Common Pool Resources: Issues in Management

G. Bhaskara Rao

Email: bhaskara2@yahoo.co.in

Society for Promotion of Wastelands Development

14-A, Vishnu Digamber Marg

New Delhi - 110 002

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Common Pool Resources: Issues in Management1

G. Bhaskara Rao2 1.0. Introduction: Historically common pool resources (CPRs) have had an important place in Indian social and economic life. In Kautilya's Arthasastra, references could be found about CPRs. Usufruct rights over CPRs, management and maintenance responsibilities and punishment for non participation in the maintenance of CPRs, etc were discussed in Arthasastra (see e.g. Agarwal and Narain 1997). CPRs serve different sections as per their needs. Though non-poor sections appeared to be drawing more quantities of certain items in absolute terms in certain places, the proportion of CPRs contribution in the family income would normally higher for the poor (Jodha, 1991). CPRs provide income and employment for the poor during off-season and also during natural calamities like drought (ibid.). CPRs have very important role in evolution of the indigenous technologies, knowledge and practices (ITKPs), which enable the local communities to optimize the use of different resources. CPRs have been playing a crucial role in preservation of local flora and fauna including many varieties of domestic animals. Some Scholars question that in growing and transforming economies like India, what reason is there to believe that changing patterns of demand, together with rising incomes, in rural areas shall not render CPRs irrelevant as providers of consumption to the poor (Chopra, 2001)? Though this hypothesis yet to be comprehensively tested, the scattered available information indicates that CPRs loose their relevance as providers of consumption to the poor only under specific circumstances. A study by this author reveals that CPRs lost their role in the food security of rural people in the Anantapur district because of well functioning and highly subsidized public distribution system (PDS)3 (Bhaskara Rao, 2000). On the other hand recent starvation deaths in Orissa emphasize the relevance of CPRs in providing food to the poor. With growing environmental problems in and around agriculture, the CPRs have to play a critical role stabilizing the ecosystem and increasing from productivity and profitability. In recent years, CPRs came under severe pressure. They have been declining in size and getting degraded at alarming pace. Using National Commission on Agriculture's norms, Saxena (2001) categorized the entire non-forest common lands of 55 million hectares as wastelands. Chopra (2001) has estimated out of total 49 million hectares of non-forest common lands, more than 44 million hectares as wastelands. Since both these estimates are based on official land 1 Paper presented at the Seminar on Policy Implication of the Knowledge with Respect to

Common Pool Resources; organized by the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi; 14th September

2001. 2 Senior Program Office and Incharge, SPWD Hyderabad Centre; 301, Sri Sai Sudha Residency;

146, Kalyan Nagar - III; Hyderabad - 500018; email: bhaskara2@yahoo.co.in 3 other such special conditions could be (a) comprehensive employment guarantee schemes and

(b) transfer of disguised and under employed people from primary sector

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use statistics, they may not truly reflect the ground reality. What ever may be the actual size of CPRs and categories, undoubtfully they are getting degraded. Therefore It is more important to understand the local causes of degradation and equally more important is the understanding of the impacts of the degradation on the livelihoods of different sections of local people (Eswaran, 2001). It should be remembered that unlike global commons, the source of the problems associated with the management of local commons is often not the users, but other agencies (Dasgupta, 1996). Even though local action result in degradation of CPRs, e.g. encroachment of common lands, overexploitation of ground water, the onus of prevention of encroachment and educating of local people remain with the State, the de jury owner and the civil society. In this paper an attempt is made to understand the local and non-local factors behind the decline and degradation of CPRs and how to reverse the process? These issues were explored by examining development policies governing the CPRs, theoretical issues in property rights and their application and various institutions in vogue in the managing of CPRs. The analysis is this paper is restricted to forests and common lands and to limited extent to water bodies. However, the framework used I the paper is applicable to all kinds of CPRs. 2.0. Development Policies Related to CPRs: Almost all policies and programs related to CPRs in India are based on Hardin's metaphor 'tragedy of commons'4 (see e.g. Saxena 2001). There is vast empirical evidence from different parts of the world including India against Hardin's metaphor (see e.g. Dasgupta 1996). Privatization of resources did not prevent/ reverse the process of degradation in many instances. CPRs have a definite role in stabilizing environment and production systems. Further, it is not technically feasible to divide certain CPRs like fisheries, groundwater, etc due to non-exclusivity and presence of externalities. On these grounds communal ownership/ management of renewable resources is preferred (Runge 1981). In India, privatization of CPRs had begun in mid 19th century. Though there are not many comprehensive studies about the impact of the privatization of CPRs, scattered evidence in different parts of the country suggests that the process resulted in severe economic, welfare and environmental losses. E.g. privatization

4 According to Hardin, as a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly

or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks, "what is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?" The utility has one 'negative' and 'positive' component. (a) The 'positive' component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receive all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the 'positive' utility is nearly '+1'. (b) The 'negative' component is a function of additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effect of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the 'negative' utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of '-1'. Adding together the components of partial utilities, a rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another, and another…. But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a common. Therein is the 'tragedy' (Hardin).

