Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis

Steven Mintz & Arline Savage & Richard Carter

Published online: 16 July 2010# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract This paper questions the ethicality of commercial relationships betweenuniversities and external donors. By examining cases such as technology transfer and theoutside funding of research interests, we identify possible conflicts of interest between theexternal provider of financial support and academic institutions. The reality today is thatuniversity administrators, who have significant decision-making powers, proactively seeklarge corporate sources of funding that may compromise academic values includingacademic freedom and the ability to make institutional decisions without the influence ofcommercial interests. For example, Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola have provided extensivefunding to universities in return for exclusivity rights to market their product on campuseseven though such products may not be healthy alternatives to other soft drinks.Pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies may have opposing interests to faculty anduniversities if the results of research do not meet the expectations of the sponsors. Curriculaissues may be slanted to promote the interests of a corporation or other provider of outsidefunding. Corporate partnerships between universities and companies such as Nike raiseethical questions when students or other members of the campus community object to theacceptance of financial support from a company that allegedly practices anti-social laborpractices in developing countries. On the other hand, corporate funding can be used tosupplement diminishing financial resources available to academic institutions, especially forpublic universities. One benefit of external funding is that it supports pharmaceutical and

J Acad Ethics (2010) 8:1–19DOI 10.1007/s10805-010-9109-9

S. Mintz (*) :A. SavageOrfalea College of Business, Cal Poly San Luis Obispo, 1 Grand Avenue, San Luis Obispo,CA 93407, USAe-mail: smintz@calpoly.edu

A. Savagee-mail: savage@calpoly.edue-mail: savagea@queens.edu

A. Savage : R. CarterMcColl School of Business, Queens University of Charlotte, 1900 Selwyn Avenue, Charlotte,NC 28274, USA

R. Cartere-mail: carterr@queens.edu

technology-oriented research and development into new products and processes that have thepotential to serve the public good. One cost of such funding arrangements is that the acceptanceof financial support from commercial interests solely to market their products on campusrestricts the choices available to students that should exist in a free market economy such as inthe U.S. The ethicality of the relationship between universities and commercial interests is amatter of concern because of the potential influence of providers of external funds touniversities that can compromise academic freedom and objective decision making.

Keywords Academic freedom, commercialism . Conflict of interests . Objective decisionmaking

Introduction

Like many countries, the depressed economy in the U.S. coupled with federal deficits, lackof state funding, budget cutbacks for higher education, and inadequate funding forspecialized programs at universities, has lead to increasing solicitation of outside sources offunds by universities (Bok 2004; Lieberwitz 2005, 122; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004;Tuchman 2009). With chronic budget deficits, university administrators are under intensepressure to become more entrepreneurial. Industry and corporate interests are responding byinfusing significant amounts of money into universities, often attached to various conditionsand expectations (Shuchman 2005). Whiteley et al. (2008, 132) and Lieberwitz (2005)point to the changing nature of universities and their enhanced alliances between industry/corporations and universities, as evidenced by, inter alia, directorships and granting ofownership equity to academics, the relationship between academic research programs andcorporate funding sources, the establishment of university-industry research centers, andlicensing agreements of research findings. In forming such relationships, an academicresearcher may receive equity in a business venture in consideration for the researcher’scontribution. Equity ownership does, however, have the potential for creating conflicts ofinterest because equity holders are part owners of the company. The researcher would profitif the company is successful, and this incentive creates the risk that the researcher mayengage in activities and make decisions that favor the interests of the company overacademic goals.

These kinds of relationships with corporate America can create a conflict of interests forU.S. universities and impair objective decision making of these institutions by promoting aproduct on campus that may not be a socially or educationally desirable choice and restrictstudent freedom to choose. For example, in 1992 Penn State University in Pennsylvaniasigned a $14 million, 10-year contract with Pepsi-Cola giving the beverage companyexclusive vending and advertising rights on each of 21 campuses collectively totaling70,000 students. The executive vice president and provost of Penn State justified the dealby pointing out that the state legislature had cut the university’s $250 million budget by3.5%. Not to be outdone by Pepsi-Cola, in December 1997 Coca-Cola signed a 15-yearagreement with the University of Maryland for $8 million up-front and $260,000 per yearin potential commissions. The University of Minnesota, with 37,000 students, has therecord: a $28 million (non-guaranteed) 10-year contract with Coca-Cola. It has beenestimated that more than 100 campuses and state higher education systems in the U.S. hadinked deals with one of the two soft drink companies (White 1999). The granting ofexclusive distribution and sales rights to Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola limits student choice ofmore desirable, healthier soft drink.

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Another consequence of decreased public funding and increased corporate funding isthat influence over research and teaching will increase. This influence gives rise to apotential conflict of interest between the need for public universities to solicit outsidesources of funds on the one hand and the need to protect academic freedom on the other.Academic freedom is a core value that provides an environment of free inquiry andautonomy to faculty over their work, independent of conflicting interests (Lieberwitz 2005,110–111; Olson 2009). This freedom includes the dissemination of ideas or facts that maybe undesirable or inopportune to university administrators, political parties, authorities, andcorporate sponsors. In principle, academic freedom allows for the dissemination ofknowledge in research and teaching, without the fear of reprisal in the form of dismissal,harassment or repression. The American Association of University Professors’ (AAUP’s)(2006, 3) widely-recognized 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom andTenure states that universities exist to promote the public interest, and not to further theinterest of the individual professor or the institution as a whole [or, of course, anycommercial sponsor]. Promoting the public interest depends on the free search for truth andits free elucidation. Academic freedom applies to teaching and research. Freedom inresearch is fundamental to the advancement of truth, while freedom in teaching isfundamental to the protection of the rights of the teacher in teaching and of the student tofreedom in learning.1

Using a Kantian approach to ethical reasoning, academic freedom rights begets dutiesand obligations for professors to their students and the university. According to the AAUP(2006, 3–4), professors should avoid a controversial matter that is unrelated to the subjectthey are teaching (i.e., an accounting professor who opines on President Obama’s warpolicies). And while they are free to express their opinions without fear of institutionalcensorship or discipline when they speak or disseminate their writing in public, they shouldshow restraint, be accurate, show respect for the opinions of others, and indicate clearly thatthey are not speaking on behalf of their institution.

