A COMPARISON OF SEARLE‟S SPEECH ACT THEORY AND

SPERBER AND WILSON‟S RELEVANCE THEORY

A Major Paper

Submitted to Dr. Robert Stewart and Dr. Charles Ray

of the

New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Course

PHIL9402: Contemporary Philosophical Hermeneutics

in the Research Doctoral Program

Allyson R. Presswood

BA, Louisiana State University, 2010

MA, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012

April 11, 2013

iii

CONTENTS

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Brief Background of Pragmatics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Definition of the Term. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Two Basic Schools of Thought. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . 4

Three Basic Approaches. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Semantic/Pragmatic Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Description of Speech Act Theory and Relevance Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Speech Act Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Relevance Theory. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Comparison of Speech Act Theory and Relevance Theory at Selected Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

Critical Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Cooperative Interaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

1

Introduction

What does hermeneutics have to do with communication? Porter and Robinson illustrate

the basic meaning of hermeneutics by appealing to its titular character, the ancient communicator

Hermes.

Hermes, a character in the ancient Greek poems the Iliad and Odyssey, played a number

of interesting roles – one of them was to deliver messages from the gods to mortals. He

was a medial figure that worked in the “in-between” as an interpreter of the gods,

communicating a message from Olympus so humans might understand the meaning. In

this way, Hermes, son of Zeus, was responsible for fostering genuine understanding –

comprehension…He had to re-create or reproduce the meaning that would connect to his

audience‟s history, culture, and concepts in order to make sense of things. In like manner,

hermeneutics tries to describe the daily mediation of understanding we all experience in

which meaning does not emerge as a mere exchange of symbols, a direct and

straightforward transmission of binary code, or a simple yes or no. Rather, meaning

happens by virtue of a “go-between” that bridges the alien with the familiar, connecting

cultures, languages, traditions, and perspectives…The go-between is the activity of

human understanding that, like Hermes, tries to make sense of the world and the

heavens.1

Since Biblical hermeneutics as a field of study deals with ancient texts, the issues interrupting

communication (i.e. historical distance) between an ancient author and a modern reader often

receive more attention than the process of communication itself, which is only to be expected

since such issues are usually the primary deterrents to understanding. Still, studying how

communication works normally should help in determining what to look for in ancient texts.2

Speech Act Theory and Relevance Theory are pragmatic theories directly concerned with how

communication happens, and thus they provide valuable insights for hermeneutics.

Many scholars concerned with Biblical interpretation (especially those approaching the

subject from a philosophical/linguistic perspective) have used theories of communication to

1 Stanley E. Porter, and Jason C. Robinson, Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, (Grand

Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 2-3.

2 This presupposes that such communication is both possible and desirable, points which (due to the limits

of this paper) will not be defended here.

2

bolster their arguments. Anthony Thiselton, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Kevin Vanhoozer rely

explicitly on Speech Act Theory in their works on hermeneutics.3 Gene Green connects

Relevance Theory to theological interpretation,4 and Ernst-August Gutt uses Relevance Theory

as a basis for his Bible translation theory, with insights that are very applicable to hermeneutical

theory.5 Since so much hermeneutical theory incorporates communication theory, a better

understanding of the latter should greatly strengthen an understanding of the former. In order to

apply SAT or RT, one must first correctly understand them. In this paper, I will give the

background and major tenets of two pragmatic theories, SAT and RT, in order to provide a solid

basis for understanding their use by hermeneutists.

In addition to the direct value of understanding pragmatic theories as they inform many

hermeneutical methods, an indirect value (perhaps a “side effect”) of studying pragmatic theories

is that pragmatics provides a microcosm within which major cross-disciplinary issues can be

clearly seen. For instance, the differences between Continental European and Anglo American

thought and theory (a major divide in many disciplines) is immediately apparent in pragmatics.

The huge debate in literary circles about where meaning is located (author/text/reader) is

reflected in the semantic/pragmatic debate plaguing pragmatists. Studying pragmatics puts

portions of these issues under the microscope so that they can be analyzed with precision, and

the decisions made about those portions may inform the greater issues.

3 Especially see Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,

1992),Kevin Vanhoozer, The Drama of Doctrine, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005) and Is There a

Meaning in the Text (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), and NicholasWolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical

Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks, (New York: Cambridge, 1995).

4 Gene L. Green, "Relevance theory and theological interpretation: thoughts on metarepresentation," Pages

75-90 in Journal Of Theological Interpretation 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2010), ATLA Religion Database with

ATLASerials, EBSCOhost (accessed March 11, 2013).

3

Brief Background of Pragmatics

Definition of the Term

“Pragmatics” is notoriously difficult to define. Besides many peoples‟ confusion between

the word as a technical linguistic term and its more popular usage meaning “practical” or

“workable,” even linguists who specialize in the subject disagree as to the proper definition of

the discipline (or perspective) they practice. Most recognize the “centrality of context”6 in any

definition – some in fact would define pragmatics as the study of context. But others believe that

“the study of context” is an insufficient or at least ambiguous explanation. Levinson spends an

entire thirty pages evaluating and discarding possibilities and eventually gives up.7 Mey devotes

a chapter to the subject and eventually decides in favor of pragmatics as “the study of the

conditions of human language uses as these are determined by the context of society.”8

Huang posits more precisely: “Pragmatics is the systematic study of meaning by virtue of, or

dependent on, the use of language. The central topics of inquiry of pragmatics include

implicature, presupposition, speech acts, and deixis.”9 Archer and Gundry follow Levinson‟s

scheme in quoting six previously proposed definitions and analyzing each one, but they settle for

5 Ernst-August Gutt, Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context, 2

nd ed., (Manchester: St. Jerome

Publishing, 2000).

6 Dawn Archer, and Peter Grundy, eds., The Pragmatics Reader, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 2. On the

other hand, many specialists avoid the term, as it simply begs the question of defining context and brings the

tensions between schools of thought to the forefront.

7 Stephen C. Levinson, Pragmatics, (New York: Cambridge, 1983), 5-35.

8 Jacob L. Mey, Pragmatics, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993), 42. Discussion on 35-52.

9 Yan Huang, Pragmatics, (New York: Oxford, 2007), 2. To further define his definition – Implicature:

what is implied but not explicitly stated in an utterance, presupposition: contextual and situational factors which lead

a person to expect certain communications, speech acts: the intentional force behind what is said, deixis: words such

as “we/you/that/there” which refer to another substantive in the conversational or concrete context (often a cause of

confusion in seminar papers – mea culpa in this regard).

4

the fairly simple explanation of pragmatics as “the cognitive, social, and cultural study of

language and communication.”10

I would propose that pragmatics could be defined even more

simply as “the study of language as it is used for communication.” The divergences in definition

stem primarily from the existence of two quite different schools of thoughts in pragmatics,

secondarily from various bases that underlie the study, and tertiarily from some disputed

questions at the heart of the discipline. A brief discussion of each of these should help unmuddy

the water – or at least bring into focus the various chunks of dirt floating therein.

Two Basic Schools of Thought

Pragmatics at its core denotes two very different enterprises: the Anglo American and the

European Continental.11

Anglo American pragmatists see a basic triadic structure to the study of

language,12

1) syntax, 2) semantics, and 3) pragmatics. As this division makes apparent,

pragmatics is thus a “component”13

of linguistics and could be termed a discipline or even a field

of study. Anglo-American linguists tend to concentrate theoretically, subsequently analyzing

data to determine a theory‟s accuracy or making up examples to explicate their theories. On the

10 Archer and Gundry, 5. They follow the Benjamins Handbook of Pragmatics for this definition.

11

Levinson, 2; Huang, 4-5; Archer and Gundry, 3-5. Also notable is Leech‟s further division of pragmatics

into five schools (“British (1): speech act, meaning, use, intention, British (2): context, situation, function, German:

agenthood of (transcendental) subject, dialogue, pronouns, speech act, French: subjectivity, markers of subjectivity,

indexicals, enunciation, American: meaning as action, the triadic sign relation”), though his delineations seem

specific rather than broad, and thus not especially helpful in defining pragmatics. See Dawn Archer et al,

Pragmatics (RAL), (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 148.

12

The distinction was coined by Charles Morris in 1938. See Levinson, 1. In this division syntax has to do

with the form or grammar of a language, semantics with the relationship between form and meaning, and pragmatics

with the relationship between user, meaning, and form. While many use “meaning” and “communication”

interchangeably, I believe (and will attempt to show) that “meaning” is properly in the domain of semantics and

“communication” in the domain of pragmatics. These terms are merely my attempt to be precise in an

overwhelmingly complicated discussion, and I make no claim that this terminology reflects that of SAT or RT; I do

believe that it reflects their conceptual views.

13

Terminology (language-component vs. language-use, presumptive context vs. emergent context) from

Archer and Gundry, 4-6.

