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A Study Guide for Confucianism

Patrick S. O’Donnell (2019)

This is one of a handful of guides that was used to introduce students to what are sometimes

called “world religions” in a course I taught for over fifteen years at Santa Barbara City College.

Thus this and companion guides were not intended, at least in the first instance, for adherents

to these respective worldviews. The title of the class: “comparative world religions,” but more

aptly described as “introduction to religious worldviews of Eastern and Western provenance,”

if only because any substantive “comparative” examination assumes or presumes a prior

acquaintance with, and thus some knowledge of, the religious worldviews being compared, and

in our case the vast majority of students had no knowledge of same, indeed, they often had very

little understanding of even the religious worldviews in which they were raised or with which

they avowedly identified. These guides were used in conjunction with the late Huston Smith’s

widely adopted text, The World’s Religions (1958). They proved to be of rather limited value, a

pedagogical disappointment or even failure, if you will, as preciously few students read them.

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dao (tao): ‘way,’ in the sense of path or road. Zhang Dainian writes ‘The concept dao is perhaps

the most important concept in Chinese philosophy.’ In the Book of Documents one finds mention

of dao with regard to cutting a channel so as to prevent a river from overflowing its banks. Dao

occurs some eighty times in the Analects. Other meanings: to explain, to tell, method, art,

teachings, doctrines (hence, ‘a way to do something’ or ‘the right way to do something’). Ames

and Rosemont state that for Confucius, dao is primarily rendao: ‘a way of becoming

consummately and authoritatively human.’ In Confucianism, one is concerned with properly

ascertaining the way of life of one’s cultural predecessors (Confucius claimed he ‘did not forge

new paths’). Coming to understand this dao allows one to properly perform li (one might say

dao, like ren, is manifest in li) in one’s own life and thereby continue transmission of what is

vital within tradition. This might be gleaned from Analects 15.29: ‘It is the person who is able to

broaden the way (dao), not the way (dao) that broadens the person.’ Confucius was reticent

about the dao of tian, the truth of which he assumes and, accordingly, is largely in the

background of the Analects. As noted above, therefore, Confucius focused on the human way, in

contrast, to the Daoists. Yet the Confucian dao is not without metaphysical significance, as in 4.8:

‘If at dawn you learn of and tread the way (dao), you can face death at dusk.’

de (te): virtue, power, integrity, moral/spiritual charisma, excellence. Originates with tian, and is

evidenced in the non-coercive or nonviolent power or effects one has on others as a

consequence or by-product of one’s virtues, of one’s personal ethical excellence and

exemplification (this appears similar to what James MacGregor Burns termed ‘transformative

leadership’). In short, de is virtuous conduct, with the implication that such conduct can have a

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magical-like effect (inspirational, motivational, and so forth) on others. This can be seen in 4.24:

‘Excellent persons (de) do not dwell alone; they are sure to have neighbors.’ Cf. 2.1: ‘Governing

with excellence (de) can be compared to the North Star: the North Star dwells in its place, and

the multitude of stars pay it tribute.’ And 2.3: ‘Lead the people with administrative injunctions

and keep them orderly with penal law, and they will avoid punishments but be without a sense

of shame. Lead them with excellence (de) and keep them orderly through ritual propriety (li)

and they will develop a sense of shame, and moreover, will order themselves.’ In 12.19 we learn

that the ‘excellence (de) of the exemplary person (junzi) is the wind, while that of the petty

person is the grass. As the wind blows, the grass is sure to bend.’ One bends to the will of or

defers to the (informally) authoritative power of de. From contemporary Anglo-American

analytic philosophy, the late Robert Nozick provides us with a compelling and evocative

description of the power of de in his book, Philosophical Explanations (1981):

It is not implausible to think we are elevated by others who are more

developed than ourselves in their striving for harmonious hierarchical

development and for a valuable life. We are aided and encouraged along

our own path of development by their striving for self-development [in

Confucian terms, ‘self-cultivation’] and purer feeling; contrast the effects

on us of encountering those with a sour mixture of one-upmanship, self-

aggrandizement, desire to dominate or destroy, and other festering emotions,

the effects of wending our way and bending our attention to their motivations

and trajectories. [….] We all know people, I hope, who bring out the best in

us, people in whose presence we would be embarrassed to speak or act from

unworthy motives, people who glow. In their presence we feel elevated. We

are pushed, or nudged further along a path of development and perfection;

rather, we are inspired to move ourselves along, in the direction shown. [….]

