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Commentary on Brenner’s “Epistemology historicised”

Cristina Chimisso

Department of Philosophy, Arts Faculty, The Open University, Milton Keynes MK7 6AA, United Kingdom

This is the version sent to the publisher, and has several differences with the published

version. Please only cite the published version: in New Directions in the Philosophy of

Science in by M-C Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel, M, Weber

(eds.) Dordrecht: Springer, 2014

Abstract

I focus on two central issues that emerge from Anastasios Brenner’s “Epistemology historicised”. The first is the relation between history and philosophy. Their integration is a worthwhile and indeed necessary goal, but it is even more complex than it seems: even in “classic” historical epistemology it was far more problematic and imperfect than it appears. The second question concerns history of philosophy. I agree with Brenner that philosophers of science need history of philosophy of science to locate their own work. I also agree that history of philosophy of science plays, or should play, an important pedagogical and political role. However, I argue that for history of philosophy to play the role envisaged by Brenner, it should be genuinely historical, unlike most mainstream versions, and less dissimilar from history of science. I shall conclude by raising some problems with the historical approach to philosophy that I advocate, and by briefly proposing some ways in which we may be able to address them.

1. Introduction

In his paper, Anastasios Brenner questions the way in which we do philosophy of science,

and invites us to have a more reflexive approach to the history of philosophy of science. He

touches on many crucial problems, ranging from the way we approach the study of science,

to the role that philosophy of science – or more precisely historical epistemology - should

have in education and indeed society. I shall only comment on a couple of points, which seem

important to me. The first question lies at the very core of historical epistemology, the type of

philosophy of science on which Brenner focuses. This is the relation between history and

philosophy. As Brenner points out, the French tradition in philosophy of science that has

produced ‘classic’ historical epistemology is perhaps the best example of how attention to

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history changes the way we see science.1 For this reason, it has been a point of reference for

current scholars who also aim to integrate history and philosophy of science. I think that this

integration is a worthwhile and indeed necessary goal, but also that it is perhaps even more

complex than it seems. In shall mention some examples to show that even in classic historical

epistemology this integration was far more problematic and imperfect than perhaps it

appears. The second question, related to the first, concerns history of philosophy. Brenner

thinks, rightly in my view, that history of philosophy of science is necessary to philosophers

of science in order to locate their own work, and indeed plays an important pedagogical and

political role. But what type of history of philosophy should we practice? History of

philosophy includes diverse approaches; what history means in many of them is rather

different from what it means for general historians, among others. Current historical

epistemology has as its object history of science, and refers to past philosophies in order to

interpret this object. In other words, it refers to the past of science and to the past of

philosophy, although those occupy different places within it. I shall make some remarks on

the different ways in which the past of science and the past of philosophy are received, that is

to say on the difference between history of science and history of philosophy. I shall argue

that a variety of approaches in the study of philosophy and science is welcome, and that the

use we intend to make of the past influences the way we approach it. However, I shall also

argue that for history of philosophy to play the role that Brenner envisages, it should be

genuinely historical, unlike most of its mainstream versions, and less dissimilar from history

of science. I shall conclude by raising some problems with the historical approach that I

advocate, and by briefly proposing some possible ways in which we may be able to address

them.

2. The difficult relation of history and philosophy

Brenner invites us to write a history of the French tradition and to retrace the debate back

from Canguilhem to Bachelard, Poincaré, Brunschvicg and Rey. On this, he is certain to find

me in agreement, as, like him, I have dedicated much work to this history. The central feature

1 I call ‘classic’ historical epistemology the philosophical movement that developed in France in the twentieth century, and that notably includes Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem. I call it ‘classic’ in order to distinguish it from current historical epistemology.

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of large part of French philosophy of science, the interaction of history and philosophy, is

also its most appealing, to me and to many others. The particular institutional, educational

and indeed social history of the first half of the twentieth century in France brought history

and philosophy close in a way that has not been the case in other traditions.2 Classic historical

epistemology originated and developed in a favourable environment. Institutionally, it found

a fertile soil as a range of disciplines, including ethnology, sociology, psychology and history

of science were in the process of finding their own identity while maintaining a close

relationship with philosophy. It goes without saying that the close relationship of philosophy

with history of science is the most apparent and fundamental. The emergence of history of

science as an autonomous discipline with its institutes, journals, jobs and qualifications was

securely linked to philosophy, and philosophers, notably Abel Rey, Gaston Bachelard and

Georges Canguilhem, directed the Institute of History of Science and Technology of the

University of Paris and its journal, Thalés.