The reality today is that university administrators, who have significant decision-makingpowers, proactively seek large corporate sources of funding (Lieberwitz 2005, 118). Theenticement of such funding and/or pressure and threats from commercial sponsors anduniversity administrators may cause, or give the appearance of causing, some academics tocompromise their academic values (Eisenberg 1988), while other academics mayexperience retaliation for upholding these values. For example, University of Californiaat Berkeley professor of microbial biology, Ignatio Chapela, an outspoken critic ofBerkeley’s commercial ties to the biotechnology industry, was denied tenure in 2003,despite overwhelming support for his tenure application by faculty colleagues in hisdepartment, as well as unanimous approval by a five-member university ad hoc committee.His application was rejected by a third committee, which included a faculty member whoserved on the advisory committee for the University of California-Novartis deal, whichgave the Swiss pharmaceutical corporation and producer of genetically engineered cropsexclusive licensing rights to approximately one third of the Plant and Microbial BiologyDepartment’s research discoveries in exchange for a payment of $25 million. Chapela’sdisputed research found that genetically-engineered corn had infiltrated native maize inMexico. The denial-of-tenure decision was linked to his role as a leading opponent of theNovartis deal, with an independent review by Michigan State University researchersconcluding that there was little doubt that the deal played a role in the denial of tenure

1 For an in-depth discussion of academic freedom, see Lieberwitz (2005: 111–117).

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decision. In 2005, the university reversed its decision and granted tenure to Chapela(Burress 2005).

The remainder of this paper is as follows. First, we discuss the causes of increasedcommercialism on university campuses. Next, we discuss the ethical framework that is usedto critique cases to show that there are conflicts of interest that can cloud independent andobjective decision making because of the influence of corporations on academic institutionsin the U.S. We then turn to specific examples of commercial influence, includingconstraints on academic freedom, technology transfer arrangements, interference incurricula issues, influencing subject matter of campus presentations, and corporatepartnerships that can lead to advertising and selling specific products on campus. Then,we discuss the benefits and costs of commercialism by drawing largely on the discussion ofthe examples. We conclude with some final thoughts about the dangers of increasingacademic involvement with commercial activities. Although we examine the commercial-ism in the U.S. context, it has broader relevance to academics in many developed countriesand some of the emerging economies too.

Forces of Commercialism

Commercialism in higher education in the U.S. can be traced to the post-1940s, when rapidgrowth in medical and defense research needs led to an increase in basic research. Throughthe U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense, the National Institutes of Health and NationalScience Foundation, major external funding programs became available to universityscientists. Just and Huffman (2009) point out that more recent events have changed theenvironment in which universities operate, including increased incentives for private-goodsresearch, creating new inventions with out-of-state for-profit partners, and a reduction inincentives for public-goods research. Just and Huffman’s results explain how higher royaltyrates for externally-funded, private-goods discoveries undertaken with out-of-state partnersreduce a university’s public-goods research. Jensen and Thursby (2001) attribute the changein the in part to the Bayh-Dole Act that was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1980. This Actcreated a uniform patent policy among the many federal agencies funding the research. As aresult of this law, universities retain ownership to inventions made under federally-fundedresearch. In return, universities are expected to file for patent protection and to ensurecommercialization upon licensing. The royalties from such ventures are shared with theinventors, a portion is provided to the University and department/college, and the remainderis used to support the technology transfer process.2

Washburn (2005) contends that since 1980, academic administrators have allowed wholeacademic departments to forge financial partnerships with private corporations, guarantee-

2 In 1980, the federal government had approximately 30,000 patents of which only 5% led to new orimproved products. Many patents were not being used as the government did not have the resources todevelop and market the inventions. Thus, Bayh-Dole gave universities control of their inventions. Prior toBayh-Dole, fewer than 250 patents were issued to universities per year. In FY 2000, there were over 330 U.S.and Canadian institutions and universities engaged in technology transfer. Technology transfer has helped tospawn new businesses, create industries and open new markets. In fact, core technologies, likely to sparknew industries, often result from university patents. University-industry collaborations have helped to movenew discoveries from the lab to the marketplace faster and more efficiently than ever before—ensuring thatproducts and services based on federally funded research reach the public. The Bayh-Dole act is consideredto be vital to the university as a whole. University gross licensing revenues exceeded $200M in 1991 and by1992 that number had risen to $250M. In FY 2000, U.S. and Canadian institution and universities grosslicensing income was reported to be $1.26 Billion.

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ing these firms favored status with respect to the inventions flowing out of their labs. Sheprovides an example in the medical field of professors who frequently endorsepharmaceutical products in which they themselves [or their major funders] have a directfinancial stake, blurring the line between academia and marketing. She believes one reasonfor the trend is that politicians increasingly view higher education as a private benefit,forcing colleges and universities to draw more of their operating funds from private donors,industry, and students (in the form of higher tuition fees). Washburn criticizes the trend andpoints to the extraordinary contributions of these institutions to American society andindustry throughout the post-war era precisely because they were independent of bothmarket forces and political dictates. Zemsky et al. (2005) identify a new strain of economicdeterminism. Because of reduced funding for public education and growing needs, nonprofitinstitutions have been placed in a position that, in order to survive in the twenty-first century,they must emulate the for-profits, such as the University of Phoenix, which has campusesthrough the U.S. and in British Columbia, and is focused on job training, credentialing, andserving market demand.

Tuchman (2009) tells the story of a fictionalized state university that wants to play in thebig leagues, so it borrows tools from the business world to reshape the university. Shepoints to “institutional transformation” by a university administration that occurs over timeand alters the culture, assumptions, behaviors, processes, and products of the institution. In“Wannabe U,” the institution’s share of the state budget went from 2.5% in the mid-1980sto 1.47% in the mid-1990s. Administrators and trustees started to search for new “revenuestreams.” The goal was to bring in new sources of funds, improve the physical plant,enhance reputation, and move up in the national rankings. Wannabe used its athleticprograms to jump start the effort.3 As the Chronicle of Higher Education (Arnone 2003)has explained, a wannabe university yearning for recognition and approvals seeks to: (1)translate a strong regional presence into national recognition and respect: (2) push to spendhundreds of millions of dollars on new construction; (3) develop a slick advertisingcampaign that portrays the institution as moving toward greatness; (4) speak of aspirations(or accomplishments) of being in the top rankings by magazines such as U.S. News andWorld Report; (5) explain that becoming a national research university is vital to its missionto better serve the region and state economy; and (6) at the height of its ambition, dream ofnurturing the start-up companies for the next Silicon Valley in California or ResearchTriangle park in North Carolina.