We want to find a way of living whereby our best energies and talents are

poured out so as to speak to and improve the best energies and talents of

others. We want to utilize our highest parts and energies in a way that helps

others to flourish. (Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University

Press, 1981)

junzi (chün tzu): gentleman; noble person; exemplary person; virtuous individual. Prior to

Confucius, junzi meant ‘son of a lord,’ denoting aristocratic rank, the male child of a noble

family (and thus important ‘blood’ ties). Confucius provides us with a transvaluation in

meaning: from nobility of blood to nobility of character. The Confucian gentleman is trained

(self-disciplined and acculturated) in ritual practice (li), study (xue), and the arts (wen). His

proper performance of li exhibits ren (jen) and relies on the power of de (te). The junzi is more

than a shi yet less than a Sage (shengren), the latter providing the model of emulation for the

junzi. Cf. 4.16: ‘Exemplary persons (junzi) understand what is morally appropriate; petty

persons understand what is of personal advantage.’ In the words of Hall and Ames, the junzi

‘serves as the primary agent of sociopolitical ordering. He performs this function by virtue of

his role as a model of [self] cultivation.’ Self-cultivation for the junzi entails bringing into

harmonious proportion that which is innate (‘nature’) and that which is acquired (‘nurture’), as

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well as affecting a harmony between his inner state and outer behavior. As regards the former,

Slingerland says ‘the goal in ritual performance was to achieve the proper balance between zhi

(‘native substance,’ that is, raw emotions and feelings) [what Ames and Rosemont term ‘basic

disposition’] and wen (‘acquired refinement’)’ (cf. 6.18). The junzi’s performance of li is both

creative and spontaneous, evoking the proper participation in li by others and inspiring their

cultivation or accumulation of ren. The intrapersonal order attained through training of the

junzi’s body and disciplining of the heart-mind (xin) is a necessary condition of interpersonal

order in the expanding circles of human conduct: from the intimate realm of the family, through

the small group and community, to larger and more complex forms of social and political

organization. It is the human heartedness or goodness of the junzi that gives life or meaning to li

that allows us to see the sacred or holy in everyday gestures and acts, in particular conventions

and social norms, in etiquette and rites of passage. It is the merit and virtues of the junzi that

authorize critical reflection on li, that authorize the possible alteration of li, that permit the

spontaneous and creative articulation and performance of li specific to the exigencies of a

particular time and place. The junzi (and even more, the Sage) knows what to do and how to do

it, in other words, he is at ease in any situation, without self-consciously deliberating how to act.

In the words of Herbert Fingarette, ‘The dao is present in the junzi’s will,’ for the ‘junzi’s will

imposes nothing, but it manifests or actualizes the dao.’

li: ritual, rites, etiquette, customs, conventions, social norms, propriety. An early instance of li is

in reference to a bronze cauldron used in sacred ceremonies. Later it refers to holy rituals, such

as sacrifices to the ancestors or divination practices. Confucius widens and deepens the meaning

of li to apply to social norms, conventions, etiquette, rituals, gestures, in short, to the myriad

forms of scripted or patterned behavior performed on a routine basis in daily life that are

ultimately sanctioned by tian and reflect the proper ways (daos) of living exemplified by one’s

cultural ancestors. In the word of Ames and Rosemont, ‘Li are those meaning invested roles,

relationships, and institutions which facilitate communication, and which foster a sense of

community [and thus common good]. The compass is broad: all formal conduct, from table

manners to patterns of greeting and leave-taking…from gestures of deference to ancestral

sacrifices, all of these, and more, are li.’ An animating assumption here is that social behavior

should be choreographed according to divine or sacred archetypes (e.g., tian) or models as

practiced by the Sages of the past and exemplified by the junzi. Generally speaking, li is the

proper or right way to do things, given a proper consideration of tradition, by the right kind of

person. Everyday social interaction can be suffused with a holiness or sacredness that comes

with the actualization of dao provided it is correctly—harmoniously and spontaneously—

performed by individuals possessed of ren. This results in human behavior being in accord with

the rhythms and patterns of tian, with its sacred cosmological and natural processes (or daos). Li

performed by individuals lacking in the requisite amount of ren is akin to mindless habit, it is

lifeless, mechanical, meaningless, awkward, self-conscious or egocentric and profane. Li

without, say, ren and dao, accounts for the fetters or shackles of tradition, of the veneration of

tradition for tradition’s sake, of the uncritical appropriation of and thus irrational deference to

tradition. More specifically, processes of reification or ossification will infiltrate li performed by

individuals not sincerely committed to self-cultivation, hindering the truly personal and

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creative appropriation of tradition. Li amounts to a social grammar learned through (1)

socialization and acculturation (beginning with the family), (2) the emulation of the right kind

of persons (e.g., the junzi and the Sage), and (3) and the informal and formal appropriation of

the material found in the ‘Five Classics’ (Odes, Documents, Rites, Changes, and Spring and Autumn

Annals). The junzi critically and creatively appropriates the li of tradition assessed in the light of

ren, a process that entails making the tradition one’s own. Because of the integral relation

between li and ren, it seems one might speak here of the moralization of human behavior with

Confucius, in other words, the scope of ‘the ethical’ is not confined to infrequent or special

situations or acts but refers in some sense to the entirety of one’s conduct, insofar as all of one’s

behavior is capable, in degree, of influencing, shaping, or contributing to an ethical disposition,

to ethical character. Ames and Rosemont well appreciate the uniqueness of this view: ‘For

