude that the Iranian leadership values a domestic power gain higher than one in

the international arena.16 The two levels may even be linked in such a way that lenience in the

international arena causes a power loss for the government domestically. That is why the Iranian

government has to play it tough internationally if they don’t want to pay the domestic bill. Thus we

can see that integrating defensive realist theory with the two-level approach increases the model’s

explanatory power.

16 Admittedly that is some weak line of argument. A true realist would laugh at the sentence and point out that it doesn’t matter how Iranians value their power, just like it doesn’t matter whether an autumn leave fancies staying on the branch or not. Power is power and a state will come to see what power means when it is made to feel what power is.

- 16 -

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