of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 1

GGAIN 8059 7 free from errors -- which is

already a very great gain117 12 To gain assurance that they do

actually accord, we must355 3 of which, as dogmatic

objections, men seek to gaincredit for a deeper insight intothe nature of

379 19 upon the surrender of thesedogmatic pretensions, gain inclearness and in natural force

436 13 of the answer, and firstconsider what we should gainaccording as the answer is in theaffirmative or

598 21 if they show reason, reasonalways stands to gain

602 35 arguments of his opponentsimply in order to gain acceptancefor his own; and I also know thata

618 18 this, but much to hope for;namely, that we may gain forourselves a possession which cannever again

GAINED 7055 6 Much is already gained if we

can bring a number ofinvestigations under

319 1 of pure reason, in that theyview all knowledge gained inexperience as being determinedthrough an

354 24 In that case much will alreadyhave been gained if, while freelyconfessing my own ignorance, I

395 6 contested, and that numeroustriumphs should be gained by bothsides, the last decisive victoryalways

577 8 <Philosophical> knowledge isthe <knowledge gained by reasonfrom concepts>; mathematicalknowledge

577 10 mathematical knowledge is theknowledge gained by reason fromthe <construction> of concepts

599 4 In this dialectic no victoryis gained that need give us causefor anxiety

GAINING 2021 20 in which no participant has

ever yet succeeded in gaining evenso much as an inch of territory,not at

582 15 analyse my empirical conceptof gold without gaining anythingmore than merely an enumeration of

GAINS 2520 14 just as it itself derives its

existence and gains ever newvigour from that source

629 8 But, on the other hand, reasonis reassured and gains self-confidence, on finding that ititself can

GALILEO 1020 7 When Galileo caused balls, the

weights of which he had himself

GAME 1245 24 will be observed that in the

foregoing proof the game played byidealism has been turned againstitself

GAP 3238 22 which alone can reveal and

make noticeable every gap in theunderstanding, alike in regard toconcepts

359 40 This gap in our knowledge cannever be filled; all that

361 5 corporeal world is merely aresult of filling the gap whereknowledge is wholly lacking to uswith

GAPS 2249 2 the sum of all empirical

intuitions in space, any gaps orcleft between two appearances(<non datur

548 33 are usually in nature itselfsuch wide gaps, that from any suchobservations we can come to

GATHER 2233 22 and we are not, therefore, in

a position to gather, simply fromthings being set in the same time

474 9 [field of] appearance, a rulefrom which we may gather what, intheir kind and degrees, are theactions

GATHERED 3059 32 hope of entirely completing

it, may already be gathered fromthe fact that what hereconstitutes our

323 1 must bear to its logicalemployment, we have gathered thatthere can be only three kinds ofdialectical

420 8 procedure is entirelyillegitimate, as may be gatheredfrom what follows

GATHERS 1111 34 Still the synthesis is that

which gathers the elements forknowledge, and unites them to

GAUGES 1309 3 and in accordance with which

it estimates and gauges the degreeof its empirical employment, butwhich

GAVE 9008 6 her empire gradually through

intestine wars gave way tocomplete anarchy; and the<sceptics>, a

025 29 laws of the motions of theheavenly bodies gave establishedcertainty to what Copernicus hadat

128 10 defined recommendations ofmoderation -- the other gavehimself over entirely to<scepticism>, having, as

278 33 of our representations ofthem, he still gave them the nameof phenomena), and on that

280 9 mode in which it is determinedLogicians formerly gave the name

'matter' to the universal, and thename

419 35 and laid hold upon the purecategory, which then gave rise toa strictly intelligible series the

643 28 It was the moral ideas thatgave rise to that concept of theDivine Being which we

654 28 even the definition which, atthe start, he first gave of thescience, is very seldom adequateto his

667 4 give a cursory sketch of thevarious ideas which gave rise tothe chief revolutions [inmetaphysical

GAZE 2183 9 to allow us to discover, and

to have open to our gaze596 30 to doubt -- in such fashion

that our enquiring gaze is moreexcited than satisfied

GE 1366 35 bearing on the nature of

thinking beings in ge

GENEALOGICAL 1301 14 functions of the former will

at once give us the genealogicaltree of the concepts of reason

GENEALOGY 1008 18 to vulgar origins in common

experience, this genealogy has, asa matter of fact, beenfictitiously

GENERA 15538 23 merely as different

determinations of a few genera,and these, in turn, of stillhigher genera, and

538 23 a few genera, and these, inturn, of still higher genera, andso on; in short, that we must seekfor a

539 5 succeeded in reducing allsalts to two main genera, acidsand alkalies; and they endeavourto show

539 30 which is quite conceivable),the logical law of genera wouldhave no sort of standing; weshould not

539 35 If, therefore, the logicalprinciple of genera is to beapplied to nature (by which I here

540 3 The logical principle ofgenera, which postulates identity,is balanced by

540 13 interest in <extent>(universality) in respect ofgenera, and on the other hand in<content>

542 14 of the <homogeneity> of themanifold under higher genera; (2)through a principle of the<variety> of the

542 22 through the processes ofascending to the higher genera andof descending to the lower speciesdo we

542 39 But for different horizons,that is, genera, each of which isdetermined by its own concept

543 3 can proceed until we arrive at

2 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationthe highest of all genera, and soat the universal and true horizon,which

543 6 which comprehends under itselfall manifoldness -- genera,species, and subspecies

543 15 is, that there are notdifferent, original, first genera,which are isolated from oneanother, separated

543 17 intervening space; but thatall the manifold genera are simplydivisions of one single highestand

543 29 with an excessive number ofdifferent original genera, andbids us pay due regard tohomogeneity; the

GENERAL 446009 14 and systems, but of the

faculty of reason in general, inrespect of all knowledge afterwhich it may

009 17 possibility or impossibilityof metaphysics in general, anddetermine its sources, its extent,and its

026 9 is concerned only with theform of thought in general), thatshould it, through this critique,be set

027 29 In that case all things ingeneral, as far as they areefficient causes, would be

028 7 <in one and the same sense>,namely as a thing in general, thatis, as a thing in itself; and saveby means

030 26 possessions which speculativereason must suffer, general humaninterests remain in the sameprivileged

031 34 in favour of useful truthsmake no appeal to the generalmind, so neither do the subtleobjections that

032 36 of system, in such manner asto satisfy not the general publicbut the requirements of theSchools

034 8 not merely in the system, butin human reason in general

034 26 a scandal to philosophy and tohuman reason in general that theexistence of things outside us(from

036 19 bound up with inner sense, ifexperience in general is to bepossible at all; that is, I amjust as

036 27 to the rules according towhich experience in general, eveninner experience, is distinguishedfrom

037 20 themselves with a new system;and owing to the general distastefor all innovation, still fewerhave the

045 23 is more determinate than thatof an object in general)

049 6 that I think in the mereconcept of body in general; andthe addition of such a predicatetherefore

049 21 I do not include in theconcept of a body in general thepredicate 'weight', none the less

this050 25 I do not include in the

concept of a body in general thepredicate 'weight', the conceptnone the less

055 5 VI. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OFPURE REASON

057 13 last question, which arisesout of the previous generalproblem, may, rightly stated, takethe form: <How

058 3 in regard to the objects ofall knowledge in general

066 11 The pure form of sensibleintuitions in general, in whichall the manifold of intuition is

069 1 Space is not a discursive or,as we say, general concept ofrelations of things in general,but a

069 2 we say, general concept ofrelations of things in general,but a pure intuition

069 9 one; the manifold in it, andtherefore the general concept ofspaces, depends solely on [the

069 15 than the third, can never bederived from the general conceptsof line and triangle, but onlyfrom

069 22 and derived from outerexperience in general, the firstprinciples of mathematical

069 33 A general concept of space,which is found alike in a foot

071 4 as it is merely the form ofouter <sense> in general

075 1 We cannot, in respect ofappearances in general, removetime itself, though we can quitewell

075 8 the relations of time, or ofaxioms of time in general, is alsogrounded upon this <a^priori>necessity

075 19 Time is not a discursive, orwhat is called a general concept,but a pure form of sensibleintuition

075 24 be simultaneous is not to bederived from a general concept

076 17 synthetic knowledge which isexhibited in the general doctrineof motion, and which is by nomeans

077 39 which is peculiar to us, andspeak of <things in general>

078 7 are in time, because in thisconcept of things in general weare abstracting from every mode oftheir

081 21 something that does indeedcontain what is general in theserelations, but which cannot exist

082 16 $8 <General Observations onTranscendental Aesthetic>

082 19 fundamental constitution ofsensible knowledge in general

082 25 only the subjectiveconstitution of the senses ingeneral, be removed, the wholeconstitution and all the

082 35 and time are its pure forms,and sensation in general itsmatter

084 21 and is valid not in relationto sensibility in general but onlyin relation to a particular

standpoint084 38 But if we take this empirical

object in its general character,and ask, without consideringwhether

089 29 to it only in relation to thesenses, or in general to thesubject), for instance, the twohandles

090 9 As conditions of all existencein general, they must also beconditions of the existence of

090 36 one of the factors requiredfor solution of the generalproblem of transcendentalphilosophy: <how are

092 8 I LOGIC IN GENERAL092 26 only the form of the thought

of an object in general093 24 the science of the rules of

sensibility in general, that is,aesthetic, from the science of the

093 25 the science of the rules ofthe understanding in general, thatis, logic

093 28 in a twofold manner, either aslogic of the general or as logicof the special employment of the

094 7 General logic is either pureor applied

094 16 Pure general logic has to do,therefore, only with principles

094 20 General logic is calledapplied, when it is directed to

094 24 principles, although it isstill indeed in so far generalthat it refers to the employmentof the

094 27 it is neither a canon of theunderstanding in general nor anorganon of special sciences, butmerely a

094 29 In general logic, therefore,that part which is to

094 31 which constitutes applied(though always still general)logic

094 36 must always bear in mind, indealing with pure general logic: 1

094 37 As general logic, it abstractsfrom all content of the

095 15 Pure general logic stands toit in the same relation as pure

095 17 only the necessary moral lawsof a free will in general, standsto the doctrine of the virtuesstrictly

095 26 General logic, as we haveshown, abstracts from all

095 30 that is, it treats of the formof thought in general

096 4 General logic, on the otherhand, has nothing to do with

096 25 The application of space toobjects in general would likewisebe transcendental, but, if

097 2 be called <transcendentallogic>, because, unlike generallogic, which has to deal with bothempirical and

097 7 III THE DIVISION OF GENERALLOGIC INTO ANALYTIC AND DIALECTIC

097 16 granted; the question asked isas to what is the general and surecriterion of the truth of any andevery

097 30 Now a general criterion oftruth must be such as would be

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 3valid

098 1 quite impossible, and indeedabsurd, to ask for a general testof the truth of such content

098 2 A sufficient and at the sametime general criterion of truthcannot possibly be given

098 5 knowledge, so far as itsmatter is concerned, no generalcriterion can be demanded

098 14 would thereby be made tocontradict its own general rulesof thought, and so to contradictitself

098 16 only the form of truth, thatis, of thought in general; and inso far they are quite correct, butare

098 21 namely, the agreement ofknowledge with the general andformal laws of the understandingand reason

098 27 General logic resolves thewhole formal procedure of the

099 7 to its content, the form ofunderstanding, that general logic,which is merely a <canon> ofjudgment, has

099 10 General logic, when thustreated as an organon, is called

099 20 may be noted as a sure anduseful warning, that generallogic, if viewed as an organon, isalways a logic

100 29 is misapplied if appealed toas an organon of its general andunlimited application, and ifconsequently we

100 32 to affirm, and to decideregarding objects in general

103 14 logical treatment of conceptsin philosophy in general

107 26 without any such exception,just as if it were a generalconcept and had an extension tothe whole of

107 33 to its own inner validity, butas knowledge in general, accordingto its quantity in comparison with

107 35 other knowledge, it iscertainly different from generaljudgments (<judicia communia>),and in a

107 36 in a complete table of themoments of thought in generaldeserves a separate place --though not, indeed

108 3 from those that are<affirmative>, although in generallogic they are rightly classedwith them, and do

108 5 General logic abstracts fromall content of the predicate

109 24 knowledge concerning theexistence of a world in general;all of them together occupy thewhole sphere

109 39 the value of the copula inrelation to thought in general

111 7 General logic, as has beenrepeatedly said, abstracts

111 23 By <synthesis>, in its mostgeneral sense, I understand theact of putting different

112 3 Synthesis in general, as weshall hereafter see, is the mereresult of

112 11 Pure synthesis, <represented

in its most general aspect>, givesthe pure concept of the

112 20 under one concept -- aprocedure treated of in generallogic

112 35 <in an intuition>; and thisunity, in its most generalexpression, we entitle the pureconcept of the

113 1 synthetic unity of themanifold in intuition in general

113 4 <a^priori> to objects -- aconclusion which general logic isnot in a position to establish

113 7 which apply <a^priori> toobjects of intuition in general,as, in the preceding table, therehave been

118 26 and criteria of all<knowledge> of things in general,and prescribe for such knowledgethe categories

119 11 criteria of the possibility ofknowledge in general are the threecategories of quantity, in which

119 36 to bring the employment ofthese concepts under generallogical rules, for the agreementof knowledge

126 14 can be, if not intuited, yetthought as object in general

126 21 Concepts of objects in generalthus underlie all empiricalknowledge as its

128 4 actually possess, namely,<pure mathematics> and <generalscience of nature>; and this facttherefore

128 18 They are concepts of an objectin general, by means of which theintuition of an object is

129 11 no intuition corresponds toit; and intuitions in general,through which objects can be givento us

131 8 grounds of the possibility ofour knowledge in general, that inorder to avoid the elaboratenessof a

131 27 This is a general observationwhich, throughout what follows,must

134 29 this object must be thoughtonly as something in general =<x>, since outside our knowledgewe have

135 39 consequently also of theconcepts of objects in general,and so of all objects ofexperience, a ground

137 12 more adequately our concept ofan <object> in general

137 25 alone confer upon all ourempirical concepts in generalrelation to an object, that is,objective reality

138 15 all of which, as such, belongto one and the same generalexperience

138 29 <a^priori> conditions of apossible experience in general areat the same time conditions of the

138 35 fundamental concepts by whichwe think objects in general forappearances, and have therefore<a^priori>

141 5 3 THE RELATION OF THEUNDERSTANDING TO OBJECTS IN

GENERAL, AND THE POSSIBILITY OFKNOWING THEM <A^PRIORI>

141 10 upon which rests thepossibility of experience ingeneral and of knowledge of itsobjects -- <sense

142 32 first and synthetic principleof our thought in general

147 5 they concern <solely the formof an experience in general>, arethe <categories>

151 7 $15 <The Possibility ofCombination in General>

151 13 the combination (<conjunctio>)of a manifold in general can nevercome to us through the senses, and

151 21 To this act the general title'synthesis' may be assigned, asindicating

154 25 analytic unity ofconsciousness belongs to allgeneral concepts, as such

154 26 If, for instance, I think redin general, I thereby represent tomyself a property which

157 9 combined in one apperceptionthrough the general expression,'<I <think>'

158 4 form of intuition in time,merely as intuition in general,which contains a given manifold,is subject to

158 22 which logicians give ofjudgment in general

161 8 to the manifold of a givenintuition in general

162 1 first, the concept, throughwhich an object in general isthought (the category); andsecondly, the

162 10 consequently, the thought ofan object in general, by means ofa pure concept of understanding,can

163 12 limitation, and extend toobjects of intuition in general,be the intuition like or unlikeours, if only it

164 9 of the Categories to Objectsof the Senses in General>

164 11 mere understanding, to objectsof intuition in general, whetherthat intuition be our own or anyother

164 37 in respect of the manifold ofan intuition in general, and whichis entitled combination throughthe

166 32 applies to the manifold of<intuitions in general>, and inthe guise of the <categories>,prior to

166 33 prior to all sensibleintuition, to <objects in general>

167 38 synthesis of the manifold inouter intuition in general bymeans of the productiveimagination, and

168 22 synthesis of the manifold ofrepresentations in general, andtherefore in the syntheticoriginal unity of

169 9 to] constitute the thought ofan <object in general>, throughcombination of the manifold in one

169 11 me I require, besides thethought of an object in general(in the category), an intuition by

4 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationwhich I

169 13 category), an intuition bywhich I determine that generalconcept, so for knowledge ofmyself I require

170 7 proved through their completeagreement with the general logicalfunctions of thought; in the

170 9 modes of knowledge of objectsof an intuition in general (cf. $$20, 21)

171 7 of the manifold of a given<intuition in general> in anoriginal consciousness, inaccordance with

171 19 of space and of outer sensibleintuition in general lies at thebasis of my apprehension, and Idraw

171 24 synthesis of the homogeneousin an intuition in general, thatis, the category of <quantity>

172 10 which I combine the manifoldof an <intuition in general>, is-- if I abstract from the constantform of my

172 14 which it prescribes, and I doso <in time in general>

172 30 with its faculty of<combining> the manifold ingeneral, is no more surprisingthan that the appearances

173 17 Nature, considered merely asnature in general, is dependentupon these categories as the

173 22 than those which are involvedin a <nature in general>, that is,in the conformity to law of all

173 29 alone can instruct us inregard to experience in general,and as to what it is that can beknown as an

174 18 grounds of the possibility ofall experience in general

175 28 of appearances in space andtime <in general>, and thisdetermination, in turn, asultimately

176 4 GENERAL logic is constructedupon a ground plan which

176 9 in current speech arecomprehended under the generaltitle of understanding, logic inits analytic

176 13 and deals solely with the formof thought in general (that is, ofdiscursive knowledge), it can

176 22 which are pure and <a^priori>,it cannot follow general logic inthis division

177 17 INTRODUCTION TRANSCENDENTALJUDGMENT IN GENERAL

177 18 If understanding in general isto be viewed as the faculty ofrules, judgment

177 21 General logic contains, andcan contain, no rules for

177 22 For since general logicabstracts from all content ofknowledge

177 27 If it sought to give generalinstructions how we are to subsumeunder these

178 27 But although general logic cansupply no rules for judgment, the

180 27 through which the object isthought in [its] general [aspects]are not so utterly distinct and

181 12 contains pure synthetic unityof the manifold in general

181 31 as conditions of thepossibility of things in general,they can be extended to objects inthemselves

182 19 if, on the other hand, I thinkonly a number in general, whetherit be five or a hundred, thisthought is

182 30 ever be adequate to theconcept of a triangle in general

183 2 delineate the figure of afour-footed animal in a generalmanner, without limitation to anysingle

183 24 concerns the determination ofinner sense in general accordingto conditions of its form (time),in

183 30 schemata of the pure conceptsof understanding in general, weshall now expound them accordingto the order

183 34 is space; that of all objectsof the senses in general is time

184 2 of the manifold of ahomogeneous intuition in general,a unity due to my generating timeitself in the

184 6 is that which corresponds to asensation in general; it is that,therefore, the concept of which in

184 30 a substrate of empiricaldetermination of time in general,and so as abiding while all elsechanges

185 2 of cause, and of the causalityof a thing in general, is the realupon which, whenever posited

185 12 representations with theconditions of time in general

186 30 of sensibility, ought to applyto things in general, <as theyare>, and not, like the schemata

188 15 be constituted, their relationto sensibility in general willexhibit completely andsystematically all

188 27 of the possibility ofknowledge of an object in general

189 28 negative, condition of all ourjudgments in general, whatever bethe content of our knowledge, and

190 7 It holds of knowledge, merelyas knowledge in general,irrespective of content; andasserts that the

191 35 of synthetic judgments is aproblem with which general logichas nothing to do

193 23 to concepts of an object ofappearances in general

193 37 judgments a great dealregarding space in general and thefigures which productiveimagination

194 16 is necessary to syntheticunity of experience in general

194 25 to a possible empiricalknowledge in general

194 26 conditions of the <possibilityof experience> in general arelikewise conditions of the<possibility of

195 14 and as it were the exponent,of a rule in general

195 21 evident in every empirical

proposition, however general itsapplication, suffices to make thisconfusion

196 3 with the mere <intuition> ofan appearance in general, partlywith its <existence>

196 29 4 Postulates of empiricalthought in general

197 8 as in the other with theprinciples of general physicaldynamics

198 7 of the manifold [and]homogeneous in intuition ingeneral, in so far as therepresentation of an object

198 18 the same synthesis wherebyspace and time in general aredetermined

199 30 relation are indeed synthetic,but are not general like those ofgeometry, and cannot, therefore,be

200 4 although the <employment> ofthese numbers is general

201 20 to intuition the matter forsome object in general (wherebysomething existing in space ortime is

201 24 is affected, and which werelate to an object in general

202 27 there is in every sensation,as sensation in general (that is,without a particular sensationhaving

205 6 But the causality of analteration in general,presupposing, as it does,empirical principles

205 22 destroying the unity of oursystem, anticipate general naturalscience, which is based on certain

208 2 But the real, whichcorresponds to sensations ingeneral, as opposed to negation =0, represents only that

208 5 the synthesis in an empiricalconsciousness in general

208 17 It is remarkable that ofmagnitudes in general we can know<a^priori> only a single <quality>

208 31 The general principle of theanalogies is: All appearances

209 19 take place only through theirrelation in time in general, andtherefore only through conceptsthat connect

209 29 The general principle of thethree analogies rests on the

211 20 us how mere perception orempirical intuition in generalitself comes about

211 23 of the postulates of empiricalthought in general, which concernthe synthesis of mere intuition

212 14 far only] as [it is theschema] of a synthesis in general

213 10 the substratum whichrepresents time in general; andall change or coexistence must, inbeing

214 7 change and of allconcomitance, expresses time ingeneral

230 35 not of the alteration ofcertain relations in general, butof alteration of state

239 2 4 THE POSTULATES OF EMPIRICALTHOUGHT IN GENERAL

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 5239 36 with the formal conditions of

an experience in general239 37 But this, the objective form

of experience in general, containsall synthesis that is required for

240 6 an <a^priori> condition uponwhich experience in general in itsformal aspect rests, in which caseit is a

240 24 in themselves the form ofexperience in general, they haveobjective reality, that is, theyapply

241 6 of all relation to the form ofan experience in general, and tothe synthetic unity in which alone

242 6 formal and objectiveconditions of experience ingeneral

242 24 of continuous magnitudes,indeed of magnitudes in general,are one and all synthetic, thepossibility of

242 27 of the determination ofobjects in experience in general

243 4 define all real connection inan experience in general

243 31 any way decide the form ofpossible experience in general

247 16 here sought to prove is thatinner experience in general ispossible only through outerexperience in

247 17 is possible only through outerexperience in general

249 38 or whether my perceptions canbelong, in their generalconnection, to more than onepossible experience

250 3 prescribes <a^priori> toexperience in general the ruleswhich alone make experiencepossible

252 27 <General Note on the System ofthe Principles>

257 5 THE GROUND OF THE DISTINCTIONOF ALL OBJECTS IN GENERAL INTOPHENOMENA AND NOUMENA

259 16 in any principle is itsapplication to things <in generaland in themselves>; the empiricalemployment is

259 21 the logical form of a concept(of thought) in general, andsecondly, the possibility ofgiving it an

261 1 The concept of magnitude ingeneral can never be explainedexcept by saying that it

261 24 and view them as concepts ofthings in general and therefore oftranscendental employment, all

263 6 this peculiar feature, thatonly in virtue of the generalcondition of sensibility can theypossess a

263 17 of their application tosensibility in general (schemata)

263 24 The logical functions ofjudgments in general, unity andplurality, assertion and denial

263 28 are nothing butrepresentations of things ingeneral, so far as the manifold oftheir intuition must

264 6 of a possible experience,never to things in general withoutregard to the mode in which we are

able264 11 anticipate the form of a

possible experience in general264 17 form, synthetic <a^priori>

knowledge of things in general(for instance, the principle ofcausality) must

264 24 as the unity of the thought ofa manifold in general

265 1 then expresses only thethought of an object in general,according to different modes

265 29 of understanding in respect ofobjects in general, that is, ofthought; but since they are merely

268 3 an intelligible entity,namely, of a something in generaloutside our sensibility, as beinga <determinate>

268 34 of appearances under theconcept of an object in general --a concept which is determinablethrough the

269 5 even this unity they candetermine, by means of general<a^priori> connecting concepts,only because of

269 13 what I have said in theopening sentences of the <GeneralNote> appended to the precedingchapter

269 21 object, which is the conceptof something in general, throughthat which is given insensibility, in

269 33 follows from the concept of anappearance in general; namely,that something which is not initself

270 26 but signifies only the thoughtof something in general, in whichI abstract from everything thatbelongs