Westerners, there is ostensibly a distinction to be made between being boorish and being

immoral. For Confucius, however, there are simply varying degrees of inappropriate,

demeaning, and hurtful behavior along a continuum on which a failure in personal

responsiveness is not just bad manners, but fully a lapse in moral responsibility.’ The writer and

philosopher Iris Murdoch perhaps comes closest to the Confucian perspective on the scope of

ethics. Murdoch believed that all our states of consciousness and action presuppose cognitive

and affective discrimination and that any such discrimination is subject to moral appraisal, as

evidenced here in a passage from her book, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (1992):

The moral life is not intermittent or specialised, it is not a peculiar

separate area of our existence. [….] Life is made up of details. We

compartmentalise it for reasons of convenience, dividing the aesthetic

from the moral, the public from the private, work from pleasure. [….]

Yet we are all always deploying and directing our energy, refining or

blunting it, purifying or corrupting it, and it is always easier to do a

thing a second time. ‘Sensibility’ is a word which may be in place here.

Aesthetic insight connects with moral insight, respect for things

connects with respect for persons. (Education.) Happenings in the

consciousness so vague as to be almost non-existent can have moral

‘colour.’ All sorts of momentary sensibilities to other people, too

shadowy to come under the heading of manners of communication,

are still parts of moral activity. (‘But are you saying that every single

second has a moral tag?’ Yes, roughly.) [….] [M]uch of our self-

awareness is other-awareness, and in this area we exercise ourselves

as moral beings in our use of many various skills as we direct our

modes of attention.

Li thus has everything to do with what Murdoch refers to here as the proper directing of our modes

of attention. Finally, Michael Nylan well explains the egalitarian quality in the Confucian

conception of li as enshrined in the three Rites canons:

they promote a kind of egalitarianism in three senses: they assume

that everyone can be perfected; they stipulate that a code of manners,

aristocratic in origin, be learned by and applied to all humans; they

advocate the assignment of social rank according to virtue and merit,

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defining both in terms of relative contributions to the larger society;

and they aim to school each person, through theory and praxis, in the

very social skills that facilitate effective interaction. Accordingly, it

should come as no surprise that non-elites in early, medieval, and late

imperial China were at times more eager than social and political elites

to embrace the precepts set forth in the Rites canons.

ren (jen): benevolence; humaneness; goodness; perfect virtue; authoritative conduct; love. (This

is a difficult term to translate precisely into English.) Ren is the sum of uniquely human ethical

virtues, an all-encompassing ethical if not spiritual ideal, crystallized in the practice of

benevolence and compassion. Karyn Lai writes that ren, ‘in its general form…is manifest as a

concern for the human condition; in its more specific instances, it is manifest as a concern for

specific others.’ Ames and Rosemont define ren as ‘one’s cultivated cognitive, aesthetic, moral,

and religious sensibilities as they are expressed in one have ritualized roles and relationships.’

Ren is even expressed, in part, in ‘one’s posture, and comportment, gestures and bodily

communication.’ Ren is the result of self-cultivation, an educational process that commences

within the family and continues throughout one’s lifetime, for it is, in the words of Hall and

Ames, ‘a process term that has no specific terminus ad quem [endpoint].’ Similarly, Kim-chong

Chong notes that ren, ‘like autonomy, is…an achievement concept.’ The exemplary or

authoritative person (junzi) is continually self-surpassing, on a perfectibilist moral and spiritual

path that ends with the Sage, the ideal spiritual figure of the Golden Age that serves as a

lodestar for self-cultivation in the Confucian tradition. Ren, like the Platonic Good, cannot be

definitively expressed in propositional language, for it is as much about ‘knowing how’ as

‘knowing that’ (a distinction that goes back to the philosopher Gilbert Ryle; these two modes of

knowing are not mutually exclusive), and thus one reason we know about the presence of ren

through li, the latter embodying this ‘knowing how.’ Slingerland, however, accounts for the

Confucian reluctance to define ren—hence its ‘indeterminate character’ and ‘apparent

vagueness’—to ‘the problematic nature of judgments of character.’ Again, Platonic thought

might help us here: Socratic dialectic and dialogue demonstrated that the virtues are not wholly

captured in the names, propositions and images by which we learn to know them, however

much such knowledge is integral to coming to know their true nature, a knowledge that, in the

end, takes the form of nonpropositional (some might say ‘intuitive’) insight. Replace ‘the good’

with ‘ren’ in the following from the Platonic scholar, Francisco Gonzalez, and you can better

appreciate this argument: ‘Propositions are well suited to expressing knowledge of objects or

facts; they can no more express knowledge of the good, however, than they can express

knowledge-how or self-knowledge, both of which are involved in knowing the good.’ Insofar as

li is the codified, external expression of ren (David Hinton), li and ren are similar to Socratic

dialogue and dialectic as discussed by Gonzalez in Dialectic and Dialogue: Plato’s Practice of

Philosophical Inquiry (1998) (perhaps why the scenes of Confucius and his students depicted in

the Analects are reminiscent of Socrates and his interlocutors in the agora):

[T]he use that characterizes dialectic itself instantiates what it brings us

to understand, so that this understanding is always self-understanding (in

the sense of ‘knowledge of knowledge’). This is why this use presupposes

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an affinity between the subject and the object. One must have and thus be acquainted

with virtue and the good, even though only implicitly and confusedly, in order to

inquire into them. As a user’s knowledge, knowledge

of virtue and the good is acquired and exhibited in the very practice of inquiry, rather

than in any propositional results abstracted from that practice.