5

other hand, European Continental linguists view pragmatics as a perspective.14

In their view,

pragmatics concerns language “use” and is inextricably intertwined with syntax, sociology, and

even anthropology; the study of language from any angle yields important information, and all of

it must be considered in tandem to arrive at correct conclusions. European Continental linguists,

then, tend to concentrate on data and derive theories from it.15

A fundamental difference between the two can be seen in their views of “context.” The

Anglo American school defines context as “the set of variables that statically surround strips of

talk,”16

while the European Continental school argues that context “stand[s] in a mutually

reflexive relationship…with talk, and the interpretive work it generates” so that talk “shapes

context as much as context shapes talk.”17

Thus context is on the one hand static and on the other

shaping, on the one hand surrounding and on the other intertwining. These two views are

summed up as “context-presumptive” and “context-emergent.” The battle over context reflects

and encapsulates the heart of the differences between the two schools.18

Three Basic Approaches

Pragmatics has emerged as its own field of study connected most closely with linguistics,

but the pragmatics river has at least three separate tributaries, each flowing from a different

discipline and wending its way toward a specific goal. One of these tributaries flowed from

14

Verschueren typifies this approach when he say “Pragmatics cannot possibly be identified with a specific

unit of analysis, so that it cannot partake in the division of labour associated with the traditional components of a

linguistic theory…therefore, pragmatics does not constitute an additional component of a theory of language, but it

offers a different perspective.” See Jef Verschueren, Understanding Pragmatics, (New York, Oxford, 1999), 2.

15

Archer and Gundry, 3-4.

16

Alessandro Duranti and Charles Goodwin, Rethinking Context, (Cambridge: Cambridge, 1992), 31.

Quoted in Archer and Gundry, 2.

17

Ibid., 31. Quoted in Archer and Gundry, 2.

6

philosophy.19

In the early 1900s, philosophers Gottlob Frege and (his protégé) Bertrand Russell

wrote with a focus on defining propositions and statements by creating a language of logic.20

Philosophers in the 1950s and forward – Austin, Strawson, and Grice in particular – saw the

problems which resulted when principles from this logical language were extrapolated to apply

to “natural” language with all its complexities of context.21

The reactors proposed various

theories (Austin: Speech Act Theory, Grice: conversational maxims) to explain how natural

language assertions could contain truth value in spite of being context-dependent and not subject

to the strict rules and functionalities of the logical language set forth by Frege and Russell.22

The

philosophical stream of pragmatics highlights “semantics, what the words say” along with

“pragmatics, what the speaker means” as complementary endeavors which both contribute to a

full understanding of how language works.23

Many questions addressed by those who use

pragmatics to help solve philosophical problems target the semantic/pragmatic interface in that

18

Archer et al, 3.

19

Putman gives an excellent description of the two (main) stages of 20th

c. philosophy of language, “logical

positivism” and the “ordinary language school,” based on the two stages of Wittgenstein‟s thought. See Rhyne

Putman, “Postcanonical Doctrinal Development as Hermeneutical Phenomenon” (PhD diss., NOBTS, 2012), 129-

31.

20

Frege separated sentence meaning into “force, sense, and denotation,” each holding importance. He

focused his theorizing on denotation, though, and most following him concentrated also on that “aspect” of language

or tried to add analysis of the sense of language. Ordinary language philosophers (Austin, Grice) later focused on the

“force” aspect, with Searle and Vanderveken eventually outlining a logical language which made it possible to

express, in “logical language,” the insights about language use involving force as well as sense and denotation. See

Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, Essays in Speech Act Theory, ( Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001), 2-5.

21

Huang, 2-3. He names the two streams within analytic philosophy in the 1950s-60s as “ideal language

philosophy” and “ordinary language philosophy.” In the former camp, Frege and Russell were followed by Richard

Montague, David Donaldson, and David Lewis, who extended their logical language principles to apply to ordinary

language and thus brought on the reaction by Austin and Grice, ordinary language philosophers.

22

This point will be discussed in more detail later, but the early philosophers separated (in differing ways)

semantic content and pragmatic “extra,” usually locating truth-conditionality in the semantic content.

23

Robyn Carston, Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication, (New

York: Blackwell, 2002), 3. As per the discussion in the previous section, this is obviously an Anglo American

approach.

7

they use pragmatics to solve semantic indeterminacies.24

A second tributary flowed from cognitive studies. “The advent of cognitive pragmatics…

has brought a rather different orientation: „pragmatics‟ is a capacity of the mind, a kind of

information-processing system, a system for interpreting a particular phenomenon in the world,

namely human ostensive communicative behavior.”25

More simply, cognitive pragmatists wish

“to work out how inferred meanings are processed and represented in the mind.”26

Many

pragmatists in this stream focus on language development in children or on certain mental

disabilities/injuries in order to understand how the brain processes language and thus how people

communicate. Although some cognitive scientists have claimed that cognitive processes are too

complex to ever be understood fully, cognitive linguists have proposed various (somewhat)

testable theories that give at least “a cognitive account of the processes involved in

understanding utterances.”27

Though they may not be able to explain all cognitive functions, they

believe that explicating language processing capacity is not beyond the realm of possibility.

The third stream flows from sociology and cultural studies and concerns basically the

way that “intentions [are] most appropriately presented in a range of different social settings.”28

An example of socio-linguistics can be found in Haruko Cook‟s article, “Why Can‟t Learners of

JFL [Japanese as a foreign language] Distinguish Polite from Impolite Speech Styles?”29

In

24

Ibid., 4.

25

Ibid., 4. Though it is not as clear, cognitive approaches generally fall into the Anglo American view of

pragmatics. Their high concentration on theory and tendency to view context as presumptive match the Anglo

American view; however, they are very open to incorporating insights from other disciplines (especially psychology

and sociology), which is a hallmark of the Continental European view.

26

Archer and Gundry, 6.

27

Carston, 3-4.

28

Archer and Gundry, 5. This approach certainly falls under the Continental European view and is

sometimes identified as the CE view.

8

many languages, “contextualization clues” allow native speakers to correctly express their

intentions, but non-native speakers, who often simply repeat the syntactical formulas they have

learned, miss key ingredients necessary for communication. This approach to linguistics is

especially situational. Though some specific studies can be generalized, socio-linguists are not

primarily concerned with general, abstract theories and prefer to focus on individual problems

that can be solved through pragmatics.30

These pragmatic tributaries flow from the larger “geographic” divisions of Anglo

American and Continental European. Both the philosophical and cognitive streams are primarily

Anglo American foundationally and functionally. The socio-cultural stream fits the Continental

European mindset. Understanding the interrelationship between these various views

demonstrates why a simple definition of pragmatics escapes even the greatest pragmatists.

Perhaps simpler is better after all. The definition of pragmatics as “the study of language as it is

used for communication” seems to be broad enough to capture the basic aims of the various

approaches and streams, but specific enough to differentiate pragmatics from semantics or

communication studies.

The Semantic/Pragmatic Debate

Besides the distinctions seen among the broad categories of Anglo American/ European

Continental and philosophical/ cognitive/ socio-cultural, a few other basic decisions often

undergird a particular approach to pragmatics but sometimes are not explicitly stated. The major

decision involves the primacy of „what is said‟ or „what is implicated.‟ All pragmatists agree that

„what is implicated‟ is integral to communication, but they do not all agree about how a sentence

29

Article included in Archer and Gundry, 354-70.

9

(string of words) and an utterance (spoken string of words including context) relate to each

other.31

Levinson clearly sets forth (but does not espouse) the traditional view,32

which basically

says that a sentence is the starting place for meaning, but when it is issued forth into a context as

an utterance, the hearer “fills in the blanks”33

and makes decisions about ambiguous words. On

the other side are “radical contextualists” who see a bigger gap between sentence and utterance,

holding that at least part of the communication occurring from an utterance actually has no

relationship to the sentence itself.34

In the traditional view, „what is said‟ has primacy; in the

latter position, „what is implicated‟ does.35

Based on this divide, some linguists separate „sentence meaning‟ and „speaker meaning,‟

holding „speaker meaning‟ as the proper domain of pragmatics and „sentence meaning‟ as

semantic in nature. Problems immediately arise in attempting to clearly delineate these two, and

pragmatists debate whether a sentence meaning totally apart from speaker meaning actually

exists in any case. This linguistic debate mirrors (and perhaps underlies?) the hermeneutical

debate over authorial or textual meaning.36

Though many other factors are in play in the

30

Eugene A. Nida, “Sociolinguistics and Translating,” in Sociolinguistics and Communication, Ed by

Johannes P. Louw, (New York: UBS, 1986), 1-3.

31

Levinson, 18-19. Each linguist has their own specific terminology and definition for “sentence” and

“utterance,” but those two terms seem to capture most simply the basic idea that most are attempting to

communicate, and will suffice at this point.

32

Stephen C Levinson, “Presumptive Meanings,” Pages 86-98 in The Pragmatics Reader, Ed by Dawn

Archer and Peter Grundy, (New York: Routledge, 2011), 92-93. He gives a helpful chart picturing what he believes

is Grice‟s view (94). See footnote 35.

33

For example, the sentence “Who does he think he is?” could be used as an utterance communicating

something like “I am displeased that John, our boss, cut our lunch break in half,” or something like “Which famous

person does my (elderly) uncle believe that he is today?”

34

There are many positions in between these two extremes, and indeed within each of the two options

listed. For an excellent summary and discussion of them, see Claudia Bianchi, Ed, The Semantics/Pragmatics

Distinction, (Stanford: CSLI, 2004).

35

Bianchi, 5-7.

10

hermeneutical debate, the primary location of meaning linguistically (in sentence or utterance)

certainly has a major role.