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of village common lands leads to the shift of the biotic pressure to the forest areas, which resulted in larger environmental problems (Karanth, 1992). However, the policy makers and other important players in India had adhered to that metaphor and have been guiding the process of privatization of CPRs. Principal reason for privation of CPRs is ignorance or imperfect information on which decision were taken (It will be discussed further in the next section). Other factors, which have contributed to privatization of CPRs are: a. Distribution of CPRs found to be an easy option vis-à-vis redistribution of

land under land reforms program. b. For political leaders distribution of CPRs is one of most favorite vote-caching

options. c. For officials, especially at lower rung, it is one of the most important options

of graft. d. For many NGOs privatization of CPRs may fetch development projects. 3.0. Ignorance: The World Bank in its World Development Report (1992) said that ignorance is important cause of environmental damages and a serious impediment to finding solutions in most of the developing countries. India is no exception. This assertion, though applicable to the development and utilization of all kinds of natural resources in India, is more pertinent to the common pool resources. The most insidious reason for the decline and degradation of CPRs is false perceptions about CPRs. Many key players, including political leaders, officials and NGOs involved in the development and utilization of CPRs, view that the loss of CPRs is at least inevitable and, perhaps even desirable (Jodha, 1998). We have three categories of imperfect information. First category is about the potential role of CPRs, second category is about the nature of CPRs products and third category is about CPRs' management.

3.1. The Role and Potential of CPRs:

It is quite known that CPRs provide a number of products and services to the local, national and global communities. E.g. the tropical forests provide timber, non-timber forest products (NTFP) (such as, food items fruits, nuts, rattan and game), medicinal materials, raw materials for artisan industries and firewood), grazing for livestock, land for shifting cultivation, improvement in micro/ local environment, i.e. secretion of Oxygen and Carbon sequestration, improvement of local watershed/ soil quality and hydrological cycle, supply of a large variety of genetic materiel and recreational and aesthetic benefits including tourism. Similarly the common lands provide physical products like food, fiber, fodder, fuel-wood, timber, water, manure, silt and space (for dumping). They also provide income and employment opportunities, such as off-season activities, drought period sustenance, additional animals and pretty trading/ handicrafts, etc. Large social and ecological gains like resource conservation, drainage, recharge of

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ground water, sustenance of poor farming systems and better micro-climate/ environment, etc., also accrue to the local communities form the CPRs (Jodha 1990). Similarly water bodies, apart from providing water for irrigation, domestic and institutional purposes, provide food and shelter to host of marine life including many kinds of birds, water to wild life and increase the ground water recharge. But some of these services are not commonly known. Until now, the values of most of these services in monitory terms are also not known. For example, conversion of large tracks of natural forests into commercial plantations was one of main objectives in forestry policies. For many years, main focus of forest management was to maximize commercial timber output. Even NTFPs were considered as incidental benefits. As a result no attempts were made to even to extract all available NTFPs, leave alone incorporating of measures to optimize their production in the forest management plans. Table -1 below shows gap between current extraction levels vis-à-vis potential of many NTFPs. Table -1: Current Production and Potential of NTFPs in India

In thousand tons Description Current Production Potential

production Fibres and flosses 6 50 Grasses (other than fodder) 350 525 Bamboo 1,932 4,309 Canes 14 21 Essential oils 2 3 Non-edible oils 430 6,671 Tans and dyes 187 290 Gums and resin 91 175 Lac and tassar silk 22 35 Tendu leaves 210 300 Drugs and spices 3 5 Source: Gupta and Guleria 1982 as quoted in Lal 1992

The above are old and aggregate estimates. Recent and disaggregate estimates show even larger gap between potentials and current collections in many NTFPs. E.g. Kovila Foundation, a Visakhapatnam based research and training organization, whose primary focus is NTFPs, claims that only 3% of forest potential in Eastern Ghats is being utilized. It was noticed in some of SPWD's project villages that the people are not collecting large quantities of Amla and few other NTFPs due to lack of market. In Srikakulam district, it was observed in SPWD's project villages in Seetampet mandal, that neither the local people nor the FD officials are aware of gum kariar potential. The Girijana Cooperative Corporation (GCC), which was set up to provide marking support to tribal and which has the monopoly over thirty NTFPs, purchases from tribal only a handful