Confucius is often asked in the Analects what he means by the word ren, and he nowhere

provides a satisfactory definition or propositional formulation that fully articulates the essence,

truth or meaning of ren, however much his examples and references point to some aspects,

features or qualities of ren. It is natural for his students to ask such questions, and the collective

process of inquiry serves to instantiate and exhibit ren! As Ames and Rosemont state, ‘like a

work of art, it is a process of disclosure rather than closure, resisting fixed definition and

replication.’ The Analects suggests, to borrow from Nozick, that ‘we are to care about, accept,

support, affirm, encourage, protect, guard, praise, seek, embrace, serve, be drawn toward, be

attracted by, aspire toward, strive to realize, foster, express, nurture, delight in, respect, be

inspired by, take joy in, resonate with, be loyal to, be dedicated to, and celebrate’ the values and

virtues that make up ren. Cf. 4.1: ‘In taking up one’s residence, it is the presence of ren

(authoritative persons) that is the greatest attraction. How can anyone are called wise who, in

having the choice, does not seek to dwell among ren (authoritative persons).’ Chong explains

that ren is approached in ‘the language of integrity, self-worth, courage, and right,’ in stark

contrast with an egoistic focus on ‘material things, profit, wealth, rank, and the opinions of

others.’ In processes of enculturation and socialization it is fair to say, with Kwong-loi Shun,

that the ‘ideal of ren is shaped by actually existing li practices in that it is not intelligible and

cannot be shown to have a validity independent of them. However, it is not totally determined

by li because advocacy of the ideal allows room for departing from or revising an existing rule

of li.’ Enculturation and socialization are what shape innate dispositions and tendencies or, put

differently, are what awaken our awareness of and attraction toward ren (Confucius did not

articulate a theory of human nature as such, although his understanding of same seems, by

default, open-ended). In this sense, li might metaphorically be seen as deposits of jen, as

concretized jen, which, in turn, serve to facilitate an attraction toward the value of jen. Yet jen

transcends li as Shun makes clear, inasmuch as it is the former that allows for critique and

modification of the latter. This transcendent quality of jen with respect to li is well explained by

Slingerland:

Although the training through which virtues are acquired proceeds

according to a general set of rules or principles, the actual decisions

made by a person with fully virtuous dispositions are both more

flexible and more authoritative than the rules themselves. Thus,

once a practice has been mastered, in the sense that the requisite

virtues have been developed, this mastery brings with it a certain

independence from the rules that constitute the practice: the master

is able to reflect upon the rules and may even chose to transgress or

revise them if, in her best judgment, this is what is required to realize the

good or goods specific to that practice. Practice mastery thus brings with

it a type of transcendence: the freedom to evaluate, criticize and seek to

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reform the practice tradition itself.

We all have some implicit awareness of the good or ren as a consequence of our enculturation

and socialization through li practices, and further Confucian self-cultivation draws us closer to

ren as the essence of our humanity. If ren is ultimately rooted in the dao of tian, and we owe our

existence to such cosmological forces and powers, it might even be argued, Socratic-like, that

individuals possess an innate knowledge of ren, however dim, and that Confucian self-

cultivation and education serves to bring such knowledge into ever-greater awareness and

fruition, hence we are not ‘taught’ ren (like a liquid being poured into an empty vessel) in the

conventional sense. This is certainly in keeping with Mencius’ later assertion that human nature

is intrinsically or innately good, accounting for how one can come to recognize and appreciate

the good through psychological and moral developmental processes. It is traditionally stated

that there are two indispensable parts to jen: shu (‘reciprocity,’ or the negative formulation of the

Golden Rule: ‘do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire’) and zhong (‘loyalty’).

These concepts seem applicable to the various hierarchical roles one is involved in daily life (the

argument of David S. Nivison), with the considerations of shu applicable to one in a ‘superior’

position or rank, and zhong applicable to one in a ‘subordinate’ position or rank. Of course one

is typically involved in roles of both types, for example, the (superior) relation of the father to

the son in the family, while the father at his place of employment may have a manager or boss,

in which case he is now in a subordinate relation. Empathy appears therefore to be fundamental

to both shu and zhong (and of course both can be no less appropriate to roughly equal relations

as well).

ru: prior to Confucius refers, first, to dancers and musicians in religious ceremonies or holy

rituals and later those who themselves were masters of religious rituals and ceremonies.