Just and Huffman (2009) point out that “the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermathhave only exacerbated these trends. Frequently, the reaction of public universities has beento raise tuition thereby reducing the differential between public and private universities.Historically, state governments have provided a majority of public funding with the federalgovernment and student tuition providing smaller shares, whereas private universities havedepended heavily on tuition and secondarily on federal funding. Thus, with reduced statesubsidies, revenue shares for public research universities have begun to look more likethose of private research universities.” Their research shows that between 1990 and 2001,private gifts, grants, and contracts have increased as a source of funding private universities,public land-grant institutions, and other public universities by, respectively, 223%, 65%,and 83%. Funding through federal grants, contracts, and appropriations have increased by98%, 21%, and 52%. At the same time, funding through state grants, contracts, and

3 Tuchman is a professor of Sociology at the University of Connecticut. While she never refers to herinstitution by name, one need only look at the success of its men’s and women’s basketball program over thepast dozen years or so to know she is using the University as the backdrop for Wannabe U.

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appropriations have changed by −85%, 7%, and −10%, while tuitions and fees have changedby −5%, 23%, and 42%.

Tuchman (2009) contends that today’s universities are business-like with branding a likelyconcern of the institution. Being more business-friendly and catering to industry needs has hada number of financial benefits for universities. Statistical studies show that since the 1980s,industry funding for academic research has grown faster than any other source increasing from$264 million in 1980 to $2 billion in 2001 (Wiener 1986, 38). Although industry providesroughly 7% of academic research funding nationally, at individual schools the percentages arefar higher. For example, Duke University draws 31% of its research and development budgetfrom industry. At Georgia Institute of Technology, MIT, Ohio State, Penn State, and CarnegieMellon, these percentages have now jumped to 21, 20, 16, 15, and 15, respectively. Evensmaller, less prestigious research universities are highly dependent on industry funding,including Alfred University in New York state (48%); the University of Tulsa in Oklahoma(32%); and Lehigh University in Pennsylvania (22%) (Shulman 1999, 54).

Framework for Ethical Analysis

Commercial ties can lead to a variety of ethical concerns. They may impair academicfreedom and affect stakeholder interests. Independence in decision making may becompromised because of a conflict of interests. Objectivity may be replaced by makingdecisions that financially benefit the university or an academic unit. The result may be aloss of integrity if commercial ties are placed ahead of principled decision making byadministrators who do not have the courage to turn down a donation when they believe it isnot in the best interests of the institution. In this section we discuss the ethical concerns ofcommercialism in universities.

What is the Role of a University?

One of the problems with the growing trend toward commercialism in today’s universities isthat it exacerbates the already growing trend of placing increased emphasis on bringing in fundsthrough grant-related research projects and commercial arrangements, without considering theethics of such activities. For example, accepting funds from commercial interests may lead tocompromising objective decision making if, for example, the commercial supporter (i.e., acorporation) expects that in return for the funding the university will slant its curriculum in away that portrays the corporation in a more positive light than might occur absent the financialsupport. We provide examples of such conflicts later on in the paper.

Institutions of higher learning should serve the public good. Certainly, the researchactivities of universities can lead to valuable innovations that improve the wellbeing ofmany in society, such as when new medicines and medical procedures are developed.Technology transfer can lead to new start-ups, entrepreneurship, jobs for graduates and abetter quality of life. An important question is whether such benefits exceed the costsinvolved with respect to whether the recipients of outside funding conduct their researchactivities and report the results in an unbiased manner.

AAUP Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure

Over 200 scholarly and educational groups are signatory to the Statement of Principles onAcademic Freedom (1940), agreed upon by representatives of the AAUP and of the

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Association of American Colleges (now the Association of American Colleges andUniversities). The purpose of this statement is to promote public understanding and supportof academic freedom and tenure and agreement upon procedures to ensure them in collegesand universities. According to the statement, institutions are conducted for the commongood and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the institution as awhole. The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free exposition.Academic freedom in research and teaching are fundamental to the protection of the rightsof the teacher in teaching and of the student to freedom of learning. Underlying these rightsis also the duty of individual faculty members to meet their responsibilities by conductingresearch and teaching activities with objectivity and integrity.

The AAUP also issued a Statement on Professional Ethics in 1966 that was revised andapproved by the Association’s Council in June 1987. One part of the statement isparticularly appropriate to our examination of commercialism: “Professors practiceintellectual honesty and although professors may follow subsidiary interests, these interestsmust never seriously hamper or compromise their freedom of inquiry” (AAUP 1987).

Conflict of Interests

A conflict of interests occurs when one party’s judgment is clouded by relationships withanother party. Typically, the other party has influence because of some business or financialentanglement. The result may be to place the interests of the party providing the supportover those of other stakeholders, including faculty, students and the public at large.

Many universities have conflict of interest policies to guide university and facultyrelationships with external providers of financing through grants and research projects. Forexample, the University of California at San Diego (UCSD 2010) differentiates between aconflict of interest and a conflict of commitment. According to its policy:

A conflict of interest occurs when (1) an employee has a significant financial interestin a company that is providing funding for the employee’s research or otherUniversity activity or (2) the research might directly and significantly affect thesignificant financial interest of an employee responsible for the conduct of theresearch project. A conflict of commitment occurs when a University employee’scommitment and time to an outside activity interferes with the employee’sperformance of University duties.

Our concern with the UCSD policy is that it is written from the perspective of Universityemployees who have the opportunity to influence the University’s business decisions in waysthat could lead to personal gain or give advantage to firms in which employees have an interest.Nothing is said about conflicts that arise because of commercial decisions made byadministrators that obligate the institution to act in certain ways as a result of business andfinancial relationships with external providers of funding that may impair stakeholder interests.