271 4 sensible intuition, since theythink objects in general, withoutregard to the special mode (the

271 23 The object to which I relateappearance in general is thetranscendental object, that is,the

271 25 indeterminate thought of<something> in general

271 28 as merely the object of asensible intuition in general, andso as being one and the same forall

271 31 as bringing it under a conceptof object in general

274 36 or merely signifies the unityof thought in general -- completeabstraction being made from themode

280 6 The one [matter] signifies thedeterminable in general, the other[form] its determination -- bothin the

280 16 Also as regards things ingeneral unlimited reality wasviewed as the matter of all

283 17 regard to understanding,taking them as things in general

283 26 which is valid only ofconcepts of things in general, tocover also the objects of thesenses

284 14 General mechanics can indeedgive the empirical condition

284 26 case as regards the mere

concept of a thing in general, butnot as regards things asappearances

284 38 Substances in general musthave some <internal> nature, whichis

288 7 But if I apply these conceptsto an object in general (in thetranscendental sense), without

288 12 the representation of anobject as a thing in general isnot only <insufficient>, but, whentaken

288 22 If I think to myself merelythings in general, the differencein their outer relations cannot

289 20 is not found in the concept ofa thing in general, it is also notto be found in the things

289 24 Because in the mere concept ofa thing in general we abstractfrom the many necessary conditionsof

290 3 have been omitted in theconcept of motion in general, thatmake possible a conflict (thoughnot indeed

290 11 and confine myself to theconcept of a thing in general, Ican abstract from all outerrelation, and

290 27 justified, if beyond theconcept of a thing in generalthere were no further conditionsunder which

291 21 nothing left in the mereconcept but the inner in generaland its interrelations, throughwhich alone the

292 2 consists in is the mererelation of something in generalto the senses

294 19 Consequently what we do is tothink something in general; andwhile on the one hand we determineit in

294 35 required, and this is theconcept of an object in general,taken problematically, without itshaving been

294 37 are the only concepts whichrefer to objects in general, thedistinguish

297 7 WE have already entitleddialectic in general a <logic ofillusion>

300 26 A <Reason in general>301 30 I apprehend this property of

straight lines in general and initself, from principles; Iapprehend it

302 8 or by conditions of a possibleexperience in general

302 10 inferred merely from theconcept of happening in general;on the contrary, it is thisfundamental

302 22 laws we should be able to fallback on their general principles

305 20 any law for objects, and doesnot contain any general ground ofthe possibility of knowing or of

306 22 obviously the principlepeculiar to reason in general, inits logical employment, is: -- tofind for the

307 11 appearances, or even in thethinking of things in general)

6 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationextends to the unconditioned

309 21 TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTICSection I THE IDEAS IN GENERAL

314 22 The genus is <representation>in general (<repraesentatio>)

315 27 contains the condition underwhich the predicate (general termfor what is asserted) of thisjudgment is

316 12 unconditioned, a pure conceptof reason can in general beexplained by the concept of theunconditioned

323 11 either as appearances or asobjects of thought in general

323 15 of] appearance; (3) therelation to all things in general

323 16 Now all pure concepts ingeneral are concerned with thesynthetic unity of

323 20 synthetic unity of allconditions in general

323 24 of the condition of allobjects of thought in general>

328 20 totality of the conditionsunder which objects in general, inso far as they can be given me,have to be

328 22 of all conditions of thepossibility of things in general,<i.e.> from things which I do notknow through

329 5 come to a concept which wasnot included in the general listof transcendental concepts butwhich must

330 3 For inner experience ingeneral and its possibility, orperception in general and

330 3 in general and itspossibility, or perception ingeneral and its relation to otherperception, in which no

330 7 knowledge but as knowledge ofthe empirical in general, and hasto be reckoned with theinvestigation of

332 1 object, but a form ofrepresentation in general, thatis, of representation in so far asit is to

332 25 If our knowledge of thinkingbeings in general, by means ofpure reason, were based on morethan

332 35 regarding the nature ofthinking beings in general

337 6 that is, into a <concept> ofthinking being in general

337 27 It means a something ingeneral (transcendental subject),the representation of

340 16 in regard to such hypotheses,we can make this general remark

348 35 sensation is given -- ifreferred to an object in general,though not as determining thatobject, it is

352 35 in itself, but only theappearance of a thing in general,can exist by itself

353 22 knowledge of the nature of athinking being in general, this'I' would have to be an intuitionwhich, in

361 29 We still owe the reader aclear general exposition of thetranscendental and yet natural

362 8 The synthesis of theconditions of a thought in general

362 19 Since, in thinking in general,we abstract from all relation ofthe thought to

362 22 the synthesis of theconditions of a thought in general(No

362 26 inference to the condition ofall thought in general, which isitself unconditioned, does notcommit a

363 7 is always required; and owingto the highly general character ofthe problem, intuition has beenleft

363 12 But although I have no generalanswer to the former question, itstill seems as

363 18 the conditions of thepossibility of thought in generaland <a^priori>, they could notcontain any such

363 25 which I ascribe to myself as athinking being in general can,however, show in what the errorconsists

364 5 concept which I make formyself of a something in generalthat does not allow of beingintuited

365 6 Self-consciousness in generalis therefore the representation ofthat which is

367 4 the pure formula of all myexperience in general announcesitself as a universal propositionvalid

367 7 an absolute unity of theconditions of thought in general,and so extends itself further thanpossible

368 13 The following general remarkmay, at the outset, aid us in ourscrutiny

370 13 of the consciousness of myselfin thought in general, yieldsnothing whatsoever towards theknowledge

370 15 The logical exposition ofthought in general has beenmistaken for a metaphysical

370 32 from which it starts, and addsto the thought in general [<i.e.>to the concept of a thinkingbeing] the

370 40 but that they are applicableto things in general and to thingsin thems

371 13 we speak of a being that canbe thought in general, in everyrelation, and therefore also as itmay

371 22 if we call to mind what hasbeen said in the General Note tothe Systematic Representation ofthe

371 26 in the major premiss, asrelating to an object in generaland therefore to an object as itmay be given in

372 20 unity of self-consciousness inthought in general, which has tobe present whether the subject be

375 20 not begin with the concept ofa thinking being in general, butwith a reality, and we shouldinfer from the

375 23 what it is that belongs to athinking being in general

377 5 knowledge to the nature of allthinking beings in general,through the empirical, but inrespect of every

378 1 determination of the self (asa thinking being in general) bymeans of the categories is equallyso

378 32 real that is given, givenindeed to thought in general, andso not as appearance, nor as thingin itself

378 38 intellectual, becausebelonging to thought in general

380 19 undetermined concept of athinking being in general

381 13 the only question that remainsbeing how in general a communionof substances is possible

381 19 GENERAL NOTE ON THE TRANSITIONFROM RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

381 37 I think myself only as I doany object in general from whosemode of intuition I abstract

384 12 subjective conditions of allrepresentations in general (of thesubject or soul), incorrespondence with

384 21 conditions of the possibilityof objects in general

385 35 of the conditions of allpossible things in general, itgives rise to an <ideal> of purereason which

389 27 this means no more than theconcept of object in general,which subsists in so far as wethink in it

390 31 may form, of a totality of<things in general>

392 23 The conditioned in existencein general is termed contingentand the unconditioned

401 13 by a time of non-existence) anexistence in general whichpresupposes no other conditionwhatsoever

401 29 If that void, and consequentlyspace in general as <a^priori>condition of the possibility of

401 37 The <mundus intelligibilis> isnothing but the general concept ofa world in general, in which

402 1 is nothing but the generalconcept of a world in general, inwhich abstraction is made from allconditions

404 40 to its relation to a possibleexperience in general

417 27 concepts of the necessaryexistence of a thing in general

418 11 have to employ concepts ofcontingent beings in general(viewed as objects of theunderstanding alone)

425 12 as its cause; and theconditions of existence in generalrest always again upon otherconditions, without

429 21 and acquire any considerableinfluence in the general life orany real favour among themultitude

429 34 is likewise generated, andthat in existence in generaleverything is conditioned, an

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 7unconditioned and

435 9 of derivation, of thecondition of existence in general,with all questions as to whetherit is brought

441 34 the purely intelligible causeof appearances in general thetranscendental object, but merelyin order to

449 9 From this it then follows thatappearances in general are nothingoutside our representations --which

455 34 The quite generalrepresentation of the series ofall past states

459 33 This general statement isobviously applicable to space

461 21 the transcendental division ofan appearance in general, thequestion how far it may extenddoes not

462 21 account of this distinction;for just as in the generalrepresentation of alltranscendental ideas we

467 10 This distinction, when statedin this quite general and abstractmanner, is bound to appearextremely

469 10 intelligible character (thoughwe can only have a general conceptof that character) this samesubject must

470 16 The point has already beendealt with in the generaldiscussion of the antinomy intowhich reason

479 28 of Appearances as regardstheir Existence in general>

481 36 to decide as to thepossibility of things in general,and should declare theintelligible to be

483 14 of the possibility of thesensible series in general

484 24 that is, from pure concepts ofthings in general

485 6 THE IDEAL OF PURE REASONSection I THE IDEAL IN GENERAL

491 14 The universal concept of areality in general cannot bedivided <a^priori>, becausewithout

494 30 a principle which must bevalid of things in general

494 34 principle of the possibilityof things in general

500 2 that is, from experience ofexistence in general; or finallythey abstract from all experience

501 1 while the inference from agiven existence in general to someabsolutely necessary being seemsto be

503 12 Notwithstanding all thesegeneral considerations, in whichevery one must concur

506 2 of the possible real contentof a thing in general, somethingis still lacking in its relationto my

506 10 conditions> of possibleempirical knowledge in general,whereas through its existence itis thought as

507 28 the need to assume as a basisof existence in general something

necessary (in which our regressmay

512 13 inference an actual existence(an experience in general), andadvance, in such manner as we can,to some

514 28 cosmological proof presupposesan experience in general, it isnot based on any particularproperty of

514 31 given through empiricalconsciousness in general

515 17 necessary as a condition ofthe existent in general, I cannotthink any particular thing as initself

517 6 It therefore follows thatmatter, and in general whateverbelongs to the world, is notcompatible

518 10 If, then, neither the conceptof things in general nor theexperience of any <existence ingeneral>

518 11 general nor the experience ofany <existence in general> cansupply what is required, itremains only to

525 30 of the original being from anexperience in general (withoutdetermining in any more specificfashion

527 34 attempt to assert it of thecontingent in general, thereremains not the leastjustification for

532 32 is directed solely to the useof understanding in general, inrespect of those objects that fallto be

534 23 By general admission, <pureearth, pure water, pure air>

537 25 also in those cases in which,as with matter in general, weencounter powers which, though toa certain

537 29 ground that special naturallaws fall under more general laws,and that parsimony in principlesis not

538 26 far as they can be deducedfrom higher and more generalconcepts -- this is a logicalprinciple, a rule of

544 29 of this law, since itinstructs us only in quite generalterms that we are to seek forgrades of affinity

550 15 reason -- the schema of theconcept of a thing in general,which serves only to secure thegreatest

550 39 unity of the manifold ofempirical knowledge in general,whereby this empirical knowledgeis more

558 26 from corporeal nature, butfrom nature in general, that is,from all predicates of anypossible

558 31 speculative reason is theconcept of the world in general

559 3 remains for pure reasonnothing but nature in general, andthe completeness of the conditionsin nature

561 2 cannot affect the teleologicallaw itself, in its general bearing

561 12 so far as to assumeconfidently, and with generalapproval, that everyth

564 30 as may be possible in theessence of things in general, itseeks to know the existence ofthis supreme

569 39 it not that we are suspiciousof abstract and general doctrines,however clear, and were it notthat

573 32 in relation to the use of theunderstanding in general, theSchools have attempted, thoughvery

574 14 Owing to the general desirefor knowledge, negative judgments,that is

574 23 but in respect to the contentof our knowledge in general, whichis either extended or limited by a

578 17 represent in intuition theconcept of a cause in generalexcept in an ex

579 21 Once it has adopted a notationfor the general concept ofmagnitudes so far as theirdifferent

580 20 which belongs to the schema ofa triangle in general, andtherefore to its concept

580 29 to deal; but it relates onlyto a thing in general, as definingthe conditions under which the

581 23 of appearances is the conceptof a <thing> in general, and the<a^priori> synthetic knowledge ofthis

581 24 <a^priori> synthetic knowledgeof this thing in general can giveus nothing more than the mere ruleof

581 29 Synthetic propositions inregard to <things> in general, theintuition of which does not admitof being

582 36 <in concreto>, but to thetime-conditions in general, whichin experience may be found to bein accord

590 5 the principle of thepossibility of axioms in general,and is itself no more than aprinciple derived

600 10 it is counteracted, <in theprocess of enlisting generalacceptance>, by the vanity ofothers; and thus in

601 21 and estimating of the rightsof reason in general, inaccordance with the principles oftheir first

607 1 validity of the concept ofefficient cause in general, isbased on no insight, that is, onno

607 3 be ascribed to its necessity,but merely to its general utilityin the course of experience, andto a

607 37 far extended, the limits ofwhich we know in a general wayonly; but must rather be comparedto a sphere

608 21 And on this ground a generaldoubt regarding all dogmaticphilosophy

611 16 defining its <limits>, and

8 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationwhile creating a general mistrustfails to supply any determinate

619 16 in the individual case isstill subject to a general law,but as regards each individual itcertainly

620 22 conditions of the possibilityof things in general is just astranscendent a procedure as toassert

624 25 more than the determination ofan object in general in accordancewith this one single concept

624 28 under which alone a concept ofhappening in general isobjectively possible -- namely, byshowing that

630 3 Thus general logic, in itsanalytic portion, is a canon for

630 4 is a canon for understandingand reason in general; but only inregard to their form; it abstracts

631 36 and ordering of the worldcomprehensible in a general sortor way, but we should not be inthe least

636 30 considers only the freedom ofa rational being in general, andthe necessary conditions underwhich alone

636 39 employment of the freedom of arational being in general; andthat these laws command in an<absolute>

637 17 indeed have causality inrespect of freedom in general, itdoes not have causality in respectof nature

638 25 by moral laws, would itself bethe cause of general happiness,since rational beings, under the

656 1 experience or narration, or(as in the case of generalknowledge) through instruction

660 34 principles we can distinguishsome that are more general, and sohigher in rank than others; butwhere in

661 10 of subordination (of theparticular under the general)cannot determine the limits of ascience; in the

662 7 and principles which relate toobjects in general but take noaccount of objects that <may begiven

664 23 Such, then, in general, is theidea of metaphysics

664 27 having proved deceptive, ithas now fallen into generaldisrepute

665 28 authority, through thatcensorship which secures generalorder and harmony, and indeed thewell-being of

GENERALITY 2363 9 Similarly no one can answer in

all its generality the question,'What must a thing be, to be

660 31 but only a certain precedencein respect of generality, whichwas not sufficient to distinguishsuch

GENERALLY 8081 3 they decide for the former

alternative (which is generally

the view taken by mathematicalstudents of

084 25 If, as generally happens, westop short at this point, and donot

304 23 If, as generally happens, thejudgment that forms the conclusion

338 21 above proposition is intended,and is therefore generallyexpressed as 'The soul is notcorporeal'

381 3 peculiar to the problemconsists, as is generallyrecognised, in the assumedheterogeneity of the

600 7 is what breeds these secretdevices -- and this is generallythe case with those speculativejudgments which

601 31 to which both sides lay claim,and which is generally followed bya merely temporary armistice

627 7 upon empirical intuitions, thesubreption can generally beguarded against through repeatedcomparison of

GENERATE 4144 37 supply impressions but also

combine them so as to generateimages of objects

252 18 which we first give ourselvesan object and generate its concept-- for instance, with a givenline, to

252 22 it demands is exactly thatthrough which we first generatethe concept of such a figure

386 14 Reason does not reallygenerate any concept

GENERATED 22031 12 in a wise and great <Author of

the world> is generated solely bythe glorious order, beauty, and

134 1 belong to the act whereby itwas to be gradually generated

135 12 unity is impossible if theintuition cannot be generated inaccordance with a rule by means ofsuch a

154 13 Synthetic unity of themanifold of intuitions, asgenerated <a^priori>, is thus theground of the identity of

198 4 of a determinate space or timeare generated, that is, throughcombination of the homogeneous

198 28 their addition a determinatetime-magnitude is generated

200 11 So also is the number 12, asthus generated through thesynthesis of 7 with 5

202 7 This magnitude is generated inthe act of apprehension wherebythe empirical

204 25 Such an aggregate is notgenerated by continuing withoutbreak productive synthesis

210 27 and the real in theirperception, they can be generatedaccording to rules of amathematical synthesis

220 1 agree that the manifold ofappearances is always generated inthe mind successively

231 23 of the reality (b - a) is inlike manner generated through all

smaller degrees which arecontained

231 28 does not consist of thesemoments, but is generated by themas their effect

252 16 of the faculty of knowledgethrough which it is generated

260 1 with which this scienceoccupies itself, are generated inthe mind completely <a^priori>,they would

350 6 From perceptions knowledge ofobjects can be generated, eitherby mere play of imagination or byway of

385 15 the slumber of <fictitious>conviction such as is generated bya purely one-sided illusion, butat the same

429 33 another event which itselfagain is likewise generated, andthat in existence in generaleverything is

503 36 of the synthesis through whichthe concept is generated has beenspecifically proved; and suchproof, as

584 15 and the magnitude of anintuition that is therebygenerated (number), -- all this isthe work of reason

596 21 They serve to counteract otherpoisons generated in our bodilyhumours, and must have a place in

666 16 However gross the religiousconcepts generated by the ancientpractices which still persisted in

GENERATES 1036 41 time, the coexistence of which

with the changing generates theconcept of alteration

GENERATING 4153 11 because it is that self-

consiousness which, whilegenerating the representation '<Ithink>' (a representation

184 3 intuition in general, a unitydue to my generating time itselfin the apprehension of theintuition

198 23 small, without drawing it inthought, that is, generating froma point all its parts one afteranother

202 1 is also possible a synthesisin the process of generating themagnitude of a sensation from itsbeginning

GENERATION 11134 15 that is, not in any direct

manner with the <generation> ofthe representation, but only withthe outcome

185 22 The schema of magnitude is thegeneration (synthesis) of timeitself in the successive

199 11 synthesis of the productiveimagination in the generation offigures

232 25 in time is a determination oftime through the generation ofthis perception, and since time isalways and

232 27 and in all its parts amagnitude, is likewise the

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 9generation of a perception as amagnitude through all

434 3 as to be infinitely divisible;whether there is generation andproduction through freedom, orwhether

438 5 the occurrence of self-causedevents, that is, generationthrough <freedom>, then by anunavoidable law of

452 6 a given pair of parents thedescending line of generation mayproceed without end, and we canquite well

558 13 No windy hypotheses ofgeneration, extinction, andpalingenesis of souls will be

609 39 of concepts, and, as we maysay, this spontaneous generationon the part of our understandingand of our

619 7 Generation, in man as in non-rational creatures, is

GENERATIONS 2041 22 that in the interconnected

lives of all future generationsthere will never be any lack ofnew knowledge

453 4 proceeds from every member inthe series of generations to ahigher member, and no empiricallimit is

GENERATIVE 1387 1 to, not co-ordinated with, one

another, and generative of a[given] conditioned

GENERIC 1545 20 of these principles, we

discover a unity in the genericforms of the orbits, and thereby aunity in the

GENERICALLY 1266 32 to the manner in which they

are in themselves genericallydistinct from one another

GENUINE 10013 7 Such assistance is not

required by genuine students ofthe science, and, though always

204 24 of different appearances, andnot appearance as a genuinequantum

313 1 But it is not only where humanreason exhibits genuine causality,and where ideas are operativecauses

324 2 each of these sciences is analtogether pure and genuineproduct, or problem, of purereason

427 36 of reason, then he showed inthis regard a more genuinephilosophical spirit than anyother of the

440 1 empirical idealism, which,while it admits the genuinereality of space, denies theexistence of the

440 31 distinguished from dreams, ifboth dreams and genuineappearances cohere truly andcompletely in one

599 23 honesty, and modesty, we found

in the seemingly genuine examplesof goodness with which we were

656 39 knowledge, lie nowhere but inthe essential and genuineprinciples of reason, andconsequently cannot be

665 2 ceaselessly occupy itself,either in striving for genuineinsight into them, or in refutingthose who

GENUINELY 5051 19 such a sure and wide synthesis

as will lead to a genuinely newaddition to all previous knowledge

223 30 they would be merelyfictitious and without genuinelyuniversal validity

302 35 that knowledge derived fromprinciples which are genuinelysuch is something quite differentfrom knowledge

426 4 on its own proper ground,namely, the field of genuinelypossible experiences,investigating their laws

601 7 since neither of them can makehis thesis genuinelycomprehensible and certain, butonly attack and

GENUINENESS 1102 27 time yield a criterion of the

correctness and genuineness of allits components

GENUS 15052 33 and to mark out all this

knowledge, which forms a genus byitself, not in any cursoryoutline, but in a

314 21 The genus is <representation>in general

491 17 of reality which would becontained under that genus

539 12 that behind these varietiesthere is but one genus, nay, thatthere may even be a commonprinciple

539 32 we should not even have theconcept of a genus, or indeed anyother universal concept; and the

540 6 their agreement as comingunder the same genus, and whichprescribes to the understandingthat

540 20 and are always on the watchfor the unity of the genus; those,on the other hand, who are more

540 27 prescribing that, in beginningwith the genus, we descend to themanifold which may be

540 30 alternative procedure, that ofascending to the genus, weendeavour to secure the unity ofthe system

540 33 to the sphere of the conceptwhich marks out a genus, we can nomore determine how far it ispossible

541 1 Consequently, every genusrequires diversity of species, andthese in turn

541 31 of the species, and still moreso in that of the genus

542 26 as they one and all springfrom one highest genus, throughall degrees of a more and more

widely543 2 they can all be surveyed; and

from this higher genus we canproceed until we arrive at thehighest of

543 18 divisions of one singlehighest and universal genus

GEOGRAPHERS 1606 32 The celebrated David Hume was

one of those geographers of humanreason who have imagined that theyhave

GEOGRAPHY 1606 15 given time, but not the limits

of all possible geography

GEOMETERS 1025 13 it in accordance with the

example set by the geometers andphysicists, forms indeed the mainpurpose of

GEOMETRICAL 12019 21 author of even the least

important among the geometricaldemonstrations, even of thosewhich, for ordinary

068 33 The apodeictic certainty ofall geometrical propositions andthe possibility of their

069 12 For kindred reasons,geometrical propositions, that,for instance, in a triangle

070 26 For geometrical propositionsare one and all apodeictic, thatis

085 37 universality which arecharacteristic of all geometricalpropositions

096 20 Neither space nor any<a^priori> geometricaldetermination of it is atranscendental

122 29 of which space is the pureform -- where all geometricalknowledge, grounded as it is in<a^priori>

180 12 concept of a <plate> ishomogeneous with the puregeometrical concept of a <circle>

501 29 Thus the fact that everygeometrical proposition, as, forinstance, that a triangle

579 30 by means of an ostensiveconstruction (the geometricalconstruction of the objectsthemselves), we

580 18 one, and in this case is themethod of geometricalconstruction, by means of which Icombine in a

590 26 its proof, is deduced byreduction, is not indeedgeometrical in nature, but isstill constructive in a way

GEOMETRICIAN 3054 9 few fundamental propositions,

presupposed by the geometrician,are, indeed, really analytic, andrest on the

579 2 Now let the geometrician takeup these questions

585 32 I shall show that inphilosophy the geometrician can byhis method build only so many

10 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationhouses of

GEOMETRY 18053 23 as little is any fundamental

proposition of pure geometryanalytic

070 17 Geometry is a science whichdetermines the properties of

070 22 which go beyond the concept --as happens in geometry(Introduction, V)

071 6 that makes intelligible the<possibility> of geometry, as abody of <a^priori> syntheticknowledge

085 24 Since the propositions ofgeometry are synthetic <a^priori>,and are known with

086 9 have recourse to intuition, asis always done in geometry

122 23 Geometry, however, proceedswith security in knowledge

167 34 belong to a pure science, andconsequently not to geometry

167 39 productive imagination, andbelongs not only to geometry, buteven to transcendental philosophy

170 35 as <object> (as we arerequired to do in geometry),contains more than mere form ofintuition; it

199 9 The mathematics of space(geometry) is based upon thissuccessive synthesis of the

199 31 synthetic, but are not generallike those of geometry, andcannot, therefore, be calledaxioms but only