Because of the links between such ceremonies or ritual performance and the topical matter in

the ‘Six Classics’ (i.e., the Book of Poetry, the Book of History, the Book of Rites, the Book of Music,

the Book of Changes, and the Spring and Autumn Annals—the Book of Music was eventually lost, so

the Six Classics became the Five Classics), the ru were often teachers, both in official capacity

and as private tutors. Ruists were also well-versed in the arts or culture (wen): li, music, archery,

charioteering (or carriage driving), mathematics, and calligraphy, for example. By the Warring

States period, Confucius was widely acknowledged, when not esteemed, as the leading

exemplar of the ru tradition. Later, the ‘Way of Confucius’ and the ru tradition became one,

such that every ru was by definition a Confucian and vice versa.

shengren (or simply sheng): Sage; in the moral and spiritual hierarchy of ideal figures the Sage is

closest to, if not the embodiment of, perfection. The Sage acts in full harmony with the patterns

and processes of nature and tian. In other words, the way (dao) of the Sage is one with both the

dao(s) of the natural world and the dao of heaven. Traditional Chinese history upholds the

model of pre-dynastic and other ‘sage kings’ like Yao, Shun, Wen, and the Duke of Chou who

ruled with the Mandate of Heaven (tian ming) and thus in their personal and political behavior

displayed an awareness of the harmony, beauty and sublimity intrinsic to natural processes.

Nivison has argued that the notion that these were ‘sage kings’ was relatively late in

articulation, a position that accords with the fact that the pertinent chapters in the Analects are

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likely later interpolations in comparison to books 3-7 and 9, what Van Norden calls the ‘core

books’ of the Analects. In 7.34 Confucius says that he cannot be considered a shengren, and in

7.26 he laments, ‘I have no hopes of meeting a sage. I would be content if I would meet someone

who is a junzi.’ The junzi holds ‘the words of the sage’—along with the Mandate of Heaven and

great men—‘in awe’ (16.8). The Sage is the one person who ‘can listen to music and discern in it

the original details and quality of an age and its culture’ (Hall and Ames). Ignoring the words of

their Master, the Confucian tradition soon designated Confucius a Sage, indeed, it viewed him

as the archetypal Sage. Hall and Ames further fill out the portrait of the Sage as ‘the rare person

[who] elevates the human experience to profound aesthetic and religious refinement, making

the human being a worthy partner with the heavens and the earth.’ Moreover, and in keeping

with the metaphorical imagery of dao, ‘the shengren have traveled, appropriated and enlarged a

longer stretch of the road than the shi and junzi, and they are providing signposts and bearings

for the latter as well.’

shi: soldier, scribe, bookkeeper, minor administrator, government official, lower level

functionary of a lord, retainer, servant, scholar-apprentice. This ‘relatively new class of men’

was ‘drawn from downwardly mobile, dispossessed nobility, and upwardly mobile, ambitious

peasantry.’ From within their ranks emerged idealists of various sorts who contributed to the

emergence and consolidation of the ‘hundred schools’ (the Confucians, Legalists, Taoists,

Mohists, The Disputers [Mingjia; later known as the ‘School of Names’]). In the Analects, the shi

is found endeavoring to emulate or become a junzi. Michael LaFargue proffers two propositions

as fundamental to the shi idealist: first, that ‘good social organization depends on the ruler

gaining the voluntary respect and cooperation of the people,’ and, secondly, that ‘the good ruler

sets the tone for his society:’

He does this by his personal good qualities and [moral and spiritual]

charisma [de], and by showing genuine care, concern and competence

in looking out for their needs. [….] The manner in which he conducts

himself both privately and publicly establishes a certain atmosphere that

subtly but powerfully influences the way people conduct themselves. It

is primarily this tone that the ruler sets, rather than laws, teachings or

beliefs authorities teach to people, that is expected to produce a good

peasant citizenry and an orderly society. The shi idealists reflected in the

Mencius and the Tao Te Ching regard themselves as the chief tone setters

of society. The new ‘foundation’ [for the crumbling sociopolitical order]

inserts itself into public life primarily in their own person then. In

whatever office they hold, they strive to set the proper tone for the social

group in their charge, and in this they serve as exemplars for the rulers

whom they serve. And when the rulers ask for their advice about

particular political problems, hey advise them to address these problems

in a way that will also set the tone for the larger society.

tian (tian): very roughly (and perhaps misleadingly), ‘heaven.’ With Ames and Rosemont, I

think this term is best left untranslated, as there is no remotely satisfactory equivalent term in

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English. Unlike heaven in the Abrahamic religions, Tian is best understood as both transcendent

and immanent, for the natural world is part of heaven, although the fact that this term replaced,

in some functional sense, Shang Di, suggests, in addition, that it has a supernatural role. In fact,

some of the anthropomorphic qualities associated with the ‘Lord on High’ carried over into tian