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of items. By completely banning the grazing in some locations under JFM, large quantities of fodder and grasses were left unutilized. Most conspicuous by their absence in the official statistics, policies and program are environmental services that the forests provide to the local, national and global communities. Though emphasis was given to environmental consideration since 1988, it was not clear about the nature and quantities of these services. Who benefits from these services and who bears the costs are not known. Table - 2 below shows approximate values of different goods and services provided by the forest in India. Annual rent from forest in the form of environmental services

Rs. billion Goods/ Services Annual

rent Timber and firewood 128.80 NTFPs 10.90 Grazing 22.00 Environmental Services (other than recreation and as harbourers of Biodiversity)

566.80

Biodiversity 66.00 Recreation 10.00 Total 795.50 Source: Lal 1992

The annual value of forest goods and services in late 1980s was estimated as Rs.795.5 billion. It was equal to a quarter of GDP in 1987-88 (in current prices), however, in records, forestry only makes a contribution of about 1.2 percent to the GDP (Lal, 1992). In other wards the real value of goods and services provided by the forests would be around 10 to 12 thousand per hectare per year. Compared to many international estimates the above appeared grossly under estimate. One such estimate is given at Table - 3 below. Costanza et al (1998) compiled these figures from various studies. The net value of environmental service of tropical forests of US$ 1,766 per hectare is an under estimate (Costanza et. al 1998) (as quoted in Nathan and Kelkar 2001). Table - 3: Value of Annual Local Ecosystem Services of Tropical Forest Service Value in US $ per Hectare Erosion control 245 Soil Formation 10 Nutrient cycling 922 Waste treatment 87 Food Production 32 Raw material 315 Genetic resources 41 Recreation 112

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Service Value in US $ per Hectare Cultural 2 Total 1766 Source: Costanza et al 1998 as quoted in Nathan and Kelkar 2001

Non-forest common lands are not so fortunate in terms of statistics about the value of their products and services, etc. However various case studies and estimates indicate that the value of goods and services from non-forest CPRs accruing to the local communities is not far behind that of forest areas. E.g. Jodha studies indicates that rural communities are drawing about 14 to 23% of their income from CPRs (Most of which are non-forest) in 80 and odd study villages. Different estimates show a vast gap between supply and demand for fodder and firewood in rural India. Table - 4: showing the gap between demand and supply for fodder and firewood around 1990.

In million tons Item Demand Supply Deficit Firewood 235 40 195 Dry fodder 780 440 340 Green fodder 932 250 682 Source: Ministry of Rural Development as quoted in CSE, 1995.

It is quite clear that non-forest CPRs meets most of this gap. To meet these gaps collection from common lands exceeds by a huge margin, i.e. a lot of capital stock being removed from the CPRs. These lands also provide environmental services albeit at lower level. These services include preservation of Biodiversity, recharge of groundwater, improvement of local environment, soil formation, provision of silt and drainage, etc. The importance of water bodies does not require any emphasis. Irrigation tanks, apart from irrigation, provide fish, fodder, timber, etc and services like recharge of groundwater, food and water to wildlife including birds. The above clearly show the importance and value of different CPRs. The purpose of this paper is not to provide exact estimate of environmental services of each category of CPRs but to highlight their nature and magnitudes. If the environmental services are excluded, most of the investments on CPRs, including forests do not pay back. There have been very few studies of the costs and benefits of forest management. One, which focuses on a forest plantation in Rajasthan, concluded that the internal rate of return (IRR) when only the tangible benefits (grass, firewood and bamboo) were taken into account was less than 2% over a 25 year period (Maitra and Solapurker, 1999 as quoted in Conroy, 2001a). However, the same study concluded that when environmental services are included the IRR is far higher – 42% over a 15-year period (as quoted in Conroy, 2001a). It is common knowledge that thousands of farmers in North

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India had uprooted their plantations in the 1980s because they proved to be economically not viable. Though environmental services, provided by the CPRs, are real and affecting the people every day at local, national and global level, they are ignored in investment decisions. E.g. Government of Andhra Pradesh sponsored evaluation study of the on going watershed program indicates that only 25.6% of total funds are allocated for the development CPRs. Of this 25.6%, plantation of (mostly fruit trees) on a small portion of area accounted for 9%, formation of percolation tanks, repair of feeder channels accounted for another 9% and desilting of tanks (including application silt on private lands) and gully plugging accounted for the rest. It is interesting to note that about 16.2% total funds were spent on check-dams built on private property and only 0.4% of total funds were invested on check-dams in CPRs. (WASSAN, 2001). Non-appreciation of the importance of CPRs, especially the value of their environmental services is the main reason for their decline and degradation. Presence of externalities, i.e. some benefits accruing to non-owners or non-right holders and non-development of institutions to internalize such externalities is another reason. Division of ownership, management responsibilities and usufruct rights among different sets of people/ organizations is another important reason for decline and degradation of CPRs. Latter two points are discussed in next sections.