Interestingly, even descriptions of the semantic/pragmatic debate by pragmatists are

determined in large part by the pragmatic stream a writer is in. Philosophers are often interested

in this decision because of truth-value location: can only semantic meaning hold truth value

(Grice) or can speaker meaning be truth-conditional (the later Searle)?37

Linguists and cognitive

scientists see the debate as an interaction between the code-model of communication and the

inferential-model of communication. The code-model (usually assumed as the basic way people

communicate, by encoding and decoding messages) held sway at least until the 1900s, and

supports “what is said” as primary in communication. The inferential-model (proposed by H.P.

Grice and an American philosopher, David K. Lewis, among others) supports “what is

implicated” as primary in communication.38

Thus Grice is on two different sides of the debate

depending on which perspective one views it through!39

36

“Speaker meaning,” of course, would correspond roughly to an authorial location of meaning, and

“sentence meaning” to a textual location of meaning. For a discussion of the hermeneutical debate, see Kevin J.

Vanhoozer, Meaning, 15-32, and Thiselton, 55-79.

37

Using Fregean terminology, does sentence meaning require analysis only of denotation/sense or also of

force?

38

Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, 2nd

ed., (Malden, MA:

Blackwell, 1995), 2. The code-model describes communication as a simple matter of encoding thoughts into

language, which is heard and decoded – it is semantic in nature because everything the speaker intends to

communicate is present in the language itself. The inferential model describes communication as a complex matter

in which the speaker‟s words do not contain his entire meaning, but require contextual input as well.

39

Grice holds the “traditional” view from a philosophical perspective, in that he does not locate truth-value

in speaker meaning, but he actually was one of the first to break from the traditional view and propose a new one in

the linguistic perspective. His inferential model may show primacy of “what is implicated” in communication, which

is what cognitive scientists and linguists are interested in. Interpretations of Grice seem to suffer from more trouble

than usual since his interpreters approach pragmatics with different goals; this may be due, too, to the fact that he

did not answer the “primacy” question of the semantic/pragmatic debate but merely pointed out (for the first time!)

that language is inferential (not necessarily primarily so). Searle is also on different sides depending on perspective.

In the philosophical scheme, he falls on the side of truth-value (or, as he shifts it, felicity) being also measurable,

meaning that he supports “what is implied” (Vanderveken and Kubo, 6) but in the cognitive scheme, he moves from

Grice‟s inferential scheme “back to the code model” (Sperber and Wilson, Relevance, 24).

11

Seeing all these options may be confusing,40

but without an introduction to the

presuppositions forming the bases of various pragmatic theories, understanding how they relate

and interact would be nearly impossible. As Cappelen and Lepore point out, “it is impossible to

take a stand on any issue in the philosophy of language without being clear on these issues

because what you consider as evidence…depends on how these distinctions are ultimately

drawn.” 41

Carston warns strongly that simple comparisons between pragmatic theories are not

possible, and that one must consider all the factors in play between (for instance) cognitive or

social approaches, and between semantic/pragmatic decisions, in order not to compare apples to

oranges (or even bicycles).42

In spite of all the complexities, the theories have a great deal in

common. As Archer and Grundy sum up eloquently, “We leave you to judge who represents the

good and who the bad in these epic struggles, hoping perhaps that the various schools and

traditions will in the fullness of time turn out, like the protagonists in that galaxy far, far away, to

be closely related members of an estranged family with a lot more in common than they had

supposed.”43

40 And these options, even just in the semantic/pragmatic debate, are only the tip of the iceberg! For

example, cognitive scientists would bring in Chomsky‟s competence (semantic)/performance (pragmatic) distinction

in the theory of mind to explain their understanding of the debate (Carston, 6-10).

41

Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism and

Speech Act Pluralism, (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005), ix.

42

Carston, 11.

43

Archer and Grundy, 8.

12

Descriptions of Speech Act Theory and Relevance Theory

Speech Act Theory44

Austin

J.L. Austin (1911-1960) was an “ordinary language philosopher” whose turn toward

linguistics was a primary impetus toward and foundation for the “new” field of pragmatics.

Philosophers of language are primarily interested in the truth-value of language, and for Gottlob

Frege and Bertrand Russell in the early 1900s, that equated to being concerned with the truth

value of declarative sentences, with each declarative being necessarily true or false, and other

language types (modals, etc.) given very little attention. Austin, concerned with a scheme which

seemed to force natural language to conform to an “idealized” language, wanted to change the

focus to “How to Do Things with Words”45

– in other words, how ordinary language works.46

Ordinary language philosophers turned the debate over truth conditions on its head by claiming

that “a sentence has complete truth conditions only in context.”47

In lectures (at Oxford in 1952-

4 and at Harvard in 1955) he promulgated his ideas, especially his central thesis that “saying is

(part of) doing, or words are (part of) deeds.”48

Austin‟s work was the catalyst for Speech Act Theory (SAT), but his foundational ideas

have been developed by other scholars in ways far beyond his initial theorizing. Still, the basis he

laid is important. In order to investigate natural language, he first separated “constative”

44

Speech Act Theory definitively falls into the Anglo American philosophical approach to pragmatics. In

fact, SAT is nearly constitutive of the philosophical branch of linguistics, as Austin‟s and (later) Searle‟s SAT is the

fountainhead of the philosophical tributary feeding linguistic pragmatics. For a more detailed (and philosophically

precise) discussion of the history of SAT, see Vanderveken and Kubo, 1-21.

45

The title of his “canonical” work on Speech Act Theory, published after his death in 1960.

46

Archer et al, 5; Archer and Grundy, 11.

47

Bianchi, 3.

48

Huang, 93.

13

sentences, descriptive sentences which were the only meaning-laden ones according to his

contemporaries, from “performative” utterances, which act instead of describing. Perfomatives

could be implicitly so, as when the enormous evil lupine states “I‟ll blow your house down,” or

explicit, if he says “I threaten to blow your house down.”49

Constatives could be true or false, but

performatives could merely be “felicitous” or “infelicitous” based on success.50

Though Austin

began with this distinction, he later proposed that all language was in fact performative. Under

this scheme he introduces his much-quoted distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and

perlocutionary acts – the stated words, speaker‟s performative intention, and effects on the

hearer,51

respectively.52

Though all three of these were part of the foundational essay (“How to

Do Things with Words”) from which SAT derived its name, illocutionary acts are the focus and

possibly only essential issue in SAT.53

Austin divided Speech Acts into five types: verdictives,

exercitives, commissives, behabitives, and expositives.54

49 On another interpretation, both of these could be indirect speech acts trying to accomplish the declarative

illocutionary act most directly expressed by “Let me in!”

50

Levinson, 229.

51

The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary is vague and suffers from an extreme lack of

precision, especially in Austin‟s writing. Huang elucidates the division helpfully: “The main differences between

illocutions and perlocutions can be summed up as follows. In the first place, illocutionary acts are intended by the

speaker, while perlocutional effects are not always intended by him or her. Secondly, illocutionary acts are under the

speaker‟s full control, while perlocutionary effects are not under his or her full control. Thirdly, if illocutionary acts

are evident, they become evident as the utterance is made, while perlocutionary effects are usually not evident until

after the utterance has been made. Fourthly, illocutionary acts are in principle determinate, while perlocutionary

effects are often indeterminate. Finally, illocutionary acts are more, while perlocutionary effects are less

conventionally tied to linguistic forms” (103-4, italics mine). Searle says very little about perlocutionary effects

since, in his scheme, illocutionary effects include any effect on the speaker which is part of the illocutionary force.

So in promising or warning, when the hearer recognizes the promise or warning, that is the illocutionary effect. John

R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay on the Philosophy of Language, (New York: Cambridge, 1969), 71.

52

Archer et al, 35.

53

Levinson, 236. Huang agrees: “The term „speech act‟ in its narrow sense is often taken to refer

specifically to illocutionary acts.” Huang, 31. Searle has written very little on perlocutions, since he views them as

“outside” the SA itself. “It has seemed crucial to the theorists of speech acts, unlike earlier behavioristic theorists of

language, to distinguish the illocutionary acts, which is a speech act proper, from the achievement of the

perlocutionary effect, which may or may not be achieved by specifically linguistic means.” John R. Searle et al, ed.,

14

Searle

John R. Searle (1932- ), similarly to Austin, is an “ordinary language philosopher”55

interested in naturally occurring rather than idealized language. He is the Slusser Professor of

Philosophy at the University of California in Berkeley, and has written enough books and articles

to fill a 63-page bibliography.56

He originally built on Austin‟s SAT, but has greatly refined and

extended it, especially by intentionally integrating it with linguistics.57

Thus Searle borrows

terminology and many basic ideas from Austin, but he does not use the words or apply the

concepts in exactly the same way. His primary works on the subject include Speech Acts (1969),

Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Act (1979), Speech Act Theory and

Pragmatics (1980), and Foundations of illocutionary logic (1985) with Daniel Vanderveken.

Searle‟s hypothesis in Speech Acts is that “speaking a language is performing acts

according to rules.”58

The heart of Searle‟s theory is his idea of “illocutionary act” (IA).