(e.g., in the Documents, tian ‘hears and sees,’ and we can speak of the ‘will [ming] of tian’), but

the latter notion is considerably less anthropomorphic than the former. I am also in agreement

with Robert Louden’s position (contrary to the view of Fingarette and others) that the passages

in the Analects in which tian occurs ‘form a consistent whole, one from which we can reliably

infer both that Confucius was a strong religious believer in a nonconventional sense, and that

his moral orientation was itself dependent on his religious outlook.’ Cf. 7.23, in which Confucius

is informed that the Minister of War in Sung was attempting to kill him: ‘Tian is the author of

virtue [de] that is in me. What can Huan Tui do to me?’ Or consider Confucius’ remark in 9.5,

where we learn that, like Socrates, Confucius believed he was on a divine mission: ‘With King

Wen dead, is not culture [wen] invested here in me? If Tian intends culture to be destroyed,

those who come after me will not be able to have any part of it. If Tian does not intend this

culture to be destroyed, then what can the people of Kuang do to me?’ The next passage in the

Analects finds Confucius’ student Zigong claiming that ‘Tian definitely set him [Confucius] on

the path to sagehood.’ Confucius clearly believed the aspiring junzi should ‘model himself on,

and seek moral guidance from, Tian’ (Louden). As Tian is not personal deity of any sort, it

cannot speak to us in any way but a metaphorical sense, yet the wise (i.e., those with zhi,

‘wisdom’) can discern meaning in the fact that ‘the four seasons turn and the myriad things are

born and grow within it’ (17.19). Louden’s interpretation of this passage suggests Confucius, in

this instance at any rate, was not far from the worldview of the Daoists: ‘he is implying that

through the harmony, beauty, and sublimity of its natural processes Tian communicates a great

deal about how human beings ought to live and act, at least to those who have learned to listen

carefully to it.’ Confucius was, comparatively speaking, reticent about things supernatural or

metaphysical. It seems there are myriad reasons to account for such reticence (reasons not

dissimilar from those we find among spiritual teachers preferring the oral to the written word,

or the reason Plato gives us in the Seventh Letter: ‘this subject matter cannot at all be expressed

in words as other studies can’) without thereby implausibly turning Confucius into some sort of

humanist. On the other hand, one might plausibly infer from such reticence that Confucius did

not countenance metaphysical speculation of any sort and, furthermore, if metaphysical talk

distracted in any way from the urgent and practical matters at hand (how to live and act here

and now in a very human world) it was to be avoided.

wen: originally, line or pattern; to inscribe, to embellish; the arts or culture; generally speaking,

wen makes reference to the patterned regularity or symmetry, harmony and beauty found in 1.

(the dao of) tian (Heaven), 2. (the dao of) the natural world, and 3. (the dao of) a properly humane

culture. With regard to tian and the natural world one might say that wen is evidenced in the

physical laws (or normative regularities) of nature (cf. Anthony Zee’s Fearful Symmetry: The

Search for Beauty in Modern Physics, 1999), or the mathematical and aesthetic elegance of the

Golden Ratio—Phi—throughout human history (see Mario Livio’s The Golden Ratio, 2002). For

Confucius, wen entailed, with regard to humane culture, the ‘six arts,’ namely, rites, music,

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archery, charioteering, mathematics and calligraphy. Of course given Confucius’ commitment

to the Five Classics, we can assume poetry and dance were likewise essential. In 7.6 Confucius

says, ‘Set your sights on the way (dao), sustain yourself with virtue (de), lean upon benevolence

(ren), and sojourn in the arts (wen).’ Confucius’ position on the role of tradition in an

appreciation of the arts is gleaned from 3.14: ‘The Chou [Zhou] dynasty looked back to the Hsia

[Xia] and the Shang dynasties. Such a wealth of culture! I follow the Chou [Zhou].’ In the Book of

Rites (one of the Five Classics) we are reminded that ‘the perfection of virtue is primary, and the

perfection of art follows afterward.’ Put differently, the arts are enlisted in the Confucian project

of moral and spiritual self-cultivation (perfectibilist growth and education). They serve to

integrally and holistically discipline or train the body and heart-mind (xin) of the would-be

junzi. As Edward Slingerland reminds us, ‘music was considered by the early Confucians to be

one of the most powerful tools for shaping the emotions, and the metaphor of musical

perfection also served for Confucius as a metaphor for the perfected state.’ Xunzi understood

wen as essential to harnessing or disciplining the ‘natural and irrepressible’ emotions that ‘burst

forth in words, poems, songs, and dances’ (Goldin):

There is a danger, however, that this effusion of passion may

overstep its proper bounds by violating the principles of the Way,

and what began as a natural human tendency may metamorphose

into a source of chaos. But the Sage Kings took steps to address

just that problem: they established rituals of artistic expression,

ensuring that poems and song conform to the Way. For when

the people of a state sing and hear proper music, they are influenced

by its power to bring themselves in line with the Way as well. (Goldin)