3.2. Problems of Externalities: Even though the non-forest common lands provided very useful and valuable goods and services to the local communities, the State, which is the de jury owner gets next to nothing. In other words, for the State the total, average and marginal production from non-forest common lands is zero. As a result these lands get allocated for all kinds of purposes such as agriculture, plantations, non-agriculture use, etc, irrespective of their suitability and productivity in new uses. Most often it was found that such transfers result in net welfare loss (see e.g. Brara, 1992). E.g. the productivity of agriculture crops on privatized common lands is about half of that of tradition croplands (Jodha, 1991 and Singh, 1994). Though the rational for privatization of CPRs is equity, majority of privatized CPRs has ended up in the hands of non-poor sections of the society (Karanth 1992, Jodha 1991). Lands (most of which are common lands) were allocated for industries and institutions much more than they required. Most of these lands have been kept waste for many years. E.g. the Hyderabad Urban Development Authority (HUDA) has identified more than 5,000 hectares of wasteland with different institutions under its jurisdiction. Environmental services like conservation of Biodiversity, Carbon sequestration, regulation of water flow, etc are not the valid reason for tribal to conserve the forests, unless they get a share in these benefits. In the absence of such a sharing mechanism, tribal and other forest dwelling people try to utilize the forest for shifting cultivation, firewood collection, grazing, etc. Employment in logging

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and wood processing units is another important sources of sustenance for them. Without developing an institution to transfer a portion of environmental benefits accruing to the to national and global communities, any curbs on traditional uses of forest by the tribal and other forest dependent sections would affects adversely their interests. Currently the Government of Andhra Pradesh is negotiating with the World Bank for another loan for the forestry sector. The Government plea is that though the forests turn green, the forest dwellers remain poor. Therefore the focus in the second phase would be on livelihoods. From the experiences of the first phase, one can not expect major changes. In any case these kinds of charity works do not provide enduring solutions. The only abiding solution which ensures sustainable development of forest and improvement of the socio-economic condition of forest dependent communities would be recognition of the communities' rights over environmental services including genetic materials provided by the forests and development of institutions for transfer of the benefits. Such arrangement would place a larger responsibility on the shoulders of forest communities to protect the forests.

3.3. Management of CPRs: Property right involves a bundle of five entitlements, viz. access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation (see box - 1 below). In case of private property, all five entitlements remain with one person/ group/ organization. In case of common pool resources, these entitlements get divided among different players. In any CPR, typically the local communities have the usufruct rights, which include access and withdrawal entitlements and the State holds other entitlements, viz. management, exclusion and alienation. The segregation of entitlements between the State and local communities is the crux of the problem leading to degradation of CPRs. State the de jury owner of CPRs gets very little or no revenue from the CPRs. On the other hand local communities, de facto users face uncertainty about the future revenue from the CPRs. As a result both the State and local communities invest very less in development and management of CPRs. Instead of addressing this crucial issue of dichotomy, the State has been concentrating on technological and financial solutions. To attract more technical and financial inputs for the development of CPRs, time and again the State has been trying to privatize these resources. While doing so it has been ignoring the interest of local communities, which have been deriving their sustenance from CPRs for centuries. There have been a numerous cases of handing over of all entitlements over CPRs to individuals (privatization), but there are not many instances of handing over of all entitlements over CPRs to communities. When the communities are vested with all rights (including exclusion and alienation) over CPRs, they will take care of CPRs like private property. Any cursory study of most of successful experiments in CPRs/ natural resource restoration such as Arabari, Tarun Bharat Sangh's Water Harvesting Program, Sukhomajri, Ralegaon Siddhi, CFM in Orissa and Bihar, DHAN Foundation's Community Banking and Tank Restoration, SPWD's Tank Restoration, to name a few, suggests that institutions were given priority over financial and technical

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inputs in all those projects. On the other hand in most of the Government sponsored programs, like watershed development, JFM, etc, financial and technical inputs were given priority over institution. A recent evaluation of watershed development program in AP states that in majority of 17 out of 27 total studied watersheds, users are not organized into groups. Wherever groups are formed, their roles and responsibilities are not well defined as group, in majority of the cases (WASSAN, 2001). The results would be obvious. A major study of several watersheds in 70 villages in Maharashtra and AP revealed that increase in agriculture production did not last for more than two years. Structures were abandoned because of lack of maintenance and there was no mechanism for looking after common lands (Farrington ed. 1999 as quoted in Saxena, 2001). A senior forest official, while admitting the shortcoming in the JFM program, asserted that a large-scale up scaling of any experiment is bound to have such loopholes especially in the initial periods. Tarun Bharat Sangh, which has taken up over 4,500 water harvesting structures in over 850 villages, demonstrated that with right priorities and operational strategy, even a small organization can take up scale it intervention with minimum loopholes.