From an intellectual point of view, what made philosophy interact not only with history of

science but also with ethnology, sociology and psychology was that all these disciplines

addressed similar questions. The investigation of how the human mind works was at the very

core of the work of a number of these disciplines’ practitioners. The empirical data on the

functioning of the mind could be gathered in different ways: psychologists set up

laboratories, the historian of philosophy Lucien Lévy-Bruhl turned to ethnological reports

(and co-founded the Institute of Ethnology at the University of Paris) while other

philosophers turned to the history of science.3 The close interaction of philosophy and history

developed in this interdisciplinary milieu. Moreover, the use of a historical model in

philosophy was legitimised by a very French tradition, that of Positivism, and in particular by

Auguste Comte’s conception of the mind as having a history.

However, the history of philosophy provided further legitimizing models for the interaction

of history and philosophy of science. Indeed, Georges Canguilhem argued that philosophy of

science had always paid close attention to history of science. But for him epistemologists did

not always grasp that their exemplar was not the definitive expression of science, but rather a

2 I discuss the history and development of this tradition in (Chimisso 2008). 3 Here are some example of the use ethnological reports and of the history of science in the study of the mind: (Lévy-Bruhl 1910); (Lévy-Bruhl 1922); (Lévy-Bruhl 1996 [1927]); (Brunschvicg 1912); (Brunschvicg 1922); (Bachelard 1991 [1934]); (Bachelard 1993 [1938]); (Bachelard 1988 [1940]); (Metzger 1926) ; (Canguilhem 1943); (Canguilhem 1955).

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particular historical episode. He cited Kant who, in the second Preface of the Critique of Pure

Reason, had justified his critical project by reference to the history of mathematics and

physics. However, Canguilhem regarded Kant as fundamentally mistaken in his belief that he

could extract a definitive set of norms governing the production of knowledge from the

science of his time (Canguilhem 1993 [1977], pp. 19-20). On this point, as in many others,

Canguilhem invoked Bachelard’s authority, but did not cite Léon Brunschvicg who in fact

had made the very same point. As a self-proclaimed neo-Kantian, Brunschvicg aimed to

study the mind as Kant had done, but with a crucial difference: for him no single episode of

the history of science could give us the key to understanding how the mind works. Rather, an

extensive study of the history of science should serve this purpose. The history of science for

him showed that, contrary to what Kant had concluded, the mind changes in time. For the

philosopher who believed that the concepts that structure our knowledge are not given once

and for all, epistemology could not be done without history (Brunschvicg 1922, p.552);

(Brunschvicg 1936). Indeed, even those who did not think that the mind changes in

significant ways, as for instance Emile Meyerson, employed history in order to prove their

point (Meyerson 1931). The question of whether the mind changes according to time and

culture was on the table, and history was necessary in order to answer it.

The interaction of history and philosophy in the French tradition has created a particular

perspective not only on science, but on epistemology, in the English rather than French

meaning, that is on the theory of knowledge in the broad sense. The legacy of this tradition

has taken different forms, and notably nowadays it is invoked by the scholars working within

the modern version of historical epistemology (Rheinberger 2010b); (Rheinberger 2005);

(Hacking 1999); (Hacking 2002); (Davidson 1998); (Daston 2000). I strongly believe in the

potential of the marriage of philosophy and history, and also in the teaching and inspiration

with which the French tradition can provide us in this context. However, this marriage is a

difficult one, and we should not idealize the occasions in which it seems to have worked. It

was difficult in the French tradition as well, and we cannot learn from it without a critical

approach. In fact, some of the issues that Brenner indicates regarding the present situation can

be easily found there too. The classic historical epistemologists’ advantage was perhaps that

those among them more committed to history and those more committed to philosophy were

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in close contact, shared students and seminars sessions.4 This closeness, however, also

brought to the fore differences, although these were not always easily expressed, as the

balance of power and the web of dependency or friendships were often difficult to ignore.