“Illocutionary” has to do with speaker intentionality, and “act” reflects his foundational idea that

language “does something.” He distinguishes between the propositional content (p)and

illocutionary force (F) of an illocutionary act, such that a p = “I blow your house down”

Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980), viii. Searle also sees the theory of perlocutionary

effects as having the ability to collapse SAT altogether. “If we could get an analysis of all (or even most)

illocutionary acts in terms of perlocutionary effects, the prospects of analyzing illocutionary acts without reference

to rules [read: codes] would be greatly increased. The reason for this is that language could then be regarded as just

a conventional means for securing or attempting to secure natural responses or effects…Illocutionary acts would

then be (optionally) conventional but not rule governed at all.” Searle, SA, 71.

54

J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 2nd

ed, (Cambridge: Harvard, 1975), 151. Since his categories

have since been replaced by Searle‟s, extensive definitions will not be given here.

55

Searle, as can be seen by a brief glance at the contents of Speech Acts, is driven by philosophical

questions. He discusses fallacies, deriving „ought‟ from „is,‟ reference, and many other topics heavily debated in

philosophical circles (v-vi).

56

“John Searle,” http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/ (accessed March 29, 2013).

57

Archer and Gundry, 12-13.

58

Searle, SA, 36.

15

combined with a F = “I threaten” would yield an F(p) = “I threaten to blow your house down,”

which might be expressed simply as F(p) = “I‟ll blow your house down.”59

Further, he divides

the propositional indicator p into a referring (R)60

and a predicating (P)61

part.

The distinctions between F, R, and P allow him to be precise in talking about language,

and to simultaneously uphold its ability to have truth value while taking into account how it

works in reality. Since he has distinguished between content (p or RP) and function (F), he can

assign both reference and predication to the content portion of an utterance, which is completely

dependent on its function. The truth of R rests on whether it successfully indicates to the hearer a

“singular definite reference” intended by the speaker.62

The “truth or falsity of P” is determined

by its occurring in “a certain illocutionary mode determined by the illocutionary force indicating

device of the sentence,”63

or more simply: P is true or false for the content depending on the

function. To give an example, the utterance “Your house is burning” can be seen as made up of R

= “your house,” P = “(is) burning,” and F = warning/assertion (depending on context). If R

successfully refers to a known location, P accurately expresses the current properties of R, and

the F with which the speaker speaks is recognized, then the utterance is felicitous (or happy or

successful, depending on the SA theorist).

59 Ibid., specific example mine. See SA, 31 for Searle‟s more detailed instructions for symbolizing various

types of Speech Acts, i.e. requests are expressed by ! (p) and yes-no questions by ? (p).

60

Searle gives “Rules of Reference” including seven conditions which have to be met for reference to

succeed, and three semantic rules derived from those which must be met in order that “R make a singular definite

reference.” SA, 94-6. The discussion of referents is more complex than one might first suppose, since Searle deals

with the real/fictional divide, deixis, and a host of other issues under this heading. 72-96.

61

Searle discusses predication in detail and notes that he does not define predication as many of his

contemporaries. SA, 26; 97-127. Contra Frege, he argues that predicates do not refer (to either an entity or a concept)

but attribute properties. 102.

62

Ibid., 96.

63

Searle, SA, 127.

16

In his chapter on “The Structure of Illocutionary Acts,” Searle analyzes and categorizes

illocutionary force.64

His goal is to identify the “rules” by which the game of language functions;

not rules in the sense of prescriptive commandments, but rather rules in the sense of function

descriptors. 65

In a later essay Searle builds on Austin‟s and his own earlier works but attempts to

provide a better classification system for illocutionary acts.66

Using three “dimensions” (quite

similar to his earlier “rules”), “illocutionary point (or purpose), direction of fit, and sincerity

condition,”67

as determinates, he distinguishes five categories of illocutionary acts: “assertives,

directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations” divided by their illocutionary point.68

Though some English verbs may seem to fall into one category, they can usually be used with

various illocutionary force. What is the importance of categorizing Speech Acts? According to

Searle, being able to classify all language utterances (by use of illocutionary point) shows that

language is a game with set rules, not an inchoately infinite number of language uses.69

His

64 Searle. SA, 54. Chapter 3: 54-71.

65

Ibid., 33-42. The “game of language” sounds very Wittgensteinian, but Searle and Wittgenstein actually

part company over this very issue.

66

John R. Searle, “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts,” Pages 1-29 in Expression and Meaning, Ed., John

R. Searle, (New York: Cambridge, 1979).

67

The five illocutionary points correspond exactly to the five SAs and are the main determining factor

thereof. Ibid., 2-5.

68

Ibid., 12-20. Assertives serve the purpose of committing a speaker to the truth of what he says; they have

a words world fit (meaning that they match words to the world); they can be judged by the sincerity of truth or

falsity .12-13. Directives have the purpose of getting a hearer to do what the speaker wants; they have a world

words fit (meaning they want the world to match their words); they can be judged by the sincerity of desire, not

truth. 13-14. Commissives have the purpose of committing the speaker to a future action; they have a world words

fit; they are judged by the sincerity of intention. 14-15. Expressives have the purpose of “express[ing] the

psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional content.”

15; they have no direction of fit. Declarations serve the purpose of matching world words simultaneously with

matching words world; they have no sincerity condition . 17-20. (Unfortunately for those who prefer order,

“declaration” was chosen rather than “declarative.”)

69

Ibid., 29.

17

attempt to precisely define the pragmatics of language mirrors earlier linguists‟ classification

systems for syntax and semantics.

Thus far Searle‟s early work. Following his initial publications, a great number of

scholars began to respond to, refine, refute, or use his ideas; though Searle does not necessarily

disagree with uses of his theory, he felt the need, two decades later, to focus again on the

philosophical aspects of SAT. Vanderveken and Searle together wrote Foundations of

Illocutionary Logic in 1985, Searle‟s most mature work to that date and his last major

publication specifically about SAT. This work does not advance Searle‟s ideas about SAT so

much as it codifies them, or sets forth a complete system by which they can be expressed using

formal logic.70

The ability to “exploit in SAT the resources of the theory of truth developed in

the logical trend in contemporary philosophy” came from Searle‟s replacement of Austin‟s

“locutionary act” with “utterance and propositional act.”71

. After this, Searle began to study

philosophy of the mind and then philosophy of society or institutions; his works in both of these

areas reflect his ideas on SAT but do not impact the theory itself.72

Other Developments

Several other scholars have written on SAT; some have further developed what Austin

and Searle originally proposed, and others have taken their most basic idea (illocutionary acts)

70

John R., Searle and Daniel Vanderveken, Foundations of Illocutionary Logic, (New York: Cambridge,

1985).See especially Chapter 6: “Axiomatic Propositional Illocutionary Logic,” (106-122), which Searle calls the

“central chapter of the book,” x.

71

Vanderveken and Kubo, 6. Making this distinction allowed Searle to connect his “force” and “content”

with Fregian “sense” and “denotation.”

72

A great summary of Searle‟s shift in concentration from one area to another can be found in John R.

Searle, “Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality,” Pages 3-16 in Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality, Ed., Gunther

Grewendorf and Georg Meggle, Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy 79, Ed., Gennaro Chierchia et al, (Boston:

Kluwer Academic, 2002). In his view, understanding cognitive function (from a philosophical perspective) and

social function is necessary as a proof of SAT. He believes that his work in these areas has bolstered his theory of

language by giving it a basis on which to rest. Searle, “SA,” 7-11.

18

and proceeded in a different direction. Daniel Vanderveken is notable in the former camp. After

co-authoring a book with Searle, Vanderveken edited and contributed to a collection of Essays in

Speech Act Theory with Susumu Kubo which are especially helpful in extending and more

precisely defining Searle‟s theory. For example, Vanderveken (with Searle‟s agreement)

identified six components which make up an illocutionary force: “its illocutionary point (the

main component), its mode of achievement of illocutionary point, its propositional content

conditions, its preparatory and sincerity conditions, and its degree of strength.”73

Each

component can vary; if two illocutionary acts have all six components in common, they are

identical, but the variation of any one of them creates a different IA (though the “different” IA‟s

could still be classified under the same basic category if they had the same illocutionary point).

One of Vanderveken‟s main contributions to SAT is his attempt to extend it to apply to discourse

(instead of being limited to the utterance level). He uses Searle‟s “directions of fit” as the

deciding factor between his four “discursive goals”: descriptive (words things), deliberative

(things words), declarative (words things), and expressive ( ).74

Many pragmatists following Searle greatly criticize the specific categories of IA he

proposed, even if they agree that categories exist. Scholars have proposed at least five other

classification systems for IAs (besides Austin‟s and Searle‟s).75

Levinson, along with Sperber

and Wilson, suggest a move toward better defining the basic syntactical (relating to form)

categories of declarative, interrogative, and imperative in terms of SAT since these appear to be

73 Daniel Vanderveken, “Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory,” Pages 25-62 in Essays and Speech

Act Theory, Ed by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001), 28.

74

Vanderveken and Kubo, 19.

75

Levinson, 241.

19

fairly universal, unlike Searle‟s five categories.76

This form-based investigation leads usually to a

reduction in major categories, though perhaps to a better specification of minor categories.

Others suggest that better defining the semantic (relating to function) categories could form the

foundation for a more precise categorical system. This function-based investigation usually ends

in a multiplication of categories, usually less precise and much less helpful than Searle‟s

“summary.”77

Both of these tendencies show a move away from pragmatics and back toward a

more categorizable syntax or semantics – a drive toward order and simplicity, as it were.