Box - 1: Different Ownership/ Management Systems: The term common property resources is often referred to varying empirical situations including: (a) Property owned by a Government, (b) Property owned by no one, and (c) Property owned and defined by a community of resource users. However, within national boundaries, we hardly find any resource, which is not owned by any one. Technically, in all countries the State is de facto owner of all 'non-private property'. Apart from above three kinds of situations, we have yet another situation called 'private property'. Property rights are referred to a 'bundle of entitlement' defining the owner's rights, privileges and limitations for the use of a resource. In case of common pool resources, there are two kinds of property rights, viz. (a) operational-level property rights, which include access and withdrawal rights, and (b) collective choice property rights, which include management, exclusion and alienation rights. The relationship between bundle of rights and ownership position is shown below.

Rights Position Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized User

Access and Withdrawal X X X X Management X X X Exclusion X X Alienation X

Different bundles of property rights affect the incentives individuals face, the type of actions they take, and the outcomes they achieve. An important difference often discussed in literature is that between owners, who hold a complete set of

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rights, and all other users, who do not hold complete rights. In particular, the right of alienation is believed crucial for the efficient use of resources. Alienation right combined with exclusion rights produce incentives for owners to undertake long term investment in a resource. Another important difference is that between claimants and authorized users. Claimants, because of their rights of management, face stronger incentives than do authorized users to invest in governance structures for their resources even though their incentives are weaker than proprietors or owners. Claimants can devise operational level rights of withdrawal for their situation. Without collective- choice rights of exclusion, however, they can no longer be assured of being rewarded for investing in withdrawal rights. Consequently, whether claimants exercise their rights of management depends upon whether they act within a set of circumstances that allows them to capture the benefits of coordinating their activities even without rights of exclusion. Finally, authorized users posses no authority to devise their own rules to access and withdrawal. Their outcomes dependent primarily upon the operational level rights that others define for them. Whether the incentives they face induce them to act so as to achieve efficient outcomes depends upon the institutional design and skill of those, who hold the collective choice rights. Since authorized users do not design the rules they are expected to follow, they are less likely to agree to the necessity and legitimacy of the rules. Authorized users may engage in a game with rule enforcers, seeking to gain as much as possible. Source: Schlager and Ostrom, 1992. Note: 1. Access: The right to enter a defined physical property. 2. Withdrawal: The right to obtain the 'produce of a resource. 3. Management: The right to regulate the internal use patterns and transforms the resource by

making improvements. 4. Exclusion: The right to determine who will have an access right, and how that right may be

transferred. 5. Alienation: The right to sell or lease out property

4.0. Institutions5 for the Management of CPRs: The previous section shows that segregation of different entitlement among two or three persons/ organizations over CPRs is the main cause for the decline and degradation of CPRs. For effective development and management of CPRs, either the operational-level property (usufruct) rights should be transferred to the State from local communities or the collective choice property rights should be transferred from the State to local communities. It is abundantly clear that the State can not effectively exercise its collective choice property rights over CPRs leave alone the usufruct rights. Therefore local communities, obviously, should get collective choice property rights along with usufruct rights. Then the debatable question is what is the appropriate institution to govern the CPRs.

5 The term institution is used with its broader meaning, i.e. it is as an arrangement and also as an

organization.