Hélène Metzger is a case in point. She was in a rather weak academic position for all her life,

despite the high quality of her publications and her commitment to the teaching of the

students of the Institute for the History of Science and Technology of the University of Paris

where historical epistemology developed. A historian of chemistry, she not only chose

philosophers as her interlocutors, but also produced important epistemological works

(Metzger 1926); (Metzger 1987). She shared with the philosophers theoretical concerns,

namely understanding the different ways of thinking in the history of science.5 Despite her

close collaboration with philosophers, and the support she received from them, she

occasionally stressed the shortcomings in their use of history. She chose to express her doubts

most clearly in a conference paper on the philosopher Emile Meyerson, who regarded himself

as her mentor (a role that she in fact contested, see (Chimisso and Freudenthal 2003)). She

stressed that his work was epistemological (rather than historical), and that his use of

‘historical examples’ aimed at understanding the mind was part of a tradition, that included

philosophers as diverse as Comte, Cournot, Renouvier, Mach, Duhem, and ‘her colleagues’

Abel Rey and Léon Brunschvicg. She welcomed the collaboration of history and philosophy,

but also emphasised that the history of science must be ‘scrupulously’ and wisely interpreted,

and never distorted, in order to be of use to the philosopher (Metzger 1987, pp. 95-106 ). I do

not think that there is much doubt that she thought that Meyerson and other philosophers used

historical ‘examples’ in order to confirm their theses (which were rather diverse), but did not

have enough concern for historical accuracy and research. Her own intensive work on

sources, attention to details and her narrow historical focus, mainly on seventeenth and

eighteenth-century history of chemistry, greatly differed from the philosophers’ grand

narratives.

While Metzger was very much part of the milieu in which historical epistemology developed,

and indeed can be seen as a historical epistemologist, the historian of mentalités Lucien

4 I analyze the links between the scholars in the historical epistemology milieu and surroundings in (Chimisso 2008), and in (Chimisso 2001). The minutes of the seminars held at the Société française de philosophie, published in its Bulletin, are very interesting in this, and others, respects. 5 Her lectures on Newton at the École Pratique des Hautes Études are arguably the best example of the historical application of her theoretical concerns (Metzger 1938).

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Febvre, founder of the Annales, kept his distances from that milieu, and indeed from

philosophers of science in general, despite his close links with Abel Rey. His attack on the

use of history by philosophers was particularly caustic, and he dismissed the work of those

philosophers, like Brunschvicg, whom he regarded as old-fashioned, and only concerned with

‘high’ culture. He concluded that what those philosophers called history had little do with the

history of historians like himself. Febvre’s unwillingness to engage with historical

epistemology, which in fact developed from Brunschvicg’s teachings, has been seen as a

missed chance by the historian Roger Chartier. The latter has argued that if Febvre had

engaged with it, he could have avoided theoretical naiveties in his own work (Chartier 1988,

pp. 35-6). The fact remains that a sustained dialogue did not take place, either then or later.

To mention a more recent example, Michel Foucault’s work – which springs from this

tradition - has been criticised by historians for his obscure style, his lack of narrative, his

historical inaccuracies, his ambiguous relationship with truth, his disregard for causal

explanations, and more (Rowlinson and Carter 2002). Indeed, Mark Poster has commented

that “many American and British historians have received Foucault's books ... as an attack on

the discipline of history” (Poster 1984, p. 73).

Classic historical epistemology was developed mainly by philosophers who worked in close

contact with ethnologists, psychologists and sociologists, especially at the beginning of the

history of this tradition. Their history was history of science. As a discipline, history of

science was developed by the philosophers themselves, and kept rather apart from general

historians, including historians of mentalités, who arguably should have been their obvious

interlocutors. Perhaps it was not only historians like Febvre who missed an opportunity by

not engaging with the philosophers, as Chartier argues, but also the philosophers by not

learning from the historians. The mutual distrust and lack of knowledge of one another’s

work meant that historians were more likely to either ignore or attack classic historical

epistemology. The current version of historical epistemology, on the other hand, appears to

have developed in historical milieus, notably at the Max Planck Institute for History of

Science in Berlin, and to be more dominated by historical approaches – although a spectrum

of approaches exists in it as it did for classic historical epistemology, as shown by Lorraine