200 23 What geometry asserts of pureintuition is therefore undeniably

201 9 science which determines theseconcepts, namely geometry, wouldnot itself be possible

579 15 not only construct magnitudes(<quanta>) as in geometry; it alsoconstructs magnitude as such

579 29 by means of a symbolicconstruction, just as in geometryby means of an ostensiveconstruction (the

591 39 dogmas; the propositions ofarithmetic or geometry wouldhardly be so named

616 27 as absurd as to think ofproving a proposition of geometrymerely as a probability

GERM 2654 29 For this idea lies hidden in

reason, like a germ in which theparts are still undeveloped and

655 15 and all have had their schema,as the original germ, in the sheerself-development of reason

GERMAN 4235 21 The word community is in the

German language ambiguous273 35 'an <intellectual> world', as

is commonly done in Germanexposition

331 36 to good taste, have usurpedthe place of their Germanequivalents, both in this sectionand in the work

587 29 The German language has forthe [Latin] terms <exposition

GERMANS 1066 25 The Germans are the only

people who currently make use ofthe

GERMANY 2033 5 spirit of thoroughness which

is not extinct in Germany) how thesecure progress of a science is tobe

036 4 that the spirit ofthoroughness is not extinct inGermany, but has only beentemporarily overshadowed by

GET 3253 29 We can never get further than

proving, that without thisrelation

258 38 upon the sources of its ownknowledge, may indeed get alongquite satisfactorily, there is yetone task

478 24 regard to the causality offree actions, we can get as far asthe intelligible cause, but notbeyond

GETTING 1401 17 of extension boundaries of the

world-whole -- thus getting rid oftime and space

GIFT 2030 3 with a critique of pure

reason, yet such a gift is not tobe valued lightly

178 4 himself; and in the absence ofsuch a natural gift no rule thatmay be prescribed to him for this

GIFTS 1652 7 is not guilty of any partial

distribution of her gifts, andthat in regard to the essentialends of

GIVE 131018 4 quite precisely delimited; its

sole concern is to give anexhaustive exposition and a strictproof of

020 18 based upon fixed laws,constraining nature to give answerto questions of reason's owndetermining

025 21 chooses the objects of itsthinking, and can also give anexhaustive enumeration of thevarious ways in

029 4 that made on behalf ofmorality -- would have to give wayto this other contention, theopposite of

032 30 dogmatism we must not allowourselves to give free rein tothat loquacious shallowness, which

042 28 <a^priori>, and which perhapsserve only to give coherence toour sense-representations

058 4 Nor is much self-denial neededto give up these claims, seeingthat the undeniable, and

058 25 exhaustive application of suchan organon would give rise to asystem of pure reason

060 22 But it is not required to givean exhaustive analysis of these

concepts, nor a066 35 For this reason it is

advisable either to give up usingthe name in this sense of critiqueof

068 10 obtain light upon thesequestions, let us first give anexposition of the concept of space

075 13 be derived from experience,for experience would give neitherstrict universality nor apodeictic

086 9 You therefore give yourself anobject in intuition

086 14 You must therefore giveyourself an object <a^priori> inintuition, and

088 19 must affect the mind, and onlyin this way can it give rise to anintuition of itself

090 14 original>, that is, is notsuch as can itself give us theexistence of its object -- a modeof

099 5 of an art so specious, throughwhich we give to all ourknowledge, however uninstructed wemay

106 18 can, therefore, be discoveredif we can give an exhaustivestatement of the functions ofunity

112 27 The concepts which give<unity> to this pure synthesis,and which consist

114 36 to add the derivative andsubsidiary, and so to give acomplete picture of the familytree of the

115 9 To note, and, where possible,to give a complete inventory ofthese concepts, would be

119 30 and so in an <a^posteriori>analytic manner give us back andaccord with what has previouslybeen

127 24 these concepts and theprinciples to which they giverise, to pass beyond the limits ofexperience

131 17 as I trust, in the sectionreferred to, finally give way tocomplete insight

144 10 To this faculty I give thetitle, imagination

144 25 only to accidentalcollocations; and so would notgive rise to any knowledge

158 22 able to accept theinterpretation which logiciansgive of judgment in general

163 22 Only <our> sensible andempirical intuition can give tothem body and meaning

163 35 so much as possible, not beingin a position to give anyintuition corresponding to theconcept, and

165 12 the subjective condition underwhich alone it can give to theconcepts of understanding acorresponding

175 34 We have now to give an accountof their employment, and the

177 24 knowledge, the sole task thatremains to it is to give ananalytical exposition of the formof knowledge

177 27 If it sought to give general

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 11instructions how we are to subsumeunder

196 30 titles I have intentionallychosen in order to give prominenceto differences in the evidence andin

206 15 Let us give an example210 15 that the rule of its synthesis

can at once give, that is to say,can bring into being, this

215 26 We can therefore give anappearance the title 'substance'just for the

242 10 of experience), for we can, asa matter of fact, give it anobject completely <a^priori>, thatis, can

252 18 nothing save the synthesisthrough which we first giveourselves an object and generateits concept

257 13 a fog bank and many a swiftlymelting iceberg give the deceptiveappearance of farther shores

264 18 the principle of causality)must, therefore, give place to themodest title of a mere Analytic of

273 23 the observation of the starryheavens, would give an account ofthe former; theoretical astronomy

273 26 according to Newton's laws ofgravitation, would give an accountof the second, namely, of an

284 15 General mechanics can indeedgive the empirical condition ofthis conflict in an

300 31 Now that I have to give anexplanation of this highestfaculty of

301 13 table of the functions of theformer will at once give us thegenealogical tree of the conceptsof

303 8 to any object, but tounderstanding, in order to give tothe manifold knowledge of thelatter an

307 17 by an ascent to ever higherconditions and so to give to ourknowledge the greatest possibleunity of

309 15 concepts of understandingcategories, so we shall give a newname to the concepts of purereason

320 12 to the practical concepts, andin that way may give support tothe moral ideas themselves,bringing

324 20 deduction>, such as we havebeen able to give of thecategories, is, strictly speaking

334 20 wherein the thoughts, as beingtransitory, give place to oneanother

339 8 in short, everything whichouter senses can give us --neither are nor contain thoughts,feeling

344 13 Consequently, I can give nonebut tautological answers to allquestions

347 16 into difficulties, and findsitself obliged to give way toempirical idealism, in that itregards the

349 31 We must give full credence tothis paradoxical but correct

354 15 I admit that this does notgive me any further knowledge ofthe properties of

356 39 through long custom, it isimpossible at once to give totheir correction that claritywhich can be

360 31 Now on speculative principlesno one can give the least groundfor any such assertion

364 11 Yet this does not give us thatknowledge of the soul for which weare

365 25 If we desire to give a logicaltitle to the paralogism containedin

368 22 (categories), but are merefunctions which do not givethought an object to be known, andaccordingly do

368 23 an object to be known, andaccordingly do not give evenmyself as object

377 16 that we should regard thisrefusal of reason to givesatisfying response to ourinquisitive probings

398 31 determine (occupy or limit)it, or rather which give anempirical intuition in accordancewith its

405 31 Were we to give heed to them,then beside the mathematical point

425 7 as to the conditions of itssynthesis it can give no answerwhich does not lead to the endless

429 5 hard to accept a principle forwhich he can give nojustification, still more toemploy concepts

430 10 the only way of escape fromtheir perplexities to giveadhesion to one or other of theopposing parties

438 34 Possible experience is thatwhich can alone give reality toour concepts; in its absence aconcept

458 34 the <determining> of themagnitude, and does not give any<determinate> concept

458 39 far, in order [by means of theregress] to give that empiricalmagnitude which first becomes

469 33 I have thought it advisable togive this outline sketch of thesolution of our

473 19 impulses may impel me to<will>, they can never give riseto the '<ought>', but only to awilling

473 24 or of pure reason (thegood),reason will not give way toany ground which is empiricallygiven

478 29 circumstances the intelligiblecharacter should give just theseappearances and this empirical

487 11 entirely different nature; noone can explain or give anintelligible concept of them; eachis a kind

498 27 Thus the argument has failedto give us the least concept ofthe properties of a

498 37 assumption that there exists asupreme being to give effect andconfirmation to the practical

laws, in507 2 in the principle that bare

positives (realities) give rise tono contradiction, cannot be deniedto it

511 24 intellectual concept of thecontingent cannot give rise to anysynthetic proposition, such asthat

513 2 But it does not givesatisfaction concerning thequestion of its own

514 12 For since it is not requiredto give any credentials of itsreality save only the need

514 19 very essence of reason that weshould be able to give an accountof all our concepts, opinions, and

523 5 'immeasurable' in power andexcellence -- give no determinateconcept at all, and do not really

523 22 Physico-theology is thereforeunable to give any determinateconcept of the supreme cause of

529 4 and intuition, might thereforeperhaps give additional weight toother proofs (if such there

529 6 understanding for theologicalknowledge, and to give it anatural leaning in this direction,not to

529 28 refuse to meet my demand thathe should at least give asatisfactory account how, and bywhat kind of

530 5 confine myself to the moderatedemand, that they give, in termswhich are universal and which arebased

533 29 in reality proceed; none theless it serves to give to theseconcepts the greatest [possible]unity

535 38 itself establish rules, and atthe same time to give to thenumerous and diverse rules of the

546 35 thought, all restrictingconditions, which give rise to anindeterminate manifoldness, beingleft

547 26 those differences in theinterest of reason that give riseto differing modes of thought

548 22 reason in that regard, theywill not only give rise todisputes but will be a positivehindrance

549 12 themselves; any deceptiveillusion to which they giveoccasion must be due solely totheir

549 35 may differ from that which wehave been able to give of thecategories

550 37 our knowledge to more objectsthan experience can give, but as<regulative> principles of thesystematic

553 26 but, on the other hand, we arein a position to give asatisfactory answer to all thosequestions

556 16 since the systematicconnection which reason can giveto the empirical employment of theunderstanding

556 30 unity an object; and sinceexperience can never give an

12 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationexample of complete systematicunity, the

569 17 principles of transcendentknowledge, they give rise, by adazzling and deceptive illusion,to

575 4 from <culture>, which isintended solely to give a certainkind of skill, and not to cancelany

580 13 The former would only give usan empirical proposition (based onthe

581 25 synthetic knowledge of thisthing in general can give usnothing more than the mere rule ofthe

581 26 of the synthesis of that whichperception may give <a^posteriori>

582 23 a position to construct theconcept, that is, to give it<a^priori> in intuition, and inthis way to

595 10 admitted, without our havingon that account to give up theseaffirmations, which have at leastthe

597 36 miracle of resurrection), hewould not be able to give anyother answer than that he wasconcerned for

598 6 with the interests ofreligion), and so to give pain toa well-intentioned man, simplybecause he

599 4 In this dialectic no victoryis gained that need give us causefor anxiety

599 26 represent ourselves as betterthan we are, and to giveexpression to sentiments which wedo not share

600 4 we feel in regard to our ownassertions, or to give anappearance of coclusiveness togrounds of

605 5 as to its pretensions, and tomake it willing to give a hearingto criticism

608 35 of these ideas, it is underobligation to give an account oftheir validity or of theirillusory

615 39 we have to call in auxiliaryhypotheses, they give rise to thesuspicion that they are merefictions

617 12 idea we can never haveknowledge sufficient to givecertainty to our proposition, ouropponent is

618 11 But how can we do so, unlesswe give it freedom, nay,nourishment, to send out shoots

621 36 to which so hazardous a coursemust rightly give rise

629 22 the domain of pure reason, andwhich, it may be, give occasion toerror solely owing to

637 19 although moral principles ofreason can indeed give rise tofree actions, they cannot giverise to

637 19 can indeed give rise to freeactions, they cannot give rise tolaws of n

641 36 the world, what the cause mustbe that can alone give to this law

its appropriate effect, and so forus

643 19 of reason in many othersciences, could give rise only tocrude and incoherent concepts ofthe

649 21 nature (physico-theology) mustalways necessarily give rise

650 1 yet does so without my beingin a position to give aspeculative account of it

651 8 as must compel the moststubborn scepticism to give way

651 18 as <negative> belief, whichmay not, indeed, give rise tomorality and good sentiments, butmay

651 19 to morality and goodsentiments, but may still giverise to an analogon of these,namely, a powerful

663 18 nothing more from experiencethan is required to <give> us anobject of outer or of inner sense

667 3 change in metaphysics cameabout, but shall only give acursory sketch of the variousideas which gave

GIVEN 686012 15 is, as it were, the search for

the cause of a given effect, andto that extent is somewhat

022 16 something in regard to themprior to their being given

022 35 thing, that the <experience>in which alone, as given objects,they can be known, conform to the

023 2 presuppose as being in meprior to objects being given tome, and therefore as being<a^priori>

023 8 in the manner in which reasonthinks them -- be given inexperience, the attempts atthinking them (for

023 16 objects, commensurate withthem, can be given in experience-- the secure path of a science

024 19 that our representation ofthings, as they are given to us,does not conform to these thingsas they

024 24 far as we know them, that is,so far as they are given to us,but only so far as we do not knowthem

027 14 of things, save in so far asintuition can be givencorresponding to these concepts;and that we can

033 25 which, not perhaps without myfault, may have given rise to themany misunderstandings into which

036 23 In order to determine to whichgiven intuitions objects outsideme actually correspond

045 35 to which no correspondingobject can ever be given inexperience

047 6 the intuition, in beingthought, can itself be given<a^priori>, and is thereforehardly to be

048 4 entirely different order, inwhich it attaches to givenconcepts others completely foreignto them, and

053 9 to the concept of 7, unit byunit, the five given in intuition

053 34 to join in thought a certainpredicate to a given concept, andthis necessity is inherent in the

054 2 is not what we <ought> to joinin thought to the given concept,but what we <actually> think init, even

054 37 we must employ principleswhich add to the given conceptsomething that was not containedin it

056 15 this <kind of knowledge> is tobe looked upon as given; that isto say, metaphysics actuallyexists, if

061 37 Through the former, objectsare given to us; through thelatter, they are thought

062 3 the condition under whichobjects are given to us, it willbelong to transcendental

062 5 which alone the objects ofhuman knowledge are given mustprecede those under which they arethought

065 10 takes place only in so far asthe object is given to us

065 14 Objects are <given> to us bymeans of sensibility, and it alone

065 19 because in no other way can anobject be given to us

066 6 therefore, while the matter ofall appearance is given to us<a^posteriori> only, its form mustlie

068 14 it contains that whichexhibits the concept <as givena^priori>

069 18 Space is represented as aninfinite <given> magnitude

069 32 Space is represented as aninfinite given magnitude

070 14 (1) that such knowledge doesreally flow from the givenconcept, (2) that this knowledgeis possible only

070 15 knowledge is possible only onthe assumption of a given mode ofexplaining the concept

071 27 understood how the form of allappearances can be given prior toall actual perceptions, and soexist in

075 3 Time is, therefore, given<a^priori>

075 22 same time; and therepresentation which can be givenonly through a single object isintuition

075 31 representation, <time>, musttherefore be given as unlimited

075 32 But when an object is so giventhat its parts, and every quantityof it, can be

075 34 limitation, the wholerepresentation cannot be giventhrough concepts, since theycontain only partial

078 16 respect of all objects whichallow of ever being given to oursenses

078 18 is always sensible, no objectcan ever be given to us inexperience which does not conformto the

078 24 that belong to things in

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 13themselves can never be given tous through the senses

083 14 most enlightened knowledge ofthat which is alone given us,namely, their appearance

084 5 and the intelligible as merelylogical, has given a completelywrong direction to all

085 30 concepts or throughintuitions; and these are giveneither <a^priori> or<a^posteriori>

086 5 Or take the proposition,"Given three straight lines, afigure is possible", and

086 27 the object, since this objectis [on that view] givenantecedently to your knowledge,and not by means

086 39 objects are therefore mereappearances, and not given us asthings in themselves which existin this

087 16 themselves apart from changeof location, is not given throughintuition

088 11 and if all that is manifold inthe subject were given by the<activity of the self>, the inner

088 14 perception of the manifoldwhich is antecedently given in thesubject, and the mode in whichthis

088 15 subject, and the mode in whichthis manifold is given in the mindmust, as non-spontaneous, beentitled

088 32 them, are always regarded assomething actually given

088 33 Since, however, in therelation of the given object tothe subject, such propertiesdepend

089 1 be outside me, or that my soulonly <seems to> be given in myself-consciousness

090 31 determines its existencesolely in relation to givenobjects

091 3 <a^priori> judgment we seek togo out beyond the given concept,we come in the <a^priori>intuitions

092 13 Through the first an object<is given> to us, through thesecond the object is <thought>

093 10 To neither of these powers maya preference be given over theother

093 11 Without sensibility no objectwould be given to us, withoutunderstanding no object would be

095 13 hinder or help itsapplication, and which are allgiven only empirically

096 6 <a^priori> in ourselves oronly empirically given, accordingto the laws which theunderstanding

098 2 general criterion of truthcannot possibly be given

100 9 that objects to which it canbe applied be given to us inintuition

100 25 without distinction -- uponobjects which are not given to us,nay, perhaps cannot in any way begiven

100 26 given to us, nay, perhapscannot in any way be given

105 26 of many representations, andamong them of a givenrepresentation that is immediatelyrelated to an

109 32 they constitute the wholecontent of one given knowledge

111 26 <pure>, if the manifold is notempirical but is given <a^priori>,as is the manifold in space andtime

111 29 the representations mustthemselves be given, and thereforeas regards <content> no concepts

111 31 Synthesis of a manifold (be itgiven empirically or <a^priori>)is what first gives

112 23 What must first be given --with a view to the <a^priori>knowledge of all

115 26 them; and a systematic'topic', such as that here given,affords sufficient guidance as tothe proper

116 28 <necessity> is just theexistence which is given throughpossibility itself

119 2 number of true consequencesthat follow from a given concept,the more criteria are there of its

122 11 Plainly the only deductionthat can be given of thisknowledge is one that istranscendental

122 31 objects, so far as their formis concerned, are given, throughthe very knowledge of them,<a^priori>

123 35 represent the conditions underwhich objects are given inintuition

124 8 For appearances can certainlybe given in intuitionindependently of functions of the

125 2 in the understanding, or mustbe entirely given up as a merephantom of the brain

126 4 possible, first, <intuition>,through which it is given, thoughonly as appearance; secondly,<concept>

126 11 they appear, that is, beempirically intuited and given

126 19 of the senses through whichsomething is given, a <concept> ofan object as being thereby given

126 20 given, a <concept> of anobject as being thereby given,that is to say, as appearing

129 12 in general, through whichobjects can be given to us,constitute the field, the wholeobject, of

130 5 though perhaps in themselvespossible, cannot be given in anyexperience

131 14 of these elements of theunderstanding is first given inSection 3, immediately following

132 31 of reproduction, if a certainname were sometimes given to this,sometimes to that object, or wereone

135 29 intuitions only in so far asit represents in any givenappearances the necessaryreproduction of their

137 15 Appearances are the soleobjects which can be given to usimmediately, and that in themwhich relates

137 37 in so far as through themobjects are to be given to us,must stand under those <a^priori>rules of

140 27 Were the unity given in itselfindependently of the first sourcesof

141 13 as empirical, namely, in itsapplication to given appearances

141 19 with the appearances wherebythey were given, that is, inrecognition

143 38 What is first given to us isappearance

151 8 THE manifold ofrepresentations can be given in anintuition which is purelysensible, that is

152 1 <combination> is the only onewhich cannot be given throughobjects

152 9 can anything that allows ofanalysis be given to the facultyof representation

152 20 functions combination, andtherefore unity of given concepts,is already thought

153 4 That representation which canbe given prior to all thought isentitled intuition

153 18 For the manifoldrepresentations, which are givenin an intuition, would not be oneand all <my>

153 28 of the apperception of amanifold which is given inintuition contains a synthesis of

153 37 so far, therefore, as I canunite a manifold of givenrepresentations in <oneconsciousness>, is it

154 3 The thought that therepresentations given in intuitionone and all below

154 20 <a^priori>, and of bringingthe manifold of givenrepresentations under the unity ofapperception

155 3 the necessity of a synthesisof the manifold given inintuition, without which thethoroughgoing

155 5 as simple representation,nothing manifold is given; only inintuition, which is distinct fromthe

155 7 which is distinct from the'I', can a manifold be given; andonly through <combination> in one

155 9 all the manifold would <eoipso> be given, would be<intuitive>; our understanding canonly

155 13 of the manifold ofrepresentations that are given tome in an intuition, because I callthem one

155 18 under which allrepresentations that are given tome must stand, but under whichthey have also

156 1 as the manifoldrepresentations of intuition are<given> to us, they are subject to

14 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationthe former of these

156 5 nothing can be thought orknown, since the givenrepresentations would not have incommon the act

156 9 knowledge consists in thedeterminate relation of givenrepresentations to an object; andan <object> is

156 10 is that in the concept ofwhich the manifold of a givenintuition is <united>

156 27 bring into being a determinatecombination of the given manifold,so that the unity of this act isat the

157 6 no more than that all <my>representations in any givenintuition must be subject to thatcondition under

157 14 in the representation 'I am',nothing manifold is given

157 30 is that unity through whichall the manifold given in anintuition is united in a conceptof the

157 35 for such [objective]combination is empirically given

158 4 merely as intuition ingeneral, which contains a givenmanifold, is subject to theoriginal unity of

158 12 besides is merely derived fromthe former under given conditions<in concreto>, has only subjective

158 16 which is empirical is not, asregards what is given, necessarilyand universally valid

159 1 I investigate more preciselythe relation of the given modes ofknowledge in any judgment, and

159 6 a judgment is nothing but themanner in which given modes ofknowledge are brought to theobjective

159 9 is employed to distinguish theobjective unity of givenrepresentations from thesubjective

160 5 The manifold given in asensible intuition is necessarilysubject to

160 8 act of understanding by whichthe manifold of givenrepresentations (be theyintuitions or concepts)

160 11 All the manifold, therefore,so far as it is given in a singleempirical intuition, is<determined>

160 16 employed in determination ofthe manifold of a given intuition(cf. $13)

160 17 Consequently, the manifold ina given intuition is necessarilysubject to the

160 26 shows that the empiricalconsciousness of a given manifoldin a single intuition is subjectto a

160 34 <unity of intuition>, by whichan object is given

160 35 includes in itself a synthesisof the manifold given for anintuition, and so already containsthe

161 1 which the manifold for anempirical intuition is given, and

must direct attention solely tothe unity

161 5 from the mode in which theempirical intuition is given insensibility, that its unity is noother than

161 7 to $20) prescribes to themanifold of a given intuition ingeneral

161 13 namely, that the manifold tobe intuited must be given prior tothe synthesis of understanding,and

161 17 which should not represent toitself given objects, but throughwhose representation the

161 18 representation the objectsshould themselves be given orproduced), the categories wouldhave no

161 23 whereby it brings thesynthesis of a manifold, given toit from elsewhere in intuition, tothe unity

161 26 knowledge, that is, theintuition, which must be given toit by the object

162 3 and secondly, the intuition,through which it is given

162 3 For if no intuition could begiven corresponding to theconcept, the concept would

162 24 Now <things in space and time>are given only in so far as theyare perceptions (that is

163 7 under which alone objects canpossibly be given to us, are validno further than for objects of

163 25 an object of a <non-sensible>intuition to be given, we canindeed represent it through allthe

164 23 to determine inner sensethrough the manifold of givenrepresentations, in accordancewith the synthetic

164 30 that is, application toobjects which can be given us inintuition

166 16 of intuitions, and cannot,even if intuitions be given insensibility, take them up <intoitself> in

166 23 to say, in respect of themanifold which may be given to itin accordance with the form ofsensible

167 26 as an object that is<thought>, in so far as I am givento myself [as something other or]beyond that [I]

168 29 mode of intuition, wherebythis manifold is given

169 4 mode in which the manifold,which I combine, is given in innerintuition

169 24 intuition which is notintellectual and cannot be givenby the understanding itself, notas it would know

169 27 Existence is already giventhereby, but the mode in which Iam to determine

169 29 is, the manifold belonging toit, is not thereby given

169 29 In order that it be given,self-intuition is required; andsuch intuition

169 30 required; and such intuitionis conditioned by a given<a^priori> form, namely, time,which is sensible

171 4 determined in space or in timemust conform, is given <a^priori>as the condition of the synthesisof

171 7 the unity of the combinationof the manifold of a given<intuition in general> in anoriginal

170 36 it also contains <combination>of the manifold, given accordingto the form of sensibility, in an

171 31 the sensibility) space andtime are first <given> asintuitions, the unity of this<a^priori>

172 7 without which that relation oftime could not be given in anintuition as being <determined> inrespect