Confucius and his followers were well-known for reciting the three hundred odes, playing them

on strings while singing and dancing. His devotion to the Odes exemplifies his understanding of

wen. The Odes had variegated epistemic, political, ethical, aesthetic, psychological, and cultural

functions in ancient China, only some of which we’ll mention here (see the excellent treatment

in Nylan’s The Five ‘Confucian’ Classics, 2001). Not surprisingly, ‘all traditions portray the Odes’

vital importance as a cultural repository of eminent utility and as a teaching tool for the social

graces’ (Nylan). The Odes could arouse the emotions of others, allow for the acute perception of

others’ feelings, enhance a fraternal sense of community, ‘diplomatically’ express grievances or

critiques so as not to offend or humiliate their targets, serve as a display of character and

erudition. Formally or stylistically speaking,

the inherent ambiguity and the multivalence of the odes allowed

songmakers and audience alike to thrill to witty displays of learning,

imparting a single meaning to lines quoted with a specific context.

In effect, then, an ingenious, flexible, yet guided response, reaching

ever higher levels of insight, became both the prerequisite for and

the end product of Odes’ learning. (Nylan)

We might see the Confucian project of self-cultivation itself in aesthetic, or more broadly,

artistic terms, as Hall and Ames do in Thinking Through Confucius (1987) and Nylan does here:

Moral self-cultivation is itself a kind of exquisite taste: the truly

cultivated have learned to delight in the moral Way [Dao] and to

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appreciate the beauty and utility of ritual [li]. Such sophisticated

powers of discrimination keep them on the path of full humanity

(jen), painstakingly refining their initial impulses toward sympathetic

understanding, like the jade cutter who cuts and files, chisels and

polishes the precious material. People who know enough to take

pleasure in the Way find that the end products of their efforts,

their lives or their jades, have become exquisite works of art. (Nylan)

Little noticed, the Confucian conception of wen has much in common with the Platonic if not

classical Greek understanding of the role of music and dance in paideia (moral education; aretē,

or the moral habituation to virtue; education directed toward ‘the Beauty and the Good’): ‘As an

instrument of paideia, ritual dancing, in which the customs of the group are encoded, implied

the acquisition of moral virtues and a sense of civic responsibility, of mature allegiance to the

community, an espousal of its traditions and virtues’ (Steven H. Lonsdale, Dance and Ritual Play

in Greek Religion. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). For Plato, music and dance were ‘the

first and fundamental steps of education,’ constituting a form of ‘unwritten laws’ that

complement or sustain the written laws of the polis. These unwritten laws might helpfully be

identified as a subset of Confucian li. Substitute heart-mind (xin) for ‘soul’ in the following and

the identification is transparent: Plato believed music and dance contributed to moral education

and civic virtue, in other words, to ends motivated by an intimate knowledge of the Good,

‘because rhythm and harmony penetrate most easily into the soul and influence it most

strongly, bringing with it decorum and making those who are correctly trained well-behaved’

(Lonsdale). Music and dance in ancient Greece, like the composition and performance of the

odes in classical China, ‘made moral learning at once the most natural and so most delightful of

all human activities—far more than a polite accomplishment, a significant source of gratification

[or, in Greek terms, eudaimonia]’ (Nylan).

xiao: filial piety, meaning a strong sense of loyalty and respect toward one’s parents. This

ethical obligation or moral duty, in the words of Liu, ‘is one that has penetrated Chinese culture

the most.’ The duty, as Liu also notes, extends beyond the lifetime of one’s parents insofar as

Confucius prescribes a proper length and attitude for mourning the death of one’s parents

(1.11). Filial piety does not entail blind—unthinking—obedience, as both children and parents

alike are bound by the rule of proper conduct or propriety. And part and parcel of respect and

loyalty is a corresponding mental attitude: reverence (or devotion). Filial piety is especially

important in as much as the family is the moral embryo of the larger society and thus where one

first learns the meaning and value of the varieties of virtuous behavior (e.g., gratitude or love)

that form the backbone of ethical character and thus are absolutely necessary to proper

performance one’s roles outside the family. In other words, it is within the family—the setting of

one’s first relationships—that the process of lifelong moral development begins.

xin (hsin): heart and/or mind but probably best rendered as ‘heart-mind;’ also, thoughts and

feelings, as Chad Hansen explains, ‘the common translation of xin as “heart-mind” reflects the

blending of belief and desire (thought and feelings, ideas and emotions), into a single complex

dispositional potential.’ Discussions of the heart-mind in Confucianism touch upon issues

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associated with human nature, and our capacity for human development, transformation, and

self-transcendence. Anyone can aspire to be a Sage, for the peasant and Sage alike possess xin,

and yet the heart-mind of the Sage has become like an exquisite piece of jade: cut, chiseled, and

polished to perfection. The fact that, in theory or principle anyone might become a sage does

not of course speak to the question of how many individuals actually become sages or even

aspire to be sage-like. Consider, for instance, the following from Paul Rakita Goldin’s

explanation of Xunzi’s belief that ‘however vile their initial dispositions, if people attune

themselves to the Way unceasingly, they may become Sages themselves:’