The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill’s (UNC 2009) conflict of interest andcommitment policy defines a conflict of interest as when a member of the Universitycommunity, or that person’s family, possesses a personal financial interest or externalexecutive position related to an activity that involves that party’s University responsibilities.While the University encourages faculty to engage in appropriate outside relationships withprivate industry and the nonprofit sector, it does not define what is “appropriate.” Thepolicy states that conflicts of interest or commitment should be avoided when they have thepotential to directly and significantly affect the University’s interests, compromiseobjectivity in carrying out University responsibilities, or otherwise compromise performance

Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis 7

of University responsibilities, unless such conflicts are reported, reviewed, and managed inaccordance with the policy. Several examples are given of conflict of interest situations,including the invention and development of new patentable and non-patentable technologiesthat are licensed by the University to commercial entities “so that University research resultsmay reach the market for the public good.” However, there is nothing in the policy thataddresses commercial interests in university programs or other activities that may impact thevisibility of an entity on campus and provide commercial advantages not available to otherentities.

Cleveland State University (CSU 2005) defines a conflict of interest as when a memberof the University community has an existing or potential financial or other material interestthat impairs, or appears to impair, the University employees’ independence and objectivityin the discharge of further responsibilities to and/or for the University. A conflict of interestis considered to occur whenever a University employee receives financial or other materialbenefit through inappropriate use of proprietary knowledge or information of theUniversity. Examples of significant financial interest include royalties from intellectualproperty rights such as patents and copyrights. Similar to UNC, the CSU policy fails toaddress institutional conflicts that result from financial or other material benefits providedby outside commercial interests.

Examples of Commercial Interest Cases

Academic Freedom

A multitude of instances where academic freedom may have been compromised for moneyin fact or appearance can be found in media reports, books and academic literature. Selectedcases are presented below.

Clemson University and BMW

Clemson University in South Carolina received its largest cash donation ever from BMW in2002. The $10 million donation was used to start a $1.5 billion Automotive Research andEducational Center. In return, Clemson granted BMW certain privileges, including acouncil of BMW managers who meet monthly to advise Clemson on its curriculum.Advisory councils typically are made up of a variety of stakeholders with different points ofview and interests. In Clemson’s situation the granting of exclusive privileges may createthe appearance that the curriculum could be slanted to reflect BMW’s or the automotiveindustry’s point of view.

BMW also provided Clemson with a list of professors and engineers for hiring purposes.While Clemson did not hire any of the people on the list, it did ask candidates to interviewwith BMW representatives. Moreover, BMW has a representative who reviews studentpapers to ensure that proprietary information is not submitted for publication. This intrusionis a breach of academic freedom because it can potentially lead to censorship of whatstudents can and can not say about BMW. While a case can be made for BMW’s rights toprotect its proprietary information, that job should be left to the professor to ensure BMW’sinfluence over written material does not go further. Finally, Clemson’s president drives aBMW X5 sport utility vehicle that can be traded in every 10,000 miles, courtesy of BMW.The vehicle is part of a pool that BMW has made available for use by state leaders(Browning 2006).

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In an unusual case, a Florida developer, who is suing Clemson, claims in court papers thatafter Clemson signed a contract with him for a high-speed wind tunnel, BMW threatened tomove its research center and financing for the Clemson graduate center to Tennessee ifClemson did not work directly with BMWon its own plans and terminate its relationship withhim. Clemson terminated his contract. Handwritten notes from the chief financial officer forClemson’s endowment fund were obtained during discovery. These notes were taken during ameeting between the Clemson and BMWofficials. The notes read “BMW is going to drive theentire campus” and also indicated that BMW officials were very critical of the developer’sinclusion in the wind tunnel project. Some critics are concerned that Clemson is blurring thelines between academia and business (Browning 2006).

James Kahn and the Immune Response Corporation (IRC)

James Kahn was a professor of medicine at the University of California in San Francisco.Kahn depended on government and industry grants to fund his research. He valued hisacademic freedom and saw collaborations with industry as a merging of complementaryinterests. His logic was that new medical discoveries were only beneficial to patients if theyhad been adequately tested for effectiveness, safety and marketability.

Kahn was the lead investigator in a huge clinical trial to test IRC’s AIDS drug, Remune,with IRC paying 35% of his salary. The purpose of the research was to investigate whetherthe drug, and experimental vaccine, slowed down the progression of AIDS or enhancedsurvival rates. The drug trial involved seventy-seven medical centers and over 2,500 patients.Three years into the study, the research team and an independent data safety monitoring boardfound that the drug did not work. It was nomore effective than a placebo. The monitoring boardhad the authority to halt the study, which it did. IRC was public company and was legallyobligated to report this decision to the SEC and its shareholders. Kahn says that is when thetrouble began (Washburn 2005, 103–106). IRC immediately contested the findings andprevented Kahn and his team from access to the last 5% of the data by “locking thedatabase.” They offered to provide the data only if Kahn made no publication or publicdisclosure of the findings without the express written consent of IRC’s medical director,which may be withheld at the director’s discretion (Washburn 2005, 106–108).

Unwilling to surrender his academic freedom, and even though the dataset wasincomplete, Kahn wanted to make the results of the study public by submitting theirmanuscript to the Journal of the American Medical Association, but 3 weeks after thejournal accepted the manuscript for publication, IRC sued Kahn and the university for $7million to $10 million for damages to its business (Browning 2006; Washburn 2005,106–108). Ultimately, the article was successfully published and later an arbitration panelruled in favor of the university (Washburn 2005, 108).

While Kahn’s motives to publish the manuscript may have been to bolster his researchportfolio, there is no doubt that the public has a right to know about drug trials of amedicine that fail to improve the condition of those affected by AIDS. Indeed, one mightargue that the results had a public health dimension that overrode any other interest,especially the self-interest of IRC.

Biotech Industry and Technology Transfer

Technology transfer has been a growing field of commercialism during the past 30 years.Many large research institutions have separate technology licensing offices [e.g., StanfordUniversity’s Office of Technology Licensing (OTL)] to facilitate the transfer of patents and

Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis 9

products developed by the university and brought to market. The OTL’s mission is tocommercialize professors’ discoveries, manage Stanford’s growing patent portfolio, andcarry out the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act (Washburn 2005). That Act gives U.S.universities control of their inventions and other intellectual property that results fromfederal-government funded research.