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Traditionally, We have two kinds of institutions, viz. formal and informal, to govern the CPRs. The formal institutions centered around the 'council of village elders' (commonly know as Panchas). Resources specific committees and/ or persons such as Neerigatti (supervisor of irrigation tank), professional grazers, etc used to help these councils. With the State's appropriation of community resources during the British period and introduction of the modern Panchayat Raj institutions in the 1950s, the formal institutions have disappeared. The informal institution consists of religious sanctions, social practices, etc. Protection of sacred groves is one such institution. Some of these informal institutions are still exist mostly in arid and semi-arid areas. These institutions are rigid and at times may go against social and economic equity. All institutions, currently, operating in CPRs can be divided into three categories, PRIs, Official CBOs and non-official CBOs 4.1. PRIs: These are the constitution bodies and de facto owners of local CPRs. However, in 1950s, PRIs were not given adequate powers, because, then leadership believed that gross social and economic inequalities were conspicuous in the rural India. A few dominant sections were dominating the larger disadvantages sections, which were poor, illiterate and heavily dependent on upper cast and richer section. The leadership believed that a few dominant sections might corner all the powers bestowed on PRIs. During late 1980s and early 1990s, a shift has taken place. A wide range of powers and privileges were confirmed on PRIs through constitutional amendment. But in reality, those powers were not transferred to PRIs in most of the states. E.g. except in Kerala, village-Sarpanchs have only nominal discretionary funds at their disposal (SPWD, 2000). In most of the states, ownership over CPRs yet to be transferred to PRIs. Even in the current euphoria of people's participation, PRIs were ignored. Official CBOs: 1990s witnessed a sprut of variety of resources specific community based organizations such as Village Forest Committees (VFC), Watershed Development Committees (WDC), Water Users Associations (WUA), etc. There are certain positive benefits in all these sectors during this period (see e.g. Hanumantha Rao, 2000, and CWS 2001). However, the net contribution of these CBOs, over and above the impact due to additional invests in these respective sectors, is not significant. Only exception is VFCs. Under JFM, regeneration of forests in all most all parts of the country is primarily due to protection rendered by the local communities. In other wards, the local communities have shouldered the cost of protection. They have - (i) given up shifting cultivation, (ii) stopped firewood collection and sale, (iii) controlled grazing by their own cattle, (iv) prevented and controlled forest fires, (v) prevented grazing, firewood cutting and smuggling by others and (vi) worked at a very low wages on forester works. Unfortunately the growing green cover could not provide them their livelihoods security. The reasons for these shortcomings are explored below. The proponents of community management envisaged creation of 'village republics' with very substantial autonomy from the State apparatus. In reality the joint management programs actually adopted by the States have never

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approached this level of devolution of control and integration across resources (Lele, S). The participation envisaged is more in execution than in planning. In all states except Gujarat, the VFCs have a forest department person as ex-officio secretary, and in all states, the communities' decisions are subject to veto by the forest departments. By contract department plans often cannot be seen, let alone vetoed, by the communities. Each harvest - even if part of an approved management plan - still requires departmental permission; and delays may damage the resource (e.g. through the drying up of bamboo) but there is no penalty for the department (ibid.). In fact the rational for constituting these committees appeared to appease the donors and ease the administrative burden on the respective departments. Setting up of these joint management committees, in different States, is invariable accompanied by a large grant or loan from bilateral and/ or multilateral agencies. Most of these committees have been formed in those locations, where the resource is poor condition, or socially/ logistically the most difficult to manage for the particular department (ibid.). E.g. VFCs have been formed only on the periphery of forests, where the biotic pressure is very high. Similarly most of the responsibilities were transferred to WUAx of lower rungs only, where state investment is very little and whose management involves heavy transaction costs. Another important shortcoming of these committees, which undermines their effectiveness, is lack of integration among different resource CBOs at the field level. Yet another shortcoming is neglect of ITKPs. 4.3. Non-Official CBOs: We have numerous traditional, informal, spontaneous, and NGO facilitated institutions protecting natural resources in general and CPRs in particular. Conroy (2001b) compiled 25 hypothesis, which influence the initiation and effectiveness of community management and tested them with information gathered from CFM areas of Orissa. The overview of hypotheses and findings are given at Table - 5 below. Table - 5: An Overview of Hypotheses and Findings6 No. Hypothesis Confirmed

1 Size: the smaller the number of users, the better the chances of success

�, X

2 Boundaries: the more clearly defined are the boundaries of the group, the better the chances of success

�

3a. Relative power: The more powerful are those who benefit from retaining the protected forest and the weaker those who favor sub-group enclosure or private property, the better the chances of success.

�

3b Homogeneity: The more homogeneous the group the greater the chances of success

X

4 Existing arrangements for discussion of common ?

6 Those ticked have been confirmed; those with an X were not confirmed; where there is a tick

and a cross some of the findings support the hypothesis and some do not. Those with a question mark could not be tested properly.

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No. Hypothesis Confirmed

problems: the better developed are these, the greater the chances of success

5. Extent to which users are bound by common obligations: The more important is social reputation, the better the chances of success.

?

6. Punishments against rule breaking: The more the users already have enforceable rules elsewhere, the better the chances of success.

?

7. Consensus about who are the users, in terms of both customary and legal user rights is essential prior to collective action for forest protection.

X

8. Distribution of (a) decision-making rights and (b) use rights among members of the protection group must be considered fair.

�

9a Proximity of protected forest The greater the overlap between the location of the protected forest and the residence of the users, the greater the chance of success.