Small men can become noble men, and noble men can revert to being

small men. [….] In his antonomastic style, Xunzi writes that even a person

in the street can become the equivalent of Yu, a famous sage, although such

a transformation would require an accumulation of learning which would

be difficult to accomplish. [….] At this point Xunzi elaborates: it is possible

to walk across the world, although no one has done it; but the fact the no one

has done it does not mean that it is impossible. Likewise, it is possible for a

person in the street to become the equivalent of Yu, although, ostensibly, no

one has done it recently; but the fact that it is difficult does not mean that it

is impossible. It is difficult because it requires unceasing self-cultivation and

vast accumulation of learning. (Paul Rakita Goldin, Rituals of the Way: the Philosophy of

Xunzi. Open Court, 1999)

Many Confucians believe that tian (t’ien) has endowed humanity with the heart of the Way

(daoxin), with the inherent potential and inclination to strive for the good. According to Hansen,

both Confucius and Mozi (Mo-tzu or Mo Di) ‘assume that we actualize the [xin’s] disposition by

internalizing culture, by language.’ For Mencius (Mengzi), on the other hand, xin dispositions

are innate, intrinsic to human nature and as such, distinguish us from ‘beasts.’ Moreover, these

dispositions can grow and flower as from a seed, provided they prove capable of trumping

interference from certain bodily desires, baser passions, or selfish motivations. It is through the

heart-mind that one realizes the specifically Confucian cluster of virtues: filial piety (xiao),

loyalty (zhong), empathy (or the negative formulation of the Golden Rule: shu), humaneness

(ren), propriety (li), that which is just and morally proper (yi), and wisdom (zhi). According to

Mencius (Mengzi), it is our xin that entertains, weighs and decides between competing courses

of action in its role as the ‘natural governor of the self’ (Philip Ivanhoe). But this situational

exercise of judgment becomes, for the Sage, a spontaneous act ‘without ambivalence or

indecision. His intuition is reflexive and inevitably motivates him’ (Hansen). The ability to

spontaneously respond to situations in an ethically sensitive and appropriate way reflects the

possession of ‘precise practical knowledge and infallible self-control’ (Hansen). This, in turn, is

the by-product of cultivated powers of concentration or meditation, what Mencius calls the

‘unmoved heart-mind.’ Finally, qi fills the empty space, as it were, of the stilled or emptied

mind, in Hansen’s words, providing ‘the metaphysical underpinning of this idealized moral

psychology.’ In Mencius’ words: ‘If one cultivates it [i.e., qi] with uprightness and does not

harm it, it will fill up the space between Heaven and earth. It is a qi that unites yi [moral

intuition] with the Dao.’ Xunzi (ca. 310-210 BCE), the last great exponent of Confucianism before

the close of the classical period of Chinese philosophy, did not share Mencius’ conception of the

13

intrinsic goodness (as a capacity or potential to be realized, signified by the four ‘incipiences’

above) of human nature. As Goldin notes, for Mencius, human nature can grow and change,

‘for xing embodies the unique characteristics of human beings, while in Xunzi’s work, it

signifies only the characteristics that all people share from birth.’ Xunzi famously argued that

this shared original nature (i.e., what we have from birth: xing) is bad or evil, what is good,

rather, is ‘artifice,’ for example, the transformation wrought by a teacher well-versed in the Dao

of li and morality, or the norms and conventions of conduct established by the Sage Kings of

prehistoric times (a Golden Age, if you will). It is artifice, in the form of trying and exhaustive

self-cultivation, ‘that completes one’s nature’ (Goldin), as a kind of (moralized) ‘second nature.’

For Xunzi, it is the heart-mind is capable of knowing the Dao owing to its possession of three

(paradoxical yet not mystical) qualities: emptiness, unity, and tranquility. It is the heart-mind

that is capable of arriving at the deliberative conclusion that it is in our self-interest in the best

sense—enlightened self-interest—to follow the rituals: ‘The mind…must be able to observe

dispassionately the conduct of the self. It observes that xing is self-destructive because it does

not conform to the rituals, and directs the self to begin the arduous process of transformation’

(Goldin). So, while morality is external in Xunzi’s conception, insofar as it is equivalent to proper

practice of the right rituals, the motivational force to be moral is internal, located in the powers

of the heart-mind. Hence, it is fair to say that ‘a person is ultimately a union of xing and artifice

(wei)’ (Goldin). Despite Xunzi’s deep disagreement with Mencius, his philosophy remains very

much in the letter and spirit of the Master in as much as a predominant refrain throughout the

Analects is the importance of learning, the love of learning being one of the criteria used to

separate the junzi from the ‘small man.’ The heart-mind, according to Xunzi, is what motivates

this love of learning.

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14

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