Daston’s and Ian Hacking’s respective works. It could be argued that the space that history

and philosophy respectively occupy in modern historical epistemology is the mirror image of

that they occupy in classic historical epistemology. This is of course also because although

the two schools share the name ‘historical epistemology’ and current historical

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epistemologists refer to Bachelard and Canguilhem, their aims are different. The aim of

classic historical epistemology, and first of all of Bachelard, was to answer philosophical

questions about the mind, and to produce a theory of knowledge. Current historical

epistemology does not appear to be epistemology in the traditional sense, but rather a history

of epistemological objects. Ian Hacking has commented on this difference and has proposed

‘historical meta-epistemology’ for current historical epistemology (Hacking 1999); (Hacking

2002, pp. 9ff). However, this distinction between the two historical epistemologies may paper

over the variety of approaches within them; things may look more complex if we for instance

include Metzger and Foucault within classic historical epistemology.

3. How historical is history of philosophy?

Brenner argues that in order to locate their own approach, philosophers of science need a

‘self-conscious and explicit history of philosophy of science’. But what type of history of

philosophy would help us to do so? Recent historical epistemology, as Brenner reminds us,

has referred to ideas coming from previous traditions, first of all, but not exclusively, the

French tradition that I have discussed above. Many scholars have used these ideas as a

framework for their own novel approach to history, drawing interesting conclusions that in

turn interest the philosopher. The question however arises: how should we approach past

philosophical ideas? Is their origin meaningful, or do they just provide timeless answers to

timeless questions? Is history of philosophy a dialogue with great ideas that have been

formulated in the past, but that are ultimately current? Or perhaps past ideas are not timeless,

but we can just appropriate them and adapt them to our own context? Many philosophers

regard their own discipline as not having a history in the sense of either development or

change; for them history of philosophy is rather a repository of texts and ideas with which we

engage in dialogue, regardless of their origins. There are various degrees of this approach,

including an almost completely ahistorical one. Many of us use this approach in teaching: for

instance, David Hume is often introduced to students in order to teach the issue of the

justification of induction, without a particular historical perspective. ‘Hume’ becomes a

short-hand for what is regarded as a long-lasting philosophical problem. Much of history of

philosophy pays more attention to history than that, but most of the time in a very restricted

way. Often it is either analysis of texts, or what historians of science would call internal

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history. If related to something outside themselves, philosophical ideas are related to

previous, contemporary and current philosophical ideas, as if they could only generate one

another. In Ian Hacking’s words, ‘history of philosophy practised in universities [is]

committed to philosophical epochs and schools, and dedicated to a canonical list of

philosophers whom it regards as pen pals across the centuries’ (Hacking 2002, p. 6). Here for

the sake of brevity and clarity I am presenting a rather simplified image of some of the

approaches existing within history of philosophy, but my image is no straw man.

Historical epistemology itself is not unaffected by this problem. Brenner cites Hans-Jörg

Rheinberger’s excellent book, On historicizing epistemology (Rheinberger 2010b). In

particular, Brenner agrees with Rheinberger when the latter calls for a convergence between

history and philosophy of science; this in his view should be achieved by historicizing

philosophy of science and by epistemologizing the history of science. This is an ambitious

and very attractive programme, and its two sides appear to include the various projects of

classic and current historical epistemology. However, inevitably there have been and there

will be different ways of intending both the epistemologization of history of science and the

historicization of philosophy of science. How do we historicise philosophy of science? Can

the history of philosophy of science be approached as we do the history of science? I am

bracketing here all the difficulties and anachronism of disciplinary boundaries between the

disciplines that now we label science and philosophy. The current disciplines of history of

science and history of philosophy have distinct, if at times overlapping, objects. The

historicity of these objects does not appear to be taken equally seriously. Even Rheinberger

seems to approach philosophy and science rather differently. To mention just an example:

when writing about scientific instruments, Rheinberger emphasizes the role of the ‘historical

and local’ context in which they are embedded (Rheinberger 2010a). Needless to say,

Rheinberger does not construct his history of epistemic things as a linear and progressive

narrative. On the other hand, when confronted with the history of philosophy, he adopts a

rather different perspective. In On Historicizing Epistemology he offers a very insightful

treatment of a number of philosophers who have inspired current historical epistemology. In

this case, however, there is no context for the emergence of ideas, which are arranged in a

rather linear development, and the scholars discussed seem to share ideas and approaches

across places and traditions.6 Even in the hands of such an eminent representative of

6 I discussed this in my review of Rheinberger’s book (Chimisso 2012).

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historical epistemology, the history of philosophy appears as a repository of ideas, or as

having at least a rather strict internal history.