Washburn (2005, 49–72) credits the birth of the “Market-Model U” to research intogenetics at Stanford University and the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF)in 1973. Two professors of genetics at these universities—Stanley Cohen and HerbertBoyer—successfully transferred genetic material from an African clawed toad intobacterium thereby getting it to replicate or clone. Their work opened up new vistas forgenetic engineering that spawned the multi-billion-dollar biotechnology industry. WhileStanford experimented with ways to extract profits from the biotech research, Boyer wasbusy exploring commercial opportunities of his own at UCSF. In January 1976, hereceived a call from Robert Swanson, a venture capitalist with a background in chemicalengineering who shared Boyer’s passion for commercializing recombinant DNAtechnology. Each man agreed to put up $500 to form a partnership. The result wasformation of Genentech (Marsa 1997, 85).

When Stanford announced its plans to patent the Cohen-Boyer invention, manyprofessors in the biomedical community voiced their misgivings about the commercialrelationships between universities and the business community. In commenting on thepatent application, one reviewer expressed concerns that the commercial nature of therelationship might detract from the public service ideals of Stanford. Department chairs andschools deans were not enthralled by the prospect that these activities would divert theirfaculty from teaching and research responsibilities. Jon Sandelin, a senior associate atStanford’s OTL, came up with the answer. He said: “So how do you offset [the resistance]?You make them stakeholders—you make them beneficiaries.” (Washburn 2005).

Washburn does not criticize the university-industry relationship that has existed as farback as the mid-nineteenth century, as evidenced by the collaboration between universityprofessors and private industry in U.S. industrial and agricultural development. Instead, it isthe elimination of any clear boundary line separating academia from commerce. She blamesmarket forces for dictating what is happening in the world of higher education as neverbefore, causing universities to engage in commercial activities unheard of in academia amere generation ago. She points to universities that routinely operate complex patentingand licensing operations to market their faculty’s inventions, thereby extracting royaltyincome and other profits and fees in return. Universities run their own industrial parks,venture-capital funds, and for-profit companies. Often, when a professor becomes the CEOof a new start-up, there is considerable overlap between the research taking place oncampus and at the firm, a situation ripe for confusion and conflicts of interest. An exampleis the University of Utah where faculty discovered an important human gene responsible forhereditary breast cancer, but did not make it freely available to other scientists even thoughthe researchers received $4.6 million in federal funding to finance the research (Wilson1995, B1). The University patented it and gave the monopoly rights to Myriad Genetics,Inc., a start-up company founded by a University of Utah professor, which proceeded tohoard the gene and restrict other scientists from using it (Marshall 1995, 1086).

Conflicts of Interest: Curricula Issues

One of the most sacred responsibilities of faculty members is to develop curricula for thecourses they teach that best reflect the state of knowledge in the field and to objectively

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present information in a way that encourages student learning. An important part of meetingthese objectives is to select the text, other readings, and guest speakers with knowledge inthe field to share their ideas in order to stimulate academic discussion. Any interference inthis process not only violates academic freedom but compromises the integrity of academicdecisions. Autonomy in curricula decisions is a core value in universities. While there maybe department oversight and coordination, the final decision of what to teach and how to teach itrests largely with the individual faculty member. However, commercial arrangements havestarted to affect what is being taught at institutions of higher learning. In this section we discusstwo examples of conflicts that existed because of the relationship between academic institutionsand outside interests.

BB&T and Objectivism

BB&T Corporation, one of the largest banks in the U.S., has been busy awarding largesums of money to universities to promote capitalism courses, including the study of AynRand’s philosophy of objectivism, which is widely read and embraced in the U.S.According to Davis (2005), since 2005 the BB&T Charitable Foundation has given 25colleges and universities several million dollars to start programs devoted to the study ofRand’s books and economic philosophy. John Allison, the CEO of BB&T, believes thatAyn Rand’s novel, Atlas Shrugged is “the best defense of capitalism ever written.” He saidthat Rand changed his life, and that he is working to ensure that Rand’s philosophy is notleft out of the nation’s college curricula.

While the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate objectivist philosophy, given that largeamounts of money are being donated by businesses in the name of teaching objectivism, itis important to understand just what is expected from such education. Rand (1986) coinedthe term “Objectivism” in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal. Objectivism derives from theprinciple that human knowledge and values are objective.

According to the Atlas Society (2010) (which promotes Objectivism as described inRand’s books, including The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged), Objectivism holds thatthere is no greater moral goal than achieving happiness. Happiness requires that one live byobjective principles, including moral integrity and respect for the rights of others. On apolitical level, Objectivists advocate laissez-faire capitalism. Under laissez-faire capitalism,a strictly limited government protects each person’s rights to life, liberty, and property andforbids that anyone initiate force against anyone else. The heroes of Objectivism areachievers who build businesses, invent technologies, and create art and ideas, depending ontheir own talents and on trade with other independent people to reach their goals. Ofparticular concern in this paper is the motivation of these “heroes” in making donations touniversities and university programs to spread the gospel of Objectivism.

Bass (2006) points out that in Rand’s philosophic system, egoism has pride of place; it isthe more fundamental, and the rights theory is supposed to be derivative. Thus, rightsderive from one’s rational self-interest rather than acting in accordance with rights of others(and one’s duties to respect those rights) as the means to achieve an end result. In Kantianethics, the “categorical imperative” states, “Act only according to the maxim [reason foracting] by which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law.” Thisuniversality perspective is further defined in Kant’s second formulation of the categoricalimperative, “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another,always as an end and never as a means only” (Kant 1959).

If we compare Objectivism to Kantian philosophy, an important question is whether thepursuit of one’s (rational) self-interest (a basic tenet of capitalism) promotes the rights of

Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis 11

others or do the rights of others and the decision maker’s obligation to respect thoserights best promote the public good, regardless of any utilitarian benefits to oneself orothers? Since a major purpose of a university education is to advance societal interestsand promote the public welfare, it is debatable at best whether this outcome can beachieved by the pursuit of one’s self-interests, rational or not. All we need do is look atthe financial crisis during the latter part of 2007–2009 that was caused in large part byegoistic behavior and we can conclude that capitalism, at least as envisioned by AdamSmith, has failed to provide the moral foundation of honesty and integrity that is aprerequisite for the invisible hand to work in the public interest. Your authors believethat the pursuit of one’s “rational” self-interest only works as an ethical theory—one tobe taught in institutions of higher learning—if one’s self interest is based on acting inways that respects the rights of others, promotes their welfare and that of society, andcontributes to the orderly functioning of commerce. Thus, it can be said that anyinstitution that accepts donations with strings attached that require objectivist teachingnot only relinquishes its curriculum decision rights but promotes a philosophy that maynot be consistent with the goals of a society, such as the U.S., that emphasizes rights(i.e., constitutional rights) rather than the pursuit of self-interests. We do not mean tosay Rand’s philosophy should not be taught. Instead, it should be part of a broaderdiscussion of philosophical, ethical thought.