173 37 and this knowledge, in so faras its object is given, isempirical

177 21 whether something does or doesnot stand under a given rule(<casus datae legis>)

179 13 the universal condition ofrules), which is given in the pureconcept of understanding, it canalso

179 22 marks the conditions underwhich objects can be given inharmony with these concepts

181 1 from those which represent it<in concreto>, as given, nospecial discussion of theapplicability of

181 35 and can have no meaning, if noobject is given for them, or atleast for the elements of which

181 38 all question as to whether andhow these may be given to us

182 2 that the only manner in whichobjects can be given to us is bymodification of our sensibility;and

189 34 or else in a manner for whichno ground is given, either<a^priori> or <a^posteriori>,sufficient

192 8 In the analytic judgment wekeep to the given concept, andseek to extract something from it

192 12 synthetic judgments I have toadvance beyond the given concept,viewing as in relation with theconcept

192 18 Granted, then, that we mustadvance beyond a given concept inorder to compare it syntheticallywith

193 1 object must be capable ofbeing in some manner given

193 4 That an object be given (ifthis expression be taken, not asreferring to

197 11 to inner sense (alldifferences among the givenrepresentations being ignored)

197 16 to discuss them in the orderin which they are given in theabove table

198 12 the same synthetic unity ofthe manifold of the given sensibleintuition as that whereby the

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 15unity of

199 6 as aggregates, as complexes ofpreviously given parts

199 19 that is, as regards the answerto be given to the question, 'Whatis the magnitude of a

200 27 infinite divisibility of linesor angles, must be given up

201 4 are mere appearances, asobjects in themselves, given tothe understanding

202 9 a certain time increase fromnothing = 0 to the given measure

202 26 represent <a^priori> thatwhich may always be given<a^posteriori> in experience

202 28 is, without a particularsensation having to be given),something that can be known<a^priori>, this

203 13 is always smaller than thedifference between the givensensation and zero or completenegation

204 7 continua>, because no part ofthem can be given save as enclosedbetween limits (points or

204 14 viewed as constituents capableof being given prior to space ortime, neither space nor time

205 10 of determining it to theopposite of a certain given state,may be possible, the <a^priori>

208 13 a synthesis that advancesuniformly from 0 to the givenempirical consciousness

208 15 Consequently, though allsensations as such are given only<a^posteriori>,their property ofpossessing

211 1 If, however, a perception isgiven in a time-relation to someother perception, then

211 10 so that if three members ofthe proportion are given, thefourth is likewise given, that is,can be

211 11 the proportion are given, thefourth is likewise given, that is,can be constructed

211 13 of two <qualitative>relations; and from three givenmembers we can obtain <a^priori>knowledge only

220 10 in themselves, and yet arewhat alone can be given to us toknow, in spite also of the factthat

220 25 as representation, while theappearance which is given to me,notwithstanding that it is nothingbut the

222 19 The advance, on the otherhand, from a given time to thedeterminate time that follows is a

225 21 state as a correlate of theevent which is given; and thoughthis correlate is, indeed

227 3 a synthesis of apprehension ofthe manifold of a givenappearance, the order isdetermined in the object

230 19 it should be possible thatupon one state in a given momentan opposite state may follow inthe next

230 22 knowledge of actual forces,which can only be given

empirically, as, for instance, ofthe moving

232 22 That is to say, its parts aregiven only in time, and onlythrough the synthesis of

232 23 only through the synthesis oftime; they are not givenantecedently to the synthesis

232 33 it dwells in us prior to allappearance that is given, mustcertainly be capable of beingknown

238 8 reality for us -- must finallybe capable of being given to us

239 33 unity, in which alone objectsof knowledge can be given

241 19 only <a^posteriori> as beingconcepts which are given throughexperience itself

242 30 in experience, through whichalone objects are given to us

243 10 only with the question whethersuch a thing be so given us thatthe perception of it can, if needbe

245 29 as in all cases where we areinferring from given effects todeterminate causes

247 27 <a^priori>, relatively to someother previously given existence;and since, even so, we can thenarrive

247 30 in the context of theexperience, of which the givenperception is a part, thenecessity of existence

247 34 known as necessary under thecondition of other givenappearances, save the existence ofeffects from

247 35 appearances, save theexistence of effects from givencauses, in accordance with laws ofcausality

248 5 we can know only from otherstates, which are given inperception, in accordance withempirical laws

248 11 those <effects> in nature thecauses of which are given to us,and the character of necessity in

248 18 grounded upon it of inferring<a^priori> from a given existence(a cause) to another existence(the

249 10 upon questions that concernthe use to be made of givenappearances for the obtaining ofempirical

249 36 context of a singleexperience, of which every givenperception is a part, a part whichtherefore

250 10 the only kind of knowledge inwhich objects are given to us

250 15 can deal only with thesynthesis of that which is given

250 36 in thoroughgoing connectionwith that which is given inperception, and consequently thatmore than

250 38 is possible, cannot beinferred from what is given; andstill less can any such inferencebe drawn

250 39 be drawn independently ofanything being given -- sincewithout material nothing

whatsoever can251 21 from its proper mathematical

significance, have given to it,namely, that to postulate shouldmean to

251 27 they may be, all critique ofunderstanding is given up

252 19 and generate its concept --for instance, with a given line,to describe a circle on a planefrom a

252 20 line, to describe a circle ona plane from a given point

253 18 of thought> for the making ofknowledge from given intuitions

253 25 is nothing which can enable usto go out beyond a given concept,and to connect another with it

253 40 and therefore of the knowledgeof an object given in <empiricalintuition>

254 30 Even the change from being tonot-being of a given state of athing, in which all alteration

255 10 Now how it is possible thatfrom a given state of a thing anopposite state should follow

257 27 Although we have already givena sufficient answer to thesequestions in the

258 18 the sum of all knowledgewherein objects can be given tous, we are not satisfied with theexposition

259 27 Now the object cannot be givento a concept otherwise than inintuition; for

264 14 of sensibility within whichalone objects can be given to us

264 20 Thought is the act whichrelates given intuition to anobject

264 22 If the mode of this intuitionis not in any way given, theobject is merely transcendental,and the

265 5 the formal condition underwhich something can be given inintuition

265 7 For in that case nothing isgiven that could be subsumed underthe concept

265 35 of understanding, and which,nevertheless, can be given as suchto an intuition, although not toone that

266 18 intuition, although not to onethat is sensible -- giventherefore <coram intuituintellectuali> -- such

266 8 <a^priori> in oneconsciousness the manifold givenin intuition; and apart,therefore, from the only

266 11 Through these forms an objectis at least given, whereas a modeof combining the manifold -- a

266 14 that intuition wherein themanifold can alone be given,signifies nothing at all

266 30 the manner in which the twoworlds can be first given to ourknowledge, and in conformity withthis

268 38 the categories represent nospecial object, given to theunderstanding alone, but onlyserve to

16 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translation269 21 of something in general,

through that which is given insensibility, in order thereby toknow

270 32 from the sensible, in whichsuch an object may be given

271 5 mode (the sensibility) inwhich they may be given

271 7 For we cannot assume that suchobjects can be given, withoutpresupposing the possibility ofanother

271 13 with other modes of knowledgethat involve given concepts whichit serves to limit, I entitle that

271 36 function of thought, throughwhich no object is given to me,and by which I merely think thatwhich may

271 37 me, and by which I merelythink that which may be given inintuition

272 13 objects outside the field ofsensibility can be given, andthrough which the understandingcan be

272 31 for their relation to anyobject more must be given thanmerely the unity of thought --namely, in

274 3 as merely intelligible, thatis to say, as being given to theunderstanding alone, and not tothe senses

274 37 made from the mode in which anobject may be given

275 21 way in which such intelligibleobjects might be given

276 10 It is the consciousness of therelation of given representationsto our different sources of

276 28 distinction of the cognitivefaculty to which the givenconcepts belong

277 29 For this reason theinterrelations of givenrepresentations can be determinedonly through

278 3 of the faculty of knowledge towhich the given representationsbelong, the representations must

278 39 plurality and numericaldifference are already given us byspace itself, the condition ofouter

280 8 being made from alldifferences in that which is givenand from the mode in which it isdetermined

280 11 In any judgment we can callthe given concepts logical matter(<i.e.> matter for the

280 22 definite fashion, demands thatsomething be first given, at leastin concept

281 6 as its original form, itfollows that the form is given byitself, and that so far is thematter (or the

281 11 formal intuition (time andspace) as antecedently given

281 26 and orators could make use inorder under given headings ofthought to find what would bestsuit

282 3 they are thought by the pureunderstanding or given inappearance by sensibility

283 21 in intuition (wherein alonethe objects can be given), andleft entirely out of account the

287 17 The reason of this is that itis not given to us to observe ourown mind with any other

288 5 is an addition from outside,which of the two is given andwhich should serve only as a modeof thinking

288 6 should serve only as a mode ofthinking what is given

289 34 intuition wherein the objectof this concept is given; they donot, however, belong to theconcept but

290 1 intuition, wherein reality(<e.g.> motion) is given, thereare conditions (oppositedirections)

290 28 which alone objects of outerintuition can be given us -- thosefrom which the pure concept has[as a

291 8 which are absolutely [<i.e.>independently] given, and withoutthese are impossible

291 23 does not arise in the case ofthings as given in intuition withdeterminations that express

291 30 and permanent, and throughthese we are given a determinateobject

292 17 of our sensible intuition, bywhich objects are given us; if weabstract from these objects, the

296 8 If light were not given to thesenses we could not representdarkness

303 14 These will be given in thecourse of our argument

304 25 whether it does not followfrom judgments already given, andthrough which a quite differentobject is

304 30 of the conclusion can besubsumed under the givencondition, then the conclusion isdeduced from

305 6 it a merely subordinatefaculty, for imposing on givenmodes of knowledge a certain form,called logical

306 27 through our assuming that ifthe conditioned is given, thewhole series of conditions,subordinated to

306 29 is therefore itselfunconditioned -- is likewisegiven, that is, is contained inthe object and its

310 39 so far transcend the bounds ofexperience that no given empiricalobject can ever coincide withthem, but

311 33 knowledge, provided only thelatter was pure and givencompletely <a^priori>

315 28 term for what is asserted) ofthis judgment is given; and afterI have subsumed the predicateunder

316 2 the major premiss in its wholeextension under a given condition

316 8 of the <totality> of the<conditions> for any givenconditioned

318 37 of reason to which no

corresponding object can be givenin sense-experience

319 14 of a maximum, it can never becorrespondingly given <inconcreto>

319 25 rules, the idea of practicalreason can always be givenactually <in concreto>, althoughonly in part

320 29 of a possible judgment underthe condition of a given judgment)

320 29 The given judgment is theuniversal rule (major premiss)

321 15 Now every series the exponentof which is given (in categoricalor hypothetical judgment) can be

321 23 on the side of the grounds orconditions of a given knowledge,in other words, of the <ascending>

321 28 the former case the knowledge(<conclusio>) is given only asconditioned, we cannot arrive atit by

321 31 of the series on the side ofthe conditions are given (totalityin the series of the premisses);only

321 35 of becoming>, not one alreadypresupposed or given <in itscompleteness>, and therefore anadvance

321 39 in the ascending line ascompleted and as given in theirtotality

322 31 concepts, the object of whichcan never be given empirically andwhich therefore lie entirely

324 16 of the completelyunconditioned <in a series> ofgiven conditions, and finally howthe mere form of the

324 23 in fact, no relation to anyobject that could be given ascoinciding with them

324 33 Once we are given a complete(and unconditioned) condition, no

325 40 as enabling us to start fromwhat is immediately given us inexperience -- advancing from thedoctrine of

328 12 totality of the series ofconditions for any givenappearance

328 20 objects in general, in so faras they can be given me, have tobe thought, I conclude to the

330 5 special distinction orempirical determination is given,is not to be regarded as empiricalknowledge but

330 22 only, that since our starting-point is a given thing, 'I' asthinking being, we begin with the

334 6 take our start from thepermanence of an object given inexperience as permanent

335 35 This proof can very easily begiven the customary syllogisticcorrectness of form

340 10 kinds of substances) think,would have to be given up; and weshould have to fall back on thecommon

343 22 This permanence, however, isin no way given prior to thatnumerical identity of our self

344 21 of which can only be inferredas a cause of given perceptions,

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 17has a merely doubtful existence

344 24 and that we can only inferthem as the cause of givenperceptions

345 1 [not in the empirical] sense)is never given directly inperception

345 15 Now the inference from a giveneffect to a determinate cause isalways uncertain

345 39 forms of our intuition, notdeterminations given as existingby themselves, nor conditions of

346 2 which regards time and spaceas something given in themselves,independently of our sensibility

348 35 (Once sensation is given -- ifreferred to an object in general,though not

349 4 think objects of sensibleintuition must first be given

349 12 is represented in it; andconversely, what is given in it,that is, represented throughperception

349 14 For if it were not real, thatis, immediately given throughempirical intuition, it could notbe

349 23 of all objects of outerintuition, is actually given inthis space, independently of allimaginative

349 26 us> (in the transcendentalsense) should be given, spaceitself being nothing outside our

351 37 substance in the [field of]appearance, is really given toouter sense, just as the thinking'I', also as

351 39 as substance in the [field of]appearance, is given to innersense

353 29 of knowledge only in so far assomething else is given inintuition which provides materialfor a

354 7 concept of our thinking selfwhich we have just given

356 17 in the effects to which theyare supposed to have given rise ininner sense

357 40 representations, but setsthem, just as they are given us insensible intuition, as objectsoutside us

362 2 of the synthesis of theconditions, for a givenconditioned

363 31 an object; for by intuitionalone is the object given, whichthereupon is thought in accordancewith

363 34 predicates of its intuitionmust first be given me, and I mustbe able to distinguish in these

368 15 that I think, but only in sofar as I determine a givenintuition with respect to theunity of

369 27 (<e.g.> in the parts ofmatter) -- should be thus given medirectly, as if by revelation, inthe poorest

369 34 any intuition of the subject,whereby it is given as object, andcannot therefore signify the

370 2 require various synthetic

judgments, based upon givenintuition

370 9 outside me through whichrepresentations are given to me,and whether, therefore, I couldexist

370 35 a predicate (that ofsimplicity) which cannot be givenin any experience

371 14 every relation, and thereforealso as it may be given inintuition

371 17 in relation to the intuitionthrough which it is given asobject to thought

371 27 general and therefore to anobject as it may be given inintuition; in the minor premiss,only as it

372 7 term 'substance' be meant anobject which can be given, and ifit is to yield knowledge, it mustbe made

372 10 which alone the object of ourconcept can be given, and asbeing, therefore, theindispensable

375 12 assumption, of which no proofcan ever be given

375 15 that already in itselfincludes an existence as given,and therefore modality, andanalysing it in

375 30 permanent intuition whereby anobject might be given, toconstruct a self-subsistent being,and this

376 16 is something real, and itssimplicity is already given in themere fact of its possibility

376 23 my existence is taken in thefirst proposition as given -- forit does not say that everythinking being

376 29 which, so far as I thinkmyself, is in no way given to mein inner intuition, it is quiteimpossible

377 30 unity in <thought>, by whichalone no object is given, and towhich, therefore, the category of

377 32 category of substance, whichalways presupposes a given<intuition>, cannot be applied

378 28 as such does not apply to anindeterminately given object butonly to one of which we have aconcept

378 31 here signifies only somethingreal that is given, given indeedto thought in general, and so not

378 31 here signifies only somethingreal that is given, given indeedto thought in general, and so notas

382 8 since I am not considering howmy own self may be given inintuition, the self may be mereappearance to

382 11 itself>, although nothing inmyself is thereby given forthought

383 12 They could be no other thanthose which must be given to me insensible intuition; and thus Ishould

386 19 For a given conditioned,reason demands on the side of the

386 28 with the principle that if<the conditioned is given, theentire sum of conditions, andconsequently

386 30 alone the conditioned has beenpossible) <is also given>

387 3 the ascending series ofconditions relates to a givenconditioned

387 6 For in the case of the givenconditioned, conditions arepresupposed, and are

387 8 conditions are presupposed,and are considered as giventogether with it

387 11 when we advance toconsequences or descend from agiven condition to theconditioned, to consider whether

387 16 think time as havingcompletely elapsed up to the givenmoment, and as being itself givenin this

387 16 up to the given moment, and asbeing itself given in thiscompleted form

387 23 as it were, the series <m, n,o>, in which <n> is given asconditioned by <m>, and at thesame time as

387 28 first series in order to beable to view <n> as given

387 32 latter series may nottherefore be regarded as given,but only as allowing of beinggiven (<dabilis>)

387 32 regarded as given, but only asallowing of being given(<dabilis>)

387 35 from the condition whichstands nearest to the givenappearance and so passes to themore remote

388 4 for the complete comprehensionof what is given in appearance

388 11 In it, in regard to a givenpresent, the antecedents can be<a^priori>

388 14 totality of the series ofconditions of any givenconditioned therefore refers onlyto all <past>

388 16 the idea of reason past time,as condition of the given moment,is necessarily thought as beinggiven in

388 17 the given moment, isnecessarily thought as being givenin its entirety

388 30 (as for instance of the feetin a rood) of the given space,those which are thought inextension of

388 31 those which are thought inextension of the given space arealways <the condition of thelimits> of

388 32 are always <the condition ofthe limits> of the given space,the <measuring> of a space is alsoto be

388 34 as a synthesis of a series ofthe conditions of a givenconditioned, onl

388 38 Inasmuch as one part of spaceis not given through the othersbut only limited by them, we

389 38 It presents a series of causes

18 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationof a given effect such that we canproceed to ascend from

390 17 Absolute completeness of the<Composition> of the given wholeof all appearances

390 20 Absolute completeness in the<Division> of a given whole in the[field of] appearance

390 32 Appearances are here regardedas given; what reason demands isthe absolute completeness

391 12 we can indeed at once assertthat for a given conditioned, thewhole series of conditions

391 14 conditions subordinated toeach other is likewise given

391 14 The former is given onlythrough the latter

391 17 due to the manner in whichconditions are given, namely,through the successive synthesisof the

391 27 appearance as a series ofconditions to a given conditioned-- reason here adopts the methodof

392 3 <i.e.> is infinite, and at thesame time is given in its entirety

392 8 limit of the world>, inrespect of the parts of a givenlimited whole, the <simple>, inrespect of causes

392 25 totality of the series ofconditions to a given conditionedis always unconditioned, since

395 34 the best criterion of thelegislation that has given rise tothem

396 19 Their abstract synthesis cannever be given in any <a^priori>intuition, and they are so

397 4 world has no beginning intime, then up to every givenmoment an eternity has elapsed,and there has

397 24 opposite, namely, that theworld is an infinite given wholeof coexisting things

397 27 Now the magnitude of a quantumwhich is not given in intuition aswithin certain limits, can be

398 14 of actual things cannottherefore be viewed as a givenwhole, nor consequently assimultaneously given

398 16 a given whole, norconsequently as simultaneouslygiven

398 34 either exist in themselves orcan be added to given appearances

399 29 from a defective concept ofthe infinitude of a givenmagnitude

399 34 than itself, as determined bythe multiplicity of given unitswhich it contains, is not possible

399 4 Antithesis> The proof of theinfinitude of the given world-series and of the world-whole,rests upon

400 5 Consequently an infinite givenmagnitude, and therefore aninfinite world

400 28 as it consists solely in therelation to the given unit, wouldalways remain the same

401 12 of actual successive statesleading up to a given (the

present) moment cannot haveelapsed, and

401 23 which is infinite in respectof extension is given as <co-existing>

401 38 This quantum thereforecontains a quantity (of givenunits) which is greater than anynumber -- which

401 34 This world is all that isgiven us in our problem

402 32 will remain, and accordinglyno substance will be given

404 17 An absolutely simple objectcan never be given in any possibleexperience

404 36 proposition by reference tothe concept of a given object ofouter intuition (of thecomposite), but

405 11 to that accidental unity ofthe manifold which, given as<separate> (at least in thought),is brought

405 25 to invent a different kind ofintuition from that given in theoriginal intuition of space, andhow can

406 23 only of the simple in so faras it is necessarily given in thecomposite -- the latter beingresolvable

406 31 refer only to the simple whichis <immediately> given as simplesubstance <e.g.> in self-consciousness)

413 35 intuitions there exists anobject which cannot be given inany possible perception, is stilla very bold

415 28 possibility of the sensibleworld, would not be given us

415 34 the representation of time,like every other, is given only inconnection with perceptions

416 2 Now every conditioned that isgiven presupposes, in respect ofits existence, a

422 6 that an object congruent withthem can never be given in anypossible experience, and that evenin

425 9 According to the antithesis,every given beginning compels usto advance to one still

426 10 images can be clearly anddistinctly provided in givensimilar intuitions

426 14 as mere thought-entities, theycan never be given

431 24 in that no question whichconcerns an object given to purereason can be insoluble for thissame

431 39 For the object must be givenempirically, the question beingonly as to its

432 10 synthesis required for itsconcept, as being given

432 13 totality -- such totality,since it cannot be given in anyexperience, being no longerempirical

432 20 possible experience are weenquiring what can be given <inconcreto> in any experience

432 28 of a transcendental object, noanswer can be given stating <what

it is>, we can yet reply that the432 30 itself is <nothing>, because

there is no given object[corresponding] to it

432 34 is not itself appearance andconsequently not <given> asobject, and in which none of thecategories

432 41 outside the sphere of thoseobjects which can be given to us-- is entirely null and void

433 16 certainty, and of thisimpossibility Lambert has giventhe required proof

433 22 For the natural appearancesare objects which are given to usindependently of our concepts, andthe key

434 15 outside our idea, it is notpossible for it to be given

434 37 require to be raised in theexplanation of any givenappearance, and is therefore not aquestion which

434 40 can never come before us,since it cannot be given throughany possible experience

435 18 so far as the conditions oftheir explanation are given inperception; but all that may everbe given in

435 18 are given in perception; butall that may ever be given in thisway, when taken together in an<absolute

435 27 as our object is only in ourbrain, and cannot be given outsideit, we have only to take care tobe at

435 30 representation of an objectthat is empirically given andtherefore to be known according tothe laws

438 14 we set it in a time<infinitely> remote from any givenpoint of time, because otherwiseit would be

438 21 or as condition) is<contingent>, any and every givenexistence is too <small> for ourconcept

439 15 the manner in which the objectof these ideas is given to us; andthis suspicion may set us on theright

440 25 subject -- but only anappearance that has been given tothe sensibility of this, to usunknown, being

440 33 The objects of experience,then, are <never> given in<themselves>, but only inexperience, and have

441 5 Nothing is really given ussave perception and the empiricaladvance from

441 19 consists merely ofrepresentations, which, if notgiven in us -- that is to say, inperception -- are

441 38 our possible perceptions, andcan say that it is given in itselfprior to all experience

442 1 the appearances, whileconforming to it, are not given inthemselves, but only in thisexperience, being

442 6 we can say that the real

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 19things of past time are given inthe transcendental object ofexperience; but

442 25 only in such a possibleexperience are they given

442 35 which objects, that is to say,appearances, are given to me

443 2 For even supposing they weregiven as things in themselves,without relation to

443 19 the dialectical argument: Ifthe conditioned is given, theentire series of all itsconditions is

443 20 entire series of all itsconditions is likewise given;objects of the senses are given asconditioned

443 21 is likewise given; objects ofthe senses are given asconditioned; therefore, etc

443 31 possibility of doubt, that ifthe conditioned is given, aregress in the series of all itsconditions is

444 7 things in themselves, thenupon the former being given, theregress to the latter is not only<set as a

444 9 <set as a task>, but therewithalready really <given>

444 11 conditions, and therefore theunconditioned, is given therewith,or rather is presupposed in viewof

444 13 is only possible through thecomplete series, is given

444 18 as mere representationsappearances cannot be given savein so far as I attain knowledge ofthem, or

444 22 sense of the terms, that ifthe conditioned is given, all itsconditions (as appearances) arelikewise

444 23 all its conditions (asappearances) are likewise given,and therefore cannot in any wayinfer the

444 26 an empirical synthesis inspace and time, and are given onlyin <this synthesis>

444 28 the conditioned, in the [fieldof] appearance, is given, thesynthesis which constitutes itsempirical

444 29 which constitutes itsempirical condition is giventherewith and is presupposed

444 34 that <in this regress> therecan be no lack of given conditions

445 3 of our common reason leads us,when anything is given asconditioned, thus to assume in themajor

445 7 that we should have adequatepremisses for any given conclusion

445 9 with its condition; they arepresupposed as given <together>with it

445 11 both as things in themselvesand as objects given to the pureunderstanding, than to proceed aswe