However, it is not simply the case that Rheinberger somewhat falls back on more traditional

ways when approaching philosophy. His difference in approach reveals a very crucial

problem that is not easy to solve: to which extent can we historicize philosophical ideas? If

we approach past (or present) philosophical ideas in order to inform our work, for instance in

order to write a history (of science, or indeed philosophy), how can we historicize those very

ideas that are supposed to guide us in the way in which we approach the object of our study?

In other words, when historians of science rely on historiographical and epistemological ideas

in order to make sense of past documents and objects, how can they make these very ideas

objects of their study as well? This is not only a problem for the historian, but also for the

philosopher; in fact, Brenner’s comments are mainly about the philosopher of science’s work.

Indeed, philosophers of science have two sets of problems, as they deal both with scientific

and philosophical ideas. Classic historical epistemologists accepted the historicity of science

and constructed their epistemologies accordingly. Newtonianism could no longer be the only

model of knowledge for them: the daring changes that were occurring in science, notably

non-Euclidean geometries, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, indicated to them

that the history of science was not a cumulative progress, and more importantly, that the

organising concepts of human knowledge were not stable. Indeed, they historicised previous

philosophical attitudes towards science: Canguilhem, in the passage cited above, briefly

explained Kant’s view of the immutability of intellectual categories as a cultural product of

the Enlightenment. For him ‘it would have been difficult’ at the time to entertain the

possibility of a history of the categories of scientific thought (Canguilhem 1993 [1977], p.

20). But what about Canguilhem’s own view? When we write a history of philosophy of

science, the view that knowledge is historical should also be treated as historical, as emerging

thanks to particular intellectual, historical and institutional circumstances. In turn, the

assumptions of the historian of philosophy of science are also historical products, and so on.

Is it there a risk of an infinite regress?

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4. Conclusion

I shall not pretend to have a simple answer, indeed any proper answer to these difficult

questions. I only have a couple of points I would like to address. First of all, I wish to clarify

that I believe that a variety of approaches to philosophy, and different degrees of historical

and/or sociological perspectives should be welcome. After all, the aims of research vary. Just

as scientists involved in a particular research cannot at the same time write a history of

scientific knowledge, and question the fundamental assumptions of their work, so

philosophers may have to bracket the historicity of their concepts when dealing with a

theoretical issue. At the same time, I also believe that a more genuinely historical approach to

philosophical ideas, and above all an awareness of the historicity of our assumptions and

methods is needed. Philosophical ideas, just as scientific ideas, emerge at a certain point in

history, under specific social, educational and cultural conditions, and develop historically. A

history of philosophy that takes history seriously is necessary in order to acquire a specific

awareness of the historicity of philosophical ideas, practices and methods. This type of

history of philosophy looks rather different from the more traditional history of philosophy,

of the type that is found in history of philosophy textbooks. A genuinely historical history of

philosophy could learn from science studies that a sociological approach can also help to

make sense of the emergence and development of philosophical knowledge. Despite excellent

works have been published in the recent years, the sociology of philosophy and the sociology

of philosophical knowledge are rather small fields, and interestingly there seems to be a

greater resistance to a sociological study of philosophy than of science.7

To return to the issue of regress, the type of history of philosophy I am promoting can

obviously be subject to it. However, it provides a degree of reflexivity that may enable its

practitioner to escape it at least partially. This is because by studying philosophy’s historical

production, the historian of philosophy is also in a good position to keep a critical eye on her

own practices and ideas. She would not only check her own ideas against past ideas, in the

timeless dialogue many of us have been trained to perform, but also the conditions of

production of her own ideas and methods against those she studies. A system of cross-

controls, as Pierre Bourdieu has put it with regard to sociology (Bourdieu 2004), can be

implemented, and can give a solid foundation to the study of philosophy. In short, I agree

7 For a bibliography of prominent works in these areas, see (Heidegren and Lundberg 2010).

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with Brenner that a history of philosophy of science would enable philosophers to locate their

own work, and, like him, I welcome a ‘historicized epistemology’. But I would like to add

that history of philosophy, in order to play this role, should be fully and properly historical.

Only a genuinely historicized history of philosophy would provide the philosopher with a

powerful reflexive tool.

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