In January 2008, BB&T announced a $1 million contribution to establish the Centerfor the Advancement of American Capitalism at the Lewis College of Business atMarshall University in West Virginia. Under conditions of the agreement, Marshallmust teach Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged as part of their curriculum. Bob Denham, seniorvice president and director of Corporate and Executive Communications of BB&TCorporation, said the motive of his bank’s donation was not to promote pre-capitalistphilosophy, but to promote discussions about the complexities of a capitalist society.Denham explained the purpose behind these gifts is to encourage a fundamentaldiscussion of the moral foundation of capitalism. “The gift(s) ultimately supportprofessors who have an interest in Rand and her philosophy regarding the morality ofcapitalism” (Marshall University 2008).”

Not all at Marshall supported taking the contributions. Larry Stickler, Faculty SenateChairman, stated that “The concern is you have industry proscribing the course”.Stickler distinguished between funding for a new building or scholarships, that areacceptable, and donations that give the donor (at least in appearance) the ability toinfluence curricula. Elaine Baker, Director of the Center for the Advancement ofTeaching and Learning, said she was worried that a business would be dictatingteaching material at Marshall. “When anybody, whether it’s a business or it could be areligious institution or it could be the government, comes and says to us ‘you will teachthis course and this is the content, the basic content,’ it totally degrades the idea thatfaculty has any sort of independence or regulation over the academic curriculum.Students will be experiencing courses anyone can buy. As long as they give us enoughmoney, we will provide the course whether it’s good for the students or not.” Indefending the decision, senior vice president of BB&T, Dave Helmer, was quick topoint out that the university had the final decision in accepting the arrangement (Unger2008). We believe his choice of words speaks volumes about the expectations of BB&Tin giving its gift. The “arrangement” is a quid pro quo—Marshall teaches Rand’sphilosophy and in turn gets $1 million.

In March 2008, BB&T awarded $2 million to the Department of Philosophy at theUniversity of Texas at Austin to establish the BB&T Chair for the Study of Objectivism. In

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commenting on the purpose of the donation, BB&T Chief Executive Officer JohnAllison said: “We are pleased to support the philosophy department’s important work inthe study of Objectivism at the University of Texas at Austin” (The University of Texasat Austin 2008). In evaluating the reasons for the University’s acceptance of the gift, weshould ask whether the department actually believed the study of Objectivism should begiven greater emphasis in the curriculum or whether the prospects of a donation thatcould be used to fund a chair position and teaching activities provided the incentive toaccept the donation. In the latter case, the University’s decision to pursue its self-interestimpairs academic freedom and objective decision making in curricula matters, a basictenet of academic freedom.

Not every university has accepted BB&T donations. For example, Meredith College inNorth Carolina rejected $420,000 from BB&T because the conditions of the donationincluded a stipulation that books such as Rand’s Atlas Shrugged must be used in the course,called “Global Capitalism and Ethical Values.” A series of faculty committees, and finallythe full faculty on a vote of 54–34 decided that they needed to retain control over coursecurricula, and not cede it to donors. The problem, according to Beth Mulvaney, chair ofMeredith’s Faculty Council, was that specific texts for the program’s core course werenegotiated as a condition of the grant by BB&T. She added: “We can’t allow donors’money to dictate what we teach (Geary 2006).”

Agribusiness and Cal Poly

Nationally-ranked California Polytechnic State University San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly) wasinvolved in an unusual controversy in the autumn of 2009, after the university waspressured by agribusiness interests into changing the format of a presentation by a guestspeaker, Michael Pollan, an author, journalist, industrial food chain activist, and professorof journalism at the University of California, Berkeley. After being pressured by David E.Wood, owner of the agribusiness Harris Beef Ranch, who is a major donor of theuniversity’s agribusiness program, the guest lecture originally scheduled to be made byPollan was changed to a panel discussion. The purpose of the speech was to help the raisemoney for the Sustainable Agriculture Research Consortium at a dinner and to give a freespeech to Cal Poly students. Pollan did receive a $20,000 speaking fee from the moneyraised by the $150 a plate dinner event (Miller 2009).

Pollan criticizes large-scale farming because it taxes too many natural resources. Hewarns against food production with a large carbon footprint because of processing,packaging or shipment. He only supports farming operations that have free rangefarming and animals that are fed their natural diet. His views on farming and raisinglivestock have garnered a large amount of criticism from traditional large-scale foodproduction companies. Wood wanted a more balanced program because Pollan’s viewson sustainable agribusiness practices and healthy food alternatives presented just oneside of the debate. Cal Poly was criticized by members of the agricultural communityfor hosting Pollan because of his controversial views on farming and food production(Miller 2009).

According to a Los Angeles Times story on the Pollan matter (2009), the Dean of CalPoly’s College of Agriculture, Food and Environmental Resources (CAFES), DavidWehner, tried to explain the change in format by saying there were some reservationsamong the CAFES department heads about Pollan because of some of his views aboutconventional, commercial farming. Consequently, it was decided there would be a panel todiscuss different views on sustainability. According to the Dean, it was uncertain just when

Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis 13

the panel would be held. The concern that was felt within the department then extended toprominent supporters of Cal Poly’s agriculture program within the community. A logicalquestion we ask is why did the University invite Pollan to speak by himself in the first placeif it shared these concerns?

According to the L.A. Times (2009), Wood wrote a letter to Cal Poly President WarrenBaker telling him that he was reconsidering a $500,000 donation towards a new livestockabattoir on Cal Poly’s campus. The letter stated that he was upset at the direction that CalPoly’s CAFES was taking. The first problem that Wood referenced was that Pollan’s speechwas being endorsed by the university. In his letter, Wood said “I find it unacceptable thatthe university would provide Michael Pollan an unchallenged forum to promote his standagainst conventional agricultural products. To add insult to injury, CAFES unashamedlyadmits to contributing $5,000 in discretionary funds to offset a portion of Mr. Pollan’sspeaking fee. Had a balanced forum been provided, I would not have such a strong negativefeeling towards the university.”