445 14 of intuition under which aloneobjects can be given

445 22 successive, the members of theseries being given only as

following upon one another intime; and I

445 26 major premiss all the membersof the series are given inthemselves, without any conditionof time, but

445 28 only through the successiveregress, which is given only inthe process in which it isactually

447 27 however, likewise be false;the world may not be given as athing in itself, nor as being inits

448 10 is always conditioned, andtherefore can never be given ascomplete, the world is not anunconditioned

448 17 in the [field of] appearanceviewed as a thing given in and byitself, prior to all regress

448 19 must therefore say that thenumber of parts in a givenappearance is in itself neitherfinite nor

448 21 existing in itself, and itsparts are first given in andthrough the regress of thedecomposing

448 22 decomposing synthesis, aregress which is never given inabsolute completeness, either asfinite or as

449 3 any who may not be satisfiedby the direct proof given in theTranscendental Aesthetic

449 13 It enables us to see that theproofs given in the fourfoldantinomy are not merely baseless

449 33 world, regarded as a thing initself, is <given> through thecosmological principle of totality

450 6 the regress in the series ofconditions of any givenconditioned

450 8 to which we can attain in theexposition of given appearances isagain conditioned

450 14 a regress in the series of theconditions of given appearances,and forbidding it to bring the

450 20 for every experience, inconformity with the given [formsof] intuition, is enclosed withinlimits

451 6 maintaining that the series ofconditions for a given conditionedis in itself either finite or

451 10 equivalent to thinking anobject that cannot be given in anyexperience

452 5 From a given pair of parentsthe descending line of generation

452 10 presuppose that totality as acondition and as given (<datum>),but only as something conditioned

452 11 as something conditioned, thatallows of being given (<dabile>),and is added to without end

452 14 when it ascends in a seriesfrom something given asconditioned to its conditions

452 24 We answer: when the whole isgiven in empirical intuition, theregress in the series

452 27 but when a member only of theseries is given, starting fromwhich the regress has to proceed

452 30 of a body, that is, of aportion of matter given betweencertain limits, must be said toproceed

452 31 For this matter is given as awhole, and therefore with all itspossible

452 39 any continued division arethemselves empirically given priorto the continuation of thedivision

453 1 other hand, since the seriesof ancestors of any given man isnot given in its absolute totalityin any

453 2 the series of ancestors of anygiven man is not given in itsabsolute totality in any possible

453 9 not proceed <in infinitum>, bydivision of the given, but onlyindefinitely far, searching forfurther

453 10 for further members additionalto those that are given, and whichare themselves again always givenas

453 11 are given, and which arethemselves again always given asconditioned

453 14 may the series of conditionsbe regarded as being given asinfinite in the object

453 16 which, as conditions of oneanother, are given only in theregress itself

453 22 When the whole is empiricallygiven; it is <possible> to proceedback in the series

453 24 When the whole is not given,but has first to be given throughempirical

453 24 When the whole is not given,but has first to be given throughempirical regress, we can only saythat

453 27 say: there are always moremembers, empirically given, than Ican reach through the regress of

453 30 in the regress, because nomember is empirically given asabsolutely unconditioned; andsince a higher

456 1 the concept of such a seriesof conditions for a givenperception arise at all

456 9 the most that we can ever knowis that from every given member ofthe series of conditions we havealways

456 19 Since the world is not givenme, in its totality, through anyintuition

456 20 through any intuition, neitheris its magnitude given me prior tothe regress

457 3 Any such concept of magnitude,as being that of a giveninfinitude, is empiricallyimpossible, and

457 6 Nor can I say that the regressfrom a given perception to allthat limits it in a series

457 23 these limits of the worldwould have to be given in apossible experience, that is tosay, we

457 35 with the common and dogmaticview, as a thing given in itself,

20 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationin its totality, prior to anyregress

457 39 conclusion also was thereforedifferent from that given above;for in the dogmatic proof weinferred the

458 3 empirical regress (throughwhich alone it can be given on theside of its conditions) has itsown rule

458 28 Similarly, since the world cannever be given as <complete>, andsince even the series of

458 29 even the series of conditionsfor that which is given asconditioned cannot, as a cosmicseries, be

458 30 as conditioned cannot, as acosmic series, be given as<complete>, the concept of themagnitude of

458 31 the concept of the magnitudeof the world is given only throughthe regress and not in acollective

458 38 to the infinite, as if theinfinite could be given, but onlyindeterminately far, in order [bymeans

459 3 Idea of the Totality ofDivision of a Whole given inIntuition>

459 4 If we divide a whole which isgiven in intuition, we proceedfrom something

459 8 The absolute totality of thisseries would be given only if theregress could reach <simple> parts

459 14 contained in the conditioned,and since this is given completein an intuition that is enclosedbetween

459 15 enclosed between limits theparts are one and all giventogether with the conditioned

459 19 to its conditions, which, asoutside it, were not given throughand along with it, but were firstadded

459 28 or parts at which it arrivesare contained in the given whole,viewed as an <aggregate>

460 26 be made to apply to a whole inwhich already, as given, the partsare so definitely distinguishedoff

460 34 The infinitude of the divisionof a given appearance in space isgrounded solely on the

460 37 number of its parts,absolutely indeterminate) is given-- the parts themselves beinggiven and determined

460 38 is given -- the partsthemselves being given anddetermined only through thesubdivision

461 38 of totality, in the series ofconditions for a givenconditioned, are throughout of thesame character

462 17 According to the table ofcategories given above, two ofthese concepts imply a

464 3 ground, and the propositionsof reason, when thus given thismore correct interpretation, may<both>

464 31 refers to an object thatcannot be determined or given inany experience

473 25 not give way to any groundwhich is empirically given

476 13 Therefore no given action(since it can be perceived only as

477 16 enquiry just as we should inascertaining for a given naturaleffect the series of itsdetermining

478 13 For a different intelligiblecharacter would have given adifferent empirical character

478 28 But to explain why in thegiven circumstances theintelligible character should

480 21 with the possibility of anunconditioned whole of givenparts, or with an unconditionedpart for a given

480 22 given parts, or with anunconditioned part for a givenwhole, but with the derivation ofa state from

484 7 Nevertheless the cosmologicalidea which has given rise to thefourth antinomy impels us to take

488 29 does not mean only that one ofevery pair of <given>contradictory predicates, but thatone of every

489 20 of predicates which asderivative are already giventhrough other predicates or whichare

493 21 requiring that all thisreality be objectively given andbe itself a thing

493 35 the understanding, theillusion to which it has givenrise

494 9 (that which corresponds tosensation), must be given, sinceotherwise it could not even bethought

494 15 the real in the [field of]appearance, must be given --otherwise the thing could not beconceived at

494 17 that )wherein the real of allappearances is given isexperience, considered as singleand

494 20 all objects of the senses mustbe presupposed as given in onewhole; and it is upon thelimitation of

494 24 those of the senses, can, as amatter of fact, be given to us,and nowhere save in the context ofa

494 29 which applies only to thosethings which are given as objectsof our senses, as being aprinciple

495 19 in the regress from theconditioned, which is given, tothe unconditioned

495 20 This unconditioned is not,indeed, given as being in itselfreal, nor as having a reality

496 21 to mere concepts, and wouldnot then require a given existenceas its basis), but solely in orderto

498 6 is here stated, namely<first>, that from any given

existence (it may be, merely myown existence) we

499 18 be raised in regard to everycause that can be given inexperience

501 1 namely, that while theinference from a given existencein general to some absolutelynecessary

502 3 there is a triangle (that is,that a triangle is given), threeangles will necessarily be foundin it

502 10 under the condition that weposit the thing as given (asexisting) -- we are also ofnecessity, in

502 36 omnipotence nor any other ofits predicates is given; they areone and all rejected together withthe

505 11 its object (through theexpression 'it is') as givenabsolutely

507 3 But since the realities arenot given to us in their specificcharacters; since even if

508 15 of existence, it reasons fromthe previously given unconditionednecessity of some being to the

511 30 impossibility of an infiniteseries of causes, given one afterthe other, in the sensible world

512 25 And in all other kinds ofreasoning from a given consequenceto its ground this would be

513 18 the transcendental idealamounts to this: either, givenabsolute necessity, to find aconcept which

513 19 to find a concept whichpossesses it, or, given theconcept of something to find thatsomething

514 9 The thing itself is indeedgiven, but we can have no insightinto its nature

514 14 of it; and since, therefore,it is in no wise given asthinkable <object>, it cannot beinscrutable

514 31 principles of reason, asapplied to an existence giventhrough empirical consciousness ingeneral

515 29 something necessary as acondition of all that is given asexistent, that is, to stop nowhereuntil we

516 8 nothing that allows of beingempirically given can be regardedas absolutely necessary

517 30 existing in its own right, andas an object given <a^priori> initself

527 12 with what ought to be), theconditioned, which is given to usin experience, is always thoughtas being

527 21 positing it as a causerelative to an existence given inexperience

527 27 objects or predicates ofobjects which can be given in apossible experience

529 24 call in question all thoseproofs which have been given inthe Analytic, rather than allow

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 21himself to be

533 36 we are to direct theunderstanding beyond every givenexperience (as part of the sum ofpossible

534 39 the universal is already<certain in itself> and given,<only judgment> is required toexecute the

535 11 instances, even to those whichare not themselves given

535 28 only a <projected> unity, tobe regarded not as given initself, but as a problem only

535 31 directing its attention tocases which are not given, andthus rendering it more coherent

539 36 I here understand thoseobjects only which are given tous), it presupposes atranscendental principle

544 7 the systems, whereas in actualfact it has itself given rise toall that is systematic in ourknowledge

544 27 infinity of intermediatemembers between any two givenspecies, which is impossible

546 13 of sensibility correspondingto them can ever be given, theycan never have an object <inconcreto>

546 31 of such a schema mustnecessarily allow of being given

549 28 concept with any certaintywithout having first given atranscendental deduction of it

550 1 is a great difference betweensomething being given to my reasonas an <object absolutely>, ormerely

550 6 object, not even ahypothetical one, is directlygiven, and which only enables usto represent to

555 38 This explains why, in relationto what is given to the senses asexisting, we require the idea of

556 6 For what is given to it doesnot consist in objects that haveto be

557 21 except in so far as the schemaof the category is given insensible intuition

558 32 For nature is properly theonly given object in regard towhich reason requires

561 6 it is yet quite impossible to<prove> in any given case that anarrangement of nature, be it whatit

561 33 This was the title given bythe ancient dialecticians to asophistical

563 8 difficult it may be toestablish this in any given case

573 24 building in conformity withthe material which is given to us,and which is also at the same time

578 15 but the colour of this conemust be previously given in someexperience or other

578 33 Suppose a philosopher be giventhe concept of a triangle and hebe left to find

581 5 for it is through them alonethat an object is given

581 9 synthesis of possible

intuitions which are not given<a^priori>

581 14 The only intuition that isgiven <a^priori> is that of themere form of

581 20 the matter of appearances, bywhich <things> are given us inspace and time, can only berepresented in

581 30 the intuition of which doesnot admit of being given<a^priori>, are transcendental

581 32 Transcendental propositionscan never be given throughconstruction of concepts, but onlyin

582 3 and appeal to the intuition inwhich it is given

582 25 But if what is given me is the<transcendental> concept of areality

582 29 intuitions, which, as beingempirical, cannot be given<a^priori>

582 41 pure intuitions, and so do notpermit of being <given a^priori>

583 10 of] appearance, in terms ofwhich all objects are given us,there are two elements, the formof intuition

583 16 to this material element,which can never be given in anydeterminate fashion otherwise than

583 34 this very reason themselves<a^priori> and can be given in aquite determinate fashion in pureintuition

586 24 the second place, it is alsotrue that no concept given<a^priori>, such as substance,cause, right

586 27 be certain that the clearrepresentation of a given concept,which as given may still beconfused

586 27 clear representation of agiven concept, which as given maystill be confused, has beencompletely

586 30 But since the concept of itmay, as given, include manyobscure representations, which we

587 7 then, neither empiricalconcepts nor concepts given<a^priori> allow of definition,the only

587 10 invented I can always define;for since it is not given to meeither by the nature ofunderstanding or by

587 27 the definition that theconcept of the object is given --and given originally, that is,without its

587 27 that the concept of the objectis given -- and given originally,that is, without its beingnecessary

587 35 definitions are never morethan expositions of givenconcepts, mathematical definitionsare

588 9 For since the definitions areanalyses of given concepts, theypresuppose the prior presence of

588 19 through which the conceptitself is first given

588 23 For since the concept is first

given through the definition, itincludes nothing

590 23 of them, that is, fromintuition, which can be given<a^priori> in accordance with theconcepts

594 22 two propositions, that theseries of appearances <given inthemselves> has an absolutelyfirst beginning

598 30 can count for anything, ormust not rather be given up inexchange for the practical

606 14 limits of my actual knowledgeof the earth at any given time,but not the limits of all possible

610 12 else that is therebyuniversally and necessarily given,he believed that he was thereforein a position

610 22 beyond the content of theconcept which is given us, we arenevertheless able, in relation toa

613 11 be brought into connectionwith what is actually given and sofar certain, as serving to accountfor

613 12 certain, as serving to accountfor what is thus given

613 20 of any new quality that doesnot allow of being given inexperience; and we cannot,therefore, make use

614 31 In the explanation of givenappearances, no things or groundsof explanation

614 33 which have been found to standin connection with givenappearances in accordance with thealready known

615 38 for those consequences whichare [<de facto>] given

616 34 only in explanation of what isactually given, or as consequencesthat follow in accordance

616 36 empirical laws from whatunderlies the actually given

621 21 Such proof does not show thatthe given concept (for instance,of that which happens)

622 29 I may not therefore concludethat if nothing be given to me butthe moving power of a body, thebody

623 9 will demonstrate thepossibility of extending our givenconcept in an <a^priori> manner toideas, and of

626 11 to discover all possibleconsequences of any givenproposition exceeds our powers

626 37 it must often happen that theopposite of a given propositioncontradicts only the subjective

627 36 it be assumed that thesensible world is given <initself> in its totality, it is<false> that

627 39 (as mere representations)which yet are to be given <inthemselves> (as objects) aresomething

630 12 employment is, as has beenshown by the proofs given,completely impossible

632 27 latter type, pure practicallaws, whose end is given through

22 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationreason completely <a^priori>, andwhich

642 38 morality, and these we canknow only as they are given us bypure reason

644 10 in order that through suchagency effect may be given to them

648 14 If, in a given case, werepresent ourselves as staking the

654 13 and does not wait for them tobe empirically given) serves asthe basis of <architectonic> unity

655 35 However a mode of knowledgemay originally be given, it isstill, in relation to theindividual who

655 37 if he knows only so much of itas has been given to him fromoutside (and this in the form in

655 38 (and this in the form in whichit has been given to him), whetherthrough immediate experience or

656 8 He knows and judges only whathas been given him

659 15 The title 'metaphysics' mayalso, however, be given to thewhole of pure philosophy,inclusive of

662 8 but take no account of objectsthat <may be given (Ontologia>);the latter treats of <nature>

662 9 treats of <nature>, that is,of the sum of <given> objects(whether given to the senses, or,if we

662 9 that is, of the sum of <given>objects (whether given to thesenses, or, if we will, to someother kind

662 27 of the senses, and thereforejust as it is given us, but solelyin accordance with <a^priori>

662 28 conditions, under which aloneit can ever be given us

663 14 a metaphysics) of objects inso far as they are given to oursenses, that is, given in an

663 14 so far as they are given toour senses, that is, given in an<a^posteriori> manner

GIVES 56005 57 the pre-eminent importance of

her accepted tasks gives her everyright to this title of honour

010 21 one of all the questions towhich it itself gives birth weshould have no alternative but toreject

034 6 attempt to change even thesmallest part at once gives riseto contradictions, not merely inthe system

041 18 the first product to which ourunderstanding gives rise, inworking up the raw material ofsensible

042 16 It therefore gives us no trueuniversality; and reason, which isso

046 30 has long been of establishedreliability, and so gives rise toa favourable presumption asregards the

046 38 Mathematics gives us a shiningexample of how far, independentlyof

051 6 What is here the unknown = X

which gives support to theunderstanding whenit believes

087 18 we may therefore conclude thatsince outer sense gives us nothingbut mere relations, this sense can

095 9 contain certain exercises forwhich pure logic gives the rules)is a representation of the

111 31 it given empirically or<a^priori>) is what first givesrise to knowledge

112 11 <represented in its mostgeneral aspect>, gives the pureconcept of the understanding

112 32 The same function which givesunity to the variousrepresentations <in a

112 33 the various representations<in a judgment> also gives unityto the mere synthesis of various

147 32 Sensibility gives us forms (ofintuition), but understandinggives

147 33 gives us forms (of intuition),but understanding gives us rules

169 33 since I do not have anotherself-intuition which gives the<determining> in me (I amconscious only of

170 38 representation, so that the<form of intuition> gives only amanifold, the <formal intuition>gives

170 38 gives only a manifold, the<formal intuition> gives unity ofrepresentation

183 22 accordance with concepts, towhich the category givesexpression

193 19 The <possibility ofexperience> is, then, what givesobjective reality to all our<a^priori> modes of

195 14 What experience gives is theinstance which stands under therule

201 22 as merely subjectiverepresentation, which gives usonly the consciousness that thesubject is

282 23 Our table of concepts ofreflection gives us the unexpectedadvantage of putting before our

301 5 but the nature of the otherfaculty, which itself gives birthto concepts, is not to beunderstood from

301 36 For the major premiss alwaysgives a concept through whicheverything that is

305 32 and logical procedure ofreason in syllogisms gives ussufficient guidance as to theground on which

308 20 The title 'concept of reason'already gives a preliminaryindication that we are dealingwith

313 38 the following out of theseconsiderations is what gives tophilosophy its peculiar dignity,we must

329 1 grounded in the nature ofhuman reason, and gives rise to anillusion which cannot be avoided

331 6 This substance, merely asobject of inner sense, gives theconcept of <immateriality>; as

simple331 9 while the relation to objects

in space gives <commercium> withbodies, and so leads us to

331 13 This last, in turn, as limitedby spirituality, gives the conceptof <immortality>

339 16 mode in which our outer senseis thereby affected gives us nointuition of representations,will, etc

362 14 the threefold transcendentalillusion which gives occasion forthe three main sections of the

385 25 conflict or antinomy of thelaws of pure reason gives rise, wemay offer a few remarks inexplanation

385 35 conditions of all possiblethings in general, it gives riseto an <ideal> of pure reasonwhich, though

423 15 experience would lead us toexpect; and so gives occasion andencouragement to an employment of

470 29 action, [viewed] asappearance, in so far as it givesrise to an event, is itself anevent or happening

478 32 object of our outer sensibleintuition gives intuition in<space> only and not some othermode

486 24 As the idea gives the <rule>,so the ideal in such a case servesas

500 17 be shown that, althoughexperience is what first givesoccasion to this enquiry, it isthe

528 36 of a supreme being, sinceexperience never gives us thegreatest of all possible effects,such as

533 4 concepts (of objects) but only<orders> them, and gives them thatunity which they can have only ifthey

541 17 logical sphere in respect ofpossible division, gives nooccasion for any such assertion --but which

542 9 is comprehended under aconcept is precisely what givesoccasion for the employment of theconcept and

553 6 concept which the purelyspeculative reason gives us of Godis, in the strictest sense,<deistic>

573 14 to mention the babel oftongues, which inevitably givesrise to disputes among the workersin regard to

582 11 The <a^priori> method gives usour rational and mathematicalknowledge

583 5 synthetic unity of empiricalknowledge, it yet gives us nointuition <a^priori>

584 19 in its mathematical employmentquite naturally gives rise to theexpectation that it, or at anyrate

585 10 In mathematics, on the otherhand, their passage gives rise toa broad highway, which the latest

646 12 necessarily valid for

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 23everyone, save as it gives rise toconviction

649 38 refers only to the guidancewhich an idea gives me, and to itssubjective influence in that

654 34 according to the descriptionwhich their founder gives of them,but in conformity with the ideawhich

665 27 On the contrary this gives itdignity and authority, throughthat censorship

GIVING 15042 35 senses, more than mere

experience would teach -- givingto assertions true universalityand strict

099 16 It was a sophistical art ofgiving to ignorance, and indeed tointentional

259 22 in general, and secondly, thepossibility of giving it an objectto which it may be applied

263 20 an object for possibleintuitions, and of giving itmeaning, under the requisitefurther

282 12 the use of these concepts isvery unsafe, giving birth toalleged synthetic principles,which the

431 15 and whether we may rightlyexcuse ourselves from giving adecisive answer

487 5 the good that has its sourcein the idea -- by giving it theair of being a mere fiction

501 10 There is, of course, nodifficulty in giving a verbaldefinition of the concept, namely,that

513 13 a being <necessarily exists>,we are no longer giving modestexpression to an admissiblehypothesis

518 33 unconditioned -- no law of anyempirical synthesis giving us anexample of any such unconditionedor

537 19 of the various powers of asubstance, and as givingexpression to an apodeicticprinciple of reason

555 12 use of the transcendentalassumption, namely, as giving thesubstratum of the greatestpossible unity of

556 29 think this systematic unityotherwise than by giving to theidea of this unity an object; andsince

569 2 they are dealing solely withspeculative reason, givingpreference to the former mode ofexpression, on

611 35 ardour with which reasoninsists upon giving free rein toitself, has not in the least been

GLADLY 2262 19 the not-being of which is

possible," I would gladly know howyou can determine this possibilityof

423 6 for the solution of which themathematician would gladlyexchange the whole of his science

GLANCE 4257 20 such hopes, it will be well to

begin by casting a glance upon themap of the land which we are aboutto

520 30 melancholy reflection, as froma dream, by one glance at thewonders of nature and the majestyof the

666 6 I content myself with castinga cursory glance, from a purelytranscendental point of view

666 9 of those who have laboured inthis field -- a glance whichreveals [many stately] structures,but in

GLASS 3228 24 A glass [filled with water] is

the cause of the rising of228 27 I draw off water from a larger

vessel into the glass, somethingfollows, namely the alterationfrom

228 30 had to the concave form whichit assumes in the glass

GLEAMS 1499 28 shine amidst the most

benighted polytheism some gleamsof monotheism, to which they havebeen led, not

GLIMPSE 1019 24 of the revolution, brought

about by the first glimpse of thisnew path, must have seemed to

GLORIOUS 2031 12 <Author of the world> is

generated solely by the gloriousorder, beauty, and providentialcare everywhere

640 23 a world invisible to us nowbut hoped for, the glorious ideasof morality are indeed objects ofapproval

GLOSSARY 1115 23 I have said, it will be

obvious that a complete glossary,with all the requisiteexplanations, is not only

GO 35010 36 complete knowledge of these,

there is no need to go far afield,since I come upon them in my ownself

021 15 leading us in the direction inwhich we desire to go

048 33 For I do not require to gobeyond the concept which I connectwith 'body' in

049 10 Since, in framing thejudgment, I must not go outside myconcept, there is no need toappeal to

050 17 Upon what, then, am I to rely,when I seek to go beyond theconcept A, and to know thatanother

053 5 We have to go outside theseconcepts, and call in the aid of

054 25 I go outside and beyond theconcept of matter, joining

060 21 enumeration of all the

fundamental concepts that go toconstitute such pure knowledge

070 22 concept no propositions can beobtained which go beyond theconcept -- as happens in geometry

081 28 when with the understandingthey endeavour to go out beyondthis field

091 3 When in <a^priori> judgment weseek to go out beyond the givenconcept, we come in the

098 24 But further than this logiccannot go

229 28 of a subject, without myrequiring first to go in quest ofits permanence through thecomparison

253 25 lacking, there is nothingwhich can enable us to go outbeyond a given concept, and toconnect

253 35 If the reader will go back toour proof of the principle ofcausality

287 16 to answer those transcendentalquestions which go beyond nature

353 34 confine ourselves to thosequestions which do not go beyondthe limits within which a contentcan be

372 13 So long, therefore, as we donot go beyond mere thinking, weare without the

379 37 but above all else the morallaw within him -- go so far beyondall the utility and advantagewhich

454 20 itself> unlimited, but onlyhow far we ought to go in theempirical regress, when we trace

461 15 How far organisation can go inan organised body, only experiencecan show

481 31 of the empirical conditions itshould go straying into the<transcendent>, adopting

506 20 our concept of an object maycontain, we must go outside it, ifwe are to ascribe existence to the

545 2 of this knowledge inaccordance with ideas which go farbeyond all possible experience