�

9b Clear boundaries The more clearly defined the boundaries of the protected forest, the greater the chances of success

?

10a The greater the benefits of forest protection, the greater the chances of success.

?

10b The more vital the resource for survival, or the higher the degree of forest dependency, the greater the chances of success.

X

10c Where traditional socio-religious forest values exist, protection is more likely to be self-initiated and sustained.

�, X

11 Users’ knowledge: the better their knowledge of sustainable yields, the greater the chance of success.

?

12 An essential factor in successful management is that use rules restricting time, place, technology or quantities of resource units are related to local conditions.

�

13 Flexibility in the nature of the use rules adopted increases the chances of success.

?

14 Users who violate operational rules are likely to receive graduated sanctions from other users or from officials accountable to the users.

�

15 The greater the ease with which rule breaking can be detected and free riders identified the better the chances of success.

�

16 Where most individuals affected by operational rules are able to participate in modifying them, the chances of success will be greater.

�

17 Monitors who actively audit common pool resource conditions and user behavior, and who are accountable to the users and may be the users themselves, are an

�

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No. Hypothesis Confirmed

essential factor in successful community management. 18a The less the state’s policies have negative implications for

self-initiated management, and the more they are supportive, the greater the chances of success.

�, X

18b If the rights of users to devise and apply their own protection and management institutions are not challenged by external government authorities, the chances of success are greater.

�, X

19 The chances of success are greater when users and their representatives have rapid access to low-cost local arenas to resolve conflicts (a) among users, (b) between users and outsiders and (c) between users and officials.

�

20 Sustainable (long-enduring) smaller-scale protection institutions tend to be “nested” in (part of) ever-larger organizations, each with its own set of rules

X

Source: Conroy, 2001b. Note: Those ticked have been confirmed; those with an X were not confirmed; where there is a tick and a cross some of the findings support the hypothesis and some do not. Those with a question mark could not be tested properly.

The non-official CBOs also suffers from kinds of limitations. Firstly most of these institutions do not have legal sanctity. In absence of legal sanctity, the local officials including police may or may not cooperate with CBOs. Non-cooperation of local officials resulted in disappearance of many CBOs and deterred such initiatives in the neighboring areas/ villages (see e.g. CWS, 2001). Another limitation, which is common for official CBOs also, is lack of integration in the development and use of different natural resources. 5.0. Ideal Institutions to govern CPRs: 5.1. Strong PRIs: The foregone suggest that division of various entitlements over CPRs between the State and local communities is the principal reason for the decline and degradation of CPRs. Transferring of collective choice property rights to local communities would ensures the restoration and conservation of CPRs and equal distribution of their produces. Currently all three categories of local institutions, viz. PRIs, official CBOs and non-official CBOs suffer from certain limitations. Empowering of PRIs by transferring all 29 subjects included in the Constitution's 73rd amendment would be one of the best solutions. With these powers PRIs can overcome all the limitations of three categories of institutions discussed above. Once PRIs become visible as the seats of power, all sections would fight for their rights. Current overall environment is quite conducive for such struggle. The education and awareness levels among disadvantaged sections are very high compared to 1950s. Adequate reservations were provided for all the disadvantaged sections in PRIs. With the support of different organizations such as active judiciary, different national commissions for

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disadvantage sections, including human rights commission, civil society, media, NGOs, etc, the disadvantage sections can assert their rights and attain their right place in PRIs. 5. 5. Gramdaan: Empowerment of disadvantage sections through PRIs, perhaps, involves a series of struggles, conflicts, etc, which may vitiate the rural communities/ economy. There are a few alternatives. One such institution is Gramdaan. Details of the Gramdaan institutions, which are functioning under Rajasthan's Gramdaan act 1971, are given at box - 2 below. Under this institution, the size of CPRs would increase as people donate their surplus lands for the village common purposes or the Gramsabha can declare any follow lands as commons. Since the villagers have absolute control over their CPRs, they would invest on CPRs like a private property. It may not be an easy task to get land donations at this juncture in many parts of the country. However it may be feasible in some backward areas in arid and semi-arid tracks like Telangana, Rayalaseema of Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, etc, which have relatively high land-man ratio. In Rajasthan about 200 Gramdaan villages have been registered under its act. The following reasons make us believe that land donation is feasible at least in some parts of the country. 1. There is a phenomenal growth in fallow lands in many parts of the country

and trend is going to continue, because of the following reasons.

a. Large and medium size farmers are getting attracted to towns and cities either by the growing economic opportunities and/ or for children's education.

b. In some regions like Telangana, extremist activities are forcing big landowners out of their villages.

c. There is a decline in profitability in agriculture due to stagnation/ decline in output prices and increase in input prices. This process may continue as India opened her markets for international supplies of agriculture commodities. As a result private capital formation in agriculture is declining in some parts of the country.

d. Growing numbers of small and marginal farmers, especially in semi arid areas, are finding their holdings as uneconomical due to frequent droughts and therefore taking up wage employment as their main sources of income leaving their lands fallow.

e. Farmers in some areas may also leave lands fallow due to environmental problems like erosion of topsoil, water logging, failure of irrigation system, etc.