Notwithstanding the President’s e-mail to the faculty described below, President Bakerwrote a letter back to Wood that offered a compromise to have Pollan answer questionsfrom the audience and then have a panel discussion with other industry professionals. Woodresponded by approving the change, but he still chastised the University for hosting Pollan.Pollan was then given the choice of having the panel discussion after his speech orparticipating in a panel. He decided to just participate in the panel perhaps because hefeared the other participants might overly criticize his presentation as part of the paneldiscussion.

In an e-mail to the university community, Cal Poly president Warren Baker defended hisrole by saying that he did not suggest in any way that Pollan’s remarks should be limited orthat he appear only in a panel. He emphasized that “any special interest groups includingdonors do not dictate classroom content nor do they dictate who will come to this campusand who won’t.” He admitted that several donors have indicated that they might not honortheir contribution pledges as a result of Pollan’s visit. Baker said he told one donor that “it’shis prerogative to contribute as he sees fit, and while an unfilled pledge may slow us down,Cal Poly will forge ahead nonetheless.” Baker also said in his e-mail that Cal Poly’smission is to educate, and that means exposing students to controversial points of view sothat they can weigh their own views and reach their own decisions. “That is the essence ofacademic freedom, a core value I’ve dedicated my professional life to defending andupholding.”

There was a blatant conflict of interest in the Cal Poly matter. A financial supporter witha vested interest shouldn’t be given a voice in developing and presenting any program, noless one that conflicts with that person’s business interests. The conflict is real and itcertainly would appear to a reasonable observer that the university is not being objective inits decision making when it considers redesigning a program to satisfy the donor. Theuniversity position should have been that the program was set in advance and wouldproceed as promised to the students and the university community. A second programsetting forth alternative views or a panel discussion about the issues could have beenscheduled at a later date.

The Cal Poly incident is somewhat similar to BB&T donations to influence curricula.One difference is the pressure that was brought to bear on Cal Poly by the president ofHarris Beef Ranch to change a pre-planned program. It’s as if BB&T told the philosophydepartment that it shouldn’t go forward with a speech on Kantian ethics because it fails toshow a balanced view by including a speaker on Objectivism. In the BB&T case, theuniversities that accepted funding knew in advance that it came with strings attached. In the

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case of Michael Pollan’s presentation at Cal Poly, the pressure was applied after the donationwas made and that made it even more objectionable.

Corporate Partnerships

The advertising of “corporate partnership opportunities” has been taken to the extreme insome instances. For example, the Pacific-10 Conference (Pac-10) is a university athleticconference (or sports league to most of the world) which operates in the western UnitedStates. It participates in the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), theorganization through which the nation’s colleges and universities govern their sportsprograms. Pac-10’s 10 members,4 mainly prestigious research universities with largestudent enrollment (e.g., Stanford, the University of California at Berkeley, the Universityof Washington, the University of Oregon, the University of Southern California, andUCLA) compete in 22 NCAA sports. Known as the Conference of Champions in the U.S.,the Pac-10 has won more NCAA National Team Championships than any other conferencein U.S. history. The website of the Pacific-10 Conference includes a statement about Pac-10Properties, “the exclusive representative of all commercial aspects of Pac-10 Conferencemarketing including sponsorship, licensing, publications, championship events, merchan-dising and Internet programs.” Potential partners are promised “one-stop shopping” thatincludes “Customized Sponsorships for Every-Sized Budget” (http://www.newscorp.com/management/foxcablenetworks.html).

According to the Pac-10 website, Pac-10 Properties is owned and managed by FoxSports Enterprises. It is a “full service sales and marketing organization that creates longterm strategic partnerships through customized integrated marketing programs that delivergreat value while addressing the needs and objectives of its corporate partners.” What thewebsite doesn’t explain is that Fox Sports Enterprise is part of Fox Cable Networks thatreaches more than 550 million subscribing television homes. Fox Sports Enterprises alsoincludes the Big Ten Network HD, a co-venture with the Big Ten Conference. Therelationship between Fox Sports Enterprise and the Pac-10 creates the appearance that onemajor cable television network may be given influence over decisions made by theConference and its members that should be based on whether it benefits the individualinstitution and not Fox Cable Networks.

Nike and the University of North Carolina

Nike was founded on January 25, 1964 as Blue Ribbon Sports by Bill Bowerman andPhilip Knight, and officially became Nike, Inc. in 1978. The company takes its name fromNike, the Greek goddess of victory. Objections to Nike’s influence in sports on collegecampuses can be traced back to at least the 1997 deal with the University of North Carolinaat Chapel Hill (UNC), when the company provided UNC with what it valued at $7.1million in athletic gear and gave $4 million in cash to Carolina’s coaches. Nike paid theuniversity an additional $400,000 to the Chancellor’s Academic Enhancement Fund. Inexchange, Nike received the right to outfit the school’s athletes on all 28 varsity teams withuniforms bearing the company’s logo—the Nike swoosh. The deal, a renewal of a 1993contract, sparked campus controversy in which some students protested alleged

4 As of June 2010, the Pac-10 Conference added two additional universities—the University of Colorado andthe University of Utah—and is now the Pac-12.

Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis 15

mistreatment of workers at Nike-contracted shoe factories in Southeast Asia and othersdemonstrated in the company’s defense. University Chancellor Michael Hooker criticizedthe company’s critics as well as news coverage of the issue. The chancellor likened thecontroversy to a “witch hunt mentality” and described the media focus on Nike as“intellectually dishonest” (Loomis 1998).

Critics of the Nike deal point to the unwarranted influence of the company on campus.Former UNC President William Friday pointed out that the university does not allow othercompanies to negotiate such contracts and especially criticized the payments to the coaches.Friday believes Nike’s success at commercializing amateur sports has distracted theuniversity’s attention to what it should be doing because the power of money influencesobjective decision making (Loomis 1998).