545 25 departures from these rules;finally, we even go on to makeadditions such as experience cannever

564 37 this unity in the essence ofthe things which go to constitutethe entire object of experience

582 2 synthetically in regard to aconcept, we must go beyond thisconcept and appeal to theintuition

582 33 With the concept of cause I doreally go beyond the empiricalconcept of an event

585 25 although in natural sciencethey do, indeed, go hand in hand,are none the less so completely

588 35 the elements obtained byanalysis so far as they go,defective definitions, that is,propositions

604 25 and wrestle with their ownshadows, since they go beyond thelimits of nature, where there is

606 11 But experience teaches me thatwherever I may go, I always see a

24 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationspace around me in which I could

619 4 We might go yet further, anddiscover quite new objections

630 24 Reason is impelled by atendency of its nature to go outbeyond the field of its empiricalemployment

649 29 Were I even to go the lengthof describing the merelytheoretical

GO-CART 1178 24 Examples are thus the go-cart

of judgment; and those who arelacking in the

GOAL 12017 6 it is brought to a stop

immediately it nears its goal; ifoften it is compelled to retraceits steps

354 31 dialectical questions,constituting the real goal ofrational psychology, are groundedon this

451 17 Yet it can never reach thisgoal, for the absolutelyunconditioned is not to be

499 35 All the paths leading to thisgoal begin either from determinateexperience and the

500 18 which in all such endeavoursmarks out the goal that reason hasset itself to attain, and which

500 20 its sole guide in its effortsto achieve that goal

533 14 ideas, positing a certaincollective unity as the goal ofthe activities of theunderstanding, which

533 24 of directing the understandingtowards a certain goal upon whichthe routes marked out by all itsrules

569 12 yet still, by the very factthat they place the goal of itsendeavours at so great a distance,carry

591 19 path which it has traversedled directly to the goal, and asthough the accepted premissescould be so

629 23 while yet in actual fact theyform the goal towards which reasonis directing its efforts

644 1 But when practical reason hasreached this goal, namely, theconcept of a sole primordial being

GOD 51029 23 similarly developed in regard

to the concept of <God> and of the<simple nature> of our <soul>; butfor

029 27 necessary practical employmentof my reason -- of <God, freedom>,and <immortality> is notpermissible

030 36 practical necessity, or of theexistence of God as deduced fromthe concept of an <ens

046 9 problems set by pure reasonitself are <God, freedom>, and<immortality>

090 10 they must also be conditionsof the existence of God

130 10 experience can follow (as withthe concept of God)

323 33 and, finally, for atranscendental knowledge of God(<theologia transzendentalis>)

325 26 proper object of its enquiriesthree ideas only: <God, freedom>,and <immortality> -- so relatedthat

325 42 of the <world>, and thence tothe knowledge of <God>

446 20 Zeno maintained, for example,that God (probably conceived byhim as simply the world)

446 27 As regards the others, if bythe word 'God' he meant theuniverse, he would certainly haveto

493 14 The concept of such a being isthe concept of <God>, taken in thetranscendental sense; and theideal

499 34 three possible ways of provingthe existence of God by means ofspeculative reason>

500 27 OF AN ONTOLOGICAL PROOF OF THEEXISTENCE OF GOD

502 32 'God is omnipotent' is anecessary judgment

502 35 But if we say, 'There is noGod', neither the omnipotence norany other of its

504 39 The proposition, 'God isomnipotent', contains twoconcepts, each of

505 1 two concepts, each of whichhas its object -- God andomnipotence

505 4 If, now, we take the subject(God) with all its predicates(among which is

505 5 predicates (among which isomnipotence), and say 'God is', or'There is a God', we attach no new

505 5 is omnipotence), and say 'Godis', or 'There is a God', weattach no new predicate to theconcept of God

505 6 we attach no new predicate tothe concept of God, but only positthe subject in itself with all

507 22 OF A COSMOLOGICAL PROOF OF THEEXISTENCE OF GOD

526 8 Since we are wont tounderstand by the concept of Godnot merely an eternal nature thatworks blindly

526 13 speaking, deny to the <deist>any belief in God, allowing himonly the assertion of an original

526 17 more just to say that the<deist> believes in a <God>, the<theist> in a <living God> (<summa

526 17 believes in a <God>, the<theist> in a <living God> (<summaintelligentia>)

553 6 which the purely speculativereason gives us of God is, in thestrictest sense, <deistic>; thatis

559 28 cause of all cosmologicalseries, is the idea of <God>

567 29 when we perceive such unity,whether we say that God in hiswisdom has willed it to be so, orthat

595 19 propositions of our reason --that there is a God, and thatthere is a future life

600 29 reason regarding the important

questions of God, the immortalityof the soul, and freedom, would

602 18 the hope of a future life, andthe existence of God, I am eagerto read the book, for I expect himby

625 6 of the transcendental proof ofthe existence of God; it is basedsolely on the coincidence of the

631 10 the immortality of the soul,and the existence of God

632 38 ought to do>, if the will isfree, if there is a God and afuture world

634 28 of its employment must bepossible -- Is there a God

639 19 Thus God and a future life aretwo postulates which

640 22 Thus without a God and withouta world invisible to us now buthoped

****644 17 as obligatory because they are

the commands of God, but shallregard them as divine commandsbecause

648 37 must admit that the doctrineof the existence of God belongs todoctrinal belief

649 18 relation it can be said that Ifirmly believe in God

650 13 have practical validity,namely, that there be a God and afuture world

650 18 be so), I inevitably believein the existence of God and in afuture life, and I am certain that

650 27 be able to boast that he<knows> that there is a God, and afuture life; if he knows this, heis the

650 35 say, '<It is> morally certainthat there is a God, etc

650 36 In other words, belief in aGod and in another world is sointerwoven with my

651 11 remains to make him <fear> theexistence of a God and a futurelife

662 24 is to say, it is the<transcendental knowledge of God>

666 13 incline to end, namely, withthe knowledge of God, occupyingthemselves with the hope, orrather

668 3 as to assert that we can provethe existence of God and theimmortality of the soul with thesame

GOES 12027 1 reason -- the <moral> -- in

which it inevitably goes beyondthe limits of sensibility

191 22 analytic, since the property,unlearnedness, now goes to make upthe concept of the subject, andthe

222 16 For appearance never goes backfrom the succeeding to thepreceding point

224 22 again arises, how this latterrepresentation goes out beyonditself, acquiring objectivemeaning in

249 11 It is a problem for that idealreason which goes out beyond thesphere of a possible experience

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 25369 7 The latter statement goes very

far beyond the former, and demandsfor its

370 31 proposition; it is syntheticin that it goes beyond the conceptfrom which it starts, and adds

452 40 The division, that is to say,goes on <in infinitum>

549 5 In this regulative capacity itgoes far beyond what experience orobservation can

561 14 If this assumption be treatedas constitutive it goes muchfurther than observation has thusfar been

611 22 understanding what it cannotreally supply, he goes on to denyit all power of extending itself

668 2 all concepts and principlesfrom experience, goes so far inthe use of them as to assert thatwe

GOING 1346 17 is, he may admit the existence

of matter without going outsidehis mere self-consciousness, orassuming

GOLD 2582 15 Thus I might analyse my

empirical concept of gold withoutgaining anything more than merelyan

586 9 Thus in the concept of <gold>one man may think, in addition toits weight

GONE 3111 21 spontaneity of our thought

requires that it be gone throughin a certain way, taken up, andconnected

452 19 or can we only say that, sofar as we have gone back, we havenever met with an empirical ground

461 17 show; and although, so far asour experience has gone, we maynot have arrived with certainty atany

GOOD 74019 18 of the passage round the

celebrated Cape of Good Hope --and of its fortunate author, hasnot been

021 10 all-destroying barbarism, ithas not yet had the good fortuneto enter upon the secure path of a

029 16 the doctrine of nature mayeach, therefore, make good itsposition

034 29 merely <on faith>, and that ifanyone thinks good to doubt theirexistence, we are unable to

055 37 not be possible; and from suchan assertion his good sense wouldhave saved him

089 16 existing things be removed, --we cannot blame the good Berkeleyfor degrading bodies to mereillusion

138 27 knowledge; and consequentlywould be for us as good as nothing

159 11 It holds good even if thejudgment is itself empirical, and

177 36 mother-wit; and its lack noschool can make good

178 40 that original want, which cannever be made good

200 27 For if these objections holdgood, we deny the objectivevalidity of space, and

205 26 perceptions, and even to someextent to make good their absence,by placing a check upon all false

273 18 According to this usage, somehave thought good to entitle thesum of appearances, in so far as

312 24 been derived from experience,have nullified all good intentions

313 24 where the experience, in thiscase of the good, is itself madepossible only by the ideas

331 35 for the Latin expressionswhich, contrary to good taste,have usurped the place of theirGerman

374 42 quantities>, and those parentsouls as making good their lossthrough coalition with newmaterial of

395 1 fighters, no matter whetherthey support a good or a badcause, if only they contrive tosecure

395 8 victory always leaves thechampion of the good cause masterof the field, simply because his

395 11 leave aside the questionwhether it is for the good or thebad cause that the contestants are

395 15 perceive the futility of theirquarrel, and part good friends

422 28 a dignity and worth such that,could it but make good itspretensions, it would leave allother human

436 15 cases the outcome is merenonsense, there will be goodreason for instituting a criticalexamination of

447 1 If it be said that all bodieshave either a good smell or asmell that is not good, a thirdcase

447 2 have either a good smell or asmell that is not good, a thirdcase is possible, namely, that abody

462 33 be found, and since the judgemay perhaps make good what islacking in the pleas which bothsides

473 24 sensibility (the pleasant) orof pure reason (the good),reasonwill not give way to any groundwhich is

487 4 impossible, and so castsuspicion on the good itself --the good that has its source inthe idea

487 5 and so cast suspicion on thegood itself -- the good that hasits source in the idea -- bygiving it

520 40 It cannot hurt the good cause,if the dogmatic language of the

521 7 fall back upon the ontologicalargument to make good itsdeficiency

528 38 Should we seek to make goodthis lack of determination in ourconcept, by

531 28 there should be a moraltheology that can make good this

deficiency, transcendentaltheology, which

532 23 suppose that transcendentalideas have their own good, proper,and therefore <immanent> use,although

549 17 Presumably, therefore, theideas have their own good andappropriate vocation as determinedby the

561 13 in an animal has its use, andsubserves some good purpose

576 34 in one field, [leading it] toexpect the same good fortune inother fields

588 12 Consequently, we can infer agood deal from a fewcharacteristics, derived from an

588 34 But since a good and safe usecan still be made of the elements

596 19 Everything which nature hasitself instituted is good for somepurpose

596 25 reason itself, and musttherefore have their own good useand purpose, which ought not to bedisdained

599 15 comes from nature, mustfinally contribute to good ends,namely, a disposition to concealour real

599 17 certain assumed sentimentswhich are regarded as good andcreditable

599 30 least the <outward bearing> ofwhat we know to be good

599 33 it corrupts the heart, andchecks the growth of goodsentiments with the rank weeds offair

600 17 and indeed even commendable,to further the good cause throughsophistical arguments rather than

600 23 incompatible with the purposeof maintaining a good cause asdeceit, hipocrisy and fraud

602 2 with the freedom of others andwith the common good of all

602 33 The reply of the <dogmatic>defender of the good cause Ishould not read at all

604 20 of any such shelter, beingstill in possession of goodexpectations in the practicalsphere, where he

615 22 hypotheses, and to presumethat we can make good the lack ofphysical grounds of explanation by

617 32 as it were in self-defence, onbehalf of his own good cause, thevery same weapons that hisopponent

633 31 of our whole state, that is,as to what is good and useful, arebased on reason

635 3 OF PURE REASON Section 2 THEIDEAL OF THE HIGHEST GOOD, AS ADETERMINING GROUND OF THE ULTIMATEEND OF

635 28 it takes no account of thepractical, it has also good causeto be satisfied

639 8 to be happy -- I entitle the<ideal of the supreme good>

639 9 only in the ideal of thesupreme <original> good that purereason can find the ground of this

639 12 the two elements of the

26 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationsupreme derivative good -- theground, namely, of anintelligible, that is

639 37 not reside in a necessarybeing, as the supreme good, whichalone can make such a purposiveunit

640 2 to moral laws under thegovernment of the supreme good,<the kingdom of grace>,distinguishing it from

640 30 is, for our reason, far frombeing the complete good

640 34 to be happy, is also far frombeing the complete good

640 35 To make the good complete, hewho behaves in such a manner asnot

641 11 worthy of it, aloneconstitutes the supreme good ofthat world wherein, in accordancewith the

641 18 else than the postulate of asupreme original good

641 18 In a supreme good, thusconceived, self-subsistent reason,equipped

642 6 the satisfying of every needwhich the highest good demands;eternal, that this harmony ofnature and

642 22 is founded entirely on theidea of the supreme good

644 2 concept of a sole primordialbeing as the supreme good, it mustnot presume to think that it hasraised

651 9 For although, through lack ofgood sentiments, he may be cut offfrom moral interest

651 19 which may not, indeed, giverise to morality and goodsentiments, but may still giverise to an

651 39 But if we do not take carethat we first make men good, atleast in some measure good, weshall never

651 39 we first make men good, atleast in some measure good, weshall never make honest believersof them

666 23 in another world at least,than by living the good life

GOOD-SMELLING 3447 5 If, however, I say: all bodies

are either good-smelling or notgood-smelling (<vel suaveolens velnon

447 5 I say: all bodies are eithergood-smelling or not good-smelling(<vel suaveolens vel nonsuaveolens>), the

447 8 opposite, namely, that somebodies are not good-smelling,comprehending those bodies alsowhich have no

GOODNESS 2599 24 we found in the seemingly

genuine examples of goodness withwhich we were surrounded a schoolfor

600 32 that purity of purpose is ininverse ratio to the goodness ofthe cause, and that candour andhonesty are

GOT 2576 2 Particular errors can be got

rid of by <censure>, and theircauses by

606 15 But if I have got so far as toknow that the earth is a sphereand

GOVERNING 2453 21 an important distinction in

regard to the rule governing suchprocedure

519 7 For all laws governing thetransition from effects to causes,all

GOVERNMENT 3008 3 Her government, under the

administration of the <dogmatists>312 25 The more legislation and

government are brought intoharmony with the above idea, the

640 1 connection according to morallaws under the government of thesupreme good, <the kingdom ofgrace>

GOVERNMENTS 1032 9 If governments think proper to

interfere with the affairs of the

GOVERNS 4337 21 the indivisible unity of a

representation, which governs onlythe verb in its relation to aperson

367 2 we find that the singlerepresentation, 'I am', governsthem all

639 2 be counted upon only if a<Supreme Reason>, that governsaccording to moral rules, belikewise posited as

666 22 way of pleasing the invisiblepower that governs the world, andso of being happy in another world

GRACE 2640 2 government of the supreme

good, <the kingdom of grace>,distinguishing it from the<kingdom of nature>

640 7 To view ourselves, therefore,as in the world of grace, whereall happiness awaits us, except inso far

GRACIOUS 3005 11 in my power, of expressing my

gratitude for the graciousconfidence with which yourExcellency honours me

005 14 To the same gracious attentionwith which your Excellency hashonoured

005 26 To such a judge and to hisgracious attention I now dedicatethis work, and to his

GRADATION 2205 30 which and negation there

exists an infinite gradation ofever smaller degrees, and if everysense must

548 26 of the widely discussed law ofthe <continuous gradation> ofcreated beings, which was

propounded by

GRADATIONS 2206 9 diminish to nothing (the void)

through infinite gradationswithout in any way altering theextensive

564 3 be required to search for it,and through all its gradations toapproximate to the supremeperfection of an

GRADES 1544 30 in quite general terms that we

are to seek for grades ofaffinity, and yields no criterionwhatsoever

GRADUAL 3373 13 into nothing, not indeed by

dissolution, but by gradual loss(<remissio>) of its powers, andso, if I

542 18 we proceed from each speciesto every other by gradual increaseof the diversity

543 35 utmost manifoldness we observehomogeneity in the gradualtransition from one species toanother, and thus

GRADUALLY 7008 6 bore traces of the ancient

barbarism, her empire graduallythrough intestine wars gave way tocomplete

014 27 <a^priori> computation, butmust be discovered gradually

133 38 in any way belong to the actwhereby it was to be graduallygenerated

203 9 of diminution, so that it candecrease and gradually vanish

372 34 that since the soul cannot bediminished, and so gradually losesomething of its existence, beingby degrees

599 20 has, undoubtedly, not only<civilised> us, but gradually, ina certain measure, <moralised> us

655 13 assembled concepts, at firstimperfect, and only graduallyattaining to completeness,although they one and

GRADUATED 1201 25 empirical consciousness to

pure consciousness a graduatedtransition is possible, the realin the former

GRAFTED 1178 1 others may indeed be proffered

to, and as it were grafted upon, alimited understanding, the powerof

GRANT 11028 35 If we grant that morality

necessarily presupposes freedom(in

028 37 as a property of our will; if,that is to say, we grant that ityields practical principles --original

029 1 assumption of freedom; and ifat the same time we grant thatspeculative reason has proved that

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 27such

079 12 I grant the whole argument220 17 This, however, is what no one

will grant385 19 itself to certain assertions,

and refusing to grant a fairhearing to the arguments for the

426 36 And, lastly, he will not grantthat a cause ought ever to besought outside

460 7 We may certainly grant thatdecomposition can never remove all

525 16 The former grant that we canknow the existence of an original

596 35 be no manner of doubt that itis always best to grant reasoncomplete liberty, both of enquiryand of

618 15 opponent, and indeed lend himour weapons, and grant him themost favourable position which hecould

GRANTED 15097 15 of knowledge with its object,

is assumed as granted; thequestion asked is as to what isthe general

192 18 Granted, then, that we mustadvance beyond a given

306 38 The unconditioned, if itsactuality be granted, isespecially to be considered inrespect of all

344 16 which belong to myself asobject, and so take for grantedthat which the questioner hasdesired to know

346 4 outer appearances (theirreality being taken as granted) asthings-in-themselves, which exist

358 6 On the contrary, it is takenfor granted; the theorising ismerely as to the mode in which

369 5 belong to thought as a merepredicate, must be granted

382 31 Should it be granted that wemay in due course discover, not in

400 22 But while all this may begranted, it yet cannot be deniedthat these two

416 12 of something absolutelynecessary must be granted

475 3 Granted, then, that reason maybe asserted to have

497 14 of a necessary being; and onceits existence is granted, wecannot, in the whole field ofpossibility

497 31 of some sort of necessarybeing is taken as granted, and ifit be agreed further that we mustcome to

528 40 and original necessity, thismay indeed be granted as a favour;it cannot be demanded as a righton

657 21 likeness to the archetype, sofar as this is granted to [mortal]man

GRANTING 6210 18 however, be thus known

<a^priori>; and even granting thatwe could in any such mannercontrive to

339 28 Accordingly, even granting thehuman soul to be simple in nature,

such470 38 Now granting that effects are

appearances and that their cause498 13 to which we can also ascribe

absolute necessity -- granting allthis, it by no means follows thatthe concept

498 33 For granting that there are inthe idea of reason obligations

651 29 through the laborious effortsof its criticism, granting eventhat in the end it should turn outto be

GRASP 5013 20 in regard to details, often

interfere with our grasp of thewhole

122 15 be engaged in only by thosewho have failed to grasp the quitepeculiar nature of these modes of

154 9 In other words, only in so faras I can grasp the manifold of therepresentations in one

395 20 deceptive appearance whicheach vainly strives to grasp, andin regard to which, even if therewere no

604 27 that they can seize and holdwith their dogmatic grasp

GRASPED 2425 4 and the derivation of the

conditioned can be graspedcompletely <a^priori>

656 15 He has grasped and kept; thatis, he has learnt well, and is

GRASPING 1111 25 different representations

together, and of grasping what ismanifold in them in one [act of]

GRATITUDE 1005 11 is in any degree in my power,

of expressing my gratitude for thegracious confidence with whichyour

GRATUITOUS 2375 11 the assumption of their

existence is a quite gratuitousassumption, of which no proof canever be given

388 3 suggested by the progressiveform of totality is gratuitous andunnecessary, since the raising ofit is not

GRAVITATION 2273 25 system, or according to

Newton's laws of gravitation,would give an account of thesecond, namely, of

545 22 of all the laws of planetarymotion, namely, gravitation

GRAVITY 4203 28 as cause is then entitled a

moment, the moment of gravity204 3 the smallest; and so with

heat, the moment of gravity, etc206 16 observing -- partly by means

of the moment of gravity orweight, partly by means of themoment of

207 16 occurs when material bodiesdiffer in specific gravity, but

only to establish from a principleof pure

GREAT 81005 24 incentive to labours, the

benefits of which are great butremote, and therefore such as thevulgar

012 9 Although this latterexposition is of great importancefor my chief purpose, it does notform

024 31 This experiment of pure reasonbears a great similarity to whatin chemistry is sometimes

031 11 of the inclinations; thebelief in a wise and great <Authorof the world> is generated solelyby the

031 17 that which is equally withinthe reach of the great mass of men(ever to be held by us in thehighest

046 14 of the capacity or incapacityof reason for so great anundertaking

046 35 The charm of extending ourknowledge is so great that nothingshort of encountering a direct

047 28 is this other circumstance,namely, that a great, perhaps thegreatest, part of the business of

059 7 it free from errors -- whichis already a very great gain

059 31 possible, and indeed that itmay not be of such great extent asto cut us off from the hope ofentirely

097 19 questions may reasonably beasked is already a great andnecessary proof of sagacity andinsight

121 39 to universal concepts, isundoubtedly of great service

142 16 This proposition is of greatimportance and calls for carefulconsideration

178 16 Such sharpening of thejudgment is indeed the one greatbenefit of examples

193 36 we know <a^priori> insynthetic judgments a great dealregarding space in general and thefigures

205 24 the same time, there is nolack of proofs of the great valueof our principle in enabling us to

206 18 of opposition to other matterin motion -- a great difference inthe quantity of various kinds of

208 8 instance of illuminatedsurface, may excite as great asensation as the combinedaggregate of many

228 1 The great majority ofefficient natural causes are

237 30 has to be made which mustlikewise be of very greatimportance as supplying a rule tobe followed in

250 16 inferences through which wethrow open a great realm ofpossibility, of which all that isactual

256 18 These remarks are of greatimportance, not only inconfirmation of our

277 13 For the difference between the

28 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationfaculties makes a great differenceto the mode in which we have tothink

283 10 in <conjunction> with eachother, each of these great menholds to one only of the two,viewing it as

288 33 to a certainmisinterpretation, have exercisedso great an influence upon theemployment of the

289 4 in the amphiboly of theseconcepts, is of great utility as areliable method of determining and

309 22 Despite the great wealth ofour languages, the thinker oftenfinds

310 3 with a certain concept, then,since it is of great importancethat this concept be distinguished

312 5 advised to follow up thisthought, and, where the greatphilosopher leaves us withouthelp, to place it

312 34 mankind may have to come to astand, and how great a gulf maystill have to be left between theidea

318 1 Since the loss of a conceptthat is of great importance forspeculative science can never be a

319 10 an object of pureunderstanding, I am saying a<great deal>, but as regards itsrelation to the subject

325 39 better adapted to the purposeof completing our great project,as enabling us to start from whatis

347 30 proceeded quite consistentlyin ascribing great importance toempirical idealism, as one of the

370 17 Indeed, it would be a greatstumbling-block, or rather wouldbe the one

385 7 unity, and though it indeeddoes so with great though illusoryappearance of success, it soon

392 14 and the totality of theirsynthesis, alike in the great andin the small, that is, in theadvance alike

393 21 narrower sense, as referringto the world of the great and thesmall, and the other two<transcendent

394 33 such that when it is adequateto reason it is too great for theunderstanding; and when suited tothe

400 17 It does not represent <howgreat> it is, and consequently isnot the concept of a

423 11 in its order and regularity --alike in what is great in it andin what is small -- and in the

436 21 This is the great utility ofthe sceptical mode of dealing withthe

436 24 deliver ourselves, at but asmall cost, from a great body ofsterile dogmatism, and set in itsplace a

437 31 the regress in the divisionwill always be <too great> for ourconcept; while if the <division>of space

449 23 can point to such dialectic as

an example of its great services451 34 between an infinite and an

indeterminately great advance(<progressus in indefinitum>)would be

453 17 The question, therefore, is nolonger how great this series ofconditions may be in itself

456 16 not yet reached, representingtheir number as so great that noempirical synthesis could attainthereto

490 34 otherwise we could never haveconceived to be so great

490 35 upon the ignorance thusdisclosed must produce a greatchange in our estimate of thepurposes for which