Because of above reasons land donations can be obtained from the growing fallow lands. NGOs experiments like P. R. Misra's Chakriya Vikas Pranli in Jharkhand and Deccan Development Society's 'grain bank' program in Andhra Pradesh demonstrated that private fallow lands could be mobilized for collective use/ cultivation. Such experiments are taking place at a number of places albeit at smaller scale in different parts of the country. The above are negative reasons

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which may induce land donations, but there are a number of positive reasons, which may contribute the process. Those include: 1. CPRs provide a number of environmental services including genetic

resources to local and non-local people. There is a possibility in the future, that the local communities may get compensation for their non-local environmental services.

2. There is growing realization about complementary relationship between CPRs and private lands.

3. CPRs act as cushion against drought and other natural calamities. They also provide off-season employment and income opportunities to the poor.

4. CPRs enable diversification of local economy. 5. CPRs sustain the ITKPs, which evolved over centuries. Box - 2: Gramdaan villages: Gramdaan is a concept of village self-governance, which was evolved by Vinoba Bhave in the context of the Gandhian vision of revitalization and empowerment of India’s villages. It was shaped in the millennial Bhoodan –- Gramdaan sacred giving of land/village movement that covered most parts of rural India during the ‘50s and ‘60s. Starting as Bhoodan as a call given by Vinoba Bhave to big landowners for donation of their excess land for distribution to the landless and poor in their villages, it evolved into Gramdan, the collective gifting/donation of all land in the village to the village assembly or Gramsabha for common management (Saint, 2000). In Rajasthan, the Gramdaan Act was passed in 1971, enabling villages to constitute themselves as gramdaani villages under the Act (Saint, 1993). There are about 200 Gramdaan villages in Rajasthan in varying states of realization of the objectives of village self-rule (Saint, 2000). The Act gave control of revenue collection, local dispute settlement, and land resource management to the Gramsabha, the executive body whose membership comprises all adult members of the village. It enabled some communities to regain control of community forest and pastures from the FD (ibid.). A Gramdan village is constituted through the declaration of voluntary transfer of lands by way of Gramdan by the landholders of a revenue village or of a part thereof with a population of not less than 100 persons. These declarations by at least 75% of the landholders owning not less than 51% of the land held by all the residents are confirmed by the Chairman, Bhoodan Yagna Board, and forwarded to the Collector of the district in which the village is situated. The Collector after his/her own inquiry declares the village as Gramdan Village from a specified date. With effect from this date all persons whose names are included in the electoral roll of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly are deemed to constitute a Gram Sabha or Village Assembly for the Gramdan village. This Gram Sabha is “the body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with power to enter into contracts and to acquire, hold, administer or dispose of property

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over which it has authority”1. In addition to its power to manage the donated and pooled lands and revenues as prescribed, the Gram Sabha has been vested with responsibility to manage common lands (subject to the rights therein of the residents of neighbouring villages) and other unoccupied lands of the State Government, with power to improve such lands without obtaining any permission from any authority. It has also been empowered: to set apart lands for community purposes; to carry out improvement to land, including methods of cultivation, reclamation of wastelands and consolidation of lands; and to prepare and maintain village records, including a register of lands in the possession of persons under the Gram Sabha. A village fund or Gram Nidhi is also provided with power to receive profits, rent, fees or other charges, loans, grants and donations etc. The Gram Sabha is also empowered to function as a Panchayat as a local self-government body for the village under its jurisdiction. Saint describes the Seedh experience as: “a unique expression of community's traditional claims over common pastures and visionary inspiration for self-governance propelled by the zeal of the village priest. Striving over four decades it has succeeded in evolving elaborate protection, use and benefit distribution arrangements with accurate records. It has dealt with Panchayat Raj institutions, Forest Department and support NGOs on its own terms to improve productivity of the common lands and increase its cultivated/irrigated area to produce surpluses in fodder, grains and milk for sale” (ibid.). The Gramdaan experience is interesting, both in its own right and as a forerunner (and hence potential indicator of what may happen) of recent moves to devolve responsibility for natural resource management to Panchayat Raj institutions (PRIs). Sources: Saint 1993 and 2000 as quoted in Conroy 2001a.

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