Unfortunately pragmatics, as most areas of study involving people, is far from simple.

One major issue which Searle raised (but, according to many later SA theorists, did not

sufficiently answer) deals with indirect speech acts. Direct speech acts, normally just called

speech acts by Searle, can describe part of language function, but utterances which structurally

fall into one category can actually function in another category (i.e. a seeming assertive by C-

3PO: “It‟s restricted” is actually a directive to R2-D2: “Don‟t go in!”). Searle answers this by

saying that “one illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another.”78

Huang argues instead that indirect speech acts are used for politeness, since indirect assertions or

requests can accomplish the goals of the speaker with the least offense.79

Levinson goes further,

and posits that pragmatic considerations determine illocutionary force (contra Searle, who would

hold that force can be determined by “literal” indicators), so that indirect speech is not a different

76 Ibid., 242; Sperber and Wilson, 246-7.

77

Levinson, 241.

78

John R. Searle, “Indirect Speech Acts,” Pages 30-57 in Expression and Meaning, Ed., John R. Searle,

(New York: Cambridge, 1979). He adds that speakers use SAs indirectly because of convention (relying on Gricean

cooperation). This view entails the illocutionary force indicating device being inherent in the sentence type (which

Searle supports), so that the “literal” illocutionary force can be separated from the “functional” illocutionary force

(Levinson, 263-4).

20

type of illocutionary act, it just does not have the form one normally expects of a speech act

category.80

Most later SA theorists agree more closely with Levinson, but since SAT is identified

so closely with Searle, his answer has a certain prominence and to some purists is definitive.

Relevance Theory

Grice

Relevance Theory81

derives directly from an idea of H. P. Grice (1913-1988), an

Ordinary Language Philosopher closely related to Austin and Searle. Grice‟s background as a

British philosopher led him to tackle the same challenge (namely: formal logical language versus

ordinary language) as his colleagues Austin and Searle. Contributing to that discussion, he drew

a definite distinction between semantics (linguistic meaning) and pragmatics (linguistic use),

saying that the former alone had truth value.82

Instead of following the path of SAT which

Austin paved, Grice came up with his own theory to explain how ordinary language functioned.

Grice‟s two central and far-reaching ideas were “implicature” and “conversational maxims,” the

latter being based on his Cooperative principle. “Implicatures,” meanings implied by an

utterance without being concretely stated, can be “conventional” or “conversational,” stemming

either from the normal meaning of the words or from the surrounding cooperative dialogue.83

79

Huang, 112-119.

80

Levinson, 276-278.

81

An excellent online bibliography (updated regularly) for RT can be found here for anyone interested in

learning more about the topic: http://www.ua.es/personal/francisco.yus/rt.html#General.

82

Archer et al, 30-3.

83

H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” Pages 43-54 in The Pragmatics Reader, Ed., Dawn Archer and

Peter Grundy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 44. An example of a conventional implicature would be understanding

“She got married and had a baby” to mean “She got married and then had a baby” in that order. Though “and” is

merely a linking word and does not imply temporal order, the normal convention in English is to list occurrences in

chronological order. An example of a conversational implicature would be to understand “5” to mean “5 o‟clock” in

21

His four types of “conversational maxims”84

are categories of his Cooperative Principle: “Make

your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the

accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”85

The maxims are

Quantity (give as much information as necessary but no more), Quality (do not say what is false

or uncertain), Relation (be relevant), and Manner (avoid obscurity, ambiguity, and

disorderliness). Implicatures can be understood by hearers because speakers are assumed to be

following the Cooperative Principle. Regarding the maxim of Relation, Grice says “though the

maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that exercise me a good

deal…I find the treatment of such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in

later work.”86

Sperber and Wilson

Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson tackled the “exceedingly difficult” problem of the

Relation Maxim and built an entire theory of communication around it. Their Relevance Theory

builds on Grice‟s work in many ways, specifically with regard to his ideas concerning

implicature and cooperation, but Sperber and Wilson have different goals and approach the

problem of communication from a different perspective than Grice. “Relevance theory is a rather

wide-ranging framework (or „research programme‟) for the study of cognition, devised primarily

in order to provide an account of communication that is psychologically realistic and empirically

response to the question “What time should I come for dinner?”, but to understand it to mean “5 children” in

response to “How many children do you have?” This follows Grice‟s principle of quantity.

84

Grice actually lists nine distinct maxims grouped into four categories. The categories are sufficient here

to understand his case, but a complete list of the nine can be found in “Logic and Conversation.” Grice, 45. Also

they appear (in an easier-to-read format) in S&W, Relevance, 33-4.

85

Grice, 45.

86

Grice, 45.

22

plausible.”87

Thus Sperber and Wilson‟s main collaborative work is titled Relevance:

Communication and Cognition, and the language used by relevance theorists in general is closer

to scientific than to philosophical terminology.88

They explain their theory best: “Relevance

theory is based on a definition of relevance and two principles of relevance: a Cognitive

Principle (that human cognition is geared to the maximisation of relevance), and a

Communicative Principle (that utterances create expectations of optimal relevance).”89

Sperber and Wilson begin by proposing that neither the code model (encoding/decoding

messages) nor the inferential model (recognizing speaker intention) of communication

sufficiently accounts for how communication works. Instead both work together, though in their

view the inferential model has precedence. “The code and inferential modes of communication

can combine. People who are in a position to communicate with one another usually share a

language (and various minor codes)…they are unlikely, then, to go to the trouble of

communicating inferentially without these powerful tools.”90

87 Nicholas Allott, “Relevance theory,” In Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy, Eds. A. Capone,

F. Lo Piparo and M. Carapezza, (New York: Springer, 2011), 1. Italics mine.

88

Compare these two quotes: “The study of speech acts has become a thriving branch of the philosophy of

language and linguistics…however, there have been few attempts to present formalized accounts of the logic of

speech acts…The aim of this book is to fill that gap by constructing a formalized theory of illocutionary acts using

the resources of modern logic.” Searle and Vanderveken, ix. Also, “The advent of cognitive pragmatics, specifically

of the relevance-theoretic approach, has brought a rather different orientation: „pragmatics‟ is a capacity of the mind,

a kind of information-processing system, a system for interpreting a particular phenomenon in the world, namely

human ostensive communicative behavior. Carston, 4.

89

Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, Relevance Theory,” Boston University, http://people.bu.edu/bfraser/

Relevance%20Theory%20 Oriented/Sperber%20&%20Wilson%20-%20RT%20Revisited.pdf (accessed March 20,

2013). Italics mine.

90

S&W, Relevance, 27-8. They continue: “The reduction of Grice‟s analysis [the inferential model] to an

amendment of the code model destroys not just its originality, but also many of its empirical implications and

justifications. The elevation of the inferential model into a general theory of communication ignores the diversity of

forms of communication, and the psychological evidence that much decoding is non-inferential.”

23

Relevance (of an input) can be defined as a “trade-off between effort and effects”91

so

that a greater positive cognitive effect and less processing effort yields greater relevance, while a

less positive cognitive effect and greater processing effort results in less relevance.92

Relevance,

then, is a measure; an input (whether utterance or stimulus) does not have to be relevant or not,

but has more or less relevance based on the cost of processing it, the cognitive effect it yields,

and its comparison (based on those two criteria) with other inputs competing for attention.93

The first major principle of RT, the “Cognitive Principle of Relevance” says simply that

“Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.”94

This definition

hearkens back to the meaning of relevance as relating to cognitive effect and processing cost.

Wilson and Sperber define a positive cognitive effect as “a worthwhile difference to the

individual‟s representation of the world,”95

which could be a new idea, a revision of an old idea,

a reorganization of thoughts, etc. Their definition of processing cost relates directly: processing

cost is “the effort taken to represent the input, access contextual information and derive any

cognitive effects.”96

So, the less effort required to obtain information, the more relevant the input

is. More effort will be expended only when the cognitive benefit seems worthwhile.97

Building

91 Allott, 3.

92

S&W, “Relevance Theory,” 4.

93

S&W, Relevance, 46-54; S&W, “Relevance Theory,” 251-253.

94

S&W, “Relevance Theory,” 255. Carston provides a more detailed discussion of the cognitive science

basis for this claim. Carston, 4-11. Basically, “cognitive pragmatics, specifically the relevance-theoretic approach, is

to be characterized as a sub-personal-level explanatory account of a specific performance mechanism conducted at

the level of representations-and-procedures” (11).

95

Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, “Relevance theory,” Pages 607-632 in Handbook of Pragmatics, Ed.

by L. R. Horn and G. L. Ward, (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 608. Quoted in Allott, 6.

96

Deirdre Wilson, “Relevance theory,” Pages 393-399 in The Pragmatics Encyclopedia, Ed. by L.

Cummings, (London: Routledge, 2009), 394. Quoted in Allott, 7.

24

on this basis of relevance,98

Sperber and Wilson propose that ostensive-inferential

communication occurs when both the communicative and informative intentions are conveyed,99

or in other words, when a hearer recognizes that (ostensive) and what (inferential) the speaker is

attempting to communicate. Successful communication does not entail agreement with the

content, merely understanding.