502 4 So great, indeed, is thedeluding influence exercised by

518 27 original being is sooverwhelmingly great, so highabove everything empirical, thelatter

519 17 face to face with so manymarvels immeasurably great, thatall speech loses its force, allnumbers

521 15 with a determinate purpose,carried out with great wisdom; andthis in a universe which is

521 19 could not of themselves haveco-operated, by so great acombination of diverse means, tothe fulfilment

523 4 For the predicates -- 'verygreat', 'astounding','immeasurable' in power and

530 24 employment, is very far frombeing equal to so great anundertaking, namely, todemonstrate the

530 26 existence of a supreme being,it is yet of very great utility in<correcting> any knowledge of this

530 33 therefore, in spite of all itsdisabilities, of great importancein its negative employment, andserves

536 21 one and the same substanceshow at first sight so great adiversity, that at the start wehave to assume

539 4 A great advance was made whenchemists succeeded in

539 25 which present themselves tous, there were so great a variety-- I do not say in form, for inthat

545 40 They can also be employed withgreat advantage in the elaborationof experience, as

548 36 design -- especially if webear in mind that in so great amultiplicity of things there cannever be much

550 1 There is a great differencebetween something being given tomy

553 17 conditions of thought as beingtoo surpassingly great for thehuman understanding

553 37 a distinction which issomewhat subtle, but of greatimportance in transcendentalphilosophy

562 19 physical grounds ofexplanation; and to his own great

convenience, though at thesacrifice of all real

569 13 that they place the goal ofits endeavours at so great adistance, carry its agreement withitself, by

574 32 are very narrow, where thetemptation to judge is great,where the illusion that besets usis very

580 37 we have endeavoured only tomake clear the great differencewhich exists between thediscursive

584 18 The great success whichattends reason in its mathematical

584 30 this procedure -- or on thepart of the vulgar of greatexpectations from their skill --should they apply

588 37 to definitions, can beemployed with great advantage

589 36 principles can never advance,however great their certainty

629 27 has a presentiment of objectswhich possess a great interest forit

635 29 But from the two great ends towhich the whole endeavour of purereason

642 14 unity of all things, whichconstitute this great whole, inaccordance with universal laws of

648 35 correctness of which I shouldbe prepared to run great risks,that other worlds are inhabited

655 20 which, at the present time, inview of the great amount ofmaterial that has been collected,or

664 2 in metaphysics, and from whichin our times such great thingshave been expected for theadvancement of

GREATER 32031 22 but through this very fact

they acquire yet greater authority035 19 edition, will, I hope, be

compensated by the greaterclearness of the new text

051 12 representation with the first,not only with greateruniversality, but also with thecharacter of

054 13 itself; or (<a + b) > <a>,that is, the whole is greater thanits part

058 8 Greater firmness will berequired if we are not to be

069 14 instance, in a triangle twosides together are greater thanthe third, can never be derivedfrom the

104 10 has been made of them over alonger time or with greateracuteness

119 1 The greater the number of trueconsequences that follow from

167 30 these are questions that raiseno greater nor less difficultythan how I can be an object

200 5 three lines, two of whichtaken together are greater thanthe third, a triangle can bedescribed, I

200 8 imagination whereby the linescan be drawn greater or smaller,

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 29and so can be made to meet at anyand

206 13 can in different appearancesbe smaller or greater, althoughthe extensive magnitude of the

207 14 smaller degrees as anotherappearance does with greaterdegrees

245 25 idealism has been turnedagainst itself, and with greaterjustice

271 6 But they do not therebydetermine a greater sphere ofobjects

279 4 which when added to itconstitutes with it a greaterspace

399 32 have argued that a magnitudeis infinite if a greater thanitself, as determined by themultiplicity of

400 22 to any assignable unit inrespect to which it is greaterthan all number

400 24 According as the unit chosenis greater or smaller, theinfinite would be greater or

400 25 is greater or smaller, theinfinite would be greater orsmaller

401 39 contains a quantity (of givenunits) which is greater than anynumber -- which is themathematical

436 10 another, from one obscurityinto another still greater, andperhaps even into contradictions

456 34 This cosmic series can,therefore, be neither greater norsmaller than the possibleempirical regress

492 13 <ens realissimum>) are merelylimitations of a greater, andultimately of the highest,reality; and they

499 9 its judgment to those pleaswhich are at least of greaterweight than any others known to us

545 15 in any such courses, theirpaths exhibit still greaterdeviations

547 36 object, whereas it reallyrests entirely on the greater orlesser attachment to one of thetwo principles

569 10 principles, which, whileindeed prescribing greater unitythan the empirical employment of

594 5 apodeictic certainty, or even,indeed, with a greater degree oflikelihood

643 21 A greater preoccupation withmoral ideas, which was

660 10 in his special disciplines, isin still greater degree incumbentupon the philosopher, that he

668 17 determine the size anddistance of the moon with greatercertainty by the naked eye than bymathematical

GREATEST 41012 1 They are also those which have

cost me the greatest labour --labour, as I hope, not unrewarded

033 3 the strict method of thecelebrated Wolff, the greatest ofall the dogmatic philosophers

047 28 circumstance, namely, that agreat, perhaps the greatest, partof the business of our reasonconsists in

071 10 this criterion bedistinguished from it with thegreatest certainty

163 2 The above proposition is ofthe greatest importance; for itdetermines the limits of the

307 18 conditions and so to give toour knowledge the greatestpossible unity of reason

312 8 A constitution allowing <thegreatest possible human freedom>in accordance with laws

312 11 with that of all others> -- Ido not speak of the greatesthappiness, for this will follow ofitself -- is at

312 32 legal organisation of mankindever nearer to its greatestpossible perfection, advances thismaximum as an

400 3 Now no multiplicity is thegreatest, since one or more unitscan always be added to

427 13 in our assertions, and yet atthe same time the greatestpossible extension of ourunderstanding, through

450 23 It is rather a principle ofthe greatest possible continuationand extension of experience

455 2 in conformity with the objectsof experience, the greatestpossible empirical use ofunderstanding, the

509 18 resources of its dialecticalskill to produce the greatestpossible transcendental illusion

513 37 All support here fails us; andthe <greatest> perfection, no lessthan the <least> perfection

516 11 to serve as a principle forobtaining the greatest possibleunity among appearances, as beingtheir

517 9 latter is regarded simply as aprinciple of the greatestempirical unity

528 36 being, since experience nevergives us the greatest of allpossible effects, such as would be

531 2 validity beyond all question,it would be of the greatestimportance accurately to determinethis concept

533 29 the less it serves to give tothese concepts the greatest[possible] unity combined with thegreatest

533 30 the greatest [possible] unitycombined with the greatest[possible] extension

533 38 possible experience), andthereby to secure its greatestpossible extension, just as, inthe case of

543 8 and to all lower standpoints,and their greatest possiblevariety, by the law ofspecification

546 33 For what is greatest andabsolutely complete can bedeterminately

550 13 in accordance with theconditions of the greatest

possible unity of reason -- theschema of the

550 15 thing in general, which servesonly to secure the greatestpossible systematic unity in theempirical

551 29 employment of <our> reason asto secure its greatest possibleextension -- that is, by viewingall

554 23 For if the greatest possibleempirical employment of my reasonrests

555 1 reason>, which through ideasof the greatest harmony and unityis the cause of the universe

555 5 of the manifold in theuniverse, and thereby the greatestpossible empirical employment ofreason

555 13 namely, as giving thesubstratum of the greatestpossible unity of experience, I amquite in order

555 24 being, in itself completelyunknown to me, to the greatestpossible systematic unity of theuniverse, solely

555 26 it as a schema of theregulative principle of thegreatest possible empiricalemployment of my reason

560 15 laws, and so enables it toarrive at their greatestsystematic unity

565 2 The greatest possiblesystematic unity, and consequentlyalso

565 5 the very foundation of thepossibility of its greatestpossible employment

565 33 be, whether this being issubstance, of the greatestreality, necessary, etc

567 32 of the regulative principle isprecisely this greatest possiblesystematic and purposive unity --a unity

567 39 a necessary unity of nature,and that in the greatest possibledegree, while we do indeed, in sofar as

568 22 systematic and purposiveunity, combined with the greatestpossible manifoldness, wereeverywhere to be met

629 15 The greatest and perhaps thesole use of all philosophy of

GREATLY 12008 37 metaphysical assertions which

they profess so greatly to despise022 3 the changed point of view by

which they have so greatlybenefited

030 9 dogmatism by which they are soearly and so greatly encouraged toindulge in easy speculation about

081 25 On the other hand, they havegreatly embarrassed themselves bythose very conditions

200 16 principle of the mathematicsof appearances greatly enlargesour <a^priori> knowledge

317 10 its attention, it cannot berelinquished without greatlyharming all transcendentalphilosophy

30 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translation412 20 What has always so greatly

embarrassed speculative reason indealing with

549 34 a deduction of them must bepossible, however greatly (as weadmit) it may differ from thatwhich we

575 29 in accordance with mereconcepts, it stands so greatly inneed of a discipline, to restrainits tendency

599 7 sore need of such dialecticaldebate; and it is greatly to bewished that the debate had beeninstituted

648 16 life, the triumphant tone ofour judgment is greatly abated; webecome extremely diffident, and

660 28 which has preoccupied humanreason so long and so greatly

GREATNESS 1523 31 can indeed lead us to the

point of admiring the greatness,wisdom, power, etc

GREEKS 1019 5 <mathematics>, among that

wonderful people, the Greeks, hadalready entered upon the sure pathof

GRIEF 1512 35 admitting the ontological

proof), I have come to grief inthe new way that I have beenfollowing, and am

GRIEVOUS 1594 10 It is grievous, indeed, and

disheartening, that there shouldbe

GROPING 7017 11 path of a science, and is

indeed a merely random groping019 10 remained, especially among the

Egyptians, in the groping stage,and that the transformation musthave been

021 2 been nothing but a process ofmerely random groping

021 24 of metaphysics has hithertobeen a merely random groping, and,what is worst of all, a gropingamong mere

021 25 random groping, and, what isworst of all, a groping among mereconcepts

030 6 path of a science, instead of,as hitherto, groping at random,without circumspection or

654 38 and often even his latestsuccessors, are groping for anidea which they have neversucceeded in

GROSS 1666 15 However gross the religious

concepts generated by the ancient

GROSSNESS 1243 29 The grossness of our senses

does not in any way decide theform

GROUND 214033 12 if only it had occurred to him

to prepare the ground beforehandby a critique of the organ, thatis

046 7 than desist from such urgentenquiries, on the ground of theirdubious character, or from disdainand

046 16 seem natural that, as soon aswe have left the ground ofexperience, we should, throughcareful

051 25 to discover, in all its properuniversality, the ground of thepossibility of <a^priori>synthetic

056 13 said really to exist, leaveseveryone sufficient ground fordoubting as to its possibility

086 15 yourself an object <a^priori>in intuition, and ground upon thisyour synthetic proposition

108 35 (a) of the predicate to thesubject, (b) of the ground to itsconsequence, (c) of the dividedknowledge

112 16 because it is executedaccording to a common ground ofunity, as, for instance, thedecade

116 17 This distinction must havesome ground in the nature of theunderstanding

117 29 found in the mere relation ofcause to effect (of ground toconsequence), for in the latterrelation the

117 31 does not in its turnreciprocally determine the ground,and therefore does not constitutewith it a

118 22 we are justified inconjecturing that it has itsground in some rule of theunderstanding which, as often

119 5 which belong to a concept asto a common ground (but are notthought in it, as quantity)

119 23 consists in theintelligibility of the assumedground of explanation, that is, inits <unity> (without

119 27 and finally, in the<completeness> of the ground ofexplanation of these consequences,which carry

123 4 such as might, prior to allexperience, serve as ground fortheir synthesis

126 8 actually lie <a^priori> in themind as the formal ground of theobjects

126 33 Concepts which yield theobjective ground of thepossibility of experience are forthis

129 20 Upon this ground alone cantheir objective reality rest

130 37 Now this spontaneity is theground of a threefold synthesiswhich must necessarily

132 36 must then be something which,as the <a^priori> ground of anecessary synthetic unity ofappearances

133 27 And as the former constitutesthe transcendental ground of thepossibility of all modes ofknowledge

135 37 There must, therefore, be atranscendental ground of the unityof consciousness in the synthesisof

135 40 general, and so of all objectsof experience, a ground withoutwhich it would be impossible tothink any

136 26 unity of this apperception isthus the <a^priori> ground of allconcepts, just as the manifoldnessof

136 27 manifoldness of space and timeis the <a^priori> ground of theintuitions of sensibility

138 21 these latter were not based ona transcendental ground of unity

139 34 The ground of the possibilityof the association of the

140 17 should direct itself accordingto our subjective ground ofapperception, and should indeeddepend upon it

141 25 If, now, we desire to followup the inner ground of thisconnection of the representationsto the

142 27 which is known <a^priori>, andso yields the ground for synthetic<a^priori> propositions which

143 4 of imagination, prior toapperception, is the ground of thepossibility of all knowledge,especially

144 17 were it not that there existsa subjective ground which leadsthe mind to reinstate a preceding

144 29 This subjective and<empirical> ground of reproductionaccording to rules is what is

145 1 unity of association had notalso an objective ground whichmakes it impossible thatappearances should

145 16 There must, therefore, be anobjective ground (that is, onethat can be comprehended<a^priori>

145 19 of a law that extends to allappearances -- a ground, namely,which constrains us to regard all

145 23 This objective ground of allassociation of appearances Ientitle their

148 15 unity of apperception is thusthe transcendental ground of thenecessary conformity to law of all

149 23 from our representations, thatis, could not be a ground why athing should exist characterisedby that

152 24 $12), namely in that whichitself contains the ground of theunity of diverse concepts injudgment, and

154 14 intuitions, as generated<a^priori>, is thus the ground ofthe identity of apperceptionitself, which

158 8 understanding which is the<a^priori> underlying ground ofthe empirical synthesis

164 17 to the unity of apperception,and is thereby the ground of thepossibility of <a^priori>knowledge, so

165 23 and is its first application-- and thereby the ground of all

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 31its other applications -- to theobjects of

173 18 dependent upon thesecategories as the original groundof its necessary conformity to law(<natura

176 4 GENERAL logic is constructedupon a ground plan which exactlycoincides with the division of

179 4 since in all attempts hithertomade, little or no ground has beenwon

189 34 by the object, or else in amanner for which no ground isgiven, either <a^priori> or<a^posteriori>

190 26 sine qua non>, but not adetermining ground, of the truthof our [non-analytic] knowledge

213 27 For such determination werequire an underlying ground whichexists <at all times>, that is,something

215 1 For this permanence is oursole ground for applying thecategory of substance to

224 2 unity of appearances in time,has been the ground of experienceitself, and has therefore preceded

226 29 The principle of sufficientreason is thus the ground ofpossible experience, that is, ofobjective

227 28 conditions of succession), asbeing itself the ground of thepossibility of such experience

229 23 of causality actions arealways the first ground of allchange of appearances, and cannot

231 29 Its ground is this: thatneither time nor appearance intime

232 12 principle that any suchpretension is of itself a groundfor being always mistrustful, andthat, in the

234 7 in which the one containsdeterminations the ground of whichis contained in the other is the

234 9 and when each substancereciprocally contains the groundof the determinations in theother, the relation

236 15 subjective community is torest on an objective ground, or isto hold of appearances assubstances, the

236 17 as substances, the perceptionof the one must as ground makepossible the perception of theother, and

238 35 context, shown that communityis really the ground of thepossibility of an empiricalknowledge of

244 21 The ground on which thisidealism rests has already been

250 24 possible things beyond that ofthe actual, on the ground thatsomething must be added to thepossible to

254 32 not prove the contingency ofthis state, on the ground of thereality of its opposite

257 4 CHAPTER III THE GROUND OF THEDISTINCTION OF ALL OBJECTS INGENERAL INTO

257 19 and to obtain assurance

whether there be any ground forsuch hopes, it will be well tobegin by

258 17 inasmuch as they contain inthemselves the ground of thepossibility of experience viewedas the

261 19 But we now perceive that theground of this precaution liesstill deeper

270 30 of sensible intuition; I mustlikewise have ground for<assuming> another kind ofintuition

278 7 it bears on the objectsthemselves, contains the ground ofthe possibility of the objectivecomparison of

278 24 at one and the same time isstill an adequate ground for the<numerical difference> of theobject

282 26 in all its parts, and at thesame time the chief ground of thispeculiar way of thinking, whichindeed

286 35 and the transcendental objectwhich may be the ground of thisappearance that we call matter isa mere

287 22 to an object and what thetranscendental ground of this[objective] unity may be, arematters

298 40 and determines it to makejudgments, is the ground of error

304 18 between what is known and itscondition is the ground of thedifferent kinds of syllogism

305 20 law for objects, and does notcontain any general ground of thepossibility of knowing or ofdetermining

305 32 syllogisms gives us sufficientguidance as to the ground on whichthe transcendental principle ofpure

314 1 but still meritorious task,namely, to level the ground, andto render it sufficiently securefor moral

314 3 For this ground has beenhoneycombed by subterraneanworkings

316 13 of the unconditioned,conceived as containing a groundof the synthesis of theconditioned

318 24 not indeed in so far as thelatter contains the ground ofpossible experience (for theconcept of the

328 34 is one in which there is atranscendental ground,constraining us to draw a formallyinvalid

331 12 matter, that is, as soul(<anima>), and as the ground of<animality>

335 37 made clear, though in popularfashion, the bare ground of proof

336 16 concepts -- not, at least, ifhe understands the ground of thepossibility of <a^priori>synthetic

336 37 of apperception, 'I think',remains the sole ground to whichrational psychology can appeal

when it351 2 idealist, however, who merely

challenges the ground of ourassertion and denounces asinsufficiently

352 17 itself either matter or athinking being, but a ground (tous unknown) of the appearanceswhich supply

360 8 without troubling ourselvesabout the primary ground of theirpossibility (as appearances)

360 32 speculative principles no onecan give the least ground for anysuch assertion

365 3 Apperception is itself theground of the possibility of thecategories, which on

375 31 a self-subsistent being, andthis merely on the ground that theunity of apperception in thoughtdoes

377 38 which the representation oftime has its original ground,cannot thereby determine its ownexistence in

382 1 represent myself as <subject>of thoughts or as <ground> ofthought, these modes ofrepresentation do not

382 34 holding <a^priori> alsoconcern our existence -- groundfor regarding ourselves as<legislating>

383 25 logical functions of subjectand predicate, of ground andconsequence, in accordance withwhich the

389 19 That is to say, in it reasonfinds no ground for proceedingregressively to conditions

412 12 absolute spontaneity of anaction, as the proper ground ofits imputability

418 14 From the same ground on which,in the thesis, the existence of an

422 21 only in dry formulas thatcontain merely the ground of theirlegal claims

426 4 the understanding is always onits own proper ground, namely, thefield of genuinely possible

446 38 strictly so-called, both fallto the ground, inasmuch as thecondition, under which alone

451 23 though without correctlyassigning the ground of thedistinction

452 20 gone back, we have never metwith an empirical ground forregarding the series as limited atany point

452 37 met with, not only is therenever any empirical ground forstopping in the division, but thefurther

461 12 from the occupation of space,which is indeed its ground

461 31 ideas, in tabular form, and inshowing that the ground of thisconflict and the only means ofremoving

464 2 totality in mere appearances,fall to the ground, and thepropositions of reason, when thusgiven

471 37 we need not concern ourselveswhat kind of ground for these

32 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationappearances and their connectionmay

472 1 This intelligible ground doesnot have to be considered inempirical

472 8 their strictly empiricalcharacter as the supreme ground ofexplanation, leaving entirely outof account

472 19 In lifeless, or merely animal,nature we find no ground forthinking that any faculty isconditioned

473 10 This '<ought>' expresses apossible action the ground ofwhich cannot be anything but amere concept

473 12 in the case of a merelynatural action the ground mustalways be an appearance

473 24 reason (the good),reason willnot give way to any ground whichis empirically given

479 15 <a^priori> know thepossibility of any real ground andits causality

481 1 how an unconditioned being mayserve as the ground of appearancediffers from that which wefollowed

481 25 all empirical conditions anditself contains the ground of thepossibility of all appearances

481 37 intelligible to be<impossible>, merely on the groundthat it is not of any use inexplaining

482 20 which exist apart from theirtranscendental ground, and whichcan remain standing while we seekan

482 27 On the other hand, to think an<intelligible> ground of theappearances, that is, of thesensible

483 13 only the purely transcendentaland to us unknown ground of thepossibility of the sensible seriesin

488 35 of all possible things,through identity of the ground oftheir complete determination

493 2 condition the possibility ofall things as their <ground>, notas their <sum>; and themanifoldness of

495 16 of such a presupposition toallow itself, on this groundalone, to be persuaded that a merecreature of

496 1 But if this ground does notrest upon the immovable rock ofthe

497 27 we conclude that the supremebeing, as primordial ground of allthings, must exist by absolutenecessity

498 32 an authority of which wecannot, simply on the ground ofthis objective insufficiency, atonce proceed

499 21 contains primordially initself the sufficient ground ofevery possible effect, and theconcept of

499 26 that we should ascend to it,and find no ground for passingbeyond it

511 38 a completion of the concept ofthe series, on the ground that wecan then conceive nothing further

512 25 of reasoning from a givenconsequence to its ground thiswould be legitimate; but in thepresent case

515 38 about nature as if there werea necessary first ground for allthat belongs to existence --solely

516 1 pursuing such an idea, as animagined ultimate ground

516 3 whatsoever of existing thingsas such an ultimate ground, thatis, as absolutely necessary, butto keep

516 12 unity among appearances, asbeing their ultimate ground; andsince -- inasmuch as the secondrule commands

517 4 not the case, we should havereached the ultimate ground ofunity by empirical means -- whichis forbidden

517 15 if such a being werepresupposed as an ultimate ground

519 3 call for further enquiry as tothe still higher ground from whichit follows

521 10 proof is possible at all) <theone possible ground of proof> withwhich human reason can never

524 11 physico-theological argumenthave therefore no ground for beingso contemptuous in their attitudeto

524 17 advancing some considerableway on the solid ground of natureand experience, and findingthemselves

524 19 itself to their reason, theysuddenly leave this ground, andpass over into the realm of mere

524 24 leap, when they have, as theythink, found firm ground, theyextend their concept -- the<determinate>

525 24 and freedom, contains initself the ultimate ground ofeverything else

529 35 the ontological; and I havetherefore no real ground to fearthe fertile ingenuity of thedogmatic

531 15 that there is no supreme beingas ultimate ground of all things,or that it has none of the

537 28 systematic unity of thevarious powers, on the ground thatspecial natural laws fall undermore general

550 18 the supposed object of thisidea, viewed as the ground orcause of the object of experience

551 26 itself) had a single, highestand all-sufficient ground beyonditself, namely, a self-subsistent

552 9 It is not, however, asufficient ground for assuminganything, that there is nopositive

553 2 It decides nothing in regardto the ground of this unity or asto what may be the inner

553 9 yields only the idea ofsomething which is the ground ofthe highest and necessary unity of

all553 38 I may have sufficient ground

to assume something, in a relativesense

554 4 necessity; and in assumingthat it has a supreme ground, wedo so solely in order to think its

554 18 Such a ground of explanationwould have to be outside the world

554 33 do not at all know in itself,and to which, as a ground of thatsystematic unity, I ascribe, inrelation

555 4 in order, under countenance ofsuch an original ground, to makepossible systematic unity of the

556 38 of the world of sense <as if>they had their ground in such abeing

557 6 thing, to which we may proceedto ascribe the ground of thesystematic order of the world

557 7 On the contrary, what thisground which eludes our conceptsmay be in its own

557 40 and are not presupposed asbeing the actual ground of theproperties of the soul

559 29 We have not the slightestground to assume in an absolutemanner (to suppose in

561 24 For it then leaves the groundof experience, which alone cancontain the signs

561 38 On the same ground I apply thename also to the sophisticalargument

564 12 I begin with a supremepurposive being as the ground ofall things, the unity of nature isreally

564 20 cause, that which serves,merely in idea, as the ground ofthe consistent employment ofreason, is simply

565 27 distinct from the world, whichcontains the ground of the orderof the world and of its connection

565 30 and there must therefore besome transcendental ground of theappearances, that is, a groundwhich is

565 31 ground of the appearances,that is, a ground which isthinkable only by the pureunderstanding

566 24 What this primordial ground ofthe unity of the world may be initself, we

567 3 of our reason, can be regardedas containing the ground of suchsystematic unity