One problem with the Nike deal is what to do when a faculty member or student objectsto wearing the Nike logo. According to a New York Times article (1999), a former assistantcoach with the St. John’s University men’s soccer team filed a lawsuit against the universityand Nike on November 19, 1999, claiming that he lost his job because he refused to wearshoes and clothing with the Nike swoosh because he believes the company’s labor practicesviolate the social teachings of the Roman Catholic Church and the mission of St. John’s.The former assistant coach asserted in a news conference that Nike apparel is “produced indeplorable conditions.”

Defenders of the Nike deal point out that without it, students and taxpayers wouldhave to come up with the money for uniforms and shoes. However, this argument isshallow as we could extend that reasoning to say that Paper Mate should provide allpens and pencils on campus with their name prominently displayed. Texas Instrumentsshould provide all calculators. What about Toyota providing cars for state travel? Wheredoes it stop? The case of Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola previously mentioned is right onpoint.

Wildcat Coal Lodge and the University of Kentucky

The new Wildcat Coal Lodge, for which donors affiliated with the coal industry havepledged $7 million, will replace the Joe B. Hall Wildcat Lodge, which houses the men’sbasketball team was originally named after the basketball team’s beloved coach ofmany years. The donors from the coal industry insisted on the word “coal” in the nameof the campus building and therein lies the controversy because of the negativeenvironment impact coal mining has had in Kentucky. “Wildcat” is the University ofKentucky’s school name and is used to identify its sports teams. On October 27, 2009,the proposal was approved by the Board of Trustees of the University of Kentucky in a16-3 vote. The only three board members to dissent were representatives of theuniversity community. The agreement to give the money to the university specifies thatcoal is included in the building’s name (http://kykernel.com/2009/10/27/breaking-news-board-of-trustees-approves-wildcat-coal-lodge-name/).

The conflict arises because of the coal industry connection. Should any university (noless a public institution) use “dirty coal money” to finance a building on campus?Ironically, the new lodge will be one of the most environmentally friendly buildings oncampus because university policy requires that any building costing more than $5 millionmust meet the U.S. Green Building Council’s Leadership in Energy and EnvironmentalDesign standards. Bob Wiseman, the university’s vice president of facilities, said thatprobably means it will take more advantage of natural light and will use recycled materialsas much as possible (Mead 2009).

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Criticisms range from using the word coal in the name of the building to supporting anenvironmentally unfriendly industry. Some object to the naming after an entire industryrather than a company that donated funds to have its name on the building. Others believeit’s unfair to other students who live in less desirable quarters on campus for basketballplayers to live in luxurious surroundings, as is expected once the building is complete(Mead 2009).

A conflict of interest issue does exist in the Wildcat Coal Lodge naming. The Universitylost its independent decision making because the agreement required that coal must be inthe name of the building rather than, for example, continuing to name the facility Joe B.Hall Wildcat Lodge. Typically, buildings on campus are named after donors who have adirect link to the purpose of the building. For example, the Haas School of Business at theUniversity of California at Berkeley is named after the CEO and founder of Levi Strauss,Walter A. Hass, whose family and business interests go back to the early 1900s in the SanFrancisco Bay Area. Another consideration is that business schools typically stress to theirstudents the importance of acting in a socially responsible and environmentally-friendlyway, and it may be difficult to square that perspective with the use of coal in the name ofsuch an important structure on the University of Kentucky campus.

Benefits and Costs of Commercialization

Bok (2004, 99–121) evaluates the benefits and costs of commercialization. He identifies themost obvious attraction of commercial ventures as bringing substantial new revenues to theuniversity. Bok contends that these donations can have an ennobling effect if used to helpfund scholarships, purchase library books and other research materials, and pay for newlaboratory equipment. Unlike some gifts, grants, and legislative appropriations that auniversity receives that are restricted in use, external donations can generally be used forany purpose decided by officials. Other benefits include helping to fund scientific andtechnological efforts that may benefit society, support funded chair and professorships tobring high quality academics to campus, and finance special programs and conferences onimportant topics such as sustainability.

Many of the costs have already been discussed including commercializing inventions forthe benefit of the donor’s self-interest, interference in academic freedom, controllingelements of the curriculum, and influencing the scope of presentations on campus. Thesecosts can negatively affect the stakeholders of a university and violate the academic rightsof members of the university community. The most important cost, however, is thecompromise of institutional values. Relationships with commercial entities can create aconflict of interests that impairs independent, objective decision making. Once a universityrelinquishes its sole right to make academic-related decisions, all pretenses of valuingintegrity above all else are gone.

Concluding Comments

Croissant (2001) believes that increasing involvement with commercial activities requiresthat the university not betray its educational values and objectives. She cautions that “thedistinction between philanthropy and advertising, or philanthropy and research contracts,seems to be eroding.” Corporations are not in the business of philanthropy for its own sake.Activities such as corporate-sponsored endowed chairs must produce economic benefits for

Commercialism and Universities: An Ethical Analysis 17

their sponsors, even if the benefits are largely intangible. She concludes that philanthropyconfers a kind of legitimacy on the donor, and it provides resources and the aura of beingworthy of gifts to the recipient.

The necessity of corporate funding exists because of cutbacks in public and privatefunding for universities. The increasingly research-oriented demands on faculty and thegrowth of biotechnology industry have created natural partnerships between faculty anduniversities, and commercial interests. University inventions and discovery are playing anincreasingly important role in economic development. Scientists now have the career optionof a technology transfer professional to bring new goods and services to the marketplace.The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 set the framework for universities to own their inventions thatwere created with federal funding. Because universities do not typically manufacture a goodor service, the way for the technology to get commercialized and out to the public isthrough technology transfer.

Commercial ties to universities can be mutually beneficial if they support importantactivities that have a public dimension and potential interference of external suppliers offunds are kept at bay with respect to curricula and programmatic matters. On the otherhand, relationships that are forged with the expectation of a quid pro quo such as the BB&Tsupport for objectivist learning has a corrosive effect on academic independence. Universitysupport for certain products such as Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, and Nike can raise legitimateconcerns of students who object to the institution’s support and promotion for a product thatmay be considered by students as unhealthy or made by a company that engages in sociallyirresponsible behavior. If institutions of higher learning continue down the path ofcommercialization, there may come a time when even the name of a university goes to thehighest bidder, as has college football bowl game naming in the U.S.

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