Sperber and Wilson use their theory of ostensive-inferential communication to derive

their second major principle, the “Communicative Principle of Relevance,” which is that “every

ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance.”100

Importantly, this

involves both the audience‟s judgment of relevance (is the ostensive stimulus worth processing?)

and the communicator‟s competence and choices. For instance, if the communicator is a foreign-

language speaker, she may require more time and express herself less clearly (thus driving up the

processing cost) than a native speaker. If the communicator chooses to withhold information, his

statement, “I drank half the glass,” which most audiences would assume entailed “only half the

glass” could conceal the fact that he also drank the other half.

97

According to S&W, effort and effect are “non-representational dimensions of mental processes,”

meaning that a person is not actively aware of judgments on relevance. The judgments are intuitive and automatic.

“Relevance Theory,” 254.

98

And assuming a Fodorian theory of mind – the “Computational/Representational Theory of Mind” – and

a mental “deductive device.” Allott, 9-11; S&W, Relevance, 71-75; 83-108. Fodor says that each system of the

mind has its own way of computing and then representing; some are specialized (i.e. vision and auditory processing)

but a central system pulls together inputs from the specialized systems and uses them to conceptualize and infer. The

“deductive device” refers to a person‟s ability to deduct logically from an input and thus understand many more

implications than were actually stated. For instance, if Amidala asks Anakin, “Have you ever created a droid?” and

Anakin responds, “I‟ve never even seen a droid!” then she would be correct to deduce that “Not seeing something

entails not creating it,” “C-3PO is a droid and thus Anakin has never seen (or created) C-3PO,” and many more

along those lines.

99

S&W, “Relevance Theory,” 255.

100

Ibid., 256.

25

Comparison of Speech Act Theory and Relevance Theory at Selected Points

Selected points of comparison below highlight issues integral to one theory or another,

especially important to a theory of communication by language in general, or significant for a

theory‟s application and use by hermeneutists. SAT and RT share an Anglo American view of

pragmatics, but (as discussed above) the former approaches pragmatic issues from a

philosophical perspective and the latter from a cognitive-scientific perspective. This foundational

divide is either causative of or correlative to the fundamental differences between SAT and RT.

SA theorists focus on logical explanations, on language itself, and on truth and felicity; relevance

theorists focus on scientific explanations, on communication more generally, and on

comprehension. In the simplified definition of pragmatics as “the study of language as it is used

for communication,” SAT focuses on the first phrase and RT on the second. SAT thrives on

prescriptive categories, RT tends toward descriptive principles. Therefore they differ at their

most basic foundational unit of “the illocutionary act” or “relevance in communication,” the

former being a categorical scheme and the latter a controlling principle. In spite of this fact,

proponents of each interact with the other, both in critique and in cooperation.

Critical Interaction

Major Critiques of SAT

S&W critique SAT as primarily institutional rather than linguistic, a categorization

accepted by Searle, though he would hold that SAT gave correct information about linguistics as

well.101

By institutional they mean that the classification system of SAT (the five types of

101

S&W, Relevance, 243. Searle says “It is at this point [lack of rules for illocutionary acts] that what

might be called institutional theories of communication, like Austin‟s, mine, and I think Wittgenstein‟s, part

company with what might be called naturalistic theories of meaning, such as, e.g., those which rely on a stimulus-

response account of meaning.” SA, 71.

26

illocutionary acts, illocutionary points, etc.) is conventionally rather than communicatively

based, and further, that these classifications do not constrain communication in the way that SA

theorists assert. Searle‟s point which provides the spring-board for S&W‟s critique is simple (but

overwhelmingly important for SAT): “In the case of illocutionary acts we succeed in doing what

we are trying to do by getting our audience to recognize what we are trying to do.”102

The RT

response surfaces a gap between categorical intentionality and recognition of a certain type of

intentionality as necessary for communication. S&W distinguish between institutional SA such

as pronouncing marriage where recognition of the category is necessary, and other SA where (in

their view) understanding the category is at most one of the inputs involved in cognition of

meaning.103

Which SA are institutional depends on the societal structure, so in English

promising, thanking, and bidding all require recognition for success but predicting, asserting, or

claiming do not. Other societal structures may have different divisions between institutional and

regular speech acts; for instance, some have provisions for divorcing merely by uttering the

words, making divorcing an institutional (and performative) SA in those cultures, unlike in

English.

The critique of the necessity of recognition for SA success may not be valid, as at least

one relevance theorist and many SA theorists have pointed out,104

but it highlights a main

102 Searle, SA, 47.

103

“A speaker who wants to achieve some particular effect should give whatever linguistic cues are needed

to ensure that the interpretation consistent with the principle of relevance is that one she intended to convey. Thus,

when an utterance is interpreted as an ordinary assertion, this is not a result of the operation of some maxim of

quality or convention or trughtuflness, but simply of an interaction between the form of the utterance, the hearer;s

accessible assumptions and the principle of relevance.” S&W, Relevance, 249.

104

Steve Nicolle, “Communicated and Non-Communicated Acts in Relevance Theory,” Journal of

Pragmatics 10, no. 2 (2000), http://elanguage.net/journals/pragmatics/article/view/300/234 (accessed March 29,

2013), 242. Also Marc Dominicy and Nathalie Franken, “Speech Acts and Relevance Theory,” Pages 263-283 in

Essays in Speech Act Theory, ed., Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001),

283.

27

difference in the basis of SAT and RT and thus deserves consideration. On the other hand, the

blanket statement that a hearer must recognize an intention in order for an IA to be successful

suffers from a distinct lack of both proof and precision. Must the hearer recognize the specific

force (predicting, warning) or the category (assertive, declaration) or both? How would we know

that this logically precedent recognition is happening rather than, say, S&W‟s communicative

intention being fulfilled? Must a speaker recognize both SA categorizations of an indirect SA to

understand it? Questions like these challenge Searle‟s assumption of how the speaker‟s meaning

is communicated.

Major Critiques of RT

Most of the SA theorists who critique RT point out some way in which RT ignores one of

the Gricean maxims, especially the overarching maxim of cooperation and the sub-maxim of

truthfulness (under Quality).105

Since RT does not assume cooperation, and subsumes the other

conversational maxims under the primary maxim of relevance, the explanations which they give

often require flouting one or more of the other maxims. For instance, in S&W‟s theory, relevance

trumps quality, so a speaker may intend to deceive (despite Grice‟s sub-maxim of truthfulness as

a condition speakers are assumed to follow). So a student who tells a teacher “I turned in my

paper already” (which is truthful if he is referring to a paper due last week in a different class)

may be assumed to be referring to the paper he is supposed to be turning in for the teacher he is

speaking to. If the teacher knows that he has not turned in the paper for her class, then according

105 Dominicy and Franken question whether RT can explain uses of imperatives without operating under

the cooperative principle. Dominicy and Franken, 283.

28

to Grice, the teacher should assume that he is referring to a paper from another class, but

according to S&W, the teacher should assume that he is lying.106

Another criticism of RT is that it may oversimplify Grice‟s distinctions between various

types of implicature.107

Grice distinguished between conversational implicature and conventional

implicature,108

but RT uses “implicature” to refer to “particularized conversational implicatures,”

assigning Grice‟s conventional implicatures as examples of explicature.109

Haugh‟s point here is

that the line between explicature and implicature is vague and suffers from confusion, especially

in other languages. Therefore when S&W limit the concept of implicature so drastically,

conventional implicatures (Grice)/explicatures (S&W) are taken by RT as much more “certain”

than they actually are. Additionally, “implicature” becomes somewhat of a catch-all term which,

by attempting to mean everything, means nothing.110

Significant Areas of Disagreement

Philosophers of language have long attempted to solve the problems of metaphor and

irony. While many pragmatists feel that they have the answers long sought, they actually have

quite a few (differing) ones. As might be expected at this point, SAT and RT provide very

106

Lewis and Grice both see the maxim of truthfulness as “trumping” all the others (including relevance);

Wilson argues against this view. Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, “Truthfulness and Relevance,” UCL Working

Papers in Linguistics,http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/PUB/WPL/ 00papers/wilson_sperber.pdf (accessed March

30, 2013), 217.

107

Michael Haugh, “The Intuitive Basis of Implicature: Relevance Theoretic Implicitness Versus Gricean

Implying,” Journal of Pragmatics 12, no. 2 (2002), http://elanguage.net/journals/pragmatics/article/view/317/250

(accessed March 29, 2013), 117.

108

Grice, 14.

109

Haugh, 121.

110

Without the Gricean specifications that “a range of different processes underlie the generation of

implicatures, and thus a variety of different categories of implicature are needed to analyse pragmatic phenomena

falling within the scope of the notion of implicature,” implicature becomes too broad and indefinable. Haugh, 131.

29

different solutions to these problems. RT has what S&W term a “deflationary account of

metaphor,”111

which basically means that they treat metaphor in much the same way as they do

all other language. “The decoded senses of a word or other linguistic expression in an utterance

provide a point of departure for an inferential process of meaning construction.”112

A

communicator may actually mean something narrower, broader, or approximate to what they

have said, and the hearer understands which by (of course) the principle of relevance. For

instance, if Hans calls Luke a droid, he could mean that Luke has done something especially

smart or especially unemotional, depending on context. Hans is using the well-known properties

of a droid113

to indicate something about Luke, a move which S&W would call extension (a

broader meaning), since he is “applying a word with a relatively precise sense to a range of items

that clearly fall outside its linguistically specified denotation, but that share some contextually

relevant properties with items inside the denotation.”114

Searle proposes that metaphors should be interpreted by a series of steps. 1) If the

utterance does not make sense, look for a non-literal meaning. 2) Look for commonalities

between the two entities/ideas (say A and B) set in comparison (C). 3) Decide which of the

commonalities applies most readily to the A term.115

He then gives nine principles which

describe the C way that A and B relate, such as when B necessarily implies C (Chewy is a giant

implies Chewy is big in size), B has well-known properties C (Chewy is a pig could mean

111

Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson, “A Deflationary Account of Metaphor,” Pages 97-121 in Meaning and

Relevance, Ed., Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, (New York: Cambridge, 2012), 97.