567 8 in idea only; and in thustaking our start from a groundwhich is not determinable throughobservation of

569 3 to the former mode ofexpression, on the ground that itenables us to avoid makingprofession of

585 6 from the field of sensibilityto the precarious ground of pureand even transcendental concepts,a

585 7 of pure and eventranscendental concepts, a ground(<instabilis tellus, innabilisunda>) that

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 33591 10 ranks it does not belong,

though it has every ground to hopefor a sisterly union with it

592 25 possible the very experiencewhich is its own ground of proof,and that in this experience itmust

595 7 on the negative side whichamounted to a positive ground forits negative contentions

595 21 For whence will reason obtainground for such syntheticassertions, which do not

597 15 language of <knowledge>, westill have sufficient ground toemploy, in the presence of themost exacting

604 21 where he may confidently hopeto find firmer ground upon whichto erect his own rational and

608 21 And on this ground a generaldoubt regarding all dogmaticphilosophy

608 26 for them by a more thoroughpreparation of the ground

614 25 Reason does not afford anysufficient ground for assuming,[even] as a matter of opinion

615 15 As regards the absolutetotality of the ground ofexplanation of the series of thesecauses

615 30 there is always at hand atranscendental ground ofexplanation which relieves us fromfurther

623 12 discreetly take thought as tohow, and with what ground forhope, we may expect such anextension through

624 23 be determined, there cantherefore be only one ground ofproof

624 32 This is the sole possibleground of proof; for the event, inbeing represented

625 1 and thus are brought back tothe same ground of proof as before

626 8 true; for in that case thereis only one possible ground forthis being so, and that groundmust also be

626 9 one possible ground for thisbeing so, and that ground mustalso be true

626 16 as holding according toanalogy, namely, on the groundthat if all the many consequencesexamined by us

626 17 consequences examined by usagree with an assumed ground, allother possible consequences willalso agree

628 29 difficulty, nay, theimpossibility, of showing groundfor their assertions, and will beleft with no

633 23 which is bound up with thiswill, whether as ground or asconsequence, is entitled<practical>

635 4 2 THE IDEAL OF THE HIGHESTGOOD, AS A DETERMINING GROUND OFTHE ULTIMATE END OF PURE REASON

638 14 no less necessary to assumethat everyone has ground to hopefor happiness in the measure inwhich he

639 10 <original> good that purereason can find the ground of thisconnection, which is necessaryfrom the

639 12 two elements of the supremederivative good -- the ground,namely, of an intelligible, thatis, moral world

641 30 reason may carry us, do wefind any considerable ground forassuming only some one singlebeing which we

645 8 provided only he is inpossession of reason, its groundis objectively sufficient, and theholding of it

645 10 If it has its ground only inthe special character of thesubject, it

645 12 Persuasion is a mere illusion,because the ground of thejudgment, which lies solely in thesubject

645 24 For there is then at least apresumption that the ground of theagreement of all judgments witheach other

645 26 characters of individuals,rests upon the common ground,namely, upon the object, and thatit is for this

648 2 Such contingent belief, whichyet forms the ground for theactual employment of means tocertain

649 24 in this same divine wisdom ano less sufficient ground for adoctrinal belief in the futurelife of the

662 36 nature is entitled<psychology>, and on the sameground is to be understood asbeing only the <rational

666 21 easily discerned that therecould be no better ground or moredependable way of pleasing theinvisible

GROUNDED 38012 2 This enquiry, which is

somewhat deeply grounded, has twosides

032 33 is the necessary preparationfor a thoroughly groundedmetaphysics, which, as science,must necessarily

068 34 possibility of their<a^priori> construction isgrounded in this <a^priori>necessity of space

074 23 they are not <a^priori>representations, but are groundedin sensation, and, indeed, in thecase of taste

075 9 of time, or of axioms of timein general, is also grounded uponthis <a^priori> necessity

085 32 concepts, and also as thatupon which these are grounded, the<empirical> intuition, neither theconcepts

122 29 the pure form -- where allgeometrical knowledge, grounded asit is in <a^priori> intuition,possesses

123 2 Also, not being grounded inexperience, they cannot, in<a^priori>

125 1 It must either be groundedcompletely <a^priori> in theunderstanding, or

127 29 Upon them are grounded (1) the<synopsis> of the manifold<a^priori>

133 8 then this synthesis ofimagination is likewise grounded,antecedently to all experience,upon <a^priori>

135 35 All necessity, withoutexception, is grounded in atranscendental condition

141 20 But all perceptions aregrounded <a^priori> in pureintuition (in time, the form

145 37 of a synthesis in imaginationwhich is grounded <a^priori> onrules

152 19 category of unity ($10); forall categories are grounded inlogical functions of judgment, andin these

188 20 but also because they are notthemselves grounded in higher andmore universal modes of knowledge

195 34 <a^priori> objective validityof mathematics are grounded

216 29 of the concept of <alteration>is also grounded upon [recognitionof] this permanence

223 29 and necessity of the rulewould not be grounded <a^priori>,but only on induction, they wouldbe

234 5 the reciprocal sequence of theperceptions is grounded in theobject, and so to represent the

248 17 dynamical law of causality andthe possibility grounded upon itof inferring <a^priori> from agiven

266 3 The categories are not, asregards their origin, grounded insensibility, like the <forms ofintuition>

270 22 (upon which the form of ourintuition is grounded), must besomething in itself, that is, anobject

276 18 Many a judgment is acceptedowing to custom or is grounded ininclination; but since noreflection precedes

316 32 where possible, up to theunconditioned, and are grounded inthe nature of human reason

329 1 Such a fallacy is thereforegrounded in the nature of humanreason, and gives rise to

329 33 Whether this claim be well orill grounded, we may, veryfittingly, in accordance with the

354 31 the real goal of rationalpsychology, are grounded on thistranscendental illusion in our

378 7 philosophy professes tosatisfy it, to be grounded indeception, and to destroy itselfin the

455 14 questions, the regulativeprinciple of reason is grounded onthe proposition that in theempirical regress

460 1 Its divisibility is groundedin the divisibility of space,which constitutes

460 35 of the division of a given

34 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translationappearance in space is groundedsolely on the fact that, throughthis infinitude

466 30 with nature, may not at thesame time be grounded in freedom

497 16 possibility, find anythingthat can make a better groundedclaim [than the <ens realissimum>]to such

549 3 however, undetermined whereand how far -- as grounded innature as such, is certainly alegitimate and

567 1 of the ends and perfectionwhich are to be grounded upon it,with just those properties which,in

642 25 it has its source in the moralorder, as a unity grounded infreedom's own essential nature,and not

654 36 the parts that we haveassembled, we find to be groundedin reason itself

GROUNDLESS 13009 9 to reason its lawful claims,

and dismiss all groundlesspretensions, not by despoticdecrees, but in

060 9 historian or critic is passingjudgments upon the groundlessassertions of others by means ofhis own, which

060 10 of others by means of his own,which are equally groundless

101 2 expose the false, illusorycharacter of those groundlesspretensions, and in place of thehigh claims to

190 2 from all inner contradiction,be either false or groundless

241 29 concepts the possibility ofwhich is altogether groundless, asthey cannot be based on experienceand its

358 33 senses; and their assertion istherefore entirely groundless

436 18 whether the question does notitself rest on a groundlesspresupposition, in that it playswith an idea the

436 26 cathartic will effectivelyguard us against such groundlessbeliefs and the supposed polymathyto which they

570 8 while perhaps honestly meant,must be absolutely groundless,inasmuch as they relate to a kindof knowledge

604 11 one, by reference to thecritical principles, howgroundless are the assertions ofthose who have launched

613 10 actuality; but this opinion,if it is not to be groundless,must be brought into connectionwith what is

624 5 nature and with the refutationof each and every groundlessillusion; at the tribunal of acritical reason

GROUNDS 87011 25 judgment; the author's task is

solely to adduce grounds, not tospeak as to the effect which theyshould

031 4 held convictions, so far asthey rest on rational grounds, aredue to quite other considerations

031 20 and, for moral purposes,sufficient grounds of proof, thennot only do these latter

034 34 For all grounds ofdetermination of my existencewhich are to be

061 32 divisions will have itssubdivisions, but the grounds ofthese we are not yet in a positionto explain

124 23 synthetic unity of thought, isa conclusion the grounds of whichare by no means so obvious

129 4 Section 2 THE <A^PRIORI>GROUNDS OF THE POSSIBILITY OFEXPERIENCE

129 24 rests, and which remain as itsunderlying grounds when everythingempirical is abstracted from

131 8 us to penetrate so deeply intothe first grounds of thepossibility of our knowledge ingeneral

147 4 These grounds of therecognition of the manifold, sofar as

147 20 <a^priori> if there were notsubjective grounds of such unitycontained <a^priori> in the

147 22 subjective conditions,inasmuch as they are the groundsof the possibility of knowing anyobject

174 17 contain, on the side of theunderstanding, the grounds of thepossibility of all experience ingeneral

186 8 As the grounds of an<a^priori> necessary unity thathas its

188 19 not merely because theycontain in themselves grounds ofother judgements, but also becausethey are

195 8 at least the suggestion of adetermination from grounds whichare valid <a^priori> andantecedently to

276 21 (<i.e.> the direction of ourattention to the grounds of thetruth of a judgment) is not indeed

280 30 themselves -- were thus, onthis view, possible as grounds andconsequents

284 32 of reciprocal injury, in whicheach of two real grounds destroysthe effect of the other -- aconflict

285 34 the same thing, this can onlybe in the order of grounds andconsequences

297 9 is truth, known however oninsufficient grounds, and theknowledge of which, though thus

298 6 through which it happens thatthe subjective grounds of thejudgment enter into union with the

298 7 the judgment enter into unionwith the objective grounds andmake these latter deviate fromtheir true

321 23 that is, of inferred knowledgeon the side of the grounds orconditions of a given knowledge,in other

322 7 sufficiently determined andsecured by its grounds<a^parte^priori>

322 18 either in itself, in whichcase it needs no grounds, or, ifit be derivative, as a member of aseries

322 19 if it be derivative, as amember of a series of grounds,which itself, as a series, isunconditionally

329 29 of my inner state, wereintermingled with the grounds ofknowledge, it would no longer be arational

354 22 may find cause, on other thanmerely speculative grounds, tohope for an independent andcontinuing

388 5 For that we require toconsider only the grounds, not theconsequences

394 9 the assertion of the oppositehas, on its side, grounds that arejust as valid and necessary

425 21 to descend to consequencesthan to ascend to grounds, it doesnot puzzle over the possibility ofthe

430 8 solely in view of theintrinsic force of their grounds,and were the only way of escapefrom their

436 12 we are well advised to leaveaside the supposed grounds of theanswer, and first consider what weshould

445 38 have failed to support theircontentions by valid grounds ofproof, nothing seems to be clearerthan that

467 1 to empirical laws, they mustthemselves have grounds which arenot appearances

471 25 rests upon empiricalconditions, but solely on groundsof understanding

472 39 a kind of necessity and ofconnection with grounds which isfound nowhere else in the whole of

473 17 No matter how many naturalgrounds or how many sensuousimpulses may impel me to

474 10 and degrees, are the actionsof reason and the grounds thereof,and so may form an estimateconcerning

474 35 of nature, and in accordancewith its empirical grounds mustinevitably have happened, <oughtnot to have

475 2 causes, but because they weredetermined by grounds of reason

476 31 of natural causes througheither outer or inner groundsantecedent in time

481 32 go straying into the<transcendent>, adopting groundsof explanation that are incapableof any

495 23 we proceed to trace theseconditions to their grounds

508 3 we were already convinced, orpersuaded, on other grounds

513 11 task of reason in its searchfor the unity of the grounds ofexplanation

514 22 or, in the case of mere

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 35illusion, upon subjective grounds

522 13 in abandoning the causalitywhich it knows for grounds ofexplanation which are obscure, ofwhich it

522 24 But to prove this we shouldrequire quite other grounds ofproof than those which are derivedfrom the

523 33 we then abandon the argumentfrom empirical grounds of proof,and fall back upon the contingency

530 37 if, in some other relation,perhaps on practical grounds, the<presupposition> of a supreme and

531 10 far from being difficult,inasmuch as the same grounds whichhave enabled us to demonstrate the

544 5 rest upon pure transcendental,not on empirical, grounds

544 6 For if it rested on empiricalgrounds, it would come later thanthe systems, whereas in

547 38 neither of these principles isbased on objective grounds, butsolely on the interest of reason,the title

551 17 all appearances, there arepurely intelligible grounds of theappearances; but as we have noknowledge

558 1 For these may rest onaltogether different grounds, ofwhich we can know nothing

558 17 investigations will bedirected to reducing the groundsof explanation in this field, sofar as may be

562 19 so far as that cause is to befound in physical grounds ofexplanation; and to his own greatconvenience

566 30 question may still be pressed:Can we, on such grounds, assume awise and omnipotent Author of theworld

590 15 Consequently, no empiricalgrounds of proof can ever amountto apodeictic proof

595 8 For so far as concernscriticism of the grounds of proofoffered by those who make dogmatic

600 5 or to give an appearance ofconclusiveness to grounds ofproofs which we ourselvesrecognise to be

606 1 cannot, therefore, be madesave on <a^priori> grounds; on theother hand, that limitation of itwhich

614 32 explanation of givenappearances, no things or groundsof explanation can be adducedother than those

615 5 nature must themselves beexplained from natural grounds andaccording to natural laws; and thewildest

615 22 that we can make good the lackof physical grounds of explanationby appealing to the hyperphysical

617 7 propositions I do not mean theaddition of fresh grounds fortheir assertion, but merely thenullifying of

625 31 us to comprehend truth in itsconnection with the grounds of itspossibility

626 1 When the grounds from whichthis or that knowledge has to be

626 22 which proceeds fromconsequences to their grounds, isnot only a quite rigorous but alsoan

626 26 ostensive proof, of reviewingthe whole series of grounds thatcan lead us to the truth of aproposition

627 25 therefore rightly to beopposed on <subjective> grounds,we have yet no right to deny thepossibility of

628 20 carries with it atranscendental deduction of thegrounds upon which it is itselfmade to rest

628 23 If an opponent relies onsubjective grounds, it is an easymatter to refute him

640 11 Practical laws, in so far asthey are subjective grounds ofactions, that is, subjectiveprinciples, are

641 26 which speculative theologydoes not, on objective grounds,even so much as <point the way>,and as to the

642 27 connects the purposiveness ofnature with grounds which must beinseparably connected <a^priori>

645 5 which, though it may rest onobjective grounds, also requiressubjective causes in the mind of

645 33 upon the understanding ofothers whether those grounds ofthe judgment which are valid forus have the

646 4 which we have taken as beingits objective <grounds>, and canthus explain the deceptivejudgment as

646 39 For since such judging is notbased on grounds of experience,but being in every case necessary

647 14 For the subjective groundsupon which we may hold somethingto be true, such

648 25 which we regard ourselves ashaving sufficient grounds, whileyet there is no existing means ofarriving

650 34 certainty; and since it restson subjective grounds (of themoral sentiment), I must not evensay

651 6 and can, indeed, be supportedby strong grounds of analogy, butnot by such as must compel the

GROUP 6116 10 be divided into two groups;

those in the first group beingconcerned with objects ofintuition, pure

116 12 pure as well as empirical,those in the second group with theexistence of these objects, intheir

116 14 The categories in the firstgroup I would entitle the<mathematical>, those in the

116 15 entitle the <mathematical>,those in the second group the<dynamical>

116 17 these are to be met with onlyin the second group

117 8 that of <community>, which isfound in the third group, itsaccordance with the form of adisjunctive

GROUPS 3116 10 may, in the first instance, be

divided into two groups; those inthe first group being concernedwith

197 2 thereby distinguished fromthose of the other two groups,which are capable only of a merelydiscursive

625 19 who intends his variousarguments for different groups, inorder to take advantage of theweakness of

GROW 2604 28 they may, the shadows which

they cleave asunder grow togetheragain forthwith, like the heroesin

653 28 It may grow from within (<perintussusceptionem>), but not

GROWTH 5005 5 SIR, To further, so far as in

us lies, the growth of thesciences is to work along thelines of

058 12 at last to bring to aprosperous and fruitful growth ascience indispensable to humanreason -- a

599 33 otherwise it corrupts theheart, and checks the growth ofgood sentiments with the rankweeds of fair

616 13 similar to the changes thattake place in matter (growth anddecay), and we have therefore toseek the aid

653 30 It is thus like an animalbody, the growth of which is notby the addition of a new member

GUARANTEE 1060 14 That is to say, it has to

guarantee, as following fromprinciples, the completeness

GUARANTEED 2102 15 manner, such completeness can

never be guaranteed by any kind ofmere estimate

114 9 which as based on inductiononly, could never be guaranteed

GUARANTEES 1556 18 not only furthers its

extension, but also guarantees itscorrectness, the principle of suchsystematic

GUARD 11073 12 The above remark is intended

only to guard anyone fromsupposing that the ideality ofspace

107 18 the following observations mayserve to guard against anypossible misunderstanding

179 5 other hand, if what isdesigned be a critique to guardagainst errors of judgment(<lapsus judicii>)

36 - G A Complete Concordance to Kemp Smith’s Translation436 25 which as a true cathartic will

effectively guard us against suchgroundless beliefs and the

443 12 of the senses become ofimportance, as serving to guard usagainst a deceptive error which isbound to

532 20 with, their right employment-- if only we can guard against acertain misunderstanding and socan

574 35 <negative> instruction, whichserves solely to guard us fromerrors, has even more importancethan

575 31 the narrow limits of possibleexperience and to guard it againstextravagance and error, that thewhole

599 2 by reason, that we have noneed to call out the guard, with aview to bringing the civil powerto bear

603 22 This will indeed guard theyoung temporarily againstperversion

629 6 a discipline to check itsextravagances, and to guard itagainst the deceptions which arisetherefrom

GUARDED 2587 4 to use the term, <exposition>,

as being a more guarded term,which the critic can accept asbeing up to

627 7 intuitions, the subreption cangenerally be guarded againstthrough repeated comparison of

GUARDING 5009 21 myself that in following it I

have found a way of guardingagainst all those errors whichhave hitherto set

101 6 treatment of the pureunderstanding, for the guarding ofit against sophistical illusion

327 29 After long effort he perhapssucceeds in guarding himselfagainst actual error; but he willnever

620 37 must preserve to them thischaracter, carefully guardingagainst the assumption of theirindependent

629 19 discovering truth, has onlythe modest merit of guardingagainst error

GUARDS 1385 14 It certainly guards reason

from the slumber of <fictitious>

GUESSING 2244 1 of the empirical connection of

appearances, our guessing orenquiring into the existence ofanything will

331 30 The reader who has difficultyin guessing the psychologicalmeaning of these expressions

GUIDANCE 34046 1 of the senses, where

experience can yield neitherguidance nor correction, that ourreason carries on those

115 27 such as that here given,affords sufficient guidance as tothe proper location of eachconcept, while

177 31 the very reason that it is arule, again demands guidance fromjudgment

243 21 the series of possibleperceptions and under the guidanceof the analogies to make thetransition from our

295 3 will proceed according to theorder and under the guidance ofthe categories

305 32 of reason in syllogisms givesus sufficient guidance as to theground on which the transcendental

320 9 knowledge it receives betterand more extensive guidance

330 20 All that is here required isthat we follow the guidance of thecategories, with this differenceonly

353 33 is left for us but to studyour soul under the guidance ofexperience, and to confineourselves to those

396 7 as the proofs must alwaysproceed under the guidance of pureintuition and by means of asynthesis

410 39 a liberation from compulsion,but also from the guidance of allrules

514 32 Further, it soon abandons thisguidance and relies on pureconcepts alone

518 34 of any such unconditioned orproviding the least guidance inits pursuit

520 9 of reason within experience,through the guidance which ityields in the discovery of orderand

528 24 is that which is based uponmoral laws or seeks guidance fromthem

542 1 is a discovery that waspossible only under the guidanceof an antecedent rule of reason --reason

545 19 Thus, under the guidance ofthese principles, we discover aunity in the

545 34 and that although they containmere ideas for the guidance of theempirical employment of reason --ideas

550 23 how an object is constituted,but how, under its guidance, weshould <seek> to determine theconstitution

551 7 we shall, <first>, inpsychology, under the guidance ofinner experience, connect all theappearances

562 9 use of reason in dealing withnature under the guidance of ourexperiences

562 35 an employment which is whollydependent for guidance upon theorder of nature and the series ofits

608 16 all the steps which reasontakes under their guidance asbeing null and void

621 14 I can do so only with the helpof some special guidance, supplied

from outside this concept638 25 happiness, since rational

beings, under the guidance of suchprinciples, would themselves bethe

644 29 and indeed the impiety, ofabandoning the guidance of amorally legislative reason in theright

644 31 right conduct of our lives, inorder to derive guidance directlyfrom the idea of the Supreme Being

647 4 complete certainty; otherwisewe should have no guidance as totruth

649 7 under which this unity cansupply me with guidance in theinvestigation of nature, save onlythe

649 11 still not unimportant purpose,namely, to have guidance in theinvestigation of nature, we mustpostulate

649 38 The term 'belief' refers onlyto the guidance which an ideagives me, and to its subjective

652 10 cannot advance further than ispossible under the guidance whichnature has bestowed even upon themost

658 32 who appears to exhibit self-control under the guidance ofreason, however limited hisknowledge may be

661 24 they could have no determinateend or secure guidance in theelaboration of it, and,accordingly, in

GUIDE 10020 35 at all, only from nature, it

must adopt as its guide, in soseeking, that which it has itselfput into

188 12 table of categories is thenatural and the safe guide

196 17 The table of categories isquite naturally our guide in theconstruction of the table ofprinciples

479 33 shall now employ this seriesof states merely to guide us inour search for an existence thatmay serve

500 20 itself to attain, and which isindeed its sole guide in itsefforts to achieve that goal

551 28 of this idea of a creativereason that we so guide theempirical employment of <our>reason as to

563 20 should be used only as aregulative principle to guide usin seeking for such unity in theconnection of

567 38 But since the sole aim of thatprinciple was to guide us inseeking a necessary unity ofnature, and

621 19 only with concepts of theunderstanding, our guide is thepossibility of experience

644 15 as practical reason has theright to serve as our guide, weshall not look upon actions asobligatory

GUIDED 4

of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason G - 37413 8 is determined, and for this

reason must be guided byexperience alone

541 35 in the distinction of themanifold, if it be not guided bythe antecedent transcendental lawof

558 39 since in dealing withcorporeal nature we are guidedsolely by sensible intuition

579 12 In this fashion, through achain of inferences guidedthroughout by intuition, hearrives at a full

GUIDES 3423 10 pride of human reason) rests

upon this, that it guides reasonto knowledge of nature in itsorder and

425 24 a fixed point to which thethread by which it guides itsmovements can be attached

621 16 In mathematics it is<a^priori> intuition which guidesmy synthesis; and thereby all ourconclusions can

GUIDING 1249 21 this for himself, or of easily

discovering the guiding principlefor so doing

GUIDING-CLUES 1442 9 myself (either by the light of

history or by the guiding-clues ofcauses and effects) that aregressive series

GUIDING-CONCEPT 1520 17 extends our knowledge of

nature by means of the guiding-concept of a special unity, theprinciple of which is

GUIDING-THREAD 4238 21 And since the guiding-thread

of the categories, which alone canreveal and

324 7 They follow the guiding-threadof the categories

458 7 by means either of our ownexperience, or of the guiding-thread of history, or of the chainof effects and causes

481 31 one hand, we limit reason,lest in leaving the guiding-threadof the empirical conditions itshould go straying

GUILT 2475 32 The real morality of actions,

their merit or guilt, even that ofour own conduct, thus remains

477 34 in the moment when he uttersthe lie, the guilt is entirely his

GUILTY 6055 33 in all its universality, he

would never have been guilty ofthis statement, so destructive ofall pure

089 21 an absurdity of which no onehas yet been guilty

462 34 lacking in the pleas whichboth sides have been guilty ofmisstating, the suit may besettled to the

511 10 first, but has this additionaldefect, that it is guilty of an<ignoratio elenchi>

652 7 concern all men withoutdistinction nature is not guiltyof any partial distribution of hergifts, and

664 35 reason would otherwise quiteinevitably be guilty in the fieldof morals as well as in that of

GUISE 2166 32 manifold of <intuitions in

general>, and in the guise of the<categories>, prior to allsensible

575 17 humiliation, only because, inview of its stately guise andestablished standing, nobody couldlightly

GULF 1312 34 may have to come to a stand,

and how great a gulf may stillhave to be left between the ideaand

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