112

Ibid., 105.

113

Wookiepedia, s.v. “Droid,” http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Droid (accessed April 10, 2013).

114

S&W, “Metaphor,” 106.

30

Chewy is greedy and disgusting), B and A are most similar in a certain way C (Chewy is a clown

could imply Chewy is awkwardly funny) and so on.116

Both these ways of understanding how

metaphors work make sense, but perhaps they are both missing an explanation of that certain

“punch” which a metaphor entails. As Craig Blomberg points out, metaphors can challenge an

audience to continue processing meaning and discovering connections they may not have noticed

at first hearing.117

Irony is treated in the same ways as metaphor by Searle but in a very different way by

S&W. Searle says that a hearer can recognize irony by following two principles. 1) If the

utterance does not make sense, look for a non-literal meaning, and 2) If it is “grossly

inappropriate,” the opposite is most likely meant. Certain tones of voice and can also be a clue as

to the ironic nature of an utterance. 118

Vanderveken, agreeing with Searle‟s point but expressing

it more exactly, defines indirect speech acts as those which flout Grice‟s conversational maxims,

and says that irony specifically is an exploitation of the maxim of quality.119

S&W explain irony

as an echoic use of language wherein the speaker expresses a “mocking, skeptical, or critical

attitude” toward an expectation which has not been met.120

According to S&W, irony pertains

115

John R. Searle, “Metaphor,” Pages 76-116 in Expression and Meaning, Ed., John R. Searle, (New

York: Cambridge, 1979), 105-6.

116

Ibid., 107-12.

117

“A speaker or writer who has a viewpoint he wishes his audience to accept that it does not currently hold

will seldom succeed by means of a straightforward explanation of his position. Rather he has to think of some

innocuous method of introducing the subject, while at the same time challenging his listeners to think of it in a new

way. A carefully constructed allegory may well accomplish what its nonmetaphorical, propositional counterpart

never could.” Craig L. Blomberg, Interpreting the Parables, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1990), 54.

118

Searle, “Metaphor,” 112-3.

119

Vanderveken, 57.

120

Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, “Explaining Irony,” Pages 123-44 in Meaning and Relevance, Ed.,

Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber, (New York: Cambridge, 2012), 125. Both general and occasional expectations are

possible. An expectation that parties should be fun is rather generally-held, so a person leaving a boring or tragic

“party” might remark ironically, “Well, that was fun.” But in order for an expression like “He sure is impolite” to be

31

more to attitude than information, it has a normative bias (so that something is ironic when it

departs from the norm), and it nearly always involves a certain tone of voice. Interestingly, this

scheme makes irony a second-order metarepresentation (a thought about a thought), and tests

have shown that children of a certain age and people with disabilities have much more trouble

with irony with metaphors or “literal” speech.121

Cooperative Interaction

Semantic/Pragmatic Debate

The aim of this paper does not involve solving the semantic/pragmatic debate, but suffice

it to say that while various speech act theorists and relevance theorists fall on both sides of the

semantic/pragmatic debate, as a general rule the former hold to semantic primacy while the latter

hold to pragmatic primacy. The twists and turns that accompany their explanations exemplify the

complexity of the debate and the impossibility to categorize a multifaceted theory regarding any

one point. (Making a judgment on this matter is similar to attempting to determine whether the

Star Wars character is Anakin or Darth Vader at any point in the series – sometimes it is clear

and other times not…or is he actually always both?) Searle indicates semantic primacy, as can

clearly be seen in his discussion of indirect speech acts and his claim that meaning is prior to

communication.122

S&W certainly hold to inferential primacy. Since these theories disagree on

primacy, those attempting to solve it sometimes draw from both in their arguments.123

understood as irony, the speaker and hearer must have had a specific reason for thinking “He” would be impolite

which did not turn out to be accurate. Normally a lack of politeness would be the unexpected problem deserving

ironic mention. Ibid., 125-7.

121

Ibid., 126-34.

122

Searle, “Indirect SA,” 33-34. “Individual Intentionality,” 144.

123

Bianchi, 4-9.

32

Focus on Speaker or the Speaker/Hearer Interaction

One major difference between SAT and RT is the basic “location” or source of meaning

and communication. In SAT, the source of meaning is the speaker,124

and the “location” is the

illocutionary act, including the force (F) behind the referent and predication (RP).

Communication is successful when the hearer recognizes the force (F) with which the speaker

speaks and thus correctly understands what (P) about what (R) she means to say. In RT, the

source of the meaning is still the speaker, but its “location” is a more complex interaction

between speaker, hearer, and background contextual factors. Though the speaker may intend to

communicate something, his intention in interaction with the hearer‟s processing (all dependent

upon shared physical and mental context) ultimately results in communication. These “locations”

are simplistic, but (I hope) basically correct. SAT pictures the illocutionary act as the location of

meaning, whereas RT pictures the entire interaction as necessary for meaning. This somewhat

mirrors the question: “If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it still make

a sound?” It also has huge implications for hermeneutics.

Extension to a Theory of Pragmatic Interpretation

SAT deals with individual utterances, and RT with (usually) small strings of

conversation. Neither one focuses on interpreting large discourses or entire texts. Moeschler has

written a brilliant article in which he combines insights from SAT and RT to form a pragmatic

theory of interpretation.125

From SAT he takes the “common sense argument” that since SA are

124 I should say, ostensibly the speaker. Certainly SA theorists would agree with this, but some of their

arguments (specifically those addressing indirect SA, irony, etc.) rely on meaning being located in “what is said,” so

a case could be made for the location of meaning in the locution itself. One of the contributors to Vanderveken and

Kubo‟s Essays in SAT says that SAT “is basically a theory of literal meaning.” Jacques Moeschler, “Speech Acts

and Conversation,” Pages 239-261 in Essays in SAT, Ed., Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, (Philadelphia:

John Benjamins, 2001), 260.

33

not actually isolated snippets but (in naturally occurring language) are part of larger

conversations, these conversations should also be “doing” something. Problems immediately

occur because SAT is not able to provide answers, in the normal scheme of discourse analysis,

for how sequencing and interpretation should occur.126

The sequencing problem regards how to

achieve a well-formed conversation or discourse, and the interpretation problem can be stated

simply as: “What should hearers do in order to understand what speakers intend to

communicate?”127

RT provides answers to both of those, (1) a well-formed conversation is one

in which each utterance is relevant to the one before, and (2) they should process the utterance in

relation to their accessible context and reply based on the assumption that their understanding is

correct. (2) does not guarantee accuracy, since RT is a descriptive and not prescriptive theory,

but it seems to fit how interpretation naturally happens. By using RT as the overarching

explanation for communication, SAT can be extended to apply to conversations in ways that it

could not be under a discourse analysis scheme.128

Conclusion

The fundamental difference between SAT and RT is that SAT attempts to be a theory of

meaning and RT attempts to be a theory of communication. Of course, as we have seen from the

semantic/pragmatic debate, whether meaning is possible apart from communication is a

debatable topic itself. Searle does describe communication – it happens when the speaker‟s

125

Jacques Moeschler, “Speech Acts and Conversation,” Pages 239-61 in Essays in SAT, Ed., Daniel

Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo, (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001), 252.

126

In discourse analysis, units of discourse have certain functions. SAs do not correspond at all to units of

discourse in function or interpretation – for example, questions should be followed by replies, but “answer” is not a

SA. Ibid., 240-1.

127

Ibid., 249-50.

128

Moeschler, 261.

34

intention is recognized – but wants to focus more on meaning, which is not dependent at all on

anyone or anything besides the speaker and the institutional system of language. RT does

describe meaning, but as a concept which practically rests on the foundation of communication.

An institution-based code exists in every culture, and humans utilize but do not depend on that

code for communication (and thus meaning).

Do these communication theories have any direct connection to hermeneutical theories?

Though proving connections between any two would require another paper (if not a monograph),

I would like to note some tentative links based on seeming similarities. SAT certainly supports

the search for authorial intention which characterizes redaction criticism129

and the code-

dependent nature of communication which underlies historical-critical exegesis.130

Social-

scientific critics sound very similar to RT proponents when they discuss how to interpret texts.131

Though these connections are tentative, the idea of basing hermeneutical theories on theories of

communication deserves more study.

Whether direct connections exist or not, indirect connections between hermeneutical and

communication theories abound. As seen in the introduction, several hermeneutists – especially

those in the philosophical hermeneutics tradition and, more recently, the theological

129

Norman Perrin, What is Redaction Criticism?, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 2.

130

Code-dependent communication supposes the need for decoding and re-encoding in translation;

proponents of historical-critical exegesis (at least as it is most often taught at the undergrad and masters level)

assume this same type “translation” from original context to today‟s context as a method of hermeneutics. Goldinjay

says “we need to move behind the concrete command to the principles that underlie it, not so as to stop there but so

as to turn these principles back into concrete commands applicable to our own situations.” John Goldinjay, Models

for Interpretation of Scripture, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 92.

131

Social-science critics say that “authors and audiences must share a horizon of expectations” to

communicate, so to understand what they meant, a modern hermeneutist must immerse himself in the NT context so

that he can “hear the NT with the fuller resonances it would have had for authors and addressees alike.” 58. Malina,

Bruce J. and Richard Rohrbaugh. Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels, 2nd ed, (Minneapolis:

Fortress, 2003), x. David A. deSilva, Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture,

(Downers Grove, InterVarsity, 2000), 18.

35

interpretation camp – incorporate communication theories in their own hermeneutical theorizing.

Insights from SAT and RT are invaluable in constructing a hermeneutical method. And the

primacy of meaning or communication is at the very heart of the goal of Biblical hermeneutics.

Should we attempt to recover God‟s communication by searching for the meaning of the text, or

should we attempt to discover the meaning in the text by looking for God‟s communication? Can

there be a meaning in the text divorced from its original communicative use? Should we study an

authors‟ use of text (SAT) or be radical contextualists and examine people (RT) in the

interpretive process? Questions like these are raised but not necessarily answered by studying

communication theories. They can be helpfully seen with clarity and precision through the lens

of the semantic/pragmatic debate, and hopefully this detailed look will assist in arriving at an

answer.

36

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allott, Nicholas. “Relevance theory.” Pages 1-33 In Perspectives on Pragmatics and Philosophy.

Edited by. A. Capone, F. Lo Piparo and M. Carapezza. New York: Springer, 2011.

Archer, Dawn, and Peter Grundy, Editors. The Pragmatics Reader. Abingdon: Routledge,

2011.

Archer, Dawn, Karin Aijmer, and Anne Wichmann. Pragmatics (RAL). Kindle Ed. Abingdon:

Routledge, 2013.

Austin, J.L. How to Do Things with Words. 2nd

ed,. Cambridge: Harvard, 1975.

Ballmer, Thomas T., and Waltraud Brennenstuhl. Speech Act Classification: A Study in the

Lexical Analysis of English Speech Activity Verbs. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1995.

Bianchi, Claudia, Editor. The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. Stanford: CSLI, 2004.

Blomberg, Craig L. Interpreting the Parables. Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1990.

Cappelen, Herman, and Ernie Lepore. Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic Minimalism

and Speech Act Pluralism. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2005.

Carston, Robyn. Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. New

York: Blackwell, 2002.

deSilva, David A. Honor, Patronage, Kinship and Purity: Unlocking New Testament Culture.

Downers Grove, InterVarsity, 2000.

Dominicy, Marc and Nathalie Franken. “Speech Acts and Relevance Theory,” Pages 263-283 in

Essays in Speech Act Theory. Edited by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo.

Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001.

Duranti, Alessandro and Charles Goodwin. Rethinking Context. New York: Cambridge, 1992.

Goldinjay, John. Models for Interpretation of Scripture. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995.

Green, Gene L. "Relevance theory and theological interpretation: thoughts on

metarepresentation." JTI 4, no. 1 (March 1, 2010): 75-90. ATLA Religion Database with

ATLASerials, EBSCOhost (accessed March 11, 2013).

37

Grice, H. P. “Logic and Conversation.” Pages 43-54 in The Pragmatics Reader. Edited by Dawn

Archer and Peter Grundy. Abingdon: Routledge, 2011.

Gutt, Ernst-August. Translation and Relevance: Cognition and Context. 2nd ed. Manchester: St.

Jerome Publishing, 2000.

Harland, Richard. Literary Theory from Plato to Barthes: An Introductory History. New York:

St. Martin‟s, 1999.

Haugh, Michael. “The Intuitive Basis of Implicature: Relevance Theoretic Implicitness Versus

Gricean Implying.” Journal of Pragmatics 12, no. 2 (2002). http://elanguage.net/journals/

pragmatics/ article/view/317/250 (accessed March 29, 2013).

Huang, Yan. Pragmatics. New York: Oxford, 2007.

Jobes, Karen. “Relevance Theory and the Translation of Scripture.” Journal of the Evangelical

Theological Society 50 no. 4, December 2007, 773-97.

“John Searle.” http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/ (accessed March 29, 2013).

Levinson, Stephen C. Pragmatics. New York: Cambridge, 1983.

Levinson, Stephen C. “Presumptive Meanings.” Pages 86-98 in The Pragmatics Reader. Edited

by Dawn Archer and Peter Grundy. New York: Routledge, 2011.

Malina, Bruce J. and Richard Rohrbaugh. Social-Science Commentary on the Synoptic Gospels.

2nd

ed. Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003.

Mey, Jacob L. Pragmatics. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993.

Moeschler, Jacques. “Speech Acts and Conversation.” Pages 239-261 in Essays in SAT. Edited

by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001.

Nicolle, Steve. “Communicated and Non-Communicated Acts in Relevance Theory.” Journal of

Pragmatics 10, no. 2 (2000): 233-245. http://elanguage.net/journals/pragmatics/article/

view/300/234 (accessed March 29, 2013).

Nida, Eugene A. “Sociolinguistics and Translating,” Pages 1-49 in Sociolinguistics and

Communication. Edited by Johannes P. Louw. New York: UBS, 1986.

Perrin, Norman. What is Redaction Criticism? Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969.

Porter, Stanley E., and Jason C. Robinson. Hermeneutics: An Introduction to Interpretive

Theory. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011.

Putman, Rhyne. “Postcanonical Doctrinal Development as Hermeneutical Phenomenon.” PhD

38

diss. NOBTS, 2012.

Sandra, Dominiek, Jan-Ola Ostman, and Jef Verschueren. Cognition and Pragmatics.

Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2009.

Searle, John R. Speech Acts: An Essay on the Philosophy of Language. New York: Cambridge,

1969.

___________. The Philosophy of Language. New York: Oxford, 1971.

___________. “A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.” Pages 1-29 in Expression and Meaning.

Edited by John R. Searle. New York: Cambridge, 1979.

___________. “Indirect Speech Acts.” Pages 30-57 in Expression and Meaning. Edited by John

R. Searle. New York: Cambridge, 1979.

___________. “Metaphor.” Pages 76-116 in Expression and Meaning. Edited by John R.

Searle. New York: Cambridge, 1979.

___________. “Individual Intentionality and Social Phenomena in the Theory of Speech Acts.”

Pages 142-55 in Consciousness and Intentionality. Edited by John R. Searle. New York:

Cambridge, 2002.

___________. “Speech Acts, Mind, and Social Reality.” Pages 3-16 in Speech Acts, Mind, and

Social Reality, Edited by Gunther Grewendorf and Georg Meggle. Studies in Linguistics

and Philosophy 79. Edited by Gennaro Chierchia et al. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2002.

Searle, John R., Ferenc Kiefer and Manfred Bierwisch, editors. Speech Act Theory and

Pragmatics. Boston: D. Reidel, 1980.

Searle, John R., and Daniel Vanderveken. Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. New York:

Cambridge, 1985.

Sperber, Dan, and Deidre Wilson. Relevance: Communication and Cognition. 2nd

ed. Malden,

MA: Blackwell, 1995.

__________________________. “Relevance Theory” Boston

University.http://people.bu.edu/bfraser/Relevance%20Theory%20Oriented/Sperber%20

&%20 Wilson%20-%20RT%20Revisited.pdf (accessed March 20, 2013).

__________________________. “A Deflationary Account of Metaphor.” Pages 97-121 in

Meaning and Relevance. Edited by Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber. New York:

Cambridge, 2012.

Thiselton, Anthony C. New Horizons in Hermeneutics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992.

39

Vanderveken, Daniel. “Universal Grammar and Speech Act Theory.” Pages 25-62 in Essays and

Speech Act Theory. Edited by Daniel Vanderveken and Susumu Kubo. Philadelphia: John

Benjamins, 2001.

Vanderveken, Daniel, and Susumu Kubo. Essays in Speech Act Theory. Philadelphia: John

Benjamins, 2001.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. Is There a Meaning in This Text? Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998.

Vanhoozer, Kevin J. The Drama of Doctrine. Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2005.

Verschueren, Jef. Understanding Pragmatics. New York, Oxford, 1999.

Wilson, Deirdre.“Relevance Theory.” Pages 393-399 in The Pragmatics Encyclopedia. Ed. by L.

Cummings. London: Routledge, 2009.

Wilson, Deidre, and Dan Sperber. Meaning and Relevance. New York: Cambridge, 2012.

___________________________. “Truthfulness and Relevance.” UCL Working Papers in

Linguistics. http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/home/PUB/WPL/00papers/wilson_ sperber.

pdf (accessed March 30, 2013).

___________________________. “Relevance theory.” Pages 607-632 in Handbook of

Pragmatics. Edited by L. R. Horn and G. L. Ward. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004.

___________________________. “Explaining Irony.” Pages 123-44 in Meaning and Relevance.

Edited by Deirdre Wilson and Dan Sperber. New York: Cambridge, 2012.

Wolterstorff, Nicholas. Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God

Speaks. New York: Cambridge, 1995.